

6TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
THE SECURITY OF SEA LANES OF COMMUNICATION

Southern Cross Hotel
Melbourne, Australia
11-13th October, 1988

TECHNIQUES FOR ENSURING SLOC SECURITY
IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

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Southern Cross Hotel, Exhibition St., Melbourne, Australia

Background

One of the enduring geostrategic realities of our world is that the prosperity of the peoples who live on the periphery or outside the central land mass of Asia and Eastern Europe depends upon the ability freely to exchange commodities and processed products with each other.

Since 1945 the growth of that exchange, both in value and in volume, has increased dramatically leading to the emergence of a new group of prosperous industrialised nations and the impending emergence of more such countries. Many, if not most of these, lie in the Western Pacific region.

By far the greater volume, in excess of 90 per cent, of the product of these countries is transported by sea. The ships in which they travel and the cargoes themselves represent vital national interests which are at the same time vulnerable to attack.

Assumptions that such trade would be immune to attack for essentially political reasons were probably never valid. In the last resort, the continental nations of the Soviet Bloc can survive without foreign seaborne trade. So can many of the poorer countries. The developed nations outside the Soviet Bloc cannot survive except at the price of politically catastrophic falls in standards of living.

Even at a lower level of conflict, assumptions that the political costs of attacks on merchant shipping would be greater than the military benefit derived have been proved wrong by the events of recent years in the Iran-Iraq conflict in the Persian Gulf.

At the same time, the increase in the volume and value of goods transported by sea has generated concerns about piracy and environmental threats, especially in the narrow seas.

Events in the Persian Gulf have confirmed that no one nation has the capacity to police the sea lanes of the world, even if that were in itself desirable. At the same time, they signal that low cost attacks upon shipping demand a disproportionate response which probably can only be met by a co-ordinated effort. The defence of merchant traffic in the Gulf has now involved the navies of the United States, United Kingdom, France, West Germany, Belgium, Norway and Australia as well as those of the neutral Gulf States themselves.

The SLOC Security Conferences

In 1982, experts from the United States, Japan, Republic of Korea and Republic of China came together in San Francisco to commence an examination of the problem on an unofficial basis. In 1983, they were joined in Tokyo by delegates from the ASEAN member nations and Australia. Subsequent meetings were held in Singapore (1985), Taipei (1986) and Seoul (1987).

To date the conferences have focussed upon the source of the threat to sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) with some attention being given to the nature of the threat with only limited consideration of the response.

The threat is, of course, a multi-dimensional one with merchant ships being vulnerable to air, surface and sub-surface attacks either in the narrow seas or on the broad oceans. Even within these categories of threat, a wide variety of possibilities exist ranging from the use of primitive contact mines or small gunboats to long-range missiles fired from air, surface or sub-surface platforms, or even from installations on land.

Political changes in the Western Pacific region, from which most of the delegations come, raise concerns that reliance upon the United States to bear the whole burden of sea lane defence may be misplaced. In particular, the possibility (some would argue the likelihood) that the United States may not retain access to naval and air facilities in the Philippines after 1991 force a consideration of what should be a regional response before that event occurs.

The Japanese government's decision to accept responsibility for the defence of SLOCs out to 1000 nautical miles of its territory is a helpful development. It does not, however, solve the total problem.

The international steering committee for the SLOC security conferences has decided that the 6th conference to be held in Melbourne, Australia, 11-13 October, 1988 will focus its attention on a number of specific organisational and operational problems that need to be addressed in concert so that a general solution can be found.

While the committee accepts that there are and will be political difficulties in the implementation of these solutions at this time, it believes that such solutions should be canvassed if only because political obstacles can often be overcome more quickly under the pressure of events than can the operational problems.

TECHNIQUES FOR ENSURING SLOC SECURITY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

6th International Conference on the Security of Sea Lanes of Communication

Southern Cross Hotel, Exhibition St., Melbourne, Australia

DAY 1 Tuesday 11th October, 1988

Before 1600 Arrival

1530-1900 Registration (Foyer B)

1930-2130 Reception - Southern Cross Ballroom

DAY 2 Wednesday 12th October, 1988 (Southern Cross Ballroom)

0930-1045 Formal Opening (Chairman: Col L.G. Clark, MC; National President,
Australia Defence Association)

Official Welcome	-	RAdm A.L. Beaumont AM (Australia)
Keynote addresses	-	Senator Shigeto Nagano (Japan)
		Gen Richard G. Stilwell (U.S.A.)
Strategic Overview	-	Michael O'Connor (Australia)

MORNING COFFEE (Foyer B)

1115-1230 Organisational Structures for SLOC Security
(Chairman: Dr. Jun Tsunoda - Japan)

- N.E. Asia	(Prof Young Kyu Park - Korea)
- ASEAN Area	(BGen Soedibyo - Indonesia)
- ANZAC Area	(Dr M.J. Kennedy - Australia)

LUNCH (Australis Room)

1400-1515 SLOC Security Systems I
(Chairman: Tsao Jiun-han - China)

- Naval Control of Shipping	(VAdm T. Hozumi - Japan)
- Command, Control, Intelligence	(J.A. Robertson - Australia)

AFTERNOON COFFEE (Foyer B)

1545-1700 SLOC Security Systems II
(Chairman: U. Alexis Johnson - U.S.A.)

- Control Of Piracy and Maritime Terrorism	(VAdm Ko Tun-hwa - China)
- Open Forum	

DAY 3 Thursday 13th October, 1988 (Southern Cross Ballroom)

- 0930-1045 SLOC Security Operations I
(Chairman: Choon-ho Park - Korea)
- Convoy or Defended Lanes (VAdm F.J. Blouin - USA)
 - Surveillance Tasks (VAdm K. Kitamura - Japan)
 - Foreign Access to National Bases (RAdm C. Cunanan
- Philippines)

MORNING COFFEE (Foyer B)

- 1115-1230 SLOC Security Operations II
(Chairman: Indonesia)
- Mine warfare and countermeasures (Cdre T. Roach - Australia)
 - Air defence of merchant ships (Dr J. Boutilier - Canada)

LUNCH (Australis Room)

- 1400-1515 Sharing the Burden
(Chairman: Thailand)
- Wealth Transmission by Air
and Electronics (Mr Phil Ruthven - Australia)
 - The Nuclear-Free Zone Effect (Prof W.T. Roy - N.Z.)

AFTERNOON COFFEE (Foyer B)

- 1545-1700 Final Session
(Chairman: Des Moore - Australia)
- Open Forum
 - Report Back Session (Rapporteurs)
 - Conclusion & Farewell (Dr Han Lih-wu - China)

DAY 4 Friday 14th October, 1988

Departure

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS - SLOC88

CHINA (Republic of)

Dr Han Lih-wu	<i>President, Asia and the World Institute</i>
Professor Lin Chin-sheng	<i>Former Communications Minister</i>
VAdm Ko Tun-hwa	<i>Former Defence Vice-Minister</i>
VAdm Kuo Chung-Ching	<i>Former Fleet Commander</i>
Dr Norman C.H. Wei	<i>Director, Kaohsiung Institute of Marine Technology</i>
Professor Chen Chi	<i>National Chung-Hsing University</i>
Professor Tsao Jiun-han	<i>Institute of American Culture, Academia Sinica</i>

INDONESIA

Lt. Gen. Soebiyakto	<i>Governor Lemhanas (National Defence College)</i>
Brig. Gen. Soedibyo	<i>Staff of Lemhanas and Centre for Strategic and Int'l Studies</i>
Lt. Col. Yuswaji	<i>Defence Attache, Canberra</i>

JAPAN

Senator Shigeto Nagano	<i>Member, House of Councillors</i>
VAdm Toshihiko Hozumi	<i>Former Deputy Chief of Naval Operations; Director, JCSS</i>
VAdm Kenichi Kitamura	<i>Former Fleet Commander; Director, JCSS</i>

KOREA (Republic of)

Hon. Kwan Shik Min	<i>Director, Asian Institute of Public Policy</i>
Professor Dalchoong Kim	<i>Director, Institute of East and West Studies, Yonsei University</i>
Professor Choon-ho Park	<i>Professor, Korea University</i>
Professor Young-Kyu Park	<i>Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security</i>
Dr. Seo-Hang Lee	<i>Korea Ocean Research and Development Institute</i>
Dr. Choung-Il Chee	<i>Former Lecturer, Seoul National University</i>

NEW ZEALAND

Professor Theo Roy *Dept. of Politics, Waikato University*

Mr Bernard Moran *Journalist*

PHILIPPINES

RAdm. Carlito Y Cunanan *Flag Officer in Command, Philippines Navy*

Capt. Nicasio Blancas *Assistant Chief of Naval Staff, Intelligence*

Commander Cleo I Erfe *Staff of Presidential Security Adviser, Malacanang*

Lt. Commander Cipriano Luspo *Aide to Admiral Cunanan*

National Intelligence Co-ordinating Agency

National Intelligence Co-ordinating Agency

THAILAND

RAdm. Prasit Jaipiam *Deputy Superintendent, National Defence College*

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Gen. Richard G. Stilwell *Consultant; former Deputy Under-Secretary of Defense*

Amb. U. Alexis Johnson *Former Under-Secretary of State*

Amb. Leonard Unger *Former diplomat and Professor of Diplomacy, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy*

VAdm. Francis J. Blouin *Retired senior naval officer*

Mr. William M. Carpenter *Senior Consultant, SRI International*

Mr. John Keller *Regional Director, US Information Service, Melbourne*

Dr. Robert L. Rau *Australian Defence Force Academy*

AUSTRALIA

RAdm Alan Beaumont, AM, RAN *Chief of Naval Operational Requirements and Plans*

Senator Brian Harradine *Independent Senator from Tasmania; Patron A.D.A.*

Mr. Peter White MC, MP *Shadow Minister for Defence*

Cdre. Terry Roach, AM, RAN *Director General of Naval Warfare*

Cdre. Harry Adams *Returned Services League National Defence Committee*

Cdre. David Orr	<i>Returned Services League (W.A.)</i>
Cdre. Alan Robertson	<i>Australia Defence Association</i>
Cdre. Dacre Smyth, AO	<i>Patron, Australia Defence Association</i>
Capt. Geoff Morton, RAN	<i>Strategic and Int'l Policy Div., Dept. of Defence</i>
Col. Laurie Clark, MC	<i>National President, Australia Defence Association</i>
Cmdr. Lee Cordner, RAN	<i>Joint Services Staff College</i>
Cmdr. Bill Dovers, RAN	<i>Strategic and Defence Studies Centre</i>
Cmdr. Jack McCaffrie RAN	<i>Directorate of Naval Force Development</i>
Cmdr. Stuart Pert, RAN	<i>Naval Staff College</i>
Cmdr. James Hume	<i>Adviser, Deputy Opposition Leader, Australian Senate</i>
Cmdr. Graham Harris RANR	<i>Melbourne Port Division, Naval Reserve</i>
Cmdr. Nick Horspool RANR	<i>Directorate of Naval Reserves</i>
Cmdr. Tony Grazebrook	<i>Naval Editor PACIFIC DEFENCE REPORTER</i>
Lt. Cdr. Wally Scott RAN	<i>Department of Defence</i>
Mr. Peter Henderson, AC	<i>Council for the National Interest</i>
Dr. Pat Lang, OBE	<i>Australia Defence Association</i>
Mr. John Maynes AM	<i>National President, Federated Clerks' Union</i>
Mr. Kerry Stephen, AM	<i>Carrington Slipways Pty. Ltd.</i>
Mr. Ian Adie	<i>Australian Management Staff College</i>
Dr. Ken Baker	<i>Editor, I.P.A. REVIEW</i>
Mr. Simon Brooks	<i>Adviser to Shadow Minister for Defence</i>
Mr. Michael Danby	<i>Editor, AUSTRALIA-ISRAEL REVIEW</i>
Mr. Ray Evans	<i>Western Mining Corporation</i>
Mr. Len Hansen	<i>Australia Defence Association</i>
Mr. Rod Kemp	<i>Director, Institute of Public Affairs</i>
Dr. Malcolm Kennedy	<i>Editor, DEFENDER</i>
Mr. Gerald Mercer	<i>Director, SOCIAL ACTION</i>
Mr. Tony McAdam	<i>Journalist</i>
Mr. Des Moore	<i>Senior Fellow, Institute of Public Affairs</i>
Br. Kevin Mortensen	<i>Returned Services League, Victoria</i>

Mr. Frank Mount *Austasia Consultants*

Mr. Michael O'Connor *Executive Director, Australia Defence Association*

Dr. Brian Ridge *Victorian Chairman, Australia Defence Association*

Dr. Colin Rubinstein *Dept. of Politics, Monash University*

Mr. Phil Ruthven *Executive Chairman, the IBIS Group*

Fr. Bill Smith, SJ *Institute of Social Order*

Mr. John Telford *Carrington Slipways Pty. Ltd.*

6th International Conference on
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TECHNIQUES FOR ENSURING SLOC SECURITY
IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

OFFICIAL WELCOME

by

Vice Admiral M.W. Hudson, AC, RAN
Chief of Naval Staff, Royal Australian Navy

(presented by Rear Admiral A.L. Beaumont, AM, RAN)
(Chief of Naval Operational Requirements & Plans)

Southern Cross Hotel
Melbourne, Australia
11-13 October, 1988

**CNS' SPEECH FOR THE OPENING OF THE SIXTH INTERNATIONAL SEA LANES
SECURITY CONFERENCE**

BY VADM M.W. HUDSON AC, RAN

DELIVERED BY RADM A.L. BEAUMONT AM, RAN

COLONEL CLARK,
DISTINGUISHED GUESTS,
LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,

ON BEHALF OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF OF THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY IT IS INDEED A GREAT HONOUR FOR ME TO BE INVITED TO FORMALLY OPEN THIS, THE SIXTH INTERNATIONAL SEA LANES SECURITY CONFERENCE. IT IS APPROPRIATE THAT THE NAVY SHOULD BE CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH IT, GIVEN THE ESSENTIAL RESPONSIBILITY WE HAVE FOR DEFENDING THE SEA LANES AND THOSE MERCHANT MARINERS WHO PLY THEM.

SINCE THE FIRST CONFERENCE, IN SAN FRANCISCO IN 1982, ATTENTION HAS FOCUSED ON THE SOURCES OF THREAT TO SEA LANES SECURITY, AND ON THE NATURE OF THE THREAT. I AM AWARE THAT MUCH HAS BEEN ACHIEVED IN BOTH FIELDS, DURING AND BETWEEN CONFERENCES, AND I SUGGEST THAT THE PRESENCE HERE NOW OF DELEGATES FROM SOME THIRTEEN COUNTRIES TESTIFIES TO THIS.

NEVERTHELESS, I WELCOME THE CHANGE IN EMPHASIS WHICH HAS US FOCUSSED NOW ON SPECIFIC ORGANIZATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN RESPONDING TO THREATS TO OUR SEA LANES. I HOPE TOO THAT THE THEME OF THIS CONFERENCE WILL ALLOW THOSE OF US IN UNIFORM TO MAKE A BIGGER CONTRIBUTION THAN HAS PREVIOUSLY BEEN THE CASE.

WHILE I KNOW THAT WE PARTICIPANTS WILL GAIN A CLEARER UNDERSTANDING OF HOW TO RESPOND TO THREATS TO OUR MARITIME TRADE, I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO THINK THAT, ESPECIALLY HERE IN AUSTRALIA, THE CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS WILL HEIGHTEN AWARENESS AND UNDERSTANDING OF THESE ISSUES AMONG THE WIDER COMMUNITY.

HAVING MADE THIS POINT, LET ME TURN NOW TO A FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE; THE IMPORTANCE OF TRADE, BOTH TO AUSTRALIA AND TO THE OTHER NATIONS REPRESENTED HERE TODAY.

WE IN NAVY HAVE BEEN DILIGENTLY EXPOUNDING ON THE IMPORTANCE OF TRADE, BUT WE HAVE SOMETIMES FAILED TO NOTICE THAT OUR AUDIENCE HASN'T ALWAYS BEEN LISTENING. REALISTICALLY, WE SHOULD NOT BE SURPRISED. SEA LANES SECURITY AND PROTECTION OF TRADE ARE IMPORTANT, BUT SO ARE MANY OTHER ASPECTS OF DEFENCE, AND IN TIMES OF SPENDING RESTRAINT WE MUST RECOGNISE THAT THERE ARE OTHER EQUALLY LEGITIMATE CLAIMS ON THE DEFENCE PURSE, AND THAT PRIORITIES CONSISTENT WITH STRATEGIC PERCEPTIONS WILL HAVE TO APPLY.

NEVERTHELESS, IT MAY STILL SURPRISE MANY TO LEARN THAT OUR ANNUAL EXPORTS ARE WORTH ABOUT \$31 BILLION, AND IMPORTS ABOUT

\$28 BILLION; AND MORE TO THE POINT, THAT 99.9% OF THIS TRADE BY VOLUME IS CARRIED BY SEA.

OF COURSE AUSTRALIA IS NOT THE ONLY NATION REPRESENTED HERE FOR WHICH TRADE IS IMPORTANT. JAPAN AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA ARE TWO THAT COME TO MIND READILY. JAPAN, FOR EXAMPLE, RELIES ON OVERSEAS SOURCES FOR OVER 90% OF OIL, IRON ORE, COPPER, COAL, ALUMINIUM AND WOOL; AND IN ALMOST ALL CASES IS DEPENDENT FOR THEM ON LENGTHY TRADE ROUTES. TO PUT JAPAN'S PROBLEM IN PERSPECTIVE, IN TIME OF EMERGENCY, SHE EXPECTS TO HAVE TO IMPORT ABOUT 33% OF PRESENT LEVELS OF RAW MATERIALS, SOME 200 MILLION TONNES ANNUALLY, TO MAINTAIN LIVING STANDARDS. SHE WOULD ALSO HAVE TO IMPORT ABOUT 70% OF PEACETIME FOOD LEVELS.

KOREA TOO, RELIES HEAVILY ON TRADE FOR HER GROWING PROSPERITY. LIKE JAPAN, SHE IMPORTS RAW MATERIALS AND EXPORTS MANUFACTURED GOODS, TO THE EXTENT THAT IN 1985 THE REPUBLIC IMPORTED SOME 133 MILLION TONNES AND EXPORTED ABOUT 32 MILLION TONNES; ACCOUNTING FOR ABOUT 3.5% OF THE TOTAL WORLD TRADE BY VOLUME.

IN CONCENTRATING ON THESE TWO NATIONS I AM MINDFUL OF THE VALUE OF TRADE TO OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE REGION, AND THE POTENTIAL FOR OTHERS TO GROW IN IMPORTANCE AS TRADERS. I AM AWARE TOO THAT NOT ONLY MAJOR ECONOMIES RELY FOR THEIR STANDARDS OF LIVING ON RELIABLE TRADE: SMALLER ECONOMIES, DEPENDENT ON A VERY FEW EXPORTS, MAY BE EVEN MORE SUSCEPTIBLE TO INTERRUPTIONS TO TRADE.

HOW DOES AUSTRALIA'S DEFENCE POLICY RELATE TO SEABORNE TRADE? FOLLOWING A PERIOD OF REASSESSMENT OF OUR DEFENCE POLICIES

DURING THE 1970S AND EARLY 1980S, THE WHITE PAPER OF 1987 PROVIDED SOME WELCOME CLARITY AND REALISM; PARTICULARLY IN ITS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT THAT AUSTRALIA IS PART OF A DYNAMIC REGION, SOME OF WHICH AT LEAST MAY NOT REMAIN FREE OF INSTABILITY. TO THIS END THE WHITE PAPER NOTED THE IMPORTANCE TO AUSTRALIA OF SOUTH - EAST ASIA, THE SOUTH - WEST PACIFIC, AND THE EASTERN INDIAN OCEAN. IT ALSO ARTICULATED AUSTRALIA'S WILLINGNESS TO ASSIST FRIENDS AND ALLIES IN THESE AREAS, WITHIN THE LIMITS OF OUR CAPABILITIES - SENTIMENTS THAT HAVE BEEN REPEATED BY DEFENCE MINISTER BEAZLEY SEVERAL TIMES SINCE.

EMPHASIZING THE SENSE OF REALISM WHICH IT BROUGHT TO AUSTRALIA'S DEFENCE POLICIES, THE WHITE PAPER ACKNOWLEDGED THE IMPORTANCE OF TRADE AND ITS SUSCEPTIBILITY TO INTERRUPTION. WHILE IT ASSERTED THAT OUR TRADE ROUTES WOULD BE COMPREHENSIVELY INTERDICTED ONLY IN PROTRACTED GLOBAL CONFLICT, IT ALSO CONCEDED THAT OUR TRADE COULD BE DISRUPTED IN A RANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES APPLICABLE TO LESSER FORMS OF CONFLICT. IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, THE WHITE PAPER SAW DISRUPTION AS BEING MORE LIKELY TO OCCUR IN COASTAL WATERS, FOCAL AREAS AND PORTS.

BECAUSE THE WHITE PAPER RECOGNISED THE DEMANDING NATURE OF EVEN LOW LEVEL DISRUPTIONS TO TRADE, AND FOR OTHER REASONS, IT CONFIRMED THE NEED FOR SIGNIFICANT MARITIME FORCES. YOU WILL BE AWARE, I'M SURE, OF THE BUILDING PROGRAMME WE NOW HAVE IN PLACE, FOR SURFACE SHIPS AND SUBMARINES WHICH WILL TAKE US INTO THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY CONFIDENT OF COPING WITH MARITIME CONTINGENCIES THAT MAY OCCUR IN THE REGION.

NOW I WOULD LIKE TO MENTION SOME RECENT MOVES WHICH SHOULD EMPHASIZE AUSTRALIA'S COMMITMENT TO THE REGION. FIRSTLY, WE HAVE INCREASED OUR PATROLS OF THE SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC, INVOLVING BOTH MARITIME PATROL AIRCRAFT AND SURFACE SHIPS.

SECONDLY, WITH THE BASING OF SHIPS IN WESTERN AUSTRALIA WE ARE GIVING THE EASTERN INDIAN OCEAN A HIGHER PRIORITY, AND AT THE SAME TIME WE ARE RENEWING OUR INTEREST IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA WITH THE RESUMPTION OF SHIP DEPLOYMENTS TO SINGAPORE AND MALAYSIA.

THIRDLY, IN LINE WITH THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WE ENJOY WITH PAPUA NEW GUINEA, AND OUR COMMITMENTS TO HER EXTERNAL SECURITY, NAVY WILL SHORTLY BEGIN REGULAR PATROL BOAT DEPLOYMENTS TO NEW GUINEA WATERS. AND FINALLY, THE ABILITY OF OUR MARITIME PATROL AIRCRAFT TO COVER IMPORTANT TRADE ROUTES WILL BE EXTENDED AS A RESULT OF THEIR CAPACITY TO OPERATE FROM THE AIRFIELDS WHICH HAVE BEEN BUILT IN THE NORTH AND NORTH-WEST RECENTLY.

WE IN AUSTRALIA ARE WELL AWARE THAT OUR INTENTIONS COULD BE MISINTERPRETED, OR IN FACT MISREPRESENTED. BUT, I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT THE ACTIVITIES JUST MENTIONED ARE DESIGNED TO SUPPORT REGIONAL DEFENCE COOPERATION, AND THE NEEDS OF SOME OF OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES. THEY ARE NOT INTENDED TO BE INTERVENTIONIST, AND THEY CONTINUE SUBJECT TO THE NEEDS AND WISHES OF THE NATIONS CONCERNED, WHICH MAY OF COURSE CHANGE.

ALTHOUGH I DON'T PROPOSE TO EXAMINE THE NATURE OF THE THREAT, WHICH HAS BEEN LOOKED AT IN PREVIOUS CONFERENCES, I BELIEVE IT IS APPROPRIATE TO FOCUS ON WHAT WE MIGHT NEED TO PROTECT.

AUSTRALIA'S MAIN TRADE ROUTES ARE:

- . ACROSS THE INDIAN OCEAN; TO AND FROM THE MIDDLE EAST AND EUROPE - INCLUDING THE USSR;
- . THROUGH THE INDONESIAN ARCHIPELAGO; TO AND FROM JAPAN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, AND TAIWAN, AND OTHER PARTS OF EAST ASIA;
- . EAST OF THE ARCHIPELAGO; PRIMARILY TO AND FROM JAPAN FROM OUR EAST COAST PORTS. THIS IS OUR MOST VALUABLE TRADE ROUTE.
- . ACROSS THE PACIFIC; TO AND FROM THE USA; AND
- . THERE IS ALSO A SMALL BUT IMPORTANT TWO WAY FLOW OF TRADE ACROSS THE TASMAN SEA WITH NEW ZEALAND.

IT WON'T HAVE ESCAPED YOUR NOTICE THAT WHILE THESE MAY BE AUSTRALIA'S MOST IMPORTANT TRADE ROUTES, THEY ALSO INCLUDE, IN WHOLE OR PART, SOME OF THE ROUTES MOST IMPORTANT TO MOST OF YOU.

HOW MIGHT AUSTRALIA RESPOND TO A THREAT? IN ANY MAJOR CONFLICT WE WOULD TRY FIRSTLY TO ENSURE THE SAFE PASSAGE OF SHIPPING IN OUR APPROACHES AND FOCAL AREAS. THIS TASK ALONE COULD VERY QUICKLY SOAK UP ALL OUR MARITIME FORCES, LEAVING SHIPPING IN THE OPEN OCEAN RELIANT ON OTHERS FOR ITS PROTECTION. WERE WE ABLE TO CONCENTRATE OUR EFFORTS IN PARTICULAR APPROACHES AND FOCAL AREAS, WE WOULD BE ABLE TO GIVE SOME PROTECTION FURTHER AFIELD.

COORDINATION OF OUR EFFORTS WITH THOSE OF REGIONAL NATIONS COULD BE ACHIEVED IN VARIOUS WAYS, AND WOULD ENSURE THE BEST RESULTS FROM OUR COMBINED NATIONAL EFFORTS.

THOSE OF YOU FAMILIAR WITH AUSTRALIA'S RECENT DEFENCE WHITE PAPER WILL BE AWARE THAT MUCH OF OUR DEFENCE PLANNING IS PREDICATED ON THE BASIS THAT THE MOST LIKELY KINDS OF THREAT, IN THE SHORT TERM AT LEAST, WILL BE LIMITED TO LOWER LEVELS OF CONFLICT. NEVERTHELESS I MUST SAY, EMPHATICALLY, THAT WE ARE NOT IGNORING THE POTENTIAL FOR MORE GENERAL HOSTILITIES: WE SIMPLY DO NOT SEE THEM ARISING WITHOUT SUFFICIENT WARNING FOR US TO BE ABLE TO REACT APPROPRIATELY. NOR ARE WE SUGGESTING THAT THE RECENT THAWING OF SUPERPOWER RELATIONS PROVIDES SUFFICIENT REASON FOR US TO RELAX OUR GUARD JUST YET: ON THE CONTRARY WE MUST RETAIN THE CAPACITY TO IDENTIFY UNHEALTHY CHANGES IN OUR REGION AND TO RESPOND ACCORDINGLY.

GIVEN THE LENGTH, AND CONSEQUENT RELATIVE EASE OF INTERDICTION OF OUR SEA LANES, HOWEVER, AUSTRALIA COULD NOT EXPECT TO DEFEND THEM ALL IN ANY MAJOR CONFLICT. WE WOULD HOPE FOR HELP FROM OUR ANZUS PARTNERS, BUT WE WOULD ALSO EXPECT TO COOPERATE WITH OUR REGIONAL ALLIES AND FRIENDS, FOR WHOM THESE SEA LANES ARE ALSO IMPORTANT - THOSE OF YOU REPRESENTED HERE. AUSTRALIA'S DEFENCE POLICY IS FOUNDED ON SELF-RELIANCE, BUT NOT TOTAL SELF-SUFFICIENCY. WE RECOGNISE READILY THAT OUR SELF-RELIANCE MUST BE FOUNDED ON A FRAMEWORK OF ALLIANCES AND AGREEMENTS, NOT LEAST THOSE WITH REGIONAL COUNTRIES.

SO FAR, I HAVE SPOKEN AT SOME LENGTH ABOUT THE NEED FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION: AS HAVE OTHERS FROM TIME TO TIME. AND WITHOUT

WISHING TO PLAYDOWN THE IMPORTANCE OF SUCH DISCUSSION, WHICH INDEED IS VITAL BEFORE ANY MORE CONCRETE STEPS CAN BE TAKEN, MAYBE THE TIME HAS COME TO MAKE SOME PRACTICAL MOVES TOWARDS COOPERATION. AT THE SAME TIME I ACKNOWLEDGE THAT OUR MILITARY FORCES DO ENGAGE IN EXERCISES, BOTH MINOR AND MAJOR; BUT THEY TEND TO BE RELATIVELY FEW, FAIRLY INFREQUENT AND LOW KEY. FOR THESE REASONS TOO, THEY DO NOT PROVIDE THE FULL VALUE THAT WOULD ACCRUE FROM REGULAR EXERCISING, WITH PARTICULAR ACHIEVEMENTS IN MIND.

IF THE TIME IS RIGHT FOR A MORE PRACTICAL APPROACH TO REGIONAL NAVAL COOPERATION THEN I BELIEVE THAT THIS CONFERENCE, AND ITS THEME HAVE GIVEN US A PERFECT OPPORTUNITY TO BRING IT ABOUT. BUT, LEST I MIGHT APPEAR TO BE PUSHING THE ISSUE, LET ME SAY THAT I AM ACUTELY AWARE OF THE SENSITIVITIES APPLYING TO MY PROPOSAL, AND THAT THEY MAY CAUSE SOME OF YOU REAL CONCERN. IF I DO PUSH, IT IS ONLY BECAUSE OF MY BELIEF IN ITS IMPORTANCE, AND I READILY ACCEPT THAT THE PACE AT WHICH WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO PROGRESS COULD BE QUITE SLOW, ESPECIALLY AT FIRST.

AT THE SAME TIME WE MUST NOT FORGET THAT THE UNITED STATES EXPECTS REGIONAL NATIONS LIKE US TO TAKE A GREATER SHARE IN THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEFENCE MATTERS; WE SHOULD NEED LITTLE REMINDING OF THE OVER COMMITMENT FACING THE USN IN PARTICULAR. SO WHILE CIRCUMSPECTION WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE NEEDED AS WE SEEK CLOSER COOPERATION, LET US NOT IGNORE THE VERY REAL INCENTIVES WHICH ALMOST SEEM TO BEG FOR IT.

FROM MY PERSPECTIVE, THE WAY AHEAD IS CLEAR, IF NOT NECESSARILY EASY TO ACCOMMODATE. I BELIEVE WE NEED:

- AN ASSESSMENT OF SHARED REGIONAL INTERESTS,
- AN ASSESSMENT OF REGIONAL CAPABILITIES WHICH COULD FORM THE BASIS OF A CO-ORDINATED RESPONSE TO TRADE PROTECTION PROBLEMS,
- A DETERMINATION AS TO HOW TO ACHIEVE REGIONAL CO-OPERATION WITHIN THIS FRAMEWORK OF SHARED INTERESTS AND COMBINED CAPABILITIES, AND
- PROBABLY MOST DIFFICULT OF ALL, THE INSPIRATION TO TAKE THE FIRST STEP.

WITHOUT WISHING TO CLAIM ANY MONOPOLY ON INSPIRATION IN THIS COMPANY, I WOULD LIKE TO OFFER THE RAN'S SERVICES IN COORDINATING OUR EFFORTS TO IMPROVE COOPERATION. IN DOING SO I ADMIT THAT THERE IS A NEED FIRST OF ALL FOR THE NAVIES INVOLVED TO DISCUSS THEIR IDEAS AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS, BEFORE WORKING LEVEL DISCUSSIONS TAKE PLACE. THIS SHOULD ENSURE THAT ANY RESERVATIONS OR POTENTIAL PROBLEMS DO NOT AFFECT EFFORTS AT THE WORKING LEVEL.

AS SOME OF YOU WILL BE AWARE WE HOSTED THE FIRST WESTERN PACIFIC NAVAL SYMPOSIUM IN CANBERRA LAST WEEK. THIS OCCASION PROVED TO BE AN EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY FOR MAKING A START ON IMPROVING REGIONAL COOPERATION, AND DETERMINING THE ASPECTS OF SHIPPING PROTECTION IN WHICH MOST PROGRESS CAN BE MADE. TOGETHER WITH THE CHIEFS OR THEIR REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE NAVIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, MALAYSIA, SINGAPORE, THAILAND, BRUNEI, KOREA, NEW

ZEALAND, PAPUA NEW GUINEA AND THE UNITED STATES, WE MADE OUR FIRST TENTATIVE STEPS.

THE SYMPOSIUM PROVED TO BE EXTREMELY SUCCESSFUL, AND ON BEHALF OF MY COLLEAGUES I AM VERY PLEASED TO BE ABLE TO ANNOUNCE THE FOLLOWING INITIATIVES:

- . WE AGREED TO INVESTIGATE THE MEANS OF GETTING THE BEST VALUE FROM OUR EXISTING EXERCISE PROGRAMME, AND TO DETERMINE HOW TO IMPROVE THE EXERCISE PROGRAMME, NOTING THAT THE NEEDS AND CAPABILITIES OF OUR NAVIES VARY MARKEDLY.
- . WE ALSO AGREED TO INVESTIGATE THE POTENTIAL FOR OUR VARIOUS NAVIES TO PROVIDE TRAINING IN RELEVANT ASPECTS OF MARITIME OPERATIONS TO THOSE AMONG US WITH PARTICULAR NEEDS. WHERE POSSIBLE, THIS WILL BE CONDUCTED UNDER EXISTING DEFENCE COOPERATION ARRANGEMENTS.
- . THERE WILL BE AN EXAMINATION OF THE MEANS WHEREBY WE AS FRIENDS AND ALLIES CAN DEVELOP PROCEDURES WHICH WILL ASSIST IN THE PROTECTION OF SHIPPING WITHIN OUR REGION. THIS COULD INVOLVE PRODUCING ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE SHARING OF INFORMATION ON SHIPPING MOVEMENTS, AND PUTTING IN PLACE ARRANGEMENTS FOR COORDINATING OUR FORCES SO AS TO GAIN THE GREATEST VALUE FROM WHAT INEVITABLY WILL BE LIMITED CAPABILITIES.

OF COURSE PROGRESS WILL BE SLOW, PARTICULARLY AT FIRST. BUT THE IMPORTANT POINT IS THAT WE HAVE BEGUN: WE HAVE DECIDED TO COOPERATE ON AN ISSUE OF IMPORTANCE TO ALL OF US. SOME QUITE TRICKY ISSUES REMAIN UNRESOLVED, AND TO BE FRANK THERE IS NO POINT IN AVOIDING THE FACT THAT NATIONAL ATTITUDES WILL UNDOUBTEDLY TEMPER THE ENTHUSIASM WHICH WE CARRIED AWAY FROM LAST WEEK'S SYMPOSIUM. STILL IF WE ARE PREPARED TO BE PATIENT I BELIEVE THE REWARDS WILL BE RICH INDEED.

IN CONCLUDING, COULD I JUST MAKE THREE POINTS:

- . FIRSTLY, THOSE OF US FOR WHOM THE INDIAN AND PACIFIC OCEANS ARE MAJOR TRADE ROUTES KNOW THE IMPORTANCE OF KEEPING THEM OPEN, AND THE DIFFICULTIES THAT WILL BE INVOLVED IF THEY ARE THREATENED.
- . SECONDLY, EVEN THOUGH SOME OF THE NATIONS REPRESENTED HERE HAVE BILATERAL OR MULTILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS INVOLVING THEIR NAVIES, THERE IS SCOPE FOR DEVELOPING MORE EFFECTIVE REGIONAL COOPERATION AIMED AT KEEPING OPEN OUR SEA LANES OF COMMUNICATION AND PROTECTING OUR SHIPPING.
- . AND FINALLY, I WOULD LIKE TO THINK THAT THIS CONFERENCE WILL CONTINUE THE ENCOURAGING PROGRESS MADE AT LAST WEEK'S SYMPOSIUM, AND WILL MAKE A VALUABLE CONTRIBUTION TO THE BUILDING OF REGIONAL COOPERATIVE MEASURES TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF OUR SEA LANES.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, IN DECLARING THIS CONFERENCE OPEN, I CONGRATULATE THE ORGANIZERS FOR THEIR CONTINUING AND SUCCESSFUL EFFORTS AT FOCUSING INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION ON THIS MOST IMPORTANT SUBJECT - THE SECURITY OF OUR SEA LANES. MUCH HAS ALREADY BEEN ACHIEVED AS A RESULT OF THE FIVE PREVIOUS CONFERENCES, SO I TRUST THAT THE SUBJECT OF THIS CONFERENCE, RESPONDING TO THREATS TO SEA LANE SECURITY, WILL PROVE A FRUITFUL TOPIC FOR DISCUSSION. CERTAINLY, IT IS IN THE INTERESTS OF ALL OF US THAT IT SHOULD.

THANK YOU.

KEYNOTE ADDRESS

presented by

GENERAL R.G. STILWELL, USA RET.

to

THE SIXTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE

on

SEA LANES OF COMMUNICATION

Melbourne, Australia

October 1988

As its designated spokesman, I extend the warm greetings of the United States delegation to all other participants in this, the Sixth Annual Conference of our organization. We are grateful to our Australian colleagues for the excellent preparations that have made possible this assemblage; and, through them, congratulate the entire Australian population on the occasion of their great nation's bicentennial.

Some 16 months ago, at the outset of our outstanding conference in Seoul, events in the strategic Persian Gulf underscored the criticality and dynamics of our study agenda. The United States had made a commitment, subsequently backed by major naval force deployments, to uphold the principle of unrestricted transit of international waters by the commercial traffic of all nations. Today, a cease fire has supplanted the mindless killing of the Iran-Iraq war; the Persian Gulf is relatively placid; and U.S. naval forces are phasing down. We may never know the degree to which Iranian decision-making was influenced by the strong resolve of the United States and other European allies; but, to be sure, it was substantial. The lesson is clear. Short of that far-off day when the external conduct of all nations is governed by a universally accepted regimen of international law, diplomacy must be backed by power and the willingness to use that power, as needed, to protect one's peoples, institutions and values.

The dramatic - and essentially favorable - developments of the past year have removed the Persian Gulf from center stage in world affairs - at least for the nonce. In the same time frame, there have been events of great moment elsewhere in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean. Those events attest to the volatility of the regional and global environments; they attest, likewise, to both the complexity and the strategic significance of the areas we have again assembled to discuss.

The entire world is attentive to the pronouncements and initiatives of Secretary General Gorbachev as they relate to both Soviet foreign and domestic policy; and the challenge is to determine whether they do, in fact, signal sea change in the posture of that communist superpower. It is evident that the Soviet leadership has reached the firm conclusion that its economic system is fatally flawed and must be overhauled as completely as possible without jeopardy to the political control of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

But if real change is afoot inside the Soviet Union, there is still no evidence that the Soviet Union has in any way modified its long-standing foreign policies. What we have been witness to is much greater sophistication in the conduct of external relations and in the exploitation of international communication means. Thus, our current estimate is that Gorbachev aims to revitalize, not revolutionize, the Soviet

system, to the end of enhancing its ability to pursue its expansionist goals in the decades ahead.

As forecast in Gorbachev's widely heralded address at Vladivostok two years ago, the Soviets have focussed much greater attention on East Asia, and for multiple reasons. The Soviet leadership has belatedly recognized the steadily increasing economic power and therefore the strategic significance of the Pacific basin; appreciates that much augmented trade with the free nations of Asia can accelerate the economic development of Siberia; appreciates also that the Soviet Union must better posture itself to counter the rapidly changing and now outwardly looking China; and sees new opportunities to improve the "correlation of forces" in the zero-sum competition with the United States for influence in the Third World.

Recent Soviet diplomatic, commercial and psychological initiatives have been notable for their number and diversity, as contrasted with any past period. In the diplomatic arena, the most notable have been the strenuous -although thus far unsuccessful - efforts to improve Soviet-Japanese relations primarily to acquire advanced industrial technology and financial resources; the equally strenuous efforts to gain Chinese acceptance of a Summit meeting as precursor to reestablishment of Communist Party ties and resolution of key

foreign policy differences; a barrage of arms control proposals (a freeze on nuclear weapons deployments in Asia; a multi-national naval conference with the same general objective; simultaneous deactivation of Soviet and US bases in Vietnam and the Philippines, respectively; and tongue and cheek accession to the protocols of the Treaty of Rarotonga which brought into being the South Pacific nuclear-free zone); and the official visits ^{of} Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and other high-ranking members of the Soviet hierarchy to the Southeast Asian states and the Southern Pacific region.

As my colleagues know better than I, the Soviet merchant marine (MORFLOT) aggressively seeks larger shares of intra-region and inter-region oceanic cargo contracts; and has the diversified fleet and rate structures to be a serious contender for bulk, general and containerized cargoes. Moscow is reputedly ready to invest in the Philippines for appropriate quid pro quo while its continuing attempts to conclude fishing agreements and berthing rights in Micronesia and the Australian subcontinent have been well documented by Michael Danby and other experts. Complementing these initiatives, the International Department of the CPSU has skillfully orchestrated cultural and informational activities to drive home the peaceful intentions of the Soviet Union and its anti-imperialist stance. The principal target audience, quite

logically, is the youth - too unread to be familiar with the seventy-year history of the Soviet regime.

All this proceeds under the shadow of formidable Soviet military power and its support of allies who continue to destabilize the western Pacific and Indian Ocean areas. There has been no diminution of the massive ground and air forces in the Soviet Far Eastern Theater of Operations; the targets of the soon-to-be deactivated SS-20s will be assumed by SS-25 mobile missiles deployed farther westward; the Soviet Pacific Ocean fleet has been upgraded qualitatively and quantitatively, and its out-of-area operations have increased; North Korea has been provided advanced air and ground weaponry and, in return, has greatly facilitated Soviet intelligence and other operations; Camranh Bay has been developed into the largest Soviet naval deployment base outside the USSR while, in return the Soviet Union has upgraded the Vietnamese armed forces and provides the wherewithal to sustain the occupation of ill-fated Kampuchea. The Indian-Soviet relationship must also be noted with concern, particularly as regards Soviet advisory and materiel support to an Indian navy expanding in size and reach. As the publication "Soviet Military Power" reports, Soviets have leased a cruise-missile-equipped nuclear attack submarine to the Indian navy - the first time that any country has transferred a nuclear-powered warship to another. ⁷ Clearly, the military capabilities of the Soviet Union and its operative

support programs constitute the primary threat to the security of Sea Lanes of Communication in this critical region. But there are other threats afoot. And the most worrisome center on the Philippines, guarding the eastern flank of the South China Sea.

A year ago, I signalled impending crisis in the Philippines; and developments in the intervening months provide scant basis for optimism about the restoration of stability and progress in that beleaguered nation and, concomitantly, its role in protecting lines of communication through the South China Seas. The incumbent government has been unable to make any measurable inroads against a well-entrenched, externally supported insurgency; indeed, the political - and the more dangerous - activities of the Philippine Communist Party continue to increase in effectiveness and expand in scope. One has reason to ponder whether the events of February 1986 did, in fact, constitute a revolution; or were simply the first stage of an upheaval that would eventually lead to the demise of democracy in the Philippines.

Subsumed in all this is the future of U.S. bases in that country. The ongoing review of the modalities governing the current agreement have had a tortuous course. The communists and the non-communist left have found common cause in the base issue; and, principally via the media, have fanned anti-

American sentiment particularly in Metro Manila. Given these dynamics, the unreasonable expectations of the Aquino government on compensation and the political orientation of the Philippine congress, the prospects for a satisfactory base agreement beyond September 1991 are not good. The United States is, per force, seriously considering previously unthinkable options for maintaining its strategic posture in this critical region.

If the involving stance of the Philippines will significantly shape the future environment of the South China Sea, so, too, will the orientation and policies of the Peoples Republic of China. My trip to that country this past summer was in the immediate wake of the Chinese-Vietnamese imbroglio in the Spratleys. The extent to which the Chinese heralded that incident, and moved aggressively to resolve it, may well have been indicators of an increasingly prominent role in the maritime affairs of the Western Pacific. Several imperatives would, in Chinese eyes, justify a modernized, multi-purpose naval arm of greater capability and reach. These include rapidly expanding foreign trade, particularly subsequent to the absorption of Hong Kong; intensified exploitation of subsurface resources of the adjacent seas and, notably, in areas subject to conflicting territorial claims; a predictable increase in Soviet Pacific Ocean fleet transits to/from the South Pacific and Indian Oceans; and the sheer logic of a great world power

having a contingent capability for forced protection and pursuit of its self-enunciated interests. Our collective hope must be that such augmented PRC naval power as may eventuate will contribute to overall security of sea lanes and contiguous land areas.

My concentration on the Western Pacific does not imply that that area weighs heavier in the balance than the Indian Ocean. As the gateway to the energy and mineral resources of the Middle East and Africa, it merits sharing center stage in our discussions. Recent developments along the northern littoral present both challenges and opportunity. On the one hand, there is a reasonable prospect that a re-oriented Burma, now in a state of chaos bordering on anarchy, will emerge as a cooperating member of the free world community and a de facto extension of ASEAN. But to the west, there are reasons for concern. Sri Lanka continues in turmoil; the Indian Army appears there to stay; and the question remains: what foreign naval powers, if any, will have access to the deep water port of Trincomalee. Pakistan, following the sudden demise of President Zia, is in considerable foment. And, finally, while we can measure the growing capability of the Indian naval and air arms, we have yet to diagnose the national objectives those forces are intended to support.

This geopolitical survey - its cursory and disjointed nature notwithstanding - serves one modest purpose. It is to underscore the high significance and multi-faceted nature of the subjects we have assembled to deliberate. But I submit we must do more than deliberate. As our distinguished colleague and architect of this forum, Ambassador Han Li Wu, exhorted a year ago, it is imperative that we synthesize, record and promulgate our findings of the past several conferences. Additionally, I urge that we commission the preparation of a compendium which would detail what the Sea Lanes are all about, to include pertinent maps and statistics. With the imprimatur of our organization to establish its authenticity, I am confident that such a volume would be a very valuable and much sought reference.

Keynote Address Presented at the 6th International SLOC
Conference in Melbourne, October 11, 1988

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SECURE SLOCS FOR THE NATIONS IN THE WESTERN
PACIFIC

by Shin Kanemaru

President

Japanese Center for Strategic Studies

Ladies and gentlemen

It is of great significance that the 6th International SLOC conference, sponsored by the Australian Defence Association and the Institute of Public Affairs, is held in this commemorative year of the bicentennial of the Australian foundation, and at the point when the Soviet Union signed the INF Treaty with the United States and has started to withdraw its forces from Afganistan, while in the Middle East the long lasting Iran-Iraq war has reached a truce, all of which indicates that world situations seem to be changing greatly.

First of all, I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude and respect to the members of the Australian side and of the International Steering Committee who organized and prepared this conference so well. It is my great pleasure and honour to be given this opportunity at the very beginning of this

conference, to sum up the political and strategic problems covered by the previous conferences, stressing the significance of secure sea lanes of communications for the nations in the Western Pacific and to express some of my personal views about it.

It is generally recognized that the signing of the INF Treaty is the result of military increases of the United States aimed at a powerful America" and the coincidental support of the Western bloc toward the United States' energetic efforts to abolish intermediate nuclear forces. The signing of the INF Treaty has given the peoples of the West a hope that it may become a milestone toward a comprehensive arms control.

However, it is undeniable that coupled with the skillful peace offensive by the Soviet Union, it has also created a detente mood among the peoples of the West. Hence, such a question as "Why should we endeavor to secure our sea lanes of communications, when the world situation is moving toward a detente?" may be raised.

However, it goes without saying that the balance between the East and the West, in terms of tactical nuclear forces and conventional military forces will become far more important after the abolition of INF. In this respect, the Western nations, being inferior in conventional military forces, should cooperate to strengthen their own conventional military forces, as well as decrease the unbalance of both the East and the West in an asymmetrical manner, so as to maintain the balance at a

Lower level. However, it is not so easy to realize, as we actually see that the USSR, while it is very active in carrying out a peace offensive, continues to increase its military power in the Far East, especially the Pacific Fleet and the air forces, quantitatively as well as qualitatively. What it implies in relation to the security of the SLOCs is very serious.

Through the past five International SLOC conferences, we have reached basic agreement on the significance of securing the safety of the SLOCs and the necessity of our cooperation for that purpose. Let me give you the essential points of our agreement: First, the freedom and safety of the sea lanes, i.e., SLOCs, must be secured, as it is vitally important for the existence and development of Western Pacific nations. We, the countries in the Western Pacific, being geopolitically sea powers, have achieved tremendous economic development after the War under the free economic system; living standards of the people have improved; so that the next century will be called the Pacific era. With economic development and the improvement in living standards, trade of necessary fuel resources, raw materials, food and industrial goods has increased. Since most of these goods are transported by sea, securing the freedom and safety of the SLOCs has become all the more important.

Secondly, another important objective of the defence of the SLOCs is to safeguard sea transportation of personnel and material necessary for the continuation of defence, in case of

emergencies, and to contribute to securing the safety and freedom of action for operating naval forces. This is because the security of our Western Pacific nations is supported by the military support and cooperation of the United States, and the threat from the Soviet submarines and heavy bombers in the Western Pacific has been increasing.

Thirdly, improvement of our SLOCs defence system is an important part in the deterrent of a major war. The maritime strategy of the United States is highly significant in terms of a deterrent to a major war, and it is indispensable for securing the safety and freedom of action of the U.S. naval forces as well as sea transportation of military personnel and supplies. In the case of a major war, it would be considerably protracted, and it is necessary to secure the supply from abroad of fuel, raw materials, and other necessary goods for the survival of the peoples and the continuation of defence.

Fourthly, defence of SLOCs, extending over such wide sea areas, cannot be achieved by any nation alone, however powerful it might be. The mutual cooperation among related nations in some form or another is necessary. However, establishing a collective defence system like NATO in the areas of the East Asia and the Western Pacific seems to be impossible in the foreseeable future; therefore, how to resolve this problem is an important political and military task for us.

I have so far summarized the significance of securing the SLOCs

and the necessity of cooperation among the Western Pacific nations, in which basic agreement was reached through the past International SLOC conferences. I would like to add a few words, in this context, on the significance and problems of our defence effort of the SLOCs in the Northeast Asia and the Northwest Pacific subregion.

First, the sea areas extending approximately 1,000 nautical miles from Japan, not only south of the Japanese islands, but also east of them, is the most important as well as the most dangerous for the safety and security of not only our SLOCs but also the East Asian countries. The SLOCs of our three nations in the northeast Asia, that is, Japan, the Republic of Korea and the Republic of China, converge in this area, and the U.S. Naval operating forces coming to help the defence efforts of the northeast Asian nations, pass through or operate in this area. As this area is close to the Soviet naval bases, too, this area may be said to be a good operational area for Soviet submarines and heavy bombers, and it is this area that they must pass through in order to extend their operations.

Next, it goes without saying that the defence of three straits around Japan is essential not only for the safety of SLOCs in the Western Pacific, but also for the security of the East Asian areas. However, securing the Japanese islands and the southern half of Korean peninsula is a premise of the defence of the three straits. In this regard, we should pay attention to the remarkable increase of the Soviet sea control

capabilities, including the Pacific fleet's major surface combat vessels and submarines and cruising missiles carried on board them. These would indicate that the USSR intends to secure control of the Seas of Japan and Okhotsk as well as the areas around the Kurile Islands and Kamchatka Peninsula, and to expand the controlling area even further toward the northwestern Pacific. The defence of Japanese and Korean territories, including the three straits around Japan, is the premise of defence of sea lanes in the ocean, and we now face more serious threats than every before. Accordingly, I would like to point out that strengthening the defence capabilities not only of land territories but also against aircraft, surface vessels and submarines operating in the Sea of Japan as well as anti-surface missiles to be fired from them, is now a more important and serious problem.

As a result of the improved performances of submarines, increased number of heavy bombers such as backfire, and improved performances of air-to-surface missiles mounted on them, the defence of the SLOCs in the Western Pacific has become more complicated and difficult. It should be especially noticed that in addition to anti-submarine warfare operations, the air defence of vessels on the seas has become a new and grave problem.

Lastly, it is said that the next century is the Pacific era. The countries surrounding the Pacific and the island nations in the Pacific basin are connected with each other by sea lanes.

Therefore, the safety and prosperity of the countries in the Pacific sphere depend upon the safety of the SLOCs in the Pacific or the maritime security. However, in order to maintain this security, mutual cooperation among the countries in this sphere is indispensable. Through our past conferences, we have come to a general agreement on the significance of the security of the SLOCs and the necessity for cooperation among the countries concerned in order to maintain it. As I understand it, the ultimate objective of this conference is to discuss practical methods needed for implementation under the existing political and strategic situations, recommend the result of such discussion to our respective governments, and appeal to the peoples. It is a welcome advance, I believe, that many concrete problems are taken up for discussion at this conference. In concluding my address, I do hope that this conference will contribute to the promotion of further mutual cooperation among the countries concerned in the coming Pacific era.

Thank you for your attention.

6th International Conference on
the Security of Sea Lanes of Communication

TECHNIQUES FOR ENSURING SLOC SECURITY
IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

A STRATEGIC OVERVIEW

by

Michael O'Connor

Southern Cross Hotel
Melbourne, Australia
11-13 October, 1988

INTRODUCTION

The organisers of this conference determined very early that it should concentrate its deliberations upon the organisational structures and techniques for dealing with any threats to the security of the sea lanes of communication upon which all our countries depend so heavily.

Nevertheless it was felt that the discussions should take place within a broad strategic framework. Clearly the desirability of any particular organisation or course of action will reflect the strategic realities as they are perceived by the participants. It would be fair to say that not all here represented would agree upon the strategic details. Nor is it, I suggest, necessary to do so.

Having said that, one of the basic realities of security planning is that it normally takes place in an environment in which political interests are inclined to play down any sense of threat or urgency. Long-range operational planning often occurs if at all *sub rosa*, behind the leadership's back. But realities have a habit of forcing themselves on to the political agenda and at very short notice. This suggests a need for at least informal and non-binding international discussion not only of the strategic possibilities but also the potential operational and organisational responses.

Thus, it is useful for a conference such as this which mixes the practitioners with scholars and critics to exchange ideas in a forum which does not commit any government to any course of action or any particular relationship between nations or groups of nations.

Having said that, I would like to focus now on three basic themes in this strategic overview. They are:

- * the relationship between Japan and the Soviet Union in the Western Pacific;
- * the issue of protracted low intensity conflict as contrasted with that of global conflict; and
- * the significance of anti-shipping operations in the Iran-Iraq War.

THE SOVIET-JAPAN RELATIONSHIP

The central issue that we must come to grips with is that the struggle between East and West will go on, however it manifests itself in an apparently more reasonable Soviet Union. Underlying this assertion is the reality that the Soviet bloc is still ruled by an unrepresentative oligarchy holding power by force and by a system of total social, economic and political control.

To that unrepresentative group, the existence of free and prosperous peoples is not merely annoying; it is a positive threat. As international communications improve, the ability of the dictators to conceal from their peoples the reality that freedom and prosperity can co-exist becomes more difficult.

The economic imperative facing the Soviet leadership is to provide some of that prosperity for their own peoples. In actual fact, the gap between the two systems is growing rather than diminishing.

The Soviets have essentially two choices: what appears to be the Gorbachev way - to manage change so as not to lose the privileged position of the elites; or the conservative way - to take control of at least one of the West's productive centres. Of course, a combination of the two has the advantage of hedging bets and maintaining stability at home as well as confusion in the West.

It is simply not possible for the Soviets to defeat the United States in a straight-out confrontation and survive. Thus a rational Soviet leadership will avoid confrontation with the US, not only by avoiding its ultimate manifestation, a nuclear exchange, but also by stepping up subversion in Latin America so as to confuse and distract the American electorate.

In the era of Thatcher, Mitterand and Kohl, Western Europe is also probably immune from attack since an outright

conventional invasion of Western Europe will only destroy the productive capacity the Soviets need to control.

That leaves Japan as the most attractive target for Soviet adventurism. Not only is Japan wealthy but it is politically weak in external terms, relying too heavily on the US security guarantee. Japan is enormously vulnerable, being close to the Soviet Union and heavily dependent upon long-distance seaborne trade which it cannot protect.

In basic geostrategic terms, Japan is ripe for plucking, the only theoretical problem for the Soviets being the immense distance of their Pacific region from European Russia and its heavy industries.

The central strategic issue facing Japan's trading partners is how to prevent Japan being detached from the western camp. From a particular Australian viewpoint, our economic links with Japan are now so deep and fundamental that a Soviet success would flow over to Australia.

The Manifestations

As most students of World War II would know, military planners tend to shudder at the thought of invading the Japanese home islands. Even if successful, the cost in casualties and destruction of a valuable prize would be so great as to make the reward highly problematic. Any success will thus depend upon forcing Japanese submission at a

political level.

In broad terms, Japan must be coerced, to be cut off from its raw materials and markets but to be offered a carrot as a reward for submission. Soviet strategy is likely to mix political, economic and military measures so as to keep the Americans out but to aggravate a feeling of isolation in the Japanese community. That isolation will be intensified by Soviet operations at a distance from Japan but astride her vital sea lanes.

Already it is possible to cite a range of regional developments which, if successful in Soviet terms, will contribute to a sense of isolation in Japan.

Obviously, the growth of the Soviet presence at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam is worrying to the Japanese whose oil routes pass close by. Coupled with this, the Philippines insurgency is coming under closer Soviet influence. At worst, it will lead to the expulsion of the United States from that country and total Soviet domination of the South China Sea.

In turn that will lead to growing pressure on Indonesia which, if successful, could force shipping from the south and west to travel south and east about Australia at much greater cost.

Low cost Soviet probes into the South Pacific, either directly or through surrogates, would, if successful, further extend the area over which Soviet maritime power

would dominate. Australia would be cut off from the United States, its primary source of advanced military equipment.

The Soviet-influenced success in New Zealand which effectively if temporarily destroyed ANZUS has caused serious concern among Japanese planners.

And by no means unimportant, the rapid development of India's naval power means that Japanese traffic in the Indian Ocean can move only with Indian permission.

LOW INTENSITY OR GLOBAL CONFLICT

Australia's Defence Minister, Kim Beazley, recently warned a Canberra audience about the dangers of overestimating the chances of sustained peace with the Soviet Union when he said:

We would certainly do well to remember that the underlying Soviet view of the world as divided between two social systems, in which the West is a permanent and irreconcilable adversary, remains under Gorbachev.

That is a view which has not found favour with some countries in the region - and certainly not with some groups in Australia.

At the same time, there is a danger which I have perceived

in some of our earlier conferences that the threat from the USSR is seen solely in the context of a global conventional war between the West (loosely defined) and the Soviet Bloc. There seems to me to be two basic fallacies in this approach.

The first is that many countries, especially in South East Asia, prefer not to identify themselves politically with either group. They believe that they could stand aside from such a conflict - and probably they could. It would be too immense and too concentrated for them to play any significant part. Such a view is understandable and is also probably correct.

The second - and in my view more significant fallacy - is that the USSR shows no sign of seeking such a conflict despite its clearly aggressive political intent as reiterated by Mr Beazley. What is far more likely to cause us countries of the Western Pacific our problems is some kind of low intensity protracted conflict which would directly threaten our interests but at a level of intensity which would preclude United States intervention. Such an approach is much more likely to appeal to a Soviet leadership which knows it cannot win a one-to-one battle with the United States.

In my view, Soviet strategy has always been incremental. This is consistent with Leninist teaching. It eschews the long-range unsupported push into what cricketers call the deep field.

In the aftermath of the loss of South Vietnam and the consequential expulsion of US land-based military power from South East Asia, the struggle has become fundamentally a struggle for dominance at sea. As my friend, Admiral Hozumi, has pointed out in a previous conference in this series, the Soviet strategy is to control the marginal seas of Okhotsk, Japan, East China and South China.

To that list we could add an intention to exercise control of the archipelagic nations of the Philippines and ultimately Indonesia.

To digress slightly, it is also perfectly consistent that India should be seeking to dominate the marginal seas in the Indian Ocean as well as the approaches to the Indonesian straits. Such a development benefits only the USSR.

The Political Context

These developments need to be seen in the context of Mr. Gorbachev's 1986 Vladivostok speech in which he asserted a Soviet interest in the Pacific. What to many Australians, including senior government ministers, appeared no more than a legitimate claim by a superpower leader can be seen as much more threatening by to Japan, China and Republic of Korea.

Gorbachev has gone further in asserting that claim by setting up a campaign to detach Japan from the United States. The campaign consists of three basic themes.

The first of these is the perennial nuclear free zone proposition, this time for the north Pacific. Of course, it will not bind the Soviets but it is designed to get the United States Seventh Fleet out of Japan. Fuelled in part by conferences in Australia's Peace Research Centre, the NFZ concept is unlikely to succeed but it will muddy the waters not only in Japan but here in Australia where it is necessary to develop an awareness of the link between Japan's security and ours.

The second element is the implementation of the so-called separation of forces. What the Soviets are peddling is the idea that peace in the north-west Pacific will be assured if there is no chance of a confrontation between Soviet and American forces. They put the view, usually through the mouths of obsessively neutralist academics, that such a separation would generate confidence because the Soviets are concerned that American forces in the region are designed to attack the Soviet Union.

We are supposed to believe that the Soviets have this fear that the Americans are poised to invade the Soviet Union from the most inappropriate axis, where the chances of victory are much less than Hitler's or Napoleon's and in a political context completely lacking a *casus belli*.

Of course, the real objective is to get the Americans out of the Western Pacific and back to Hawaii, leaving the ground to the Soviets.

Thirdly, the threat to Japan of isolation may be softened by a promise to return Japan's northern territories, occupied since 1945 by the Soviet Union. The Soviets may argue that, with the Americans gone, they would have no need for their retention.

The Soviets have not yet made that move, although there is talk about it. Such an offer would meet resistance within the Politburo if only because of a reluctance to surrender any territory anywhere ever.

Nonetheless, it is an attractive carrot because it would be so intensely divisive within Japan. As well, there will be outsiders who would advocate that the Japanese submit to this sort of blackmail.

Of course, the pressure on the United States to move out of Subic Bay and Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines dovetails neatly with this strategy and explains the Soviet abandonment of its old allies in the Philippines in favour of the formerly Maoist Communist Party of the Philippines and its various political and military fronts.

In effect, the success of such strategies would force the United States Navy to withdraw from the Western Pacific, leaving a vacuum to be filled by the Soviet Navy which would claim to be operating in its own waters.

Within the bounds of this broad strategic approach, there is no room for the all-out superpower confrontation. The

American electorate will be given no grounds to unite in support of allies in the Western Pacific. Indeed, every propaganda weapon, including tensions over trade, would be used to break down the mutual confidence which has existed between America and such allies as Japan, Australia and New Zealand. There is, however, ample scope for very limited politico-military pressures to be applied to individual countries and interests with the ultimate objective of isolating Japan. A central element of the strategy would be to prevent regional nations from combining to support each other with only distant and basically logistic support from the United States.

THE PERSIAN GULF SHIPPING WAR

Finally, let me offer some brief thoughts arising from the experience of neutral countries in the Iran-Iraq War of 1979-88.

Before the attacks on neutral shipping commenced, it was generally believed, perhaps unrealistically, that neutral merchant shipping would not be attacked in any conflict. Why this belief should have persisted in the face of historical experience and commonsense is probably no longer relevant. There was probably more than an element of wishful thinking about it.

The underlying principle to be observed is surely that no commander will neglect an opportunity to damage his enemy if

he has the operational capability and the political freedom to do so, and if he believes that he will avoid retaliation.

Iran and Iraq have done the rest of the world a favour in this sense that they have destroyed a myth that was always dangerous, the myth that helpless neutrals would be allowed to go about their business free from interference.

I suspect that before the shipping war commenced there was a further assumption common among defence planners - that shipping which did come under attack would simply go elsewhere. What in fact happened was that shipowners began to demand that their governments protect them. After all, they had paid their taxes so they were entitled to protection.

What then happened was that, contrary to all political, academic and journalistic rationality, many of the principal naval powers led by the United States had to intervene to protect shipping from practically every conceivable threat except the very one the planners considered most likely, the submarine.

Not only that, but the cost soon escalated to a level which threatened procurement budgets and combat readiness in other theatres. If the war had not ended, the NATO countries in particular would have been faced with rapidly rising defence budgets or a significant reduction in other programmes, both defence and non-defence.

It was very apparent that the defence was facing that fundamental problem, the law of disproportionate response. For a very small cost - and with no apparent rational objective - Iran especially was forcing the United States and her allies into an extremely costly defensive exercise.

To digress slightly, it also seemed to me as a distant and amateur observer that the Western navies were dropped into a situation for which they were not well-equipped or trained.

The fundamental lesson to be learned - or relearned - from this is that we cannot afford to be too rigid in our assumptions, our equipment programmes or our training. Nor can we afford to argue - as many in high positions have done - that unprotected assets will somehow be immune in time of conflict. We cannot assume that a conflict will take a particular form or that peacetime allies will automatically come to our assistance in time of war. In particular, we cannot afford to ignore the political context in which conflict takes place because, especially in the limited war, the political context is the fundamental determinant of strategy, of operations and, sometimes, even of tactics.

CONCLUSION

To conclude then, I would suggest that the strategic environment in which this conference is being conducted is one which over the next decade or more will see an intensified Soviet effort to detach Japan from the broad

Western alliance so as to sustain the privileged position of the ruling oligarchy in the Soviet Union.

That effort will combine political, economic and military coercion with possibly a politically divisive offer to restore some part of the northern territories provided Japan withdraws from its alliance with the United States.

If successful, the policy could radically reshape the political and economic relationships of the Western Pacific at a time when economic growth and political stability are leading to unrivalled prosperity and freedom for the region.

The military dimensions of the campaign could well include pressure on merchant shipping because of Japan's heavy dependence upon overseas trade as well as the current vulnerability of that shipping.

Soviet policy would be likely to apply that pressure at a level which would make American intervention in support of Japan politically difficult if not impossible.

The experience of the shipping war in the Iran-Iraq conflict suggests that an effective campaign could be conducted either directly or by surrogates at low cost compared with the cost of an adequate defence.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES FOR SLOC SECURITY
IN NORTHEAST ASIA

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INTRODUCTION *

As a generalization, it may be said that the delegations from the nations represented at the previous conferences agreed to the following general conclusions:

1. The security of the sea lanes of the Pacific Basin since the mid-1970s has become a matter of increasing concern to the individual nations of the Basin area. Their high dependency on the import of energy and raw materials, especially strategic ones, is the principal basis for their concern.

2. The recent buildup of the Soviet Pacific Fleet and its strategic implications indicate that the principal but not the only source of the threat to the sea lanes, particularly in case of war, is the Soviet Union.

3. Deterrence is the best means of keeping vital SLOC secured.

4. Since individual nations cannot effectively provide for SLOC security on their own, there is a need to develop cooperation between nations of the Pacific Basin.

However, it is also acknowledged that irrespective of its desirability, the establishment of a multilateral collective defense system for SLOC security is not feasible in the near future due primarily to political difficulties. As a consequence, as Michael O'Connor among others has lamented, there has been little discussion of the practical means of cooperation by which the threat can be countered,

while there has been much discussion about the threats and the constraints on the development of a cooperative system.

I believe, it is in this context that the international steering committee for the SLOC security conference has decided that the 6th conference should focus its attention on a number of specific organizational and operational problems that need to be addressed in concert so that a general solution can be found.

I fully agree with the need to discuss and develop the practical means of cooperation. However, it seems to me that the steering committee's position tends to over-emphasize the importance of dealing with military problems of cooperation at the expense of political problems as evident in the following statement.

"While the committee accepts that there are and will be political difficulties in the implementation of these solutions at this time, it believes that such solutions should be canvassed if only because political obstacles can be overcome more quickly under the pressure of events than can the operational problems."

Needless to say, it is of great importance to deal with military problems of cooperation, for a kind of division of labor or harmonization of military activities helps avoid duplication of effort and mutual interference and exploit the opportunity of a far better force posture than is possible with scarce national naval forces. But in the discussion of mutual cooperation it seems more reasonable and meaningful to consider both military and political problems together rather than considering them separately, since military

aspect of cooperation varies depending not only upon the nature and scope of events but also upon the assessment of the events by individual nations. For instance, would Japan intend to blockade the Korea-Tsushima straits in case of another Korean war in order to prevent North Korean naval forces from being deployed in the southern part of the Korean waters?

The purpose of this paper, then, is to propose an alternative means of keeping the Northeast Asian SLOC secured to sheer military aspect of cooperation.

REVIEW OF THE CONSTRAINTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF COOPERATION

In this section, attempts are made to review the constraints on the development of military cooperation in conjunction with previously suggested means of cooperation in an effort to clarify and highlight the obstacles with which we are now faced.

As the ways of sharing burdens of the SLOC defense among the four navies in Northeast Asia Sang-Woo Rhee made suggestions for "the division of SLOC defense zones" and "functional division of SLOC defense" at the First International SLOC Conference in San Francisco in 1982.¹ Rhee, by pointing out that the U.S.-Japan agreement for bilateral division of the SLOC defense zones (i.e., Japan's declaration of defending the sea defense zone in the Pacific up to 1,000 nautical miles from her coastline) would enhance security of the SLOC in Northeast Asia for the American allies, suggested

a multilateral burden sharing system based on the division of SLOC defense zones. Rhee did not specify how and what areas should be assigned to South Korea and ROC for SLOC defense except for mentioning that "the U.S. and Japan help strengthen the navies of ROK and ROC to take responsibilities of SLOC defense surrounding their own territories."

As an alternative to the division of SLOC defense zones, Rhee also suggested to share the burdens functionally. To defend common SLOC among the concerned nations, according to Rhee, we can establish a joint "North-East Asian SLOC Defense Allied Forces" (NEASLOC/DAF) and each member nation takes functionally divided roles for the operation by dispatching special units to the joint forces.

Similarly, O'Connor also offered some thoughts on the means of cooperation at the Fourth International SLOC Conference in Taipei in 1986.² O'Connor's suggestion encompasses two broad areas: "force structure" and "command structures." The essence of force structure proposals is that nations should be willing to work towards complementary force structures in order to ensure that "the combined forces in each region are as capable as possible of meeting the threat to SLOCs without having to call for outside assistance." In addition, O'Connor suggested to establish three maritime headquarters to control multinational forces assigned to SLOC protection by national governments, i.e., the Northeast Pacific Area, the ASEAN Area, and the ANZAC Area.

In proposing these thoughtful suggestions both Rhee and O'Connor noted that these suggestions should be seen as a basis for further research and discussion, and admitted that there would be many difficulties in implementing these joint cooperations. Nevertheless, they failed not only to elaborate on obstacles to the development of cooperation but also to suggest how to deal with them, thereby relegating their valuable suggestions to impractical means of joint cooperation for the SLOC security.

Then, what are the constraints on the development of cooperation for the SLOC security?

First, it is generally understood that the question of mutual cooperation as far as the security of sea lanes in the Western Pacific in general and in Northeast Asia in particular is concerned depends to a great extent upon the Japanese defense policy ~~policy~~ and attitude. However, as Toshihiko Hozumi and many others have already pointed out, "Japan takes a position that, in the field of sea-lanes defense as well, Japan will exercise the self-defense right only within the individual and independent defense right and it is not allowed to exercise collective defense under the present Constitution." ³ Then, the serious questions that arise are as follows: Is Japan able to cooperate militarily with the Asian nations?; Is Japan able to get out of the present individual and independent defense policy and to go collective in terms of SLOC security?; Is Japan able to help strengthen the navies of South Korea and ROC

as Rhee suggested?; Is Japan able to contribute to military operations if an armed conflict is to break out in the Korean peninsula or between ROC and the PRC? It seems that the answers to these questions are either negative or ambiguous at best.

Second, naval forces are inherently flexible to the extent that there is no guarantee that they will arrive at the time and place of each nation's need or preference. From this follows that a nation cannot allow itself in any way to restructure its naval forces or base its contingency planning on a particular common strategy. In this connection, it should be noted that there are differences in threat assessment by the nations of this region although generally speaking all of them perceive the Soviet Union as a common threat. For instance, while South Korea is now, and continues to be, devoting its whole military forces to protecting itself from North Korea, Japan is primarily worried about the Soviet Union, as is the U.S., and ROC views the PRC as the primary threat. In addition, the nations of this region have different backgrounds in their politics, economy, and military, and there is no firm multilateral security system like NATO without which it is much more difficult to promote military cooperation for the defense of SLOC. As a consequence, it is highly doubtful whether the nations in Northeast Asia would be able to agree on a particular type of force structures or functional division of SLOC defense as a desirable arrangement.

In the end, the attempt to establish a multilateral force structure may find the nations of the region demurring due mainly to differences in their military as well as political interests.

Third, there is a question about the degree of contribution that South Korea and/or ROC can make to either functional or geographical division of SLOC defense. With their economic resources and technological capabilities, the U.S. and Japan could certainly assume their shares of the burden for the security of the SLOC. But what about ROC and South Korea? Do they have enough resources and capabilities to share more burdens than they are responsible now?

The present structure and composition of the navies of ROC and South Korea clearly demonstrate the limited roles they could play. That is, their roles and operations are geared primarily to the defense of their respective coastlines. It should be also noted, as Choung-il Chee aptly points out, that in general a navy is a very expensive proposition, requiring a very high expenditure, and that South Korea already spends more than 35% of its national budget for the defense and any drastic increase in its defense budget would seriously strain its economy, which in turn gradually jeopardize its defense capability.⁴

In sum, it can be said that for the aforementioned reasons, security relationships are much more complex in this region than in Europe and, as a result, it is much more

difficult to overcome political problems. From this follows that in the discussion of mutual cooperation both military and political problems should be taken into consideration.

CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES AT SEA IN NORTHEAST ASIA

As the discussion thus far indicates, it is extremely difficult to implement joint military activities for the SLOC security in Northeast Asia. How then can we keep vital SLOC secured? Are there any other alternatives to joint military activities?

In the ensuing pages, I propose to give a serious consideration into confidence building measures at sea (maritime CBMs) as an alternative to joint military activities for the SLOC security in Northeast Asia. Underlying assumption of the maritime CBMs is that reductions in the possibilities of the political exploitation of superior naval power, in the occurrence of naval incidents, in the danger of inadvertent escalation of naval incidents in peace time or during crises, and in the danger of surprise attack would contribute to a great extent to the SLOC security.

In 1975, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in Helsinki agreed to certain military confidence building measures (CBMs). The purpose of such measures is to prevent normal peacetime military activity from causing fear, tension, and misunderstandings. The measures, however, do not apply to the level of forces nor do they constrain force structures. That is, unlike arms control measures,

CBMs do not address the reduction or limitation of armaments or armed forces. They are designed primarily to increase transparency and predictability, thus preventing routine military activity from causing alarm.

Given this general nature of CBMs, the conceivable types of maritime CBMs are as follows: 5

- (1) Prior notification of major naval maneuvers;
- (2) Exchange of observers on board warships during maneuvers;
- (3) Measures to reduce the risk of dangerous incidents at sea during maneuvers built upon traditional naval rules of behavior;
- (4) Establishment of channels of communication and procedures for early notification of sea accident and for consultation on subsequent actions.

Is there then any possibility to introduce effective maritime CBMs in Northeast Asia?

Minimum Conditions for Maritime CBMs in Northeast Asia

Masahiko Asada insists that minimum requirements to be met when introducing CBMs in a region are the existence of a sense of threat, the absence of a state with single-minded intention to invade the other, and the absence of excessive military imbalance between the states concerned. 6 That is, it would be meaningless to introduce CBMs between states enjoying mutually friendly relations and CBMs would not work if one side is determined to invade the other. 7 Likewise,

it would be difficult to introduce CBMs under conditions of military imbalance, since they are unnecessary measures for the superior nation. With these general conditions in mind, let us examine whether the conditions for introducing maritime CBMs exist in Northeast Asia.

With respect to the existence of feeling of threat, it does not seem necessary to elaborate on the Soviet threat, for we are already familiar with naval capabilities and strategies of the Soviet Union and their implications for SLOC security in Northeast Asia. However, it should be noted that the Soviet Union also sees great dangers to its security from the buildup of U.S. Pacific forces. Soviet military strategists are particularly concerned about the forward offensive posture of the U.S. Navy and argue that the buildup of Soviet naval power in the Pacific is a "strictly defensive measure to counter U.S. expansionist policy." ⁸

Stephen Gibert points out five potentially dangerous conflict arenas in Northeast Asia and Western Pacific: confrontation between the Soviet Union and the PRC; clash between North Korea and South Korea; conflict between the PRC and Vietnam; attack or some other military action by the PRC against ROC; and conflict between the two superpowers as the result of a Soviet-American clash in Europe or elsewhere. ⁹ From this follows that major sources of conceivable wars in Northeast Asia are the Soviet Union, the PRC, and North Korea. Let us consider the possibilities of armed aggression by these communist nations under the present

situations of this region.

First of all, while the growth of Soviet Pacific Fleet during the past decade has been impressive, there seems little likelihood of a preemptive attack by the Soviet forces including a Soviet invasion of Japan. That is, although it is highly controversial whether the Soviet naval buildup in the Pacific region has been prompted by an offensive strategy, many analysts maintain that underlying rationale and orientation of the Soviet Pacific Fleet has not been mainly offensive. For instance, Gibert argues that:

"Soviet naval strategy in the Pacific is, to a large extent, the mirror image of that of the United States. That is to say, despite the fact that Soviet military doctrine stresses the offense, the Russian Navy's concept of wartime operations, influenced by geographic factors, is largely defensive in character." 10

In addition, the leaders of the Soviet Union would not easily contemplate an invasion of Japan, since the presence of U.S. forces in Japan as well as the U.S. commitment to defend Japan and PRC forces with the potential to exploit Soviet neglect of the Sino-Soviet border function as a deterrent force against Soviet invasion. 11

Secondly, as to the probability of the use of forces by the PRC against ROC, analysts tend to agree that it is very unlikely. Hengtse Tu, for instance, argues that PRC's blockade of ROC is not exclusively a military question, and that "even taking military considerations alone, it is very doubtful that Communist naval forces could blockade such a long coastline as Taiwan's, especially with the two super-

powers looking on from the north." 12

Indeed, the facts that major security threat to the PRC comes from the Soviet Union, and that the success of the PRC's "Four Modernization" depends to a large extent on its relations with Western nations suggest that PRC's threat to ROC has become much less immediate and grave than it was in the period of 1950 to 1970. In this connection, Gibert aptly points out that:

"Beijing knows that an attack on Taiwan would so disrupt its ties with both the United States and Japan as to, in effect, isolate the PRC in its confrontation with the USSR. This is too dangerous a price to pay to bring Taiwan under its control." 13

Therefore, it seems safe to conclude that it would be both politically counterproductive and militarily unwise for the PRC to use its forces against ROC.

Finally, there is the question about the possibility of North Korea's invasion of South Korea. Clearly, the Korean peninsula is the volatile powderkeg of Northeast Asia, the place where war may break out with only minutes notice.

Moreover, many observers are particularly concerned about the recent strengthening of military ties between the Soviet Union and North Korea which is a grave threat not only to the security of South Korea but also to that of the SLOC in Northeast Asia in the sense that it will increase the possibility of Soviet involvement and thus the Soviet naval intervention in another military clash in the Korean peninsula. 14

However, it should be noted that the recent changes in

the international relations in general and in South Korea's policy toward North Korea in particular can make a great contribution to the stability of the Korean peninsula. The emerging new detente mood between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and the improving U.S. and Japanese relations with the PRC may become a significant force for stability in the peninsula. More specifically, these improving relations between the great powers would increase the possibility that both the Soviet Union and the PRC might dissuade North Korea from taking any military adventurism against South Korea in order to avoid a direct confrontation with the U.S. and a subsequent escalation of such confrontation into a global war.

Furthermore, a timely announcement of the special declaration by President Tae Woo Roh of South Korea in the interest of national self-esteem, unification and prosperity on July 7, 1988 demonstrated the willingness and readiness of South Korea to make changes in its policies toward North Korea to facilitate North Korea's acceptance of peaceful coexistence on the peninsula. ¹⁵

During the past decade, the Pacific has become an arena for intensified naval competition between the superpowers. As a consequence, in recent years, the U.S. and the Soviet Union have repeatedly accused each other of relentlessly expanding and modernizing their naval forces in the Pacific. Then, the question becomes whether the excessive naval imbalance between the superpowers exists in the Pacific.

It does not seem required to elaborate further on the Soviet naval buildup in the Pacific. Suffice to say that since the mid-1970s there has been a distinct shift in the proportional distribution of Soviet naval capabilities from the Baltic and the Black Sea Fleets to the Pacific and the Northern ones, and that during the latter part of the 1970s a clear strengthening of the Pacific Fleet relative to the Northern one took place with respect to both submarines and large surface combatants (See Tables 1 and 2, and Figures 1 and 2).

To the contrary, during the 1970s, U.S. naval forces in the Pacific continued to be reduced to reach a post-World War II low, largely as a result of the fall-out of the Vietnam war. However, the Reagan Administration, as part of its commitment to build a modern 600-ship navy, has accelerated the strengthening and modernization process of the U.S. Pacific Fleet.¹⁶ For instance, the U.S. Pacific Fleet has received Spruance-class destroyers, Perry-class frigates, Los Angeles-class nuclear attack submarines, Ohio-class Trident SSBNs, Tarawa-class amphibious assault ships, Whidbey Island-class amphibious ships, and Aegis cruisers. And two of the U.S. navy's four reactivated battleships (New Jersey and Missouri) and three of the navy's five nuclear aircraft carriers were also assigned to the Pacific Fleet.

Moreover, the strengthening of the U.S. Pacific Fleet has been accompanied by the Reagan Administration's increased emphasis on a naval strategy known as the "Maritime Strategy," which seeks not to sacrifice the Pacific.¹⁷ That is, no longer

Tabel 1: Distribution of Soviet submarines of different types among the 4 fleets for the years 1968, 1975, 1980, and 1987

	NORTHERN			BALTIC			BLACK SEA			PACIFIC			T O T A L		
	-68	-75	-80 -87	-68	-75	-80 -87	-68	-75	-80 -87	-68	-75	-80 -87	-68	-75	-80 -87
SSBNs	14	38	46 37							6	11	25 25	20	49	71 62
+ SSBNs	21	15	3 1	6	6	6				14	8	7 7	35	23	16 14
= SSBNs & SSBNs	35	53	49 38	6	6	6				20	19	32 32	55	72	87 76
SSGNS	18	28	26 24							10	12	19 20	28	40	45 44
+ SSGS	13	16	12 5	6	2	2 2	1	3	2	3	9	16 16	22	28	23 15
= SSGNS & SSGS	31	44	38 29	6	2	2 2	1	3	2	13	21	25 26	50	68	68 59
SSNs	10	26	33 51							5	6	13 24	15	32	46 75
+ SSS	105	54	54 42	63	73	28 23	40	43	18 17	62	45	39 34	270	215	139 115
= SSNs & SSS	115	80	87 93	63	73	28 23	40	43	18 17	67	51	52 58	285	247	185 191
SSNs & SSS	115	80	87 93	63	73	28 23	40	43	18 17	67	51	52 58	285	247	185 191
+ SSGNS & SSGS	31	44	38 29	6	2	2 2	1	3	2	13	21	25 26	50	68	68 59
= Number of attack subs	146	124	125 122	69	75	30 25	40	44	21 19	80	72	77 84	335	315	253 250
+ SSBNs & SSBNs	35	53	49 38	6	6	6				20	19	32 32	55	72	87 76
= Total number of subs	181	177	174 160	69	75	36 31	40	44	21 19	100	91	109 116	390	387	340 326


Source: John Kristen Skogan, "The Evolution of the 4 Soviet Fleets 1968-1987," paper presented at the International Comparative Workshop on Soviet Seapower, Sorland, Norway, June 6-10, 1988.

Table 2: Distribution of large surface combatants of different types among the 4 Soviet fleets for the years 1968, 1975, 1980, and 1987.

	NORTHERN				BALTIC				BLACK SEA				PACIFIC				TOTAL			
	-68	-75	-80	-87	-68	-75	-80	-87	-68	-75	-80	-87	-68	-75	-80	-87	-68	-75	-80	-87
Aircr/heli carriers			1	1					2	3	2	3		1	2		2	3	4	6
Missile cruisers + Old cruisers	3	7	9	11	2	2	2	1	2	5	7	6	2	3	8	11	9	17	26	29
= Number of cruisers	2	3	2	2	4	5	3	2	5	5	4	3	4	3	3	3	15	16	12	10
Missile destroyers + Old destroyers	6	9	14	27	7	14	14	12	11	15	20	21	4	9	17	24	28	47	65	84
= Number of destroyers	18	13	5	3	15	14	5	6	18	14	13	6	25	18	13	6	76	59	36	21
Total number of large surface combatants	29	32	31	44	28	35	24	21	38	42	46	39	35	33	42	46	130	142	143	150

Source: Same as Table 1

Figure 1: Proportional distribution of Soviet submarines over the period 1968-1987




Source: Same as Table 1

is the U.S. Pacific Fleet regarded as a 'swing' force whose assets would be diverted to the European theatre at the onset of a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict.

Therefore, it seems that overall, the U.S. naval posture in the Pacific has improved considerably in the 1980s and as a consequence not only that the superpower naval balance has been achieved in the Pacific but also that the overall correlation of forces today is favorable to the U.S. ¹⁸ (See Table 3).

In sum, the foregoing analysis indicates that minimum conditions for the introduction of maritime CBMs in Northeast

Figure 2: Proportional distribution of large surface combatants of the Soviet Navy over the period 1968-1987



Source: Same as Table 1

Asia are met, namely, the presence of a sense of threat, the improbability of armed aggression, and the absence of excessive military imbalance.

Reasons for Maritime CBMs in Northeast Asia

The existence of minimum conditions for introducing maritime CBMs in Northeast Asia does not necessarily mean that they can be effective in creating and enhancing

Table 3: The Pacific Naval Balance

	U.S.	Soviet Union
Principal Surface Combatants:		
— Aircraft carriers	6	2
— Battleships	2	0
— Cruisers	18	15
— Destroyers	29	16 ¹
— Frigates	46	55 ²
Submarines:		
— Strategic	8 ³	32 ⁴
— Attack	43	90 ⁵
Amphibious	32 ⁶	21 ⁷

¹ About 10 are obsolete gun-destroyers of *Skory*, *Kotlin* and *Kildin* classes.

² About 30 are obsolete gun frigates of *Riga*, *Grisha* and *Petya* classes.

³ *Ohio* class SSBNs. Each carries 24 *Trident* missiles with a total of 192 warheads per boat.

⁴ Includes 16 *Delta*, 9 *Yankee* class SSBNs and 7 *Golf* class SSBNs.

⁵ About half are nuclear-powered. 25 carry cruise missiles.

⁶ Includes 6 assault carriers, about 30,000 tons each.

⁷ Includes one *Ivan Rogov* class landing ship dock (LPD).

Source: Amitav Acharya, "The United States Versus the USSR in the Pacific: Trends in the Military Balance," Contemporary South-east Asia, Vol.9, No.4 (March 1988), p. 296.

confidence among the nations in the region. In other words, to be effective, maritime CBMs must be introduced only after the regional characteristics are taken fully into account. It is, therefore, necessary to examine the reasons for and the usefulness of applying the maritime CBMs to Northeast Asia.

First, in dealing with the security of the SLOC in Northeast Asia, the dilemma with which we have been faced

is that while it is required to develop a joint military cooperation in order to enhance defense as well as deterrent capabilities, the obstacles to such development are not easy to overcome. In contrast, maritime CBMs by their nature can bypass many of the problems related to the development of joint military activities. That is, on the one hand, maritime CBMs leave naval forces and their existing composition largely intact, and as a consequence they do not interfere with the existing level of deterrent capability as well as the balance of naval power. On the other hand, since maritime CBMs are designed to prevent normal peacetime military activity from causing fear, tension, and misunderstandings, they help to reduce the danger of inadvertent conflict and escalation, and unintended naval war resulting from mutual uncertainty, miscalculation or misinterpretation. From this follows that maritime CBMs could improve relations with adversaries without entailing any loss. Therefore, maritime CBMs, if adopted, make it unnecessary to enhance deterrent capability which requires a difficult and long process of compromising complex political difficulties of each nation.

Second, the strategic importance and the frequency of naval maneuvers make maritime CBMs appropriate in Northeast Asia. Since the Pacific became a major area of direct military rivalry between Soviet and U.S. naval forces, both nations have steadily increased the tempo of naval operations pursued in very close proximity to each other. Moreover,

both nations have also continued to expand the proportion of their naval forces that are nuclear capable and/or nuclear equipped.

As a result of this undesirable development, along with the extremely short warning times involved in warfare at sea, the risk of nuclear war in this region through inadvertence has increased to an alarming level. In this connection, Peter Hayes argues that among the conceivable nuclear wars in Asia-Pacific a naval nuclear shoot out between U.S. and Soviet Pacific Fleets in a crisis is the most likely case.¹⁹ Viewed in this context, it would be expedient for us to take the initiatives and introduce maritime CBMs as these could contribute to avoid such a dangerous situation by increasing transparency and predictability.

Third, in Northeast Asia, maritime CBMs are less difficult to implement than other measures such as joint military cooperations or arms control. Unlike joint military activities, as mentioned earlier, maritime CBMs are not designed to enhance deterrent and/or defense capabilities which entail a long and difficult process of compromising various military as well as political interests of the nations concerned. In addition, the fact that some forms of CBMs including maritime CBMs already exist in Northeast Asia could serve as an important impetus to seriously consider the further development of maritime CBMs. For instance, the Air Safety Agreement of 1985 between the

U.S., the Soviet Union, and Japan may be viewed in this light. Moreover, annually since 1982, the U.S. and South Korea have notified North Korea and the PRC of their Team Spirit exercises and have invited them to send military observers, and there is a 1972 agreement between the U.S. and the Soviet Union that stipulates measures to prevent incidents between warships during maneuvers on the high seas.²⁰ Given this history of CBMs in Northeast Asia, it would be safe to assume that there is a good chance of introducing effective maritime CBMs in this region.

Another favorable factor which makes the implementation of maritime CBMs relatively easier is that they can be taken on a unilateral basis. In other words, since maritime CBMs do not interfere with the existing level and structure of naval forces, they can be implemented unilaterally. Moreover, unilateral implementation can be used as a means of showing off implementor's military capability as well as of demonstrating its nonaggressive intentions. However, this is not to say that unilateral implementation is more desirable and more effective than reciprocal implementation of maritime CBMs. To be sure, unilaterally implemented maritime CBMs may deprive the other side of its incentive to engage in such measures, thus making them less effective. Nevertheless, it should be noted that notwithstanding its shortcoming, unilateral implementation of maritime CBMs, if adopted with vigor, could contribute to the implementation of reciprocal maritime CBMs.

Fourth, emerging mood of new detente between the U.S. and the Soviet Union as well as among the four great powers in Northeast Asia suggests that the prospect of implementing maritime CBMs on reciprocal basis is much brighter now than ever before. More importantly, Mikhail Gorbachev based on his "New Thinking" has been urging CBMs in general and maritime CBMs in particular. In addition to his proposals in Vladivostok speech and in Merdaka interview, Gorbachev, put forward a more specific proposal for maritime CBMs in the Asia-Pacific region in Krasnoyarsk speech on September 16, 1988. For instance, Gorbachev stated that:²¹

"Second: the Soviet Union is inviting the main naval powers of the region to hold consultations on the non-increase of naval forces in the region. Third: the USSR suggests that the question of lowering military confrontation in the areas where the coasts of the USSR, the People's Republic of China, Japan, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and South Korea converge be discussed on a multilateral basis, with a view to freezing and commensurately lowering the levels of naval and air forces and limiting their activity."

"Fifth: in the interests of the safety of sea lanes and air communications of the region, the USSR suggests that measures be jointly elaborated to prevent incidents in the open sea and the air space over it. The experience of the existing bilateral Soviet-American and Soviet-British accords, as well as the USA-USSR-Japan Trilateral Accord could be used during the elaboration of these measures."

This is not to say that we should accept the Gorbachev's proposals at face value, but that given the symptoms of new detente, we should make efforts to take the initiative by carefully examining them and suggesting a counterproposal instead of flatly refusing or ignoring them.

In short, the foregoing analysis suggests that maritime

CBMs are quite viable and would serve an important confidence enhancing role in this region.

CONCLUSION

This paper attempted to propose maritime CBMs as an alternative to military cooperation for the security of SLOC in Northeast Asia by examining the conditions for and possibility and usefulness of applying maritime CBMs to the region.

This preliminary examination suggests the following tentative conclusions:

First, the variety of military as well as political interests of the nations in the region makes maritime CBMs more suitable than military cooperations for the security of SLOC in Northeast Asia.

Second, the strategic importance of the sea, the frequency of naval maneuvers, and the danger of a naval nuclear war make maritime CBMs appropriate in this region.

Third, maritime CBMs could make a considerable contribution to ensuring the most important security interest of the region, namely, maritime safety.

Fourth, given the emerging mood of a new detente maritime CBMs are quite viable and would serve an important confidence enhancing role in this region.

Fifth, we should continue to examine and develop more effective maritime CBMs.

FOOTNOTES

* The views expressed in this paper are the author's own and do not represent those of the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Korea.

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3. Toshihiko Hozumi, "Regional Cooperation for SLOC Security in Crisis or Conflict: A Japanese Viewpoint," Dalchoong Kim (ed.), Resources, Maritime Transport and SLOC Security in the Asia-Pacific Region (Seoul: Institute of East and West Studies, Yonsei University, 1988), pp.225-226. Also see, Ki-tak Lee, "Regional Cooperation for the Security of SLOC in Northeast Asia," Chen, Ko and Wang (ed.), op.cit., pp.46-54.

4. Choung-il Chee, "The Role for the Two Koreas' Navy and Defense of the SLOC," Dalchoong Kim (ed.), Ibid., pp.143-157.

5. Johan Jorgen Holst, "Strategic Developments in the North Atlantic and the Norwegian Sea-Challenges to Norway," an address by the Norwegian Minister of Defense to the International Comparative Workshop on Soviet Seapower, Sortland, Norway, June 9, 1988, p.21, and Masahiko Asada, "Confidence-Building Measures in East Asia: A Japanese Perspective," Asian Survey, Vol.28, No.5 (May 1988), pp.507-508.

6. Asada, Ibid., p.491.

7. Ibid.

8. Amitav Acharya, "The United States Versus the USSR in the Pacific: Trends in the Military Balance," Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol.9, No.4 (March 1988), p.292.

9. Stephen P. Gibert, "Great Power Naval Strategies in Northeast Asia and the Western Pacific," Dalchoong Kim (ed.), op.cit., pp.87-88.

10. Ibid., pp.100-101. Also see, Acharya, loc.cit.
11. Asada, op.cit., p.505.
12. Hengtse Tu, "A New Threat to Taiwan: Military Blockade," Chen, Ko and Wang (ed.), op.cit., pp.62-63.
13. Gibert, op.cit., p.107.
14. See, for example, Ki-tak Lee, loc.cit. and Choung-il Chee, loc.cit.
15. The declared changes in South Korea's policies toward North Korea in the President Roh's declaration are as follows:
 - (1) We will actively promote exchanges of visits between the people of South and North Korea, including politicians, businessmen, journalists, religious leaders, cultural leaders artists, academics and students and will make necessary arrangements to ensure that Koreans residing overseas can freely visit both parts of Korea.
 - (2) Even before the successful conclusion of the North-South Red Cross Talks, we will promote and actively support, from a humanitarian viewpoint, all measures which can assist dispersed families in their efforts to find out whether their family members in the other part of the peninsula are still alive and their whereabouts, and will also promote exchanges of correspondence and visits between them.
 - (3) We will open doors for trade between South and North Korea, which will be regarded as internal trade within the national community.
 - (4) We hope to achieve the balanced development of the national economy with a view to enhancing the quality of life for all Korean people in both the South and the North, and will not oppose nations friendly with us trading with North Korea provided that it does not involve military goods.
 - (5) We hope to bring to an end counterproductive diplomacy characterized by competition and confrontation between the South and the North and to cooperate in ensuring that North Korea makes a positive contribution to the international community. We also hope that representatives of South and North Korea will

contact each other freely in international forums and will cooperate to pursue the common interests of the whole Korean nation.

- (6) To create an atmosphere conducive to durable peace on the Korean peninsula, we are willing to cooperate with North Korea in its efforts to improve relations with countries friendly to us including the United States and Japan, and in parallel with this, we will continue to seek improved relations with the Soviet Union, China and other socialist countries.

16. Acharya, op.cit., p.290.

17. James Nathan, "The Maritime Strategy and the U.S. Alliances: Prospects and Forebodings, " International Relations, Vol.IX, No.2 (November 1987), p.158. On the "U.S. Maritime Strategy," also see, Lee Baggett, Jr., "U.S. Maritime Strategy," Ellmann Ellingsen (ed.), NATO and U.S. Maritime Strategy: Diverging Interests or Cooperative Effort (Oslo: The Norwegian Atlantic Committee, 1987), pp.5-28, Gibert, op.cit., pp.90-100, and Acharya, Ibid., pp.292-297.

18. Richard G. Stilwell, "Keynote Speech," Dalchoong Kim (ed.), op.cit., p.11.

19. Peter J. Hayes, "Problems of Extended Deterrence in the Asia-Pacific Region With Particular Reference to Korea," paper presented at the Second Annual Conference of the Council on U.S. Korea Security Studies, Bloomington, Indiana, December 5, 1986.

20. Asada, loc.cit.

21. Gorbachev's speech in Krasnoyarsk on September 16, 1988, News Release, Press Office of the USSR Embassy in Canada, September 20, 1988.

THE HEADQUARTERS OF
THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES
INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE



INDONESIA'S PERCEPTION OF SLOC IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

by

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INDONESIA'S PERCEPTION OF SLOC IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
PRESENTED BY MAJOR GERERAL SUBIJAKTO
ON THE 6TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE SECURITY
OF SEA LANES OF COMMUNICATION.
MELBOURNE, AUSTRALIA 11-14 OCTOBER 1988

I. Introduction.

An appreciation of Indonesia's Archipelagic outlook and basic doctrine of National Resilience is a sine qua non for understanding her basic attitude towards SLOC.

Hence chapter II will discuss these basic concepts; this will be followed by chapter III Indonesia and ASEAN commitments to ZOPFAN and SEANWFZ, chapter IV that describe our appreciation of the nation's strategic environment, and chapter V that will discuss our role in safeguarding SLOC and possible ways of cooperation with friendly countries.

Here we would like to point out and emphasize that our Archipelagic outlook is the culmination and concrete manifestation of our historical seafaring tradition and that is based on the realities of geopolitics; whereas our doctrine of national resilience grew from our historical experiences as a fighting nation since the proclamation of Independence to determine our destiny in accordance with the principle of self - determination, without attaching ourselves to either bloc in the Cold War.

II. Indonesia's Archipelagic Outlook, Doctrine of National Resilience and Regional Resilience.

a. Archipelagic Outlook.

The archipelagic outlook that is Indonesia's national outlook, considers an archipelago as a "sea studded with islands, implying that the sea element is larger than the land element" or "a group of islands and other natural configurations which are interrelated closely, so that they form intrinsically a geographic, economic and political unity", (National Resilience, issued by Indonesia's Institute for National Defence, Jakarta, November 1974).

Indonesia's archipelagic outlook is the result of a long historical process dating from pre-colonial days; it was officially proclaimed as Indonesia's national outlook in 1957 and this was followed by the issuance of the Act on Indonesian Waters No. 4/1960.

Here we would like to point out and emphasize that the archipelagic outlook has been accepted as an international principle of the law of the Sea as contained in part IV of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982. This U.N. Convention on the law of Sea was signed by 119 states in the Montego Bay conference in Jamaica (December 6 - 10, 1982), and 35 countries have already ratified it. Indonesia has also ratified it by National Act no.17/1985.

Sovereignty of an Archipelagic State.

The sovereignty of Indonesia as an archipelagic state extends over a) her group of islands and other

natural configurations enclosed by the archipelagic base lines; b) her territorial seas extending to twelve nautical miles measured from the archipelagic base lines; c) the air space over above mentioned territory, and d) the sea-bed including its subsoil with all its natural resources in the above mentioned territory.

The Right of Passage.

In accordance with articles 51 and 52 of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Archipelagic State recognizes the right of passage for ships of all states through her archipelagic waters. Unless determined otherwise -- because of safety, pollution and/or other factors -- the right of passage for all ships through straits in her archipelagic waters that have hitherto been used for international navigation, will be upheld.

b. National Resilience.

The definition of national resilience that Indonesia's government has adopted as its national concept/ doctrine in 1974, reads as follows.

The dynamic condition of the nations which includes tenacity, sturdiness and endurance enabling her to develop such a national strength that is capable to cope with any threat or challenge from within as well as from without, either directly or indirectly endangering her existence, national life and her pursuit of

national goals.

This concept is based on Indonesia's basic philosophical outlook of Pancasila and her experience, particularly during the long struggle for Independence. It developed originally from the integrated ideological, political economic, socio - cultural and military approach that was, subsequently enlarged into the Astaqatra or eight aspects approach, to wit : the three natural aspects (geographical, natural resources and potentials & capabilities of the people) and five social aspects (ideology, politics, economics, socioculture, defence & security) approach.

It is clearly a defensive concept/doctrine that is inward looking in nature to build up her national strength while stressing cooperation and consultation with her neighbors.

c. Regional Resilience.

After national resilience has been adopted as Indonesia's national concept, it was discussed among the ASEAN countries in order to reach a common definition for regional resilience that was later accepted by the Manila summit of December 1987.

To the Indonesian definition as mentioned before, the Thai working paper added : "National resilience is basically defensive in nature, aims at developing a nation's own strength and capabilities to safeguard its

interests and at the same time promote cooperation between nations and groups of nations for mutual benefit" .

To this should be added Foreign Minister Adam Malik's statement of regional resilience in the 5th ASEAN Annual Ministerial Meeting in Singapore in 1972 as follows :

"It is to enhance the capabilities and abilities of each member country and people in all fields of national endeavour, in order to withstand and overcome all kinds of outside interference and adverse influence, harmful to its sound and harmonious development".

Whereas Malaysian Foreign Minister Tan Sri Gazali Sjafei added :

"The notion of regional resilience may be defined as the ability of each state in the region to be fully committed to their organizational interrelatedness and interdependence as the first principle of foreign policy. ASEAN is clearly a first step in that direction".

These and other inputs have temporarily led to the following definition :

"The dynamic condition of a group of nations in a region which includes tenacity, sturdiness

and endurance, enabling the development of each nation's national resilience in the spirit of regional solidarity, cooperation and loyalty, capable of coping with all threats and challenges coming from within as well as from without, that directly or indirectly, endanger the existence, the national life and the struggle of those nations and at the same time also endanger the interests of the region as a whole".

The concepts of national resilience and regional resilience that have been adopted by ASEAN, provide this regional organization with her own ideological foundation based on her own values and Weltanschauung.

The meeting of the ASEAN senior officials of ZOPFAN (Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality), held in Bangkok on June 10, 1978, agreed that the concepts of national resilience and regional resilience contribute significantly to the philosophical basis for ASEAN cooperation and solidarity.

Regional resilience is an on-going process which is already developing among ASEAN member countries by strengthening regional cooperation, alongside the effort to enhance their own national resilience. Its aim, to quote Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik again,

is : to "consciously" work towards the day when the security in their own region will be the primary responsibility of the Southeast Asian nations themselves.

III. Indonesia and ASEAN Commitments to ZOPFAN and SEANWFZ.

Since its foundation in 1967, the member-states of ASEAN have been of the view that the countries of SEA share a primary responsibility to strengthen the economic and social stability of the region and thereby minimise intervention and interference by extra regional states. They expressed their conviction in the Bangkok Declaration that all foreign bases were temporary in nature, and they agreed to review issues of common concern affecting the region, believing that by harmonising their views and policies, they would contribute to the peace and security of all nations in SEA.

These principles were reaffirmed and further developed in the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on South East Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality in November 1971 (ZOPFAN). Subsequently the Declaration of ASEAN Concord in 1976 called for immediate steps to recognize South East Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality.

The Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality constitutes the general political framework within

which all the states of SEA would practice political consultation and reciprocal restraint.

An important element of the ZOPFAN idea is the concept of South East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ). It provides additional substance to the meaning of ZOPFAN. It would commit the nations of SEA to enhance regional peace and security. This aspiration has been adopted in the Manila Declaration 1987 (3rd ASEAN Summit) within the framework of political cooperation; and ASEAN should intensify its efforts to achieve the early realization of ZOPFAN and to the earliest possible establishment of a SEANWFZ. For this purpose all efforts should be intensified through consideration of all aspects relating to the establishment of the Zone and consultations with other states in SEA as well as with outside powers for the purpose of obtaining their support for the zone.

IV. The Strategic Impact of the Asia-Pacific Environment on Southeast Asia.

Following the Sino-Soviet split, the Sino-American rapprochement and the emergence of the USSR as an active player as perhaps best testified by her naval power and Gorbachev's Wladiwostok statement of July 28, 1987, a new big power constellation has emerged in the Asia-Pacific region that can be summarized as follows :

US-USSR confrontation or rivalry in which the PRC maintains a neutral-benevolent attitude towards the former has since replaced the Sino - American confrontation of the 50's and 60's. Interaction between these three powers and America's ally Japan -- that has emerged as an economic super power in her own right--has ever since determined the basic pattern of developments in the region.

This new big power realliance was fatal to Lon Nol's Kamboja and Thieu's South Vietnam, but proved generally beneficial to the other Southeast Asian nations who no longer had to choose between their giant neighbor and the Asia Pacific power par excellence in the region.

However, Ho Chi-minh's Vietnam felt "betrayed" by their erst-while staunch Chinese ally (like Taiwan, and the above mentioned Camboja and Vietnam that felt "betrayed" by the USA !) and felt it had no choice but turn completely towards the Soviet Union in facing the American bombing to win the Vietnam War. This provided the USSR with the unique opportunity -- that she did ^{not} fail to realize -- to establish a foothold in Southeast Asia so as to counter the American bases in the Philippines and threaten the Chinese from the south.

This understandably irritated and antagonized the Chinese who felt their assistance to the Vietnamese cause -- Deng Xiaoping has mentioned the not inconsiderable amount of US \$ 10 billion -- did not deserve this.

The result was that they supported the anti-Hanoi Pol Pot-led Khmer Rouge, and subsequently carried out a "punitive expedition" against Vietnam following the latter's invasion of Camboja.

With regard to Indonesia, it can be stated that the New Order that came to power in the mid-sixties, became alienated from the communist world in general and the PRC in particular because of their sympathy with and/ or support for the Indonesian Communist Party. Hence that in looking for assistance, investment, trade and cooperation, she looks towards the west and Japan without sacrificing her traditional free and active foreign policy that was inherited from her Founding Fathers.
1)

1)

Nationalism and anti-colonialism made it impossible for Indonesia to side with the American-led western bloc that consisted primarily of the colonial countries of Great Britain, France, the Netherlands and Belgium. On the other hand, godless Marxism is an alien ideology to the majority of Indonesians; hence the much respected Hatta defined in 1948 that Indonesia would carry out a free and active foreign policy. This is to say free from entanglements with either power bloc in the Cold War, and actively work for world peace.

That is to say, Indonesia should not join either the western or communist bloc, but actively work to realize her own ideals and world peace. This policy still stands today. Hence that Indonesia consistently refuses to take sides in the super power rivalry since this will only aggravate tension in the region that could never be conducive to her economic development and world peace !.

Moreover realizing that a harmonious environment is a sine qua non to realize her national objective of economic development, Indonesia moved rapidly to end confrontation, and with her neighbors subsequently established ASEAN in 1967. And as we all know, ASEAN adopted in November 1971, the orientation of ZOPFAN that still stands today.

2)

Here it should perhaps be emphasized that in practice Indonesia could cooperate with forces with whom she shares common or parallel interests without, however, sacrificing her free and active principles that could only invite unwanted domestic repercussions !

3)

Following Indonesia's alienation from the communist world as mentioned, the other ASEAN nations became disillusioned with the USA that, after having mobilized them for over two decades in her containment of China policy, suddenly improved her relations with Beijing without consulting or even informing them in advance. Kissinger's secret visit to Beijing took place in July 1971, whereas the ASEAN declaration of ZOPFAN was accepted in November 1971. Or in other words, ZOPFAN could be said to be the concrete manifestation of the disillusion of the ASEAN nations with big powers and their determination "to be master in their own house !".

Even though much criticism have been leveled at ASEAN's slow progress in achieving positive results, yet here we would like to point out that this was caused because, until now, most of ASEAN's attention and efforts have been directed at laying the necessary foundation --like reducing mutual suspicions and misunderstandings and creating better mutual appreciation and understanding -- for a sound ASEAN cooperation. Much still remains to be done but ASEAN has already been acknowledged as one of the few successful regional organizations !.

It is consistent with this line of thinking too, that Indonesia accepted the role of interlocutor that is trying to bridge the differences between ASEAN and Vietnam based on the common national aspiration that the Southeast Asia nations should be master in their own region while recognizing the legitimate rights -- like economic, commercial, political, etc. -- of interested powers in the region.

Moreover Indonesia realizes that the continued existence of ASEAN and the Indochinese bloc that are hostile to and can be played out against each other, could only prevent the realization of above mentioned aspiration and continue intervention if not rule by outside powers in the region. This Indonesia is determined to resist !.

Besides, the various territorial claims of the coastal states on the Spratly, Paracel and Natuna islands, offshore terrorism, acts of searobbery and sabotage can have a strategic impact on Southeast Asia.

To sum up Indonesia's perception of her strategic environment :

1. It is Indonesia's considered opinion that the USA is still the strongest force in the region, even though she no longer dominates it as before because of the emergence of the Soviet navy. However it will take the Soviet some time before she can reach qualitative parity with the American military presence in the region, whereas in other fields -- like economic, scientific & technological, educational, cultural, etc. -- she is no match or the Americans.
2. The Japanese economic super power's role is no longer limited to economics, but has also expanded in the other fields like politics, defence, etc. Indonesia realizes the necessity of Japan's present defense role of the sea lanes" radiating a thousand miles from Tokyo, but any further expansion of this role should be carefully considered.

Even though her defense budget is now slightly above 1 % of her GNP, yet it is already the third largest defense budget in the world after that of the USA and the USSR.

3. Indonesia also realizes that the success of China's modernization will have a big impact on Southeast Asia that has to be taken seriously into account.

4. It can not be denied that Indonesia tries to bring ASEAN and Vietnam together through the common denominator of Southeast Asian nationalism, that rejects foreign domination or even rule that has been the case with all the Southeast Asian nations in modern time.

This nationalism should be based on the spirit of cooperation and interdependence but should not be narrow or extreme since this could only be harmful if not outright dangerous to the region.

5. To prevent Southeast Asian nationalism from becoming narrow or extreme that could be a negative factor in regional and/or international affairs, the ASEAN nations are developing the concept of regional resilience that is stressing regional cooperation, based on the principles of mutual understanding, mutual respect, mutual confidence and

mutual assistance for the common good of the region.

6. The ASEAN nations including Indonesia are, at present and in the foreseeable future, focussing on economic development so as to bring prosperity to their peoples. Historical, realistic and other factors account for the fact that ASEAN is looking towards the West and Japan in trying to realize this in the shortest possible time without, however, forgetting their own identity. Hence they are advocating the concept of regional resilience as mentioned above.

7. Obviously the above - mentioned basic change in the Asia - Pacific power constellation can not but vitally affect Sloc in Indonesia's archipelagic and ASEAN waters, especially considering the strategic geography of Indonesia and ASEAN between the Asian an Australian continents and the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

Security problems to Sloc resulting from this new power constellation evolve around the US-USSR relationship; besides the spill-over of the Camboja problem, intra and inter regional territorial claims/disputes, terrorism, piracy and navigation failure. Hence the next chapter will focus on

Indonesia's perception on her role in safeguarding SLOC in her archipelagic and ASEAN waters.

IV. Indonesia's Role in Safeguarding SLOC in Indonesian and ASEAN waters.

As a responsible, independent nation -- that, geographically can never seriously contemplate a "closed country" policy - Indonesia's perception of her role in safeguarding SLOC in her archipelagic waters should be done within the framework of her national concepts of the archipelagic outlook and national resilience. Likewise the security of SLOC in ASEAN waters should be based on the concept of ASEAN regional resilience.

However Indonesia realizes that her national resilience, that is a sine qua non to properly carry out her task in safeguarding SLOC in her archipelagic and ASEAN waters, is still far from perfect. Hence, cooperation and assistance -- primarily in economic cooperation -- to strengthen her national resilience, will be welcomed. Indonesia is facing, for the present and the near future, the task of stepping up her ability for the safeguarding of SLOC that is also in her own national interest. Within this context, Indonesia has already started the long process of updating her maritime laws and regulations so as to conform to the U.N. Law of the Sea. Other activities, include :

- a. maintenance of safety of navigation of the straits that are used for international passage;
- b. carry out surveys to update existing maps of above mentioned straits;
- c. upgrading her personnel in order to be able to carry out the maintenance and safeguarding of the above mentioned straits; carry out joint exercises with her neighbors and/ or friendly countries to safeguard SLOC that is a common interest;
- d. acquire the necessary equipment (like patrol craft, communications and navigation equipment, on-shore facilities, etc.) within the limits of our budget, etc.

Some activities that we are actively contemplating or have already started with our neighbors and friendly countries are :

- a. assistance and cooperation in the education and training of Indonesia's personnel so as to enable them to better perform their tasks of maintenance and safeguarding the straits used for international passage;
- b. joint exercises that will familiarize our personnel with their counterparts and their systems that is a sine qua non for smooth cooperation and actions whenever necessary to guard our common interest;

- c. assistance and cooperation in carrying out surveys and other activities to update maps of the existing straits so as to guarantee the safe navigation of passage;
- d. assist Indonesia in acquiring the modern equipment that is necessary to safeguard safe navigation.

Some of above-mentioned activities have already started on a limited scale, but have to be stepped up and intensified if we want Indonesia to be able to perform her task better in the shortest possible time.

VI. Conclusion

Like the other nations of the world, Indonesia is also vitally interested in keeping open the sea lanes of communications in our interdependent world, and Indonesia realizes her heavy responsibility in safeguarding SLOC in her archipelagic and ASEAN waters.

Hence we would like to state here emphatically that Indonesia is not reluctant to cooperate with other vitally interested nations in this regard; however this cooperation and assistance should be based on the concepts of her archipelagic outlook, national and regional resilience, and should not infringe on her sovereignty as an independent nation.

Cooperation and assistance for specific activities within the framework of safeguarding SLOC that is our common

concern, should be based on agreements that have been reached by the interested parties. Certainly it is not in Indonesia's national interest not to cooperate in safeguarding SLOC, since Indonesia recognizes that this will influence her economic development.

The same basic attitude also determines Indonesia's perception of ASEAN's role in safeguarding SLOC in ASEAN waters. ASEAN should be primarily responsible for safeguarding SLOC in ASEAN waters that should be based on the regional concept of regional resilience. ASEAN also welcomes and does not reject cooperation and assistance in helping her step up her ability in performing this task of common concern as long as this does not infringe on the sovereignty of the ASEAN nations that have stated in the Manila summit of December 1987 that their ultimate objective is the creation of ZOPFAN and a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, and where nationalism is still a decisive force !.

ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURES FOR SLOC SECURITY IN THE
ANZAC AREA.

BY

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ON
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Organisational Structures for SLOC Security in the ANZAC Area.

1. Overview.

This paper examines the need for more highly integrated and co-operative security measures by Australia and New Zealand as a means of enhancing the sea lanes security of the South Western Pacific. This, it is argued might provide a model for similar integration of command and operations arrangements for other nations in the Asia-Pacific basin. It has been argued that it is time for a shift in the current paradigm [1] used in thinking about and planning co-operative security arrangements and in the specific tasks of establishing SLOC security. The central question of policy formulation has been examined. The historic evidence and current strategic situation supports the view that government action and policy development that is reactive or driven by unexpected events has been a failure. In addition this approach has little utility and rather than deterring aggression it provides opportunities for those hostile to our particular nation's way of life. Command and operational structures can only be effective in action and as a deterrent force if they are put in place and exercised. SLOC security in the South Western Pacific can best be achieved by a shift in our way of thinking which generates the political and military will to take the action to integrate the ANZAC command and operational structures to pre-empt the short and long-run threats which are emerging in the region.

2. Introduction.

The nations in the Asia-Pacific basin have all set as national aims the continued development of their natural and human resources in order to increase the social, political and material standards of their people. The most remarkable demonstrations of the advances being made in this area are those of the vast tonnages of goods and material carried by ships in the region. It cannot be disputed that maritime transport acts as one of the most important means of supporting the continued expansion of trade in the region. The huge increase in the scale of trade has been dramatically emphasised by the quantum leaps that have been made in the size and types of ships now employed.

The huge ships that routinely pass through the region and especially through the choke-points of the straits are vulnerable to interdiction which may range from minor acts of terrorism to systematic attacks by warring states. No matter the form, such interdiction is capable of causing serious economic and political damage to the nations of the region. It is unfortunate that many public officials and opinion makers in Australia seem unable to grasp the importance of maritime trade and the degree to which it is vulnerable to attack. In 1911, Sir Julian Corbett noted that there was no simple answer to maritime security, apart from command of the sea. "Command of the sea, ... means nothing but the control of maritime communications, whether for commercial or military purposes." [2] Corbett's ideas have a long lineage stretching back to the early Greek strategists. They were first, however, most cogently argued by A T Mahan in his The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783, published in 1890. Mahan argued that sea power, both of the naval and non-military types could be the key to preventing and prevailing in conflict. He noted "... it can scarcely be denied

that England's uncontrolled dominion of the seas, during almost the whole period ... was by long odds the chief among military factors that determined the final issue." [3] In the Asia-Pacific basin, an area in which the oceans, seas and straits are fundamental to continued economic advance, it is vital to the national security of all nations that maritime trade be free to expand and operate unhindered by either threats or actions of those hostile to our way of life. In providing this security the co-ordination and co-operation of the naval forces is a necessary step forward.

3. The Current Assessment.

Modern weapons systems and new approaches to warfare have made SLOC security much more vulnerable than ever before. The Gulf war has shown how vulnerable maritime transport is to such weapons. The Falklands war provides evidence of how a reactive policy is enormously costly and how a deterrent policy might have prevented this war. Indeed it is clear that having forces in place and public knowledge that they are ready for use is essential to deter possible aggressors. Military operations to regain lost of political initiatives are much more difficult as the Grenada incident has shown. [4]

Developments similar to those which occurred in Grenada are highly likely in the South West Pacific as Libyan, Cuban and Soviet agents seek to establish their influence in the region. The Soviet attempts to extend its influence in this area can be directly linked to Gorbachev's 1986 Vladivostok initiative and the long-run Soviet policy of avoiding direct confrontation.[5] The use of protracted warfare remains the underlying reality of Soviet policy and public utterances of openness and reduced tension must be treated with scepticism. The future success of Soviet tactics to bring South West Pacific

island states into their camp, linked with a hostile stance by India would isolated Australia and New Zealand and choke the maritime trade in the Asian Pacific basin. Such a shift of power would change the world order and possibly prevent the United States from taking action to maintain the freedom of shipping in the region.[6]

The Australian government has begun to take a greater interest in the South West Pacific but this has largely been in response to events unfavourable to Australia's interests, rather than as a result of a realistic appreciation of the long-run importance of the region. In addition the government has not accepted the need to provide forces in being for the protection of maritime trade, except in the case of a general conventional war. The lessons of the gulf war and those of Soviet sponsored protracted war operations have been ignored.

4. The Utility of Long-Run Co-Ordination.

The Soviet Union and her clients, as Henry Kissinger has recently noted, operate from a particular world view which enables them to generate an overall long-term strategy. In contrast the western powers continue to operate from a reactive set of ad hoc policy positions. The initiative, although conditioned by the weakness of the Soviet economy, rests with the Soviet Union. This has meant that since 1945 western responses to Soviet challenges have almost all been based on reactions to events or policies aimed at negating Soviet initiatives, rather than being directed at a set of positive goals.

There is a wealth of historic evidence that suggests that reactive policies result, in many cases, in huge human, economic and political costs as nations

and allies struggle to win back the initiative from aggressors. It is one thing to respond to a crisis with unlimited expenditure to ensure national survival, but surely it is better to make the necessary economic sacrifices now to deter future crises.

The long-run co-ordination of command and operational structures, set in an overall security plan for the South West Pacific, will provide greater economic, political and military utility and generate a higher level of security.

5. The Need for a New Security Paradigm.

Thomas S. Kuhn [7] has shown that the commonly accepted idea that scientific knowledge and development are the result of incremental research is not borne out in real-world science. He argues that progress is made when the old accepted model or paradigm breaks down and scientific imagination is used to create a new paradigm. We face the problem where the old paradigm of direct superpower competition has begun to break down. Imagination and daring are needed to take the quantum leap needed to create a new paradigm which actually addresses this new reality. Subtle pressure rather than direct confrontation in nuclear or conventional war are being used to divide and neutralise individual states. The Soviet use of clients, fellow-travellers and agents of influence are of greater concern than her display of military force. It is easy, however, for these apparently subtle and unimportant moves to be passed off as the normal actions of an international power. This ignores the reality of Soviet intentions and obscures the need for a much more sophisticated paradigm. The nations involved in this conference need to make the steps to develop a new paradigm which looks to the long-run security of their nations and the region as a whole. National goals and interests need not

be mutually exclusive, but can and must accommodate the needs of the region. The region has benefitted from interdependence in trade and technological exchange. But future economic, social and political development can only be ensured if they are guaranteed by a new security paradigm which goes beyond the limited inward looking policies of the present governments in Australia and New Zealand.

6. The Organisational Paradigm.

The organisational model proposed, seeks to go beyond the petty barriers of bureaucratic incrementalism to take up a broad view of the security needs of the ANZAC area and South West Pacific as a whole. This demands a complete shift from domestic concerns to a view of the regional reorganisation of military forces and agencies. The first element needed is the establishment of a joint ANZAC area command which has a permanent staff linking the assets of the Australian and New Zealand maritime, air and land commanders. The necessary intelligence, communication, planning and logistic support will need to be provided to this command. A further element should include the relevant officers drawn from the South West Pacific island states. In addition joint staffing and training programmes will need to be established to ensure that this is a command capable of effective day to day operations. It must also be linked to civil maritime, transport and communication operations. To bring greater commonality of purpose and equipment, a joint Australian and New Zealand equipment co-ordination body needs to be established. This body should have the capacity to liaise directly with the island states.

7. The Operational Benefits of the Paradigm.

The operational model would ensure a far more economic use of existing resources and act as a force multiplier. Australia and New Zealand would both benefit from continued joint operational activity in which the island states would also benefit. Operations would exercise a wide range of existing assets to real purpose. These might include similar units from ASEAN nations and in the long-term would act as a model for the systematic integration of defence forces and agencies for the whole of the Asia Pacific region. This could provide overall SLOC security, mutual support, a real deterrence to potential aggressors and a force in being should the United States be unable to maintain its existing bases in the region. The shift to such an organisational and operational model would provide the nations of the region with an opportunity to combine their resources and gain a significant and favourable shift in the strategic balance in the region.

8. Conclusion.

The break down of the ANZUS treaty has further eroded the overall security of the region. This has, however, forced Australia and New Zealand to consider their security relationship more carefully. Unfortunately the government responses have placed too much emphasis on the economic costs of acquiring military assets. It is essential that there be a major shift in the understanding of the importance of SLOC security in the area and how, even with limited forces, co-operation and co-ordination can generate a more powerful force and act as a deterrent. This shift in thinking must also take into account the need to co-ordinate all levels of government policy concerning the South West Pacific. Defence, foreign affairs, trade and aid

policies should be directed toward a plan that enhances the welfare and security of the South West Pacific. Such a plan would integrate the ANZAC and island states' security assets and provide a model for similar regional security networks.

The need for a new paradigm is essential, and the only barriers to its creation are in the minds of our national leaders. It is time that we sought to stimulate their creative imagination and political will to make this model a reality.

Endnotes.

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6th International Conference on
the Security of Sea Lanes of Communication

TECHNIQUES FOR ENSURING SLOC SECURITY
IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

NAVAL CONTROL OF SHIPPING

by

Vice Admiral (Retired) Toshihiko Hozumi

Director, Japanese Center for Strategic Studies

Southern Cross Hotel
Melbourne, Australia
11-13 October, 1988

- Japanese Stand -

by Toshihiko Hozumi

(Director, Japanese Center for Strategic Studies)

1. Foreword

In modern wars, it is impossible for navies to maintain absolute control of the seas. In order to secure the safety of shipping during time of war and emergency, the vessels must be protected from attacks by enemy submarines and airplanes. It becomes necessary to have shipping control as well as to carry out naval operations in order to destroy enemy submarines and airplanes which attack our ships.

It is necessary to have civil as well as military systems for carrying out control of shipping at time of emergencies. Civil systems means the major duties of which is to allocate ships to the national and private sector's demand for sea transportation, after establishing order of priorities. As to the military system, it means that the navy controls shipping to protect ships from enemy threats. This is called naval control of shipping (NCS).

In this article, the stand of Japan will be described mainly from the point of naval control of shipping (NCS).

2. Japanese Naval Control of Shipping During the WWII

In March, 1941, the Ship Protection Law (the law by which the navy confers authority to transportation businesses or owners of ships to issue necessary directions in order to protect their ships from enemy attacks) and in August, 1941, the Wartime Maritime Transportation Control Principles (principles concerning national control of ships and sailors) were established, however, Japan entered

WWII without making any preparation on either organisation or military forces sufficient to secure safety of shipping.

During WWII, from December 1941 to August 1945, Japan lost 2,568 ships over 1,000 gross tons, totalling 8,433,000 gross tons.

The merchant ship losses during WWII due to enemy action is as follows:

	No. of ships	Tonnage	Tonnage ratio (%)
Damage by submarines	1,153	4,766,000	56.5
Damage by airplanes	905	2,603,000	30.8
Damage by mines	249	562,000	6.7
Ordinary sea disasters	174	415,000	4.9
Others	87	87,000	1.1
Total	2,568	8,433,000	100.0

Major damage inflicted on our ships during WWII were 56.5% by submarines, and 30.8% by airplanes. The reason why there could be no effective measures taken against the US destruction of marine traffic was that no preparation had been made to secure safety of shipping prior to the start of the war and the other reason was that despite the fact that damage increased after the war started, no adequate and timely countermeasures were taken to avoid them.

Each naval station of the Imperial Japanese Navy was responsible for securing the safety of ships in the assigned areas, however, at the start of the WWII, the navy did not possess the escort ships and patrol planes for convoy. All the efforts were made for increasing the striking capabilities against enemy battle groups and there was delay in having the necessary force for the protection of shipping, so that no operations to eliminate submarines and airplanes which would threaten these ships could be carried out, nor the necessary force for convey could be secured. Also as to system, it was only in November, 1943, when General

Headquarters for ~~convoy~~ service, which was in a position to give unified direction to the naval stations, ~~had~~ their own assigned areas and convoy units. It was in May, 1945, only ~~three~~ months before the end of WWII, when the Naval General Headquarters for the joint operation of shipping control and other naval operations was established.

Thus, ~~because~~ both the sea lane security systems and escort forces were insufficient and inadequate, Japan suffered great damages from the attacks of the US submarines, ~~airplanes~~ and the mines laid by B-29s in its sea transportation, and the import of resources from the southern areas occupied by the Japanese forces was disrupted, and Japan fast lost its ability to sustain the war, terminating in its defeat.

3. Safety Measures of Sea Transportation Since the WWII

The vital importance of securing sea transportation to the living and safety of the Japanese remains unchanged now as it was during the WWII. According to governmental statistics for 1987, total import for the year was 591,000,000 tons, countries from which we imported our major items were, in the amount of money, the US (23%), followed by Indonesia (5.8%), Australia (5.5%), United Arab Emirates, People's Republic of China, Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, Canada, Republic of China and West Germany.

As these figures indicate, we import mainly from Southeast Asian Countries and the countries along the Pacific and Indian Ocean. It is imperative for us to defend these sea lanes even in emergencies in order to secure imports from these countries.

What is likely to be a threat to our sea lanes is about 70 attack submarines and 40 Backfire bombers of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, judging from their capabilities and published documents. Although the People's Republic of China and North

Korea do possess attack submarines, we estimate that they will not have sufficient capabilities to attack Japanese sea lanes in the foreseeable future.

The Maritime Self-Defence Force of Japan is increasing its defence capabilities necessary for defending sea lanes from the threat of the Soviet submarines and bombers for hundreds of nautical miles from the coast of Japan and also for 1,000 nautical miles long sea lane south of our mainland. Although Japan still lacks in measures to cope with any bombers which may attack our sea lanes infiltrating the Pacific Ocean after making detour around our air defence zone of our mainland, as far as our naval operations for the defence of sea lanes are concerned, necessary forces are being steadily increased. However, at the present moment, neither the government nor shipping company is interested in shipping control at the time of emergencies, and it is only the Maritime Self-Defence Force that is being guided on implementation of NCS carried out by NATO and the US, and undertakes the study for its application in Japan.

4. NCS of the US

Various NCS measures seem to have been taken by the US during WWII. It is said that the US forces continued their study and came to establish the systems of NCS (Naval Control of Shipping) and MSTS (Military Sea Transportation Service).

The outline of the US' NCS mechanism is as follows. As the Korean War broke out in 1950, the US was necessitated to establish satisfactory organisation concerning naval control of shipping, and adopted the world-wide system along the line of NCS already taken up the UK and Canada. This is the NCSORG (Naval Control of Shipping Organisation), established in July, 1950. The highest officer responsible for NCS in the US is the CNO (Chief of Naval Operations), appointed by the JCS (Joint Chiefs of Staff). CNO has the Shipping Control Branch to establish basic shipping control plans and carry out necessary administrative business, but let the OCA (Operational Control Authorities), which have their

respective assigned area, implement daily shipping control. Although OCA is one of NATO organisations, it functions concurrently as one of the US military organisations.

NCSO (Naval Control of Shipping Officer) is placed at a major port in OCA's area, and Reporting Officer is stationed at smaller port, responsible for reporting on the movement of merchant vessels to the central NCS organisation.

The communication system used for NCS is called MERCO (Merchant Vessel Control Message), and a standardised format is used. The report on the movement of merchant vessels in peacetime and designation of routes to be taken by convoys and independents sailing, the report on their entry to and exit from ports and direction to divert their courses in emergencies are done by the communication system.

NCS Activities in Peacetime

Each organ of NCS at peacetime is not fully manned, but preparation is taken that the organisation can be expanded at emergencies, so that limited routing and limited control of shipping exercises of NCS personnel (reserve force) are carried out. At these organs, necessary publications and data necessary for NCS are stored, to be produced whenever necessary when NCS begins.

Occurrence of Emergency and NCS Measures

At the time of war or when national emergency is declared, either CNO (Chief of Naval Operations) or the commander of a fleet issues the General Emergency Message, and required directives on the steps merchant vessels should take are given out. At the same time, NCSORG (Naval Control of Shipping Organisation) comes to be fully manned, publications are distributed,

communication system is implemented, directives are given to ships, and gradually more and more control of shipping is administered.

5. Direction of Application of NCS in the Asian and Oceanic Area

It is necessary to have both naval operations, which destroy enemy airplanes, submarines and surface ships which attack our ships, and NCS which enables safe shipping operations avoiding these threats. Naval operations and NCS must be in close co-ordination and function of NCS must cover the whole areas where sea lanes lie.

The first function of NCS is to determine whether to organise convoy or sail independently, in order to have safe and efficient shipping. If the ships were to be included in convoy they can be protected from enemy attacks, while the efficiency of each ship would be lowered, as there will have to be some lapse of time before the convoy can be organised, and on account of busy unloading work after they are in port. Also the speed of the convoy would be that of the slowest ship.

In the case of independent vessel, the greatest defect is that it is difficult for it to get sufficient protection from escort forces, compared with convoy. Decision is made whether convoy or independent is to be adopted, depending upon the situation of the enemy and on the performance of ship.

The second function of NCS is the designation of route and navigation planning. The naval authorities have information of threats imposed on the en route of sea lanes and surrounding harbours. NCS authorities issue directives on the time of entry to and exit from the port and the route to be taken, depending upon such information. The time when the vessel leaves the port and enters it is the period when the ship is the most vulnerable from the enemy attack, and it is necessary to have close co-ordination with the naval harbour defence unit. When the NCS authorities receive information from the navy that the enemy appeared in the route the vessel(s) is heading, directives are given on changes of route or

navigation speed so that the vessel(s) can navigate the safest route, avoiding the looming enemy ahead.

The third function of NCS is the report from the vessels concerning the port it enters or leaves and its voyage. In order for NCS to issue appropriate and timely directive concerning safety of the vessel, it is necessary for it to grasp the movement of all the vessels in the seas under its jurisdiction, and the reports are made from the vessels for this purpose to NCS. It is necessary to establish necessary document and format concerning such reports, and there must be necessary personnel to handle such communication installed.

These three are the NCS functions at the time of emergency. Also it is necessary for NCS to issue orders to the ships of the country when they are outside the national boundary to take necessary measures as war or national emergency is declared. In order for NCS to do so, there must be documents stipulating safety measures of vessels and communication system provided.

In examining a suitable organisation which would fulfil above functions to apply in the Asian and Oceanic sea areas, the American NCS organisation can give us many suggestions. What NCS aims is to secure safe shipping, and in order to achieve it we must have exact information concerning the enemy, and communicate it to our ships concerned as soon as possible. Enemy information which are in all the seas of our sea lanes must be collected, but a country alone can not collect the information concerning enemy submarines, airplanes and mines etc., which would threaten the ships' navigation, and send the report to the vessels of friendly nations sailing in the seas each country is responsible for. Compared with the function of OCA (Operational Control Authorities) of the American NCS organisation, the above suggestion may leave something to be desired yet, but still it has the advantage of being implemented without concluding any military agreement, if each country decides to co-operate with each other.

International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue

Search and Rescue Agreement gives us suggestions on the co-operation of the countries concerned on exchange of information at peacetime. Japan joined the treaty as the 19th country to sign in June, 1983 (Australia and New Zealand were ahead of us in signing the treaty). According to SAR treaty, a Rescue Co-ordination Center is established in each member country, and each country takes it upon itself to complete its communication system and its search and rescue region is to be established with the agreement of the member nations of the treaty. According to such agreement, and after making adjustment between the US and Japan, the area Japan is responsible for has been determined, and Japan Ship Report System (JASREP) was established. Accordingly, the ships which navigate in the sea north of Latitude 17 degrees North and west of Longitude 165 degrees East are to report their positions to Japan Maritime Safety Agency. JASREP is connected with the US AMVER System, and joining these two systems at the same time is possible. The SAR treaty aims at rescue of ships on the oceans, and is different from NCS in its character, but has many points of similarity as far as its functions are concerned, i.e.

- A. Each country has the region assigned and co-operates with each other.
- B. Each country exchanges information with the neighbouring states.
- C. Communication system is established.

These points are common functions of both NCS and SAR.

If mutual co-operative system is established on the basis of non-military co-operation for rescue ships in peacetime, and if it would develop into shipping control for the safety of ships at the time of emergency, it would greatly contribute to the safety of sea lanes of the free nations altogether.

6. Conclusion

Securing safety of sea lanes is of vital importance for the safety of the free world nations and the existence of their people. Therefore, not only in case of a world-wide war, but also at the time of low level conflicts, sea lanes of free nations may very well be attacked. In order to secure these sea lanes, it is indispensable for the countries concerned to destroy the targets which constitute threats to ships' navigation with the naval operations in keeping with the characteristics of respective sea and the threat presented, and, at the same time, to have an organisation capable of shipping control, having close co-ordination with the naval operations.

In defending the sea lanes in Asia-Pacific areas, it is necessary for the countries concerned to have mutual co-operation. In such a case, American NCS organisation and that of the SAR Convention give suggestions in the clarification of the possible problems. The international atmosphere for co-operation among the countries concerned in defending the sea lanes would contribute to the safety of the free world, and it is to be hoped that the system of co-operation would take further concrete form.

COMMAND, CONTROL, INTELLIGENCE

Commodore Alan Robertson RAN (Rtd)

6th. International Conference on
The Security of Sea Lanes of Communication
in the Western Pacific

Melbourne, Australia, 11th-13th October 1988

COMMAND, CONTROL, INTELLIGENCE

Introduction

Assumptions

I believe it is not possible to address this subject without making some assumptions. Accordingly, I assume that all Governments concerned have agreed,

- a. to the establishment of the three suggested Naval Control of Shipping areas, North East Asia, the ASEAN and ANZAC areas.
- b. to the commitment of national resources to the common objective of protecting shipping within defined geographical areas.
- c. to the subordination of some measure of national sovereignty to the needs of this proposed multi-national organisation.
- d. to delegate an adequate measure of political authority to a standing council to determine policy for the organisation

and that,

e. NATO or some other established international politico-military organisation would release enough appropriate publications, such as signal books, to the proposed organisation.

Some Problems of Multi-national Command Structures

Human nature being what it is, and national sensitivities being what they are, the establishment of multi-national military command structures which aim to co-ordinate the efforts of independent nations with differing social and political traditions can present a daunting challenge. Even given my assumptions above about political goodwill and endorsed policy guidelines, the opportunities for debilitating misunderstandings still remain. While it is easy to use, say, the well-tried Task Force Organisational framework to establish command relationships and to adopt without amendment the command definitions in, say, the released NATO publications, the allocations of command authority to the representatives of the various member countries is unlikely to be without hazards. Personal, Service and National ambitions are bound to come into it,

as any study of multi-national organisations since 1945 will show. Furthermore where units of one nation are placed under the operational control of an allied commander, it is entirely possible, for example, that the terms of the subordinate's national directive may not be satisfactory to his superior. And that is only one possible problem, there could be many more.

I have no intention to strike too negative a note at the outset, and, happily, in my experience, navies seem to find it easier to work with each other than other Services, but I believe it would be unwise not to expect difficulties in both establishing an effective command and control structure, and then fleshing it out with appointed commanders and units.

Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence

Command and Control

With that as background and using a form of Task Organisation for our framework, let us try to envisage a notional command and control structure for SLOC security in the Asia-Pacific region.

For a number of obvious reasons the United States would almost certainly be asked to provide the Common Superior, the Task Force Commander(CTF). Whether that would be

CinCPac, CincPacFlt, or some other deputy for NCS would be a matter for the US to decide, as would be the provision and location of his headquarters.

Under the CTF I envisage his three principal area commanders; let us call them Task Element Commanders (CTE's).

For the North East Asia area, and for the obvious reason of the relative size of the contribution each could make, it seems likely that Japan would be invited to provide the CTE and his headquarters. I assume that Japan and Korea could be able to agree to the delineation of areas of command responsibility, in those narrow waters where their sea areas are adjoining.

Similarly, in the ANZAC area Australia could be expected to provide the CTE and his headquarters, with New Zealand, I hope, volunteering to provide a Task Unit and a sub-area command, with the military assets to go with it.

About the ASEAN area I am less certain. Furthermore the problem is compounded by a large US component and existing USN command headquarters already established at Subic Bay. So there are many possibilities, and rather than make a

choice I would much prefer to hear what the ASEAN members themselves think would be the best solution, but I will put up a proposal as a basis for discussion, and listen to your views.

For geographical reasons I would suggest that the Philippines should provide the CTE and his headquarters. While some of the US forces based at Subic might be assigned to the ASEAN area CTE, I believe the bulk of them should remain under US national control as a reserve to be used by the CTF to reinforce especially threatened points, or to conduct strikes against enemy bases, and so on.

Even after that there are still tricky problems to be resolved, sorting out command boundaries and responsibilities in such important waterways as the Malacca Strait, Singapore Strait, and the South China Sea. Maintaining realistic command areas and keeping individual national requirements satisfied could present problems. Clearly Indonesia is best placed to control the Straits and seas in its own archipelagic waters, and given that huge task, might be willing to have Malaysia accept responsibility for the Malacca Strait, and Singapore, the Singapore Strait.

Headquarters and Staffing

Once the problems of the command areas and commanders had been resolved, the need for appropriately equipped and

sited headquarters has to be satisfied. The actual scale of facilities needed in each could be determined by the CTF and his subordinate commanders, adapting existing national facilities to meet agreed standards. As well the desirability of providing liaison officers, or alternatively, some measure of multi-national staffing would need to be considered. On the whole it would seem to me less costly and just as effective to provide liaison officers to adjacent area commands, to help smooth the path of international co-operation.

Operational Units

Operational units, ships and aircraft, would be assigned within the Task organisation by the CTF. Generally, it would seem to be most practical to try to keep, say, an escort force commander and his screening ships from one navy as much as possible. The problems of different languages, and the common understanding gained through national training systems suggest to me that any more ambitious ideas of mixing force elements in multi-national groupings for idealistic reasons, should be resisted, except for training exercises. This is especially important because of the need for effective communications.

Communications

Although not specifically part of my brief, the glue which would hold this proposed organisation together is communications. And I speak as a former communicator, with some experience of multi-national organisations, both NATO and SEATO.

Given the ready availability of commercial international communications channels, it would not be too difficult to establish a fixed network to link all the land-based commanders with one another. And there should be no difficulty in providing a suitable high grade cryptographic system, since there are now so many readily available from commercial sources.

A major problem to address would be whether to use narrative messages and hand-plotted data in the various headquarters, or to establish a much more sophisticated computer-based data transfer system. Because of the large volumes of data NCS systems generate, the very large organisation envisaged, and the need for speed and accuracy, these reasons suggest to me that automated data systems would be essential. But, of course, we should be wary of scaring off politicians if it looked like costing

too much, initially. We might have to sneak up on them later. But the transfer of NCS data by automated systems could minimise language problems and generally ensure a much more efficient system.

As far as seagoing units and land-based maritime aircraft are concerned, communications is another strong argument for trying to keep units of one navy together. Furthermore, some may have automated tactical data systems, not necessarily fitted in other nations' units. Problems of communications compatibility can be severe.

Even when nations ostensibly speak the same language there can be differences of understanding of even the most simple matters, or the different interpretations placed on the meanings of signalling procedures, for example. So, while my inclination is to see multi-national groupings, I believe it would be unrealistic, at least in the initial stages. But it would be necessary to make these reasons known to everybody, to avoid the dangers of excessively rigid nationalistic attitudes being developed to the detriment of morale.

Intelligence.

It only requires the briefest acquaintance with some of the books describing the conduct of shipping protection operations in World War II to realise that the availability

and management of operational intelligence would be vital to the organisation's success. Each member nation will have its own sources now, some more sophisticated than others. Only the United States, for instance, will have a comprehensive ocean surveillance system using satellites. But sometimes even very simple sources of intelligence can be very effective. For example, Australia's Director of Naval Intelligence set up a simple coastwatching service in the 1930's, and it produced priceless intelligence on ships, aircraft, and sometimes even submarines. Around harbours spotters can be trained to watch for aircraft-laid mines, enemy intelligence gatherers and possible special force raiding parties. Between these two levels, satellites and spotters, the success of the British Admiralty's submarine tracking room in World War II, co-ordinating intelligence from a number of sources lead to insights into the operational deployment patterns of German U-Boats.

My point is that each member nation can make a significant intelligence contribution, whatever its sources. How much each would choose to contribute would be a national decision; how much they would feel obliged to withhold information to avoid compromising sources is another matter. But it is a fact that the better the operational intelligence the organisation could provide, the easier it

would be for our colleagues at sea who had the lonely, dangerous and often plain boring task of being the last line of defence for the shipping on which we all depend.

CONCLUSION

This, of necessity, has been a fairly sketchy coverage of a vast subject. I have done no more than raise a number of issues which I hope we can pursue in more detail in our discussion. What I have said is merely to spark discussion, and is of far less importance than the comments you will make on those issues, or even the issues you think I should have raised but have not done so.

Control of Piracy and Maritime Terrorism

By Tun Hwa Ko

Paper prepared for the Sixth International SLOC Conference

October 11-14, 1988

Melbourne, Australia

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Control of Piracy and Maritime Terrorism

By Tun Hwa Ko

I. Foreword

As recently as July 12, 1988, a 370-ton Greek ship, CITY of POROS with 471 passengers on board was attacked by terrorists, as the ship headed for Trocadero Marina in the Paleo Faliron seaside suburb returning from a daylong three island cruise.(1) Greek government sources said the terrorists were two men and a woman armed with automatic weapons and grenades. They had been photographed during the attack. An announcement by the Greek Ministry of the Merchant Marine said at least 9 people died and 98 were injured. Only two of the dead had been identified: Antonis Demaizis, the ship's 45-year-old first mate, and a Danish tourist, 33-year-old Karl Johan Grabas. The other bodies had been burned beyond recognition and mutilated by shrapnel wounds. In the confusion, the unidentified attackers escaped in a waiting speedboat.

The above-mentioned story was an extract from a report of CHINA POST, a newspaper published in Taipei. No further account of the incident can be obtained in Taipei for analytical studies on the case, except for the impression that this was just another inhumane and criminal act by agents of terrorism at sea.

This kind of maritime terrorism has occurred in other areas, such as in the Red Sea, Persian Gulf, Lebanon, Central America and in Western Sahara where the Polisario guerillas have preyed on trawlers and coasters.(2) In Philippine waters, there have been several cases of

Taiwanese fishermen encountering awful atrocities committed by Filipino groups who were motivated as much by greed as by political pretensions. A few of them have been caught and tried in courts.

In February 1981, disguised as harbour pilots, an IRA squad boarded the 500-ton coaster NELLIE M as she entered Lough Foyle in Ulster (North Ireland). The crew was forced to take to boats, after which the terrorists placed explosives and sank the ship. A year later they repeated the Operation on the SAINT BEDAN. In 1985, a Spanish naval patrol vessel was attacked by terrorists with one crew killed and others wounded. In 1986, a Soviet factory ship was attacked. She fired back.

The ACHILLE LAURO affair might be a better known case remembered by the general public. On 7 Oct. 1985, Arab terrorists hijacked the Italian cruise ship, ACHILLE LAURO, which had more than five hundred crew members and passengers, including many Americans on board. Italy's immediate response was to carry out a diplomatic effort with the Arab world, backed by a naval task force fully prepared, were diplomacy to fail, to launch an open-sea rescue mission. At Italy's request, Syria had not granted permission to the terrorists to bring the ACHILLE LAURO into one of its ports. The Governments in Cyprus and Tunisia had denied the terrorists in a similar manner. Yasir Arafat, whatever may have been his earlier involvement in the hijacking itself, agreed with Rome to enlist other leaders of PLO to persuade the terrorists on board to release the ship and the hostages in exchange for their own safe passage to freedom. Italy had also lined up Egypt to provide its territory for support, and to guarantee that the agreement between Italy and the terrorists would be carried out by both parties. People might still remember vividly the rest of the story with an American passenger, named Klinghoffer, murdered

by the terrorists and thrown into the Mediterranean sea along with his wheelchair. Four terrorists were released to the Egyptian authorities who transported them by civil airliner to freedom. But, the airliner was intercepted by the U.S. military and was forced to land at Sigonella, a NATO air base located in Sicily. American intelligence found that Abu Abbas, a notorious and dangerous leader of a PLO terrorist group was on board the Egyptian airliner. The U.S. Government asked the Italian authorities to detain him. The Italian judge who looked into the matter found that insufficient grounds existed to hold anyone except the four terrorists and released Abu Abbas.

There is no need here to retell the ACHILLE LAURO affair and the storming diplomatic relations between the Rome and Washington created by the incident. What we want to say here is only that the terrorism is being felt also at sea. It deserves our attention and studies.

II. Difficulties of Committing Terrorism at Sea

In our series of International Conferences for the studies of SLOC, we discussed in Singapore in 1985 the problems of Piracy and Anti-piracy.(3) We gave a ^{good} account of the history and causes of piracy. Statistics on the loss of life and property by pirates from 1980-83 were given. We also showed the tactics developed and employed by the pirates. In our previous conference, we had also suggested some anti-piracy measures, and urged for more and closer international co-operation to combat age-old international crimes. Today, here in Melbourne, I am assigned to discuss piracy and terrorism at sea; I'd like to point out that there are some similarities in basic techniques employed by both pirates and terrorists. Because their primary targets are the same-sea going ships, passengers

and crew which they have to get control of.

Without going into too much legal technicality on the definitions of pirates and terrorists, we could, for practical purposes, say that pirates are after money and other material gains while the terrorists are pursuing their political objectives. But this is not a clear cut line of demarcation between the two. There may be cases of piracy with political ingredients, and terrorists who seek material gain as well. We are here concerned not so much about their classifications but about how they plan, operate, and attain their objectives.

First, let us look at the terrorists at sea. Their job seems to be more difficult than would be on land because of the following conditions :

(1) The primary objects of hijackers are passengers. It is the value of human life which they ^{are} trying to exploit, to make use of in blackmail. There are more and more passengers who travel by air, and fewer passengers who can afford the luxury of ocean liners in cost and in time. In a busy international airport, there may be 2 to 3 airplanes landing or taking off within a few minutes; but, one would have to wait for weeks to see a passenger liner sailing out of a harbour. The infrequent voyages may not be ideal opportunities for the terrorist's own political timing schedule.

(2) Most cargo ships have no passengers on board. There are some cargo-passenger ships which carry cargo and passengers. But the passengers are usually 'not-so-important' ones, and they are only a few in number. Cargo does not have much political significance and cannot be held as hostage.

(3) On board an air transport, the passengers are all sitting in one

straight cabin. It is easy to control them with one or two armed hijackers. Crew and passengers on board a ship are scattered all over the ship on many decks and in numerous compartments. It would take a great deal of manpower to keep them at bay. Most of the compartments are watertight, which can be closed firmly to block passage. It is difficult to reach and to go through all the compartments. If one or two hijackers dare going down below the decks and to the lower compartments, the hijackers themselves may get lost, or out-numbered and get captured or killed.

(4) No ship is identical to another, even if they are of the same class or type. A Boeing 747 is precisely the same as another 747, in its controlling system and in all other arrangements. But no two ships are arranged in the same way. It is difficult to find out how to control a ship before boarding, and it would take time to find out many things after boarding. An aircraft is piloted from the cockpit. A ship has many alternative steering stations where the ship can be commandeered and navigated. It is difficult for hijackers to command ^a ~~to~~ ship.

(5) The speed of ships is slow. The cruising speed of a modern ship, on average, would amount to 20-25 knots. Air hijackers can force the pilots of a airliner to fly from one place to another, and perhaps, back to the first place, according to their by minute wishes. But a ship cannot do that even fully under the control of hijackers. Ships take a long time to go from one place to another. Sea and air rescue teams can intercept hijacked ships easily. While a hijacked ship is steaming at sea, the hijackers cannot get away quickly for their own freedom.

(6) A small number of hijackers can sneak into an airport somehow with

small weapons. But, to attack a ship and its crew, would require a much greater number of men and weapons. It would require a ship, perhaps, to intercept the target ship; or the terrorists would have to disguise themselves as passengers. Either way would cause more attention than in an air hijacking. On board an aircraft, armed guards would hesitate to shoot, because the bullet could damage the fuselage and cause a pressure problem in the aircraft in flight. That is why studies are being done using slow-velocity bullets to hurt the hijackers by staying inside their bodies but not to penetrate through them. On board a ship, a severe gun battle can take place without sinking the ship. There have been some cases of mutiny in which different gun positions with 40mm and larger calibers were turned round and shot against each other between the contesting parties on the same ship. It is not easy for hijackers to overpower a crew, if the crew is armed or there are armed guards. They could put up a fight after being hijacked, if they were trained for it.

(7) One objective of terrorism is to generate some sensational head line news, or more important, TV camera coverage so it can be seen by the general public. A hand grenade exploding in a crowded downtown area will draw a great number of news reporters to the scene. But there would be no on-the-spot witnesses to a gun battle on board a ship at sea. TV men and by-standers would not be available until the ship came into harbour. Some trouble-makers have found that a non-violent demonstration in a crowded city can create as much attention as a bloody hijacking. Therefore, in order to make a certain political view felt, terrorist attack at sea is not the best method. It would only be worth it if they were to use some more drastic measures at sea to maximize the threat and publicity. It is not entirely impossible for terrorists to use some

nuclear explosive devices, radioactive weapons, or to attack some nuclear facilities and installations. Because nuclear power stations need water for cooling, many nuclear reactors are near seashores within the reach of terrorists at the sea.

Assume that a ship steered by some terrorists has managed to come into a harbour and anchor. The ship suddenly announces that she has some sort of nuclear device on board, and the terrorists threaten to detonate it if their political demands are not met in time, or if the ship is boarded by any rescue force. It is not entirely impossible for some terrorists to steal a nuclear device, or even to crudely make one.


It might not be a regular bomb. It can be just some sort of radioactive material illegally obtained from a medical center or research outfit.

With what they claim to have on board the ship, they are capable of harming society. The amount of expertise needed to construct a simple device for dispersing radioactive material is no more than that derived from college physics, chemistry and engineering. If they are short of this, they could just make some empty bluff without actually possessing any nuclear device, so long as they could convince people they have something. The other option for them is to attack some offshore oil facility.

III. Operations of Terrorists at Sea

There are no commonly known rules of operation employed by terrorists at sea. Methods employed by terrorists vary from case to case. But, nevertheless, due to the nature of the game and maritime environment, the accompanying flow chart might be used to describe the logical steps adopted by terrorists. We have reason to believe that terrorists are

Flow chart I. operations of Terrorists





Analysis (A)

(1)


Planning (B)

(2)



(C)

(D)




ANALYSIS
PLANNING
PREPARATION

(A)

(B)

(C)

(1)



FLOW CHART II, COUNTER TERRORISM

well-chosen, daring and smart men or women while the master minds behind them are certainly highly intelligent and cunning. Their operations might be generalized and categorized into logical sequences of (A) analysis, (B) planning, (C) preparation, and (D) execution, as shown in the chart.

In (A), the terrorists have to determine their objective, that is, precisely what they want to achieve. They must keep the objective firmly in their minds as they choose their physical targets, the ships and passengers that they want to attack. They have to obtain information about the physical targets as well as the geography and the intended route of the ships. Then, they have to analyze the suitability, acceptability and feasibility of the targets and the whole operation. If all of these turn up to be favorable, then the said target is chosen and the decision is made. The next step is (B), planning how to do it. Choose the right men or women for action. Provide suitable equipment and weapons. Decide the time and place, and the way of approaching the target. Make an alternate plan in case things turn out differently. Also make plans for escaping (with or without hostages). The next step would be (C), preparation. Make every man or woman ready. Train them and rehearse the operation plan, evaluate the outcome of the rehearsal, and make necessary changes in the plan. Put the action team on stand-by, waiting for the order of execution. The final step is, of course, the (D) execution. If all conditions are as expected, execute the operation; if not, make changes.

Here, we have to point out one more thing. The operation does not end at step (C). In fact, the hijack begins at step (C) when the action team has to fight, negotiate and conclude the whole drama.

IV. Operations of Counter-Terrorism

Offensive and defensive operations are sometimes the two sides of a coin. In the previous section, we have ^{pointed} pointed out the logic of terrorist's operations at sea. To counter them, the same steps could be followed, that is, step (A) analysis, (B) planning, (C) preparation, and (D) execution.

In (A) analysis, set out our goals on what to defend, and which group of terrorists we have to watch and counter. First, make a thorough review of our counter-measures in the past to discover our own weaknesses. Then, re-estimate the current situation, lay emphasis on our own vulnerabilities. Keep on gathering new information and review constantly our capabilities to meet the attacks.

In the second step (B) planning, up-date our counter-terrorist plans, train our counter-forces, test combat readiness. Carry out war games with different scenarios. High ranking officersⁱⁿ in the government, especially thoses involved in crisis management should be invited to witness the counter-terrorism war games and join in the discussion and criticism, because things may happen in the same way as that played in the games, or with some variation. A tremendous amount of thinking and discussion can be saved among governmental agencies and officials facing an actual crisis, if all the key players are familiar with the war games, and have played together in the same games.

Shipowners, shipmasters and crew, port administrators, and harbour police should also be invited to participate in the war games and to discuss the detailed and practical technical measures for improving the security

practices on ships and in port terminals.

V. Conclusion and recommendation

Terrorist attack at sea is nothing new. It happened in early history, and it is still occurring in our time. It is, however, in my opinion more difficult for terrorists to hijack a ship on the high seas than it is to hijack a civil airliner in flight. It is also more difficult to set instant sensational publicity while a ship is in a remote corner of the sea. But, nevertheless, it has happened. The frequency of terrorism on the whole is declining, but we cannot hope that terrorism, like many other acts of violence, will disappear for ever. The nature of terrorism is that it can only be solved by social change and political settlement. But, when an act of terrorism is being carried out at sea, it can only be rescued by military action to protect and save the innocent people. So, no matter what original mission might have been assigned to a navy of any nation, an additional mission should be added: " To combat the terrorism at sea. "

--- THE END ---

Footnotes :

- (1) China Post (Taipei) July 13, 1988. P.2
- (2) Captain John Moore RN Jane's Naval Review Jane's Publishing Ltd.
London 1987. P.38
- (3) Vice Admiral Ko Tun Hwa (ret.) Piracy and Anti-Piracy, Paper
prepared for Singapore SLOC Conference 1985

6th International Conference on
the Security of Sea Lanes of Communication

TECHNIQUES FOR ENSURING SLOC SECURITY
IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

CONVOY OR DEFENDED LANES

by

Vice Admiral Francis J. Blouin
United States Navy (Retired)

Southern Cross Hotel
Melbourne, Australia
11-13 October, 1988

Convoy or Defended Lanes

Vice Admiral Francis J. Blouin, US Navy (Ret.)
September 1988

At the 4th International conference on the Security of the Sea Lanes, I made a presentation entitled "Search and rescue: International Co-operation in the Pacific Basin." The conference was informed of various programs that in peacetime are greatly improving the control and safety of commercial shipping, providing knowledge of ships' positions in the oceans of the world. The tremendous advances in techniques for communications and navigation, made possible by improved electronics, computers, satellites etc., give promise that "being lost" will be a thing of the past. In wartime, however, such systems, if operated by the enemy, would increase the threat to all shipping.

The United States gained considerable experience in World War I and World War II in sailing supplies of all kinds across the seas to its forces and its allies. The most notable of those operations were in the Atlantic, where the threat was greatest, and resulted in the development of sophisticated and efficient convoy operations. There were also some successful high speed independent ship transits. Early in each war, however, and before the defences were organized, German submarines inflicted great casualties.

Lessons learned the hard way should help us prepare for future conflicts. Here in Australia we can appreciate that the vast areas of the Pacific dwarf those in the Atlantic, greatly increasing logistic problems. For example, the Indian Ocean is more distant from the United States than any other place on the earth. In fact Trincomalee, in Sri Lanka, is approximately equidistant from New York and San Francisco: about 11,500 miles from either. The normal areas of operations in the Persian Gulf and South Asia is about five steaming days away from Diego Garcia and 12 days from Subic Bay. Consequently, logistic support in the Indian Ocean is a problem which is greatly complicated by the vast distances to any major supply point. Extremely limited capacity at seaports and

airports in the littoral countries adds to the difficulties involved in their use.

The objective of Protection of Shipping is the safe and timely arrival of shipping at scheduled destinations. To accomplish this, a combination of offensive and defensive operations is required. This could include operations remote from the sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) - such as barriers, strike operations, surveillance - as well as close-in defence. As protection of shipping is a part of the overall sea control operations in an area, the responsibility for protection of shipping rests with the naval commanders.

There are several concepts that appear practical: convey, defended lanes, single sailings, alternate routing. Then, as in the past, the US would expect that its efforts to keep open the SLOCs would be augmented by allied forces. In the Pacific, it is expected that allies would be actively involved but primarily near their own areas. Japan has already accepted the commitment to defend a perimeter 1,000 miles outward from Tokyo; others such as the ROC and ROK are capable of substantial contributions.

There is no need to explain to this group the importance and necessity of maintaining the security of SLOCs in the Pacific in both peace and war. So, what could be the threat? In past SLOC conferences, the Soviet Union was usually identified as the major threat, and Mainland China as a potential threat, especially to the ROC on Taiwan. However, the Persian Gulf experience gives evidence that threats can arise from unanticipated sources. Small countries, revolutionary movements, terrorists, pirates, etc., can obtain sophisticated weapons and cause turmoil in concentrated areas. In this paper the discussion is mainly on the threat that the USSR poses to the main Pacific SLOCs.

Although the Persian Gulf SLOC situation does not translate fully and directly to the Western Pacific-Indian Ocean SLOC problem, some attention to it is relevant. The Persian Gulf is a special case: an enclosed shallow sea where two local belligerents were at war for over seven years, and where the political and strategic cross-currents of several nations have long been involved. It is

obvious that US and the USSR have at least some degree of common interest in containing SLOC attacks, even to the point where the Soviets proposed a UN-sponsored naval patrol to restore order and security to Gulf shipping. The US and the USSR recognized that this is a crucial strategic area to both the Western and Eastern power blocs. It is generally accepted that more than two-thirds of the earth's known oil reserves are contained in the Gulf area and the US determined that it was necessary to defend Western interests there. At one time the US had some 20,000 personnel deployed there in ships and aircraft, and these were augmented to some degree by forces of other nations. These efforts did reduce casualties. The principal threat came from mines, missiles launched from shore or aircraft, and gunfire from small fast gunboats. Affirmative aggressive action probably could have quickly disposed of such threats. However, political considerations necessitated drawing a fine line between deterring the attacks and escalating to war.

It is assumed for this discussion that the primary (but not the only) threat to the East Asian and South Asian SLOCs comes from Soviet submarines, and that these nuclear submarines can cruise the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans. Soviet surface ships and aircraft pose additional threats, particularly in the Western Pacific. Moreover, any study of the protection of the Asian SLOCs must consider the geography of the vast area. The large open ocean area and long ship transits provide challenges to both the protection and interdiction of the SLOC.

In the years since World War II there have been greatly improved capabilities for the detection and tracking of submarines, as well as similar improvements for surveillance of surface ships by aircraft and satellites. Detection is better but the enemy is more numerous and more threatening.

A very dangerous time for all ships about to make an ocean transit is the initial stage. To meet this threat, the US has now established Maritime Defence Zones. Coast Guard units, combined with naval forces both active and reserve,

will defend harbours and shipping lanes along the US coasts in time of war. These MDZs are Navy commands, headed by Coast Guard area commanders when activated. The maritime defence zone commands will combine active and reserve units in both the Navy and Coast Guard in missions of mine warfare, counter-mine warfare, in-shore undersea warfare, convoy escort and defence of US port facilities against sabotage, terrorism and accidents. These coastal defence missions are essential to our strategic deployment, sustainment and resupply. The MDZ area of operations includes the navigable waterways, port areas, harbour approaches, and ocean areas from the coast seaward to 200 miles. Among the MDZ objectives is to ensure the successful departure of military reinforcement and resupply shipping and the safety of maritime cargoes. The threat with which the MDZ must deal includes the entire spectrum of covert and hostile actions that could compromise a port or sink a ship at sea. This includes all types of attacks, military and terrorist. In effect the MDZ establishes defended lanes within its area for all shipping. It seems logical that the development of this concept would be appropriate for our friends in the Western Pacific.

The Pacific ports of the US, however, are several thousands of miles from those in the Far East. The critical importance of the SLOCs between those ports is obvious in peace as well as in war. Virtually all of the raw materials, manufactured goods and military supplies must go by sea. The security of the SLOCs is vital, strategically, to the economic welfare and military logistics support of all nations bordering the Pacific and for this reason the US has organized its forces and assets to provide control and protection of its shipping. There are several options for the protection of ships in the SLOCs: convoy, independent sailings, defended lanes, and offensive operations to ensure control of certain areas.

In the US, convoy comes to mind first because of experience gained in World Wars I and II, primarily in the Atlantic. It is cost-effective in the use of

naval assets but has disadvantages because of delays in formation, resulting in port congestion and slower transit speeds. The use of convoys is based on the premise that all but essential military and economic shipping would be curtailed during the conflict. In the past the best and safest way to move slow merchant ships in a hostile environment was by an adequately escorted convoy. There is some doubt that future convoys could be provided adequate conventional escorts during the long transit of the Pacific. Planners would like to allocate about seven surface escorts to a six-merchant ship convoy, but how many more for a 50-ship convoy? How many convoys would be at sea simultaneously? Today's merchant ship is larger and faster but submarines are now quieter and faster and carry missiles as well as torpedoes. It does seem that convoys in future conflicts will require expanded escort capability. To assist in convoy protection there are such assets as detectors on the ocean bottom (SOSUS), maritime patrol aircraft, carrier-based ASW aircraft and helicopters, attack submarines, small helos embarked on the escorts (and possibly on merchant ships as well). Since such ASW resources would be limited it may be necessary to plan even larger convoys in order to concentrate their protective forces. In an expansion of the convey concept, these forces could be deployed to provide protected areas or defended lanes along the convoy's route.

If an anti-shipping campaign did not materialize, the preferred method of ship movement probably would be independent sailings. Independent sailings allow the ship to sail when ready, proceed at the ship's most favourable speed, follow the most direct route and proceed through the offloading process as quickly as its own schedule will allow. Other advantages of an independently sailed ship include the ability to use the ship's top speed as an evasive measure and the possibility that a single ship might pass through enemy surveillance undetected, or if detected, make interception less likely. Limited enemy assets and the large open area of the Pacific could give the advantage to independently sailed ships under some circumstances. Speed alone, however, no longer gives

significant advantage to the merchant ship against the modern submarine. History teaches us that even in World War II merchant ships sailing independently suffered the heaviest losses.

The independent ship could make good use of protected lanes if they were established. A protected or defended lane would involve sanitizing a geographical area against the submarine threat, followed by the installation of a barrier or protected perimeter to provide for penetration warning. It could also involve the positioning of own forces at the perimeters for attacks, destruction, and or neutralization. Protective forces would be positioned along a transit route. Each unit of the protective force would be assigned an area of responsibility, the size of which depended upon the speed and sensors of the protective platform, perceived threat, environmental conditions, and weapons involved. Ships, aircraft, submarines, and fixed arrays could be employed along the protected lanes which could be an advancing area. Merchant ships proceeding along the protected lane could be passed from one area of responsibility to the next, but it might be necessary to leave gaps or unprotected spaces between the protected areas.

In a future conflict it must be accepted that convoys and even single ships in transit will be very quickly detected and kept under surveillance. Consequently, hostile submarines will be directed by their control centres to make interceptions at points most favourable to the attacker. In the vast Pacific, it is assumed that the most susceptible areas would be just outside the maritime defence zones. Nevertheless, hostile submarines will not be free to cruise undetected since anti-submarine detection systems are also being constantly improved.

A convoy will require the usual close-in escorts which with their helos would provide anti-submarine defence (ASW) and limited anti-air defence (AAW). It is less likely that there would be a threat from surface ship raiders. There have been several proposals for basing helos and even VSTOL aircraft

aboard some merchant ships in the convoy. There are practical problems in such basing, when one considers the maintenance and control problems that would be involved, and the additional expense of the helicopter and the ship modifications. However, in wartime, costs do not eliminate useful programs.

In today's world of long range aircraft and of submarines with the capability of launching attack missiles from well outside the defences of the convoy's accompanying escorts, it is apparent that an outer defence barrier is required. In World War II, ASW was greatly enhanced by the operations of the hunter-killer group, consisting of a small aircraft carrier and destroyer escorts. It does seem that such groups would be required in any future conflict, either to proceed in advance of large convoys to provide a defended lane, or operated to sanitize particularly vulnerable areas. Since carriers and escorts are in limited numbers, an intensive program would need to be initiated for reactivation of reserve ships or building of new ships.

In conclusion, in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, convoy operations will be essential, but their routing will need to be planned to take advantage of defended lanes and areas. The convoy would be large in order to take efficient advantage of protecting forces. it would sail with a number of surface escorts throughout transit. At least some of these escorts would have hello assets in addition to their own ASW and AAW capabilities. The defended lanes and or areas would be established utilizing ASW carrier groups, submarines, and patrol aircraft along the convoy route. These protective forces would be responsible for defence in the sea areas between maritime defence zones. Finally, it comes down to a full realization that to obtain security of the sea lines of communication, one must gain and maintain control under, on, and above the seas. It is not a choice of Convoy or Defended Lanes, but a plan for Convoy and Defended Lanes.

6th International Conference on
the Security of Sea Lanes of Communication

TECHNIQUES FOR ENSURING SLOC SECURITY
IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

SURVEILLANCE TASKS

by

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Director, Japanese Center for Strategic Studies

(presented by Vice Admiral (Retired) Kenichi Kitamura)
(Director, Japanese Center for Strategic Studies)

Southern Cross Hotel
Melbourne, Australia
11-13 October, 1988

(Prepared for the 6th International SLOC Security Conference)

Surveillance Tasks

Rear Admiral Yasuo Ito (Ret)

Director
Japanese Center for Strategic Studies

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Foreword

The International Steering Committee of the International SLOC Security Conference asked the SLOC Study Group, Japan to submit a paper covering the following contents:

- Currently there are following questions relating to the actual execution of surveillance activities undertaken together with other operations such as sea lane patrol or escort of shipping, for the security of the SLOCs in the Western Pacific. When related nations conduct surveillance operations, how can surveillance operations by each nation be co-ordinated? To what extent can related nations ensure the timely exchange of information?

The Steering Committee expects that the paper covers the extent of surveillance activities for the security of the SLOCs in the Western Pacific and the costs required to implement the above activities.

It can hardly be said that the surveillance activities being currently undertaken by the Japan Self Defence Forces (mainly maritime and air) in the adjacent sea-air areas to Japan are sufficient, considering that the current geographical coverage is comparatively limited. Because we have not information enough for discussion on requested subjects in detail, we would simply touch some basic matters concerning surveillance and outline some conceptual matters considered necessary for promoting surveillance activities in the Western Pacific. We would also refer to surveillance works in general.

I THE MEANING OF "SURVEILLANCE"

According to the US Department of Defence Dictionary of Military Terms, "surveillance" is defined as "the systematic observation of aerospace, surface or subsurface areas, places, persons or things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic or other means."

The following two kinds of information can be collected by means of systematic observation by aircraft and vessels including submarines of opposing forces which could pose a threat to the security of the SLOCs. They are:

1. Information on the capabilities of vessels and aircraft. By undertaking such observations, it is possible, for example, to confirm the type of vessel and aircraft in question, the equipment or weapon systems on-board and so on, and to estimate their performance.
2. Information on the movements of opposing vessels and aircraft. By detecting and locating these objects through observing their movements, necessary information on their movements can be collected.

Some of the information on their movements can be put to immediate practical use for own military operations as so-called "tactical information". Some of them can also be made use of as "strategic information" through analysing, evaluating and accumulating these various data. In either case, it should be a basic principle that information collected by means of surveillance activities be distributed only to those who "need to know" them.

II SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES RELATED TO SLOC SECURITY

The following points can be mentioned as the general features of surveillance activities. First, observation operations should be undertaken by various means systematically on the basis of co-operation. Secondly, in general, the geographical area of surveillance activities should cover a wide scope. And thirdly, in most cases, observations should be continue throughout a specific period(s).

Because of the above-mentioned special features the following points should be taken into account, when surveillance activities are executed for the security of the SLOCs.

1. In order to expect the substantial effect of the surveillance activities undertaken for securing the SLOCs against opposing submarines, aircraft and surface vessels (including various kinds of anti-ship missiles and other weaponry, carried on board), surveillance capabilities of a wide scope covering air, sea and underwater areas should be provided for observation of the movements of objects in question.
2. For the purpose of smooth co-ordination of surveillance activities as well as the timely exchange of information among operating forces and units taking part in surveillance activities, some co-ordination system including necessary telecommunication network should be established.
3. For the security of the SLOCs, it is essential to implement surveillance operations over a much wider area, not relying merely on such immediate or direct measures covering relatively limited areas, as escort of shipping, patrol along sealanes or mines counter-measures.
4. Surveillance operations for the security of the SLOCs should be executed continuously throughout a necessary period and should also be started in a peacetime.

III CONTRIBUTION TO SLOC SECURITY EXPECTED OF SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES

When the above-mentioned surveillance operations are undertaken, the following effects could be expected for the security of the SLOCs.

- 1 Preventing any threat from becoming a direct threat but as various attack

weapons' performances are developed in velocity, efficiency, complexity and so on, attacks on the ASLOCs expanding in a wide air, surface and subsurface area could be made from increasingly longer distance within a shorter time than previously. It can be expected that this will be the case all the more in future. Accordingly, as there are limits to the effectiveness of the above-mentioned direct measures such as shipping escort, patrol along sea lanes, mine counter measures and so on, the security of the SLOCs will become more difficult to achieve in future.

Confronted with this tendency, if effective surveillance activities covering a wider sea-air area and being not limited to a sea lane zone could be accomplished, besides these direct measures, the security of the SLOCs could be achieved more easily and safely, because such surveillance operations in an area considerably distant from the objects to be secured would make it possible to detect and eliminate invisible threats, in advance of their becoming direct threat to the SLOCs.

Surveillance activities might be said to be similar conceptually to "layered air defense" or "air defence in depth."

"Wide area SLOC security concept" in the North Atlantic, developed by the US Navy, can be mentioned as a typical example of surveillance operations for the security of the SLOCs. The concept includes land-based forces such as OTH radar and fighter-interceptor as well as OSIS (Naval Ocean Surveillance System) and ITSS (Integrated Tactical Surveillance System).

2. Evaluation of Opposing Forces' Capabilities and Estimate of their Intention in Advance.

Needless to say, if we fail to estimate the opposing forces' capabilities accurately, it will be very hard to cope well with an enemy's attack on our SLOCs in an emergency. On the contrary, if we can detect precisely their intention in advance, effective counter-measures could be taken easily. Surveillance

activities provide one of the means which makes this possible.

Major threats to the SLOCs are submarines, surface vessels, aircraft and various anti-ship missiles carried on board them, mines and so forth. By conducting systematic and continuous surveillance activities and analytical evaluation of collected information, it will become possible, at the very least, to estimate the performance and actual conditions of their weapons systems, pattern of movement, force composition and so forth of various vehicles, except details of attack weapons loaded on board.

This means that surveillance activities should be executed continuously throughout peacetime and that the necessary organization or systems should be established so that evaluated information may be exchanged and utilized among the related nations.

If the surveillance activities are not practiced in peacetime but only in emergencies, it would be difficult to prepare necessary plans to get effective results such as provision of necessary equipments, deployment of forces, development of tactics and so forth. It would also be difficult to carry out effectively such operations as escort of shipping, patrol and so forth, that is direct measures for the security of the SLOCs.

It is necessary to catch timely and precisely any unusual indication, in order to detect in advance and carry out effective countermeasures against attempt of opposing forces. This is possible by conducting continuous surveillance of the movements of opposing vessels and aircraft in and around the SLOC area and by assessing analytically various information collected through surveillance activities.

In many cases, the objects of surveillance activities should not be limited only to military vessels and aircraft of opposing forces but include also commercial vessels. This is because when the opposing forces attempt to attack our SLOCs, subtle changes in the movements even of their commercial vessels can often be detected in advance.

As mentioned above, surveillance activities for the security of the SLOCs should be practiced systematically and continuously not only during emergencies but also in peacetime.

IV OUTLINE OF EQUIPMENT USED FOR SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES

Equipment used for surveillance activities in the SLOC sea area comprise mainly the following:

Air: Various radars are used for observation activities. It is considered likely that OTH radar capable of covering a far distant area ranging from 500 to 1,800 nautical miles will play the main role in this activity in future. To investigate a detected target, interceptors are used.

Surface: For surveillance over a far distant area extending beyond the horizon, OTH radar is considered an effective means, but patrol aircraft are also effectively used for surveillance over a comparatively wide area. Patrol aircraft and surface vessels are used for investigation. It should be noted that good results may be obtained by using these means properly according to the features of each.

Subsurface: In addition to fixed underwater detection equipment laid in important straits, patrol aircraft, submarines and surface vessels are used for surveillance. In comparison with P-3C class patrol aircraft, surface vessels were not highly regarded in terms of their capabilities for comparatively long distance underwater surveillance. However, the installation of TACTAS, SURTAS and other towed sonar system developed by the US Navy has made their underwater surveillance capabilities upgrade immensely.

For underwater surveillance, anti-submarine patrol aircraft, surface

vessels, submarines and fixed underwater equipment are used.

Anti-Submarine patrol aircraft: Fixed-wing anti-submarine patrol aircraft (P-3C is typical of this type) have excellent manoeuvrability and capabilities of long-distance surface and underwater surveillance. They are used for collecting information and investigating and tracking targets in a wide area.

P-3C can cover an area ranging to more than 1,000 nautical miles for detecting surface objects with search radar installed on board. They take photographs and collect electronic information of detected objects.

P-3C can detect underwater objects by means of sonobuoys laid on the sea surface. If the underwater condition of sound transmission is good, P-3C can cover the area of several tens of nautical miles in radius by a single aircraft.

Although patrol aircraft can detect a number of objects in a wide area within a short time, their capability of staying in the air is limited. When surveillance work should be continued for a long duration, a considerable number of aircraft is required, of course.

Surface vessels: Surface vessels such as destroyers and destroyer escorts are inferior to patrol aircraft in manoeuvrability but superior in cruising endurance. Therefore, they are suitable to conduct surveillance continuously during a long time for detecting specific objects in a specific comparatively narrow area. It is also possible to improve extremely their capabilities of underwater surveillance by using the "towed-array sonar" developed by the US Navy mentioned above.

Submarines: The biggest advantage of submarines for underwater surveillance is to be able to measure underwater temperature by themselves which influences a great deal underwater sound propagation, and to stay at the desired depth for detecting sound secretly.

Fixed underwater equipments: They are used usually for surveillance of submarines passing through such comparatively narrow waters as important straits or choke points. The feature of fixed underwater equipment is that they can be used semi-permanently, regardless of any weather conditions. However, co-operation by vessels or patrol aircraft is necessary for tracking detected targets.

V CURRENT JAPANESE SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES

The outline of the current Japanese surveillance activities is as follows:

Air: Japan Air Self-Defence Force is in charge. Their activities are limited mainly within the air defence zone above and around Japan.

Surface: Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force is in charge. They conduct surveillance work in the neighbouring sea areas around Japan including the three straits (Soya, Tsugaru and Tsushima). P-3Cs are used mainly in relatively wide areas, and escort vessels in a specific area or for specific objects.

Subsurface: Fixed underwater equipment is used for surveillance in and around major straits. Surface vessels and aircraft are sometime used for surveillance as required.

There is no authorized co-operation system with other nations.

VI ESTABLISHMENT OF SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM FOR SLOC SECURITY IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC

In order to ensure the safety of the SLOCs in the vast Western Pacific, it

is needed to establish in peacetime an international system suitable to coordinate surveillance activities by related nations.

As mentioned above, it is obviously difficult to ensure the safety of the SLOCs, if we leave SLOC security only to operations in relatively narrow coverage such as patrol along sea lanes or direct escort of shipping by aircraft and vessels.

Accordingly, besides such operations, it is necessary to establish in peacetime a surveillance system which enables the implementation of effective wide-area surveillance operations around the SLOC area "in depth", in order to ensure the security of the SLOCs in the Western Pacific region.

As to NCS (Naval Control of Shipping) which is one of the essential measures of the security of the SLOCs, most of the main functions of NCS such as formation of convoy, selection and designation of shipping lanes, designation of navigation schedules and so forth, will be planned based on various information acquired by surveillance activities. Accordingly, it can be said that strengthening the surveillance system in the Western Pacific is also essential for effective functioning of NCS.

Considering that the Soviet attack capabilities on our SLOCs in the Western Pacific have rapidly been increased quantitatively as well as qualitatively, the establishment of surveillance systems could be said to be indispensable for the security of the SLOCs in this region.

At present, we depend for most of the surveillance activities in the Western Pacific upon the United States. However, recent events in the Persian Gulf which is far narrower than the Western Pacific have proved that no one nation has the capability to implement single-handed surveillance tasks in vast air, surface and subsurface area.

Our current dependence on the United States may not be allowed to be continued in future, considering changes in international situations as well as the fact that the security of the SLOCs in the Western Pacific contributes to the

security of the nations concerned. Accordingly, it would be reasonable that surveillance tasks be shared by the nations involved.

When we study sharing of surveillance tasks among the nations concerned, the geographical conditions of each country and the equipment that respective nations can hold and operate should be taken into major consideration. However, generally speaking, it might be proper to apportion surveillance area on the following basis:

1. Surveillance tasks in coastal waters, important straits and other major choke points are to be assigned to the coastal countries concerned, in principle.
2. The apportionment of surveillance areas in the vast ocean is to be discussed among the countries concerned.

The establishment of a co-ordination centre which may be named "Western Pacific Surveillance Co-Ordination Centre" is needed to ensure the safety of the SLOCs and the implementation of effective surveillance activities in the Western Pacific. It is also needed to co-ordinate and integrate surveillance operations conducted by the nations involved. It would be proper that the United States be in charge of its administration and co-ordination of operations conducted by the nations concerned. The following are considered as major functions of the centre:

1. Co-ordinative function to achieve smooth implementation of surveillance operations by the nations concerned.
2. Timely exchange of various information collected through surveillance operations by the nations concerned.

In order to make the centre function effectively, it is necessary to organize not only a surveillance network among the countries concerned but also a requisite telecommunication network to co-operate with, for example, the

following systems:

1. Ocean Surveillance Information System (OSIS-US)
2. Integrated Tactical Surveillance System (ITSS-US)
3. Naval Control of Shipping Centre (NCS-each country)
4. Ship's Reporting System (SREP-each country)
5. Operation Headquarters of Navy and Air Force (each country)

CONCLUSION

Essentially, effective results of surveillance activities could not be expected if surveillance activities for the security of the SLOCs are commenced after the international situation becomes tense. Accordingly, it is necessary to start jointly surveillance activities in the Western Pacific as early as possible in peacetime. However, as a matter of fact, it may be politically difficult to realize.

On the other hand, it is also true that the threat posed to the SLOCs in the Western Pacific has rapidly been increasing due to the remarkable increase of the Soviet naval and air forces in the Far East, the continued expansion of their existing military bases in Vietnam, the difficulties in negotiation on continuation of the US use of the military bases in the Philippines and so forth.

Under such circumstances, it will not be easy to get an early resolution. However, we would like to believe that there will be a possibility of solution to such difficulties in the not so far future, if good ideas turn up as the Steering committee pointed out. We, our SLOC Security Study Groups, should continue steady studies so as to realize it in the near future.

In closing this report, we would like to express our heartfelt appreciation and gratitude to the International Steering Committee members who raised such an important issue to study, to which little attention has been paid, although it is a very important basic subject for the security of the SLOCs in the Western Pacific.

6th International Conference on
the Security of Sea Lanes of Communication

TECHNIQUES FOR ENSURING SLOC SECURITY
IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

FOREIGN ACCESS TO NATIONAL BASES

by

Rear Admiral Carlito Y. Cunanan, PN
Flag Officer in Command, Philippines Navy

Southern Cross Hotel
Melbourne, Australia

11-13 October, 1988

FOREIGN ACCESS TO NATIONAL BASES:

AN ESSENTIAL ASPECT OF THE REGIONAL SECURITY OF THE SEA LANES OF COMMUNICATION

by

*Rear Admiral Carlito Y Cunanan AFP
Flag Officer In Command
Philippine Navy*

It is a generally-accepted fact that the sea lanes of the Western Pacific are crucial to world trade and communication. There is, therefore, a need to ensure that these sea lanes should continue to be free and available for all members of the international community of nations.

Evolving Geopolitical Configurations in the Region

Developments in the recent years indicate the possible intensification of the socio-political tensions in the region. In 1978, a peace treaty between the People's Republic of China (PROC) and Japan was firmed up. During this period, the relationship between China and the United States (US) also became stronger.

In late 1978, a treaty was forged between the Soviet Union (USSR) and Vietnam. Since then, the USSR has provided Vietnam approximately over US\$ 2 billion in military aid, along with 2,500 military advisors; and, over US\$ 5 billion in economic aid, as well as 3,500 economic advisors.¹

This treaty has enabled the USSR to extend its military presence in the region. It is reported that the USSR has a

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permanent naval presence of 15 ships and auxiliaries, and over
2
100 aircraft in the area.

The strengthened ties between Japan and China, and between the US and China, can be viewed as part of a long-term encirclement of the Soviet Union by China and the West. It is, thus, to be expected that the USSR will try to relieve the pressure by expanding its sphere of influence in the region south of China.

By its military presence in Vietnam, the USSR has secured for itself a vantage position whereby it could quite readily have access to the sea lanes of Southeast Asia. With Vietnam as a staging base, the Soviets can respond rapidly either to a crisis in the region; or, to project itself as a naval and air power in Southwest Pacific.

The possibility underscores the need, as an Australian Minister had once said, "to reduce tensions there that promote uncertainty and increased involvement in the region by
3
external powers."

In addition to these emerging geopolitical configurations, the United States had been advocating for burden sharing in the maintenance of security in the region.

The call by the US for burden sharing is not new. Since its Vietnam experience, and the deterioration of its economy,

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the US has admitted that is "is no longer able to shoulder the burden of defense alliances to the degree that it has done so in the past."⁴

In the light of these developments, the need to secure the region's sea lanes of communication assumes added significance.

Prospects for Disruption of Sea Lanes

The possibility that the Soviets will indeed try to disrupt the sea lanes of Southeast Asia, of course, is a matter of studied speculation. Indeed, there is a school of thought which says that the disruption of the region's sea lanes would be more detrimental to the Soviets.

The extent of the Soviet's merchant and fishing fleets argue that the Soviet, themselves, would end up with the shorter end of the stick when this happens. Soviet trade with Indochina and Southeast Asian countries alone is worth almost US\$3,000 million.

The commercial sea lanes passing through Southeast Asia are vital to Soviet interests in the transfer of goods and materials between Soviet European and Far Eastern ports.⁵

In addition, recent announcements of the USSR policy on *glasnost* inspire hope among many that we are truly moving towards an era of peace.

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Given all these, the possibility for an armed conflict over the sea lanes nonetheless still exists. Nations continue to consider war as an effective tool in the prosecution of a foreign policy.

It would be rash to predict that no conflict will happen. The Stockholm-based International Peace Research Institute had noted that, since 1945, a major war had occurred every three and half years.⁶

The projections of a resource-scarce future coupled with unabated population increase indicate that countries will probably wage wars for minerals, fishing grounds, and energy resources that can be extracted from the sea bed.⁷

Protecting the Sea Lanes: A Regional Concern

This underscores the need to secure the sea lanes of the region. Viewed from the wide expanse of regional security, it is extremely difficult (and costly) for one country to prevent, by itself, the disruption of sea communications. Affected countries have to participate actively and sincerely in a collective effort to regulate the sea lanes.

The individual participation of a country in such an effort will have to depend on its national policies and its capabilities. There may be some who would have the naval force to secure the passage of shipping in the region and

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prevent attempts to prevent the free flow of sea traffic. In like manner, there might also be some countries which may have the naval capacity to bring military power to bear in distant sea areas.

In both instances, access to friendly shore facilities are essential. This strategic necessity, coupled with the wide expanse of the area to be secured, mandates the need for a collaborative framework for regional security. A framework that can serve as a basis for the relationships among the countries involved.

Regional Security: The Philippine Position

The Philippines, as an independent sovereign state, and as a member of the world community, adopts the principles of international law. It subscribes to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations.

This adherence to the principles of international cooperation, including the maintenance of regional security, is reflected in the covenants that the Philippines have struck with various countries.

The Philippines is a signatory to the Southeast Asian Collective Defense Treaty (Manila Pact). Consistent with its commitments, it had made its modest contributions to efforts

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aimed at the maintenance of regional peace.

Together with other members of the ASEAN, the Philippines declared in 1987 that it seeks, among others, to promote regional peace through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law and adherence to the UN charter.

In that declaration, it affirmed that all foreign bases are temporary and remain only with the expressed concurrence of the countries concerned and are not intended to subvert the states in the area.

A strong strand of consistency characterizes the Philippine position with regard to the maintenance of regional peace and security.

The 1986 Philippine Constitution provides that, after the 1991 expiration of the agreement between the Philippines and the US concerning military bases, "foreign bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when Congress so requires, ratified by the majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state."⁸

The Philippine Constitution also provides that "The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its

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territory."

Quite recently, the Philippine Secretary of Justice has rendered the opinion that the definition of "national interest" is incumbent on the President of the Philippines.

This has been taken to mean that the Constitutional policy on nuclear weapons in Philippine territory does not necessarily imply a total ban.

These Constitutional provisions do not close the door to the forging of regional security arrangements between the Philippines and other countries. What they emphasize is the process by which such agreements are to be made binding on the country and its people.

Meanwhile, the arrangements covered by the Military Bases Agreement of 1947 between the Philippines and the US with regard to US facilities in Philippine bases is currently being reviewed.

Among others, the 1947 Agreement provides that the Philippine and the US, without prior mutual consent, cannot grant any Third Power any rights, power, or authority whatsoever in or relating to military bases.

Over time, several amendments have been introduced.

In 1959, it was mutually agreed that the operational use

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of the bases for military combat operations other than those conducted in accordance with the Manila Pact and the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty shall be the subject of prior¹¹ consultation with the Philippine Government".

In 1979, this agreement was modified to state that the bases are Philippine military bases over which Philippine sovereignty extends; that, each base shall be under the command of a Philippine base commander; and, assured the US of unhampered military operations involving its force in the¹² Philippines. Incidentally, apart from being the Flag Officer In Command of the Philippine Navy, I concurrently serve as the Commander of Subic Naval Base Command.

These internal developments in the Philippines and its evolving agreements with other countries underscore its openness to collaborative arrangements for the region's continued peace.

Foreign Access To Philippine Bases: Prospects

In the context of these developments and agreements, the current practice in providing foreign access to Philippine bases where US facilities are located, is for a Third Country to seek the approval of both the Philippine Government and the US Navy Facility Commander before a third country naval force can enter, say, the Subic Naval Base.

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The Philippine experience indicates that most often, entry of third country armed forces is for purposes of port visit, reprovisioning, repairs, conferences, naval exercises, or training. The period of their stay can be a brief single day or a longer one, depending on the nature of their request. Most of those which call on Philippine bases are from allied countries such as Japan, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, and Australia.

Expanded Access Possible

It is certainly possible for the Philippine government to expand foreign access to its bases beyond its current practice and arrangements. What is essential, in the realization of this possibility, is a clear enunciation of the terms of reference within which access is to be granted.

The proposed arrangement would have to be consistent with Philippine commitments to the United Nations charter and to other countries.

It will have to be in accord with the provisions of the Philippine Constitution; and, the proposed agreement will not diminish Philippine sovereignty over its territory.

If foreign access to national bases will consist of refueling, reprovisioning, maintenance and repair, emergency health services, and operational coordination and consultation,

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then, there could be no serious objections to the proposed arrangements.

Certainly, efforts should be exerted to minimize those that will tend to intensify the socio-political tensions in the region, such as arms build-up and the like.

Vital in the realization of a multilateral concept of regional security for the sea lanes of communication is its congruence to Philippine national interests.

Definitely, Philippine national interests will be the main and primary yardstick in the decision to provide foreign access to Philippine bases.

If it is established that such access is deemed beneficial to Philippine national interests, then it is highly probable that the Philippine government will favor moves to make its maritime ports, naval bases, and stations, and its military or commercial airport facilities to friendly nations particularly in the proposed multilateral arrangements.

Alternative Arrangements To Be Explored

Today, in the Philippines, there are strong sentiments about the continued stay of US military facilities in Philippine territory. It is highly probable that there will

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be stiff opposition to any proposal that would parallel the current arrangements between the Philippines and the US. In this regard, alternative, and perhaps, more politically-feasible arrangements would have to be explored.

Consensus on Perceived Threat

Proposals for inter-country collaboration to secure the sea lanes of the region can gain stronger political acceptance when there is a commonality of perceptions, among the participating countries, regarding the perceived threats. There might be some debate as to what would be the threats to the region's security. This, however, does not detract from the need to secure the region's sea lanes of communication. There is a general consensus that this need is real. Addressing needs require resources. If there are costs to regional stability and peace, then, there is a need to meet these costs.

Meeting The Costs of Regional Security

In this regard, the costs involved in addressing this regional need will have to be determined. Agreements among the governments affected in carrying, equitably, the burden of regional security will have to be forged.

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The countries in the region have their own respective priorities. They have their own individual national agenda. It is an agenda that will determine what a government is willing to contribute to the costs of regional security. What a country is willing to share will depend on its perception of the benefits that it will reap from such an arrangement. It will also depend on what it thinks it can afford.

It may be anticipated that the costs of regional security cannot be equally shared among the affected countries. But, it should be expected that all should contribute, albeit unevenly.

Interdependence should be the guiding principle in the definition of roles to be adopted by the affected countries. In this manner, the possibility of one country assuming a dominant position over the others could be minimized.

In Sum

The Philippines is aware of the current geopolitical events that can eventually re-shape the security configuration in the region.

The Soviets have expanded their influence into the region. The US had repeatedly asked the affected countries to share in the costs of maintaining regional security along with its announced intentions to scale down its military presence in the region.

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These twin developments will certainly affect the balance of power that is essential in the continued stability of the region.

All these point to the need for alternative arrangements to ensure regional security. These arrangements should stem from a common perception on the threats to the regional sea lanes; and, an agreement on the role of each country to secure these sea lanes.

For some countries, particularly, in Southeast Asia, this role could consist of providing access to national bases for naval and air forces tasked to secure the regional sea lanes of communication. In this regard, the criteria for sharing the costs of regional security will have to be firmed up, and agreed on by the countries involved.

Historically, the Philippines has looked with favor at any collective effort to ensure the safety and free unhampered use of international sea lanes in the Western Pacific. In this context, the Philippines supports the current effort.

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6th International Conference on
the Security of Sea Lanes of Communication

TECHNIQUES FOR ENSURING SLOC SECURITY
IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

MINEWARFARE AND COUNTERMEASURES

by

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11-13 October, 1988

SECURITY OF SEA LANES OF COMMUNICATION MINEWARFARE

INTRODUCTION

Distinguished guests, Ladies and Gentlemen. I am honoured to have been invited to address you today. It is an opportunity not only for me to share with you my view of minewarfare and its part in SLOC's Security, but for me to learn something from you of your own professional concerns.

As some of you may be aware both mine countermeasures and mining are enjoying a resurgence in Australia. Great importance is attached to these aspects of naval warfare by the Australian Government. Indeed some one half billion dollars has been allocated to the various MCM projects already in hand to provide the RAN with a credible MCM force.

During the next 20 minutes I will discuss mining and mine countermeasures in strait control from the Australian perspective. Firstly I wish to emphasize the importance of the shipping straits that link Australia with its trading partners to the economy of Australia and also to our trading allies.

DISCUSSION

Trade

Australia is a trading nation. We have a small, consumer-oriented economy which relies upon imports to contribute to our standard of living. In order to pay for the goods we import and to finance government programmes, we must offset the cost of imports by exporting.

Federal Government policy is to encourage the development of our export markets. In dollar terms, Australia exported goods to the value of \$3,200

million in the twelve months to June 1986 in tonnage that amounted to 244 million tonnes, making Australia the third worldwide volume exporter behind the USA and Saudi Arabia. Import values were \$3,400 million, being some 20 million tonnes.

The majority of our trade, some 96 per cent, was carried in foreign ships. Incidentally less than half of one per cent of trade tonnage was carried as airfreight.

There are a number of important considerations when analysing these facts.

Firstly, it will be important to continue to use foreign ships for the carriage of export and import commodities. Our merchant fleet is too small to carry the volume required by Australia.


The assumption that national shipping would enjoy some protection from belligerents has been compounded by recent events in the Persian Gulf where both Iran and Iraq appear to be indiscriminate in their attacks on national shipping.

Finally, Australia is reliant upon maritime trade and its imports and exports are predominantly carried by foreign flag vessels. Australia's major trading partners are Japan, the United States, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and Singapore and were the top five destinations for exports for the year ending June 1986. All countries also figure prominently in Australian imports. Obviously Australia's geographic position necessitates shipping transitting the archipelagic straits to her north as well as the Pacific Island Straits as a means of following the most direct route to their destination.

This slide highlights the trade routes on which shipping to and from Australia travel. It is important to note that a major proportion of this shipping uses the archipelagic straits to the north of Australia.

Naval Control of Shipping

TRADE ROUTES



From this slide it is apparent that in times of tension Australia needs to keep trading and of course this means we have to protect and control shipping servicing the Australian coastline. The mining or even the threat of mining a strait or two, particularly those to Australia's immediate north, could have severe economic results. Mining of these straits would not necessarily reduce trade but would increase transport costs because shipping would need to transit longer safer routes. This leads me to naval control and naval protection of shipping.

Australia is a member of an alliance which practices naval control of shipping. Australia's area of interest is immediately apparent on this slide. Please note that the archipelagic straits to Australia's north are of major interest to Australia for trade purposes.

Naval control of shipping is sometimes thought of as a convoy mentality. Basically what is conjured up is that any large group of ships sailing around together are 'sitting ducks'. This is a misconception and shows a lack of understanding of one of the cheapest yet most effective procedures in maritime protection. We have all heard the arguments for and against naval control of shipping so I'll not elaborate any further. Naval control can provide protection to shipping simply by routing convoys around a likely danger such as a declared minefield. Another form of protection is the escorting of convoys by warships to ward off any would be aggressor. We are seeing both of these tactics employed in the Persian Gulf right now.

Mining

The sea mine possesses a number of unique qualities which are significant in any consideration of how they might be used strategically. Mines are versatile, not only can they do direct damage to military and logistic units but they can also attack broad facets of the enemy's economy. Because ships typically carry a large bulk of goods, they are much more vulnerable to attack than other modes of

transport. Mines can destroy and disrupt the enemy's merchant marine. They can increase the damage inflicted by other weapon systems by channelling traffic into positions favourable for attack. They can be used to close ports, disrupt storage and force the diversion of traffic to decrease or even stop cargo flow. They have deterrent effects which weigh heavily in their political and psychological importance.

Mines are waiting weapons. The target must come to the mine. While this might at first be thought a disadvantage it actually has a number of positive attributes. The mine can maintain vigilance over a long period without continued commitment of forces. The initiative or aggression must come from the enemy. A direct face to face confrontation between belligerents can also be avoided.

Mines usually are invisible weapons. If they are laid covertly, they can inflict maximum damage because of surprise. If they are announced the psychological impact is maximized because of the size and unknown nature of the threat.

Mines can be selective weapons. Few other weapons can be made to select a specific size or class of target or be as selective in depth or range.

Mines are ideally suited to providing graduated responses in intensity, area and time of attack. The minimum response required to attain a military goal can be chosen. The advantage of a potential aggressor offensively mining a strait are numerous and apart from the actual sinking of ships there are other objectives which can be obtained:


- A. forcing the enemy to expend men and material on repairing damaged ships;
- B. forcing the enemy to engage in mine countermeasures consumes men and resources at enormous cost in comparison to the cost of mines;
- C. delays of shipping and disruptions of cargo handling at ports or both ends of a supply line are also valuable secondary effects of mining even if no ship is sunk, and
- D. demoralization of both ship and shore support crews is also a valuable bi-product.

The effect of the sea mine on any form of shipping, military or merchant, can be horrendous. During World War II the sea mine accounted for more shipping tonnage sunk than any other form of naval warfare. Its strategic advantages may be summed up by this slide which aptly describes the mine's effect on the outcome of the landing at Wonsan during the Korean War.

As I have tried to portray to you, the mine is an effective weapon when used offensively or defensively. I have described its offensive virtues. A mine's defensive attributes have also been realized by the Australian Government and the Australian Defence Force, because, in 1981, we obtained a limited defensive mining capability. This acquisition was important given the dependence of Australia's economy on seaborne trade.

Australia has a vast area of mineable waters. The tyranny of distance is on our side so it is probable that any potential aggressor, with the exception of the superpowers, could only lay a few mines offensively. To this end we would need to protect our own straits by defensive mining. As I mentioned earlier a defensive minefield can be used to funnel friendly shipping through a channel or strait that the owner controls. As an enemy is not privy to the mines' positions in this defensive field he is not likely to transit that area unless he is willing to do so at the risk of losing a ship or ships. No naval or merchant commander would transit a declared mined area unless it had been sanitized by MCM vessels previously and any MCM effort necessary to sanitize the area would be unlikely while we still had military control of that area. It is in this scenario of sea and air control that Australia would use its mines to control shipping straits; that is deny any potential enemy the use of the waterways.

Should we lose control of the strait we would wish to deny the enemy the ability to use it at his own will. To this end it is likely that the Australian Defence Force with its strike assets, such as the F-111, would deny the enemy use of the strait by conducting an offensive minelay.



Mine Countermeasures

The RAN concept for operations recognises that an opponent could use mines to disrupt Australia's coastal shipping. The areas of greatest risk to mining are the north and north-west particularly in the constricted and shallow waters such as the straits and shipping routes to and from most of our ports. Serious disruption could also be achieved in the constricted waters to the south and south-east of the continent.

Our strategic guidance emphasises the need for a military capability to control the sea and air approaches to Australia and to defend the mainland. The geographic and strategic factors suggest that any initial threat to Australia would be maritime and air in nature. In the present benign regional strategic circumstances, government policy emphasises the need to contribute to the maintenance of regional stability. Strategic guidance seeks to ensure that Australia's geography is exploited to allow a defence posture which can control, where necessary, the approaches to Australia and ultimately defend the continent. The broad strategy calls for a range of versatile and flexible forces as well as a credible expansion base which can, given a change in strategic circumstances, provide the basis from which to expand to conduct conventional warfare at higher levels of conflict.

Australia has embarked on a programme to build a credible MCM capability. The programme is developed along the lines called for by strategic guidance in that the force to be developed will be necessarily small but will have the capacity for rapid expansion. I will discuss the actual force composition shortly, however, let me first describe our concept for the use of this force in strait control.

In any environment where we maintain sea and air control the movement and tasking of MCM units is unrestricted. therefore a group of these units could be assigned to the area commander for reconnaissance purposes, thereby ensuring

that straits and port approaches have not been covertly mined.

Further, the presence alone of MCM assets would make a miner think twice about how he would mine an area. It also makes his problem more difficult as he would need to incorporate anti-sweep devices such as high ship counts to partially offset the effects of MCM. He may wish to sow his field with anti-MCM vessel mines or sweep obstructors which replace an actual mine in the field and reduce the effectiveness of the minefield against target ships.

Therefore an MCM force-in-being can act as a deterrent particularly during low level conflict where a mine or mines could be laid for political leverage. The mining or declared mining of a strait through which shipping must transit is an effective means of achieving political leverage on any maritime nation such as Australia or her neighbouring allies.

In areas where we do not have sea and air superiority the effectiveness of MCM would be very much reduced. We assume the enemy would target our MCM vessels, as we would his, thereby rendering any MCM effort less effective. This is not to say that MCM effort could not be conducted in a hostile environment. It could but only if suitable combatants were assigned for protection. If this occurs the minefield has achieved its aim by causing us to redirect some of our combatants away from other priority tasks.

Command and Control

How then do we effect command and control over our assets when in Australian waters or those straits belonging to friendly or allied countries in our region.

Firstly, in more substantial levels of conflict the naval control and protection of shipping organisation would be set in place. However, during

periods of low or escalated low levels of conflict command and control of our MCM vessels in Australian waters would be instigated in accordance with the Australian C2 arrangements in force at the time.

Command and control of MCM assets in straits other than Australian waters, such as those in the Indonesian archipelago, would be based on a joint co-operative and consultative process with Indonesia. Operational command of the actual assets would remain with the RAN while control of those assets would be under the auspices of the joint HQ.

MCM Programme

As I stated previously, the RAN has embarked upon a MCM ship and capability programme. The programme is divided into three projects namely, the Minehunter Project, a Minesweeping Project and a Mine Warfare Systems Centre project.

The Minehunter Inshore project intends that the RAN acquires at least six minehunter inshore or MHIs as they are commonly known. These minehunters are Australian designed and built using glass reinforced plastic. They are 32 metres in length, 9.8 metres in beam and have a 2 metre draught. The minehunting weapon system used is the Krupp Atlas MWS 80 which utilises the DSQS 11H Sonar. As the name implies these vessels have been designed primarily for inshore work.

As you saw on a previous slide Australia has a large area of mineable waters and it is in these waters that these vessels will be employed. The mine neutralisation system is the PAP 104 MK3 of MK5; a proven performer with European navies.

Unfortunately minehunting alone is not the answer to Australia's total mine countermeasures problem. A complementary minesweeping capability is

required. Consequently the RAN's second MCM project intends to acquire both an influence and mechanical minesweeping capability. The basis of this project is the development of a core force of 10 suitable craft, probably fishing vessels which will tow Australian designed and developed influence minesweeping equipment.

For example, the Buoyant Vehicle Dyad has been designed to replace the magnetic influence minesweeping equipment seen on MCMVs throughout the world. This slide shows the larger of two BVDs. Several of these when towed in tandem can simulate the magnetic signature of large merchant ships. A number of the smaller BVDs will emulate the magnetic signatures of a destroyer. When the BVDs are combined with an acoustic noisemaker the sweep will emulate the magnetic and acoustic signatures of a potential target ship.

The concept of a core force will allow training to be conducted during peacetime and allow for rapid expansion in times of tension. Essential to both the preceding capabilities is the development of an acoustic precursor capability so that an area or strait can be swept against the anti-MCMV mine prior to actual MCM operations by those vessels. To this end the RAN is currently exploring the possibility of using marinised helicopters, such as the Sea King, to tow an acoustic noise maker. Alternatively an unmanned, remote controlled precursor drone boat concept is being explored as well.

Given that trials and evaluation of the two prototype MHIs are successful and the minesweeping capability project proceeds as scheduled Australia's MCM force from the 1990s will be a minimum of six MHIs, ten craft of opportunity, a yet to be determined number of precursor elements and two clearance diving detachments. This force will be sub-divided into two groups with one group stationed on the east and west coasts of Australia.

This will reduce the time required for the MCM force to respond to a mining threat which is particularly important given Australia's vast coastline. MCM vessels will be supported by land based forward support units.

In order to control the MCM force the RAN is planning to build a mine warfare systems centre in Sydney. This will be the centre of minewarfare specialist knowledge in the RAN and will provide command and control, maintenance, software support, mission planning, analysis activities and training facilities for the force. It will commence operation in 1993 and will have a staff of about 60 personnel.

Conclusions

In conclusion then I have, in the past 20 minutes, provided you with a overview of the importance of shipping to the Australian economy. I have highlighted the importance of the trade routes servicing Australia and shown which straits are particularly important to Australia as a maritime nation. I have endeavoured to provide you with a precis of the RAN's minewarfare concept of operations in strait control and emphasised the advantage of mining in strait control. Last but not least I discussed what MCM projects are currently in train to provide the RAN with a credible MCM force in being; one that is able to counter the mining threat in all levels of conflict through the core force or expansion force concepts.

As a final remark I would like to add that any potential aggressor against Australia who wishes to mine a shipping strait as a political leverage against Australia would also face retribution in some form from Australia's trading partners. Not only will Australia be economically weakened by hindrance of imports and exports but so will those countries which rely upon our exports and imports to sustain their economy.

Thank you for your attention. Do you have any questions?

6th International Conference on
the Security of Sea Lanes of Communication

TECHNIQUES FOR ENSURING SLOC SECURITY
IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

AIR DEFENCE OF MERCHANT SHIPS

by

James Boutilier

Southern Cross Hotel

Melbourne, Australia

11-13 October, 1988

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THE AIR DEFENCE OF MERCHANT SHIPS

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Dean of Arts
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Embargoed until 11 October 1988

INTRODUCTION

At first glance the answer to the question of providing aerial protection for merchant shipping appears straightforward; allocate aircraft to patrol Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCs). While this might have been a suitable solution seventy-five years ago, today's maritime environment is much more complex and unpredictable. As the number and capability of sea-going weapon systems increase and as nations like Australia and Japan remain acutely dependent on merchant shipping for their survival, it is appropriate to re-examine the ways in which airpower can be employed to defend that shipping. In the first instance an analysis of world routing maps suggests that upwards of ninety percent of global shipping passes within easy range of land-based aircraft. But it is not merely a case of planes attacking vessels as they have done in the Persian Gulf Tanker War. Airpower in the form of fighters, Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft, Vertical/Short Take Off and Landing (V/STOL) machines, and helicopters must be employed to defend shipping from incoming air to surface (AS) and surface to surface (SS) missiles, from surface and submarine attack, from attack by land and sea-based aircraft, and from mines sewn in a variety of ways. These are demanding tasks, particularly at a time when the lessons of the past are being forgotten, when the peacetime and wartime organization of merchant shipping enjoys a low priority, and when threats to merchant ships are multiplying. The object of this paper is to examine the ways in which airpower can be used to combat those threats.

BACKGROUND

What is the nature and extent of the problem? It is self-evident -- yet bears repeating nonetheless -- that the global economy is overwhelmingly dependent on shipping. Over 99.5 percent of the world's trade is still carried by ships.¹ Seaborne traffic is the least expensive way of transporting large quantities of goods over great distances.² Compare, for example, the lift capabilities of the American C-5A Galaxy, one of the world's largest cargo planes, and the average merchant ship. The latter could carry the equivalent of 300 Galaxy cargoes.³

Currently, 400,000,000 gross tons of shipping appear on the world registers. Put another way that represents approximately 60,000 vessels of all sorts and sizes. At any one time, 15,000 of those ships are likely to be at sea. The magnitude of these numbers is more easily comprehended if we think of the fact that 800 ships per day pass through the Dover Straits.⁴

Most national economies are heavily reliant on merchant shipping. More than 70 percent of American trade goes by sea while the nation is obliged to import more than 90 percent of such vital materials as manganese and chrome.⁵ Japanese figures tell a tale of even greater dependency. Ninety-five percent of Japan's crude oil, iron ore, copper, tin, and soy bean comes from overseas while 100 percent of Japan's aluminum, nickel, coal, wool and cotton is introduced by ship.⁶ If we look at crude oil imports alone, we see that it would take over 1600 tankers, with a mean dead weight capacity of 150,000 tons, to meet Japan's annual needs.⁷ Fortunately for Japan (leaving aside the question of protection for a moment) her merchant fleet is huge. At the opposite end of the scale is Australia with only 100 merchant ships, a number just sufficient to meet her local and

overseas needs. As it is, only 3 percent of Australian export cargoes travel in Australian bottoms and thus the nation is acutely vulnerable to dislocations in world shipping.⁸

Wartime shipping needs are likely to be immense. If combat on the central front in Europe is of any duration it is likely that NATO will call upon upwards of 10,000 ships to sustain itself.⁹ One estimate suggests that there will be a requirement for 6000 round-trip journeys between North America and Europe in the first thirty days of fighting. What is more, the ships involved in such exercises are certain to be much bigger and more attractive targets than their World War I and II counterparts. Individual supertankers today can carry as much oil as an entire convoy forty-five years ago.¹⁰ Aerial protection of these resources is certain to be a vital (and arguably the paramount) ingredient in an allied victory.

WORLD WARS I AND II

The experience of two World Wars suggests unequivocally that the aerial protection of merchant shipping was and is supremely important. The allies did not initiate convoys until fairly late in World War I. The Germans declared unrestricted submarine warfare on 1 February 1917 over much of the Mediterranean and a vast area surrounding the British Isles. By April, the merchant shipping situation was desperate, one ship in four steaming into oblivion. The following month the convoy system was adopted and was fully operational by August.¹¹

Convoying is essentially defensive but this reality did not accord with the views of many Royal Navy officers who favoured the dash and élan of hunter-killer operations. While the latter may well have been congruent

with RN traditions, they proved totally useless in terms of destroying U-boats. There were, for instance, 50 destroyers, 50 torpedo boats, and some 500 auxiliary patrol vessels engaged in offensive operations against U-boats in the Bristol and English Channels in the early part of 1917, but while U-boats sank 100 ships of 500 tons and above during the period February to April, the British failed to sink a single submarine.¹² Indeed, as the Admiralty's Naval Staff History of the Second World War concluded, "the numerous hunting forces accounted altogether for [only] one U-boat [in the balance of the 1914-1918 war] and made no contribution to the defence of shipping".¹³

The same thing could certainly not be said about airpower. While the allied inventory of maritime airpower was motley (consisting as it did of aircraft, seaplanes, airships, and kite balloons; the last mentioned being towed astern of ships in a convoy) and lacking in the ability to destroy U-boats, it was mightily effective in protecting merchant shipping. During 1918 maritime airpower was engaged in over 7000 sorties in defence of convoys and only three ships were lost out of the tens of thousands convoyed. The history of the French coal trade convoys lends further support to these statistics. Out of the 39,352 vessels that sailed across the English Channel only 53 (0.14 percent) were lost when aircraft were present.

The fact that airpower had rendered convoys "virtually immune from successful attack" was soon forgotten.¹⁴ Most navalists and politicians in the interwar years succumbed to a fatal mixture of naivete and illogical thought. Although conveying had proven the most effective means to ensure safe passage and to destroy U-boats its value was largely overlooked. The

Royal Air Force not only controlled all maritime airpower until 1937, but it was mesmerized by the apparent effectiveness of bombing. Thus all long range aircraft were to be employed bombing European targets rather than protecting shipping. A further consequence of the bombing mentality was the argument (resonant of those in the nuclear age) that the destructive power of bombs would render future wars short. If, however, that were not the case, then there was no need for haste since prolonged conflict would give the combatants enough time to make up for their military deficiencies.¹⁵

For its part the Admiralty was forced to wrestle with pacifism and parsimony in the form of naval arms limitations and Treasury cheese-paring. Compounding the RN's unpreparedness was the mistaken belief that ASDIC had neutralized the submarine menace. Although 37 percent of U-boat attacks in Home Waters in the last nine months of World War I were on the surface, where ASDIC was ineffective, the Admiralty managed to convince itself by 1937 that submarine attack was a thing of the past.¹⁶ Furthermore, the RN had a fixation of its own: battleships. Despite the impending air and submarine revolutions, naval planners were still mesmerized by the battlefleet concept. As Roskill notes, the Fleet Air Arm, like the submarine and convoy escort, remained a poor relation of the big ship navy in the 1930s.¹⁷

The same sense of unreality prevailed in the merchant shipping realm. Ill-founded anti-convoy arguments began to re-surface in the interwar period and the Admiralty lacked the nerve needed to persuade ship owners as to the importance of peacetime convoy exercises. It followed, therefore, that there were no slow mercantile convoy exercises against submarines or air attack between 1919 and 1939.¹⁸ There was also a good deal of uncertainty in

official circles about equipping merchant men with defensive weaponry. Ship-owners bridled at the cost of installing weapons and questioned whether the legal status of their vessels would be altered to their detriment if arming took place. The Admiralty allowed itself to be drawn into fitting merchantmen with anti-aircraft guns even though a committee on anti-aircraft fire concluded that "the problem of the protection of merchant shipping from air attack [was] unsolved. Improvised methods of arming merchant ships with obsolete equipment are absolutely valueless".¹⁹ In the final analysis, it seems "that anti-aircraft guns were provided ... for three reasons -- because they were available, because of their morale effect, and because it was unthinkable that no attempt should be made to defend each individual ship against aircraft attack".²⁰ As it happened a defensive effect was achieved by inadvertence. Anti-aircraft weapons were almost worthless against air attack when merchant men sailed as independents, but the barrage effect of merchant vessels in a convoy was considerable.

It comes as no surprise that the British were almost completely unprepared to provide adequate protection for convoys on the eve of World War II. While their level of imports had risen since 1914, their merchant fleet had declined in size.²¹ Nevertheless, there were still likely to be 2500 British ships at sea at any one time. The Admiralty had about 150 ASDIC-equipped destroyers but half of these were World War I vessels in reserve and what ships there were were intended primarily for screening the Home Fleet. Air escort for convoys was in the words of one celebrated U-boat hunter, Captain Donald Macintyre, "virtually non-existent".²² RAF Coastal Command had a few squadrons of twin-engined Ansons with a range

of 510 miles and two squadrons of Sunderland flying boats with a range of 850 miles. However, there were no aircraft within the command designed or aircrews trained for anti-submarine work. North Sea reconnaissance against surface raiders rather than convoy protection was Coastal Command's primary concern.²³

Confused priorities and a lack of technical capability prevented the allies from coming to grips with the U-boat threat in the North Atlantic for more than three years. The RAF was committed to a policy of strategic bombing and argued that the production of bombers had to take precedence over the production of Very Long Range (VLR) anti-submarine aircraft for Coastal Command. Even if such aircraft had been available they would have contributed little since Coastal Command was committed to hunting for raiders: all this despite the fact that not a single raider was ever intercepted.²⁴ On the naval side, the RN was still seduced by the mystique of offensive operations. Convoying was perceived to be dull and unspectacular work. The lessons of World War I were conveniently forgotten and huge amounts of energy were expended on fruitless hunter-killer sweeps.

What few aircraft there were lacked the range, detection equipment, and destructive capability to locate and destroy U-boats. Technical breakthroughs began to occur in 1942 when aircraft equipped with improved surface scanning radar and Torpex filled, shallow-set, aerial depth charges drove U-boats deeper and deeper into the mid-Atlantic. There, south of Iceland and Greenland, was the infamous Black Pit, an area of ocean beyond the normal range of allied aircraft. Only two things could solve the problem of U-boats operating with impunity in the Black Pit, the provision of escort carriers and VLR aircraft.²⁵

In March 1941 the British Prime Minister, Sir Winston Churchill, ordered that priority be given to equipping merchant ships with catapults from which they could launch fighter aircraft against Focke-Wulf 200 and other enemy bombers attacking British shipping.²⁶ The result was the so-called CAM ship. There were never very many of them but ships like the Empire Lawrence, that sailed with the Russian convoy PQ16 in May 1942, did yeoman service, its lone Hawker Hurricane breaking up a German aerial attack before being shot down by overzealous merchant gunners.²⁷

But what was needed against the mass of German aircraft deployed in northern Norway was organic airpower on a large scale, the sort of convoy protection that only carriers could provide. The allies had conventional carriers but most of them were deployed in the Mediterranean and the Pacific. The escort carrier was the answer. The first of these, HMS Audacity was, ironically, a converted ex-German blockade runner. Escort carriers were inexpensive, unadorned vessels averaging 10-12,000 tons and carrying roughly thirty fighters. By the end of the war there were forty-one escort carriers in service. It was a Swordfish bi-plane from HMS Archer in May 1943 that had the distinction of being the first escort carrier aircraft to sink a German submarine, U-752. Interestingly enough the Swordfish employed an anti-tank rocket to hole the U-boat's pressure hull, thereby inaugurating the air to surface missile age in anti-submarine warfare.²⁸

There were sufficient YLR aircraft available by the autumn of 1942 to provide aerial protection for merchant men in the "Black Pit" but confused priorities meant that suitable aircraft were allocated to other commands.

Up to December 1942 there was only one squadron of six aircraft capable of anti-submarine operations in mid-Atlantic.²⁹ Although the figures vary from source to source it appears that there were approximately seventeen such aircraft by February 1943 and almost fifty by May of the same year. It was in that month that the U-boat war reached its climax and Admiral Doenitz withdrew his wolf packs from the North Atlantic temporarily.

An analysis of the Battle of the Atlantic demonstrates the supreme importance of providing aerial protection for convoys. Even during the first two years of the war when aircraft lacked the ability to detect surfaced U-boats electronically or to destroy them once they had been found no ship was lost in a convoy enjoying air escort. The efficacy of escort and support, as opposed to patrol (the aerial equivalent of sweeps by hunter-killer surface vessels), is revealed by the fact that one U-boat kill on patrol absorbed 4020 patrol hours while one kill on escort and support entailed only 160 hours in the air. Similarly, the number of maritime aircraft lost favoured convoy escort overwhelmingly. The number of aircraft lost per U-boat destroyed in transit area patrols was 7.66 times as great as the number lost in escort and support.³⁰

The overall statistics for the war are particularly telling. Of 2,353 merchant ships sunk between 1939 and 1945 in Home Waters and the Atlantic (including the Arctic, Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico) only 20 (1 percent) were sunk when ships in convoy enjoyed surface as well as air escort. The figure for convoys with surface escort alone is 691 (29 percent). "The loss rate for ships in convoy with air escort," the Admiralty postwar analysis concluded self-evidently, "was infinitesimal".³¹

If the aerial protection of merchant shipping conferred virtual immunity on convoys the reverse was true as the Japanese experience in World War II revealed. While so much of Japan's southeast Asian strategy was predicated on acquiring access to supplies of oil, rubber, tin, and other war matériels, almost no thought was devoted to the problem of how to transport those matériels back to the Japanese home islands. Like their RN counterparts, officers in the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) were blinded by the mystique of the offensive. Although the Japanese began the war with more than 2500 merchant ships (6,337,000 gross tons), there was no department responsible for the control and protection of commercial shipping.³² The IJN was fixated with offensive, Combined Fleet, operations and not with mundane ASW activities. What is particularly ironic is that the defeat of Japan was to a considerable degree the product of inadvertence. The Americans never developed a coherent anti-shipping campaign and yet 5 percent of the Allied naval and air effort in the Pacific theatre resulted in the fatal immobilization of the shipping on which the Japanese war effort depended.³³

The Japanese adopted convoying relatively late in the war and the forces allocated to convoy protection were "ill-equipped, untrained and unco-ordinated."³⁴ Even more fundamental for our purposes was the fact that the Japanese consistently failed to employ aircraft to protect their convoys. Under the circumstances there could be only one outcome, the near total destruction of Japan's merchant fleet. Whereas the Allied loss rate in the Atlantic theatre was 0.2 percent, or one ship in 500, the Japanese loss rate was catastrophic. Of 10,000,000 gross registered tons the Japanese lost 8,900,000 g.r.t.³⁵

THE POSTWAR PERIOD: 1945-1975

The post-World War II period was characterized by a considerable degree of strategic uncertainty about the value of naval forces, an overall decline in their numbers, and a rapid rate of technological change. The advent of the atomic bomb and American nuclear experiments at Bikini Atoll in 1946 suggested that capital ships were highly vulnerable and that convoys in the future would need to be widely dispersed. There were some who wondered whether navies were likely to play any role at all in short-lived atomic confrontations. This uncertainty was captured by the British White Paper in 1957 which announced that the role of naval forces in total war was problematic.³⁶ Compounding the problem for navalists in the United States was the postwar debate as to whether or not the USAF could do the job better than the navy. Was there any need for a navy when B-36 bombers could deliver atomic bombs anywhere in the world? If bombers could do the job and if wars were to be measured in days what was the purpose of navies, convoys, and maritime airpower?³⁷

Even if this debate had not taken place the realities of postwar economics were sufficient to ensure that most of the world's navies shrank following the cessation of hostilities. The principal victims, in the long haul, were aircraft carriers and seaborne fixed wing aircraft. Even the United States Navy was not immune to these developments. In April 1949 the US Congress authorized the laying down of the United States, a 75,000 ton aircraft carrier. Five days after the keel was set in place the project was cancelled, the victim of inter-service rivalry.³⁸ The Korean War came to the USN's rescue, once again highlighting the versatility and self-sustaining strengths of aircraft carriers. The turnaround occasioned by the

war is illustrated by the fact that in 1951 the USS Forrestal, an 1100 foot, 78,000 ton carrier was authorized, thereby setting in train a building programme which would bring American carrier fortunes to their zenith in 1962 with seven attack, three Midway, and eight modernized Essex-class carriers.³⁹

The principal developments in the technical realm were dramatic changes in submarine design, the marriage of helicopter and small ship, and the appearance of maritime missile systems. By 1950 the USSR was reported to have 300 submarines and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) became the principal concern of NATO navies. At the same time helicopter technology had improved sufficiently that helicopters began to assume a greater and greater ASW role. The first Royal Navy ASW helicopter squadron (845) with variable depth or "dunking" sonar was formed in 1954 and the first ship/helicopter combination in the RN became operational in 1965 when HMS Leander put to sea with a Wasp helicopter on board.⁴⁰

In Winton's estimation the seagoing helicopter "proved a life line for the [Royal] Navy".⁴¹ The 1957 White Paper had made no mention of the use of Fighter Command in providing aerial protection for coastal merchant shipping and the CVA 01 aircraft carrier project, authorized by parliament in the early 1960s, was in danger of collapse. Like the Canadians in 1969 and the Australians in 1982, the British were finding carriers too expensive to build and maintain. Like their colleagues in the RCN and RAN, aircraft carrier proponents in the RN allowed themselves to be painted into a corner, to concede ground to their critics to the point where the true strengths of aircraft carriers were lost sight of. The Admiralty committed "a major strategic blunder" by arguing that the real value of carriers was conducting limited operations east of Suez.⁴² The government of the day cut the ground

out from under the RN by announcing Britain's withdrawal from east of Suez. There were still three front line carriers available but they were expected to be phased out in the 1970s while land-based aircraft and seagoing helicopters made up for the lack of a Fleet Air Arm.

While these changes were occurring the verities of convoy operations and of aerial protection for merchant men were being forgotten; notwithstanding the fact that the maritime environment was becoming more dangerous and unpredictable. In the early 1960s the Russians began to equip their burgeoning nuclear submarine fleet with sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs).⁴³ They also began to build up their long range naval airforce, consisting primarily of TU-16 Badger bombers, with a range of 2000 miles and standoff weapons, and TU-95 four-engined turbo-prop Bears. These aircraft were capable of operating far out to sea and the advent of airborne, surface, and sub-surface missile systems highlighted the need for increased AEW, ASW, and strike aircraft at a time when escort carriers were a thing of the past and the days of fleet carriers were numbered.

Even the USN was in trouble. In 1965 the Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, decided to let the ranks of American carriers decline without replacement. But hardly had the decision been made than those same carriers became more deeply involved in the Vietnam War. By 1967 McNamara had changed his mind and approved the construction of three nuclear-powered Nimitz-class supercarriers.⁴⁴ It was in that same year that the naval community was alarmed by news that the Egyptians, employing fast Soviet Komar missile boats, had knocked out the Israeli destroyer Elath. Once again critics of carriers asked whether these huge vessels were merely

sitting ducks, costly invitations to attack. The British were able to deflect such concerns by an elaborate sleight of hand, the through deck cruiser. Arguing that this aircraft carrier was not a carrier but a command cruiser, they fought off bitter attacks by the RAF and convinced parliament in 1973 to authorize HMS Invincible.⁴⁵ A particularly important feature of this 16,000 ton vessel was its inventory of five Sea Harriers, 650 knot fighter/reconnaissance/strike V/STOL aircraft. Not only did Sea Harriers bring fixed wing aircraft back to sea but they opened the way for a range of fairly novel deployments. The other frontline aircraft carried aboard Invincible were Sea King helicopters. These were all-weather, hunter-killer, anti-submarine machines with radar, sonar, homing torpedoes, and/or depth charges.

Invincible gave the RN a further lease on life in terms of organic air power but the basic problem was that Britain's aging fleet of carriers and America's carrier battle groups (CVBG) were not intended primarily as convoy protection systems. The former were expected to operate in Home Waters in the company of shore-based aircraft while the latter were designed to carry the battle into the enemy camp with forward deployments that would allow carrier resources to neutralize efforts to turn the flank of the central front or to destroy Soviet ballistic missile submarines.⁴⁶ There was a decided dearth of evidence in the postwar period about the value of air power for protecting merchant shipping. However, air power came to be used in somewhat unexpected ways in the mid-1970s when American RH-53D Sea Stallion helicopters afforded protection to merchant vessels by sweeping Haiphong harbour and the approaches to the Suez Canal for mines.⁴⁷

ARAPAHO and SCS

Despite the proven value of World War II escort carriers in terms of providing convoy air cover the concept of the "cheap" carrier has never enjoyed much currency in the post-war period. There have, however, been periodic attempts to revive the concept in the form of Project Arapaho, the Sea Control Ship or SCS, and the CVV or small aircraft carrier.⁴⁸ Writing in the Military Review in 1988, Major Scott Conrad described the Arapaho concept succinctly. Arapaho "is an exciting but virtually ignored Navy concept to quickly (within a matter of hours) outfit idle container ships with fully operational aviation facilities. It calls for modifying portions of the cargo deck with a readily installable flight deck and containers sized to commercial standards".⁴⁹ The host ship would generally retain 70 percent of its cargo-carrying capacity while the remainder would be taken up with containers serving as hangars for helicopters or VSTOL aircraft, command, control, and communications (C³) spaces, fuel storage facilities, and so forth. The United States Navy conducted comprehensive sea trials of an Arapaho vessel in October 1982 and these trials were reported to be successful. For some reason, though, the concept does not appear to have been developed beyond this point.⁵⁰

Similarly, the SCS concept was short-lived. During his period as Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt (1970-1974), advanced the idea of a high-low mix of shipping for the USN. At the "low" end of the scale were to be relatively inexpensive SCS, mini-carriers or escort carriers by another name. The vessels Zumwalt envisioned were to be roughly 17,000 ton, 600 foot, gas turbine ships carrying 14 SH-3 helicopters and 3 Harrier V/STOL aircraft. Each SCS would cost about \$100 million, or one-eighth the

cost of a nuclear powered carrier.⁵¹ What made Arapaho or SCS-style ships so valuable was the fact that they were capable of providing merchant men with aerial surveillance. As Klippert notes, aviation is vital to anti-aircraft warfare (AAW), AEW, and electronic surveillance (ESM) because sensors are limited to line of sight.⁵² Sensors on the masts of surface vessels cannot hope to pick up incoming sea skimmers until they are in the terminal stages of their flight paths. Airborne platforms enable convoys not only to see over the horizon but to vector defensive weapons at distant enemy targets. The US Congress, however, was not stirred by these arguments and in 1974 it deleted all funding for the SCS programme.

Congress also considered during its 1978 debates the possibility of building CVVs. These would have been 25-40,000 ton vessels operating conventional and V/STOL aircraft in order to guard SLOCs in the Atlantic and the Pacific. However, as the debate unfolded CVV proponents gradually increased the size of their ship to the point where real or imaginary cost effectiveness arguments were undercut.⁵³

AIR LESSONS OF THE FALKLANDS

In much the same way that the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) was the first modern steam and steel naval war so the Falklands war in 1982 was the first large-scale maritime testing ground for missile-electronic combat. Like the Russo-Japanese war the Falklands was productive of a substantial number of "lessons", many of them old truths re-learned or redefined. First and foremost of these was the need for organic air power.⁵⁴ While there are those who will argue that the Falklands War was aberrational in maritime terms and that navies like the RN are almost certain to conduct their

business in years to come under an umbrella of land-based air cover, there are others who will argue persuasively that such air cover is sorely overrated. Australian defence policy, for example, is predicated on the availability of such air power but the location of airfields, the availability and capability of aircraft, and the problem of transit times make it doubtful whether the RAAF will ever be able to perform a significant maritime air defence role.⁵⁵

The British would have lost the Falklands War without organic air power. As it was they were pitifully short of planes. The Ark Royal with its high performance Phantoms and AEW Gannets had been laid up in 1978 and the RN lacked the ideal mix of vessels particularly if, in the parlance of the day, it had to operate "out of theatre." In Braybrook's estimation "the great success story of the air war" in the South Atlantic was the V/STOL Sea Harrier.⁵⁶ Like the Americans today, who lack sufficient air wings to man all of their carriers, the British did not have sufficient aircraft for the task (p.280). Twenty-eight Sea Harriers were sent to the South Atlantic while four were kept back for pilot training in the United Kingdom. A further fourteen RAF GR3 Harriers were hastily modified for maritime service but they lacked the Sea Harrier's intercept radar and thus had to be confined to ground attack roles.

The carriers Hermes and Invincible normally carried five Sea Harriers each but at one stage the former had 21 fixed wing aircraft on board. The ski-jump decks on these vessels enabled the Harriers to take off with heavy payloads but prevented the elderly Gannets from being used if they could have been pressed into service for AEW. What AEW there was was largely makeshift. Sea King helicopters were fitted with search radar but most of

the AEW appears to have been achieved with Harrier pilots on picket station, 200 n.m. from the fleet, sighting enemy aircraft visually. While this system worked remarkably well under the circumstances the lack of wide-ranging AEW was a major liability for the British armada.⁵⁷

On the other hand the amazing endurance, versatility, and reliability of British aircraft was a source of tremendous strength. Sea King helicopters served in a vast number of roles, frequently in appalling flying conditions (visibility beneath 1/8 n.m. and ceiling below 100 feet), and yet achieved very high degrees of availability. Similarly, despite almost 1900 sorties, the Harriers had an 80 percent availability rate. Their AIM 9L Sidewinder missiles achieved an 88 percent success rate, knocking out 24 Argentinian aircraft. Robustness in a harsh environment rather than sophistication appears to have been one of the more important lessons of the war.⁵⁸

Of particular relevance to the issue of the aerial protection of merchant ships was the role played by commercial vessels in the conflict. A total of 56 merchant men, ranging from the 67,107 GRT liner Queen Elizabeth to the 5463 GRT Ro-Ro vessel Elk, were pressed into service and nine of them were fitted with helicopter landing facilities.⁵⁹ One ship in particular, the 14,946 GRT Cunard Ro-Ro cargo ship Atlantic Conveyor, is of interest because she was fitted with a 50 x 80 foot operating pad forward from which she flew the Harriers (as well as Chinook and Wessex helicopters) that she had transported to the South Atlantic in make-shift "hangers" between her containers. Like the Sheffield, the Atlantic Conveyor was the victim of an Argentinian Exocet missile. The loss of these vessels gave rise to a not altogether justified Exocet panic.⁶⁰ Cassandra's maintained that the day of

the surface ship was at an end. More important for our purposes was the fact that an Arapaho-style configuration was possible if helicopters and VSTOL aircraft were available. Further the loss of these ships highlighted the need for Close In Weapons Systems (CIWS) of the Gatling gun/chaff variety since no convoy is ever likely to enjoy one hundred percent aerial protection from incoming missiles.

THE TANKER WAR

The so-called Tanker War in the Persian Gulf is the latest illustration of the need for aerial protection of merchant shipping although the results are not as categorical as air exponents might have liked. The Tanker War was, in the words of one commentator, "a mere sideshow" to the prolonged and bloody Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988).⁶¹ At the beginning of the Iran-Iraq conflict the Iranian airforce was much more powerful than its Iraqi counterpart but politically motivated purges and a lack of spare parts contributed to the steady decline in the effectiveness of the Iranian airforce.⁶² By way of contrast, the Iraqi airforce grew in size and confidence over the years, embarking on the Tanker War in 1981 in a campaign of "economic attrition and political intimidation".⁶³ The Iraqi's continued their attacks on Iranian shipping for three years without Iranian response. However, in May 1984 Iran began to respond though its modus operandi was different. Whereas almost all of Iraq's targets (75 percent of which have been tankers or product carriers) were hit by aircraft missiles (mostly Exocets), the Iranians, lacking suitable anti-ship missiles, attacked with frigate gunfire, helicopters, land-based missiles and rocket propelled grenades from high speed surface craft.⁶⁴

The penultimate year of the war provides us with a number of useful examples of air power at work in the defence of merchant shipping. On 17 May 1988 an Iraqi missile struck the USS Stark FFG-31. Leaving aside the thorny issue of rules of engagement, the attack on the Stark revealed how vulnerable even a warship with a complete suite of radar and CIWS can be to incoming missiles when the lack of effective AEW gives the crew only 120 seconds to react.⁶⁵ Later the same year (21 September) US frigate-based MH-6 Army Special Operations helicopters attacked and captured an Iranian land craft, the Iran Air, laying mines in one of the merchant shipping seaways. Shortly thereafter Saudi fighter planes and naval forces drove off sixty Iranian speedboats while on 8 October MH-6 helicopters from an American frigate attacked four Iranian speedboats.

It is hard to assess the overall effectiveness of this sort of air cover since O'Rourke's calculations suggest that only one or two percent of Gulf shipping has ever come under attack and many of the attacks inflicted relatively minor damage.⁶⁶ The Tanker War was as much a political as a military exercise, and had it been prosecuted more aggressively by both sides and had American involvement extended over a longer period the relationship between aerial protection and successful passage might have been more clearly established.

THE PROBLEM

The aerial protection of merchant shipping in the foreseeable future is likely to be determined by the unfolding of naval strategy on a grand scale. Currently NATO's primary maritime objective is the defence of North Atlantic SLOCs in time of war. The principal threat to those SLOCs is seen

to be Soviet attack and cruise missile submarines, as well as land-based, long-range naval aviation.⁶⁷ It follows from this threat assessment that these forces need to be bottled up, to be prevented from reaching the North Atlantic. The resulting Forward Strategy developed by the USN in the 1980s called for the creation of a barrier across the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) gap and aggressive operations in the Norwegian Sea designed to destroy Soviet surface forces and neutralize Russian SSBNs in their White Sea redoubt. The barrier would consist of SOSUS sea floor acoustic monitoring devices, long-range anti-submarine patrols by RN Nimrod and USN P-3C Orion aircraft, and American submarine patrols. The advance into the Norwegian Sea in times of hostility would be carried out by American CVBGs with NATO naval support.

This "best defence is offense" argument has been the subject of intense debate recently. In the first place the Forward Strategy is predicated on the assumption the CVBGs can be moved into position with sufficient rapidity to intervene in the anticipated manner in times of crisis. As a subset of this concern are anxieties that such a move would be seen as an exercise in provocation rather than in resolution; stimulating confrontation rather than conciliation on the part of the Soviets. A second major concern is that even if the CVBGs were successful in defeating Soviet naval forces in the Norwegian Sea they would not necessarily be able to prevent attacks on NATO SLOCs farther to the south. And if the CVBGs fell victim to Soviet air and sea power the SLOCs would be left almost unguarded.⁶⁸

Overarching these issues is a larger geo-political reality. As a result of technical changes over the past decade the barrier has been transformed into a bastion. The enhanced sophistication, range, and

survivability of Soviet SSBNs like the Deltas and Typhoons (the latter configured for under-ice operations) with their SS-N-20s (with a range of 8300 km) mean that there is less and less need for the Russians to move into the Atlantic. Far from preventing the Russians from getting out, the problem, increasingly, will be how NATO can get into the Norwegian Sea. And if NATO does get in, at what point might the nuclear threshold be crossed. No one knows how many SSBNs the Soviets would be prepared to lose before conventional conflict escalated to all out nuclear war.⁶⁹ If that threshold were crossed the whole question of SLOC security and the aerial protection of merchant shipping might very well become academic.

The same issues obtain to a large degree in the Northwest Pacific in terms of the barrier/bastion reversal and the escalatory dynamic of the Forward Strategy. A significant difference between the North Atlantic and the North Pacific, however, is the likely absence of major wartime convoys in the latter. Nevertheless the two oceans are linked intimately by virtue of a corollary of the Forward Strategy, namely, horizontal escalation.⁷⁰ The horizontal escalation concept calls for the major diversion of Soviet military might from the Central front by the opening up of a second theatre of conflict in the North Pacific. Recognition of this reality and concern about the growth of the maritime element of the Japanese Self Defence Force has encouraged the Soviets to continue with the quantitative and qualitative build up of their Pacific Fleet.

The Pacific Fleet is now the largest numerically of the four Soviet fleets and is second only to the Northern Fleet in fire power. At the heart of both fleets are the SSBN forces and the primary role of both fleets is to protect those strategic resources. In the northwest Pacific the Soviets are

able to shelter their SSBNs within the Sea of Japan and the Sea of Okhotsk and the island barriers which made exit for them so difficult before now inhibit American egress. A close examination of the Pacific fleet inventory and land-based Soviet naval aviation (SNA) indicates that the Russians have created a formidable force designed to defend SSBN bastions and search out and destroy American CVBGs.⁷¹

The most significant additions to the Pacific Fleet surface forces in the next decade are likely to be two 65,000 ton Soviet aircraft carriers. The first, the Tbilisi (previously the Leonid Brezhnev) is now fitting out at the Nikolayev shipyard on the Black Sea and is expected to begin sea trials in 1989. Allied intelligence estimates suggest that for the moment the Tbilisi's naval aviation capabilities are distinctly limited by Western standards. The lack of catapults and arrestor gear and the presence of an Invincible-style ski-jump indicate that the Tbilisi is likely to carry upwards of 50 Short Take Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) (possibly YAK-41s) and 20 ASW/missile targetting helicopters.⁷² Several high performance, fixed-wing aircraft are being evaluated now at the Saki naval aviation test centre in the Crimea and it appears as if the Mach 2, SU-27 Flanker is the most likely candidate for a reconfigured Tbilisi. However, until such time as Flankers are added to the carrier's inventory she will be no match even for Third World fighters.⁷³

The Tbilisi is illustrative of a gradual Russian shift away from ASW to surface action and this trend is further reinforced by the deployment of powerful Kivov and Slava-class cruisers with long-range anti-ship missiles. At the same time Pacific Fleet SSNs are being fitted out with SS-N-21s, 1600 n.m. cruise missiles with nuclear (and no doubt later, fuel-air explosive)

warheads.⁷⁴ These missiles are intended to offset the advantage the Americans have enjoyed since 1984 with their Tomahawk SLCM. In addition, the Soviets have been installing SS-N-12 anti-ship cruise missiles on their 13 Echo II class boats and introducing Oscar class SSGNs to their anti-ship forces.

A 23 percent increase in the number of SNA aircraft has been reported since 1981 with more and better machines coming into service.⁷⁵ While the SNA is still overwhelmingly land-based it is capable of projecting power far out to sea. The most recent addition to the SNA is the Blackjack which has a 4000 n.m. combat radius, a supersonic dash speed of Mach 2, electronic warfare (EW) and electronic intelligence (ELINT) capability, and 12 stand-off cruise missiles. Thus Blackjack has a substantially greater range than the swingwing TU-76 Backfire and carries six times the number of missiles, an inventory sufficient to provide the sort of saturation needed to defeat CVBG defences.⁷⁶ De Cunha reckons that Pacific Fleet SNA is likely to have thirty Blackjacks by the mid-1990s and that they will be in the van of some 200 missile-equipped aircraft, including Backfires, TU-95 Bears, and TU-16 Badgers, directed primarily against American CVBGs beyond Tomahawk range.

Bears and Badgers come in a wide variety of classes and modifications but their primary task is reconnaissance, real time monitoring, and ASW. Soviet offensive policy calls for the orchestration of combined arms in a massive response designed to overwhelm opponents. As a corollary the Russians have organized attack and reconnaissance functions in depth. Thus the TU-95 Bears, with operational ranges in excess of 4000 n.m., constitute the outer reconnaissance tier with ELINT, COMINT and missile control

capability.⁷⁷ Bears also have their own anti-ship missiles (SS-N-12s and SS-N-19s). Complementing the Bears are the intermediate range 2000 n.m. Badgers and the short range 1000 n.m. BE-12 Mall flying boats. The BE-12s are intended to provide surveillance of the Seas of Japan and Okhotsk and assist other Soviet units in the early decapitation of Japanese maritime forces. These Soviet elements, in turn, are reinforced by the presence of IL-76 Mainstay AWACs-style AEW aircraft and RORSAT oceanic surveillance satellites.⁷⁸

Where does this leave merchant shipping? Almost all of the contemporary literature deals with the threat to CVBGs and ignores the issue of merchant shipping. What evidence there is, however, is not particularly reassuring. Hitherto CVBGs have been utilized to project power rather than to protect SLOCs. Some would argue that success in the first confers success in the second but this may not be the case. Certainly there is little tradition of CVBGs providing close in convoy support and the loss of CVBGs would leave convoys dangerously exposed to torpedo, SLCM, and airborne anti-ship missile attack. Although the evidence of World Wars I and II is unequivocal there is still far too little attention being paid to the realities of convoying, particularly at a time when bigger ships mean that an enemy must deal with fewer targets and when increasingly specialized ships imply specialized port facilities and thus less room for muddling through.⁷⁹ Furthermore, as Williams and others have indicated repeatedly, any future conflict is almost certain to be a "come as you are" war when there will be almost no time to improvise protective systems for convoys.

SOME ANSWERS

All of the above may appear unnecessarily gloomy. Those nations likely to be engaged in conflict with the Soviet Union (if that is, for sake of argument, the opponent) have an impressive inventory of maritime power of their own. The Americans have 12 or 14 or 15 aircraft carriers (depending on the vagaries of presidential and congressional politics during the next decade) with immensely powerful airwings.⁸⁰ Complementing this organic air power of F-14 fighters and A-3 AEW aircraft are AWACs Airborne Warning and Control aircraft of the sort that the Americans operate out of Iceland and the Saudis, assisted by the Americans and backed by American F-15s, operate over the Persian Gulf. AWACs are capable of surveying very large areas and tracking multiple targets, but as Sokolsky argues, the loss of a single AWAC can leave a major gap in AEW defenses.⁸¹

Of equal importance in terms of the provision of aerial protection are long-range maritime patrol aircraft like the Lockheed P-3C Orion. The Orion is the primary ASW aircraft of the USN and of the Australian, Canadian, Japanese and Netherland navies. It has proven to be a highly successful weapon system but of late questions have been raised about the P-3C's survivability in a wartime environment particularly at a time when it seems likely that submarines may come to be fitted with their own surface to air missile (SAM) systems.⁸² Orions and Nimrods are also vulnerable to attack by enemy aircraft and the destruction of enemy aircraft by NATO fighters gives us an idea of the layered effect of aerial protection for merchant shipping; that is to say that the fighters act at one remove protecting the Orions that isolate the submarines that endanger surface vessels.

Since 1981 the Japanese have taken over a larger share of defending the Japanese home islands and providing protection out to 1000 n.m. from their coasts primarily along the Ryukyu chain, the archipelago paralleling some of Japan's main SLOCs.⁸³ In view of the growth of the SNA and the existence of large numbers of Russian attack submarines in the Northwest Pacific AAW, AEW, and ASW have taken on a new importance for the Japanese Self-Defence Forces, working within the overall framework of American strategy. Over-extended as they are, the Americans are anxious for the Japanese to bear a greater share of the regional defence burden. However, while the maritime element of the JSDF is probably the world's sixth or seventh largest naval force it lacks the ability to provide adequate air cover over its area of responsibility.⁸⁴ This year the Japanese announced their intention to acquire a light carrier and quite possibly Russian naval exercises in the Sea of Japan -- in which shipping was subject to fierce air attack -- was designed to deliver a message to the Japanese Diet. Whatever the case, simulations of a war with the Soviet Union suggest that Japanese SD Forces would be severely worsted and thus the whole question of allied ability to protect merchant shipping in wartime is difficult to answer with assurance.⁸⁵

CONCLUSION

Where does all this leave us? What does twentieth century naval history tell us about the aerial protection of merchant shipping? At the heart of the matter is a perceptual problem. Since the Russo-Japanese War

navalists have been captivated by battle ships, aircraft carriers, submarines and maritime missile systems. These weapons are offensive in nature. Convoys are defensive and thus ipso facto of a lesser order of importance. And yet global warfare (provided it is of any duration) is by definition maritime. Convoying will be central to any prolonged conflict and the ability of land, sea, and air forces to function will depend upon the successful movement of goods along SLOCs. And yet western armed forces, who are overwhelmingly dependent on commercial shipping for the transport of their men and matériel, appear to be strangely indifferent to the axioms of convoying.

World War I and II demonstrated unequivocally that aerial protection was the key to successful convoying. The concern of western navies, however, is with offensive operations. No provision has been made for modern equivalents of escort carriers. The Arapaho concept, a sophisticated elaboration on CAM ships, appears to have been shelved, the lessons of the Falklands War notwithstanding. One even hears of plans to patrol SLOCs offensively, an approach totally discredited in both wars. What one needs to do is patrol ships not oceans.

Thus the outlook is not promising. Modern missiles, aircraft, and submarines demand the presence of a wide range of organic airborne capabilities if convoys are to be protected. These capabilities are present in CVBGs but they are going after targets leaving merchant ships without the sort of aerial protection they so richly deserve.

ENDNOTES

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6th International Conference on
the Security of Sea Lanes of Communication

TECHNIQUES FOR ENSURING SLOC SECURITY
IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

THE NUCLEAR FREE ZONE EFFECT

by

W.T. Roy

Southern Cross Hotel
Melbourne, Australia
11-13 October, 1988

THE SOUTH PACIFIC NUCLEAR FREE ZONE AND REGIONAL SECURITY

(With Special reference to Sea Lanes of Communication)

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Sixth International Conference on the Security of Sea Lanes
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THE SOUTH PACIFIC NUCLEAR FREE ZONE AND REGIONAL SECURITY

(With Special reference to Sea Lanes of Communication)

The security concerns of any specific region of the world can be studied usefully only in the context of contemporary global power patterns and alignments. At present the dominant feature of the global pattern is the ongoing rivalry between two superpowers, each heavily armed with nuclear weapons, and the simultaneous existence of at least three other powers with similar capabilities of a lesser, but still significant, degree. Periodically, one or other of the major rivals exhibits a flash of sweet reasonableness, which holds promise of scaling down the intensity of competition. The most recent instance of this is a Soviet proposal to withdraw from Vietnamese facilities in exchange for a similar abandonment by the USA. of its bases in the Philippines. However, the question arises immediately of whether such a proposal is indeed evidence of voluntary modification of the proposer's position, in the interests of promoting harmonious relations, or whether instead it is tantamount to an admission of lack of capability to sustain its existing position. Proceeding from this to a more general proposition concerning the nature of superpower status, it seems evident that, in its ideal form, such status requires the capability to project its presence ubiquitously, without fear of being baulked or pre-empted by its opponent. However, this ideal has never been fulfilled. Indeed, the record of superpower confrontation after the end of the Second World War has several examples of each of them imposing on itself a self-denying ordinance, with respect to a specific region, which it assumes to be of vital concern to the other. For example, clandestine subversion aside, Soviet abstinence from maintaining a forward presence in Latin America is matched by

America's lack of influence in Eastern Europe. In short, a state of mutually observed standoffs prevails. The only conditions in which this status quo is likely to be altered is if one of the powers detects a decline in the capability or will of the other to maintain its special position in what was, until then, an uncontested region, and considers that exploiting this opportunity to alter the balance of influence in its own favour is worth the risk. So far this has not happened, unless the Cuban missile crisis is read as an historical example of a miscalculated attempt by the Soviets to carry out just such an exercise, only to discover that the risk to itself had been gravely underestimated, thus forcing its withdrawal from an unexpectedly untenable position.

If we apply this theoretical construct to the South Pacific region, it is historically evident that it has hitherto had all the characteristics of being an American lake, although that power's influence has been indirectly exerted, largely through surrogates in the ANZUS alliance system. Evidence of this can be found in the virtual absence hitherto of any Soviet naval surface craft¹ in the area, notwithstanding that much of it consists of recognised international waters. Hence, the South Pacific cannot be regarded as an arena of superpower confrontation. Further, if it is agreed that the term 'Nuclear Free' is a synonym for 'Nuclear Weapons Free', then the South Pacific has always been deserving of being thus designated. None of its states has the technology to produce such weapons, nor do they store them on behalf of states that have. It may well be enquired then, why South Pacific states found it necessary to declare their region a Nuclear Free Zone (NFZ), when it already enjoyed that status de facto, and also was not an arena of superpower competition.

The answer clearly is that this happy state of affairs was perceived by South Pacific states as having no guaranteed permanence, and further that it was already threatened by foreseeable events in the near future. Perhaps the most important of these is the renegotiation in 1991 of the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, which internationalized and denuclearized the South Polar continent. This event alone may be the harbinger of international rivalries being transferred to what is currently a NFZ. To better comprehend these South Pacific concerns, it is advisable to consider briefly the origins of the SPNFZ, formally established on 6 August 1985 by the Treaty of Rarotonga, and also the motives and policies of its two major signatories - Australia and New Zealand.

ORIGINS OF THE SPNFZ

Precedents for NFZs are not new, but they seldom got past the stage of proposals and discussions, which led to nothing because of persistent suspicion of each other among prospective participants. Indeed, the postwar European scene is littered with the remains of aborted initiatives for the setting up of such zones.² Nevertheless, by coincidence, the only two NFZs that did come to fruition are contiguous to the SPNFZ. The first in Antarctica (1959), and the other is the Latin American NFZ set up by the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1967. In fact, the latter was not only something of an inspiration to Pacific states, but provided a convenient model, even down to the inclusion of Protocols,³ which nuclear powers were invited to sign and ratify to indicate their willingness to underwrite the non-nuclear states of the Zone.

Notwithstanding this encouraging example, and an early attempt in 1975 by New Zealand, Fiji and Papua New Guinea to get UN support for a NFZ, nothing practical was to take place until, in 1983 and 1984 respectively, Australia and New Zealand elected Labour governments that are still (1988) in office. Since both Labour Parties have, in varying degrees, long advocated the creation of an NFZ, the time was ripe to try to implement this resolve. Fortunately for both parties (and governments), Australia and New Zealand were members of the South Pacific Forum, which provided them with a readily available venue to muster support for the scheme.

The South Pacific Forum emerged first as an addendum, and then as an alternative to the South Pacific Commission's annual Conference. It represented the interests of Pacific states, which shortly before had been colonies of the metropolitan powers, that were the founders and movers of the South Pacific Commission. With the rapid progress of decolonization in the South Pacific, the Forum soon superseded the Commission and its Conference in importance. Further, through its annual meeting, it provided a convenient venue for initiating detailed discussion by a working party of the NFZ proposal. The resultant draft Treaty was tabled at the 1985 meeting of the Forum, held in the Cook Islands, and duly signed by all those present excepting Vanuatu, Tonga,⁴ and the Solomon Islands. Ratifications followed at varying intervals.

The determinants of the willing support of South Pacific island status also bear examination. In the first place, though newly emerged from colonial states, and palpably affected by feelings of revived ethnonationalism, they shared common problems of remoteness,

poverty, overpopulation and unemployment - all of which made them in a measure dependent on the developed economies of Australia and New Zealand, as donors of aid and Meccas for emigrants from the islands. Further, most of the new indigenous régimes (again Vanuatu excepted) were based on hereditary chiefly traditions and consequently tended to be conservative. If we add to this the factor of religiosity, which is endemic to most island populations, it is easy to see why (unlike other Third World States - say in Africa) the Pacific states have a marked tendency to lean towards the Western world, particularly as embodied in neighbouring Australia and New Zealand.

However, there is one notable exception to this preference for the West, and that is France. Of all former colonial powers in the Pacific, France alone clings grimly to the role of metropolitan overlord of far-flung territories. Notwithstanding French assertions that their system is not a colonial one, but based on the concept of a Union of all Francophone territories, with representation in the metropolis, the other Pacific states remain unimpressed. The confrontational situation that exists between settlers and indigènes in New Caledonia has attracted widespread support for the Kanak cause among Pacific states. Nevertheless, the main concern with a continuing French presence in the Pacific is not political, but environmental, and is related to their long continuing series of nuclear tests on their island territories of Mururoa and Fangataufa. Admittedly, tests are no longer atmospheric ones, following a successful action in 1974 by Australia and New Zealand in the World Court. Nonetheless, large numbers of the ordinary populations of the South Pacific (including Australia and New Zealand) remain unconvinced by French assurances that radiation hazards are minimal and

environmental pollution and destruction non-existent. Ironically, these French assertions are verified in an independent report prepared by the New Zealand Radiation Laboratory after extensive field tests at Mururoa.⁵ The successful French sabotage of the Greenpeace flagship Rainbow Warrior in Auckland harbour (10 July 1985), and the subsequent fracas between New Zealand and France over the fates of two captured French agents, did little to enhance the French image in the South Pacific. Hence, almost in spite of herself, France has served as a focus of disapproval or even hate, and unwittingly proved a catalyst that has strengthened the sometimes fragile bonds that unite the scattered micro-states of the SPNFZ.

Finally, there is another bonding factor impelling South Pacific states to hang together in the SPNFZ. This is the appearance of Soviet influence in the South Pacific, which is regarded as unwelcome or even threatening. Admittedly, so far the Soviet presence has not been a military one, but in the form of fishing fleets, commercial vessels (both freight and passenger) and oceanographic survey ships. However, what SPNFZ governments find disturbing is the attempt to penetrate the nascent Trade Union movement in the region by seeking affiliations of island unions to the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), which is Soviet controlled through its headquarters in Prague. Again, Gorbachev's celebrated Vladivostok speech (July 1986), giving notice of increased Soviet interest in the Pacific, reinforced by similar comments by Foreign Minister Shevernadze in Canberra (4 March 1987) do little to reassure basically conservative populations about Soviet intentions. Even though the US has won no approval because of its failure to condemn French nuclear testing, to control only tardily the alleged deprivations of its tuna fishing fleet, and refusing to

sign the relevant Protocols of the Treaty of Rarotonga, it still remains the less feared and disliked of the two superpowers. In fact, one hope of the signatories is that the very existence of the SPNFZ will in some way induce the two antagonists to carry out their confrontations elsewhere.

Perhaps the enthusiasm of the Australian and New Zealand governments for the SPNFZ needs to be explained. It would be too simple to suggest that a strong thread of pacifist ideology runs through all Labour governments in the Western world, and that Australia and New Zealand are no exception. If anything, the quite considerable support for anti-nuclear policies among their mass populaces can be attributed to a relatively new phenomenon - this is the so-called 'Peace Movement'. It is demonstrable that the original role model was the British CND. However, with the passage of time, a strange metamorphosis has taken place in the movement in its antipodean habitat. First of all, it has embraced a variety of causes, some of which have little relation to the original concerns of CND. Examples of preferred causes are political independence for New Caledonia, the abolition of apartheid in South Africa, the welfare of Polynesian women, Aboriginal and Maori land rights, ending American 'imperialism' in Grenada, Nicaragua etc. - The list is tediously long. So also is the variety of peace groups. (350 in New Zealand alone) and their sources of support - academics and other 'professional' people,⁶ feminists, ecological protectionists, clergy of various denominations, housewives, trade unionists and teenagers. With such an astonishing plethora of supporters, it would be idle to account for this mobilization by some facile conspiratorial scenario, or the even simpler thesis that it merely represents the exploitation

of the guileless and gullible by the wicked and the venal. In fact, what appears to have happened is that the Peace Movement, in its many manifestations, has by design or even accident, touched a responsive chord in the descendants of settler populations, once unquestionably loyal to the country and culture of their origins, but now increasingly aware of an independent identity - and a Pacific one at that. This new-found nationalism expresses itself in diverse ways. New Zealand, for example, has taken the path of non-nuclear dedication to the extreme point of having virtually frozen itself out of the protective ANZUS alliance, on account of its intransigence over the matter of port visits by nuclear powered or even potentially 'nuclear capable' ships. While Australia is no whit less nationalistic, it has hitherto remained in closer association with its American ally and nuclear armed guarantor - the USA. Despite this, it must be noted that, even here, there is a perceptible drift towards greater independence or even isolationism implied in the recommendations of the Dibb Report of 1986 and the Defence White Paper of 1987. Notwithstanding these marked differences, both states have made common cause in their sponsorship, membership and virtual underwriting of the SPNFZ, and it is very unlikely that any conceivable change of governments will terminate their participation in this zonal enterprise.

SECURITY OF THE SPNFZ AND ITS SLOCS

Internal Threats

Although this study is concerned chiefly with external threats to the area, which will be addressed shortly, it is abundantly clear that internal threats to its security are also of great importance. If

such threats mature to the point where the internal stability of states is seriously affected, then it follows that their capability of responding effectively to external threats is correspondingly reduced. While there are several types of internal threats, three stand out as being particularly dangerous, because they affect the whole fabric of the society in which they appear.

First of all there is the existence of ethnic conflicts, historically based but recently revived and exacerbated, mainly by demagogues apparently for no better reason than their own egotistic satisfaction. Next, there are systematic attempts to undermine the economic structure of more developed states like Australia and New Zealand, by small but dedicated groups ideologically opposed to the system. Though many members of these cadre parties appear to be self-motivated, they do receive external encouragement and material support to continue in their self-appointed mission of overthrowing the economic and political systems of the states in which they live and of which they are citizens. Their dedication to their task enables them to exert a degree of malign influence out of all proportion to their numbers. Thirdly, there is a threat of recent origin, all the more dangerous because of its insidious nature. This is the systematic penetration of the educational systems of Australia and New Zealand by a multidisciplinary 'mongrel?) 'subject' labelled 'Peace Studies'. Since this has appeared at all levels from the post-graduate to the elementary it bids fair to influence a whole rising generation. Now if its concern was the systematic study of conflict resolution, then it would be academically and pedagogically respectable. However, a glance at the curriculum proposed and the textbooks prescribed makes it instantly apparent that objectivity is the least likely

characteristic of the enterprise. Taken severally and collectively then these three internal threats, if permitted to burgeon, are guaranteed to produce societies deeply divided by a variety of conflicts, economically in decline, and vitiated of any will to resist external encroachment. Grim though this scenario may seem, there is plenty of evidence to prove that it is no figment of imagination and its potential denouement must be a source of considerable satisfaction to the enemies of the Western world and its way of life.

External Threats

The difficulty of identifying readily perceivable external threats to a region increases in proportion to the distance that separates it from major foci of military power. One consequence of this phenomenon in the case of the SPNFZ in general, and Australia and New Zealand in particular, is the ready adoption of the facile assumption (presented as a rational deduction) that no threat exists. In a slightly modified form the qualification is sometimes made, in both states, that any perceptible threat is at least ten years away. It remains something of a mystery why this precise time span was chosen and by whom. Nevertheless it has become a shibboleth on which much ANZAC military planning is predicated. This seems to be almost an act of deliberate self-deception, when candidates for the role of potential external aggressor are clearly silhouetted on the horizon of the South Pacific. If nothing else the protein hungry and/or overcrowded populations of the USSR, PRC and Japan cannot but look at the abundant maritime food resources of the sparsely populated South Pacific and Antarctic with envy. To obtain pre-emptive or even monopolistic access to even a portion of this plenty would be an enterprise worth considerable effort or even some risk. This is not,

even for a moment to suggest that military adventures at some distance from home bases is a favoured or even seriously considered method. Even where the naval capability exists - as in the case of the USSR - the cost/risk equation is not likely to work out to the adventurer's advantage. Far better then is the alternative of economic penetration and virtual purchase of forward positions in Oceania, in states with friendly or at least malleable governments. Whether this amiable attitude is based on compatibility of ideology or perception of personal advantage by the island leaders, is a matter of little moment. The end result of an established forward position, from which to exploit the riches of the sea or of renegotiated spheres of interest on the Antarctic icecap, is a worthwhile end in itself.

Although the PRC and Japan (even partially remilitarized) have been cited above as possible candidates for the role of south Pacific interloper, this is currently in the realm of theory. The USSR presents a rather different case. Not only has it given notice of intention to play a larger role in the Pacific, but it has steadily built up its resource base in its Far Eastern territories, encouraged their accelerated settlement, and underpinned it all by posting about one third of all its armed forces in the area. Further, the acquisition and enhancement of substantial base facilities at Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang now gives the USSR the capacity to thrust Southward when the occasion offers. Meanwhile, the Soviet leadership seems content to play a waiting game, using considerable experience and expertise in the field of subversion to erode rival influences in the South Pacific, and promote the emergence of governments likely to be complaisant or even act as surrogates. In fact, the best of all worlds from the Soviet point of view, would be to achieve the fruits

of successful military enterprise without ever having undertaken the risks. However, such a 'best case' scenario is never confidently predictable, so a pragmatic and cautiously opportunistic Soviet leadership may find itself forced to take steps that might lead it closer to conventional conflict than it deems safe or desirable. These potential circumstances unavoidably involve the SLOCs of the SPNFZ.

SLOCs OF THE SOUTH PACIFIC

While the signatories of the Treaty of Tlatelolco are faced with the possibility of interdiction of maritime traffic travelling up and down sealanes more or less parallel to their coasts, connecting South American ports with each other, Panama and the US, these lanes are not nearly as vulnerable as those of the SPNFZ. To start with, the former are within comparatively easy reach of naval forces operating out of their native harbours, and also of the formidable US naval capacity on both coasts. Further, at least one of these states - Chile - has a specifically Pacific orientation, a strong naval tradition, and a known antipathy (at least at governmental level) to foreign encroachment, especially of communist origin.

On the other hand the SLOCs of the SPNFZ criss-cross vast areas of ocean, carrying veritable argosies laden with primary produce, minerals and manufactured goods to and from Asian markets, the US and also, via Panama, to declining, but still valuable traditional markets in Europe. These SLOCs are particularly vulnerable to interdiction in the long reaches they must cover, and any protective measures within the capabilities of the Australian and New Zealand navies are woefully

inadequate, because of the miniscule size of those forces and their extremely limited operational range.

Lesser used SLOCs in the region are those running more or less in an East-West direction in approximately the same Latitudes within which New Zealand lies. Where these do not terminate in Chilean ports, they round the Horn using either the Strait of Magellan or the Drake Passage. Because of the much greater distances involved, particularly if the final destinations are Argentina, Brazil or even Europe, normal traffic is not of great significance (approximately 100 vessels a month). However, in the event of the closure of the Panama Canal because of regional conflict, sabotage, or the installation of anti-capitalist/anti-Western government, no option remains but for traffic to move Southwards and use the constricted SLOCs already named. One estimate puts the increase at a staggering 900% representing 1047 ships a month.⁸ It can be argued that the tremendous distance separating these South Pacific SLOCs from Soviet naval units bases in Kamchatka-Petropavlosk, Vladivostok or even Cam Ranh Bay, are in themselves adequate protection from interdiction. However, this does not take into account the possibility of the Soviets shortly finding a congenial host nation among the micro-states of Oceania (say Vanuatu), nor the fortitude of Soviet submariners operating patrols at distances and for periods unacceptable to their Western counterparts, nor the convenient proximity of Soviet scientific stations in Antarctica to the SLOCs in question. Indeed, this last consideration merits some amplification.

Since the internationalization of Antarctica by the 1959 Treaty, rival territorial claims have been in abeyance, and several states

have sent scientific expeditions and established stations (some permanently manned and others intermittently) around the ice-cap. No state has been more active than the USSR, commencing in 1956 and completing a circle of stations - seven of them permanent. Of these, three - Leningradskaya, Russkaya, and Bellinghausen - are admirably placed to monitor traffic using the southern most SLOCs, and therefore to direct interdicting submarine forces to their targets. Since Russkaya (established 1980) is in Marie Byrd Land, which has not been claimed by any nation, this Soviet establishment with potential for future territorial claims caused concern in Australia and New Zealand. Pravda devoted an article at the time refuting "accusations made in the Australia press" about Soviet territorial ambitions. Unfortunately no such accusation had been made, so it seems likely that the Soviet disinformation ploy of planting a story, which it could then refute, went awry, when Pravda duly refuted the concocted story without being aware that it had failed to appear! Nevertheless, this episode adequately illustrates the importance that the Soviets attach to the area and their established position there.

In summation then, it has been established that the SLOCs of the South Pacific are no less vital to the continued prosperity of the Free World economics they connect than their North Pacific and Atlantic counterparts, but are far more vulnerable because of their excessive lengths and the military weakness of the Austro-Oceanic states that should protect them. Further, the existence of a palpable threat in the form of a well armed Soviet presence to the North cannot be denied, any more than its potential to pursue economic, political or even territorial prizes if and when opportunity offers. Indeed, in

any escalation of conflict short of nuclear war, the vulnerability of the SPNFZ would be an invitation to such a predator, which predictably would treat the Treaty of Rarotonga with contempt, despite its ritual endorsement of its Protocols. What countermeasures can be devised to meet this potential threat to the fragile prosperity and tranquillity of the South Pacific?

COUNTERMEASURES AND CONCLUSIONS

The best possible scenario is one of co-operation between the states of the SPNFZ - particularly Australia and New Zealand - and the states that are at the other end of the South Pacific SLOCs. Clearly some of these - the US and Japan, closely followed by the ROK and ROC - are better placed than others to secure longer reaches of these SLOCs than they currently do. However, in a rational scenario, it would be unwise to exclude the possibility of invoking the participation of the PRC, which has both the motive and the means in the form of a navy with burgeoning blue-water capability. Again, two states not particularly in favour with the SPNFZ states are Chile and France. Nevertheless, they are favoured by geography and have the naval capability to intervene in the critical middle reaches of the South Pacific SLOCs. Hence, a preplanned and regularly co-ordinated pattern of counter-interdictory measures, consistently followed by an admittedly ill-assorted set of collaborators, is probably the best of all possible deterrents to external threats to the region. Clearly, however, this countermeasure is contingent on all potential partners displaying a degree of rationality in framing defence policies, that they have so far failed to exhibit - even intermittently.

The worst scenario imaginable for the South Pacific completely negates its pretensions to high-sounding moral leadership of other nations, on the grounds that it has embraced a 'nuclear free' philosophy and institutionalised it by treaty. This case could arise from internal causes alone. Ethnic rivalries being allowed to escalate to virulent hatred, economic management for the prosperity of all being sabotaged by ideologically opposed minorities, orchestrated from afar, and the decline of national morale in populations indoctrinated by educational systems, infiltrated by the false prophets of a 'peace' that is synonymous with pusillanimity and abject surrender - all this adds up to a condition where the nations of the South Pacific will enter a new helotage, which they will have invited and probably deserve.

Of course, between these two extreme scenarios - perhaps equally improbable - lies a spectrum of derivatory options, ranging from the modestly optimistic to the fairly risky, but in varying degrees capable of serving the security interests of the South Pacific region.

Whatever the eventual outcome may be of the interplay of forces currently observable in the South Pacific, the ultimate determinant - as always and everywhere - will be the skill and clarity of vision of the policy makers of Pacific states, and nowhere more importantly than in Australia and New Zealand. The leaders of these states, no matter of what political persuasion, would do well to pause in the midst of their ritualistic rhetorical outpourings to heed the acute observation of one of the greatest analysts of international affairs in this century:

'Diplomacy, one might say, is the brains of national power, as national morale is its soul. If its vision is blurred, its judgement defective, and its determination feeble, all the advantages of geographical location, of self-sufficiency in food, raw materials, and industrial production, of military preparedness, of size and quality of population will in the long run avail a national little.'

(Hans J. Morgenthau Politics Among Nations)

NOTES

- (1) It is well known that Soviet fishing, commercial and oceanographic vessels are equipped to carry out electronic surveillance of communications facilities of other powers. Further a measure of interchangeability exists between personnel on these carriers and the Soviet navy proper. Again, though hitherto not definitively detected, it is highly likely that Soviet submarines carry out familiarization patrols in South Pacific waters, particularly since the acquisition of forward base facilities in Cam Ranh Bay makes for shorter periods at sea without the necessity of surfacing.
- (2) Finnish, Polish and Swedish initiatives have taken place since the early sixties. A rather grandiose UN attempt in 1985, involving twenty-one nations debated the possible creation of NFZs in Europe, Africa, the Middle East and South Asia, but could not arrive at even tentative agreement.
- (3) These Protocols in the Treaty of Rarotonga are aimed specifically at existing nuclear powers.

Protocol I requires nuclear powers with territories within or near the zone to refrain from manufacturing, stationing and testing any nuclear device in those territories. This clearly is aimed mainly at France, though the UK and USA are also nominated.

Protocol II invites all five nuclear powers to undertake not to use or threaten to use any nuclear device against parties to the Treaty or any territory in the Zone that is the responsibility of a signatory to Protocol I.


Protocol III requires signatories not to test nuclear explosive devices within the SPNFZ.

The USSR and the PRC have hastened to sign the Protocols albeit with explicit and implicit reservations on adherence being contingent on the acquiescence of other nuclear powers. The USA, UK and of course France have so far declined the invitation to sign the Protocols.


- (4) Vanuatu is something of a maverick in the community of Pacific states. It has unilaterally declared itself nuclear free, flirts with the USSR, Libya and Cuba, and regards the Treaty of Rarotonga as not going nearly far enough. Tonga on the other hand is ultra-conservative, and regards the Treaty as subversive of Western influence and protection in the region. Indeed, Crown Prince Tupou'toa is reported to have said that warships of friendly nations were welcome to visit Tonga particularly if they were nuclear armed!

- (5) Published in 1984, the report of the National Radiation Laboratory, which has been in the business of monitoring radioactive fallout since 1949, stated that French Polynesians received lower doses of radiation from all sources, including fallout, than the world average, and therefore were less unlikely to acquire diseases related to such exposure.
- (6) Examples are associations of Physicians, Scientists and even Architects against nuclear arms. At a more proletarian level - but with university trained leadership - is the Pacific Peoples' Anti-Nuclear Action Committee (PPANAC) set up in 1980 in Auckland to articulate the concerns of the large Polynesian population now resident in New Zealand.
- (7) One reliable source puts the figures in the case of Australian trade alone at 5000 sailings a year to and from Japanese and other East Asian ports, and 800 to the Americas.

(Brig. F.W. Speed, 'Defence in the South West Pacific'. The Army Quarterly and Defence Journal. Vol.116 (3). July 1986, p.309.
- (8) Adm. Jose J. Merino, 'Trouble in the Southern Pacific', Proceedings, U.S. Naval Institute, December, 1986. p.81.



The SPNFZ as established by the South Pacific Forum on 7 August, 1985



Territorial claims in the Antarctic region

