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

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Formalism theory pdf

Form and content are common metaphysical terms in philosophy. The form is a form of thing, a container without contents. Concepts are good and correct forms. Content is a concrete manifestation of this form. Something good can relate to helping someone in need. It's content. Ethical formalism therefore rejects concerns about real moral acts and concentrates on fundamental sources of moral kindness, regardless of their application. Any ethical theory has the form, or rule of action, and content, the specific nature of this action. Ethical formalism does not have content at all. Formalism is an ethical universalism that consists of absolute laws. Therefore, the content of any particular moral action does not make sense. If the universal law says do not cheat, then under no circumstances deception is allowed. Immanuil Kant is one of the most important promoters of ethical formalism. In his view, no ethical theory could be concerned about the actual content of specific moral acts - it should make rules based solely on the constitution of the human will itself. This suggests that the human will can apply the rules to all situations it encounters. It begins from the point of view of human equality and is decided on the idea that only universal laws passed at large can contain anything moral. Ethical formalism believes that the source and foundation of ethical laws contains their value. So the consequences don't matter. Kant's famous formalist principle is one of the most famous ethical formalist ideas. For Kant, a truly moral action is an action that comes from free will. It will be free when no external influence, such as vested interests, prevents it. It will in this case be completely free, and therefore completely universal. Ethical actions arising from will are indeed good because they are free and universal. Universality becomes the basis of morality because it does not take into account any particular interest. It's morally for morality. Kant's famous ethical formalism shows a source of moral action through agency, which is completely free of limitations and therefore necessarily completely universal. All rational people are capable of this kind of action. Since it is a source of moral kindness, and all people can fulfill it, every rational person is a source of moral good. If this is true, then all people should be seen as goals in themselves, not as means. The whole concept of universality means that real moral norms must apply to all in the same way. Not in a very long time -- not, perhaps, since the late 1940s or the beginning of years - there were as many new basic management practices as there are today: reduction, outsourcing, general quality management, economic value analysis, benchmarking, reinenering. Each of them is powerful powerful But, with the exception of outsourcing and reingering, these tools are designed primarily to do things differently what is already being done. They are like making tools. However, doing what is increasingly becoming a central challenge facing management, especially large companies that enjoy long-term success. The story is familiar: the company, which was a superstar only yesterday, finds itself in stagnation and disappointment, in trouble and, often, in a seemingly unmanageable crisis. This phenomenon is by no means confined to the United States. It has become common in Japan and Germany, the Netherlands and France, Italy and Sweden. And it happens just as often outside of business, in trade unions, government offices, hospitals, museums and churches. In fact, it seems even less compliant in these areas. The root cause of almost every one of these crises is not that things will be done badly. It's not even that the wrong thing is being done. Indeed, in most cases, the right things are done, but to no avail. What explains this obvious paradox? The assumptions on which the organization was built and managed are no longer true. These are assumptions that shape the behavior of any organization, dictate its decisions about what to do and what not to do, and determine what the organization considers meaningful results. These assumptions are about markets. They are about identifying customers and competitors, their values and behavior. They are about technology and its dynamics, about the strengths and weaknesses of the company. These are assumptions that the company is receiving money. This is what I call the company's business theory. Every organization, whether it's business or not, has a business theory. Indeed, the valid theory, which is clear, consistent and focused, is extremely strong. In 1809, for example, German statesman and scientist Wilhelm von Humboldt founded the University of Berlin on a radically new university theory. And for more than 100 years, before Hitler's arrival, his theory defined the German university, especially in the field of scholarships and research. In 1870, Georg Siemens, the architect and first CEO of Deutsche Bank, the first universal bank, had an equally clear business theory: to use entrepreneurial finance to unite a still rural and divided Germany through industrial development. In its 20 years of founding, Deutsche Bank has become the best financial institution in Europe, which it remains to this day, despite two world wars, inflation and Hitler. And in the 1870s Mitsubishi was founded on a clear and completely new business theory, which for 10 years made it a leader in developing Japan and for another 20 years made it one of the first truly multinational enterprises. Similarly, business theory that's what the success of companies such as General Motors and IBM, which dominated the U.S. economy in the second half of the twentieth century, and the challenges they faced. In fact, what underpins the current malaise of so many large and successful organizations around the world is that their business theory no longer works. What underlies the malaise of so many large and successful organizations around the world is that their business theory no longer works. Whenever a large organization gets into trouble, and especially if it has been successful for years - people blame lethargy, complacency, arrogance, mammoth bureaucracy. A plausible explanation? Yes. But rarely an appropriate or correct one. Consider the two most notable and widely reviled arrogant bureaucracies among the big American companies that have recently been in trouble. From the early days of the computer, it was an article of faith in IBM that the computer would go the way of electricity. The future, IBM knew, and could prove, with scientific rigor, lay with the central station, an increasingly powerful mainframe in which a huge number of users could connect. Everyone came to this conclusion - economics, the logic of information, technology. But then, suddenly, when it seemed that such a central station, based on the mainframe information system actually appeared, two young people came up with the first personal computer. Every computer manufacturer knew that the computer was absurd. He had no memory, database, speed, or computing power to succeed. Indeed, every computer manufacturer knew that a PC had to fail - a conclusion reached by Xerox just a few years ago when its research team actually built the first computer. But when this wrong monster - first Apple, then Macintosh - came on the market, people not only loved it, they bought it. Every big, successful company throughout history, faced with such a surprise, refused to accept it. It's a silly whim and will disappear in three years, said CEO Seis after seeing the new Kodak Brownie in 1888, when the German company was dominating the global photographic market, as IBM would be in the computer market a century later. Most mainframe manufacturers responded in a similar way. The list was long: Control Data, Univac, Burroughs and NCR in the United States; Siemens, Nixdorf, Machines Bull and ICL in Europe; Hitachi and Fujitsu in Japan. IBM, the master of mainframes with the same sales volume as all other computer manufacturers combined and with record profits, could react in the same way. In fact, it was meant to be. Instead, IBM immediately adopted PCs as a new reality. Almost overnight, he shrugged off all his tried and tested policies, rules and regulations and created not one but two competing teams to develop an even simpler PC. A A Years later, IBM became the world's largest PC manufacturer and industry standard setter. There is absolutely no precedent for this achievement in the history of business; he hardly asserts bureaucracy, lethargy, or arrogance. However, despite unprecedented flexibility, agility and humility, IBM floundered a few years later in both the mainframe and the PC business. Suddenly she was unable to move, to take decisive action, to change. The GM case is equally puzzling. In the early 1980s, when GM's core business, passenger cars, seemed almost paralyzed, the company acquired two large businesses: Hughes Electronics and Ross Perot's Electronic Data Systems. Analysts generally considered both companies mature and rebuked GM for gross overpayment for them. However, within a few short years, GM has more than tripled the revenue and profit of the supposedly mature EDS. A decade later, in 1994, EDS had a market value six times what GM paid for it, and ten times its original revenue and profits. Similarly, GM bought Hughes Electronics - a huge but profit-free company, with only defense - shortly before the defense industry collapsed. Under GM's leadership, Hughes actually increased its defense profits and became the only major defense contractor to successfully move to large-scale non-defense operations. Remarkably, the same bean counters that were so ineffective in the automotive business - 30-year-old GM veterans who never worked for any other company or, for that matter, outside of finance and accounting departments - were the ones who achieved these startling results. And in the two acquisitions, they simply apply policies, practices and procedures that have already been used by GM. This story is familiar to GM. Since founding the company in a flurry of acquisitions 80 years ago, one of its main competencies has been to overpay for well-performing but mature businesses, as was the case for Buick, AC Spark Plug, and Fisher Body in those early years and then turn them into world-class champions. Very few companies have been able to match GM's performance in making successful acquisitions, and GM has certainly failed to accomplish these feats by being bureaucratic, sluggish or arrogant. However, what worked so beautifully in these ventures that GM knew nothing about failed miserably at GM itself. One of GM's main competencies was to overpay for a well-effective but mature business and then turn them into world-class champions. Which may explain the fact that both IBM and GM's policies, practices and behaviors that have worked for decades, and in the case of GM, still work well when applied to something new and different- no longer for the organization in which and for which they were developed? The reality is that every organization is actually actually changed quite dramatically from those that everyone still assumes that he lives. In other steps, reality has changed, but business theory has not changed with it. Prior to the agile response to the new reality PC, IBM once turned its core strategy around overnight. In 1950, Univac, the world's leading computer company, showed a prototype of the first machine developed as a multipurpose computer. All the earlier projects were for disposable machines. Ibm's own two previous computers, built in the late 1930s and 1946s, performed only astronomical calculations, respectively. And the machine that IBM had on the drawing board in 1950, designed for the SAGE air defense system in the Canadian Arctic, had only one goal: early identification of enemy aircraft. IBM immediately abandoned its strategy of developing advanced single-purpose equipment; he has put his best engineers to work on perfecting the architecture of Univac and, from it, designing the first multipurpose computer that can be manufactured (rather than handmade) and serviced. Three years later, IBM became the world's dominant computer manufacturer and standard-bearer. IBM did not create a computer. But in 1950, his flexibility, speed and humility created the computer industry. However, the same assumptions that helped IBM win in 1950 turned out to be its abolition 30 years later. In the 1970s, IBM assumed that there was such a thing as computer, as it was in the 1950s. But the appearance of the PC nullified this assumption. Meinfraim computers and PCs are, in fact, no more one organization than generating stations and electric toasters. The latter, although different from each other, are interdependent and complementary. In contrast, mainframe computers and PCs are primarily competitors. And, in their basic definition of information, they actually contradict each other: for mainframe, information means memory; For a defenseless PC, it means software. The construction of generating stations and the manufacture of toasters should be carried out as separate enterprises, but they may belong to the same legal entity as General Electric for decades. In contrast, mainframe computers and PCs probably can't coexist in the same legal entity. IBM tried to combine the two. But because pc was the fastest growing part of the business, IBM couldn't subordinate it to the mainframe business. As a result, the company was unable to optimize its core business. And because mainframe was still a cash cow, IBM couldn't optimize the PC business. After all, the assumption that a computer is a computer, or more prosaically, that the industry is controlled by hardware, is paralyzed by IBM. The assumption that a computer is a computer, or more prosaically, that the industry paralyzed by IBM. GM had an even more powerful and successful business theory than IBM, IBM, that made GM the largest and most profitable manufacturing organization in the world. The company has not suffered a single failure in 70 years - the record is unparalleled in the history of business. GM's theory is united into one seamless web assumption about markets and customers with assumptions about core competencies and organizational structure. Since the early 1920s, GM has assumed that the U.S. auto market is homogeneous in its values and is segmented by extremely stable revenue groups. The resale value of a good car was the only independent variable under the control of management. High trade-in values allowed customers to switch to the next category of purchases of new cars, in other words, to cars with higher profits. According to this theory, frequent or radical changes in models can only reduce trade-in values. Internally, these market assumptions went hand in hand with assumptions about how production should be organized in order to get the largest market share and the highest profit. In the case of GM, the answer was a long run of mass-produced cars with a minimum of changes each model year, resulting in the largest number of uniform year models on the market at the lowest fixed cost per car. GM then translated these assumptions about market and production into semi-autonomous divisions, each focused on one segment of revenue, and each of them was designed to intersect its highest price model with the lowest price model of the next division, thus almost forcing people to trade up, provided that used car prices were high. For 70 years this theory worked like a charm. Even in the depths of depression, GM has never suffered a loss while steadily gaining market share. But in the late 1970s, his assumptions about the market and production became invalid. The market is fragmented into extremely volatile segments of the lifestyle. Revenue has become a factor among many in the decision to buy, not just one. At the same time, lean production has created a small economy. This has made short runs and variations in models less expensive and more profitable than long launches of homogeneous products. GM knew all this, but I just couldn't believe it. (Union GM still doesn't.) Instead, the company tried to rectify the situation. It has supported existing revenue-segment divisions, but each division now offers a car for each wallet. It tried to compete with the economy of lean small-scale production, automating large-scale, long-term mass production (losing about $30 billion). Contrary to popular belief, GM patch things over with tremendous energy, heavy and generous investments of time and money. But the fix only confused the customer, the dealer, as well as the staff and management of GM itself. At the same time, GM neglected his real growth market, where he had leadership and would have Unsurpassed: light trucks and minivans. While patching things up with energy, hard work and money, GM neglected its real growth market: light trucks and minivans. Business theory has three parts. First, there are assumptions about the environment of the organization: society and its structure, market, client, technology. Secondly, there are assumptions about the specific mission of the organization. Sears, Roebuck and Company, in the years during and after World War I, defined its mission as an informed buyer for an American family. Ten years later, Marks and Spencer in the UK defined their mission as an agent of change in British society, becoming the first classless retailer. The ATT, again in the years during and immediately after World War I, defined its role as ensuring that every U.S. family and business has access to the phone. The mission of the organization should not be so ambitious. GM foresaw a much more modest role as a leader in ground-based motorized transportation equipment, according to Alfred. Sloan Jr. In the 1920s, Marks and Spencer set out to transform British society into the first classless retailer. Third, there are assumptions about the basic competencies required to carry out the organization's mission. For example, West Point, founded in 1802, defined its core competence as the ability to be leaders who are trustworthy. Marks and Spencer, circa 1930, defined their core competency as the ability to identify, design and develop the goods he sold, rather than as an opportunity to buy. Around 1920, ATT defined its core expertise as a technical guide that would allow the company to continuously improve service, constantly reducing rates. Environmental assumptions determine what the organization is paying for. Mission assumptions determine what the organization considers to be meaningful results; in other words, they point to how it suggests that it will make a difference in the economy and society as a whole. Finally, assumptions about core competencies determine where an organization must succeed in order to maintain leadership. Of course, all this sounds deceptively simple. It usually takes years of hard work, thinking and experimentation to achieve a clear, consistent and credible business theory. However, to be successful, each organization has to work one out. What are the specifications of the actual business theory? There are four of them. 1. Assumptions about the environment, mission and basic competencies must be true. When four penniless young men from Manchester, England, Simon Marks and his three brothers-in-law, decided in the early 1920s that the everyday penny bazaar should become an agent of social change, the First World War is profound the class structure of their country. It has also created a ton of new buyers for Stylish but cheap merchandise like underwear, blouses and stockings-Marks and Spencer are the first successful product categories. Marks and Spencer then systematically began work on the development of completely new and unheard of core competencies. Until then, the main competence of the merchant was the ability to buy well. Marks and Spencer decided that the customer knows not the manufacturer, and the merchant. Therefore, the merchant, not the manufacturer, should design the product, develop it and find manufacturers in order to ensure that the product was under its design, specifications and costs. This new definition of a merchant took five to eight years to develop and make acceptable to traditional suppliers who have always seen themselves as producers rather than subcontractors. The assumptions in all three areas must be in line with each other. It was perhaps GM's greatest strength during its long decades of domination. His assumptions about the market and the optimal production process were perfect. In the mid-1920s, GM decided that this also required new and as yet unheard-of core competencies: financial control over the production process and capital allocation theory. As a result, GM invented modern cost accounting and the first rational capital allocation process. Business theory should be known and understood by the entire organization. It's easy in the early days of the organization. But as it becomes successful, the organization is increasingly taking its theory for granted, becoming less and less aware. Then the organization becomes sloppy. He's starting to cut corners. He begins to pursue what is appropriate, not what is right. He stops thinking. He stops doubting. He remembers the answers, but he forgot the questions. Business theory becomes a culture. But culture cannot replace discipline, and business theory is discipline. Business theory must be tested constantly. He's not grave on stone tablets. It's a hypothesis. And this is a hypothesis about things that are in constant motion -- society, markets, customers, technology. Thus, built into the theory of business should be the ability to change itself. Some business theories are so strong that they last a long time. But being human artifacts, they are not eternal, and, indeed, today they rarely last very long. Eventually, every business theory becomes obsolete and then becomes invalid. This is exactly what happened to those on which the great American enterprises of the 1920s were built. It happened to the grandmasters and the ATT. It happened to IBM. This is clearly happening today with Deutsche Bank and its theory of a universal bank. This is also clearly happening with the rapidly untangling Japanese keiretsu. Some business theories are so strong that they for a long time. But in the end, everyone gets old. The first reaction of an organization whose theory is outdated is almost always defensive. The tendency is to put your head in the sand and pretend that nothing is happening. The next reaction is to attempt a fix, as GM did in the early 1980s or as Deutsche Bank does today. Indeed, the sudden and completely unexpected crisis of one big German company after another, for which Deutsche Bank is a home bank, indicates that its theory no longer works. That is, Deutsche Bank no longer does what it was designed to do: to ensure effective management of a modern corporation. But patching never works. Instead, when the theory shows the first signs of obsolescence, it's time to start thinking again to ask again what assumptions about the environment, mission and basic competencies reflect reality most accurately - with the clear premise that our historically transmitted assumptions, the ones with which we all grew up, are no longer enough. What then should be done? There is a need for preventive assistance, that is, to introduce into the organization systematic monitoring and testing of its business theory. There is a need for early diagnosis. Finally, it is necessary to rethink the theory that is stagnating and to take effective measures to change policies and practices by bringing the behaviour of the organization in line with the new realities of its environment, with a new definition of its mission, and with new core competencies to be developed and acquired. Preventive care. There are only two preventive measures. But, if they are used consistently, they should keep the organization alert and are able to quickly change themselves and their theory. The first measure is what I call rejection. Every three years, the organization has to challenge every product, every service, every policy, every distribution channel with a question, if we weren't already in it, would we be included now? By questioning conventional policies and procedures, the organization makes itself think about its theory. It forces itself to test assumptions. It makes you ask: Why wasn't this work, even though it looked so promising when we entered it five years ago? Is it because we made a mistake? Is it because we did the wrong thing? Or is it because the right things don't work? Without systematic and deliberate failure, the organization will be overtaken by events. She will spend her best resources on something she should never have done or should not do anymore. As a result, it lacks the resources, especially of the people needed, to take advantage of the opportunities that arise from changing markets, technologies and core competencies. in other words, it will not be able to respond constructively to the opportunities that are created when its business theory becomes obsolete. obsolete. the second preventive measure is to study what is happening outside of business, and especially to study the unusual. Walking around management became fashionable a few years ago. It's important. And so he knows as much as possible about his clients - an area where information technology makes the fastest progress. But the first signs of fundamental change rarely appear within your own organization or among our own customers. Almost always they will show up first among one noncustomers. Unusual always surpass customers. Wal-Mart, today's retail giant, has 14% of the U.S. consumer goods market. This means that 86% of the market is not unusual. The first signs of fundamental change rarely appear among their customers. Usually they will show up first among one noncustomers. In fact, the best recent example of the importance of noncustomer is American department stores. At the peak of its popularity about 20 years ago, department stores served 30% of the U.S. non-food retail market. They constantly interrogated their clients, studied them, examined them. But they did not pay attention to 70% of the market, which were not their customers. They saw no reason why they should. Their business theory suggests that most people who could afford to shop in department stores did. Fifty years ago, this assumption was true. But when baby boomers came in at an age, it ceased to be valid. For the dominant group among baby boomers - women in educated families with two incomes - it was not money that defined where to shop. Time was a major factor, and women of this generation could not afford to spend time shopping in department stores. Since department stores looked only at their customers, they didn't recognize this change until a few years ago. By then, the business had already dried up. And it was too late to bring back the baby boomers. Department stores have learned on their way that while being customer-driven is vital, it's not enough. The organization should be marketed too. Early diagnosis. To diagnose problems in the early stages, managers must pay attention to warning signs. Business theory always becomes obsolete when an organization achieves its original goals. Achieving your goals, then, is not a reason to celebrate; it's a reason for new thinking. ATT fulfilled its mission to provide every U.S. family and business with access to the phone by the mid-1950s. Some executives then said it was time to rethink the theory of business and, for example, separate local services where goals were achieved from growing and future businesses, starting with long-distance services and extending to global telecommunications. Their arguments went unheeded, and a few years later the ATT began to flounder, only be rescued by the antitrust that made Fiat what the company's management refused to do Rapid growth is another sure sign of a crisis in the organization's theory. Any organization that doubles or triples in size in a fairly short period of time has necessarily outgrown its theory. Even Silicon Valley has learned that beer bashes are no longer adequate for communication once the company has grown so large that people have to wear name tags. But such growth challenges much deeper assumptions, policies and habits. To continue in health care, not to mention growth, the organization must ask itself once again questions about its environment, mission and core competencies. There are two more clear signals that the organization's theory about business is no longer valid. One is unexpected success, whether it's your own or a competitor's. Another unexpected failure, again, whether it's one or a competitor. At the same time that japanese car import was the Detroit Big Three on the ropes, Chrysler registered a completely unexpected success. Its traditional cars were losing market share even faster than GM and Ford were. But sales of his Jeep and his new minivans - almost a random development - have skyrocketed. At the time, GM was the leader of the U.S. light truck market and did not dispute the design and quality of its products, but did not pay attention to its bandwidth. After all, minivans and light trucks have always been classified as commercial rather than passenger vehicles in traditional statistics, although most are now bought as passenger vehicles. However, if she had paid attention to the success of its weaker competitor, Chrysler, GM might have realized much sooner that its assumptions about both its market and its core competencies were no longer valid. From the very beginning, the market for minivans and light trucks was not a lucrative market and had little impact on trade-in prices. And, paradoxically, light trucks were one of the areas in which GM, 15 years ago, had already advanced quite far towards what we now call lean manufacturing. An unexpected failure is as much a warning as an unexpected success and should be taken as seriously as the first minor heart attack of a 60-year-old man. Sixty years ago, at the height of the depression, Sears decided that car insurance was an accessory rather than a financial product, and that its sale would thus fit its mission as an informed buyer for an American family. Everyone thought Sears was crazy. But car insurance has become Sears' most lucrative business almost instantly. Twenty years later, in the 1950s, Sears decided that diamond rings had become a necessity, not a luxury, and the company became the largest and probably the most in the world of diamond retailer. It was logical for Sears to decide in 1981 that investment products had become consumer goods for American American It bought Dean Witter and moved its offices into Sears stores. This step was a complete disaster. The American public clearly does not consider its financial needs to be consumer products. When Sears finally gave up and decided to run Dean Vitter as a separate business outside the Sears stores, Dean Vitter immediately began to blossom. In 1992, Sears sold it at a net profit. An unexpected failure is as much a warning as an unexpected success and should be taken as seriously as the first minor heart attack of a 60-year-old man. If Sears saw his failure to become an american family investment provider as a failure of his theory rather than an isolated case, he could start restructuring and reposition himself ten years earlier than it actually did when he still had a significant market lead. For Sears, it may have seen how some of its competitors like J.C. Penney immediately did, that Dean Witter's failure cast doubt on the whole concept of the homogeneity of the market is something of a very concept on which Sears and other massive retailers have based their strategy for years. Treatment. Traditionally, we've been looking for a miracle worker with a magic wand to turn a sick organization around. However, to create, maintain and restore the theory does not require Genghis Khan or Leonardo da Vinci in the executive syit. It's not genius; it's hard work. It's not smart; he is conscientious. This is what executives are paid for. To create, maintain and restore the theory is not required Genghis Khan in the executive syit. It takes hard work. There are indeed quite a few executives who have successfully changed their business theory. The CEO, who built Merck into the most successful pharmaceutical business in the world, focusing exclusively on the research and development of patented, high-margin breakthrough drugs, radically changed the company's theory by acquiring a major distributor of generic and nondescript drugs. He did it without crisis, while Merck supposedly did very well. Similarly, a few years ago, the new CEO of Sony, the world's most famous manufacturer of consumer electronics, changed the company's business theory. He acquired a Hollywood film production company and, with this acquisition, shifted the center of gravity of the organization from the hardware manufacturer in search of software to the software manufacturer, which creates a market demand for the equipment. But for each of these obvious miracle workers, there are dozens of equally capable executives whose organizations stumble. We cannot rely on miracle workers to rejuvenate outdated business theory more than we can rely on them to cure other types of serious diseases. And when talking to these flesh, they categorically deny that they act with charisma, vision or, for that matter, laying hands. Hands. start with diagnostics and analysis. They recognize that achieving goals and rapid growth require a serious rethinking of business theory. They do not reject an unexpected failure as a result of a subordinate's incompetence or as an accident, but see it as a symptom of a systemic failure. They do not take responsibility for unexpected success, but see it as a challenge to their assumptions. They recognize that obsolescence is a degenerative and, in fact, life-threatening disease. And they know and accept the time-tested principle, the oldest principle of effective decision-making: degenerative disease will not be cured by procrastination. This requires decisive action. A version of this article was published in the September-October issue of Harvard Business Review for September-October 1994. Reviews. formalism theory slideshare. formalism theory in english literature. formalism theory pdf. formalism theory mcqs. formalism theory in stylistics. formalism theory of art. formalism theory definition. formalism theory in film

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