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In the Spotlight

*This section highlights the exceptional research achievements of
a DPE Brother*

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Violent and Non-Violent Strategies of Resistance

A Game-Theoretic Model of Civil Conflict

Felipe Herrera

Abstract

Nonviolent movements are historically more than twice as successful as their violent counterparts. Of 323 resistance movements between 1900 and 2006 analyzed by Stephan and Chenoweth (2011), nonviolent movements were successful 53% of the time, whereas violent movements were successful only 26% of the time. Given these statistics, why do insurgent groups choose to use violence to achieve their political aims? I propose a game-theoretic model of civil conflict which factors information problems, bargaining, and costly signaling to predict insurgent group behavior at the macro-level to answer the question: at what point in a strategic interaction would an insurgent group choose to turn to violent strategies? Building on the findings of Chenoweth and Stephan and based on Fearon's rationalist explanations for war, these models improve upon the existing literature on insurgent group violence by demonstrating the strategic interaction, rooted in fundamentally rationalist logic, that results in rational decisions to use violence or nonviolence.

1. Introduction

Nonviolent movements are historically more than twice as successful as their violent counterparts.¹ Of three hundred and twenty three resistance movements between 1900 and 2006 analyzed by Stephan and Chenoweth, nonviolent movements were successful 53% of the time, whereas violent movements were successful only 26% of the time.² Given these statistics, why do insurgent groups choose to use violence to achieve their political aims? Stephan and Chenoweth posit that the relative success of nonviolent movements is due in large part to the fact that nonviolent resistance presents "fewer obstacles to moral and physical involvement and commitment,"³ essentially a mobilization argument that contends nonviolence simply makes recruitment easier for an insurgent group. Additionally, they argue that nonviolent resistance is more likely to create meaningful "shifts in loyalty among [the state's] supporters, including members of the military establishment,"⁴ allowing meaningful shifts in insurgent endowments, with state and military defection providing a significant advantage for rebel groups. Stephan and Chenoweth conclude that successful nonviolent resistance is more likely to create a "durable and internally peaceful [democracy], which [is] less likely to regress into civil war,"⁵ arguing that violence is recursive, and nonviolent movements can be successful for longer periods of times.

¹ Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, *Why civil resistance works: the strategic logic of nonviolent conflict* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013)

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

Beyond the micro-level factors analyzed by Stephan and Chenoweth regarding insurgent nonviolence, I propose a game-theoretic model of civil conflict which takes into account information problems, bargaining, and costly signaling to predict insurgent group behavior at the macro-level to answer the following question: at what point in a strategic interaction would an insurgent group choose to turn to violent strategies? Building on the findings of Chenoweth and Stephan and based on Fearon's rationalist explanations for war, these models improve upon the existing literature on insurgent group violence by demonstrating the strategic interaction, rooted in fundamentally rationalist logic, that results in rational decisions to use violence or nonviolence.

2. Existing Explanations

A primary school of thought concerning rebel use of violence versus nonviolence contends that insurgent violence is a mobilizational tool that encourages support. Kalyvas introduces rationality into the literature on large-scale violence against civilians, which he claims is "typically framed and understood as irrational."⁶ Ultimately, he concludes that we should not assume violence is irrational – there is a clear and strategic logic underlying a rebel group's decision to use violence, which he argues is primarily to "maximize civilian support under a particular set of constraints."

Wood argues that insurgents intentionally and strategically manipulate violence to this end, claiming that weak rebel groups especially use more violence than strong rebel groups because they do not have the resources to provide incentives for mobilization.⁷ Additionally, indiscriminate regime violence reduces the need for incentives to recruit support, thus reducing rebel reliance on violence as a mobilization tool, but only if the insurgents can credibly provide security. Therefore, stronger groups will use less violence against civilians as regime violence escalates, while weaker insurgents escalate violence in response to indiscriminate regimes.⁸

Cohen advances this school of thought by examining sexual violence as a mobilization tool that functions as a means for recruitment, additionally arguing that the social aspect of wartime rape is a method employed to improve unit cohesion within insurgent groups.⁹ Contrary to Wood's point that a rebel group that is stronger relative to the state will use less violence as a tool for mobilization and recruitment, Cohen argues the opposite regarding sexual violence – state weakness, relative to the insurgent group, is positively associated with increased wartime rape.¹⁰ However, the main issue with this argument is that it is too one-dimensional, and claims that the strategic decisions to use violence are influenced primarily by rebel capacity relative to

the state, effectively ignoring the relationship between a rebel group's objective capacity and its subjective demands in relation to the state's. While Kalyvas introduced the concept of rationality into these larger conversations on rebel use of violence, he stops short of advancing the role of bargaining theory in the calculations of rebel groups and thus presents a one-dimensional thesis that leaves room for advancement.

Another major school of thought regarding rebel strategies of violence and nonviolence concerns rebel endowments prior to the full formation of an insurgency or the onset of conflict. This school of thought can be further delineated by literature focusing on the "resource curse" and research focusing on social-institutional theory to explain the effects of preexisting social networks on the outcomes of conflict. Billon argues that "resource sectors influence the likelihood and course of armed conflicts," and specific resources make wars "more likely, nasty, and lengthy."¹¹ Combining this literature with Collier and Hoeffler's notions of greed and grievance, whereby rebellion may be explained by "atypically severe grievances... [or] by atypical opportunities,"¹² Dreher and Kreibaum conclude that the extraction of natural resources exerts externalities which lead to grievances, while simultaneously providing economic incentives through revenues from these resources.¹³ Notably, they claim that, "the consequent risk of both terrorism and rebellion depends on the group's characteristics as well as the state's reaction to its actions."¹⁴

Focusing on social-institutional theory, Staniland argues that the literature on the "resource curse" cannot adequately explain why insurgent groups with similar resource wealth result in such widely different outcomes. He proposes that "the social networks on which insurgent groups are built create different types of organizations with differing abilities to control resource flows."¹⁵ The limitations of this school of thought which focuses on economic and social rebel endowments, is in its inability to adequately provide a framework from which we can conceptualize the dynamic interaction between the state and a rebel group. Dreher and Kreibaum hint at this notion in their conclusion when they mention the extent of the effect of a group's capacity coupled with the state's reactions on the risk of terrorism and rebellion, but merely scratch the surface without delving deeper.

An emerging school of thought shifts the focus towards the effects of the strategies used by rebels on peace processes and negotiation. Pospieszna and DeRouen argue that rebels use "violence to demonstrate their ability to exact costs on the government, thus forcing the latter to negotiate."¹⁶ To this end, they briefly touch on rebel uses of violence conceptualized through

¹¹ Philippe Le Billon, *Wars of plunder: conflicts, profits and the politics of resources* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2013)

¹² Paul Collier, "Greed and grievance in civil war," *Oxford Economic Papers* 56, no. 4 (2004): 563-95. doi:10.1093/oep/gpf064.

¹³ Axel Dreher and Merle Kreibaum, "Weapons of choice," *Journal of Peace Research* 53, no. 4 (2016): 539-53.

doi:10.1177/0022343316634418.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Paul Staniland, "Organizing Insurgency: Networks, Resources, and Rebellion in South Asia," *International Security* 37, no. 1 (2012): 142-77. doi:10.1162/isec_a_00091.

¹⁶ Paulina Pospieszna and Karl Derouen, "Civil War Mediation and Rebel Use of Violence Against Civilians," *Armed Forces & Society* 43, no. 3 (2016): 500-22. doi:10.1177/0095327x16647538.

⁶ Stathis N. Kalyvas, "Wanton And Senseless?" *Rationality and Society* 11, no. 3 (1999): 243-85.

doi:10.1177/104346399011003001.

⁷ Reed M. Wood, "Rebel capability and strategic violence against civilians," *Journal of Peace Research* 47, no. 5 (2010): 601-14. doi:10.1177/0022343310376473.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Dara Kay Cohen, "Explaining Rape during Civil War: Cross-National Evidence (1980–2009)," *American Political Science Review* 107, no. 03 (2013): 461-77. doi:10.1017/s0003055413000221.

¹⁰ Ibid.

bargaining theory as tools used to demonstrate rebel capacity and create credible commitments. However, this is only a surface-level analysis and Pospieszna and DeRouen shift their focus towards different conclusions unrelated to bargaining theory.

Further research contends that the degree to which an insurgent will use violence depends on the extent of its territorial control. Kalyvas claims that “the lower the level of an actor’s control... the more likely that [a group’s] violence, if any, will be indiscriminate.”¹⁷ Kalyvas goes on to claim that indiscriminate violence occurs in “specific situations for explicable reasons to achieve understandable goals.”¹⁸ This line of research, however, fails to consider that the opposite holds true statistically more often – rebel groups employ nonviolent strategies with much higher rates of success than violent strategies – and thus stops short of attempting to model the factors influencing rebel groups to turn away from nonviolence. Specifically, there is no consideration given to how state demands influence rebel decision-making.

3. Rationalist Theory

At its core, the fundamental logic behind rationalist explanations for the causes of war – and by extension, the strategic use of violence in my models – is that the expected utility outweighs the costs.¹⁹ Fearon defines a number of these explanations that influence the expected utility equation: private information and “incentives to misrepresent such information,” commitment problems, and issue indivisibility.²⁰ Most importantly, however, he notes that these factors cause bargaining problems that lead to conflict. Game theory assumes rationality in all participating actors and contends that all actors are value-maximizing in any strategic interaction – thus, in a system with complete and perfect information, wars would not break out because a bargain can be reached at the exact point of each actor’s relative capability.

Actors often have a range of options within a strategic interaction, representing different values across different dimensions. Policy options may be continuous including points within an interval or range (one-dimensional) or across time and space (multidimensional). To this end, a continuous action space model is useful in order to represent the infinite choices available to actors and capture the interaction in a linear sense as well as across time and space. On a basic continuous action space model, the point where a bargain between two actors will be reached when a game is repeated ad infinitum within a closed system with complete and perfect information would be point w where w is the probable outcome of war, and the potential costs of war would be denoted as point c , with the difference in each actor’s $w-c=EU$ formula (probable outcome minus costs of war equals expected utility) representing the bargaining space available. In this sense, we should understand that information problems and the incentive for

actors to misrepresent their capabilities contribute to this fog of war. This leads to a breakdown of bargaining when actors are unsure where the other actor lies on the continuous action space and thus make irreconcilable simultaneous demands that lead to violence. Where the research is lacking but where this framework is potentially useful, however, is in its ability to be translated to capture the interaction that produces nonviolent or violent insurgent behavior. In line with rationalist theory, I argue that the decision by an insurgent group to use violent strategies will depend largely on rebel capabilities relative to the state and the extent of state/rebel demands in a strategic interaction.

4. Methodology

When designing the models, I found that a continuous action space model was able to capture how the extent of the simultaneous demands of the state and the rebel group and the relative costs of war influenced decision-making. Additionally, an extensive-form game, formatted as a symmetrical decision tree with actors making one-off choices in a simple interaction, allowed me to model individual conflicts on a case-by-case basis. To this end, and in order to test the validity of my models, I will apply them to the specific cases of: Catalonia, where violence has not yet broken out but the state has engaged in repression against the opposition; Syria, where insurgent groups used violent strategies against a repressive state; Egypt, where the state granted broad concessions to a nonviolent resistance movement; Venezuela, where an insurgent group has not necessarily formed yet but the state is engaged in mass repression. Taken together, both models complement each other such that they produce an effective means to model insurgent behavior and predict future insurgent behavior.

I developed a few predictions for what the models would be able to convey. On a continuous action space model, when $w-c \geq 0.53$, where w and c are decimals between 0 and 1, w is the probable outcome of war, and c is the relative cost of war, I predict an insurgent group will use nonviolent strategies 100% of the time. The logic here is that if the probable outcome of war minus the likely costs of war (or the costs inflicted upon the insurgent group by the state’s use of violent repression) is greater than 0.53 on the model, we should expect the insurgent group to maximize the utility of their strategies by employing nonviolence. When $w-c \leq 0.26$, I predict an insurgent group will use violent strategies 100% of the time. The logic here is that, following the aforementioned equation, if the result is less than 0.26 on the model, we should expect the insurgent group to use violent strategies because they are below the threshold for nonviolence to be effective. Finally, when $0.53 \geq w-c \geq 0.26$, I predict an insurgent group will use nonviolent strategies with probability $[(w-c) \div 0.53]$ and violent strategies with probability $(w-c) \div 0.26]$. The logic here is that the relative distance of the insurgent group’s expected utility from the points of violent success (0.26) and nonviolent success (0.53) can determine the probability by

¹⁷ Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The logic of violence in civil war* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011)

¹⁸ Ibid.


¹⁹ James D. Fearon, “Rationalist explanations for war,” *International Organization* 49, no. 03 (1995): 379. doi:10.1017/s0020818300033324.

²⁰ Ibid.

which an insurgent group will use one strategy over the other.


I modeled this interaction in various ways. First, I used an extensive-form game with incomplete information to highlight the effect of information problems on bargaining and how both actors will engage in signaling. Second, a continuous action space model will allow me to define how the probable outcome of a chosen strategy and the costs incurred influence the calculus of an insurgent group's chosen strategies. Finally, a simple 2x2 game allows me to demonstrate certain limitations of my preferred models and account for differences we may note in outcomes on a broader level.

As per my predictions based on the statistical findings of Chenoweth and Stephan, I model the continuous action space of insurgent strategies as follows:



The variables i_r and i_s represent the ideal points for each actor, which is 100% of the action space. Without factoring in the costs of violence or the probable outcome of violence, this model serves as a framework for understanding at which points it can be predicted that violence will be used by the insurgent group ($EU \leq 0.26$, or expected utility is less than or equal to 0.26). Furthermore, studying actual rebel actions and the manner in which events unfold, we can place rebels and states in a civil conflict at their respective points on this continuous action space and make claims regarding actual capabilities and demands. Additionally, the precise points where we place the rebels and the state will factor in when the state is making considerations regarding its beliefs of rebel capacity, which influence their decisions on whether or not to repress or concede.

These considerations can thus be captured on the extensive-form game with imperfect information, which is modeled as follows:



Actors:

- Insurgent Group
- State

Actions:

- Insurgent Group: {Violence, nonviolence}
- State: {Repress, Concede}

Possible Outcomes:

- V-R
- V-C
- NV-R
- NV-C


Variable N for Nature serves as the value determining the strength of the insurgent group, and p is the probability that the group is strong while $1-p$ is the probability that the group is weak. The factor of imperfect information is captured by the dotted horizontal line at the second decision node where the state makes its first decision. At this point, the state still has imperfect information regarding the capabilities of the insurgent group and thus does not know where it is operating on the decision tree, but it must still make a decision based on its beliefs. Furthermore, the variables in the model are organized as follows:

$$i_r(x) \geq w_x \geq c \geq 0 \geq s$$

The logic behind these variables is that ix is the ideal point for both actors and represents the entire action-space in question. The variable w_x represents the probable outcome of a successful war, i.e. the demands of the player are met after violence has occurred. The variable c represents the likely costs of the war, and as such cannot exceed the total demands of a player nor the area of the value of the action-space, although it is possible for the state to concede and suffer from the violent strategies of the insurgent group, thus receiving a payoff of $-c$. At any rate, each of these variables is set as greater than or equal to the others in consecutive order because we can understand a situation wherein two players issue simultaneous demands for the entire action space (thus, $ix = wx$) and the costs of war create such destruction as to eliminate the utility of the action-space altogether ($ix = wx = c$). This would be an extreme case, and would likely involve nuclear war or the large-scale use of weapons of mass destruction, but is still a logical event and justifiable in terms of the model. Finally, regarding the variable s , we understand that there is a sort of “social cost” for a state that engages in violent repression against its citizens. Whether this involves members of the state apparatus being tried for war crimes or the involvement of international actors depends largely on the extent of the social cost, but this cost will always be a negative value and diminish the expected utility for a state.

5. Findings and Analysis

The Nash equilibrium is the stable state of a strategic interaction where no individual actor will unilaterally deviate, holding constant the choices of any other actors involved. Each player under Nash equilibrium is behaving rationally (choosing optimally) based on how other player(s) are anticipated to act, and understanding how a player will make a choice based on their beliefs regarding the other player provides key insights as the models are applied to specific cases. Examining the extensive-form game and solving for the Nash equilibria through backwards induction, we find two main takeaways:



iff $p > 0.74$

- Insurgent Group at start: NV
- State at (NV): C
- Payoffs associated are $(ir, 0)$

iff $p < 0.74$

- Insurgent Group at start: NV, V
- State at (NV): R
- Payoffs associated are $(-c, is)$ and $(-c, ws - c)$

First, when an insurgent group is strong, the Nash equilibrium of the strategic interaction lies at (NV, C). Nonviolence when a rebel group is strong relative to the state incurs fewer costs than violence for the rebel group, and concessions by the state eliminate both the social costs of repression and the costs of engaging violent conflict against a stronger rebel group, so the logic here is intuitive. On the other hand, however, we see that the insurgent group is indifferent between violence and nonviolence when it is weak and the state is expected to be repressive.


What accounts for outcomes beyond the Nash equilibrium of this model? We must factor

in the discrepancy between the state's beliefs regarding rebel capacity and the rebel group's actual capacity. As the model indicates, while the insurgent group is sure regarding its capacity, the state is unsure of where, conceptually, it is making its decisions (i.e. whether it is operating on left side of the extensive-form game versus the right side of the model). What we might infer from the model therefore is the manner in which an insurgent group uses this logic to their advantage through signaling. As it is understood that the Nash equilibrium where the rebel group is strong is at (NV, C) and the Nash equilibrium where the rebel group is weak is at (V, R) and (NV, R) because of the group's indifference to the outcome (as it remains the same regardless of the group's strategy), a rebel group may use nonviolence initially to attempt to signal its strength to the state. Since we expect to see rebel groups use violence only when $p \leq 0.26$, we assume the inverse also holds true: nonviolent strategies signal that $p \geq 0.74$, and the state, acting with uncertainty at this point, must interpret this signal and decide whether it assumes the rebel group is actually strong or not, as this choice will impact the payoffs for the state. To this end, the model provides an interesting insight into the statistical findings of Chenoweth and Stephan, and perhaps serves as an intervening variable that explains why we see a higher prevalence of nonviolent resistance movements succeeding.

6. Case Studies

As a note, I have adapted these situations using the original model as a rubric for each conflict. The Nash equilibria are still highlighted in yellow; decision paths that are not in line with the Nash equilibrium are highlighted in orange, and decision paths that lead to Nash equilibrium are highlighted in green.



Catalonia, where violence has not yet broken out but the state has engaged in repression against the opposition:



Although there was a period when the Spanish government offered to abort their mandated suspension of self-rule in exchange for concessions from the Catalanian president, specifically a call for regional elections, Puigdemont's response was unclear.²¹ The Catalanian parliament declared independence, and the Spanish government initiated the implementation of article 155 of the Spanish constitution to establish direct rule, removed Puigdemont, ordered the dissolution of the Catalanian parliament, and scheduled new elections on December 21, 2017. The state did not initially issue indivisible demands, evidenced by their flexibility in negotiating with the Spanish Socialist Worker's Party to study the possibility of reforms²² and their offer to allow self-rule in exchange for regional elections, but the Catalanian parliament did by fully declaring independence, thus changing the strategy profile of the Spanish government, leading it to impose direct rule.²³

Tying the outcomes of the extensive-form game to the continuous-action space model, we can assume that Catalonia is categorically weaker than the Spanish government ($p > 0.74$). Further, without complete information on Catalonia's capacity, we can still assume that a weaker Catalonia relative to the Spanish government is more likely because the decision path of a weak Catalonia leads us to the Nash equilibrium. To this end, the model demonstrates that Catalonia's indifference to violent or nonviolent strategies when it is weaker and allows us to predict that there is a greater probability of violence breaking out.

Syria, where insurgent groups used violent strategies against a repressive state:



The case of Syria is noteworthy in the context of these models because the Syrian opposition initially protested nonviolently,²⁴ but they were met with brutal repression by the state.²⁵ Bashar Al-Assad engaged in a very specific strategy profile, known as the grim trigger, whereby the Syrian opposition's choice to enter the game and resist the state catalyzed a strategy of unrelenting repression, as he had calculated that "zero tolerance would head off an escalation."²⁶ In all subsequent iterations of the model, Al-Assad has committed the state to violent repression against the opposition, and thus the opposition has used violent strategies in response to Al-Assad's grim trigger strategy profile. Al-Assad's demands were indivisible: full control of Syria. These demands shifted rebel strategies towards violence. However, since the rebels initially used nonviolent strategies, we must assume the probability that they are stronger than the state is $0.26 < 0.53$ and decreasing over time as violence is used to a much greater extent than nonviolence.

This case clearly shows the logic behind the factor of indifference that the model captures. Since we assume the rebels are weaker than the state given the outcomes on the extended-form game, it is no surprise that they easily shifted between nonviolence and violence, as the payoffs were the same in either outcome. Thus, the game remains in Nash equilibrium for the duration of the interaction, until the rebels lose to the state.

Egypt, where the state granted broad concessions to a nonviolent resistance movement:

²¹ Angel Collado, "El Gobierno podría frenar el artículo 155 en caso de que Puigdemont convoque elecciones," *El Confidencial*, Oct. 18, 2017. https://www.elconfidencial.com/espana/cataluna/2017-10-18/independencia-cataluna-gobierno-rajoy-carles-puigdemont-elecciones_1462694/.


²² Juan Carlos Merino and Luis B. Garcia, "Sánchez acuerda con Rajoy abordar la reforma de la Constitución a cambio de apoyarle," *La Vanguardia*, Oct. 11, 2017. <http://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/20171011/431980233564/pedro-sanchez-rajoy-requerimiento-declaracion-de-independencia.html>.

²³ "Catalans declare independence as Madrid imposes direct rule," *BBC News*, Oct. 27, 2017. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-41780116>.

²⁴ "حالة الصلابة نيبل اطم يراج ائتلاف شمد بلى يف نور هاطتي ني يروسلا تائم," *Al Arabiya*, Mar. 15, 2011.

²⁵ Kareem Fahim and Hwaida Saad, "A Faceless Teenage Refugee Who Helped Ignite Syria's War," *New York Times*, Feb. 8, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/09/world/middleeast/a-faceless-teenage-refugee-who-helped-ignite-syrias-war.html?_r=1.

²⁶ *Ibid.*



What separates the Egyptian case from the other two? Why did Mubarak concede totally and almost immediately (within 18 days of the start of protests)? The discrepancy lies either in the totality of the protesters' demands and significantly lower demands issued by the state, or in a high probability of a strong opposition force. Through firsthand accounts from officers, it is understood that the number of protesters overwhelmed the police force, forcing them to retreat and lose control over the country.²⁷ Analyzing the case through the models, we assume that the likelihood that the opposition was strong relative to the state is $p > 0.74$. The fact that the same game played itself out under Morsi supports the conclusion that a high probability of a strong opposition force relative to the state had a greater effect in influencing the Egyptian case. This logic is effectively captured by the model. The outcome of this interaction is (NV, C), which is the Nash equilibrium for a strong opposition force. We can assume from the model that the opposition's choice to use nonviolence successfully signaled to the state the capacity of the group, and this signaling on the part of the protesters forced Mubarak to resign.

7. Limitations, Intervening Variables, and Further Research

In the case of Venezuela, the models cannot adequately capture scenarios that do not have at least a cohesive resistance movement opposing the state. The Venezuelan opposition is best described as a loose network of coalitions that tap into popular support against the state but do not necessarily wield that support for their own ends. While there are near-daily protests and occasional mass mobilizations in the streets of Caracas, these protests are organized more individually and on a more local level by a range of organizations, including but not limited to: Popular Will, Justice First, A New Era, Democratic Action, Copei, Movimiento Estudiantil,

etc.²⁸ Due to the fractures within the greater movement at the macro level, and since there is not a sole, clearly defined insurgent group that can bear the costs of repression and violence and make calculations on this basis, the models cannot capture the interaction between Venezuela's protesters and Maduro's government. A separate model would be useful in this case to demonstrate how the state's influence in creating localized food shortages serves as entry-deterrence to deter insurgent groups from organizing a fully-fledged resistance.

Regarding insurgent use of nonviolence as a signal to the state of its capabilities, given our understanding of the Nash equilibrium and as the Egyptian case illustrated, the argument can be made that this fact serves as an intervening variable that explains why we see a higher prevalence of nonviolent resistance movements succeeding. It may not be actual rebel capabilities, per se, or even the extent of rebel demands that are influencing state decision-making but rather the state's beliefs, influenced by the rebel group's signals.

A limitation of the extensive-form game is that it represents a one-off game where each player makes one decision and thus only captures the interaction at this very broad level, effectively ignoring key differences across time and space within any civil conflict. However, we can conceptualize how the game plays itself out and repeats ad infinitum, with the N variable (Nature, which represents the endowments of the rebel group at the onset of the interaction) constantly changing as the insurgent group's capabilities change. However, even this variable N presents a challenge, as the model itself is not able to capture what influences it. Rather, as discussed in the literature review, there is a separate school of thought that seeks to explain the factors behind these rebel group endowments. These models, based on game theory and rationalist theory, are unable to explain this dynamic.

These models, additionally, assume absolute rationality in all actors involved. Game theory assumes that an actor will seek to maximize their payoffs in any and all interactions. A common issue to this end lies in defining, limiting, isolating or accounting for every possible variable that would influence a player's strategy and the game's outcome. In order to create a model, certain variables will inherently be cut out of the calculations. As such, there are only specific research questions that can be answered by game theory. However, in attempting to explain the rationality underscoring insurgent use of violence and nonviolence, game theoretic models provide key insights not offered by other methodologies.

Further study of the rational decisions to choose violent or nonviolent strategies should develop an infinitely repeated game with a discount factor which would be able to model how the interaction develops over time (though not necessarily across space) especially as the trend seems to be that civil conflicts are becoming more protracted. The discount factor in this model accounts for the relative changes in the payoff structure over time, as conflict becomes costlier and costlier to maintain, or as the insurgent group's power relative to the state itself changes.

²⁷ Asma Alsharif and Yasmine Saleh, "Special Report: The real force behind Egypt's 'revolution of the state'," Reuters, Oct. 10, 2013. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-interior-specialreport/special-report-the-real-force-behind-egypts-revolution-of-the-state-idUSBRE99908D20131010>.

²⁸ "Partidos de oposición conforman Mesa de la Unidad Democrática," Noticiasve, Aug. 6, 2009. <https://web.archive.org/web/20100825075629/http://www.noticiasve.com/partidos-de-oposicion-conforman-mesa-de-la-unidad-democratica/>

This model would be represented as $G(\infty, \delta)$, where G specifies the structure of each round (actors, actions, preferences), ∞ represents the time-limit of the game (infinite in this case, but any finite time period can be substituted), and δ represents the discount factor (how payoffs change over time).

8. Conclusions

Calculating the subgame-perfect Nash equilibria of these models, one can conclude the specific decisions we expect insurgents and states to make. Rebel capabilities relative to the state and the extent of state/rebel demands in a strategic interaction provide key insights into the rational decisions to use violence or nonviolence in a civil conflict, and these insights are effectively captured in my models. It should be noted that these models are prescriptive and only model behavior that states and rebels should engage in. The utility of the models lies in their ability to provide rationalist explanations for the outcomes of each scenario. The validity of the model's predictive and prescriptive capabilities will be tested over time as situations develop and conflicts play themselves out, but so far the intuition behind the current case studies and predictions is sound.

Additionally, these models are not static, and can be updated in real time as new information arises. Over the course of this research, as events have unfolded in Catalonia, a number of changes were made to the model to reflect new information. Overall, with the exception of Venezuela for previously stated reasons, the models were able to accurately capture the interaction in each case examined (i.e. the actual course of events matched the Nash equilibria), and provided useful insights to better understand the reasons behind the actions rebels and states take. Having a better understanding of the dynamics at play and being able to make recommendations on strategy profiles to optimize outcomes can prove beneficial in mitigating the potential for violence or making effective predictions for future conflicts.

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Balancing Bosnia

Austin Benner

Abstract

This article traces the history of the Bosnian War and the resulting role of the Office of the High Representative in the governance of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It focuses upon the effects of the war and continuing ethnic divide upon the agendas of the various domestic governments as well as the possibility of eventual fully domestic rule of the country. The Office of the High Representative currently occupies a unique role in Bosnian governance per the powers allotted to it by the Dayton agreement and the resulting Bonn meeting. All relevant domestic actors alongside their foreign supporters will be analyzed, particularly in regards to their relationship with the Office of the High Representative as well as with one another, in order to provide a clear answer to the question this article poses concerning the future governance and political standing of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

1. Introduction

An old American adage says that the evidence of a good compromise is when neither side is happy. The status of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its people certainly meet the latter qualification, but is that really a good thing? Over twenty years after the disintegration of the Yugoslav Socialist Republic brought war to the Bosnian people and the Dayton accords attempted to bring peace to the region, the divisions between the three major ethnic groups are still incredibly stark and relevant. With shell craters and landmines still physically scarring the nation while the collective trauma mentally scars the people, there are those wondering if there ever can truly be harmony among the Bosnian-Croats, Bosniaks and Bosnian Serbs living within the young states borders. With neighboring Croatia’s ascension to the European Union in 2013 has come increasing encouragement from the European Union for other states including Bosnia-Herzegovina to implement reforms to make eventual accession possible. That being said, the domestic governments (of which there are three) of Bosnia-Herzegovina remains deeply divided along ethnic lines, with each respective government pursuing nationalistic agendas. This leads to the question of whether the Global and European communities, who provide the legitimacy to the Office of the High Representative, should adopt a path of idealism and let Bosnia-Herzegovina work out its own problems, or stay the course in their use of the Bonn powers to their effectiveness in order to curb ethnic nationalism within the nation whilst keeping a close eye on domestic developments. What should the future for the Office of the High Representative be in regards to the nation they oversee?

2. Literature Review

2.1. School of thought 1: The OHR should try to remain an observer as much as possible and essentially stay the course

The first school of thought is indeed the most moderate of the bunch, it advocates for the continued presence of the Office of the High Representative into the foreseeable future and using the Bonn powers in a limited capacity and only in situations of a certain severity. This School observes Bosnia-Herzegovina as a nation still heavily impacted by ethnic conflict and unable to move on without the oversight of the OHR.

Jozo Pavković, 2018, “Večernji list: interview with High Representative Valentin Inzko”, Office of the High Representative

At the forefront of this school of thought is the Office of the High Representative itself, the High Representative himself has elaborated that he is against the use of the Bonn powers in all but the most severe situations. He explicitly states in this interview that, even if the 2018 election results were unfavorable, “No one should expect the OHR to resolve this issue with the Bonn powers. It is the job of the BiH Parliamentary assembly and the parties in the assembly.”¹ This was not his final say on the Bonn powers however, for he also stated that the elections must occur and alluded at action on the part of the Office of the High Representative should they be blocked by any entity.

Mary Miller, 2014, “Nationalism, Identity, and Rhetoric in Bosnia Herzegovina: a Rhetorical Analysis of Presidential Speeches, 2004 – 2012” Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 433

This scholarly dissertation does an excellent job analyzing the rhetoric being generated by various political entities within Bosnia-Herzegovina. In particular it focuses on the rhetoric of the Presidents of the various federations via analysis of their speeches. What this does a nice job of is analyzing official rhetoric but what it lacks (and it does mention this itself) is an analysis of rhetoric on the ground and outside of the realm of the superficial.

International Crisis Group, 2009, “Bosnias Incomplete Transition: Between Dayton and Europe”

This think tank piece falls into both schools of thought, advocating for the OHR’s closure but only at the right moment and definitely not immediately. The piece outlines several reasons for keeping the OHR open in the short-run in order to pressure compromise that can be institutionalized, one of which includes the liberal use of the Bonn powers in order to intimidate political leaders who are pursuing nationalistic agendas that may provoke conflict.

2.2. School of Thought 2: It’s time for the OHR to cease to exist

This school of thought, much like a political party, is a tent which represents those who would like to see the OHR gone. However, it splits over whether there should be an institution replacing it. Some sources argue that the OHR should be replaced with an EU institution to aid Bosnia in meeting the requirements necessary to ascend into the EU. Other sources say the OHR is the equivalent of an overprotective parent that’s holding Bosnia-Herzegovina back from maturing. Others still argue that the OHR lacks the legal support or physical backing anymore to implement the Bonn powers and as such is already practically defunct.

International Crisis Group, 2007, “Ensuring Bosnia’s Future: A New International Engagement Strategy”

This think tank piece talks about how the Bonn powers are currently unenforceable due to lack of a strong enough coalition military force present in Bosnia to put down any possible resistance that could arise from a disgruntled domestic government.

Tim Banning, 2014, The Bonn Powers of the High Representative in Bosnia Herzegovina: Tracing a Legal Figment, Goettingen Journal of International Law 6

This Scholarly article analyzes the full legal backing for the Bonn powers, going all the way back to the original Dayton Accords. The author argues that the Bonn powers no longer carry any legal support and are being used illegally. As such he calls their existence “a powerful, but delusive legal fiction”

Jelena Jovanović, 2013, Does Bosnia and Herzegovina still need the OHR?, Masaryk University

This Thesis provides a view of the OHR as a parental organization that has overstayed its welcome. It admits that Bosnia-Herzegovina would’ve been hard pressed to overcome its initial challenges after the Dayton Accords without the Office of the High Representative. On the flip side though, it also claims that the OHR providing a safety cushion for BiH is what is preventing it from developing as a nation.² Essentially, so long as the OHR is present in Bosnia-Herzegovina, there will be very little organic, responsible development in regard to government institutions.

Berdal, M., Collantes-Celador, G. & Zupcevic Buzadzic, M. (2011). Post-War Violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina

This paper analyzes the level of violence experienced by Bosnia and Herzegovina after the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords. It does not assume that Bosnia and Herzegovina have been completely spared from post-conflict violence but rather their experience with it has been

comparatively smaller than other postwar nations. It makes an interesting connection by claiming that this is a product of the continued ethnic segregation within the country and a lack of hard initiatives to come to terms with ethnic reintegration and other traditionally reconciliatory measures.

3. Contextualization and Analysis

Most of Bosnia-Herzegovina's current tensions and woes can be traced back to the Bosnian War. The Bosnian War was one of many wars that was conducted within the former territory of, and after the breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The conflict began in April of 1992 and lasted until early 1996. The War broke out soon after the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina declared its independence from Yugoslavia in a referendum that was boycotted by Bosnian Serbs. When hostilities were initiated, three primary factions emerged. They were composed of the Bosniaks supporting the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Bosnian-Serbs supporting Republika Srpska and the Croats supporting the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia. The war was a dramatic game of tug-of-war between the factions with atrocities being committed by all sides against all other sides. Some of the most notable events included the massacre of 8,000 Bosniak Muslim men and boys after their seizure from a UN protection site at Srebrenica as well as the Siege of Sarajevo, which lasted for almost the entirety of the conflict and holds the record for the longest siege in modern warfare. The conflict left hundreds of thousands of dead and was only ended when the international community stepped in and pushed the respective faction to the negotiating table. The result was the Dayton Accords, a peace treaty that ended major hostilities and now operates as a de facto constitution for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

It was from that table in Dayton that the current governing system of Bosnia and Herzegovina was derived. The current system divides the country into two major zones and one minor zone of governance. The two major zones are The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska, whilst the minor one is the district of Brčko. The two major zones control territory based upon territorial control lines at the end of the war and despite being technically part of the same country, have many of their own institutions, including their own governments. Though the nation as a whole is governed by the Presidency, there are essentially three presidents, each of which represents one of the major ethnic groups within Bosnia and Herzegovina. If this sounds confusing, that's because it is; on top of the Presidency resides the Office of the High Representative, a chief executive operating on behalf of the international community and appointed by the European Union, with the powers to dismiss elected and non-elected officials at will. To understand how an international institution came about the possession of such a power and is still allowed to wield it to this day, one must understand the current and

past status of all of the actors at play within Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The first and arguably most hostile actor to analyze is the Bosnian-Serbs and the Republika Srpska. Republika Srpska bears the same name as it did during the Bosnian War and its declaration of independence in 1992, though after the war it was incorporated into Bosnia and Herzegovina (Not to be confused with the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina). During the war, the army of Republika Srpska carried a massive military advantage over its rival factions in that it had access to military equipment from Yugoslavian armories via capture and foreign support from Serbia. This support was reported on by John Kifner when he wrote "The Bosnian Serbs receive food, fuel and weapons from Serbia, and their firepower has been augmented by volunteers from Serbia. The Bosnian Serb militias, organized by militants, are dedicated to a "Greater Serbia," incorporating all Serb-populated areas of Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia and Montenegro. These militias are widely held to be responsible for most of the atrocities in Bosnia."³ This advantage allowed the army of Republika Srpska to overpower its numerically superior foes during the war on many occasions and carry out its ethnic cleansing operations. In the period after the war, Republika Srpska has continued to carry out an agenda that can be described as pure nationalism. The president of Republika Srpska, Milorad Dodik has called for independence referendums repeatedly saying, "Nobody can prevent us from holding a referendum. We never gave up on it, but everything has its timing."⁴ If Republika Srpska were to hold a referendum, Rikard Jozwiak, a correspondent at Radio Free Europe whom I had the privilege to interview, believes that would be the time for the OHR to act, "The OHR should for sure use the Bonn powers if Republika Srpska went so far and conducted an actual independence referendum. It is very important that the West is vigilant here and it is very important that Serbia plays a constructive role as a regional player. A referendum could trigger a spill-over effect to Kosovo, other parts of Bosnia and Macedonia. It would really open a Pandora's box that only EU membership for all the nations in the region could close forever."⁵ This piece of diction outlines just how destructive secession would be not only to Bosnia and Herzegovina but also the Western Balkans in general. The threat of secession alone concerning Republika Srpska provides a compelling argument for the continued presence of the OHR.

Republika Srpska continues to receive support from abroad, namely from Serbia, the nation that Republika Srpska wishes to join, but also from the Russian Federation. The nation of Serbia itself is receiving support from the Russian Federation, which has put a damper on its relations with the EU in its own accession process. Mr. Jozwiak, when questioned on Serbia's relationship with Russia had this to say, "At some point Serbia must decide which chair it wants to sit on. It should be an easy choice considering how much money the EU is spending in Serbia and how much Serbia is trading with the EU compared to Russia. I would wish for Belgrade to align with EU foreign policy decisions such as sanctions on Russia immediately. It would really

³ John Kifner, "Yugoslav Army Reported Fighting in Bosnia to Help Serbian Forces." (New York Times, 1994)

⁴ Bojana Barlovac, "Dodik: Republika Srpska Will be Independent" (BalkanInsight, 2012)

⁵ Rikard Jozwiak, (spoken interview, 2018)

boost its chances of joining the EU sooner. As in my previous answer, I note that Serbia should be a regional player. That entails responsibilities, especially in Bosnia. Russia is always capable of interfering in the Western Balkan. Just look at Montenegro but also Republika Sprska. But the more mature Belgrade behaves in its relationship with the EU, the less of a chance Moscow have to wreak havoc in the region.”⁶ Mr. Jozwiak does carry many important points with this quote, namely Serbia is receiving far more funding from the European Union than it ever has received from Moscow and the rational choice for the Serbs both in Serbia and Republika Srpska is to move closer to the EU. As EU membership for both Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina would bring the two closer to each other than any other non-destructive option. It is clear though, at the current juncture, that Republika Srpska remains one of the most dangerous players in what has already proven to be a dangerous game.

The next ethnic political group to discuss is the Bosniaks. The Bosniaks represent a unique ethnic group not only in Bosnia and Herzegovina but in the Western Balkans in general, this is because they’re predominantly Muslim. During the war, the Bosniaks outnumbered all the other ethnic groups not only in population but in soldiers, that being said they didn’t have the same amount of equipment nor training that gave the Serbs such an advantage and as such had to receive most of their equipment from foreign sources or scavenging. Every ethnic group within Bosnia has foreign supporters and for the Bosniaks that was the Pakistanis actively and the Americans and British passively. In Mark Curtis’s book “Secret Affairs: Britains Collusion with Radical Islam” a former Indian intelligence officer remarks, “according to reliable estimates, about 200 Muslims of Pakistani origin living in the UK went to Pakistan, got trained in the camps of the HUA and joined the HUA’s contingent in Bosnia with the full knowledge and complicity of the British and American Intelligence agencies.”⁷ International support from Islamic countries has continued for the Bosniaks in peacetime, the nation at the base of it these days is Saudi Arabia, who has practically thrown money at Bosnia for the construction and maintaining of Mosques. Regarding rhetoric, the Bosniaks are slightly less corrosive than the Bosnian-Serbs, though it’s clear that the disdain between groups is still present, take this quote, from the former Bosniak representative to the Presidency, “To those whose offices...in Republika Srpska are open today, I am disappointed by this disrespect for the laws of this country...”⁸ That being said, though this rhetoric is confrontational, it still relates back to the Bosnian government, which in a way is unifying. The Bosniak population are undoubtedly the most dedicated of the groups towards some sense of unity.

The final group to discuss is the Croats. During the war the Croats were the smallest of the three major ethnic groups and they still are outnumbered within Bosnia and Herzegovina. For obvious reasons of ethnic kinship they were sponsored during the war by neighboring Croatia

and were known to sometimes align themselves with one of the two other ethnic groups in order to better their chances at victory. The Croats represent the other half of the Bosnian Christian cake, being Catholics to the Serbs Orthodoxy. While the Croats aren’t as bombastic as the Serbs or as large as the Bosniaks, they carry with them a good recent example of how the ethnic groups of Bosnia and Herzegovina still haven’t come to terms with their own faults. On the 29th of November 2017, Slobodan Praljak, a former general who served with Croatian forces during the Yugoslav wars, lost his appeal process and had his conviction for war crimes reaffirmed. Praljak stood up from his seat, shouted that he was not a war criminal and committed suicide in front of the court by drinking poison. Despite his conviction, many memorials to Mr. Praljak began popping up all over Bosnia and Herzegovina and within Croatia. A man in Mostar was quoted as saying, “We want to honour him as he lived proudly, but couldn’t live with this injustice. He was one of us.”⁹ How can a society that still reveres war criminals as role models be considered stable, let alone be expected to move forward without oversight? The scarier notion is that this attitude towards leaders in the war is not isolated to the Croats, but also reciprocated by the Bosniaks and the Serbs.

4. Conclusion

Though the physical war in Bosnia concluded no more than 20 years ago, the ethnic conflict continues, the three groups continue to jostle for control both over their own people and to assert themselves over all others. Though idealistically there is some merit to the argument of needing to withdraw the OHR in order to allow Bosnia and Herzegovina to develop domestically, the reality is that there is just as much of a chance if not more of Bosnia simply relapsing back into armed struggle. After every genocide the international community remarks, “never again,” are they really prepared to say “mission accomplished” now and withdraw the OHR, only to watch in horror as Bosniaks slaughter Serbs and Serbs slaughter Croats once more on the evening news? My answer is a resounding no. The situation in Bosnia is far too fragile for a withdrawal, the plan moving forward must be to stay the course and continue to observe the development of Bosnia-Herzegovina through the OHR until reasonable progress has been made.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Mark Curtis, “Secret Affairs: Britains Collusion with Radical Islam” (Serpents Tail Publishing, 2010)

⁸ Mary Miller, Nationalism, Identity, and Rhetoric in Bosnia Herzegovina: a Rhetorical Analysis of Presidential Speeches, 2004 – 2012”, (Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2014), 433

⁹ Andrew MacDowall, Slobodan Praljaks suicide reopens old wounds in Bosnia” (The Guardian, 2017)

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Laws for Large Numbers: A Study of the Development of Japan and its Statistical Agencies

Alexander Chreky

Abstract

Statistical agencies are a relatively unresearched topic within the field of international research. Most of the research which investigates them is historical or sociological in nature, leaving large gaps of knowledge. In this research paper I attempt to begin to fill in that gap of knowledge by analyzing the relationship between the development of the statistical agency, which is operationalized as moved from a nontechnocratic to a technocratic designation, and the development of Japan, from low income to high income status and from authoritarian to democratic. This data is gathered via qualitative analysis of literature concerning Japan’s statistical agency and via professional measures of GDP per Capita and Democracy over the eras covered. I utilize the case study methodology, specifically Congruence Procedure type 2: Multiple within case comparisons, to compare Imperial Japan to Modern Japan. Evidence collected results in a finding that there is a correlation between the development of a state, both economically and democratically, and the development of its statistical agency.

1. Introduction

The development of a state is a puzzle for the ages. Indeed, it is among one of the longest discussed puzzles in modern history, starting with the first formal work of political economy (what was later called the field of economics), Adam Smith’s *Wealth of Nations*. It was here Smith first attempted to explain the nature and causes of the wealth of nations.¹ This is fundamentally similar to the question: why and how do states develop economically? Later contributions such as those of David Ricardo and Karl Marx to the body of work concerning political economy (or in the case of Marx, its critique) build upon Smith’s analysis. From there and onwards the study of development becomes so wide and varied that a summary of its works becomes similar to traversing a figurative library of babel.

My research seeks to add to this storied legacy of inquisitive thought and conceptualization relating to a state’s broader development. It is the puzzle of the development of the state as it relates to the development of its statistical service/agency. This is because I want to understand how it relates to a country’s development. Development is a rather broad category in and of itself, so I will further define it as both GDP per capita and the level of democracy within a state due to the wide range it covers. The project then looks at the relationship between the establishment and development of the state statistical agency within Japan and the increase in the level of both economic and democratic development. This research is done in order to help my audience

understand the relationship between statistical agencies and the change which occurs in the states which run them.

Much research has been done regarding the functions of the state, and the creation and maintenance of it. This research exists within both the international studies sphere and that of sociology and anthropology, and likewise there is much overlap in it. With multiple existing theories, the objective for this paper is as a ‘building block’ which seeks to “‘identify common patterns or serve a particular kind of heuristic purpose’”.²

The theories I work with include various Marxist conceptions of the state as well as Foucauldian and Weberite knowledge and information to create a background on which to base my further research. The rationale for the research objective I’ve identified can be found in the study of the object itself. There is not much or really any independent literature on statistics directly tied to development beyond various platitudes and general theories. Using these theories, I narrow in on a specific case, Japan, to answer my research question and puzzle. Certain tradeoffs definitely occur, but they will mainly be due to the use of theories and limiting factor of the variables utilized.

The methodology utilized in this paper is case study, Congruence Procedure type 2: Multiple within case comparisons.³ I compare Imperial Japan, which is defined as pre World War Two Japan, to Modern Japan, which is defined as the post World War Two polity. The variables measured are that of democracy, operationalized using the polity IV system of democracy analysis, and of economic development, which is operationalized via the low, middle, high income categorization based off of GDP per Capita. My analysis concludes that there is a positive relationship between the development of the statistical agency and that of both variables being measured.

2. Review of Scholarly Literature

In the analysis of articles, graduate theses, research papers, and speculative novels, I have come into the possession of various schools of thought concerning the development of state statistical bureaus and their various equivalents. I discuss them as such: the Developmentalist Approach, the Biopolitical Approach, the Historical Approach, and the Sociochiste Approach. The Developmentalist Approach is a noncritical surmising of statistical agencies, seeking to act as guidelines for national development and economic growth. This can be found in sources that are contemporaneous to the time they were written, such as economic journals, opinion pages and international organization press releases. The Biopolitical Approach includes works which draw from Michael Foucault’s research on society including his views and observations.⁴ This approach talks about statistics and cataloging in terms of ‘biopower’ or having power over

other ‘bodies’ and the role that statistical agencies have in the facilitation of it.⁵ The Historical Approach is a noncritical approach consisting of various in depth historical research and other chronological works. They simply detail the history of the census and statistical agencies in select countries.⁶ Finally, the Sociochiste Approach is the term I have given to the approach to understanding institutions that the noted Anthropologist David Graeber has developed.⁷ I call it the Sociochiste Approach due to its eclectic mixture of sociology and anarchist understandings of power and institutions. It is decidedly anti-authoritarian and the literature is colored and influenced that way. The literature can be summed into two parts which comprise the understanding of statistical agencies and development, the critical approaches: Biopolitical, Sociochiste, and the noncritical: Developmentalist, and Historical.

2.1. Noncritical Approach

This formulation was created through engaging with various sources which investigated statistical agencies as a phenomenon and their relation to capitalism and capitalist development. A secondary source which aided in this endeavor was a graduate level thesis from Georgetown University. In this paper the author sought “to examine the following question: what is the relationship between national statistics and governmental control?”⁸ In her subsequent case study the author takes the reader through a journey of examination relating to three economic and colonial giants: Great Britain, France, and Germany as they developed their official statistical agencies. Through her paper Fried examines the reasoning behind the expansion of what began as parts of tax collection agencies and their development into specific tools of the state used for development and control. This paper helped me set up the general idea of the research question as academically valid, since there was work of a similar nature. I would consider this to be of the noncritical historical school of thought.

Another secondary source Seeing like a Market by Fourcade and Healy creates justification for this paper. Their argument that “(a) modern organizations follow an institutional data imperative to collect as much data as possible” is what spurs the main engine for my research.⁹ Simply put, if the market must collect as much data as possible in order to continually increase profits (as is necessary in a capitalist economy), as they state, then the state must play a foundational role in the creation of the market, as the originator for the most basic census data, which can then be built upon. Their large repository of data provides a wealth of information to help advance the research, as well as interact with other research. This is another work of the noncriti-

⁵ Führer, Amand, and Friederike Eichner, “Statistics and Sovereignty: The Workings of Biopower in Epidemiology.” Global Health Action, Abingdon 8, (Germany, 2015)

⁶ Donald A. MacKenzie, Statistics in Britain, 1865-1930: The Social Construction of Scientific Knowledge, (Edinburg, Edinburgh University Press, 1981), 1-15

⁷ David Graeber, The Utopia of Rules : On Technology, Stupidity, and the Secret Joys of Bureaucracy, (Brooklyn, Melville House, 2015), 1-34

⁸ Samantha J. Fried, “Quantify This: Statistics, the State, and Governmentality.” M.A., (Washington, D.C., Georgetown University Press, 2014), <https://search-proquest-com.proxyau.wrlc.org/docview/1531331468/abstract/4A7D4CE672E94E38PQ/1>, iii

⁹ Fourcade, Marion, and Kieran Healy, “Seeing like a Market.” Socio-Economic Review 15 (1), (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2017), <https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mww033>, 9

² George, Alexander, and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, (Cambridge, Mass., MIT, 2005), 74-76

³ Van Evera, Stephen, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, (Ithaca, Cornell, 1997), 61

⁴ Graham Burchell et al., The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality : With Two Lectures by and an Interview with Michel Foucault, (Chicago, Chicago, 1991), 1-10

cal historical school which offers an objective look at historical conditions.

Their work posits a similar conclusion for what I hope to investigate, that modern societies develop well run statistical apparati in which they categorize themselves for further economic growth/exploitation. As her research focuses more on private firms, it lacks the governmental research which I am interested in.

2.2. Critical Approach

A source which abuts this and provides a theoretical as well as philosophical framework is *The Foucault effect: Studies in Governmentality*; With two lectures by and an interview with Michel Foucault. Through these recorded lectures Philosopher Michel Foucault describes how the state controls bodies, which is termed as ‘Biopower’.¹⁰ Foucault sees statistical agencies as necessary in establishing this regime of Biopower. Through his philosophical investigations I gain an insight to more underlying reasoning behind the creation of such agencies and their role within the state. Foucault’s work would be of the critical school, as he analyzes the trappings and origins of power and attempts to deconstruct them. Foucault discusses the emergence of a new era identified by “the systems of knowledge, classification, and logics used as techniques of power”.¹¹ In effect, what he deliberates is the formation of the modern state, but he sees it more in terms of centralizing power rather than due to the development of the economy or democracy, as is sought in this research.

Seeing like a State by James C. Scott provides another secondary source of literature which looks at the various logics underlying how states influence their internal workings, i.e. economic development.¹² The book itself takes a look at various failed state-run projects, and importantly for its role within this work, the use of statistical agencies in their creation. This work can be said to fall within the critical school of discourse/thought, similar to the earlier Foucault article. His work relates mainly to failure and exists outside of my research beyond certain tools which are gained through reading it.

The reviewed literature falls into the two discussed categories of critical and noncritical literature, however, there is still a large gap in the knowledge of statistical agencies and their relation to a state’s development which are not covered. The sociological and philosophical perspective offered in the critical category of literature acknowledges the power relations which exist between governments and their citizenry, but don’t offer any in-depth research concerning the development of these statistical agencies as they relate to democratization and economic growth. My research aims to cover this gap in knowledge through the utilization of the case study methodology.

3. Methodology

The methodology being used in my research is of the case study variety. Case study research is research with the goal of close examination and comparison of one or several cases to further understand specific results and extend our knowledge of theory. As Gerring puts it, “the case study is an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units”.¹³ It is a qualitative method, but it can, and in my case does, involve the use of data to understand correlation in the case specifically as it results to the hypothesis. Within Gerring’s typology, my case study would be defined as the type II case study, as there is temporal variation- Japan in the past versus Japan in the present, but no spatial variation, as I examine one unit within different time frames.¹⁴

3.1. Case Selection

The case selected is the country of Japan. It is a large ethnically and culturally homogenous nation located within East Asia. Since the end of the Second World War the state has focused around a strategy of producing manufactured goods for export, in a method known as export-oriented industrialization.¹⁵ Along with economic change came regime change as after the Second World War a democratic constitution was put into place via the occupying American forces.¹⁶ Japan exists as a unique state which, in the past has had a strict autocracy, and in the present has a liberal democracy. There is also a major division between these eras, World War Two, which is useful in terms of research, as it aids in the examination of a statistical agency under two different political and economic regimes. Other states have less clear dividing lines between such eras, and are gradual in terms political liberalization, creating confusion as to the distinction between eras.

The research proposed is that of the “‘Building Block study of particular types or subtypes’”.¹⁷ This objective was chosen due to that lack of specific work on the project in the field of international relations. I am not proposing a new theory, but rather “fill[ing] a ‘space’ in the overall theory or in a typological theory.”¹⁸ There is nothing necessarily wrong with the fact that much of the research done on statistical agencies in the abstract is within the realm of sociology, however it is limiting in furthering our understanding of the phenomena by simply looking at it through that one lens.

¹³ John Gerring, “What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good For?” *The American Political Science Review* 98 (2), (Cambridge, Cambridge, 2004), 324

¹⁴ Ibid., 343

¹⁵ Ibid., 343

¹⁶ Richard Harvey, Brown, and William T. Liu, *Modernization in East Asia : Political, Economic, and Social Perspectives*, (Westport, Conn., Praeger, 1992), 11

¹⁷ Michael H. Hunt, *The World Transformed: 1945 to the Present*, (Boston, Bedford/StMartin’s, 2004), 86

¹⁸ George, *Case Studies*, 76

¹⁹ Ibid., 78

¹⁰ Burchell, *Foucault Effect*, 1-8

¹¹ Ibid., 133

¹² James C. Scott, *Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*. Yale Agrarian Studies. (New Haven, Yale, 1998), 3-13

3.2. Operationalization of Variables

The dependent variable of my study is the statistical agency. In Japan it is known as the National Bureau of Statistics.¹⁹ The statistical agency is operationalized as technocratically or on non-technocratically run. This is determined by analysis of literature on Japan's statistical agency, including pre- and post-war analysis. Within the literature, technocratically run bureaus are referred to as being run by experts in their respective fields. Non-technocratically run bureaus are run with interference from political military and economic elites, which can lead to distortion and false outcomes to benefit said elites.

There are two independent variables in my study. The first is that of GDP per capita. It will be operationalized as low income, middle income and high income. I will be utilizing the world bank's operationalization which states that a state with GDP per capita of \$1,025 or less is low-income, a low-middle-income state is between that and \$4,035. A middle-income state has a value between that of \$4,035 and \$12,475 and a high-income state is that with a GDP per capita of \$12,475 or more.²⁰ GDP per capita functions as a measure for economic wellbeing within a nation and is used in my research as a proxy for economic development.

The second independent variable I am analyzing is that of democracy, specifically authority trends within each country. This variable is operationalized as authority trends within the nation, being three levels: democracy, transition regime/anocracy and autocracy. Democracy is 6 and above on the Polity IV scale. A transition regime is between 6 and -6 on the scale. An autocracy is -6 and below on the scale (Polity IV 2010). Democracy exists as a potential 'other' factor within my study, as to the reasons behind a statistical agency being run well or not.

3.3. Hypotheses

The first hypothesis I will test is: As a society's economy develops into higher income levels, it will have a better, and technocratically run statistical agency. It is diagramed as such:

(+)

Increase in GDP per Capita → Technocratic Statistical Agency

The second hypothesis I will test is: The more democratic a nation is, the more technocratically run the statistical agency is. It is diagramed as such:

(+)

Increase in level of Democracy → Technocratic Statistical Agency

3.4. Methods for Data Collection and Analysis

Data collection is carried out through the investigation of various government sources and press releases detailing specific information pertinent to the research. For gathering the

economic data, a special project known as the Maddison project exists, which allows me to view economic data back to the 1870's.²¹ This is important as my analysis is multi temporal, stretching back to that time. For my democracy score I rely on the previously established Polity IV system of ranking state's political systems from autocracy to democracy. This is a well-reviewed and used source for the determination of the level of democracy within a state (Polity IV 2010).

For the data analysis I will be using the Congruence Procedure type 2: Multiple within case comparisons as discussed by Stephen Van Evera.²² This procedure allows me to "make a number of paired observations of values on the IV and DV across a range of circumstances within a case."²³ What is of particular importance is the comparison of Japan in the past to modern Japan, specifically for the dependent variable, statistical agency funding, which needs to be compared to modern Japan in order to ascertain if the funding level is underfunded, semi-funded and well-funded. The independent variables act to provide information into whether or not there is a relation between a change in them and a change in the dependent variable.

3.5. Evaluative Standards

The variables and their measures I have chosen, have both merits to and issues with them. By looking at economic development through the lens of GDP per capita, I potentially miss out on other more accurate measures which could more directly impact the statistical agency. However, I was not able to determine other measures which would have had a narrower impact, so I have gone with this larger catch-all measure of growth and economic development. Democracy is another variable which can have potential issues with it. Beyond the concerns of what democracy is, and whether or not certain nations can really be counted as such due to having near uninterrupted one-party rule for almost their entire history, the use of democracy as a variable can have issues. It is also affected by many things and exists within the complex ecosystem of a society. My measure for it, Polity IV, takes a well-rounded approach in terms of defining democracy and rating it on its scale, measuring many different factors that influence and change democracy which include factionalism, 'special conditions' autocratic backslide and many others (Polity IV 2010). This provides what Lisa Baglione would call "measures [which] are both valid and reliable."²⁴ Finally the measure for a state's statistical agency being funded does allow some slippage in terms of validity and reliability, as it is a measure which I have come up with myself and has therefore not been rigorously tested. The statistical agency being technocratically run or not is another potential issue in terms of validity and reliability. Since my analysis relies upon a close reading of literature, there is the possibility of different interpretations of it. However, due to the easy dividing line of the Second World War, I, as well as my audience have a pretty good

²¹ "Maddison Project Database" <https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/historicaldevelopment/maddison/releases/maddison-project-database-2018>, (Germany, University of Groningen, 2018)

²² Van Evera, Guide, 61

²³ Ibid., 63

²⁴ Lisa Baglione, Writing a Research Paper in Political Science: A Practical Guide to Inquiry, Structure, and Methods., (2007), 138

¹⁹ "Statistics Bureau Home Page." <http://www.stat.go.jp/english/index.html>, (Japan, 2018)

²⁰ "World Bank Open Data | Data." <https://data.worldbank.org/>, (2018)

idea of statistical agencies being technocratically run, or not.

4. Analysis

What is the relation between the development of statistical agencies and the development of the state? I claim that as the state develops, becoming either more democratic or more economically developed, statistical agencies which undergird them become more technocratic in character. The casual mechanism which exists in this example is different for each of the reasons. For democracy, the statistical agency becomes more technocratic due to the necessity of running an open and public facing administration. Such administrations focus more on good quantitative results for their rule and goals in order to prove to the greater populace that they are worthy of electoral success. For economic development the mechanism is slightly different. As the economy grows, it demands further development of resources and the populace as there are less ‘easy’ growth opportunities available. In order to accomplish this, a statistical agency must become more technocratically run, rather than run by the whims of the current administration to accomplish one goal or another. This allows the deeper coordination of various actors within the economy, and more efficient exploitation of resources available. With the case of Japan, I examine two separate time periods. The first I examine is that of Imperial Japan, which I categorize as restoration of the emperor, Meiji, to the throne in 1868, to the end of World War Two in the Pacific, in 1945.²⁵ The second time period I examine is that of post-war Japan, specifically from after the end of American occupation in 1952 to the present era.²⁶ I draw upon data about democratization from Polity IV, from which I have made a graph of the ‘democracy score.’ I draw upon economic data from the Madison Project, from which I have made another graph. They are both posted below in their entirety, and certain sections are referenced in specific throughout the analysis.




Figure 1

²⁵ Sadao Asada, “The Shock of the Atomic Bomb and Japan’s Decision to Surrender - A Reconsideration.” *Pacific Historical Review* 67 (4), (1998), <https://doi.org/10.2307/3641184>, 477-512

²⁶ Eiji Takemae, *The Allied Occupation of Japan*, (New York, Continuum, 2002), 11




Figure 2

4.1. Imperial Japan

Imperial Japan, from its outset was a quickly modernizing giant. With reforms pushed through by emperor Meiji, a formerly feudal backwater was turned into an imperialist power the likes of which competed with other established great powers such as France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and eventually the United States.

For the value of the economy, specifically that of GDP per capita, the country was lacking. In the graph pictured below, I present the values of GDP per capita of Imperial Japan, from 1870 to 1944.




Figure 3

The value in the starting year of 1870 is \$985 USD, which qualifies the country as low-income status. It reaches low-middle-income status definitively by the year of 1880, as there is some slippage back and forth between the value of \$1025 USD, which is the cutoff for low-middle-income status as defined by the World Bank.²⁷ This value raises steadily to a high of \$3815 USD in 1940, but never official makes it to the rank of official middle-income status. While this growth

is impressive, especially for a state which had been all but feudal in character until its rapid modernization under emperor Meiji, it is not enough to propel it to status which was fully equivalent to the other contemporary modern powers such as the UK, France, Germany, the USSR and the United States. The US's economy was in fact three times the size of that of Japan at the time and was almost considered high income at a value of \$11,307 USD.²⁸ Japan at the time was about equivalent to the power of Italy, a middling kingdom not known for its economic prowess. The economy of Japan in the Imperial era was characterized by a system of family-owned conglomerates and monopolies known as Zaibatsu. The zaibatsus were key in the early development of Japan, concentrating capital into select families which aided development, however, “despite much research, the contributions of zaibatsu to the rapid development of the prewar period remain unclear. The zaibatsu were clearly key players in this development.”²⁹ Japan may have in fact been hindered by this type of corporate paternalism and “questions remain about whether powerful zaibatsu families grew overly concerned about preserving their wealth and control and avoided high-risk projects in new industries that might have further accelerated Japan's modernization.”³⁰ This was alleviated somewhat right before the war, as major industries were nationalized, but not enough time passed under the state-run administration to fully compare it to the zaibatsu style.

Democracy was a rare thing in Imperial era Japan. There was somewhat of a constitution, known as the Oath in Five Articles which was sometimes described as “as a constitution for all ages.”³¹ However, an oath is simply the word of a leader, and can be abused, as words often are. This was the status quo for the first several years in Meiji era Imperial Japan, until 1889, where a formal constitution which granted an assembly known as the Imperial Diet.³² It has several powers, but most authority was still vested within the emperor, who had almost supreme authority under the constitution. Eventually, after the end of the First World War, an era in Japanese politics known as the Taishō Democracy came into being. It was characterized by a two-party system and the granting of universal male suffrage.³³ A further democratization came under the Early Shōwa period, where local assemblies in colonies started to gain political power of their own and sent elected representatives to the main islands. This however was not to last, and the machinations of military factions within the government as well as fears of communist takeover and revolution culminated in the invasion of Manchuria and the establishment of the Manchukuo client state.³⁴ The militarization of the government continued to the Second Sino-Japanese War in

²⁸ Bolt, Jutta, Robert Inklaar, Herman de Jong and Jan Luiten van Zanden “Maddison Project Database, version 2018.” (2018), Rebasing ‘Maddison’: new income comparisons and the shape of long-run economic development, Maddison Project Working paper 10

²⁹ Morck, Randall, Masao Nakamura, and Sheldon Garon, “A Frog in a Well Knows Nothing of the Ocean: A History of Corporate Ownership in Japan.” (2005), 368

³⁰ Ibid., 368

³¹ Keene, Donald, “Emperor of Japan: Meiji and His World, 1852-1912.” (2005), 340

³² “1889 Japanese Constitution.” (1889) <https://history.hanover.edu/texts/1889con.html>.

³³ Mikiso Hane, Modern Japan a Historical Survey. 2nd ed., (Boulder, Westview Press, 1992), 240

³⁴ Hane, Mikiso. 1992. Modern Japan a Historical Survey. 2nd ed. ACLS Humanities E-Book. Boulder: Westview Press.

³⁴ Mikiso Hane, Modern Japan a Historical Survey. 2nd ed., (Boulder, Westview Press, 1992), 240

1937, and only ended with the occupation of the Japanese mainland by American forces. The graph below details the democracy score of Japan through this tumultuous era.




Figure 4

In the analysis of this graph, we observe several things. The value up to the coronation of Emperor Meiji is -10, an absolute autocracy on the polity IV scale. With his coronation and subsequent constitutionalism, the score moves all the way to +1, an anocracy, which exists as a mix between dictatorship and democracy, or a mixed regime. This continues, despite the increase in democratization that is observed in the Taishō and Shōwa periods due to their ultimately ephemeral nature. The only other change comes at the end of the war, where the American occupation force arrives and begins writing a new constitution and political system for Japan. As observed, there was an increase in democracy, but it was not extensive enough so that the state would be considered democratic.

The dependent variable, the condition of the state statistical service, undergoes somewhat of a change during this era as well, but it is fraught with setbacks and influenced by patrimonial relationships. In the Imperial era “statisticians debated about whether statistics was a general method for all subjects of scientific analysis or a particular form of statecraft.”³⁵ In addition “Meiji statisticians competed primarily with stakeholders of traditional political authority to gain a place at the center of governance on one front, and with discipline based, established scientists in the academy on another front.”³⁶ As well, efforts by those who had gone abroad in order to study the ‘western sciences,’ specifically those of statistics, ran into issues when they returned to Japan,

³⁵ Alain Desrosières, “How to Make Things Which Hold Together - Social Science, Statistics and the State.” Sociology of the Sciences xv, (1991), 197

³⁶ Shigeru Aihara et al. “Toukei nihon keizei - keizai hattatuten wo toshitemita nihon toukeishi. (Statistics and Japanese economics - History of Statistics in Japan through the Lens of Economic Development).” (Tokyo, 1971), 76

“Efforts to institutionalize statistical work in government administration met resistance from those invested in the former power structure of military authority and close monitoring of subject populations. Similarly, efforts to institutionalize statistics as an entirely new academic science met resistance from those invested in established academic disciplines where statistics could be adopted as a new tool.”³⁷

This competition and interference makes it so that I classify that the statistical agency/service at the time would be characterized as non-technocratic.

4.2. Modern Japan

Modern Japan, 1953- present, was characterized by rapid change and rebuilding after the Second World War, focusing mainly on manufacturing and later on advanced technology and research. It is among the premier economies and democracies in the modern world, at times only being second to the United States in the first category. While there has recently been stagnation and a worrying trend towards militarization, modern Japan is a distinct and separate state from Imperial Japan.

This couldn’t be any truer for the economy of the post-war state. The war had destroyed the capacity of the Japanese state and ability of the economy to produce enough to feed and clothe its people. There were major risks of starvation as well as complete collapse of Japanese society as it existed. The loss of Japanese colonies also compounded this issue further by depriving it of key natural resources necessary for a modern economy such as rubber, oil, metals and other raw materials.³⁸ While American aide helped avoid complete catastrophe, production was still below prewar levels. America came to aid Japan in a secondary way with the onset of the Korean War. Japan was favored by a policy of special procurement, in which America would buy supplies for its troops from the Japanese economy. Most of these supplies were simple to manufacture and allowed the reindustrializing of the nation.³⁹ Further expansion occurred as Japan positioned itself as a center for cheap manufacturing, due to increased internal consumption as well as favorable trade treaties with Western states. The idea of the zaibatsu came back, albeit in a different form as the Keiretsu which “efficiently allocated resources and became competitive internationally.”⁴⁰ They also prioritized long term planning which helped in the later transition of the Japanese economy from manufacturing-based, to service and research-based.

In the analysis of the economic growth data of the postwar years, several things are uncovered.




Figure 5

Japan enters this era as a low-middle-income nation, with a GDP per capita of \$1,776 USD in 1945. It enters middle-income territory by 1957, reaching \$4,067 USD per capita. High-income status arrives by 1970 with a per capita GDP of \$12,904 USD (World Bank 2016). This is an incredibly rapid and sustained level of growth which continues to 1995, where stagnation begins to set in and literature about a ‘lost decade’ of growth begins to appear.

Democracy in Japan follows a similar if not faster route of development. A new constitution of Japan was introduced in 1946, which was accepted by the Diet. It included many liberal and social reforms to the old Meiji style constitution which had ruled Japan since its promulgation in 1889.⁴¹ It removed the Emperor from a position of power and privilege within Japanese politics and fully enshrined the powers of the state within the new Diet. Universal franchise was made into law as well as trade unions legalized. Any idea of an official state religion was removed, as well as any potential military tendencies within the famous article 9 of the constitution which prohibited a standing military.⁴² Since the enshrinement of this new constitution, democracy in Japan has been a resounding success, with no authoritarian slide back and regular competitive elections occurring every several years.

The polity IV graph shows much of the same information as described above.

³⁷ Jennifer Winther, “The National Character of Science: Statistics in Modern Japan.” (2017) 24
³⁸ Dick Nanto, “The United States Role in the Postwar Economic Recovery of Japan.” (ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 1977), 253
³⁹ Ibid., 265
⁴⁰ Hunt, Transformed, 211

⁴¹ Ibid., 86
⁴² Ibid., 87




Figure 6

From 1946 to 1953, the gradual movement from 2 to 10 on the democracy score represents the movement from military government under MacArthur to fully independent liberal democracy under sovereign Japanese control. Within the polity IV series, any number between that of 6 and 10 represents a full democracy, and from 1953 to present that number has been 10 (Polity IV 2010). This counts as an increase in democracy as discussed earlier in the methodology section of the paper.

Along with monumental advances within the economy and political spheres, the statistical agencies within Japan have also undergone vast change. American and Japanese officials made sure to help redevelop the new post war institutions and agencies of statistics by having “postwar Japanese elite statisticians given an unprecedented amount of political power to rebuild the statistical system”.⁴³ Indeed, “In the minds of both the Americans and Japanese, a sound statistical system was a fundamental part of democratic governance. In ideological terms, elite statisticians argued that statistical knowledge revealed the true nature of Japanese capitalism and that its dissemination enabled the Japanese people to hold their government accountable”.⁴⁴ This directly connects to the earlier claim made within the analysis in the paper, that more democratic government would lead to a better and more technocratically run statistical agency. This trend continues on to modern Japan, which categorizes the post-war statistical agency as technocratically run.

4.3. Analysis

There exists evidence for both of the claims, that democracy and economic development lead to a well-developed, technocratic, statistical agency. Through reviewing the evidence presented, it has been shown that Japan, in moving from its Imperial character to that of its modern character has developed as predicted. For the first hypothesis, it was posited that an increase of GDP per capita, operationalized as moving from low-income status to middle and

high-income status would lead to a more technocratic statistical agency:

(+)

Increase in GDP per Capita → Technocratic Statistical Agency

Japan indeed moved from low to middle-low income status during the Imperial era, but there was no subsequent increase in how well run the agency was. However, when it moved from low-middle-income to middle income and eventually high-income status, the statistical agency became more developed and technocratic as evidenced in the reading of the literature related to it. For the second hypothesis it was suggested that an increase in the level of democracy within the country could also increase the development of the statistical agency:

(+)

Increase in level of Democracy → Technocratic Statistical Agency

As Japan moved from imperial anocracy to liberal democracy in the post-war era, the statistical agency as well became more developed and technocratic. However, there was more evidence for a direct causation in the literature between the two than for the economic development hypothesis.

5. Conclusion

The initial question I set out to research, what the relation was between a country’s development and the development of its statistical agency was quite complex, more than what I expected it to be. In investigating such complex and multifaceted phenomena as democracy and economic development in relation to statistical agency development the theoretical literature greatly aided me in my quest for answers and what hadn’t been discovered yet. Most of the literature was sociological and discussed the ‘more human’ aspects of the statistical agency and the development of the state. Specifically, the philosophical work of Michael Foucault, which discussed regimes of control and governmentality aided me in my work by providing interesting thoughts and conclusions from his own research. The other authors as well contributed to my search for terminology and understanding of the relationship of the statistical agency and the state. Japan existed as an interesting choice for case study, as it represents a country in which two radically different modes of government and economy existed at two different times. This is useful for comparison, and as such I utilized the Congruence Procedure type 2: Multiple within case comparisons.⁴⁵ The research I conducted indeed showed a connection between the development of the state in terms of democracy, and the economy. As Japan changed from an authoritarian imperial style government, to a liberal democratic one, there was development within the statistical agency, a movement from non-technocratic governance to technocratic governance. This correlation was also shown in regard to the development of the economy.

⁴³ Winther, Character, 48

⁴⁴ Laura Hein, “Statistics for Democracy: Economics as Politics in Occupied Japan.” Positions: East Asia Cultures Critique 11 (3), (2003), <https://doi.org/10.1215/10679847-11-3-765>, 765

⁴⁵ Van Evera, Guide, 61

This research and its results aid in providing evidence for theories relating to capitalism and its development. Rather than speculation or philosophical thought experiments, it is grounded results which aid in providing an academic justification for further theorizing. As such my research has provided those results. It is not that a state can simply wave a wand and create a well-developed statistical agency, but rather it is a complex interplay between the economy and democracy which develop it and necessitate its development. Literature previously took the agency's development as a given, and instead analyzed its effects on the population and the economy. My research indicates that it is not so simple.

There are potential confounding variables which could throw off my study, such as focusing on one case, Japan, rather than a multitude of cases. However, the strength of the case study methodology lies within its deep examination of variables and cases. With further case studies, perhaps on the statistical agencies of Germany, comparing East Germany and West Germany, more information could be found towards the correlation which I have established within this paper. I would also have liked to have had the ability to access information about the agency within native language sources, as they would provide more information than translated or other works which are of a more secondary nature.

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The Decline of Personal Religious Sentiment and the Evolution of Clerical Power in Revolutionary Iran: Shariati to Khamenei

Amir Dif

Abstract

This paper is an explanatory synthesis of scholarly opinion on the concurrent, and I posit to be related trends of religious sentiment and the growth of clerical power in Iran, prior to the Islamic Revolution between 1960 to the late 1990's. I present scholarly belief that philosophical and political figures in pre-revolutionary Iran, such as Ali Shariati and Ayatollah Khomeini cultivated a revolutionary spirit using the institution of Islam in the lead-up to the revolution. In the period following, scholars show a decline in popular religious sentiment and a rise in institutional clerical power stemming from three events: the Iran-Iraq war, the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, and the constitutional reforms enacted by Ayatollah Khamenei in his capacity as Supreme Leader, a roll for which many believe his was ill-suited.

1. Introduction

The following is an explanatory synthesis of scholarly opinion on the trends of religious sentiment and the growth of clerical power starting in pre-revolutionary Iran, roughly in the 1960's to 1979, and ending in what can be understood as post-revolutionary Iran, in the late 1990's. In this paper, I will present scholarly belief that popular figures such as Ali Shariati and Ayatollah Khomeini popularized the idea of Islam, and Shiism in particular, as a revolutionary tool, resulting in a dramatic rise in personal religious sentiment in the period preceding the Islamic Revolution of 1979. In the period following, scholars show a relationship between the decline of popular religious sentiment and the rise of clerical power which was catalyzed by the following three events: the Iran-Iraq war, the death of Khomeini, and the constitutional reforms enacted by Khamenei in his capacity as the Supreme Leader of Iran, a roll for which many believe he was poorly suited.

A reasonable hypothesis detached from historical analysis would say that personal religious sentiment grows alongside clerical power in importance to society, but scholarly opinion tends to actively disprove this in the case of Iran. Scholars observe that the Office of the Supreme Leader's role diverged from being a champion, uncontested interpreter of Islam, with the support of the people, towards being a guardian of Iran's political institutions and "status-quo." This eventual divergence between popular religiosity and clerical power will be explored in the following stages: First, I will discuss Ali Shariati's popular philosophical influence as explained by Keddie¹ and Abrahamian², and Sachedina³. Shariati, widely agreed to be the greatest influencer on revolutionary Islam, championed the narrative that it was this Islam that

¹ Keddie, Nikki R. *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution*. New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 2006.

² Abrahamian, Ervand. "'Ali Shari'ati: Ideologue of the Iranian Revolution.'" *MERIP Reports*, no. 102 (1982): 24-28. doi:10.2307/3010795.

would be the sole necessity of the revolutionaries to carry out their task of reforming Iran. All three show that Shariati, along with his predecessors worked to influence the rise of popular Shi'ism and popularized Shi'ism as a political tool. Ayatollah Khomeini, an equal champion of revolutionary Islam drew on the techniques of clerics past and used mass media through way of the cassette tape to disseminate his message. Scholars indicate that the Ayatollah was unprepared and startled by his forthcoming role as the Supreme Leader. His vision for the revolution shows to be like Shariati's, but changes significantly once he is in power.

I will then transition into the second section, which examines scholarly opinion on post-revolutionary Iran, defined as the period after Khomeini took power and began to consolidate it, and continuing into Khamenei's constitutional reforms. Brumberg⁴, Roy⁵, and Zubaida⁶ are all significant scholars in the context of post-revolutionary Iran. Here I will identify and expand upon the three aforementioned events as catalysts for the separation of faith from political leadership, those being the Iran-Iraq war, the death of Khomeini, and the reforms implemented by Khamenei, according to scholarly consensus. This is not to say those in leadership were faithless, but only to say that revolutionary Islam was no longer the motivating force behind reform. Rather, it was supplanted by political pragmatism and maneuvering.

2. Pre-Revolution

Ridgeon, quoting Boroujerdi⁷, wrote “If the Iranian intellectual panorama of the 1960s was dominated by Jalal Al-e Ahmad, that of the 1970s undoubtedly belonged to Ali Shariati.”⁸ Ali Shariati's enormous impact on the Islamic Revolution is not understated in any scholarly work. Nearly identical language is used among Keddie⁹, Ridgeon, Sachedina, and Abrahamian who all use the label “Ideologue of the Revolution” to describe Shariati either in the title of their work or in their text. Scholars agree on this name by consensus, and as such, time should be dedicated to understanding the implications of it. Being the “ideologue” contrasts him with who scholars may see as the “practitioners” of the revolution, such as Khomeini. The name divides him from the rest of the revolution, which may not have necessarily been driven by ideology but by other motives. Those motives, in the case of Khomeini or Khamenei, may have been political. While others are not expressly labeled “practitioners of the revolution” or “politicians of the revolution” by explicit consensus from scholars, it is by implication that if Shariati served his role as an ideologue, then others must have served roles as something other than ideologues. As

the revolution's chief ideologue, scholarly perspective of Shariati's ideology is of course worthy of careful examination.

Scholarly methodology towards understanding Shariati's views consists of examination of his writings, which are not numerous, and paying detailed attention to his speeches, for which he gained acclaim. On Shariati, Keddie notes that “There is as yet no complete bibliography of Shariati, and as many of his works were short mimeographed lectures, or transcriptions from cassettes, while others appeared under pseudonyms or in obscure reviews, it is hard to establish one.”¹⁰

In addition, Shariati's political philosophy is difficult to label for scholars, seeing as he rejected Marxism for “being too removed from Iran's Islamic history”¹¹ while wanting to establish an identical classless society. To the regime, Mohammadi and Mohammadi identify that revolutionaries were labeled “Islamic Marxists” and that this “became the standard description used in domestic news broadcasts” broadcasted by the state media.¹² Ridgeon writes “his world view was different from that of Marxists by claiming ‘Marx makes economics the infrastructure of man, but we [hold] precisely the opposite view’”¹³ As Ridgeon clarifies, Shariati believed that it was within the hearts and minds of the people that Islam would find its rightful place in leading the revolution. Shariati's political philosophy rejected not only the Western imperialist forms of government, but also the former Iranian monarchical governments. Shariati's scorn was extended to the clergy in its association with Iranian monarchy, who he believed “substituted themselves for God because they encouraged blind imitation to themselves, rather than leading the people towards God by nurturing human reason.”¹⁴ Scholars hold that it is the alienation of Marxism, capitalism, empiricism, etc., from Iran's Islamic history which make them inherently incompatible. Truly virtuous and right political philosophy for Iran, by this logic, could only be Islam. An Islam which was revolutionary by nature is what Shariati preached, as scholars show. Shariati leaves no room for a privileged class in the revolution but does reserve space for himself and those like him as intellectuals.

Abrahamian cites what Shariati calls the *rushnafekran*, or the “intelligentsia”¹⁵ who would be responsible for removing from society its self-exploitative tendencies. Abrahamian does not qualify this intelligentsia as Shariati's advocacy for ruling elite which came later in the revolution separate from Shariati, but instead as a group who was privileged and educated enough to understand society's “inner contradictions.” According to Abrahamian, the intelligentsia as used by Shariati was “fortunate in that it lived in a society whose religious culture, Shiism was

³ Abdulaziz Sachedina Chapter 9 Ali Shariati: Ideologue of the Revolution in *Voices of Resurgent Islam* New York Oxford, Oxford University Press 1983
⁴ Brumberg, Daniel. “The Trials and Tribulations of Complex Routinization.” In *Reinventing Khomeini: The Struggle for Reform in Iran*. University of Chicago Press, 2001.
⁵ Roy, Olivier. “The Crisis of Religious Legitimacy in Iran.” *Middle East Journal* 53, no. 2 (1999): 201-16. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4329317>.
⁶ Sami Zubaida, “Is Iran an Islamic State? in *Political Islam: Essays from Middle East Report*, ed. Joel Stork and Joel Beinin (Berkeley, CA, 1997), 103–119
⁷ Boroujerdi, M. *Iranian Intellectuals and the West*. Syracuse University Press, 1996. P.106.
⁸ Ridgeon, Lloyd. “Civilization and Modernization” in *Religion and Politics in Modern Iran*. I.B. Tauris & Co. 2005.
⁹ Ibid., (Keddie, 198)

¹⁰ Ibid., (Keddie, 201)
¹¹ Ibid., (Ridgeon,174)
¹² Ibid., (Mohammadi & Mohammadi, page 142)
¹³ Ibid., (Ridgeon 176)
¹⁴ Ibid., (Ridgeon, 176)
¹⁵ Abrahamian, Ervand. “‘Ali Shari’ati: Ideologue of the Iranian Revolution.” *MERIP Reports*, no. 102 (1982): 24-28. doi:10.2307/3010795.

intrinsically radical.”¹⁶ Sachedina¹⁷ uses identical terminology to describe the intelligentsia, labeling them as those “who could come to grips with the society’s inner contradictions.”¹⁸ To Sachedina and less so to Abrahamian, the intelligentsia were a response to modernity and were necessary for “Muslim youth in the Third World.”¹⁹ In addition, Sachedina, unlike Abrahamian labels this group as mujtahid. Keddie’s text does not mention this idea.

Ridgeon identifies Shariati’s most popular writing as “Islam-shenasi (Recognizing Islam)” a text which describes Islam as “compatible with reason, democracy, and social and economic equality.”²⁰

This inherent radical nature of Shiism is described in the same way by Sachedina, but who uses a markedly different source to describe Shariati’s views. Sachedina uses Shariati’s role in establishing the “Husayniya-yi Irshad,” an institution which hosted Shariati’s most influential and radical lectures.²¹ The word husayniya and the concept of a husayniya as a place of supplemental Islamic learning outside of the mosque is a great deal of focus for Sachedina who draws an obvious link between it and the life and martyred death of Imam Husayn. In his work *Suicide Bombers: Allah’s New Martyrs*²², Farhad Khosrokhavar, again uses the term “ideologue of the revolution” to describe Shariati. Khosrokhavar’s focus on martyrdom in his work furnishes an extremely important insight into Shariati which other scholars do not explain: the shift from passive to active Shiism thanks to Shariati. He explains that “Muslims often adopted a passive attitude and mentally projected themselves into an End of time that left oppressive and unjust regimes free to dominate the people in this world.”²³ Shariati, according to Khosrokhavar helped to mobilize Shiism into “Ali’s Shiism”, which was, according to Shariati “in keeping with Shiism’s original vocation and would hasten the coming the hidden imam.”²⁴ In terms of importance to the faithful in Iran, the return of the hidden Imam cannot be understated. An idea such as this one would certainly grasp at the hearts of Iranians.

While the life of Imam Husayn would be common knowledge to most Iranians, especially the educated youth who constituted much of Shariati’s audience, Sachedina and Keddie remark that his approach to understanding Islam was done with “a fresh style of discourse and a new terminology to interpret and teach Islam in the Iranian milieu.”²⁵ Shariati’s ability to communicate with and understand the Iranian youth, who were faced with challenges unlike any previous generation was what made him significant. Sachedina writes “While the leaders of the religious class, the ulama, realized the urgency to communicate with the youth, they found

themselves ill-equipped methodologically to direct the younger generation(. . .).”²⁶ While Shariati rightly receives much scholarly praise for speaking to Iran’s youth in a new way which engaged them in the revolution and showed them the virtue of Revolutionary Islam and how it could guide them, Ayatollah Khomeini played an incontrovertible role in mobilizing revolutionary Islam against the shah. Of interest to this paper are the philosophy Khomeini preached and the methods with which he preached so that I may identify where and how they changed.

Significantly, as Mohammadi and Mohammadi²⁷ write, Khomeini’s rhetoric focused on popular revolutionary Islam, and the importance of Islam itself rather than about himself or of gathering around one single leader. The authors show that Khomeini’s message on his cassette tapes did not necessarily place him squarely as the leader of the Islamic Revolution. His cassettes were extremely popular and reached a huge base. Mohammadi and Mohammadi write “The biggest rival to Khomeini for popular affection in the cassette stakes was Shariati.”²⁸ In his sermons, he attacks the regime, the White Revolution, and ultimately makes similar points to Shariati. He too is ant-Western, anti-imperialist, anti-monarchy, and pro-revolutionary Islam. Khomeini, in what is perhaps second nature to him as a trained clergyman, bolsters every political argument he makes with a religious one. Mohammadi and Mohammadi identify Khomeini’s term “vahdat-e-kalame”, or his message of “each stratum of the nation to maintain solidarity” as being significant for his message.²⁹ They write that “the functional argument for solidarity in Islam is also a prefiguring of the total dominance of this perspective over all others that was the outcome of the movement.” Solidarity through Islam, especially revolutionary Shiism, elevates the actions one person may take in the eyes of their nation, according to the authors. “Death was elevated to martyrdom, something glorious rather than terrifying, thus empowering an unarmed people and belittling any regime threats.”³⁰ Mohammadi and Mohammadi, then, agree with Khosrokhavar who previously discussed the importance of martyrdom to the revolutionaries. Ancillary to Khomeini’s proclamations for popular mobilization were those of other religious figures, according to Mohammadi. Other ayatollahs issues similar proclamations as Khomeini, but Mohammadi also indicate that his message resonated with a stratum of religious figures, whom they dub “lesser religious figures.” This included “Tehrani, Khomeini, Rabbani, and many others.”³¹

The revolutionary message of Shariati, Khomeini, and others needed no further repetition, and the people were undoubtedly convinced that it was Islam that would carry them into a world of virtue, peace, and equality by the spring of 1979. Mohammadi state unambiguously that the people are convinced of Islam as their message and as Khomeini as their leader. Mohammadi cite

¹⁶ Ibid., (Abrahamian, 26)

¹⁷ Abdulaziz Sachedina Chapter 9 Ali Shariati: Ideologue of the Revolution in *Voices of Resurgent Islam* New York Oxford, Oxford University Press 1983 page 197

¹⁸ Ibid., (Sachedina, page 197)

¹⁹ Ibid., (Sachedina, 197)

²⁰ Ibid., (Ridgeon, 176)

²¹ Ibid., (Sachedina, 195)

²² Farhad Khosrokhavar, *Suicide Bombers: Allah’s New Martyrs* (London, 2005)

²³ Ibid., (Khosrokhavar, 73)

²⁴ Ibid., (Khosrokhavar, 73)

²⁵ Ibid., (Sachedina, 196)

²⁶ Ibid., (Sachedina 191)

²⁷ Sreberny-Mohammadi, Annabelle, and Ali Mohammadi. *Small Media Big Revolution: Communication, Culture and the Iranian Revolution*. University of Minnesota Press, 1994. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/j.ctttbf8>.

²⁸ Ibid., (Mohammadi, 121)

²⁹ Ibid., (Mohammadi & Mohammadi, 124)

³⁰ Ibid., (Mohammadi & Mohammadi, 124)

³¹ Ibid., (Mohammadi & Mohammadi, 125)

popular chants such as “Hossein is our savior, Khomeini our leader”, “Our movement is Islamic and our leader is Khomeini” as rather convincing evidence of the public’s total enthrallment with popular Islam and Khomeini as its flag-bearer.³²

One must note that the public’s appointment of Khomeini as its leader is a sharp divergence from the ideology which initially catalyzed the movement. I have described scholarly work on Shariati which prescribes no singular leader to the Islamic movement, and instead focuses on Shariati’s stress on public unity and classlessness. Keddie identifies the work of Bani Sadr as carrying this same message. She writes “The goal of Islamic government, to Bani Sadr, is not only to stop a person or group from monopolizing power; it is to suppress centralized power and the state as a form of oppression.”³³ Keddie neatly summarizes Bani Sadr’s ideology, saying that “thus, one must not adore any leader, neither Stalin, nor Hitler, not de Gaulle, nor Mosaddeq, nor Khomeini, as the cult of men leads to enslavement and totalitarianism.”³⁴ The work of Shariati and Bani Sadr eventually fell on deaf ears, as Mohammadi and others show, but it seems to have resonated with Khomeini until he had no choice but to lead the new government. Khomeini’s decision to lead was certainly not his plan. Following the fleeing of the Shah, they write “Khomeini had declared himself ready to establish an Islamic Republic and even to head it (already backtracking on earlier comments that he would return to Qom and stay out of politics).”³⁵

Khomeini’s leadership was surprising and self-contradictory to him, but he nevertheless embraced it. Now, I will examine scholarly opinion on Khomeini’s continued divergence from the philosophy of the revolution and will end with Khamenei’s own divergence as well.

3. Post-Revolutionary

In this section I will synthesize work from three scholars- Brumberg, Zubaida, and Roy. I will focus on their explanations of the events which followed Khomeini’s ascension to power and the changing religious attitudes of the Iranian public and its rulers until the period where Khamenei enacted his constitutional reforms.

To Brumberg, Iran-Iraq war is self-evident proof of Khomeini’s “failure to institutionalize the revolution.”³⁶ Brumberg writes that the “socioeconomic and human costs of the Iran-Iraq War might have encouraged Khomeini to acquiesce to routinization” and then later writes “yet the bloody fighting did not compel the Imam to be more pragmatic: on the contrary, the martyrdom of thousands of young men filled his head anew with mystical visions.”³⁷ Khomeini, according to Brumberg, believed that if he could continue to use visions of martyrdom through allusion to sacred Shiite imams he would have the backing of the Iranian people and the majles. With “clear

political intent,” Khomeini continued down a path of attempting to Islamize Iran’s institutional values.³⁸ In Brumberg’s view, this political calculation did not serve Khomeini well, and only moved him further away from the initial philosophy of the revolution.

Brumberg sees Khomeini’s actions in the war as part of a larger pattern- one where Khomeini uses his dual religious and political authority to issue statements in which he self-proclaims more power for himself. Brumberg uses a speech Khomeini gave to the majles in an attempt to break the political gridlock between the parliamentary body and the Council of Guardians in order to illustrate his point that Khomeini continued to elevate himself beyond the scope of Islam. Khomeini said, “secondary provisions [which]...have been ordained for the very reason that problems may arise in a particular society...these are also ordinances from God.”³⁹ Most fascinating in this section is Brumberg’s interpretation of the statement. He writes “by thus implying that secondary rulings were also mandated by God, Khomeini virtually equated the clerical power to issue such rulings with the authority of God himself!”⁴⁰ Two more statements from Khomeini help Brumberg expand on his point even more. The next was, according to Brumberg, a “half-baked attempt to shift his authority to the majles” by institutionalizing the revolution.⁴¹ Khomeini said “The main thing is that we serve Islam...serving the government is the same as serving Islam... We should no longer say we are in a revolutionary situation.”⁴² Such a statement seems to incontrovertibly say that Khomeini believed that his role as the faqih was to safeguard Iranian political institutions, and that Islam was his political tool to achieve this. Brumberg provides further evidence of this. In a public dispute between then President Khamenei and Khomeini, Brumberg notices that Khomeini believed “that the faqih was not merely the interpreter of the law, but in some sense the vehicle of law itself.”⁴³ The dispute at hand was over a statement Khamenei made where he said “the executive branch...should have a permanent presence in society...within the limits of Islamic laws and Islamic principles.”⁴⁴ This statement, according to Brumberg angered Khomeini who responded by saying “the government, which is part of the total [or absolute] vice-regency of the Prophet...is one of the foremost injunctions of Islam and his priority over all other secondary injunctions, even prayers, fasting, and the hajj... The government is empowered to unilaterally revoke any lawful agreement...if the agreement contravenes the interests of the country. It can prevent any matter, whether religious or secular, if it is against the interests of Islam.”⁴⁵ Something very similar is in Roy’s text when he cites a letter Khomeini wrote to Khamenei on how “the government can unilaterally abrogate legal (sharia) agreements. “‘Legal’ here means conforming to the sharia. It does not simply mean that the government might decide on things which are not in the sharia

³² Ibid.,(Mohammadi & Mohammadi, 158)
³³ Ibid., (Keddie, 211)
³⁴ Ibid., (Keddie, 210)
³⁵ Ibid., (Mohammadi & Mohammadi, 159)
³⁶ Ibid., (Brumberg,130)
³⁷ Ibid., (Brumberg,129)

³⁸ Ibid., (Brumberg,129)
³⁹ Ibid., (Brumberg,129)
⁴⁰ Ibid., (Brumberg,129)
⁴¹ Ibid., (Brumberg,129)
⁴² Ibid., (Brumberg,129)
⁴³ Ibid., (Brumberg,135)
⁴⁴ Ibid., (Brumberg,135)
⁴⁵ Ibid., (Brumberg,135)

(such as customs duties), which has always been the case even for very fundamentalist regimes. Khomeini explicitly states that the government might ignore or alter some sharia requirements.”⁴⁶

Zubaida uses the constitution itself, rather than just statements from Khomeini to show that it was the state, not Islam, which drove the post-revolutionary government. Zubaida writes “It [the constitution] privileges the sharia as a source of legislation, but this is only one of its many provisions.”⁴⁷

Khomeini’s statements in the wartime period did not harm the legitimacy of his leadership because he was legitimate both religiously and politically. This dual legitimacy proves to be an unsustainable model, as other scholars discuss.

Zubaida and Roy contradict each other’s arguments on the role of Islam in the new Islamic Republic. Zubaida holds that “the project of the Islamic Republic is to Islamize state, society, and culture.”⁴⁸ Roy asserts the point that “in a religious revolution, the status and role of religion is nevertheless defined by political institutions, not religious ones. Politics rule over religion.”⁴⁹ These contending positions offer interesting interpretations of what Roy calls “the conjunction of two legitimacies, religious and political.”⁵⁰ This equilibrium of legitimacy is not identified by scholars of pre-revolutionary Iran, perhaps because in the case of Khomeini dual legitimacy is assumed. His appointment as leader by popular referendum, and the lack of scholarly dialogue questioning Khomeini’s fitness to rule indicates without question he possessed what Roy believes the concept of velayat-e faqih necessitates, that being religious and political legitimacy. Roy in fact writes “this congruence was realized only in the late Imam Ruhollah Khomeini’s person.”⁵¹

Roy’s dialogue on the crisis for legitimacy is predicated upon the idea that religious legitimacy cannot also offer political legitimacy, nor vice versa. A true leader of the Islamic Republic must seek out both. Clerical ability as a litmus test for leadership indicates a public deeply invested in the Islamic character of its leaders. As Roy points out, after the death of Khomeini, Khamenei fails this litmus test. Roy writes “Khomeini’s death in 1989 meant the end of this double legitimacy. His successor as Guide, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was not a leading religious authority.”⁵²

Roy and Zubaida agree that Khamenei’s leadership was severely complicated by the simple fact that he was not Khomeini. Lacking religious credentials, his logical calculation was to bolster himself as a politician as much as possible. This was done, according to Roy and Zubaida through constitutional reform. On the 1989 amendments, Zubaida writes that these reforms, “sanctioned by Khomeini before his death, allow the government to disregard sharia

provisions in legislation and policy.”⁵³ What this left was a government that was “Islamic in its personnel (...) Their political discourse couched in religious terms, and their conflicts often conducted with religious rhetoric. Beyond that, the form of organization of the state and its institutions have no particularly Islamic features, and it is difficult to see what such features would be like.”⁵⁴ Roy cites article 107 of the constitution as amended in 1989. He writes that “the disappearance of any mention of the marja in the 1989 constitution shows clearly that the Guide, who is the supreme authority in the Islamic Republic, need not necessarily be the leading authority in religion.”⁵⁵

4. Conclusion

Scholars of pre-revolutionary Iran believe that popular opinion rested on the idea of revolutionary Islam carrying the country out of its legacy of being imperialized, and of its rulers oppressing the masses. Scholars hold that Shariati’s message reached and affected many, and that his message of total unity was echoed by Khomeini. They both presented to the public total unification through Islam. The collective efforts of the society would surely hasten the return of the twelfth Imam. Scholars of post-revolutionary Iran problematize that Khomeini actually believed this. They show that through his actions and his rhetoric he believed in Iran’s institutions and in safeguarding his power.

Scholars of post-revolutionary Iran show that in three distinct stages, the religious legitimacy of the Iranian Supreme Leader dwindled, and religious rhetoric became less effective at mobilizing the public and others in leadership. First with the Iran-Iraq war, where Khomeini’s rhetoric on martyrdom indeed mobilized the basij in unprecedented ways but did not convince Brumberg of the Khomeini’s ability to institutionalize the revolutionary values. Second, the death of Khomeini presented questions of the characteristics of the faqih. To Roy and Zubaida, the appointment of Khamenei showed that the faqih need not be religiously dominant over all others, but only politically. This is a divergence from the philosophy and rhetoric found early in the revolution. Third, the constitutional reforms of 1989, according to Roy and Zubaida finalized the removal of revolutionary Islam from the Islamic Republic. It secularized religion and secured the faqih’s role as a political one.

An expansion of this paper would examine more scholarly opinion on popular religious sentiment in post-revolutionary Iran. It would ask more specifically the philosophy, if any, that individuals had on the continuing role of revolutionary Shiism after it was carried out. It would also seek more recent scholarship. Roy, while extremely well-versed, published his work in 1999. His writing is suggestive of an urgency he felt to make it known that Khamenei was ill-suited for his job. This urgency is felt among other writers as well, and a detachment from the historical time period may grant other scholars a different take on the events which transpired.

⁴⁶ Ibid., (Roy, 205)
⁴⁷ Ibid., (Zubaida, 106)
⁴⁸ Ibid., (Zubaida, 105)
⁴⁹ Roy, Olivier. “The Crisis of Religious Legitimacy in Iran.” Middle East Journal 53, no. 2 (1999): 201-16. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4329317>.
⁵⁰ Ibid., (Roy, 201)
⁵¹ Ibid., (Roy,201)
⁵² Ibid., (Roy, 202)

⁵³ Ibid., (Zubaida, 119)
⁵⁴ Ibid., (Zubaida, 118)
⁵⁵ Ibid., (Roy, 205)

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Polarities of Power: Globalizing Forces in a Changing Mexico

Alberto Garcia

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of globalization on the stability of the Mexican economy, focusing particularly on the social and economic well-being of Mexicans and the viability of key industries, such as hydrocarbons and tourism. Increasing economic interdependence under a regimen of globalization demands the reevaluation of Mexico’s international partnerships, particularly with the United States. In making such a reevaluation, Mexican leaders must consider a closer economic and political relationship with China, and enhancing Mexican engagement with multilateral organizations.

Introduction

Globalization is a phenomenon that dominates our day-to-day lives down to its most fundamental aspects. Thanks to globalization, we can drink the same Starbucks coffee in almost every country, enjoy imported goods for cheap prices and travel across the globe with ease. The world is more connected now than it has been than at any other point in world history. The extent of the process of globalization is present even in the smallest villages in the most remote regions. One region that has been impacted tremendously by globalization is Latin America, in particular Mexico. This paper will compare the positive and negative effects that globalization has had on Mexico while assessing the benefits of Sino-Mexican economic cooperation.

Positive Impact of Globalization within Mexico

NAFTA

One of the most prominent examples of globalization in the Americas is the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which has just recently been negotiated in a new deal as the United States-Mexico- Canada Agreement (USMCA). While NAFTA is a controversial agreement in Mexico, advocates have argued that Mexico’s economy has benefitted immensely from the trade agreement. Some of the benefits from NAFTA have included industrial diversification, an export-oriented economic strategy, increased trade and investment, financial credibility and a better position on the political field with the United States.

Before NAFTA, Mexican exports relied heavily on its oil industry; in 1980 oil exports accounted for 70% of its exports, while today they make up only 7% of total exports.¹ Globalization through NAFTA has allowed for more efficient manufacturing and a dramatic increase in export volume. The manufacturing of automobiles, automotive components, electronics and textiles have been the biggest exports for Mexico.

¹ Lyal White, *Mexico’s NAFTA: More Pros than Cons*. (Johannesburg, South Africa: South African Institute of International Affairs, 2004), 4.

Asian Foreign Direct Investment

The automotive industry in Mexico has benefited greatly from Mexico's more liberal trade policies, making it an attractive destination for foreign investors. In general, foreign direct investment into Mexico has increased since the 1980s when Mexico pursued trade liberalization policies. Between 1994 and 2001 U.S. manufacturing companies invested \$2.2 billion on average every year.² Further investment by automotive companies has made Mexico the 7th largest automotive producer as of 2017.

Thanks to globalization, FDI has poured in from East Asia, in particular from Japan, Mexico's largest investor from that region. = According to Japan's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tarō Kōno, Japan is ready to increase investment in Mexico. The future Secretary of Foreign Affairs for Mexico has stated that Japanese automotive parts and components that are made in Mexico are expected to increase over the next five years.³ As of 2012, the largest Japanese automotive companies that have a stake in Mexico's export economy are Honda, Nissan and Toyota.

Trade between Japan and Mexico has increased substantially thanks to the introduction of liberal trade policies. Between 2005-2010 trade between the two countries averaged \$17.7 billion a year and compared to figures for the years between 1993-2004 trade has doubled.⁴ The process of globalization is thanks to the reduction of trade barriers such as tariffs and import duties in the cases of Mexico and Japan. Additionally, Mexico's closeness to the American automobile market and its comparative advantage for manufacturing transportation products has made it a favorable destination for investment. However, there are still issues that remain that create uncertainty for investors and the new administration under Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador.

Oil Industry and Foreign Direct Investment

In addition to the increased inflow of manufacturing FDI, Mexico has made sweeping energy reforms to divest from its dependence on natural resources such as petroleum. The deregulation of the oil industry in Mexico has allowed for major investors to enter the market, and the newly elected president has vowed to respect the 2013 Energy Reforms. Mexico benefits greatly from opening its oil industry to outside investors and has even brought in an estimated \$200 billion in new investments for the country.⁵

There remains a stigma that foreign direct investment into Latin America has caused disparity rates to increase quite substantially. However, according to Palma, it is not credible to say that an increase in imports of capital goods has increased inequality. She states that investment

per worker in 2013 in Mexico was 20% lower than investment per worker in 1980. This paper will later go into more detail regarding the negative effects of increased FDI into Mexico.

International Arena

Globalization has also strengthened Mexico's position on the international playing field due to its membership of several major international organizations and groups. Mexico is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), General 20 (G20), the Pacific Alliance, and is a founding member of the United Nations. All in all, Mexico has diplomatic relations with 176 foreign governments and maintains a strong leadership role within Latin America.

It's membership in organizations such as these means that Mexico is part of the international community. However, this does not mean that it wields the same political power within these organizations. Mexico's economy and politics are heavily influenced by its close ties with the United States.

Negative Impact of Globalization within Mexico

Globalization has produced a great deal of economic and financial benefits for Mexico. However, globalization is a double-edged sword, as it has also produced negative effects that have greatly impacted certain levels of society. These negative effects include: having its policies influenced by the United States, substantial reliance on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), a surge in maquiladoras, economic inequality, and increased local corruption vis-à-vis foreign companies. These negative effects are widespread and have a significant impact on Mexican workers.

In the 1980s, Mexico aggressively pursued trade liberalization, opening its borders to trade and lifting restrictive trade policies. The most significant move towards trade liberalization was the ratification of NAFTA, which created a free-trading space across Mexico, the United States and Canada. It was expected to also bring many economic benefits to all three countries, though it also created a great deal of political and social problems for Mexico.

In terms of political influence, Mexico has experienced a major setback under NAFTA, as its trade policies are greatly influenced by the United States' economic power. The erosion of independent financial leverage is best demonstrated in the trade talks that concluded in a new trade deal known as the USMCA. The biggest concerns for Mexico were that the rules of origin for car manufacturing, which stipulate that in order for a vehicle to qualify for zero tariffs it must be made up of at least 62.5% of parts made in either Canada, Mexico or the U.S. Mexico had been strongly pushing for the same or lower rate that was previously in place, but the U.S. rebuked Mexico's proposal and demanded it be raised much higher in order to reduce competition and

¹ Lyal White, Mexico's NAFTA: More Pros than Cons. (Johannesburg, South Africa: South African Institute of International Affairs, 2004), 4.

² Ibid., 3.

³ Mexico Now, Japan seeks to increase investments in Mexico's automotive industry, pending NAFTA negotiations, (Altavista, Chihuahua: Mexico Now, 2018)

⁴ Melba Falck Reyes, Japanese Foreign Direct Investment in Mexico and the Impact of the Global Crisis, (Washington, D.C.: Journal of Globalization, Competitiveness, and Governability, 2012), 45-47.

⁵ Jude Clemente, Mexico's New President To 'Respect' Oil And Gas Reforms, Maintain Energy Alliance With U.S., (Jersey City, NJ: Forbes, 2018), 1-2.

protect U.S. car manufacturers. Mexico was forced to give concessions and raise the percentage, all in return for very small gains. As is demonstrated, Mexico does was unable to wield enough political and economic power to counteract U.S. power and was forced to give into certain demands at its own expense, underscoring Mexico's comparative economic weakness.

NAFTA was expected to raise wages and improve working conditions. However, the rise of maquiladoras undermined those hopes. Maquiladoras are typically sub-contracted factories owned by U.S., Chinese and sometimes Mexican firms that assemble parts into final products to be exported to the U.S. Even though all parties to NAFTA signed the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC), standards and working conditions worsened for Mexican workers. This is partly due to the presence of cheap labor and the increased costs that come with enforcing a safe working environment.

A major problem with maquiladoras is the fact that workers are discouraged from reporting injuries to companies. If a worker reports an injury to their employers, they are at risk of being fired due to the high costs that they pose for the company. In many cases workers have had to suffer injuries without proper medical treatment, as hospitals are required to report these workplace injuries for legal purposes. There are times when workers are severely injured or die and company will payout a small sum of settlement money. There has been a case where a worker was crushed to death by a poorly maintained machine. HD Electronics, the employer, paid out a settlement of a mere \$11,538, which was less than 3 years of that worker's income.⁶

According to an article by the Harvard International Review, data on reported workplace injuries in Mexico are incredibly difficult to find. For example, in 2011 there were 2.8 million accidents reported to employers in the United States, while in Mexico only 17,302 were reported.⁷

Now that NAFTA is on the verge of being replaced by the USMCA, there are many concerns as to how it will affect maquiladora workers. Presently, there are no provisions that guarantee the safety of workers on either side of the border. The only provision that has been introduced to "help" workers is a provision that requires auto manufacturers to pay a higher minimum wage.

Globalization accomplishes a great deal for major corporations by reducing costs and opening new avenues for investment. However, the biggest losers from globalization in Mexico are the lower class. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, poverty within Mexico has stayed at the same levels since 1994, the year NAFTA was signed; nor have wages have not increased when compared to other Latin American countries during the same period.⁸ Mexico's per capita income rose 1.2% between 1993 and 2013 which is not as impressive when compared to the rates of Brazil, Chile and Peru.⁹ When it comes to GDP per capita in Mexico, between 1994 and 2013 the annual growth was 0.9% which is very low when compared to El Salvador (1.9%),

Chile (3.4%) or Panama (4.4%).¹⁰ This is astonishing when you compare the growth rates that Mexico experienced between 1960 and 1980, when Mexican per capita GDP doubled.

Increased trade between the U.S. and Mexico should have led to more employment as production increased. However, this has not been the case in Mexico, where unemployment has risen. The most dramatic increases in unemployment are among farmers, particularly corn farmers, due to the U.S. subsidizing domestic corn farming (NAFTAs Economic Impact, 2018).¹¹ Mexican farmers are unable to compete with cheap corn being imported from the U.S. and have thus been driven out of the market. This has also led to a great deal of outward migration to the U.S. as well.

Finally, NAFTA has led to a marked increase in corruption in Mexico. Globalization has only increased the levels of corruption within Mexico and according to data from Trading Economics, Mexico's Corruption Rank has increased from 40th in 1996 to 135th in 2017.¹² Additionally, according to the Business Anti-Corruption Portal bribe taking is commonplace across all socioeconomic strata of Mexican society. Governing institutions such the tax administration, customs, public procurement, health services, land administration, natural resources, legislation and civil society are all rife with bribe taking. In a notable case, Wal-Mart executives paid an alleged \$24 million to Mexican officials in order to sidestep zoning issues and environmental permits.¹³

Tourism Sector Impacts

Positive Effects

Tourism in is one of the largest sectors of the Mexican economy, and the third largest source of foreign exchange earnings after oil exports and migrant remittances. One of the biggest positive effects that globalization has had on Mexico's tourism sector is the increase of investment and structural loans from international financial institutions. One major example of this is the granting of \$150 million USD from the Inter-American Development Bank in 1993 for development of key tourist destinations, such as Oaxaca, Quintana Roo, Guerrero and Baja California. In addition, tourism was heavily influenced by the changing paradigms that governed the international tourist industry. This change resulted in the privatization of Mexican state-owned hotels, many of which were absorbed by transnational corporations.¹⁴

Negative Effects

The effects of globalization are apparent in tourist destinations not located on the Mexican border. According to a report by Tamar Diana Wilson, 84% of non-border tourists (tourists

¹⁰ Mark Weisbrot, et al., Did NAFTA Help Mexico? An Updated After 23 Years (Washington, D.C.: Center for Economic and Policy Research, 2017), 6.

¹¹ James McBride, NAFTA's Economic, 8.

¹² Transparency International. "Mexico Corruption Rank." Trading Economics, December 2018.

¹³ Tom Schoenberg, Walmart Deadlocked With U.S. Over Bribery Probe (New York City, NY: Bloomberg News, 2018), 3.

¹⁴ Tamar Diana Wilson, Economic and Social Impacts of Tourism in Mexico (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2008), 38.

⁶ Esteban Flores, Misery in the Maquiladoras (Cambridge, MA: Harvard International Review, 2017), 1.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ James McBride, Mohammed Aly Sergie, NAFTA's Economic Impact (New York City, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 2018), 8.

⁹ Ibid., 8.

that do not travel to border destinations) were from the United States.¹⁵ The impacts of globalization upon the tourist industry were felt in after terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, when tourists entering the country declined from 20.64 million in 2000 to 19.66 million in 2002.¹⁶

A major disparity in the tourist industry is the gap between the wealthy Mexican that own hotels and the staff that services them. Wilson quotes author Sernau saying that the tourism industry is “filled with workers at the bottom rungs whose labor is inefficiently employed and minimally compensated and who have few chances to establish themselves in more secure and profitable positions.”¹⁷ Workers experience poor working conditions and low wages, in some cases are not compensated for overtime work. The tourism industry itself may bring more employment opportunities, especially for women, but the income gap between workers and the Mexican owners is still immense.

China as a Globalization Partner

Relations between the U.S. and Mexico have been chilly since the election of President Donald Trump. This has led to tensions during the NAFTA negotiation talks and nearly led to both sides walking out over each other’s demands. Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador has questioned its close economic relations with the U.S. and has turned his gaze east. To be less dependent on the U.S., Mexico should seek to strengthen its ties with China.

Initially, Mexico saw China as a market competitor. However, between 2013 and 2017 Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto and Chinese President Xi Jinping had a total of seven bilateral meetings to promote their “comprehensive strategic partnership.”¹⁸ Mexico is China’s largest commercial partner in Latin America is, while China is Mexico’s second largest trading partner, behind the U.S. Since 2013 there has been an increased cooperation between both countries. Many Mexican products, such as tortillas, tequila, avocados, beer, beef and pork have been introduced to the Chinese market.¹⁹ In turn, Mexico has become China’s main export destination for automobile parts and motor vehicles as well. In addition, both countries have introduced 50 new cooperation agreements over a range of critical development projects.

China has made headway in demonstrating to Mexico that it is a viable alternative economic partner to the U.S. A critical demonstration of Chinese economic power that shows the shifting balance of power in the region occurred in 2013. China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), a Chinese state-owned oil company, has made plans to invest \$8 Billion USD over the next 30 years in Mexico’s energy sector.²⁰

China has begun to shift away from its export-oriented economy towards a more consumerist market, similar to that of the U.S. According to the Mexican Ministry of economy Mexico is

searching for “new strategic partners...to push forward [the 2017 Multilateral Agenda] initiatives that reflect national interests and priorities....”²¹ Mexico understands that it must to loosen its ties to the U.S. to become more independent and diversify its partnerships. However, it must also be careful to not become too dependent on China, for it could sour relations with the U.S., arguably its closest ally.

Conclusion

As the world has become more interconnected the forces of globalization have brought immense changes to all levels of Mexican society. Globalization has helped Mexico to become recognized as a rising economic power, especially by Asian countries. It has benefitted from inward flows of investment due to a reduction in tariffs and an increase in foreign direct investment. Internal reforms within Mexico have also diversified its energy sector, which will make the Mexican economy less dependent on oil for revenue in the long term. In addition, Mexico has enhanced its position on the world stage through membership in various international organizations. However, globalization has also negatively affected Mexico in a variety of ways. Reduction of safety standards and the maintenance of low wages under NAFTA has had severe repercussions for lower-class workers. Poverty remains a serious problem for many Mexicans. Only the wealthy have made significant financial gains from globalization, as operating costs have been reduced and profits have been increased. As a large percentage of the Mexican economy, tourism is highly susceptible to outside forces as, certain events or an economic downturn in the US can affect the number of visitors. To reduce its dependence on the U.S., Mexico needs to diversify its network of global partners. Therefore, Mexico should continue to enhance its comprehensive strategic partnership with China, while recognizing the danger of becoming too dependent on Asia’s rising superpower.

¹⁵ Ibid., 38.

¹⁶ Ibid., 39.

¹⁷ Ibid., 40.

¹⁸ Juan Rojas, China and Mexico: Developing Trade, Investment for the Future (Beijing, China: China Briefing, 2017), 1.

¹⁹ Ibid., 2-3

²⁰ Ibid., 3.

²¹ Margaret Myers, Ricardo Barrios, China’s ‘Period of Strategic Opportunity’ in Mexico (Washington, D.C.: The National Interest, 2017), 1.

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White Nationalism and "Reverse Othering"

Stephen Young

Abstract

There was a surge in white nationalist and supremacist discourse in online spaces during the 2016 election campaign. Rhetoric targeting the growing mobility of minorities and the destruction of "white culture" were more widely seen than ever before. The theme of disenfranchisement victimhood, identity, and hegemony are consistent themes across most cases. I analyze popular discourse produced by online proponents of white nationalism and white supremacy to contextualize the interrelation of culture, politics, and society within white nationalist ideology. Building on the hegemonic scholarship of Foucault and Gramsci, and Said's Orientalism, I establish a qualitative model showcasing the variety of representations in online white nationalist discourse. Through a post-modernist discourse analysis, I provide an explanation for reverse othering by examining perceptions of whom or what is to blame for the supposed disenfranchisement of a group that is already systemically powerful.

1. Introduction

White nationalist groups have been increasingly able to circulate their ideology and expand and spread their movement. The movement is a potent force that gains traction through a unifying and cohesive notion of identity. Those who subscribe to this ideology are brought together by shared concepts of supremacy of their shared identity.¹ While there has been significant research surrounding the ability to share and sustain an identity-based supremacy, there is little work done concerning the justifications for white supremacists' actions the deeper meanings that justify them. The key question this paper will explore is: based on the constitutive causality of white nationalist actors, how prevalent is the concept of reverse othering through representations of victimhood, identity, and hegemony?

I have conducted research on online discourses on white nationalism in the United States and the perceived disenfranchisement of white Americans that the movement espouses to advance its message and delegitimize democracy and multiculturalism. I have researched this topic because I want to find out how proponents of alternative right and white nationalist ideas justify their beliefs, statements and approaches, as well as the expand of those beliefs within the during the 2010's. I do this to help readers understand the recent surge in the popularity of white nationalist and alt-right rhetoric, how such rhetoric circulates on the internet, and how it has cultivated spaces for the ideology to reproduce.²

¹ Hess, Amanda. "The Far Right Has a New Digital Safe Space". *Nytimes.com*. (Accessed: May 2017). https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/30/arts/the-far-right-has-a-new-digital-safe-space.html?_r=0

² Heidi Beirich and Kevin Hicks. "Chapter 7: White nationalism in America". *Hate Crimes*. (2009), 114-115

I have utilized literature across three schools of thought that are integral to my topic; this literature is consistent with the subjective meanings that have given power to the white nationalist ideology, through power structure, communication, and identity.³ My literature review employs the scholarship of post-structuralism and post-modernism authors. It is centered around concepts of victimization and “othering” as well as the perpetuation of a salient, white identity and the belief of superiority and exceptionalism among whites.⁴ My methodology is centered around a postmodernist analysis; as culture and society intertwine, with the internet as a medium of discourse, shared interpretations of victimhood, power relations, and claims of knowledge can be adequately taken into account.⁵ This approach fits well with my topic which centers around discourse on the concept of othering, through the lens of actors who hold institutional power, but perceive themselves as victims. My research has yielded findings that showcase the frequency to which white nationalist actors justify their actions through rationalization of victimhood, placing blame on others, and a general sense of racial supremacy. As per my results, victimhood as a representation has been found consistently within analyzed white nationalist discourse.⁶

2. Literature Review

I have centralized my research on discourses of disenfranchisement and the justification of white nationalist beliefs, directly with the concept of “othering.” My interpretivist research has developed around post-structuralist and post-modernist authors.⁷ White nationalism as an ideology that has existed in a multitude of different forms throughout the history of the United States. It is an ideology that conjoins ethnicity and politics into a message that promotes separation, supremacy, and exceptionalism from groups that exist outside a collective white and/or American identity.⁸ It is also important to note that the structures and systems of power within the institutions of our time are both propagated and perpetuated by a hegemony. In the case of the United States (and much of the developed world), this hegemony is based upon the American identity, which is characterized by the white, English speaking majority. Most of the power within the United States is held by European Americans and this concept is explored within the school of thought centered around hegemonic power structures.⁹ In the case of “othering” those outside the hegemony are relegated as different and even lesser. However, my research underscores that white nationalists believe themselves to be the victims of “otherization” as non-white Americans gain more agency and power.

³ This is based on several scholar’s inputs. This will be elaborated upon in the literature review section of the article.

⁴ Daniele Converse. “Can nationalism studies and ethnic/racial studies be brought together?” *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*. 30 (July 2004), 815–829.

⁵ This is based on my methodology. This will be elaborated upon in the methodology section of the article.

⁶ This is based on my data analysis results. This will be elaborated upon in the conclusion section of the article.

⁷ Mark Poster. *Critical theory and poststructuralism: in search of a context*, section Introduction: Theory and the problem of Context (1988) 5-6

⁸ Alison Mountz. “The Other”. *Key Concepts in Political Geography*: (2009). 332.

⁹ This will be elaborated upon in the Hegemonic Scholarship subsection.

The rise of white nationalism and white supremacy can also be attributed to expansive beliefs that have an international impact. Foreign nations and peoples are implicated by white nationalist rhetoric vis-à-vis the internet and mass communications.¹⁰ To adequately capture the notion of “othering” by white nationalists online, as well as their perceived disenfranchisement at the hands of a status-quo propagated by an anti-white establishment, I have decided to broaden the scope of my research to include schools of thought that embody an internationalist point of view. In this literature review, I specifically focus on schools of thought that include hegemony, international relations and intercultural communications, as well as nationalism and identity.

2.1. *Hegemony Scholarship*

The first school of thought into which I will delve is hegemony. Hegemony highlights the fact that we exist in an era in which cultural definitions of race and ethnicity are changing. Change challenges power relations vis-à-vis one’s reality.¹¹ White nationalism is an ideology that has evolved to act as an opposing force against the tide of multiculturalism and globalization. Hegemony, in the context of a neoliberal globalist order, exists as another step from this constant process of change which. Given its large scale, is inevitably stuck without a leveled degree of legitimacy, so much so that opposing cultural expressions (in this case white nationalism) can form.¹²

These expressions from the foundation of Eurocentric knowledge systems and hegemonic virtues similar to Linda Martin Alcoff’s view on the consequences of neocolonialism on victim peoples:

The result of the wide acceptance of such hegemonic claims in the United States and in Europe is a broad-based consent to imperial war as the presumptive entitlement of the political vanguard of the human race; the result of the acceptance of such hegemonic claims in the colonized world includes such symptomatic effects as...Mexicans have an alienated relationship to their own temporal reality, and that they imagine the real present as occurring somewhere else than where they live.¹³

This acceptance of hegemonic claims has had its own effect on white nationalist ideologues. “The presumptive entitlement of the political vanguard of the human race,” assumes that power and distinction from other peoples coalesces into a relative truth that white nationalists latch on to in their discourse; namely, if groups that are distinct from the white/American identity gain a marginal amount of power or agency, it is viewed as a loss to the legitimacy of this relative truth.

¹⁰ “Alternative Right”. Southern Poverty Law Center. (Accessed May 2, 2017). <https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/ideology/alternative-right>.

¹¹ T.J.Jackson Lears. “The Concept of Cultural Hegemony: Problems and Possibilities.” *The American Historical Review*. 90, no. 3 (1985), 572

¹² Ibid, 571.

¹³ Linda Martin Alcoff. “Mignolo’s Epistemology of Coloniality.” *The New Centennial Review*. 7, no. 3 (2007), 83

2.2. *Racism in International Relations and Intercultural Communication Scholarship*

It is unsurprising that those who ascribe to a white nationalist ideology utilize discourse that harkens back to white European culture as a source of pride over other races. This notion connects with Errol A. Henderson’s understanding of supremacy:

Western states rationalized their policies of white racial domination epitomized in slavery, imperial conquest, colonization and genocide...Uniquely among the races, whites were assumed to possess civilization while nonwhites were assumed to occupy a lower stage of development characterized as either barbarism or savagery.¹⁴

Historically, even in liberal theories of international relations including democratic peace theory and constructivism, Western states such as the United States have justified their racial hegemony through the “civilizing” of people viewed to have lower economic value.¹⁵ From colonialism to the contemporary conversation about migrants and refugees, these people have been regarded as barbarians. It is within these post-colonial discourses that the concept of orientalism prevails, as it serves as a means to relegate the so called strange peoples of the East as being dangerous or lesser. Cultural relativity from the point of view of those in power, in this case the United States, is fueled by structural socio-political distinctions vis-à-vis foreign peoples. Fear of contemporary Islam and the War on Terror are critical examples of an orientalist worldview espoused by the Bush administration. Actors within the hegemony commodify oriental peoples and oriental affairs as merely subjects that can be easily mastered, or problems that can easily be fixed.¹⁶ Such discourse promotes a surface-level understanding of the Middle East.¹⁷

In the case of communication, an important part of culture is language. Language expresses the attitudes and thoughts of society and the evolution of historical, economic and political concepts.¹⁸ As the dominant language of the United States, English has come to reflect the national identity of its architects. Those who are of ethnicities outside of this sociolinguistic identity are forced to use language rife with assumptions that belittle them. Examples of this include: color symbolism, with white as positive and black as negative; the relegation of nations and peoples as “underdeveloped” or “tribal”; and the connection of socioeconomic status to the

notion of “proper” or “professional” English.¹⁹ Inherent racism perpetuates the disparaging of non-white peoples in discourse that does not even need to be used by white nationalists, but can be and are used as points of reference in their discourse. This appears in moral and scientific arguments claiming the lesser nature of black people and other non-whites. The utilization of language and symbolism in communication is key to justifying views of victimization and exceptionalism, as these negative connotations are used to legitimize the white and American identities over others.

2.3. *Nationalism and Identity Scholarship*

Authors describe nationalism as a potent manifestation of political identification.²⁰ Being Americanized is a surface-level component of American national identity, wherein cultures and peoples that exist outside of the cultural and ethnic confines of Americanness are either left out, or expected to assimilate. Milczarek-Desai espouses writes that the positive denotation of the term Americanized is a byword for success in “fitting into” the national culture.²¹ It is in this case that the white American culture is held as the standard, and anything else is lesser. Deviation away from this standard yields devaluing, commodification, and the perception of being a nuisance or threat to the hegemonic identity.²²

Issues involving the agency and sovereignty of outsiders are implicated when the homogenous national identity is propagated and reinforced by distinctions and assumptions of power. The cohesion of an identity into what is considered “nationalism” relates to V. Spike Peterson’s argument in *Sexing Political Identities/ Nationalism as Heterosexism*, where she claims that those who are not seen as a part of this “nationalist” homogenous, heteronormative gender identity effectively lose their sovereignty and are regarded as subhuman in some way.²³ In this same vein, we see the homogenous identity of white Americans play into what is called a symbolic ethnicity, a term coined by Herber J. Gans. He characterizes an individualistic ethnicity outside of one’s race as conferring greater agency upon an individual.²⁴ It is in this case that the white American majority have the social and cultural agency to ascribe to themselves a symbolic ethnicity independent from their race; non-white groups are incapable of this because the non-homogenous nature of their identities. Thus, their original ethnicities are what matters most to them.²⁵ In relation to white nationalism, ideologues consistently disparage non-whites who are incapable of separating themselves from their race and regard the increased representation of

¹⁹ Ibid, 526.

Ibid, 530.

Ibid, 533.

²⁰ Anna Triandafyllidou. “National identity and the other”. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*. 21 (1998), 593–612.

²¹ Shefali Milczarek-Desai. “Living fearlessly with and within differences: my search for identity beyond categories and contradictions. In *The Social Construction of Difference and Inequality: Race, Class, Gender, and Sexuality*.” McGraw Hill. (2009), 672

²² Alison Mountz. “The Other”. *Key Concepts in Political Geography*: (2009). 328–338.

²³ V. Spike Peterson. “Nationalism as Heterosexism.” *International Feminist Journal of Politics*. 1, no. 1 (2007), 35

²⁴ Herbert Gans. “Symbolic ethnicity: The future of ethnic groups and cultures in America”. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*. 2 (1979)

²⁵ Mary C. Waters “Optional Ethnicities: For Whites Only?” *Origins and Destinies: Immigration, Race and Ethnicity in America*. (1996)

¹⁴ Errol Handerson. “Hidden in plain sight: racism in international relations theory.” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*. 26, no. 1 (2013), 75

¹⁵ Mahmood Mamdani. “Citizen and Subject: contemporary Africa and the legacy of late colonialism.” Princeton University Press. (1946), 5 - 6

¹⁶ Edward Said. “Orientalism”. London, UK: Penguin. (1997), xv

¹⁷ Ibid, xv.

¹⁸ R. B. Moore. “Racism in the English language. In *The Social Construction of Difference and Inequality: Race, Class, Gender, and Sexuality*.” McGraw Hill. (2009), 524

non-white cultures as a movement that marginalizes whites.²⁶

3. Methodology

3.1. Mapping

I chose to analyze the popular online discourses from proponents of white nationalism and supremacism on white disenfranchisement and marginalization through othering. I utilized a post-modernist discourse analysis to research the importance of language, narratives, and meaning-making by the online white nationalist community.²⁷ I analyzed how actors within this community, through constitutive causality, have constructed their own concepts of othering and victimhood, their own rationalizations, as well as their own implications made on contemporary society.²⁸

The discourses I analyzed center around perceptions of disenfranchisement by white nationalists. Sources that I have researched reaffirm the concept of a white nationalist’s “othering” while most especially coinciding with the concepts of racism and hegemonic power that were referenced in the literature review. These primary sources include outlined motives for white supremacism, arguments against multiculturalism and diversity, justifications of the need for white nationalism and racism; and the criticisms of institutions and society.²⁹

Broadly speaking, actors that produce these discourses include the growing number of online white nationalist individuals and groups; these groups create online content that either propagates or enable the circulation of the white nationalist narrative. I analyze the rhetoric of eleven groups and individuals advocating to protect the rights, privileges, and culture of the white, American identity.³⁰

Actors that are affected by this discourse include Americans who frequent the internet. As testament to the ease with which the internet can proliferates hateful content, ideas of white nationalism continue to become more widespread and appealing. Many white American men have been convinced into following this ideology due to the speed at which its popularity has grown online.³¹ Other actors that are effected are ethnic minorities, as there are a host of implications surrounding non-white groups (immigration, war, morality, intelligence, etc.).³² Ethnic minorities are encouraged by white nationalist discourse to assimilate in some cases, and to leave the country in others.³³ Armed with less power, ethnic minorities are left with little hope to fight harmful discourses.

²⁶ Dianne Dentice, David Bugg. “Fighting for the Right to Be White: A Case Study in white Racial Identity,” Journal of Hate Studies, Vol. 12:101 (2014-2015), 104-106.

²⁷ “Alternative Right”. Southern Poverty Law Center. Accessed May 2, 2017. <https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/ideology/alternative-right>.

²⁸ This will be elaborated upon in the data analysis section.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ “Editorial: Donald Trump, ‘Fake News’ And The Rise Of White Nationalism”. Southern Poverty Law Center. (Accessed: May 2017).

³² Dianne Dentice, David Bugg. “Fighting for the Right to Be White: A Case Study in white Racial Identity,” Journal of Hate Studies, Vol. 12:101 (2014-2015), 104-106.

³³ Ibid. 104-106.

3.2. Context

White nationalism and white supremacism have always existed on the sidelines of American culture and politics. After as the end of the Civil Rights era, white nationalism and supremacism had been relegated to a fringe ideology that no longer had the support of neither lawmakers nor average citizens.³⁴ However, with the rise of political and economic power in the hands of minorities, the spread of a progressive popular culture, the prevalence of crises in the Middle East, and increasing non-white immigration, many white Americans viewed their identity and the system of power surrounding them as under siege.³⁵ Instead of a predominantly white hegemony alienating and mistreating a different group, the white hegemony viewed itself as being dispossessed from its original power. White believed themselves to be marginalized and disenfranchised by the growing mobility of different groups and institutions. I refer to this in my research as “reverse othering.”

The contextuality for the discourses that I have analyzed is either based exclusively in the United States, or has directly referenced the United States as being a setting in which reversing othering occurs. All discourses that have been analyzed exist online in the public domain. In addition, the analyzed discourses associate claims of power with identity, and reinforce these claims with references to scientific, historical and legislative revisionism. These references are consistent with white nationalist narratives.³⁶

3.3. Steps

Steps taken for evidence generation and data analysis included research into white nationalist organizations and individuals. I maintained a list of white nationalist organizations and individuals with a functioning, or at least a previously functioning web presence. Once found, I extracted texts that specifically highlighted the pages or videos wherein the group’s core values would be explicitly stated. I then utilized NVivo for qualitative data analysis, creating nodes for the variables of rationalization, blame placing, victimhood, and general supremacy.

4. Data Analysis

4.1. Discourses Through White Nationalist Advocacy

Advertisement and introspection are one and the same when analyzing the rhetoric of the National Policy Institute, a white nationalist think-tank headed by Richard Spencer. In a video posted to YouTube, Spencer speaks of the historical power and success of white people. He compares white success to the perceived dilution of white European culture, stating that:

Some might say that this task is impossible, but nothing necessary is ever impossible. So

³⁴ S.M Caliendo & C.D McIlwan, The Routledge Companion to Race and Ethnicity. (2011). 233-235.

³⁵ Dianne Dentice, David Bugg. “Fighting for the Right to Be White: A Case Study in white Racial Identity,” Journal of Hate Studies, Vol. 12:101 (2014-2015), 104-106.

³⁶ “Who Are We?” (Youtube, National Policy Institute, 2015). Accessed February 12, 2017. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3mRPhEwELo>.

long as we avoid and deny our identities at a time when every other people is asserting its own, we will have no chance to resist our disposition. No chance to make our future. No chance to find another horizon.³⁷

This case focuses on representations of nationalism and victimhood through the paradigm of cultural dilution and the rationalization of cultural and historical defense. He places blame on society at large. Such discourse is produced by NPI to spread awareness on the issue of white cultural dilution, and to call for organizational unity. Spencer’s rhetoric is also an advertisement, introduction, and a call to action, with an intention to make the white nationalist ideology appealing to other whites. Threats to white culture are addressed to remind whites of the values of their cultural history and to mobilize them to secure their future from threats posed by cultural dilution.³⁸

Richard Spencer has also further these representations through a speech celebrating the victory of Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential elections.³⁹ Entitled “Long Live the Emperor,” the speech centers on white victimhood. He blames anti-white society, media and politics as threatening white culture, creating a narrative of “reverse othering.” He repudiates contemporary society and government institutions by claiming that:

Today, neurotics and degenerates are presented to us as heroes. Beauty is openly denigrated as an offense against equality. And we are ruled by a government which, despite confiscating an outrageous amount of our wealth, can’t fulfill its basic responsibilities defending a people and territory.⁴⁰

In his statements, Spencer removes himself and his cohorts from mainstream society, reinforcing the gravity of Trump’s repudiation of truths previously held by those outside the movement. Spencer shifts mainstream discourse by branding mainstream society as a counter-hegemony acting against those whom, he believes, ought to hold power.⁴¹

Similar discourse is used as an introduction for IDENTITY EVROPA’s initial website. IDENTITY EVROPA is another organization is advocating for the preservation and propagation of a white European identity. It espouses a similar representation of nationalism, rationalized through history and culture, and places blame placed on anti-white society.⁴² Rather than a call to action, its discourse serves as a mission statement. The organization describes itself as an organization as full of “awakened Europeans” that are culturally aware of their past

and have taken a stand to protect their heritage and (echoing Spencer’s narration) resist their dispossession.⁴³

A narrative of dispossession through representations of cultural heritage and cultural dilution are likewise addressed in the statement of principles of European Americans United, another white nationalist group. The group’s discourse also champions nationalism as a solution to victimhood, wherein the protection of the white way of life and the future white generations is paramount.⁴⁴ This discourse specifically mentions that governing institutions and societal shifts are at fault, as the organization places emphasis on how continued immigration will deplete the white majority, and replace predominantly white institutions and culture with that of “Third World populations.”⁴⁵ This discourse highlights immigration specifically as a force acting against the white identity by binding the perceived, lesser nature of outsider cultures and groups to the fear of dispossession through immigration.

In accordance with the perceived threats of globalization and multiculturalism, white nationalist groups also perceive white genocide as a coordinated, existential threat to white populations. Anti-white institutions and the connection with immigration are elaborated upon by the White GeNOcide Project, an organization which advocates against multiculturalism and diversity, citing United Nations Genocide Conventions to attack ethnic diversity in white-majority nations.⁴⁶ This discourse is analyzed through the context of a hegemonic and traditionally powerful white identity which is being challenged by multiculturalism. This case encompasses representations of victimhood through immigration propagated by anti-white actors and institutions. This case acts both as advocacy as well as a call to action, as they label the acceptance of diversity in Western countries as a means of “forced assimilation” which must be put to an end.⁴⁷ Again, this plays into “reverse othering” as nonwhite cultures are perceived to have deposed the predominant white nations of America and Europe.

In the same vein, Fight White Genocide also delivers a message of advocacy. This case incorporates similar depictions of victimhood at the hands of anti-white institutions, as the organization explains the horrors of white genocide by warning about the threats of diversity as well as the existence of a double standard:

The Netherlands and Belgium are just as crowded as Japan or Taiwan, but nobody says Japan or Taiwan will solve this RACE problem by bringing in millions of third worlders and quote assimilating unquote with them.⁴⁸

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ “Statement Of Principles | European Americans United”, Europeanamericansunited.Org, (Accessed May 4, 2017, <http://www.europeanamericansunited.org/node/4>).

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ “About White Genocide” White Genocide Project, <http://whitegenocideproject.com/about-white-genocide/>

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ “White Genocide Explained”, Fight White Genocide, last modified 2017, accessed May 4, 2017, <http://www.fightwhitegenocide.com/info/white-genocide-explained/>.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Richard Spencer, “Long Live The Emperor!”, RADIX JOURNAL, <http://www.radixjournal.com/journal/2016/11/21/long-live-the-emperor>.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² “Welcome”, IDENTITY EVROPA. (Accessed: May 4, 2017). <https://www.identityevropa.com/#home>.

Along with this, the case furthers its representations of victimhood by speaking to the inability of mainstream politics to understand the threat of white genocide, stating that people “...agree that I am a nazihowantstokillsixmillionjews [sic].”⁴⁹ As the case makes clear, reverse other is a frequent feature of whites nationalist rhetoric, as some whites feel threatened by the inclusion of non-white peoples and cultures into what was once a predominantly white domain.

4.2. *Discourses Through American Nationalist Advocacy*

Rather than preserving European culture, these cases are specific to an American identity, and exclusively reference perceived issues relating to the United States. The American Freedom Party, a third position American political party that subtly promotes white nationalism, champions representations of white American victimhood. The organization rationalizes its ideology by placing blame on contemporary society, governing institutions, as well as the media.⁵⁰ Moreover, it refers to the perceived failure of politics to preserve traditional values and alleviate economic woes. The author of the organization’s statement, William D. Johnson, refers to the perceived state of disarray in the country as a “third wordish society.”⁵¹ This harkens back to implicit meanings; the statement reinforces representations of anti-white institutions and their actions against the United States and its national identity, rationalized by assumptions of power in contrast to a “third worldish” society that is opposed to white nationalist notions of peoplehood.⁵²

In the same way, American Renaissance continues the trend of criticizing institutions and propagating an agenda for white nationalism. The organization’s website represents racism and white supremacy as rationalized through science and statistics that coincide with the narrative based upon perceived truths about non-whites. Nonwhite victimhood is represented in this case as “futile attempts to eliminate ‘achievement gaps’ between races,” leading whites to view the lower success rate of non-whites as racism.⁵³ The case also mentions a rise in societal problems correlated with the number of black people within a community.⁵⁴

4.3. *Discourses Through White Nationalism and Blatant Racism*

Loyal White Knights of the Klu Klux Klan, the North Carolinian chapter of the KKK continues the trend in representations of victimhood, racism, and supremacy, as justified by historical rationales.⁵⁵ The Klan’s main webpage harkens back to traditional values and the

reverence of heritage to validate racism towards non-whites:

Just look at America the Country that our forefathers fought and died for. They tried to make a white Christian homeland for its people. Which they did our people knew the value of its blood. We as a people knew not to mix with the darker races our own Government knew the downfall of what would happen if we did.⁵⁶

Rather than calling for cultural unity, this case dwells on the perceived injustices.⁵⁷ Loyal White Knights of the Klu Klux Klan are less advocates for white unity and separation from non-whites than they are for violence and racism towards non-whites.

In a similar vein, the manifesto of white supremacist Dylan Storm Roof serves as a monumental text in the realm of racist violence. Written shortly before he committed the mass shooting in the Emanuel AME Church in Charleston, South Carolina, Roof’s writing reflects the perceived marginalization of whites and the corruption of the American identity through affirmative action, devaluing of white history, dilution of white culture, and the perception of African Americans as violent, morally inept, and problematic.⁵⁸ Much like the previous case, this discourse captures representations of victimhood, racism, and supremacy using a multitude of justifications and examples of placed blame. These representations were constructed by Roof to express his understanding of society that disadvantages whites and favoring blacks.⁵⁹ The manifesto is a testament to the “othering” to which Roof felt white Americans are subject. Discourses Through White Nationalism in the form of News, Forums, and Social Media

Finally, I analyzed more obscure cases of online white nationalist rhetoric, including the tweets of David Duke, a former Grand Wizard of the Ku Klux Klan. I analyzed two of his tweets. The first of which is his agreement with Donald Trump’s questioning of the purpose Civil War and the role of Abraham Lincoln.⁶⁰ His second Tweet cites the removal of names from a prominent Confederate historical cite as a genocide against southern culture.⁶¹ Both tweets entertain representations of cultural victimhood, rationalized through Duke’s own brand of historical revisionism.

The white nationalist forum Stormfront is an online space in which hateful rhetoric proliferates. For this case, I analyzed its general response thread after the 2012 elections. A forum administrator using the screen name Dr. Ford discusses the implications of Obama’s third term on the future of white people, specifically addressing the incapacity of a non-white majority

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Dear Fellow Americans, - American Freedom Party”, American Freedom Party, last modified 2017, accessed May 4, 2017, http://american3rdposition.com/?page_id=10137.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Welcome To Loyal White Knights Of The KKK Home Page”, Kkkknights.Com. (Accessed May 4, 2017) <http://www.kkk-knights.com/>.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Dylan Roof. “Manifesto,” The Last Rhodesian, (June 2015) <https://web.archive.org/web/20150620135047/http://lastrhodesian.com/data/documents/rtf88.txt>

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ David Duke, Twitter post, May 1, 2017 (8:34 p.m.), accessed May 2, 2017, <http://twitter.com/drdauidduke>.

⁶¹ David Duke, Twitter post, April 25, 2017 (8:34 p.m.), accessed May 2, 2017, <http://twitter.com/drdauidduke>.

to maintain established systems.⁶² Representations of racism through scientific rationalization are immediately apparent, as the author argues that, as the number of non-whites rises in predominantly white nations, the quality of life declines, thereby deteriorating the lives of white families.

The Daily Stormer propagates a similar notion of non-whites being lesser peoples. This is evident in an article written by Andrew Anglin, titled “Negroid Stabs Up UT Austin Campus, Killing One (Even MSM Forced to Admit It Was Probably Racially Motivated).”⁶³ The article, beginning with, “The thing you need to remember about black people is that sooner or later, they’re going to go on a murderous rampage. That isn’t a “racist” statement – it’s just a fact of life.” Representations of racism and supremacy are rationalized with claims of objective knowledge.⁶⁴ The Daily Stormer also showcases white victimhood by claiming that the attacker, due to his race, received lackluster media attention for his crime, while an attack by white man would have received a more coverage.⁶⁵ These representations, involving claims of knowledge of non-white people is again salient in the examined rhetoric, further contextualizing assumptions against the agency of non-whites.

4.4 Visualization



Figure 1. Showcasing recurring representations among all cases.

5. Conclusion

White nationalism continues to grow in popularity, making it essential to understanding the nature of its discourse and its underlying justifications. Taking all cases into account with my research, I was surprised to find that blame was not consistent among all cases, as some cases were more focused on one “anti-white” institution over another, though overall references to anti-white institutions were the most frequently cited grievance. Only four cases had directly referenced cultural dilution, which was initially thought to be a recurring theme across the analysis. Finally, victimhood was found in every single case; it proved to be the most uniting factor (see figure 1). All things considered, the analysis results support the commonality of othering, as the discourses across multiple white nationalist groups are all related to or contain references to “reverse othering.”

As noted in the Literature Review, the proliferation of hegemony and power structures reinforce the white nationalist ideology as well as giving the movement credibility through victimization and perceived othering. My research, in its post-modernist nature, seeks to understand the interrelation of culture, politics, and society into the white nationalist ideology.⁶⁶ In the case of my analysis, national identity is akin to white ethnicity. Both exist as floating signifiers that encompass concepts such as ability, power, intelligence, and morality.⁶⁷ This plays a role especially when a group that holds power perceives themselves to be victims of outsiders who are gaining social, political, and cultural power. As they perceive their identity to be marginalized and their power diminished, they associate with others of similar identity to reclaim what they believe they have lost.⁶⁸

5.1. Evaluative Standards

Reflexivity with regards to my research stems from my relationship as a complete outsider from those who espouse a white nationalist ideology. I am a multicultural and multiracial immigrant from the Philippines; my skin is dark, and I hold leftist political beliefs. As a minority outside of the hegemonic white identity, I am unable to associate myself with much of the ideology. As someone who does not normally visit white nationalist websites and forums, I am clueless to colloquialisms, jokes, and jargon of community members. Given the growing popularity of white nationalist movements and my limited resources as a student, I understand that I am unable to truly understand nuances of online white nationalism. I also recognize that ‘white nationalism’ constitutes many different groups and individuals. Therefore, cases and data are skewed towards highly circulated texts and discourses online. Understanding that there will always be bias, there are no absolutes, and that subjectivity is inherent especially

⁶² “Intro material for people new to Stormfront,” Stormfront, November 6, 2008, May 2017 <https://www.stormfront.org/forum/t538924/>

⁶³ Andrew Anglin, “Negroid Stabs Up UT Austin Campus, Killing One (Even MSM Forced To Admit It Was Probably Racially Motivated),” Daily Stormer, accessed May 2, 2017, <https://www.dailystormer.com/negroid-stabs-up-ut-austin-campus-killing-one/>.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Dirk Nabers, “Culture and Collective Action: Japan, Germany, and the United States after 11 September 2001,” *Cooperation and Conflict* 41, no. 3 (2006): 306.

⁶⁷ Fred Dervin, “Cultural identity, representation and othering,” *The Routledge handbook of language and intercultural communication*, 2 (2012), 181-182.

⁶⁸ Dianne Dentice, David Bugg, “Fighting for the Right to Be White: A Case Study in white Racial Identity,” *Journal of Hate Studies*, Vol. 12:101 (2014-2015), 104-106.

in interpretivism, I have done my best to conduct my research in a way that fully discloses my reflexivity and positionality. Surveys and discussions with white nationalist ideologues are avenues for further research. The latter especially is an excellent way to immerse myself in white nationalist culture and further understand their way of thinking.

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