

**Resources, Maritime Transport  
and SLOC Security  
in the Asia-Pacific Region**

Edited by  
Dalchoong Kim

Institute of East and West Studies

## PREFACE

Throughout history, man has always used and been involved with the oceans. It is comparatively recently, however, that ocean-related issues—arising out of the use, exploration and exploitation of the seas—have acquired major importance in international relations. Today, a wide variety of ocean-related events such as maritime boundary disputes, fisheries conflicts and major oil tanker accidents are regularly featured in the international press and are accorded significance on the foreign policy agendas of a growing number of states. Less publicized, but still an important part of the maritime dimension, is the issue of Sea Lanes of Communication. In terms of the scale of activity, shipping is one of the most important ocean uses, and the importance of sea lane security cannot be overemphasized.

Since its foundation in 1981, the International SLOC Study Group—which includes scholars and experts from the U.S., Japan, the Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, and recently Australia—has developed significant international research cooperation on the subject through annual conferences.

So far, there have been five international conferences. The first was held in San Francisco, 1982, the second in Tokyo, 1983, the third in Singapore, 1985, and the fourth in Taipei, 1986. Most recently, the fifth conference was successfully held in Seoul in June 1987, with the theme of "Resources, Maritime Transport and SLOC Security in the Asia-Pacific Region." It was organized by the SLOC Study Group-Korea and the Institute of East and West Studies, Yonsei University, under the joint sponsorship of the national representative groups, i.e., SRI International, the U.S.; the Japanese Center for Strategic Studies, Japan; the SLOC Study Group-R.O.C.; and the Australian Defence Association, Australia.

In view of the fact that the four previous conferences dealt at length with the various threats to SLOC security in the Asia-Pacific area, the fifth conference was urged to update the threat but put emphasis on

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maritime transport, resource problems and prospects relating to regional cooperation for SLOC security. The area of geographical concern was also extended from the original focus of the Western Pacific to include the Indian Ocean, thus covering the region from the Southeast Asia-Indian Ocean area to the Northeast Pacific. Moreover, the participation of the scholars from India and Canada enabled the Seoul Conference to widen the scope of discussion on the subject.

In addition to organizing international conferences on the SLOC security issue, the Institute of East and West Studies is committed to furthering academic cooperation and understanding among scholars and experts in the area through the publication of conference papers. This volume is the result of that commitment.

The papers in this volume attempt to highlight the importance of maritime transport, resource problems and prospects relating to regional cooperation for SLOC security. Not only this, scholars have gone to some length to investigate the issues historically and to provide a wide range of information on resource rivalry-resource access and dependency-in the Pacific-Indian Ocean basins and problems of maritime transport. Some of the papers cover the problems of naval capabilities and strategies of major regional powers and their strategic implications for SLOC security.

I sincerely hope this volume provides a background for understanding how SLOCs would be protected in time of war and what cooperative measures would be appropriate in changing international maritime environment.

In organizing the 5th International SLOC Conference, I feel greatly indebted to many people. I am especially indebted to Dr. Choon-ho Park, Director of International Legal Studies, Korea University, Dr. Seo-Hang Lee, Senior Research Fellow, Korea Ocean Research & Development Institute, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, and Dr. Young-Kyu Park, Professor at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, for their invaluable cooperation and help in organizing and making the conference successful. I am also grateful to the members of the SLOC Study Group-Korea for their support and collaboration over the years. I wish to thank the Institute

of Foreign Affairs and National Security, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Culture and Information, the Korea Line Corporation, Honam Ethylene Company, the Asia Foundation and the Korean Traders Scholarship Foundation for their cooperation and financial support for the conference.

Needless to say, this volume could not have been written without the contributors of the papers; their participation was invaluable. Sincere thanks are also extended to Mr. Jin Wang Kim, President of Seoul Computer Press for his constant help and cooperation with this publication. Last, but not least, I wish to express my gratitude to the staffs of my institute and especially to Sung Young Choi, Dong-In Choi, John Thurlow and Dilip Kumar Tiwari who have given their editorial assistance for the publication of this volume.

Dalchoong Kim  
February, 1988

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**PART I**  
**INTRODUCTION**

## WELCOMING ADDRESS

*Kwan Shik Min*

General Stilwell, Mr. Horie, Dr. Han, distinguished scholars and honored guests, ladies and gentlemen.

It is indeed a privilege and honor for me to make a welcoming address at the Fifth International SLOC Conference. From the bottom of my heart, I welcome all of you to this conference.

On a personal note, as a founding member of the SLOC study Group-Korea, I am deeply touched by the fact that the SLOC Study Group-Korea, under the leadership of Dr. Dalchoong Kim, has successfully organized this conference. I am very proud of and grateful to the SLOC Study Group-Korea and its members.

I also would like to extend my special thanks to the members of other SLOC Study Groups—namely, the U.S., Japan, Republic of China, and recently Australia—and all other foreign participants for your hard work to plan and lead SLOC Study Groups and international research cooperation on SLOC.

I firmly believe that without your efforts, international research cooperation on SLOC would not have been as successful as it is today.

As all of you know, since the end of the Second World War, Asia and the Pacific have continuously gained importance in the affairs of the world. It is here that economic growth and vitality are a common denominator. It is also here that Confucian, Buddhist, and Christian heritages are co-existing. And it is here that great historic experiments of mankind are being carried out.

Today, this region is the most dynamic economic center of the World.

As a consequence, what we do in this part of the world, and what happens here in the future, will largely influence the course of world history.

Under these circumstances, the most important challenge for the countries of this region is to have an accurate evaluation of the stark realities of sea lane security in the region and to enhance international cooperation in keeping SLOC open both in time of peace and crisis.

Viewed in this context, an international SLOC conference is just what we need and its importance can never be over-emphasized.

The previous four conferences, which dealt at length with the various threats to the SLOC in the Asia-Pacific region, were very successful.

They have proved very useful to all of us as they have helped us much to broaden and sharpen our perspectives regarding security problems of the sea lanes facing the region. Moreover, in my modest estimation, they have also helped policy makers and opinion leaders understand and assess the importance of the SLOC to the national economy and security of the countries of this region.

In this respect, I feel rightfully proud of what the previous conferences have done.

Because of the great achievements of previous conferences, our expectations for this Fifth International SLOC Conference are high.

In this regard, I am confident that this conference, co-sponsored by such outstanding organizations as SRI International of the United States, the Japanese Center for Strategic Studies, the SLOC Study Group-Republic of China, and the Australian Defence Association, will be able to achieve greater success and thereby come up to our expectations. This is more so particularly because of the timeliness of the general theme of the conference, that is, "Resources, Maritime Transport, and SLOC Security in the Asia-Pacific Region."

It is my honest feeling that no problem is insoluble when addressed by such galaxy of intellects as those present at this dis-

tinguished gathering.

Once again, I sincerely welcome all of you and hope that your stay in Korea will be both rewarding and enjoyable.

Thank You.

## KEYNOTE SPEECH

*Richard G. Stilwell*

On behalf of the United States delegation, I extend heartfelt greetings to all other participants in this, the 5th annual conference of our organization. Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, normally our leader, joins in these expressions of friendship and conveys, through me, his sincere regret that he is unable to meet with his revered colleagues on this occasion.

As our conference convenes, the security of sea lanes of communication is center stage in world affairs with special focus on the Persian Gulf. Recent developments in that key geographic area underscore the strategic significance, the complexity and the real life nature of the problem areas. We are assembled to discuss, analyze and devise ways and means to solve on a cooperative basis. Those unfolding events also provide concrete demonstration of my country's commitment to do everything in its power to uphold the principle of freedom of navigation and the imperative of non-interruption of the lifelines on which the economies of our allies and friends in East Asia so utterly depend. That commitment—to react with measured force to any use of force to either close or interfere with the passage of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz—has been subjected to considerable criticism at home and abroad on the grounds that it is inherently escalatory and a poor substitute for diplomacy.

The critics have forgotten a fundamental truth. It is that deterrence is never risk-free. The United States has, by no means, ruled

out negotiations to ease tensions in the Persian Gulf; rather, it simply recognizes that diplomacy without the backing of power is likely to be unavailing, particularly when dealing with a regime that does not respect the rule of international law. Deterrence is never risk-free. I would hope that the delegations that constitute our core group—the Republic of Korea, Japan, the Republic of China on Taiwan, and Australia—draw assurance from President Reagan's statements that the United States is determined to uphold the right of all nations to enjoy untrammled use of international waters.

The twelve months that have elapsed since we met in Taipei have been witness to significant developments with implications, both positive and negative, for the maritime environment in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean. Overall, they attest to the dynamics of our study agenda. Let me summarize a few of the more salient events.

Secretary General Gorbachev, visited Vladivostok last July and in an important speech made clear that Asia would henceforth enjoy higher priority in Soviet foreign policy. The long-standing Soviet objectives have not changed. They remain: achieving military hegemony; eroding opposing alliance systems; rebuilding close cooperation with the Peoples Republic of China and North Korea; and harnessing the financial and technological resources of Japan for the development of Siberia. However, we can expect that these objectives will be pursued with much more vigor and sophistication. There is already evidence of increased Soviet interest in activity astride the sea lanes of communication from the Sea of Japan through the Indonesian Archipelago and westward to the choke-points represented by the Suez Canal and the Cape of Good Hope. These routes loom more and more important to the Soviet Union, not only as a principal avenue for the projection of its power and influence in that vast region but also for sustenance of the Soviet economy. Thus, on the one hand, the Soviet Pacific Ocean Fleet continues to be upgraded qualitatively and quantitatively; and, on the other, the Soviet Merchant Marine carries a steadily increasing share of the total tonnage moving between European Russia and

Siberia. In this latter connection, the development at Vostochny, near Vladivostok, of what is reputed to be the largest container port in Asia, may be the harbinger of a major Soviet initiative to bid for a lion's share of oceanic transport contracts. It is also worth noting that the Soviets are intent on opening the Arctic region to commercial use, as the shortest route between the Pacific and the Atlantic, through intensive development of semi-submersibles. The security implications of Soviet control of such an economically advantageous shipping lane are all too obvious.

I would rate economic growth and expansion of international trade as the most notable trends in Northeast Asia this past year. The economies of Japan, South Korea, and the Republic of China on Taiwan retain their amazing vitality and their two-way external trade steadily rises. The same, incidentally, can be said of Hong Kong, of Singapore and, to a lesser extent, of Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia. Save for the threat of protectionism (which I am confident wise statesmen will keep in check) all signs point to a continuation of this economic forward momentum and, concomitantly of even greater maritime traffic.

Over the past year, there have been mixed signals from the Peoples Republic of China in its relationships with the Free World. Consistent with its policy of equidistance from Washington and Moscow, Beijing has forged additional cooperative links with the former and has responded to the latter's initiatives for at least limited amelioration of tensions through some increase in trade, technical assistance and resolution of the Amur River boundary dispute. Meanwhile, developments in the PRC, in the aftermath of the student demonstrations of December and January, with consequent adverse impact in Hong Kong and Taipei remind us that nation is still capable of precipitate and violent turns of national policy. Certainly, Deng Xiao Ping has not been able to institutionalize the succession. The decisions taken at the 13th Party Congress in October with respect to the scope and pace of political and economic reform will be of the greatest interest to us all. While steadfastly adherent to its responsibilities under the Taiwan

Relations Act, the United States believes that a PRC increasingly open to the West and concentrating on its four modernizations will be a major factor for stability in East Asia.

The northern and southern flanks of the South China Sea are secured by our stalwart friends, the Republic of China on Taiwan, the Republic of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Australia. But there is a clear threat on the western flank and a potential threat on the eastern flank. The importance of the naval and air facilities in Vietnam, placed at the disposal of the Soviets, needs no elaboration; the Soviets find Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang increasingly useful for a variety of purposes; and by consequence, those facilities are undergoing further expansion. One must assume that short of a truly dramatic change in the international environment, the Soviets will be able to enjoy long-term tenure of those Vietnamese bases. By contrast, the United States' access to Subic Bay and Clark Field, post 1991, is by no means assured. Indeed, at issue in the Philippines is the entire political future of that nation. In my estimate (which I'm frank to admit is not supported in many quarters) the Republic of the Philippines is in an advanced state of crisis. The new government—which has not demonstrated a capacity to act decisively—must deal simultaneously with an almost unimaginable series of challenges: establishment of a legislature which can act responsibly; reestablishment of regional and local governance; re-creation of national institutions; reform of the Armed Forces; revamp of the economy; institution of multi-faceted programs to deal with economic and social grievances at the grass roots level; and arrest of the momentum and subsequent atrophy of a still-growing, deadly communist insurgency which has already infected nearly 40% of the 41,000 Philippine villages. That nation needs all the help that we can collectively provide.

We all have reason for concern about increased Soviet activity in the South Pacific, a vast region dotted with newly-created ministates and traversed by important sea routes. The initial manifestations of Soviet interest have been political and economic, with fishing agreements concluded first with Kirabati (fortunately not renewed) and

then with Vanuatu. Of equal significance, the Soviets, by various means, have been encouraging anti-nuclear movements throughout the region with the clear aim of complicating—if not curtailing—Western military presence therein. The plus side of this is that Soviet efforts have stimulated greater U.S. attention to this clearly strategic but long-neglected area.

The Soviet Union watches developments in Sri Lanka with great anticipation. That nation lies midway between the tip of Southeast Asia and the east coast of Africa; and boasts the magnificent, deep port of Trincomalee, situated in the northeast region where the Tamil minority is strongest. Should the Tamils gain independence or a major degree of autonomy, the Soviets might well be the recipients of basing rights which would dramatically enhance Soviet naval capabilities throughout the Indian Ocean area.

As you might expect of a soldier, I have tended to emphasize the danger spots while abstaining from reciting the long list of Free World strengths (material and ideological) in the vast area we call the Pacific Basin and the conjoined Indian Ocean. On balance, I conclude that the overall correlation of forces today is favorable. But the Soviets and their surrogates are persistent. Thus if that correlation is to remain favorable over the longer term, we must continue to coalesce our efforts in furtherance of common objectives; and we must avoid major mistakes. To that end, the United States government can be counted upon to do its full share to maintain the climate of confidence so essential to political, economic and social progress; to qualitatively improve the naval, air and ground forces forward deployed under the aegis of our Pacific Command; to honor our security obligations under treaties and U.S. law; and to take all other feasible steps to enhance regional vitality and harmony.

The U.S. delegation looks forward to a most productive conference. Thank you.

## KEYNOTE SPEECH

*Shin Kanemaru*

Distinguished Guests:

It is of great significance that the Fifth International SLOC Conference, sponsored by the SLOC Study Group, ROK and the Institute of East and West Studies, Yonsei University, is held in Seoul, with so many participants representing interested states in the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean, when the Soviet Union is increasing its armed forces in the Far East and is strengthening a military concert with North Korea, while the Soviet Union is negotiating with the USA about the reduction of INF. I would wish, first, to send my heartfelt gratitude and respect to all you who have prepared this conference. And it is a great pleasure and honor for me to be given an opportunity to express my view at the opening of the conference.

At night on the 17th of last month, a US frigate patrolling in the Persian Gulf for securing the supply of oil vital to Japan and many other nations of the West and the safety of tankers transporting oil, was hit by missiles fired by an Iraqi fighter/bomber and many crew were killed or wounded. It was a great shock to us, for we were considering the problems of "Resources, Maritime Transport and SLOC Security" that is the general theme of this conference. I would like to express our heartfelt gratitude to the efforts that the US government and Navy have been making for the security of the Persian Gulf. I would also like to present our sincere condolences to the families of the victims.

I stated in my address for the Fourth International SLOC Confer-

ence in Taipei, 1986 that we now face two new serious problems in relation to the SLOC security. First, concerning the SLOC security in the Pacific Ocean, the problem is how to improve the air defence capabilities of our ASW surface units against missile strike by Back-fire bombers, in addition to the ASW capabilities able to deal with the new Soviet submarines. Secondly, concerning the defence of the three Straits of Soya, Tsugaru and Tsushima/Korea, the problem is how to secure air supremacy and seacontrol in our contiguous sea areas in the Sea of Japan, especially how to improve our anti-ship strike capabilities against the powerful Soviet air and naval of the Pacific Fleet, I feel all the more the seriousness of these problems.

In regard to the above-mentioned problems, I would like to briefly mention the recent Japanese efforts for the SLOC security within 1,000 nautical mile sea areas and the defence of the three straits. Concerning the improvement of the air defence capabilities of our ASW surface units, the Japanese Defence Agency has made a comprehensive study and on the basis of it, is now planning to realize, first of all, the installation of OTH radar system and the introduction of AEGIS system in and after the next fiscal year. And as one step towards improving our anti-ship strike capabilities, for the present, in the zones of the Soya Strait and the others, the test-firing of a newly developed anti-ship missile during this year in the USA has been scheduled.

By the way, it should be carefully noticed that a military concert between the Soviets and the North Korea has recently been strengthened. It may suggest a necessity to promote some cooperations between Japan and the Republic of Korea. And in this connection, it seems to me that the USA is now expected to play the role of a bridge between our two nations. The cooperation may include, for example, the exchange of necessary information and discussion on concrete ways of cooperation for the defence of the Korean Strait.

Last year, I also referred to the increase of the Soviet naval and air presence in the South China Sea, the move of communist power in the Philippines and the Soviets' approach to the island states in the Southern Pacific Ocean. The Soviets' move in these areas is

becoming more active and, needless to say, it may become a threat to our SLOCs in the Southeast Asian Sea areas and the Southern Pacific Ocean. I keenly feel that we should hereafter pay attention to Soviet moves in these areas and the interested nations should respectively take appropriate measures. Japan will hence endeavor to make diplomatic relations with these nations even closer and to provide more necessary economic aid to them.

I understand that we have arrived at a basic and general understanding of the importance of the SLOC security for all of our nations and the necessity of mutual cooperation for it, through the four conferences from the first one in San Francisco of 1982 to the fourth one in Taipei of last year. What we expected to achieve at the commencement of this study was, with such a basic and general understanding and recognition, to discuss feasible and effective ways of regional cooperation for the SLOC security according to special conditions of respective region, and then to arrive at mutual understanding about a concept of overall cooperation in the Pacific basin. I heartily wish that further advance toward our ultimate goal discussion on concrete ways of cooperation.

Finally, I would express my hopes for the success of this conference and express again my sincere respect and gratitude for the efforts and enthusiasm of all of you who have so well prepared this conference.

Thank you for listening.

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**PART II**

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**RESOURCES RIVALRY-ACCESS AND  
DEPENDENCY-AND MARITIME TRANSPORT**

# RESOURCES, MARITIME TRANSPORT AND SLOC SECURITY — Japan's Perspective —

*Manabu Yoshida*

## I. Introduction

Japan is a country of poor natural resources. Japan relies on overseas countries for most of her essential resources. The range of these materials extends from industrial and energy resources such as petroleum, iron ore and coal, to daily necessities such as wheat, soybeans, cotton, wool and wood. Most of these materials are imported by maritime transportation.

Ever with the progress of scientific technology in the future, it is not thought that this tendency of overseas dependence for natural resources will not change drastically or substantially.

So, it will be a matter of life or death for the existence and war endurance of Japan to maintain stable imports of the minimum amount of resources in a national emergency. In order to achieve this, it will be very important for Japan to maintain a sufficient number of ships and sailors for maritime transportation, reliable in emergency and to secure SLOCs.

In this issue, I would like to state my personal but Japanese stand point of view on each of the above subjects. And my view covers the Japanese present situation and perspective, the direction of efforts and the relation between Japan and Western countries in Asia and the Pacific region.

## II. Japanese Access to Resources and Degree of Dependence on Them (Present Situation and Perspective)

Japan, as a country poor in resources, relies on overseas countries for most of her natural resources such as energy, minerals and grain. The following statistics show the degree of overseas dependence on major natural resources in 1985.

| Degree of dependence | Materials                                 |
|----------------------|-------------------------------------------|
| 100% Dependent       | Aluminum, Nickel, Coan, Wool, Cotton      |
| MT 95% Dependent     | Crude Oil, Iron Ore, Copper, Tin, Soybean |
| MT 90% Dependent     | Coal, Natural Gas                         |
| MT 80% Dependent     | Lead, Wheat, Solt                         |
| MT 60% Dependent     | Zinc, Woods                               |

Note) MT: More Than.

The total imports of Japan in 1985 were 593.00 million tons. Among them, petroleum is still the major import, and occupies 28.7% (170.218 mil. tons) of the total imports. Also three major materials, ie. petroleum, iron ore and coal, which are essential raw materials for national basic industries such as power plants, steel manufactures and petrochemical industries, occupy 65% (387.722 mil. tons) of the total imports.

We should not make a rash decision about the long term presumption about supply and demand of energy. But according to some experimental studies through mid 1990s, based on the result of the early 1980s, there will be some reduction in petroleum but minor increases in nuclear and solar energy, without a remarkable change as a whole. The result of these studies is shown in the table below.

Next, let's take a look at the concentration of major resource imports on certain countries in 1985.

The details are shown in the next table.

| Source    | Early 1980s | Mid 1990s | Source | Early 1980s | Mid 1990s |
|-----------|-------------|-----------|--------|-------------|-----------|
| Crude oil | 62%         | 42%       | Coal   | 18.5%       | 18%       |
| Nuclear   | 7%          | 14%       | N. Gas | 7%          | 12%       |
| Hydro     | 5.4%        | 5%        | Solar  | 0.2%        | 4%        |

As of 1985, as is shown in the table above, except for a few examples like manganese (About 62%) and phosphorus (About 29%), for which Japan relies mainly on Africa, Japanese import counterparts of natural resources are unevenly distributed and are concentrated into 2 or 3 countries in South West Asia or the Middle East (About 23%) and countries of the Pacific Rim Ocean such as South East Asia (About 20%), Oceania (About 21%) and North America (About 16%).

The problem, arisen from this situation, is the necessary amount of imports in a time of national emergency. What kind of effects would have on the daily life of the 120 million Japanese and Japan's ability to endure war if there would have been a sudden cut or reduction in resource imports. Also, in an emergency situation what kind of resources would be the necessary minimum.

But, it is difficult to determine the minimum amount of imports in a time of emergency, because this amount will be affected by preconditions or assumptions. And there will be an almost infinite number of these preconditions.

In order to make a further estimation, we have to understand the effects against the primary, secondary and tertiary industries when crude oil imports, a major energy resource occupying about 60% of total energy, are reduced, and another effects on daily life when foods imports, which are directly connected with the life of the Japanese, are cut off.

Taking the two major effects I just mentioned, and our past wartime experiences into account, and estimating the minimum amount of imports needed to maintain the standard of taking guaranteed by the government, it is not unreasonable to estimate that the minimum

| Material   | Degree of Dependence (%) | Degree of Concentration<br>(Share of top 3 countries) |                     |                |                 |              |
|------------|--------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|----------------|-----------------|--------------|
|            |                          | Share of 3 countries (%)                              | Total Amt. (Mil. t) | 1st place      | 2nd place       | 3rd place    |
| Petroleum  | 99.8                     | 55.7                                                  | 94.70               | Saudi Arabia   | U. Arab Emirate | Indonesia    |
| LPG-LNG    | 99.8                     | 66.1                                                  | 25.89               | Indonesia      | Saudi Arabia    | Brunei       |
| Coal       | 94.7                     | 81.3                                                  | 75.64               | Australia      | Canada          | U.S.A.       |
| Iron Ore   | 99.6                     | 82.0                                                  | 102.25              | Australia      | Brazil          | India        |
| Bauxite    | 100                      | 96.6                                                  | 3.40                | Australia      | Indonesia       | Malaysia     |
| Nickle     | 100                      | 99.3                                                  | 3.01                | S. Pacific Is. | Indonesia       | Philippine   |
| Copper     | 95.9                     | 49.9                                                  | 1.50                | Canada         | U.S.A.          | Chile        |
| Managnese  | 100                      | 91.7                                                  | 2.00                | South Africa   | Australia       | India        |
| Phosphorus | 100                      | 93.3                                                  | 2.25                | U.S.A.         | Morocco         | Jordan       |
| Solt       | 83.2                     | 100                                                   | 6.83                | Australia      | Mexico          | China        |
| Wood       | 64.5                     | 78.7                                                  | 18.44               | Malaysia       | U.S.A.          | Soviet Union |
| Cotton     | 100                      | 63.6                                                  | 0.47                | U.S.A.         | Australia       | China        |
| Wheat      | 86.3                     | 100                                                   | 5.51                | U.S.A.         | Canada          | Australia    |
| Soybeans   | 95.6                     | 99.0                                                  | 4.86                | U.S.A.         | China           | Brazil       |

Notes:

1. Degree of Dependence =  $\frac{\text{Amount of Import} - \text{Amount of Export}}{\text{Domestic Production} + \text{Import-Export}}$
2. All data are extracted from statistics of Ministry of Transport.
3. Wood chips and Wood pulp are not included in Wood.

amount of imports needed in an emergency is 32-34% of the 1980 peace time total, that is about 200 million tons.

In these emergency imports, the ratio of peace time average of foods and crude oil are 70-80% and about 40% respectively.

Assuming these figures as the minimum import required in an emergency, there is little chance of international competition to secure resources among importing countries, unless exporting countries are directly involved in some conflicts. But Japan relies on the Middle East for 70% of her crude oil and 30% of her natural gas, this is a region where several conflicts are still being fought, and which is at the end of a long line of communication from Japan. So, Japanese imports from this area are not and can not be stable because they may be affected by some conflicts in this area.

In order to solve this problem, Japan must further promote the present policy of domestic petroleum storage. Japan may also have to consider dispersing and shifting her imports from Middle East countries to other areas.

Also, further investigation and coordination between related countries for this subject will be necessary to maintain an appropriate number of merchant ships and to secure SLOCs, from the stand point of natural resources security.

An estimated 70-80% of the usual imports of food will be needed in as emergency, but as most of this comes from our allies or friendly nations such as Oceania, North and Central America, there will be no problems in securing them.

It seems that the development of marine resources will be gradually promoted, an example of which is the cooperative mining of the sea floor oil field between Japan and South Korea in the East China Sea. In this case, it is very important for all nations to cooperate with each other from the stand point of sea control.

### III. Present Situation and Perspective of Japanese Maritime Transportation

Japanese shipping has made a rapid and unprecedented expansion in the history of world shipping after World War II. Japan also has kept practically the world's newest and largest merchant fleet of some 40 million tons.

Japanese hulls in 1985 were 39.94 million tons, and the structure of merchant fleet is shown in the next table.

| Ship's type                      | Gross tonnage (1,000 tons) | Share (%) |
|----------------------------------|----------------------------|-----------|
| Oil tanker                       | 13,837                     | 34.6      |
| Ore bulk (ore & bulk)            | 12,046                     | 30.2      |
| Bulk oil (ore, bulk & crude oil) | 1,854                      | 4.6       |
| Bulk carrier (general cargo)     | 3,796                      | 9.5       |
| Container ship                   | 1,867                      | 4.7       |
| LN(P)G ship                      | 1,478                      | 3.7       |
| Pharmaceuticals ship             | 203                        | 0.5       |
| Others                           | 4,859                      | 12.2      |
| Total                            | 39,940                     | 100.0     |

In general, the distinguishing characteristics of Japanese ships is that they are a relatively young fleet. For example, 43% of tankers and 67% of bulk carriers are less than 10 years old and 87% of the former and 94% of the latter are less than 15 years old.

As of April, 1984, Japan has about 10,000 officers and about 12,000 men, a total of 22,000 sailors. Starting with the so-called oil crisis in 1973 the decrease in world wide maritime movement of goods, a sharp decline of shipping market caused by the commissioning of too many new ships, and steep rises in sailors' labor costs, Japanese shipping, like that of other advanced countries, lost its international competitiveness and ran into difficulty. In addition to this, Japanese shipping has suffered a fatal blow by a rapid and substantial rise of the "Yen" against foreign currencies, and it is now facing serious financial diffi-

culties. Mentioning the labor costs of sailors, the annual cost of a Japanese ship is 5-7 times as much as that of Korean or Filipino run ships.

So, Japanese shipping is moving from Japanese registered ships to foreign ships, whose labor costs are cheaper. In order to recover its capability for international competition the Japanese shipping community has been making every effort to build a slim but highly efficient fleet by scrapping her surplus hulls and reforming her ships and sailors institutions. A typical example of this is shown by the fact that the average number of sailors on board a ship in 1985 is 6.83 men lower than 10 years.

Among Japanese shipping, the number of chartered ships has been increased by 18.2% during the period between 1984 and 1985. So the ratio of Japanese registered ships to chartered ships is almost level at 53:47 and the Japanese dependence on foreign ships is still increasing. Loading ratio between Japanese ships and foreign ships in the same year, is shown in the following table.

|                 |       |
|-----------------|-------|
| Japanese ships  | 41.0% |
| Chartered ships | 26.6% |
| Foreign ships   | 32.4% |

Next, the loading ratio of Japanese ships has been gradually decreasing. As for the modernization of ships, improvements and labor saving efforts like the development of collision warning system, the introduction of satellite communications and installation in the birdge of remote control engineering terminals, have been strongly promoted.

As of July, 1986, 54 ships were making experimental voyages, 39 of them are 18 sailors ships and the other 14 ships are run by 14 sailors. [Note: MO ships, ships with no one on watch in the engine room, make up 56% or 580 ships of Japanese foreign traders. Among them, ships having more sophisticated equipment and labor-saving system accounted for 15% (159 ships) at the end of 1985, and 194 ships by

October 1986.] But the high cost of these sophisticated and labor-saving equipments hinders the recovery of Japanese shipping's capability for international competition.

As for national security, the Shipping and Ship building rationalization council, an advisory body of the Ministry of Transport, pointed out that, in case of emergency in the future, shipping will be essential for securing the secure transport of things necessary for the economy of Japan, a country which relies upon foreign trade for most of her economic activities. From this stand point of view, Japanese registered ships have a very great significance for the security of Japan.

And in the interim report at 1985, it was recommended that the proper size of Japanese merchant fleet for 1990, will be 50 million tons. The breakdown of which is as follows. Number of modernized Japanese registered ships run by Japanese sailors will be 350 ships 20 million tons. Ships run by mixed crews will be 9 million tons and the amount of chartered ships 21 million tons. In this report, it was also stated that the numbers of Japanese sailors necessary for a fleet of this size is about 6,400 officers and 5,900 men, or totally of 12,300.

But the number of hulls in this report, seems to be based on the assumption that the demand for shipping and loading ratio remain the same as at present. Further, this report seems to pay attention only to the economic point of view, and not from the stand point of security. A typical example is that it comes to the conclusion that the number of hulls will be reduced by a slowing down of economic growth rate in the future and a decline of international competitive capability, i.e., by purely economical factors and with no sense of national size of merchant fleet.

But, when the goal of this report is achieved, Japan may be able to handle the hardships in emergency. These ships and sailors may match the minimum number of ships that is the result of experimental studies I have introduced before. It estimates the minimum amount of import in emergency to be about 200 million tons.

And, in that studies, it is also estimated that, in order to maintain the estimated amount of imports, monthly operations of 50-60 tankers (Average size of a ship is assumed to be 130,000-150,000t.) and

250-350 cargo ships (Average size of a ship is assumed to be 25,000-35,000t.) will be necessary.

But, if Japanese shipping fails to recover her international competitive capability and keeps operating in a deficit, each shipping companies will devote their attention to cost-saving, and as the result of it, they will hire foreign sailors. Then, the number of Japanese ships run by Japanese sailors may keep falling as the number of ships chartering and mixed boading. If so, keeping the minimum amount of Japanese registered ships, as stated in the report, will become just a pie in the sky dream.

It is a basic concept of national security to maintain stable shipping in view of the threat of enemy submarines and aircraft in emergency. In order to keep stable shipping, it is essential to maintain Japanese registered ships run by Japanese sailors. Also, when we take battle casualties into consideration, it is questionable if we can operate modernized and labor-saving ships with fewer sailors. Attention must be paid to maintaining the necessary number of sailors.

In order to accomplish mission of maritime transportation in national emergency for the Japanese shipping communities, the construction of a National Policy, based on a sense of national security, is definitely necessary.

#### IV. Security of SLOC and Perspective


##### 1. SLOC

As I said before, the sources of Japanese imports are concentrated in certain areas and countries in the world. That is to say, in 1985, about 260 million tons (43.8%) of crude oil, gas and wood came from South West Asia (including Middle East) and South East Asia, about 123 million tons (20.8%) of iron ore, bauxite, coal, nickle, and wheat from Oceania, about 94 million tons (15.9%) of coal, soybean and wheat from North America, and 53 million tons (9.0%) of iron ore,

salt, and crude oil from Latin America. Consequently, to obtain minimum amount of these major materials, such as crude oil, iron ore, coal and grain in national emergency, we must consider the security of SLOCs, to and from South West and South East Asia, Oceania, and American Continents.

Characteristics of each SLOCs are as follows.

#### South-West and South East Asia Routes



Note) NM: Nautical Mile.


All of the very Large Crude Carriers (180,000-300,000t) from South West Asia pass through the Malacca Straits, but only a few deeper draft Ultra Large Crude Carriers (300,000-500,000t) take the route via Lombok Strait, then transit through the waters of the Indonesian and Filipino Islands. The SLOCs from South East Asia as well as West Australia join with the SLOC from South West Asia by way of Lombok.

In emergency or war time, ships from South West and South East Asia, and West Australia, will use either SLOC Route-1 or 2, depending on the situation (Routes are indicated in the chart in previous page. These routes are not officially numbered, but for convenience only in this issue). In SLOC from South West Asia, it is reported that there are some problems such as the effect of the Iran-


Iraq war in the Persian Gulf, and pirates in the Malacca Straits. In war time, it is estimated that this SLOC will be under heavy threat by the Soviet submarines and aircraft from bases in Coastal Area of Siberia, Cam Ranh Bay, Nicobal and other bases in South East Asia. It will be a very serious and difficult situation from the security stand point of view. And it will be very important to maintain the security of this SLOC.

In addition to this, Indonesia and Philippine had declared the state of archipelago in 1960 and 1961 respectively, and regard the waters surrounding the archipelagoes of both countries, as their internal waters. We have to consider that ships are steaming this area as the innocent passage.

#### Oceania Routes



The SLOC from West Coast of Australia joins with that from South East Asia via the Lombok Strait. But, the main route is the SLOC from the East Coast of Australia northwards. In peace time, there is no problem on this SLOC. However, in war time, Soviet submarines and aircraft may easily reach this route and attack it. We have to pay keen attention to the Soviet Union's recent active approach to islands countries in the vicinity of this SLOC in the South Pacific.



Generally, the SLOCs from North and Central America are the northern great circle route in summer, and is southern composite route via the Central Pacific near Hawaii in winter. The SLOC from South America is similarly the southern composite route via the Central Pacific near Hawaii in winter. In war time, the main route from North America would have to be concentrated on the southern route via Hawaii, Guam and along the Bonin islands, because the northern great circle route from North America passes just south of Kamchatka and the Kuril Islands, and heavy threats from Soviet submarines and aircraft will be anticipated. This southern SLOC would also be the main continuous military reinforcement and logistic support route for U.S. Forces deployed in Far East. As I mentioned before, the SLOC north of Guam will possibly join with the SLOC from Oceania.

To sum up, there are three major SLOCs vital to the survival and war endurance of Japan, that is to say, the SLOC from South West Asia, South East Asia and and some part of Oceania via Malacca or Lombok Strait, the SLOC from major part of Oceania via Guam and along with Bonin Islands, and the SLOC from American Continents via Hawaii, Guam and the Bonin Islands.

These three SLOCs will be also very important, both for countries

like South Korea, Philippines and Taiwan to maintain their imports, and for U.S. Forces to receive reinforcements.

## 2. Defense of SLOCs

Those three SLOCs I just mentioned, are vital for Japan. However, they are also very much related to the national security and the defense of SLOCs for the countries in the North East Asia, the South East Asia, the North West pacific and the Indian Ocean. So, we can say that the defense of these SLOCs are a common subject for the nations in these regions.

However, these countries and regions have different backgrounds in their society, history, politics, economy, military and geography, and there is no firm collective security system like NATO. So it is not easy to promote the cooperation and mutual assistance in the defense of long SLOCs in this wide area against the growing threat of the Soviet Union. Therefore, we have to make steady and step by step efforts to establish cooperation of groups of countries that have common interests, a common perception and common measures of defense against Soviet threat.

In North East Asia, there are security treaties between Japan-U.S.A. and South Korea-U.S.A. As for the security of Taiwan, there is a national law in the U.S.A., related to the security of Taiwan, so the U.S. maintains firm security relations with these countries.

The common war scenario for those four nations is that a direct conflict between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. in Western Europe or South Asia is not confined to that region but escalates or expands into a world wide war. In this situation, it would be very difficult for Japan and South Korea to maintain their neutrality because of their security treaties with U.S.A. and their geographical location. Then to SLOCs 1,000 nm from Japan, which Japan intends to secure, are vital to South Korea and Taiwan too.

Especially, South Korea's SLOCs take the South Western or South Eastern route in Japanese SLOCs' waters, then cross the Tsushima

Strait via the waters west of Kyushyu. In case of conflict between North Korea and South Korea by the North's invasion of the South, the defense of SLOCs for South Korea and U.S. Forces in Korea is strongly related to the maritime defense in this region.

It is very difficult for Japan to defend these long SLOCs by herself. So, based on Japan-U.S. security treaty, we intend to defend them by cooperation with the U.S.A. Following this policy, Japan makes it her main mission to defend the SLOCs to a distance of 1,000 nm radius from Japan, including the three bottle neck straits of Soya, Tsugaru and Tsushima (Southern half of Korean-Strait). On the other hand, Japan expects the U.S.A. to defend the SLOCs outside the 1,000 nm radius. This area of 1,000 nm radius is the one that three major SLOCs concentrate on, the fishery waters of Japan and the one within JASREP (north of 17 deg. N.Lat., west of 165 deg. E.Long.) based on SAR treaty '79, where Japan is responsible for conducting SAR.

The Japanese ASW operation to defend SLOCs will contribute not only to the Japanese SLOCs' security but also to the protection of SLOCs for South Korea and Taiwan. It will also contribute to the security of countries beyond this area and the defense of SLOCs in the South East Asia, the South Pacific and the Indian Ocean.

The reason is that this area, including three straits, forms a bottle neck for Soviet surface combatants and submarines advancing into the outer oceans, and is also the operational area for U.S. Naval Force who support the defense of North East Asia, and the reinforcement route for U.S. Forces to be deployed as well as the logistic supply route for the U.S. Forces already deployed in the Far East. However, this area is so wide, i.e., about 3 times as wide as the Mediterranean Sea or almost the same as the area of about 500 nm radius expanding from the northernmost tip of Norway through England and the Iberian Peninsula to Morocco.

So, the Japanese force level authorized in the Defense Program Outline of 1976, that will be roughly achieved at the completion of the mid-Term Defense Build-Up Program from 1986 to 1990, (about 100 P-3Cs, about 60 DDs and DEs, 16 Submarines, about 35 MCM ships, and about 100 ASW helicopters) is not enough to defend these SLOCs.

Therefore, after 1991, we need to further develop our capability to defend the 1,000 nm SLOCs by increasing the fleet AAW capability against the threat from Backfires as well as strengthening surface ships, aircrafts and C<sup>3</sup>I etc, both in terms of quality as well as quantity. In addition to this, the defense of the SLOCs in the North East Asia and the North West Pacific, military cooperation among Japan-U.S.A., South Korea-U.S.A. as well as Japan-South Korea, especially in the area around Korea-Strait, will be very important. And we may also have to promote the military cooperation to defend the waters around Taiwan, including the Taiwan Strait, the Bashi Strait and the South China Sea.

We also have to handle the defense of the Malacca Strait against the threat from Cam Ranh Bay, by the cooperative efforts among nations in South East Asia. Furthermore, we have to solve the problem of the maintenance of U.S. bases in the Philippines and the Soviet's approach to the South Pacific Nations.

If we succeed to promote our efforts toward the goal of defending the SLOCs, to cooperate among countries in this region, and to coordinate with the global strategy of the U.S. Navy, the future of the SLOCs' defense by western nations in the Pacific and Indian Oceans will be very bright. This will also contribute to the deterrence against large scale war.

# MARITIME TRANSPORT AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

—The Experience of Korea—

*Seo-Hang Lee*

## I. Introduction: Development of Korea's Marine Interests

It is assumed that the facts of geography and socio-economic environments are the two major components affecting the national marine interest.<sup>1</sup> Surrounded by seas in three directions and with its given political and socio-economic conditions, the Republic of Korea has developed various marine policy areas.

With its significant domestic consumption of fishery products, and the continued confrontation with the Communist North since the early 1950s, the Korean marine interests has been traditionally emphasized on two major issues, i.e., coastal fisheries and defense against North Korean infiltration by way of the sea. However, since the mid-1960s, several major environmental changes—such as the rapid industrialization of the Korean economy with increased energy needs, technological advances, and the changing international maritime order—challenged this traditional hierarchy of national marine interest and multiplied marine policy areas.

As a result, exploration of shelf resources (oil and gas in parti-

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1. Lewis M. Alexander, "Indices of National Interest in the Oceans," *Ocean Development and International Law* 1 (No. 1, 1973), p. 23; and J.R.V. Prescott, *The Political Geography of the Oceans* (London: David & Charles, 1976), p. 15.

[Table 1] Status of Marine Issues in Korea

| Marine Policy Issue                                        | 1950-60 | 1960-70 | 1970-80 | 1980- |
|------------------------------------------------------------|---------|---------|---------|-------|
| Defense (Anti-Maritime Infiltration)                       | Major   | Major   | Major   | Major |
| Coastal Fisheries                                          | Major   | Major   | Major   | Major |
| Distant-Water Fisheries                                    | Minor   | Major   | Major   | Major |
| Maritime Transport                                         | Minor   | Minor   | Major   | Major |
| Shelf Resources (Oil and Gas)                              | Minor   | Major   | Major   | Major |
| Overall Regime Structure<br>(including policies on UNCLOS) | Minor   | Minor   | Major   | Minor |
| Pollution                                                  |         | Minor   | Major   | Major |
| Scientific Research                                        |         | Minor   | Minor   | Minor |
| Deep Sea-Bed Mining                                        |         |         | Minor   | Minor |

Source: Status of each marine issue was assessed by the author according to the time of Korean government's enactment. The framework of this table is derived from Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), p. 97.

cular), maritime transport (shipping), pollution control, and distant-water fisheries were added to the category of Korea's major marine issues in the mid-1980s. In addition, concerns over scientific research, deep sea-bed mining, and overall ocean regime questions (such as policy on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea) began to emerge gradually. Today, an explosion of marine issues and shrinkage of policy space among issues are being envisaged (see Table 1).

In terms of the scale of activity, shipping is one of the most important ocean uses. Maritime commerce is carried by a fleet of ships ready to respond to commercial opportunities throughout the world.<sup>2</sup> Ships are the predominant vehicles for international trade

2. Maritime transport can be classified according to two general types of service: charter (bulk) shipping and liner shipping. Charter shipping is non-scheduled, tends to deal in shipload lot, will go anywhere, and sets prices through free competition. It can be subdivided into the carriage of liquid bulk (crude oil, chemicals, and other liquid bulk) or dry bulk (grains, metal ores, and coal, for example). In contrast, liner trade carries less-than-shipload lots, usually sails on rigid schedules on defined routes, and are ordinarily centralized. See R.A. Ramsay, "The Organization of Shipping," *Ocean Yearbook 1* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), pp. 212-13.

and create significant economic benefits. Over the past few years the rapid growth of the national merchant marine has become a key factor in Korea's emergence as a rising economic and maritime power. From a relatively modest base, Korean shipping capacity has grown to a position of global prominence.

It is in this context that the author would like to examine the role of maritime transport in national development from the perspective of Korean experience. The primary focus will be given to patterns of Korea's oceanborne trade and various characteristic of its shipping policy. This primary focus will be followed by security issues of Korean maritime transport.

## II. Importance of Oceanborne Trade and Its Patterns for Korea

As conveyed by the catchphrase of the "outward-looking development strategy," Korea has stressed foreign trade as a means of furthering its economic well-being. Exports increased from \$250 million in 1966 to \$30 billion in 1985, with an average rate of increase of 28 percent per year. Imports also expanded remarkably during the same period, rising from \$720 million to \$31 billion.<sup>3</sup> Thus its ratio of the value of foreign trade to the gross national product (GNP) exceeded 70% in 1985.

This growth both in exports and imports has brought about a new challenge: the development of a shipping industry. The significance of shipborne trade in Korea may be seen by comparing it with airborne trade. Over the last decade, shipborne trade has accounted for more than 99 percent of total foreign trade, whereas airborne trade has represented less than one percent. No cargo movement over land has been reported, as Korea does not trade with the Communist regime of North Korea. Hence, the vital importance of shipping has never been doubted.

3. *Major Statistics of Korean Economy, 1986* (Seoul: Economic Planning Board, 1986), p. 223.

[Table 2] Korea's Total Seaborne Trade, 1975-1985 (tonnage in thousands)

| Year | Exports | % Change<br>by Year | Imports | % Change<br>by Year | Total   |
|------|---------|---------------------|---------|---------------------|---------|
| 1975 | 9,985   |                     | 35,142  |                     | 45,127  |
| 1976 | 14,311  | +43.3               | 41,447  | +17.9               | 55,758  |
| 1977 | 16,814  | +17.5               | 51,498  | +24.3               | 68,312  |
| 1978 | 16,038  | -4.6                | 61,843  | +20.1               | 77,881  |
| 1979 | 17,828  | +11.2               | 72,992  | +18.0               | 90,820  |
| 1980 | 22,682  | +27.2               | 71,353  | -2.2                | 94,035  |
| 1981 | 26,297  | +15.9               | 79,024  | +10.8               | 105,321 |
| 1982 | 27,569  | +4.8                | 80,938  | +2.4                | 105,507 |
| 1983 | 29,279  | +6.2                | 88,905  | +9.8                | 118,184 |
| 1984 | 30,617  | +4.6                | 95,119  | +7.0                | 125,736 |
| 1985 | 31,899  | +4.2                | 101,112 | +6.3                | 133,011 |

Source: *Statistics Yearbook of Maritime and Ports, 1986* (Seoul: Korea Maritime and Port Administration, 1986), p. 152.

Table 2 summarizes the recent trends of Korean shipborne trade. Total exported seaborne cargo tonnage increased remarkably in the past 10 years; total seaborne imports in cargo tonnage also steadily expanded over the same period. Thus the total volume of shipborne trade exceeded 130 million tons in 1985. This figure represents about 3.5 percent in total world trade volume.

As shown in Table 2, Korea imports much more than it exports, approximately at the ratio of 3 to 1. Its imports are raw materials such as ores, coal and oil; Korea's exports are manufactured and consumer goods. Its major export trade is with North America, Japan, and Southeast Asia. On a tonnage basis, North America and Japan trade represent 18.5 million tons, 58 percent of Korea's total exports of 31.9 million tons in 1985.<sup>4</sup> The predominant exports are iron material and cement at 10 million tons.

The total tonnage of its imports in 1985 was over 100 million tons. Crude oil is the single largest import item, totalling over 30 million tons. Since it has no domestic petroleum production, Korea

4. The data cited in this section are based on *Statistics Year-book of Maritime and Ports, 1986* (Seoul: Korea Maritime and Port Administration, 1986), pp. 354-57.

is highly dependent on foreign sources, mainly from the Middle East and southeast Asia. By tonnage, crude oil represents almost one-third of Korea's imports. It is followed by coal and iron ores totalling 19.8 million and 13.6 million tons respectively. By trading area, Korea remains heavily unbalanced in its Southeast Asia trade, importing 25 million tons and exporting 5.9 million tons. This lack of balanced trade stems from increased crude oil reliance on Indonesia.

Most of Korea's oceanborne trade is carried from the ports of Pusan, Pohang and Ulsan on the Southeastern coast and Incheon in the West. These four ports represent over 75 percent of Korea's total foreign by tonnage.

Finally, among major world trade routes, Korea depends primarily on the following four routes: (1) Across the Asian waters East of Malacca, including the South and East China Seas and the Sea of Japan; (2) Eastward across the Indian Ocean and through the Malacca Straits; (3) From the Eastern Atlantic and onward across the Indian Ocean and through the Malacca Straits; and (4) Westward across the Pacific.<sup>5</sup>

### III. Major Characteristics of Korea's Shipping Policy

A nation's foreign trade and shipping are complementary in their functions. As noted earlier, Korea's steady increase of foreign trade in the past few decades has led remarkable expansion of commercial maritime transport. Insofar as Korea stresses foreign trade as a means

5. Other major world trade routes are: (1) Across the Mediterranean; (2) Via the Indian Ocean and the Eastern Atlantic; (3) The Eastern Atlantic, including the North Sea and the English Channel; (4) Across the Indian Ocean and onward via the Eastern Atlantic; and (5) Eastward across the Atlantic to Western Europe. See Yuan-li Wu, *Raw Material Supply in a Multipolar World*, cited in Dalchoong Kim, "Resource Dependence and Maritime Transportation of Japan," in Dalchoong Kim and Euisoon Shin, eds., *Energy Policies in Korea and Japan* (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1986), p. 129.

of furthering its economic well-being, shipping remains one of the major national marine policy sectors.

Korea's shipping policy has been characterized by the following features. First of all, it has placed major emphasis on the expansion of national shipping capacity to complement a rapid growth of foreign trade.<sup>6</sup> Korea, as a developing state, believed that the lack of a strong national merchant marine tended to limit the growth of foreign trade, with the net effect of constraining national growth. In fact, reliance on foreign shipping affected the final price of the country's exports and imports adversely, and often arbitrarily, and thereby its general competitive position in international trade. Thus, in order to increase exports, the Korean government subsidized expansion of shipping capacity; export promotion without an appropriate transportation policy was seen as short-sighted. Moreover, promotion of national shipping was seen as a means of supporting general national economic development and reinforcing national security.

The most prominent policy guideline in expanding shipping capacity has been the so-called "Planned Shipbuilding Project" which was announced at the 32nd economic ministers' meeting in November 1975.<sup>7</sup> In the past, the growth of Korean merchant fleet was completely dependent upon imports of foreign ships and hire-purchasing deals. Until 1975, the total tonnage of Korean merchant fleet was below 2.5 million tons and merchant ships acquired by these two methods represented 80 percent of total tonnage.<sup>8</sup>

However, domestic shipbuilding was given an initial boost through the "Planned Shipbuilding Project." This project included various government financial supports, such as extending funds for up to 50 percent of the total shipbuilding cost, and exemption of import duties on all shipbuilding materials.<sup>9</sup> Moreover, as the

6. *Sekey-sokui Hankuk Haeun Hangman* [Korean Shipping and Ports in the World] (Seoul: Korea Maritime and Port Administration, 1979), p. 136.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 130.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 150.

9. *Ibid.*, pp. 140-46.

government selected the shipbuilding industry<sup>10</sup> as one of the four strategic heavy and chemical industries to be developed in the Fourth Five-Year Economic Development Plan (1977-1981), the shipbuilding industry received considerable public and private investments. Along with machinery and electronics industries, it obtained more than one-fourth of total manufacturing investment between 1976 and 1981.<sup>10</sup> Technological innovation, quality improvement and market development were accompanied this investment. As a result, the shipbuilding industry in Korea has become one of the largest in the world, next to the Japanese.

Korea's shipbuilding industry grew, in part, because the industry was declining in the West, while world shipping was increasing. Although Korea's shipbuilding has been mainly export-oriented, a large portion of its oceangoing merchant ships were built by this "Planned Shipbuilding Project."<sup>11</sup> Thus, by the end of 1985, the total shipping capacity of Korea had expanded to well over 7 million tons. This 1985 figure indicates that Korea stands 13th in the world in terms of tonnage, comprising 1.7 percent of the world total tonnage of oceangoing vessels.<sup>12</sup>

The second major emphasis in implementing Korean shipping policy was placed on expanding participation by Korean carriers in the haulage of general cargo, i.e., increasing its national flag share of ocean shipment. International shipping is often cited as a major earner of foreign currency. However, prior to the mid-1970s, Korea's national flag share of oceanborne shipments was less than the target amount set by government policy.<sup>13</sup> Recognizing this, Korea has paid much attention to increasing its flag share of ocean

10. Samuel P.S. Ho, "South Korea and Taiwan: Development Prospects and Problems in the 1980s," *Asian Survey* 21 (December 1981), p. 1181.

11. *Shipbuilding Data Bank* (Seoul: Korea Shipbuilding Association, 1983), p. 146.

12. *Lloyd's Register of Shipping* (London: Lloyd's Register of Shipping, 1985), Statistical Tables, p. 5.

13. In general, developing countries generate more than 60 percent of world cargo movements, but their fleets amount to less than 10 percent of the world fleet. See Ramsay, "The Organization of Shipping," p. 214.

carriage.

The Korea Maritime and Port Administration (KMPA), which is primarily responsible for the formulation and implementation of Korean maritime transport policy, has launched a massive drive to increase national flag share of shipment under the catchphrase "our cargo in our ships made by our own hands" since 1976. The KMPA set a goal of a ratio of 50 percent of Korean cargo under the national flag. As reflected by the catchphrase, the government's effort to increase the national flag share has been largely supported by the development of domestic shipbuilding industry. The 1985 figure of the national flag share indicates over 48 percent for import, and 43 percent for export respectively (see Table 3).

Finally, like other developing maritime nations, Korea has paid a considerable attention to restructuring world shipping rules. In particular, the government has been involved in the international drive to restructure the rules governing "liner services." Globally, the market for liner shipping differs from that of any other shipping,

[Table 3] National Flag Share of Ocean Carriage, 1976-1985  
(tonnage in thousands)

| Year | Export      |               |         | Import      |               |         | B.O.C. |
|------|-------------|---------------|---------|-------------|---------------|---------|--------|
|      | Total Cargo | National Flag | % Share | Total Cargo | National Flag | % Share |        |
| 1976 | 14,311      | 6,399         | 44.7    | 41,447      | 12,222        | 29.5    | 3,309  |
| 1977 | 16,814      | 7,327         | 43.6    | 51,498      | 19,104        | 37.1    | 3,275  |
| 1978 | 16,039      | 8,899         | 55.5    | 61,843      | 30,518        | 49.3    | 5,389  |
| 1979 | 17,828      | 10,172        | 57.1    | 72,992      | 34,604        | 47.4    | 7,613  |
| 1980 | 22,682      | 11,958        | 52.7    | 71,353      | 30,673        | 43.0    | 11,437 |
| 1981 | 26,297      | 12,589        | 47.9    | 79,024      | 29,582        | 37.4    | 19,891 |
| 1982 | 27,569      | 13,281        | 48.2    | 80,938      | 38,178        | 47.2    | 32,835 |
| 1983 | 29,279      | 13,508        | 46.1    | 88,905      | 42,201        | 47.5    | 38,107 |
| 1984 | 30,617      | 13,589        | 44.4    | 95,119      | 44,555        | 46.8    | 34,191 |
| 1985 | 31,899      | 13,785        | 43.2    | 101,112     | 49,015        | 48.5    | 27,481 |

\*B.O.C. stands for "between other countries."

Source: *Statistics Yearbook of Maritime and Ports, 1986* (Seoul: Korea Maritime and Port Administration, 1986), pp. 152-153.

e.g., charter shipping; charter shipping fits the classic description of a pure competitive market, but liner shipping is organized into cartels. In the charter market, no firm or decision maker is capable of affecting the prices bid or offered for ship tonnage. In the liner market, however, shipowners organize into associations called conferences and agree among themselves as to the prices the conference will charge for supplying services and the quantity of ton-mile carriage capacity that each member will place in the conference.<sup>14</sup>

A conference is usually organized for each one-way trade. For instance, there is a conference that serves Korean and Japanese exports to the West Coast of the United States and Canada (Trans-Pacific Freight Conference), and another conference that serves U.S. and Canadian West Coast exports to Korea and the Far East (Pacific Westbound Conference). However, the liner conferences serving Korean ports have been monopolized by foreign shipowners, especially from the United States and Japan. Hence, they have always been the subject of complaints, partly on account of the level of rates and partly on account of the dictatorial attitude adopted by many conferences. Consequently, there has been pressure from the Korean shipping industry to establish non-discriminatory international liner services.

The Korean campaign to restructure world shipping rules was carried out in multilateral negotiating forums, as well as through bilateral channels. Symbolic of the political momentum of developing states in the 1983 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences. The Code of Conduct approves preferential treatment for national merchant marines, including the rights of a country to participate in the carriage of the cargoes based on the 40:40:20 formula. This means that each trading partner country has the right to carry 40 percent of its liner cargoes, leaving the remaining 20 percent for carriage by third-flag vessels (or "cross-traders").<sup>15</sup>

14. Edgar Gold, *Maritime Transport: The Evolution of International Marine Policy and Shipping Law* (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Co., 1981), p. 115.

15. Details on the negotiations of the UNCTAD Shipping Committee may be found in *Ibid.*, p. 346-56.

Korean leadership in the movement has been generally recognized, although it is still uncertain to what extent the major shipping powers will accept this particular code of conduct.

To sum up, the rapid growth of the Korean merchant marine stands out in the Third World under the government-lead interventionist policies. However, such interventionist policies are often cited as major causes of over-expansion of the shipping industry. Currently, the Korean shipping industry is reshaping its internal structure under the government-launched Shipping Industry Rationalization Plan (SIRP), a huge merge and purge scheme that through 1983 and 1984 forcibly merged the staff and assets of 66 companies into just 17 KMPA nominated lead companies.<sup>16</sup>

#### IV. Security Issues of Korean Maritime Transport

As noted earlier, Korea's economic viability completely depends upon foreign trade on the seas. Recognizing this, the Korean government has articulated its maritime interests largely in terms of the security-development doctrine.<sup>17</sup> This doctrine emphasizes the defense of the Korean waters, thereby providing a stable environment favorable for development. Thus the doctrine links national growth to expansion of security responsibilities. Adequate security measures are required to provide a congenial environment for development; as development proceeds, security responsibilities will need to grow accordingly.

With regard to the issue of maritime transport, the Korean government has emphasized the defense of sea-lanes, which could ensure transport of goods into and from Korea to its trading

16. For the details of SIRP, see "Korea: Life after SIRP," *Lloyd's Maritime Asia* (March 1987), pp. 15-17; and "Korean Survey: First the Merge, now for the Purge," *Lloyd's Maritime Asia* (August 1984), pp. 19-31.

17. Seo-Hang Lee, "South Korean Marine Policy and the Law of the Sea" (Ph.D. dissertation, Kent State University, 1984), p. 211.

partners, in public statements. Among the series of notable events which awakened the government to sea-lanes defence were: (1) the Six-Day War of 1967 in the Middle East, resulting in the closure of the Suez Canal; (2) Malaysia's extension of its territorial waters from 3 miles to 12 miles in 1969; and (3) the 1971 declaration by Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore which intended to "de-internationalize" the Malacca Straits.<sup>18</sup> The Malacca route, in particular, is a major path for super-tanker traffic between the Middle East and the East Asian waters to Korea.

Recently, the government's great concern has arisen over two offensive movements undertaken by the communist regimes. They are: (1) an increase in the number of North Korean submarines and fast attack craft; and (2) the extended use of the Sea of Japan and the Korea Straits by the Soviet Navy since the late 1970s.

While defense of sea-lanes in the major water bodies, such as the Pacific and the Indian Oceans, will necessarily involve cooperation with the United States and other allies, Korea has moved unilaterally to secure shipping in its own waters. The Korean Navy stands out in East Asia as having a growing and respectable anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability in response to North Korea's considerable lead in submarine and fast-attack craft.<sup>19</sup> Korea has been developing this capability for anti-submarine warfare, as well as anti-surface and anti-air warfare capabilities through the United States-supported five-year Force Improvement Plan (FIP) since 1976.<sup>20</sup>

For its part, the Korea Straits retains strategic importance for connecting the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea. For the Soviet Union, the Straits provides a major ocean route connecting Vladivostok and the East China Sea. If the Soviet Navy did not use the Korea Straits, it would have to travel more than twice as far from Vladivostok

18. Choon-ho Park, "Shing Kayoho-to Kitahigashi Ajia Ni Okeru Ssi-Lang Boi" [The New Law of the Sea and Sea-Lane Defense in Northeast Asia] *Defense Information* (Tokyo), July 1983, p. 46.

19. *Military Balance, 1986-87* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1986), pp. 160-61.

20. U.S. Congress. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *U.S. Troop Withdrawal From the Republic of Korea*, 95th Congress, 2nd Session, 1978, p. 44.

to the Senkakus by going the La Perouse route (north of Hokkaido of Japan and south of Sakhalin), thereby affecting Indian Ocean operations, China coast patrols, and submarine deployments from Nkhodka.<sup>21</sup>

Since the Soviet Union has shown as keen awareness over eastern Siberia as a vast and resource-rich domain, the importance of the Korea Straits has grown as a transport route. Between the main part of the Soviet Union and Siberia, there are no all-weather, hard surfaced, through roads. All support must go by the Trans-Siberian Railroad, by air, or by ship through the Indian Ocean and the Korea Straits. Thus, the movements of its naval vessels through the Korea Straits in support of the development of Siberia have increased year by year. In the past five years, the number of Soviet naval vessels passing the Straits amounted to 155; military aircraft flights over the Straits and the adjacent seas amounted to more than 260 (see Illustration). The Soviet naval activities and military aircraft movements over the Straits are likely to increase in view of the Straits' growing importance.


No doubt Korea is very sensitive to such an increased use of the Korea Straits and the adjacent seas by the Soviet Union. The Korean government regards the expansion of the Soviet Navy and the growing extent of its movements through the Korean Straits as a long-term threat to the nation's peace and stability, including sea-lanes of communication. For this reason, the Korean government is reportedly seeking an appropriate arrangement to reduce the Soviet threat; an extension of the Straits' present exceptional measure of the 3-mile territorial sea limit to 12 miles, thus abolishing the so-called "high seas corridors" in the Straits.<sup>22</sup>

Such an extension of territorial sea limits in the Straits, however, would entail various international political and legal problems. First of all, it requires Japanese collaboration. The Western Channel of

21. James T. Westwood, "The Soviet Union and the Southern Sea Route," *Naval War College Review* 35 (January-February 1982), p. 58.

22. The "high seas corridor" in the Western Channel of the Korea Straits was created by Korea's Presidential Decree No. 8994 of 1978 and Japan's Law No. 30 of 1977.

ILLUSTRATION  
Soviet Naval Activities and Military Aircraft  
Movements Around the Korea Straits



the Korea Straits is approximately 22 miles wide. Without an extension of territorial sea limits to 12 miles by Japan, there still remains the "high seas corridor" in the Straits. Reportedly the Japanese government is reluctant to join Korea by extending the present 3-miles' territorial sea limit in the Western Channel to 12 miles.

Secondly, most importantly, the Western Channel of the Korea Straits is known as one of the "international straits" which are used for international navigation. In international straits, freedom of passage is guaranteed. This general principle of free transit in international straits has been strongly supported by the major maritime powers, including the United States, and incorporated into the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea under the new legal regime of "transit passage."<sup>23</sup> Hence, in the Korea Straits all ships and aircraft, both military and commercial, enjoy the right of transit passage; this right shall not be impeded and cannot be suspended for security, or any other, reasons.<sup>24</sup>

In view of these reasons, the Soviet military passage through the Korea Straits is unlikely to be controlled by Korea. Insofar as the Soviet Union continues to use the Korea Straits and the adjacent seas militarily, it emerges as one of the major security issues of Korean maritime transport.<sup>25</sup>

23. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, UN Doc. A/Conf. 62/122 (1982), Article 38.

24. However, any activity threatening a coastal state would violate the general regime of innocent transit, in which case transit could be denied for want of innocence. In the absence of such activity, the only remedy for any threat of force—for example, a threat which may be implicit in the mere fact of the transit of a large number of warships—is to pursue the matter as a breach of international law through diplomatic channels and dispute settlement procedures. See R.R. Churchill and A.V. Lowe, *The Law of the Sea* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1983), p. 85.

25. To control the Soviet military passage through the Korean Straits, the blockade of the Straits by the Korean navy was once suggested. However, the blockade, or the threat of blockade, is not conceivable under normal circumstances for political and military reasons. For detailed conditions on naval blockade, see D.P. O'Connell, *The International Law of the Sea*, vol. II, ed., I.A. Shearer (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), pp. 1150-58.

## V. Conclusions

Korea has stressed foreign trade as a means of furthering its economic well-being. Korea's steady increases of foreign trade in the past few decades has been accompanied by the remarkable expansion of commercial maritime transport and promotion of merchant marine has been regarded a means of supporting economic development and reinforcing national security. Under this policy, Korea has expanded its national shipping capacity and increased national flag share of shipment. This past experience of Korea on maritime transport may be explained in terms of the security-development doctrine. The doctrine emphasizes the defense of the Korean waters including the sea lanes of communication, thereby providing a stable environment favorable for economic development.

Recently, Korean maritime concerns have focused on the increase in the number of North Korean attack vessels and the extended Soviet military use of its offshore waters, especially the Korea Straits. Such offensive posture and naval movements undertaken by North Korea and the Soviet Union do pose a serious latent threat to Korean maritime trade routes. Thus, a heavy burden falls upon the Korean government to seek means to obviate the perceived intimidation.

# RESOURCES, SEA LANES OF COMMUNICATION AND THE POTENTIAL FOR FUTURE CONFLICT IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC BASIN

*Malcolm J. Kennedy*

— Overview —

This paper examines food, raw materials, living space, energy and strategic mineral resources in terms of their location, demand, supply and transport to the nations of the Asian-Pacific Basin. In addition the paper considers the roles played by the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union and the South Africa in the supply of certain key mineral resources. Finally, the potential for conflict over these resources has been evaluated on a scale of low to high and short and long term risk.

## **I. Introduction**

There are many types of international conflict which can range from short term disagreements and periods of tension through to a condition of limited or total war. The cause of conflict and war has only become the subject of serious academic research and writing

during the last hundred years and more especially during the last fifty years. It is clear from the work of Beer, Bernard, Blainey, and Singer that most conflicts which escalate into war are multi-causal, however, there is evidence which points to a number of primary causal factors which act to trigger the conflict and generate the necessary and sufficient conditions which result in war.<sup>1</sup>

Territorial disputes, trade barriers, restrictions on the flow of resources, political oppression and ideological imperatives are some of the more common and important primary conflict factors that have preceeded wars. These primary causes of conflict can, in concert with factors such as military strength, assurances from allies, internal and external unity, memory of war, economic capacity, nationalism and ideology, leadership and perceptions of the ability to win the war, all play a part in the final step into war.<sup>2</sup>

A fundamental factor in the prevention of war, identified by Blainey, is that of explicit military power and the will to use it. This is the best form of deterrence.<sup>3</sup> My emphasis is even greater. Near equivalences or balances of power between rivals are especially unstable and war-provoking. Equality of power between like societies rarely leads to war but the historic record shows that power parity in rival systems is very often tested by the resort to war. *Power is a wasting asset*. It must be constantly renewed and refurbished-just as the will to use power must be repeatedly and convincingly reaffirmed. Today the most dramatic exercises of this truth are demonstrated by communist states or communist insurgent groups. Power must be exercised or rivals will subvert the basis of power, bleed away a nation's allies and eventually undermine a nation's will to use its strength. It then takes little skills by a enemy to use the faltering nation's power against itself to bring it down or neutralise it.

William H. McNeill's brilliant book *The Pursuit of Power* provides a long run study of the relationship between economic and

1. See the References for Beer, Bernard, Blainey and Singer, Blainey's work has been recognised as perhaps the most incisive study of power relations and war.

2. Blainey, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

3. *Ibid.*, pp. 16-7.

political organisation of societies, their level of technology and their ability to use power to secure and maintain national goals. He warns that "A well-equipped and organized armed force, making contact with a society not equally well organized for war, acts in much the same way as germs of a disease-experienced society do. The weaker community, in such an encounter, may suffer heavy loss of life in combat. . . whatever the exact combination of factors, a society unable to protect itself by force from foreign molestation loses its autonomy and may lose its corporate identity as well."<sup>4</sup>

More important, for our purposes, than the course of wars is the means by which wars can be prevented and deterred. There can be little doubt that, if each nation in the Free World maintains a strong national security policy, this will help to maintain the peace. The major factors in such policies must be the explicit projection of a co-ordinated foreign policy and military policy. In the interest of maintaining peace and national freedom the member nations of this conference must consider the factors that make up national power, and formulate the necessary policies that can protect and enhance each nation's national security. Hans Morgenthau has noted that the following factors make up national power: geography, resources, morale, industrial capacity, military preparedness, population, national character, quality of diplomacy and government.<sup>5</sup> My view is that only by maximising the quality of each of these factors can nations retain the capacity to deter aggressors and keep the peace. In addition the quality and standard of living of the people in each of our nations will also be enhanced as a result of such policies.

Central to this position are the concerns with resources, sea communications and the potential for conflict. The energy crisis of the 1970s made the West more acutely aware of the very high levels of dependence. Many countries had on oil as an energy source and on one or two suppliers of their oil needs. Apart from the political problems associated with various regions that supply oil and other resources, we must take into account the active measures being taken

4. William H. McNeill, *The Pursuit of Power*, p. vii.

6. H. Morgenthau, *Politics of the Twentieth Century*, p. 404.

by the Soviet Union to integrate military, political and economic policy instruments to deny Free World access to the development, transport and trade in oil and other vital resources. J. R. Thomas has shown that, from the early days of Soviet foreign policy, resources have been central to Soviet strategy, and he notes that the current domestic and foreign policy treats access to resources as vital elements of strategic planning.<sup>6</sup> Thomas notes that Soviet analysts have identified the Western world's major vulnerabilities as the supply of oil from the Persian-Arabian Gulf region and that of chrome, manganese, gold and platinum from South Africa. In addition he notes that the Soviet Union has been prepared to buy minerals from developing countries which faced threats of Western boycotts, even when such resources exist in adequate supply in the USSR.<sup>7</sup> It is clear that the Soviet Union will continue its active policy of attempting to deny or cut off vital resources by whatever means possible.

The Soviet Union has made a number of significant advances in the last two decades. It has now gained partners or client states in key strategic locations. In most cases these states provide opportunities to apply pressure to key waterways, straits, and the Panama and Suez canals. In our region, the Soviet bases in the Maritime Provinces and in Vietnam provide opportunities to disrupt, make unsafe or close the straits and narrow seas nearby. The massive Soviet investment of money, weapon systems and technology in these areas goes far beyond that which could be justified on defensive grounds. The Soviet Union's dominance of the world's narrow waters and straits is part of a long term Soviet policy to cut the flow of resources vital to the economic and military security of our nations. Short of outright closure of a waterway, which might risk war, the Soviets will be capable of putting enormous pressure on a resource-dependent nation to adopt the Soviet line. The irony of this is that European imperial history is full of examples of this sort of behaviour.

6. J. R. Thomas, *Natural Resources in Soviet Foreign Policy*, pp. 5-10.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 8 and p. 12.

## II. Food Resources

The flow of food resources in the Asia-Pacific region is huge in volume, value and importance to both producers and consumers. There will be a considerable development in the food output of the ASEAN nations, and New Zealand and Australia are capable of much higher levels of food production. The PRC will continue to struggle for self-sufficiency but her planners will relax this policy as her industrial capacity improves. The bulk of her population will be kept in the rural sector and only gradually drawn into the industrial sector. The current considerable discontent in urban areas is based on the failure of industrial and urban workers to obtain the benefits which are being won by the farm sector, and urban discontent can only be reduced, in the long run, by cheaper food and greater access to consumer goods. Imports of food, fibres and technology will continue to grow as the PRC economy grows.

In the South-West Pacific there will be many advances by the Soviet Union and her allies if the small island states do not obtain adequate and fair payment for their fishing resources and if they are not given more support and economic help by Australia and other more developed nations in the Asian-Pacific region. Most of the island states are net food importers and this is a heavy drain on their export earnings.

Food resources in the wide region should not, however, be a cause of conflict. Food producers will be keen to see greater access to the Japanese market and Japan's heavy reliance on imports will continue to make her vulnerable to SLOC disruption. The producers current and potential levels of food production mean that they have the capacity to move to near self-sufficiency if need be, and short of general war supplies are unlikely to be cut off. Supplies could, however, be seriously disrupted by deliberate pollution or by the threat of mines since most of the vessels carrying food supplies are flag of convenience ships.

### III. Raw Materials

In this section raw materials are defined as important wood, paper, animal and vegetable fibres. Like the supply of food, many of the Asian-Pacific nations are surplus producers of one or more of these products and there is a very considerable trade between the nations of the region. Japan and the PRC are perhaps the most notable exceptions. Both are major importers of timber, paper, wool, and animal and vegetable fibres. Their suppliers are, however, anxious to expand output should the demand increase. There is no real risk that the Soviet Union or her associates could bring economic or market pressure to bear on the supply of these products, and thus apart from direct action there is little fear of supplies of these raw materials and the finished goods they make up being cut off.

### IV. Environmental or Living Space

Although there is little overt evidence of major migration pressure points in Asia at the moment, it is clear that certain areas have a high risk potential for conflict as population densities increase. It is also very important to point out that throughout human history migration and famine have been the two most important releases of population pressure. Japan shows signs of a growing demand for new opportunities for migration and many Japanese look to Australia as a land that might fill this need. Australians will have to come to terms with this situation and given time it is possible that a considerable accommodation might be made. Much effort and care will, however, be needed to avoid a very strong and irrational reaction to developments of this type. The PRC has adopted a very powerful population control system which in the short run will probably stabilise population but this may cause very grave imbalances and

dislocation in the long run. Each year that passes will see more people in Hong Kong anxious to move to other lands in the region and in this Australia should be prepared to play a more generous role than that of the present government. Indeed, Australia needs all the entrepreneurial talent it can get. Indonesia has begun to develop population policies which will probably stabilise her population at levels which, with the development of her extensive resources, should provide both short and long term solutions which will avoid conflict with her neighbours. Vietnam's acute form of political mismanagement and rapid population growth are matters of grave concern. The use of "boat people" migration schemes are likely to be used again and the migration of Vietnamese into Kampuchea and Laos will almost certainly be accelerated.<sup>8</sup> Pressure on the Mekong river basin will become more acute and the north-eastern provinces of Thailand will certainly become contested areas. Indeed this is likely to be the most volatile conflict over living space in Asia.

The other highly volatile environmental struggle will be that for the domination of space and resources in Antarctica. Both aspects are important and the nation gaining control of this region will have special mineral resource advantages. The pressure for control will grow in importance in the short term while the demand for the mineral wealth of the area will be a longer term development, but the potential for conflict remains. Considerable oil reserves are believed to exist under the Weddell and Ross seas and the landward resources include natural gas, copper, coal, chromium, iron, titanium and uranium.<sup>9</sup> Organisational control mechanisms are unlikely to work unless our nations put far greater effort into counter-balancing the Soviet Union and other powers.

8. M.A. Martin, "Vietnamised Cambodia: A Silent Ethnocide," *Indochina Report*, No. 7 (July-Sep, 1986).

9. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, Vol. XXX (1984), pp. 32823-4. Treaty members include Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, France, India, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, South Africa, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, United States and West Germany.

## V. Energy Resources

Coal and natural gas resources are in surplus supply from nations within the region and do not need discussion apart from noting their vulnerability in transit, for example from Australia to Japan or Korea. Oil remains one of the highly vulnerable resources due to its production locations, high consumption rates and the continuing need for new finds. The 1970s crisis caused a ten-year trend toward conservation and the search for alternatives. The world's consumption of oil in 1982 was 2,818.8 million tonnes, the lowest figure since 1975, when 2,724.8 million tonnes were consumed. The decline in overall oil and natural gas consumption is in contrast to the steady increase, in the same period, in the use of energy from coal, water and nuclear power.<sup>10</sup>

Japan and Korea have been most active in conservation of oil as Hwang Joe Kim and Kap-Young Jeong have shown in their article "Development of Alternative Energy Sources and Energy Conservation in Japan and Korea".<sup>11</sup> Japan's dependence upon oil will significantly decrease while the economy continues to grow. Oil as a percentage of total energy consumption has fallen from the 1975 figure of 75% to 61.1% in 1982 and will fall to 56.2% in the year 2000. For Korea the figures are 56.2% in 1983 to 37.4% in 1991 to only 39.7% in the year 2000.<sup>12</sup> Nevertheless, by the year 2000 Japan will have an energy demand of some 525 million tonnes of oil equivalent and Korea will need 124.2 million tonnes.<sup>13</sup> This remarkable conservation effort is likely to be the exception rather than the rule for most of the world. Indeed, there is a counter-trend toward increased consumption in the context of a perceived world glut of oil.

10. *Ibid.*, Vol. XXIX (1983), pp. 32294-5.

11. Hwang Joe Kim and Kap-Young Jeong in Dalchoong Kim and Euisoon Shin (eds.) *Energy Policies in Korea and Japan* (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1986) pp. 47-72.

12. *Ibid.*, pp. 49-50.

13. *Ibid.*, pp. 48-51.

The short term movements in the supply of oil and the shift to alternatives should not obscure the fact, established by the CIA projections, that oil consumption will grow in the medium to long term and that oil will continue to be one of the world's most vital fuels.<sup>14</sup> The current export of Soviet oil is being supported by the plunder of Afghanistan natural gas and the predicted downswing in Soviet oil production will put additional pressure on the world's remaining supplies. In addition Soviet strategic planners have identified Middle East oil as the most important weakness of Western Europe, the United States and Japan. Soviet influence and power continues to grow in the region and may eventually be able to disrupt supply.

The Asia-Pacific rim will become the focus for major oil finds, oil production and conflict in the mid-to-long term. The demand for oil will grow rapidly as the industrialization and modernization of the ASEAN nations continues to accelerate and must be added to this the increased consumption of the PRC, ROC, Korea and Japan. Alternative forms of energy will be used but oil will remain the major source of energy for agriculture, industry and transport. Any shortage of oil will generate severe price increases in chemicals vital to increased output in agriculture.<sup>15</sup>

In 1982 South-East and East Asia held 6% and 5.7% of the world's proven oil and natural gas reserves.<sup>16</sup> It is contended that the oil and natural gas reserves of the region have been underestimated. In 1972 there was much doubt that the PRC had or could produce 50 million tonnes of oil but was, by 1982, producing over 100 million tonnes. The PRC will continue to expand oil production for three reasons. First, China's economic development, notwithstanding her coal resources, will consume larger amounts of oil in agriculture, industry and transport. Second, although her exports to Japan constitute only a fraction of Japan's oil consumption, oil will become a more important source of revenue to pay for modern technology need for modernization. Third, China will be able to make use of

14. CIA. *The World Oil Market in the Years Ahead*, 1979.

15. W. A. C. Adie *Oil, Politics and Seapower*, p. 6.

16. Keesign's, *op. cit.*, 1983, p. 32295.

"oil diplomacy" in her relations with countries like the Philippines and Thailand and oil may become a vital tool in her relations with Vietnam.

New oil fields are needed and are likely to be found in the region. Indonesia will continue to finance her development from oil revenues but will seek new fields, as will Brunei. The Thai fields in the Gulf of Thailand will be extended with further exploration and drilling. The Australian fields in Bass Strait and onshore are beginning to peak, and new fields must be developed in the next decade.

It is possible to identify six potentially important oil fields in the Asia-Pacific region which may lead to significant conflict, which may be vulnerable to exploitation by the PRC, the Soviet Union and her ally Vietnam. (See the Map on the next page for locations.)


Australia's oil, gas and coal needs are satisfied from existing resources, apart from some heavy grade oils drawn from the Middle East. The northwest discoveries are in an area of sea between Australia and Indonesia in which the territorial demarcation has not been settled. Negotiations have stalled, and given the strong anti-Indonesian views held in certain government, media and leftist circles in Australia, the risk of conflict is very high.<sup>17</sup>

At the north of the region another area is prone to conflict. The eight small islands called Senkaku by Japan and Tiaoyutai by the PRC (located some 120 miles northeast of the ROC), are of strategic and political importance. The fishing grounds and the potential oil deposits in the area, however, are of vital interest.<sup>18</sup> The PRC has adopted a wait-and-see approach to discussion over the islands and will probably involve the ROC and Japan in some trade-off over the islands during the 1990s when she will have the naval strength to back her claims to the area.

The Gulf of Thailand has the potential to be a larger source of energy and will be subject to increasing pressure from Vietnam.

17. See the discussion of these attitudes in Malcolm J. Kennedy and Michael J. O'Connor, "Australia's Indochina Policy: A Question of Selective Morality," *Indochina Report*, No. 1 (Jan-March, 1986).

18. H. C. Hinton, *The China Sea*, p. 13.



Indeed the conflict with Malaysia in the Vietnamese occupation of the island Pulau Kecil Amboya off the west coast of Sabah may be instructive in the approach Vietnam may take.

The greatest source of tension in the region is the continuing confrontation between the PRC and Soviet-backed Vietnam. Hinton has argued that the main cause of this tension is Vietnam's refusal to accept China as the "big man" or dominant power in the region.<sup>19</sup> While this invokes traditional ideas of China as the regional power accepting tribute from surrounding states, it is an incomplete explanation. The deep racial, ideological, cultural and economic differences between China on the one hand and Soviet-backed Vietnam, on the other, provides a more exact explanation. The PRC has been encircled. She seeks her "rightful" place in Asian affairs, to lead the progressive camps, and is anxious to become the major political and military force in the region. These concerns will be central to China's behavior in the future.

The evolution of new laws and treaties about seabed and maritime resources has created in the China Sea one of the most complex areas of potential conflict over transit rights, resources and undersea mining. The PRC has assumed that the area has large reserves of oil and natural gas and this has been confirmed by a number of international companies keen to be part of the development.<sup>20</sup> China's onshore oil is high in paraffin and is best suit for fuel oil, however, oil from the field on the Pearl River estuary is a low sulphur light crude also suitable for export. The PRC will seek to dominate the oil fields of the China Sea and her only real rival, Japan, has adopted a very careful and co-operative approach which should help avoid conflict. The most likely cause of conflict in the area will be the exploitation of the Paracels (Hsisha/Hoang Sa) and the Spratly (Nansha/Truong Sa) islands. The Paracels are claimed by the PRC, the ROC and Vietnam. The PRC occupied the islands in 1974. Four nations, the PRC, the ROC, the Philippines and Vietnam, dispute the ownership of the Spratlys which are located

some 400 miles south of the Paracels. The main contestants for the control and exploitation of these islands are the PRC and Vietnam. The PRC has made the most sweeping claims—a claim for all the resources of the continental shelf plus the adjacent seas around both the Paracels and the Spratlys.<sup>21</sup> The eventual application of the two hundred mile economic zone by all the nations in the region will demand major readjustments of current claims and may lead to open conflict.

The role of the Soviet Union and Vietnam in the future of the region is clear. Both have identified the military and resources weaknesses of Vietnam's neighbours as points for exploitation and they will certainly attempt to remove United States forces from the region and conduct operations to create divisions and disputes between states in the region. The Sino-Vietnamese conflict adds a further element to the risk of conflict. Vietnam has shown herself incapable of making the transition from a war-based economy and she will almost certainly seek to use military means and the support of the Soviet Union in her attempts to acquire resources in the region. Vietnam's acute energy needs mean that it is vital for her to dominate the two hundred mile resource zone along her long coastline.

The Soviet-Vietnamese ability to interdict trade and dominate offshore resources is one of the highest risk factors in the region. It is likely to be employed in the mid- to long-term and needs to be countered as soon as possible. The formation of a Sino-Soviet-Vietnam bloc can be considered *the worst possible case*.<sup>22</sup> In the short term the PRC will attempt to avoid open conflict but in the longer term she will seek to dominate and exploit the offshore resources and this will lead to conflict with Vietnam because that nation will not accept a subordinate role. Serious conflict over oil and other offshore resources in the region ranges from short term high risk with Australia and Indonesia to mid- to long-term high risk of conflict between the PRC, Vietnam and other neighbouring states.

21. *Ibid.*, pp. 16-17.

22. Adie, *op. cit.*, p. 32 argues that the PRC shares the USSR's view on the West's vulnerability in energy and mineral resources.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 35.

20. *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.

## VI. Strategic Minerals

Joan E. Spero has demonstrated that US military power has been important in preventing overt action against the supply of energy to the Free World and she argues that even non-war threats are best deterred by military power.<sup>23</sup> A similar and more urgent case can be made for the vulnerability of the US, Japan, Korea, ROC and ASEAN to the interruption of supplies of strategic minerals. Table I shows the United States' industrial and military dependence upon imported strategic minerals.

Yuan-Li Wu has shown Japan's levels of dependence for imports as: bauxite 100%, copper 90%, lead 71%, zinc 65% and iron ore 96%.<sup>24</sup> Table II assesses the medium to long term vulnerability of Japan and Korea to strategic mineral interruption.

A wide range of sources have been used to compile the data in the table and the author accepts that there may be errors due to a lack of the latest information. The assessment of a high technological and military priority for a mineral has been arrived at by indexing its use in any or all of the following: normal industrial production, basic metal production like steel, machine tool manufacture, production of chemicals, weapons systems, engines, electrical and electronic equipment. The assessment of vulnerability of a strategic mineral has been largely based on the possible interruption of supply to Japan, Korea, the ROC and the ASEAN nations. A high risk is that associated with the world supply being dominated by the production of the USSR, her allies and the PRC. In addition, the instability of South Africa and other African suppliers has been considered in awarding a high risk rating. A medium risk is where there are widely available supplies which can be significantly reduced by the loss of African supplies to the Soviet bloc. A low risk is that where large supplies are available from nations in the Asian-Pacific region.

23. Joan E. Spero, "Energy Self-Sufficiency and National Security," in R. H. Connery and R. S. Gilmour (eds.) *The National Energy Problem*, pp. 123-36.

24. Yuan-Li Wu, *Raw Material Supply in a Multipolar World*, p. 6.

There are five minerals in the high priority and high vulnerability group. They include antimony, beryllium, chromium, manganese and platinum. South Africa is an important source of these, ranging in production share from 5% for beryllium, to 39% for chromium, to 43% for platinum. Manganese is the only one of this group which can be readily obtained from Australia. There is little doubt that the supply of most of the minerals in this group is in danger given the current direction of African affairs.

The second group are the high priority medium vulnerability minerals including bauxite, cobalt, columbium, lithium, tantalum and vanadium. In this group African production ranges from 14% for tantalum, to 47% for vanadium, and to 70% for cobalt. Australian production could be expanded to offset this situation in the case of bauxite, selenium and vanadium, however, cobalt remains acutely vulnerable to market manipulation or interdiction. The remaining high priority minerals such as columbium, germanium, hafnium, indium, molybdenum, nickel, tellurium, titanium and zirconium are all available from friendly western or regional suppliers.

A cut in the supply of a range of minerals from group one or two has been assessed by various US authorities, who agree that there would be rapid breakdowns in the production of weapons systems, ammunition and spare parts should this occur. The value of alternatives and recycling is difficult to measure short of an actual stoppage in supply. Britain and Germany during the Second World War made significant use of alternatives, although the lead times for contemporary weapon systems precludes the long run methods used in the past. A nation's economic and military power could be significantly impaired by cutting, even for a short period, the supply of any of the minerals in groups one and two.

The Asian-Pacific nations can support each other in the mining, trading and stockpiling of most of the vital minerals. A loss of African chromium, platinum, cobalt, lithium, antimony and beryllium to Soviet control will gravely prejudice the security and economic life of Japan, the Republics of Korea, China and the United States.

[Table I] Key Minerals in Which the United States is Over 90% Import Dependent (1978)\*

| Indispensable Minerals or Ores Critical to High Quality in the Production of:                 | Bauxite (93%) | Chromium (92%) | Cobalt (97%) | Columbium (100%) | Manganese (93%) | Platinum-gr (91%) | Tantalum (97%) |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------|----------------|--------------|------------------|-----------------|-------------------|----------------|
| Basic steel                                                                                   |               |                |              |                  | ×               |                   |                |
| Stainless, tool, alloy steels                                                                 |               | ×              | ×            | ×                | ×               |                   | ×              |
| Basic aluminum                                                                                | ×             |                |              |                  |                 |                   |                |
| Aluminum alloys                                                                               | ×             |                |              | ×                | ×               |                   |                |
| Nickel-based and cobalt-based superalloys                                                     | ×             | ×              | ×            | ×                | ×               |                   | ×              |
| <b>Items Made Using Above Basic Products:</b>                                                 |               |                |              |                  |                 |                   |                |
| Ordnance (tanks, fighters, bombers, missiles)                                                 | ×             | ×              | ×            | ×                | ×               | ×                 | ×              |
| Power generating (turbines, controls, transmission)                                           | ×             | ×              | ×            |                  | ×               |                   |                |
| Electric motors, equipment (locomotives to mixers)                                            | ×             |                | ×            |                  | ×               |                   |                |
| All electronics (appliances, phones, navigation, controls, computers, telecommunications, TV) | ×             | ×              | ×            | ×                | ×               | ×                 | ×              |

|                                                                                   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nuclear applications                                                              | × | × | × | × |   | × | × |
| Jet engines, gas turbines (hot parts)                                             |   | × | × | × |   | × | × |
| Batteries, fuel cells                                                             |   |   |   |   | × | × |   |
| Aerospace (airframes, hulls, rocket engines)                                      | × | × | × | × |   | × |   |
| Projectiles, gun barrels, machine parts, crankshafts, axles, gears, machine tools |   | × | × |   | × |   |   |
| Mining, drilling (valve stems & systems, drift bits)                              |   | × | × |   | × |   |   |
| High-tech medical (cryogenics, heart-lung, scanners)                              | × | × | × | × | × | × | × |
| Petroleum processing, drilling                                                    |   | × | × | × | × | × |   |
| Chemical processing                                                               |   | × | × |   | × | × |   |
| Glass products                                                                    |   |   | × |   | × | × |   |
| Pharmaceutical production                                                         |   |   |   |   | × | × |   |
| Food processing, enrichment                                                       |   | × | × |   | × | × |   |
| Synfuel production                                                                |   | × | × | × | × | × | × |

Note: Since effective military technology requires highest possible performance, substitutes are not desirable. However, substitutes for purely commercial and civilian items are possible on a mixed basis—recognizing lower quality and performance would occur.

Source: U.S. Bureau of Mines.

U. Ra'anan and C.M. Perry.

[Table II] Priority of Strategic Minerals for Japan-Korea.

| Mineral      | Tech/Military Priority |        |     | Vulnerability Level |           |           |
|--------------|------------------------|--------|-----|---------------------|-----------|-----------|
|              | High                   | Medium | Low | High                | Medium    | Low       |
| Antimony     |                        | ×      |     | × (10)*             |           |           |
| Bauxite      | ×                      |        |     |                     | × (A)#    |           |
| Beryllium    | ×                      |        |     | × (5)               |           |           |
| Cadmium      |                        | ×      |     |                     |           | ×         |
| Chromium     | ×                      |        |     | × (30)              |           |           |
| Cobalt       | ×                      |        |     |                     | × (70)    |           |
| Columbium    | ×                      |        |     |                     | ×         |           |
| Germanium    | ×                      |        |     |                     |           | ×         |
| Hafnium      | ×                      |        |     |                     |           | ×         |
| Indium       | ×                      |        |     |                     |           | ×         |
| Lithium      |                        | ×      |     |                     | × (20)    |           |
| Manganese    |                        | ×      |     | × (20)(A)           |           |           |
| Mercury      |                        |        | ×   |                     |           | ×         |
| Molybdenum   | ×                      |        |     |                     |           | ×         |
| Nickel       | ×                      |        |     |                     |           | × (A)     |
| Platinum Gp. |                        | ×      |     | × (43)              |           |           |
| Rhenium      |                        | ×      |     |                     |           | ×         |
| Selenium     |                        |        | ×   |                     |           | ×         |
| Tantalum     | ×                      |        |     |                     | × (14)(A) |           |
| Tellurium    | ×                      |        |     |                     |           | × (A)     |
| Titanium     | ×                      |        |     |                     |           | × (A)     |
| Tungsten     |                        | ×      |     |                     |           | × (A)     |
| Vanadium     | ×                      |        |     |                     | × (47)(A) |           |
| Zirconium    | ×                      |        |     |                     |           | × (20)(A) |

\* The figures in brackets are the percentages produced by South Africa and southern African nations.

\*(A) means that Australia holds large under-exploited reserves of these minerals.

Sources: R Weston, Yuan-Li Wu, U. Ra'anan and C.M. Perry, *Year Books of Encyclopaedia Britannica*, and *Import and Export Bulletins*.

## VII. Conclusions

The supplies of food and fibres in our region are so broadly based as to be difficult to interrupt by political means. The interdiction of the SLOC, however, could and would cause great damage to the economies of Japan, the Republics of Korea, R.O.C. and the PRC. Environmental or living space problems and conflict are almost certain to arise in the short term with Vietnam. Oil and natural gas are so located and owned that the political and military operations of the USSR, Vietnam and the PRC could seriously block supplies to our nations. Conflicts between Soviet-backed Vietnam and the PRC are more likely to generate a high risk of conflict in our region in the mid- to long-term. The most vulnerable resources are strategic minerals, and these are likely to be a high risk cause of conflict in the short- to mid-term. In each case conflict could become high risk and short term if Vietnam and/or the Soviet Union seek to threaten to interdict or actually sabotage the SLOC. (The Red Sea incident is a case in point.)

Conflict over resources has been shown to be a primary causal factor which can lead to actual war. The development of collective political, economic and security program which will avoid such threats and deter others from destabilising our region are a vital and immediate necessity.

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**PART III**

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**NAVAL CAPABILITIES AND STRATEGIES  
OF MAJOR POWERS AND THEIR  
IMPLICATIONS FOR SLOC SECURITY**

# NAVAL CAPABILITIES AND STRATEGIES OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR SLOC SECURITY

*Kenichi Kitamura*

## Foreword

It is said that the Soviet's basic strategy is to attain ultimately a global communization under the Soviet's leadership, carefully avoiding an armed conflict with the United States. For this purpose, the Soviets will endeavor, taking every opportunity available and using mainly military power as a political instrument, to isolate the United States from its allies and to expand own influence over strategic areas throughout the world. Therefore, it is necessary, needless to say, to analyze the implications of the Soviet military buildup and movements from this viewpoint. However, this writer will discuss, in this article, the capabilities and strategies of the Soviet Navy and their implications for the security of the SLOCs of the West, considering how to deter a large scale war challenged by the Soviets, and how to cope with the situations, especially how to defend our SLOCs, if our deterrence efforts should fail.

The details about the Soviet naval power are explained in Jane's Fighting Ships, 1986-87 and "Soviet Military Power, 1987" (U.S. Department of Defence). We cannot foresee how they can show their combat abilities in actual engagements, and the writer will analyze the characteristics of their combat capabilities, in the light of

above-mentioned data, and then will estimate what they can do in the Far East theater. We can see a part of the strategic concept of the Soviet Navy in "Navies in War and in Peace" and "Seapower of the States" by Admiral of the Fleet S. G. Gorshkov. But we can foresee neither, of course, what strategies they will actually take in wartime. Their strategies may change according to our counter-measures and the resultant shift of strategic situations. Therefore, the writer will estimate the maritime strategies that the Soviet Pacific Fleet will be able to take and may take in case of a large scale war, taking the above-mentioned analysis, the US concept of global maritime strategy and the geo-political characteristics of this theater into consideration. And lastly, the writer will discuss the implications of the Soviet naval capabilities and strategies for the security of our SLOCs, primarily from a Japanese standpoint.

The following is this writer's personal view.

## I. Characteristics of Combat Capabilities of the Soviet Pacific Fleet

The Soviet Navy has been endeavoring to build up balanced fleets, as Admiral of the Fleet Gorshkov, emphasizes in "Seapower of the States."

The Soviet Pacific Fleet now consists of 2 aircraft carriers, 84 principal surface combatants, 121 other combatant ships, 90 auxiliaries, 95 submarines (excluding 25 SSBNs and including 7 SSBs), 560 naval aviation, and 1 Naval Infantry Division.<sup>1</sup>

Primary threats to our SLOCs in the Pacific Ocean come from submarines and naval aviation. For the defence of the SLOCs in the ocean, it is certainly effective to deny the transit of enemy submarines through the Soya, Tsugaru and Tsushima/Korean Straits. While the defence of the three straits is so important, the principal

1. U.S. Department of Defence, "Soviet Military Power, 1987."

surface combatants and land-based aircraft of the Soviet Pacific Fleet will be great threats to the defence of the straits.

## 1. Analysis of Combat Capabilities of the Soviet Pacific Fleet

### (1) General Purpose Submarines

Nuclear-powered submarines number 44 and occupy 44% of 95 general purpose submarines assigned to the Pacific Fleet, and the percentage is rising. 20 of those nuclear powered submarines are equipped with antisurface cruise missiles.<sup>2</sup>

The Soviet Navy puts importance on the reinforcement of submarine forces and is replacing old type submarines with newer type ones, equipped with newer weapons and being able to submerge faster and more quietly and deeply. In future, they may be able to make a missile attack on the US aircraft carrier and/or battleship battle groups more stealthy and from farther distance. They are also equipped with torpedoes. So, according to the situation, they may be assigned a task to attack enemy warships and merchant vessels, together with SSNs and SSs.

In relation to the security of this theater, it should be noticed that the Soviet newer type SSBNs equipped with improved SLBMs can make a strategic nuclear attack on the US homeland from safer contiguous sea area of the Soviet Union, namely the Sea of Okhotsk and possibly the Sea of Japan.

### (2) Principal Surface Combatants

Of the principal surface combatants, the most noteworthy ones are the 2 Kiev-class aircraft carriers (CV), 1 Kirov-class nuclear-powered guided missile cruiser (CGN), 1 Sovremenny-class guided missile destroyer (DDG) (primarily for surface actions) and 1 Udaloy-class guided missile destroyer (DDG) (primarily for anti-submarine warfare). Newspapers recently reported that 1 Slava-class

2. Jane's Fighting Ships, 1986-87.

guided missile cruiser (CG) is coming to the Far East.

Combat capabilities of these new and powerful principal surface combatants would be characterized, first, by the improvement of the capabilities for anti-surface missile attack, especially the first salvo capabilities, in addition to present heavy arms for air defence and ASW (anti-submarine warfare). Secondly, the Soviet fleet is going to have capabilities to strike enemy warships and targets ashore with missiles and sea-based aircraft, repelling enemy air attack even in the area outside the coverage of land-based fighters, although their present capabilities are limited.

These new and powerful principal surface combatants will be successively increased and eventually 2 Kirov-class CGNs, 5 Sovremenny-class DDGs and 4 Udaloy-class DDGs may be deployed in the Far East.<sup>3</sup> Then, they may be able to organize two surface battle groups with these CVs, CGNs, CGs, DDGs and the others.

Lastly, the Soviet Navy has been increasing their capabilities for amphibious operations. And this fact should be noticed in relation to the improvement of the capabilities of surface battle groups as mentioned above. It is well known that the Soviet Navy has placed emphasis, so far, on mine warfare.

### (3) Naval Aviation

The Soviet naval aviation totals about 1,600, and is the largest in the world. 560 aircraft of them are deployed in the Far East. 210 of the 560 aircrafts are fighter/fighter bombers and strike/bombers including Backfire.<sup>4</sup> Backfire bombers assigned to the Pacific Fleet may possibly number around 45.

They may make a missile attack on enemy ships from a farther distance on the ocean. In the sea areas contiguous to the Kurile islands and the Peninsula of Kamchatka, they may attack enemy ships together with land-based fighter bombers.

3. "Soviet Military Power, 1987."

4. "Soviet Military Power, 1987" and Jane's Fighting Ships, 1986-87.

About 165 ASW aircraft are assigned to the Pacific Fleet. They may be able to conduct effective ASW operations in cooperation with surface combatants in the contiguous sea area in the Far East.

## 2. Operations the Pacific Fleet May Be Able to Conduct

### (1) Operational Capabilities in the Pacific Ocean

As long as the US aircraft carrier battle groups remain operating in the Western Pacific Ocean, it would be difficult even for the Soviet surface battle group including Kiev-class CV and Kirov-class CGN to conduct offensive operations except for a surprise strike in the ocean outside the coverage of land-based fighter/fighter bombers. However, they will endeavor to improve their capabilities to challenge the US battle groups even in the ocean outside the coverage of land-based air forces.

Naval units that the Soviet Fleet can employ for a strike on enemy ships in the ocean outside the contiguous sea areas at present and in near future, will be only submarines and longer range bombers like the Backfire. In this case, loose cooperation between submarines and bombers may be possible, by making use of reconnaissance and communication satellites. However, it may be doubtful whether they can conduct a tactically coordinated and simultaneous strike on the US aircraft carrier battle group. It will also be doubtful whether bombers alone can make an effective strike on the US carrier battle group without the support of fighters. Of course, the Soviet submarines and bombers will be able to attack enemy SLOCs.

### (2) Operational Capabilities in the Contiguous Sea Areas

In the light of relative air strength and the location and number of air bases of Japan and the Soviet Union as well as relative geographical position of both, it cannot be denied that the Soviet will be favorable for securing air supremacy over the Sea of Japan and the Sea of Okhotsk. And if the Soviets could secure air supremacy in

this area, the Soviet Pacific Fleet might be able to search and destroy enemy submarines and surface combatants deployed therein and to deny enemy naval units to enter there, with their overwhelmingly superior naval forces, repelling enemy air attack under the support of land-based air units. And if the Soviets could secure air supremacy and seacontrol of the Sea of Japan and the Sea of Okhotsk in this way, then they might try an amphibious invasion of the northern part of Hokkaido in order to assure the control of the Soya Strait.

The Soviets might also make North Korea invade South Korea without employing their own ground forces. In this case, the Soviets could provide North Korean ground forces with support from the sea, and could interrupt the SLOCs to and from the ROK with their own and North Korean submarines.

## II. The Soviet Maritime Strategies for the Far East

### 1. Strategic Implications of the Far East Sea Areas Surrounding Japan for the Soviet Strategy

Under the worldwide strategic situations of the East-vs-West confrontation, the Japanese Islands and the Korean Peninsula compose the most forward front where the continental powers and the sea powers directly confront each other. If the continental powers intend to advance overseas, they must pass through a chain of those islands at either point. For the Soviet warships, especially those based on the coast of the Maritime Provinces, the Soya, Tsugaru and Tsushima/Korea Straits are natural obstacles that they inevitably have to pass through. If we could control these three straits and deny the transit of Soviet warships in wartime, the main body of the Soviet Pacific Fleet would be blockaded in the Sea of Japan; and the Sea of Okhotsk, the Kurile Islands and the Peninsula of Kamchatka would be isolated. It would be fatal to the Soviet

nuclear strategy because their SSBNs are reported to be deployed in the Sea of Okhotsk and the Northern Pacific Ocean.

On the contrary, if the Soviets controlled the three straits, they could not only make the Sea of Japan and the Sea of Okhotsk substantially their own lakes and secure the Soviet Far East territories, but also secure their exits toward the Pacific Ocean and make their strategic position in the Far East most favorable for them.

### 2. The Soviet Maritime Strategies for the Far East

It is said that the Western Theater of War is first and the Far Eastern Theater of War is second in priority for the Soviet planners.<sup>5</sup> However, from a viewpoint of the control of strategic resources and main sea lanes of the world, the Middle East must be as important as the Western Theater of War is. A scenario that a large scale war is caused by a conflict in the Middle East, is sometimes presumed in strategic studies for this reason.

In any way, when the Soviets commence a war, it is their basic strategy to win a decisive victory as early as possible by a blitzkrieg strike with concentrated mass upon the break-out of war. Consequently, if the Soviets should open a war either in Western Europe or in the Middle East, they would be careful not to undertake large scale offensive operations simultaneously in the Far East with their own ground forces. However, it does not always mean that the Soviets will take a strategic-operationally defensive strategy in the Far East for the following reasons.

First, they would endeavor to secure the Soviet territories as well as Sakhalin, Kurile Islands and the Four Japanese Northern Islands now under their occupation. They would also endeavor to ensure the safety of their SSBNs deployed in the Sea of Okhotsk and the Northern Pacific Ocean, so that those SSBNs may be able to conduct strategic nuclear strike as soon as the situation demands.

5. "Soviet Military Power, 1987."

For this purpose, they have to secure the control of the Sea of Japan, the Sea of Okhotsk, the external contiguous sea areas of the Kurile Islands and the Peninsula of Kamchatka, and to secure own SLOCs passing through these sea areas, by repelling attacks by US aircraft carrier battle groups and SSNs. The control of the Soya Strait is essential, needless to say, to accomplish these operations. And if they could secure air supremacy and seacontrol of the Soya Strait zone, it might not be impossible for them to try an amphibious invasion of the northern part of Hokkaido to ensure the control of the Soya Strait.

Secondly, it cannot be denied that Northeast Asian areas including Japan and the ROK may be vulnerable from a viewpoint of maritime strategy. It is because both Japan and the ROK are poor in vital natural resources and have to depend upon import from abroad for them. It is also because most military aids to both nations in wartime is transported by sea lanes across the vast Pacific Ocean and because their sea lanes converge in the northwestern area of the Western Pacific comparatively near to the Soviet naval and air bases.

Lastly, it may be possible that the Soviets contemplate controlling the Tsushima Strait and then the Yellow Sea by forcing North Korea to invade the ROK with naval and air support. Such a strategy may be effective to draw US attention to this area, avoiding the employment of own ground forces and a possible serious risk to themselves. If they succeeded in such a contemplation, they might be able to make the PRC lean toward the Soviets by applying military pressure and thus to make the over-all strategic situations decisively favorable for the Soviets.

In the light of the above analysis, the strategies that the Soviets could and might take in this theater, if a large scale war should happen in either Western Europe or the Middle East, would include some or most of the following operations (not in the order of priority).

- (1) To secure and maintain the air supremacy and seacontrol of the Sea of Japan, the Sea of Okhotsk and the contiguous sea areas of the

Kurile Islands and the Peninsula of Kamchatka.

- (2) To protect their own SSBNs deployed in the Sea of Okhotsk and the Northern Pacific.
- (3) To secure their own SLOCs passing through the sea areas mentioned in (1) and, in this relation, to invade the northern part of Hokkaido.
- (4) To destroy enemy aircraft/battleship battle groups in the Western Pacific, especially in their contiguous sea areas.
- (5) To expand sea areas under their control in the Northwest Pacific.
- (6) To interrupt enemy SLOCs.
- (7) To force North Korea to invade South Korea, providing primarily naval and air support, and to control the Tsushima Strait, and then the Yellow Sea, if possible.

### III. Their Implications for the SLOC Security

In order to defend our SLOCs in the Western Pacific Ocean, some or all of the following operations should be conducted. The aim of the defence of the SLOCs is expected to attain as a result of accumulation of the effects achieved by these operations.

- (1) To neutralize enemy bases for submarines and, if possible, bombers.
- (2) To interdict the transit of enemy submarines through the three straits.
- (3) To search and destroy enemy submarines deployed in the ocean by ASW operations.
- (4) To escort our own shipping.
- (5) To defend our own ports and harbors (including air defence and mine counter-measures).

#### 1. The Defence of the Three Straits and the Air Supremacy and Seacontrol of the Sea of Japan

From a view point of the SLOC security, the defence of the three

straits means the control of communications passing through the straits, that is, to secure our own communications and to deny enemy ones. While it goes without saying that the defence of the three straits is effective for the security of our SLOCs in the Pacific Ocean, the control of the straits especially the Soya Strait is also essential for the Soviets. And so, it is never easy for us to defend them. But, however ASW weapon systems may improve, it is not so easy to detect and destroy enemy submarines deployed in the vast ocean. Therefore, it is still effective and important to interdict the transit of enemy submarines at a narrow chokepoint such as a strait.

In order to defend the three straits, securing the strait zones is essential. For this purpose, it is indispensable to secure and maintain air supremacy and seacontrol at least of the ROK and Japanese coastal waters in the Sea of Japan.

However, air supremacy and seacontrol of the Sea of Japan is also vital to the Soviets. In this relation, the Soviet strengthening of their anti-surface combat capabilities in addition to their present heavy arms for air defence and ASW as mentioned above, has become a serious threat to our seacontrol of the coastal waters in the Sea of Japan.

Ironically enough, if we succeed in the defence of the three straits and the blockade of the main body of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, Japan and the ROK would get the wholesale impact by the blockaded Soviet Fleet on our coastal waters in the Sea of Japan. And the impact might make the defence of the straits difficult. Consequently, how to secure air supremacy and seacontrol of the coastal areas in the Sea of Japan is now an essential problem for all of us to solve.

## 2. *The Defence of SLOCs and the Safety of the US Naval Forces in the Northwestern Pacific Ocean*

The Soviet Fleet will place most importance on the destruction of the US aircraft carrier/battleship battle groups and other principal naval forces operating in the Northwestern Pacific Ocean. The

Soviet Fleet would try to make a missile strike on the US naval forces in the far distant ocean with their submarines and backfires and other long-range bombers. The US naval forces would try their best to defend themselves against such a strike. As a result, it may be doubtful whether the Soviet bombers can make an effective strike. And if it became clear that the Soviet bombers could hardly strike the US battle groups, it may be said that the Soviet submarines would not remain the greatest threat to the US naval forces. This possibility implies that ASW operations for the SLOC defence would contribute to the US battle groups' accomplishment of their tasks. In this context, the Japanese SLOC defence efforts in the area within 1000 nautical miles from its homeland will be of significance. It implies that the Japanese ASW units may interdict the Soviet Navy's intention to destroy the US battle groups. Consequently, it may be possible that the Soviet bombers will try to destroy the Japanese ASW units. It implies that the Japanese ASW units' survival from such air strike will become a premise for their accomplishment of SLOC defence tasks.

If the Soviets' intention to destroy the US battle groups with submarines and bombers resulted in a great loss of their own units, with little effect, it may not be impossible that the Soviet Navy will shift the principal targets from the US battle groups to other surface units or rather the SLOCs of the West, unless the US battle groups approach the Soviet contiguous sea areas. Such a possibility is not surprising, because it is one of the strategies that an inferior fleet may take, as the German Navy took in WWI and WWII. While it is true that the Soviet Pacific Fleet is large in the number of ships and aircraft and powerful in reported performance of their weapons, the Fleet is still inferior to the US Fleet in relative combat capabilities, especially in the ocean beyond the coverage of land-based air forces.

It is sometimes said that the Soviet Navy puts less importance on the interdiction of enemy SLOCs. But the articles by Admiral of the Fleet Gorshkov,<sup>6</sup> show that he recognizes well the importance of

6. "The Sea Power of the State" by Admiral of the Fleet, S. G. Gorshkov.

the security of SLOCs for the Western nations. The Soviet Fleet, however, may possibly not put importance on the interdiction of enemy SLOCs during the early period of war because it is the Soviet basic strategy to win a war within a period as short as possible. But if the war was prolonged for a comparatively long term, and if it became clear, as mentioned above, that a strike on the US carrier battle groups by bombers alone is inadvisable from a viewpoint of cost-effectiveness, they would probably commence the interdiction of enemy SLOCs. In this connection, it should be noticed that Admiral of the Fleet, Gorshkov, says in his articles.<sup>7</sup> "These operations (note: "disruption of the sea communications of the enemy") are now the most important constituent part of the efforts of a fleet, aimed at undermining the military-economic potential of the enemy," while he insists that the primary mission of a fleet has shifted from "Fleet-against-Fleet Operations" to "Fleet-against-Shore Operations." In short, the interdiction of enemy SLOCs only shifted from the sphere of "Fleet-against-Fleet" to the sphere of "Fleet-against-Shore" operations.

It is also noteworthy that he points out that Germany failed in operations against the British SLOCs during the last World War, because it was too late to commence wide-spread operations and did not make other forces (air forces) support submarines by striking enemy ASW units and port facilities and conducting reconnaissance.

Admiral Gorshkov's pronouncement suggests a possibility that in a future war, the Soviet Navy may commence the interdiction of enemy SLOCs of a large scale in an early period of the war, by striking, first, enemy ASW units with both submarines and bombers. They have already built up powerful forces capable of the above-mentioned operations.

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7. Ditto.

#### IV. Conclusion

Concerning the SLOC defence, Japan has endeavored so far to improve the capabilities primarily of ASW operations and mine counter-measures. Both ASW and mine counter-measures will remain important in the future. However, in relation to the SLOC defence within 1000 nautical miles and the defence of the three straits, we face now new problems to solve, being different respectively in the Pacific Ocean and the Sea of Japan, as a result of the improvement of the Soviet Pacific Fleet's combat capabilities.

First, in the Pacific Ocean, the problem is the improvement of the air defence capabilities of ASW surface units in addition to the improvement of ASW capabilities to cope with improved submarines. Concerning the air defence of ASW surface units, how to destroy Backfire bombers themselves prior to their launching missiles, is now a serious problem. Surviving the enemy bombers' missile strike is a premise for ASW surface units to accomplish their ASW mission.

Secondly, in the Sea of Japan, the problem is how to secure and maintain air supremacy and seacontrol at least in the contiguous sea areas of Japan and the ROK. Air supremacy and seacontrol are, needless to say, indispensable for the defence of the three straits. And especially, the improvement of anti-surface strike capabilities is essential, because the Soviet Pacific Fleet has been remarkably increasing their anti-surface combat capabilities.

## GREAT POWER NAVAL STRATEGIES IN NORTHEAST ASIA AND THE WESTERN PACIFIC

*Stephen P. Gibert*

### I

It is now commonplace to point out that the Northeast Asian and Western Pacific region has become of enormous significance to world political, economic and strategic affairs. Observers also tend to conclude that, in contrast to many other areas of the world, the Northeast Asian and Western Pacific region is quite stable, with no serious security problems. While the past several decades support this sanguine view, there are five potentially dangerous conflict arenas in this part of the world. The first, and most serious, is the confrontation along the lengthy border between the Soviet Union and China. The second, which could involve both China and the Soviet Union, and certainly the United States, is a clash between North and South Korea. The third possible conflict arena is that between the PRC and Vietnam, and the fourth would involve an attack or some other military action by the PRC against the Republic of China on Taiwan.

Finally, there is the possibility of East Asia becoming involved in conflict as the result of a Soviet-American clash in Europe or elsewhere. This latter situation is especially a possibility in view of the present American military policy known as the Maritime Strategy.

with its corollary, "horizontal escalation." Maritime Strategy and horizontal escalation envision deliberate attacks on the Soviet Union in places where the United States and its allies might enjoy local superiority or might be able to marshall the requisite power capable of inflicting local defeat on Soviet forces.

It is this last conflict arena—that involving a world-wide clash between the USSR and the United States—for which the naval strategies of the three great military powers in the region are especially relevant. Of course the naval postures of the United States, the Soviet Union and the PRC reflect political and peacetime goals and objectives as well as those of wartime. This essay, will first briefly describe the international security characteristics affecting naval strategies which are unique to the Western Pacific region and which distinguish it from other potential world conflict arenas. Subsequently, American, Soviet, and Chinese naval forces and strategies in the East Asian-Western Pacific areas will be considered. Japan's complementary role to that of the United States will be discussed as appropriate since Japan has emerged as a vital link in containing the USSR and restoring the balance of power on the Eurasian continent and in the Western Pacific.

## II

As a generalization, it may be said that security relationships are much more complex in the Western Pacific than in Europe. First, unlike in Europe, the alliances in the Western Pacific are primarily bilateral rather than multilateral and the American alliance partners are not necessarily allied to each other. This, of course, was not always the case: while neither the SEATO nor the ANZUS alliance was an integrated military organization comparable to NATO, they were multilateral in character, which presumed some common security concerns among the members. ANZUS, however, followed SEATO into oblivion when New Zealand decided to bar nuclear

weapons, including U.S. ship visits, provided such ships were nuclear-armed, from New Zealand's territory. The U.S. responded by ending its security obligations under the ANZUS agreement to New Zealand.

A second reason why security relations are more complex in East Asia than in Europe is the absence of a commonly-agreed threat in East Asia. While there are differences in threat assessment by the various countries in Europe, generally speaking all of the NATO members see the Soviet Union as the principal enemy. In contrast, the ASEAN states see Vietnam as the primary threat. Some Southeast Asian countries—and certainly Taiwan—view the People's Republic of China as dangerous to their security. South Korea is more concerned about North Korea while China is primarily worried about the Soviet Union, as is Japan. Perhaps today none of the East Asian nations view Japan as a threat, but nearly all express reservations about Japan's re-armament, and South Korean-Japanese relations remain potentially tense. As a result, no NATO-type security arrangement is feasible; indeed, without U.S. participation there cannot even be multilateral military exercises. And recently it was decided that it would not be prudent for a Japanese warship to visit South Korea.

A third reason why the security situation is much different in East Asia from that in Europe is that the U.S. regards a totalitarian communist state as its principal—even if unofficial—collaborator in resisting Soviet designs on East Asia. While there is not now, nor is there any prospect of, a Sino-American alliance, the U.S. relies very heavily upon the PRC to offset the growing military might of Moscow in the Far East.

A fourth difference between the European and East Asian security situations is that the U.S. and friendly states in East Asia enjoy overall conventional military parity with the Soviet Union, in contrast to the balance of forces in the central region in Europe, where the Warsaw Pact is clearly superior to NATO forces in conventional arms. This is because the principal contending forces, other than those arrayed along the Sino-Soviet frontier and between

North and South Korea, are naval forces. While the Pacific Fleet is now the largest of the four Soviet navies, it is generally accepted that the U.S. still maintains superiority at sea in the Pacific theater.

The fifth and final reason for the uniqueness of the Asian security situation concerns Japan. While all of the great powers in Western Europe are appropriately regarded as allies of the United States, Japan, despite the Mutual Security Treaty of 1960 and some improvement recently in the Self-Defense Forces, is in essence a military protectorate of the United States. How extraordinary it is that the deficit-ridden United States, with twice Japan's gross national product but equivalent per capita income, spends approximately twenty-two times as much as Japan on defense. More to the point, the unreciprocated U.S. commitment to defend Japan stands in sharp contrast to the genuinely mutual security situation in Europe. Endless references to the Japanese "peace constitution" and Articles 5 and 9 of that document cannot obscure the really unprecedented fact that a country now second in the world in gross national product relies upon another nation for its security.

For all of these reasons, then, the U.S. security posture in Asia is quite different from that in Europe. Nevertheless, as with Europe, American strategy depends on the forward basing of U.S. forces in rimland countries with which Washington has a security relationship. These include Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia. American forces formerly based on Taiwan were withdrawn and the bases closed consistent with the PRC recognition agreement of December 1978. U.S. forces were also withdrawn from Thailand, although the security agreement between Washington and Bangkok remains in force.

### III

The defining component of the American military posture in the Western Pacific is the forward basing of U.S. forces but, in contrast

to Western Europe, in an off-shore rather than a continental posture. Forward basing is essential and will remain critically important even after the 600-ship navy, with fifteen carrier battle groups, is fully operational. This is true primarily because of the immensity of the Pacific Ocean which covers some 70 million square miles. East to West along the equator the Pacific measures about 10,000 miles, and North to South about 8,000 miles. One must distinguish, therefore, the concept of an Asian Continental power from that of a Pacific Ocean power. The United States is a Pacific Ocean power while the Soviet Union, despite the buildup of the Pacific Fleet, is still an Asian Continental power. Although there has been much alarmist discussion recently of Soviet fishing agreements and other indications of interest on the part of Moscow in the ministates of the Central and Southwest Pacific, these areas are far too remote from the Soviet Union to be of wartime utility. To be sure however, in peacetime, Soviet influence could harm American and other interests by persuading the ministates, for example, to oppose nuclear testing or missile-firing ranges in the Pacific. But in wartime, even the Soviet naval bases at Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk are not as useful as they might otherwise be because of geographical constraints. Less obvious than the semi-encirclement of Vladivostok by the Japanese islands is the fact that Petropavlovsk is about a thousand miles from the nearest railhead and not served by paved roads. Accordingly, Petropavlovsk must be supplied by sea and if it is to be supported by Soviet vessels in the theater, these must traverse one of the various straits straddled by Japan.

As long as the U.S. maintains a powerful navy, therefore, and has the use of a network of bases in the Far East, the Soviet Union can be confined to a continental status. The U.S. meets its forward defense requirements through a "dual anchoring" policy: the two "anchors" in the northern sector of the Western Pacific are the U.S. forces in Korea, the Yokosuka, Sasebo and Okinawa bases in Japan and, in the southern sector, the Subic Bay and Clark bases in the Philippines. Thus East Asia is divided into two principal operational arenas, Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. The two sets of bases

are widely dispersed, unencumbered by chokepoints, and dominated by U.S. naval and air forces from north to south and vice versa.

Each U.S. base area has its anti-Soviet naval mission. In the south, it is to hold at risk the large Soviet base at Camranh Bay in Vietnam and to prevent a Soviet threat to the sealines of communication leading from the Persian Gulf area to Japan and Korea. In the north, the U.S. bases are intended, with Japanese assistance, to prevent a Soviet breakout through the three Japanese straits into the Pacific. U.S. forward bases in the Pacific are important also to the U.S. Maritime Strategy concept known as "horizontal escalation" since they make it feasible to mount attacks on the Far Eastern portion of the USSR and on the Soviet Pacific Fleet. To be sure, there has been much criticism of the Maritime Strategy adopted by the Reagan administration, with its horizontal escalation corollary.<sup>1</sup> Whatever flaws such a concept may have concerning operations in the North Atlantic, however, it makes sense in the Northeast Asian-Western Pacific theater. Indeed, U.S. naval strategy in the Western Pacific and the Maritime Strategy are so intertwined as to be inseparable.<sup>2</sup>

U.S. forces assigned to the Pacific theater (PACOM) include two Army Infantry Divisions; two Marine Brigades; one Strategic Bomber Squadron; eleven Tactical Fighter Squadrons; five Tactical Support Squadrons; six Aircraft Carriers with Air Wings; eighty-nine Surface Combatant Ships; thirty-two Amphibian Ships; forty Attack Submarines; and twelve Maritime Patrol Aircraft Squadrons. These forces are supported, in the Western Pacific, from five major

1. Not surprisingly, much of the criticism of the Reagan administration's Maritime Strategy and horizontal escalation has come from confirmed Atlanticists from previous administrations such as Robert Komer. See, for example, his article "Maritime Strategy Versus Coalition Defense," *Foreign Affairs* (Summer 1982). And, of course, the U.S. Army is opposed because it is concerned that some of its "fair share" of defense resources might go to the U.S. Navy instead. Nevertheless, Maritime Strategy has now been accepted and endorsed by both the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. For discussion of the Maritime Strategy, see Admiral James D. Watkins, "The Maritime Strategy," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* (January 1986); and Seth Cropsey, "Forward Defense of Maginot Line?", *Policy Review* (Fall 1986).

air bases in Japan; two major air bases in South Korea; Clark Air Force Base and Subic Bay Naval Base in the Philippines; a critically important naval base at Yokosuka in Japan, as well as by several minor installations.<sup>3</sup>

Even if Soviet naval and air power continues to grow in East Asia and the Pacific, it would seem likely that the United States will still remain superior. This is because the most significant aspect of the military buildup during the Reagan administration has been in naval forces. By 1989 it is expected that the general purpose U.S. Navy will have grown from about 525 ships in 1984 to around 600. This 600-ship navy will center around 15 carrier groups (up from 13 in 1984), 100 nuclear attack submarines, and 100 surface ship escorts.<sup>4</sup> In addition, the modernization of the U.S. SSBN force continues, with an authorized total of twelve new Trident submarines and a target total of about twenty.<sup>5</sup> How much of this growing navy will be assigned to the Pacific cannot be predicted, of course, but certainly a substantial portion will be.

Under present U.S. naval strategy concepts, in wartime these strong U.S. naval and air forces will have four interrelated tasks: to attack Soviet SSBNs in their Pacific bastions; to prevent Soviet naval units from passing through the Japanese straits into the broader Pacific Ocean; to attrite the Soviet attack submarine force; and to guard the sealines of communications (SLOCS) from the Persian Gulf to Japan and Korea. In conducting these operations, the Reagan administration's assumptions, as outlined in May 1982 in National Security Decision Document (NSDD) 32, and repeated periodically since that time, is that a war with the Soviet Union might be global, conventional, and protracted. Balanced forward-based U.S. conventional forces, in coordination with allies, are to engage the Soviet military

3. Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1988* (GPO, January 1, 1987), p. 265.

4. George Hudson and Joseph Kruzel (eds.), *American Defense Annual 1985-86* (Lexington Books, 1985), p. 119-120. There is increasing speculation, however, that in an era of constrained budgets it will be difficult to man and maintain a 600-ship navy.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 85.

world-wide, even if the USSR has attacked only in Europe, and are to conduct sequential operations intended to deny a quick victory by the Soviet Union. This strategy will permit the superior productive capabilities of the allied economies to eventually bring victory or war termination on favorable terms.<sup>6</sup> As one former National Security Council staff member put it, the Reagan administration has substituted the threat of escalation in space and time for vertical escalation from conventional to nuclear weapons.<sup>7</sup>

American maritime strategy sees a global conventional war developing in three phases.<sup>8</sup> The first, "Deterrence or the Transition to War," involves the rapid, world-wide forward deployment of the U.S. Navy and other armed forces, throughout the world. Militarily, actions will include the surge deployment of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) forces, especially attack submarines, to compel Soviet submarines to retreat into defensive bastions along the Soviet coastline; the forward movement of aircraft carrier battle groups; and other military measures intended to "signal" determination to fight on a global basis.

Should these actions fail to deter the USSR, the second phase, "Seizing the Initiative," begins. In this phase, American and allied forces will attempt to establish sea control in vital areas as far forward as possible. An aggressive campaign will be waged against Soviet submarines, including the Russian ballistic missile submarines. The USSR will be attacked along its world-wide rimlands, including the Norwegian Sea—Kola Peninsula area, the Eastern Mediterranean, and in the Vladivostok-Sakhalin-Kuriles region. The primary Soviet threat to U.S. and allied forces during this phase will be the aircraft

6. U.S. Senate, Armed Services Committee, *Hearings on the Department of Defense Authorization for FY 1985: Part 8* (GPO, 1985), p. 3854.

7. Samuel P. Huntington, "The Defense Policy of the Reagan Administration, 1981-1982," in Fred Greenstein, ed., *The Reagan Presidency: An Early Assessment* (The Johns Hopkins Press, 1983), p. 101.

8. The following discussion is drawn primarily from Linton F. Brooks, "Naval Power and National Security: The Case for the Maritime Strategy," *International Security* (Fall, 1986), pp. 65-66. Linton F. Brooks is a U.S. Navy Captain currently serving as Director of Defense Programs on the staff of the National Security Council.

of Soviet Naval Aviation; in the Pacific this means that currently allied forces would encounter some 100 land-based Backfire aircraft and other missile-carrying bombers. This phase is intended to result in the establishment of a logistics structure to support sustained forward operations, including advanced bases, sealift, and mobile logistics support.

Once sea control has been established, carrier attacks will be directed against the Soviet homeland and, if circumstances permit, Marine amphibious assaults ashore. It is intended to destroy Soviet SSBNs, complete the elimination of the Soviet Navy as a viable force, and compel the Soviet Union to respond to global operations. The overall goal is to terminate the war on acceptable terms through threatening the Soviet homeland itself directly and, through the destruction of the SSBN force, change the nuclear correlation of forces in favor of the U.S. and its allies.<sup>9</sup>

There is no doubt that if the Soviet Union believes that the Maritime Strategy is sound, it contributes to deterrence. It is also true that the Maritime Strategy might serve the valuable function of denying the Soviets a quick victory even if they were successful in Europe. As far as the Pacific theater is concerned, a successful Maritime Strategy would appear to be the only feasible way to safeguard the SLOCs. The volume of shipping in the Western Pacific and limited allied naval forces available to protect it, make it obvious that the convoy system employed during the battle of the Atlantic in World War II would not be feasible. There are simply not enough escorts to meet convoy demands. Even in the Second World War the allies prevailed less because of successful convoying than by a vast ship building program. Today that problem is compounded by the decline of the U.S. merchant fleet and the use of "flags of convenience" which might result in less available shipping. Recognizing this, the U.S. Navy has accorded high priority to improving sealift forces. Nevertheless, safeguarding the SLOCs in the Pacific will be difficult, especially with regard to oil shipments along the extensive routes from the Persian Gulf to Taiwan, Japan

9. Watkins, "The Maritime Strategy," *op. cit.*, p. 14.

and South Korea.

Critics of the Maritime Strategy make six basic arguments: first, naval forces cannot contribute significantly to the outcome of the war in Europe and it is in Europe that a Third World War will be won or lost; second, Soviet air power will be able to attack U.S. carrier forces while carrier aircraft are not within range of Soviet territory; third, the strategy presumes the war will remain conventional while in fact it is current NATO strategy to escalate if necessary and the Soviet Union may do so in any event. Fourth, in the Pacific a successful Maritime Strategy requires the active cooperation of Japan not only in terms of Japanese contributions to military operations, but also with regard to permitting the U.S. to attack Soviet bases from Japan. But Japan may not, in fact, agree to this. Fifth, that the reduction of the Soviet SSBN force will not, contrary to assertions, change the Soviet-American nuclear balance since a relatively small proportion of Soviet nuclear striking power is in the ballistic missile submarine force. Finally, that budgetary constraints and a declining pool of manpower make it unlikely that the U.S. can sustain the 600-ship navy.

In sum, present U.S. naval strategy in the Pacific is controversial and likely to remain so. Indeed, future American governments might modify present plans. Even under the best of circumstances, the Maritime Strategy may fail to achieve its principal objectives. It would therefore be significant if Japan would substantially augment its present air and naval forces in the Western Pacific to complement those of the United States.

In October 1976, at the end of the fourth five-year defense plan, the Japanese government adopted the National Defense Program Outline (NDPO). The NDPO allegedly was to provide Japanese force levels capable of conducting an "unyielding resistance" to any aggressor attacking Japan "until such time as cooperation from the United States is introduced, thus rebuffing such aggression."<sup>10</sup> In short, Tokyo would continue under the NDPO, as it had the

10. The National Defense Program Outline in *Defense of Japan 1985* (Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency, n.d.), p. 248.

previous thirty years, to rely upon the United States to defend Japan. A recent Japanese Defense "White Paper" affirms Japan's continuing dependent status in its review of the NDPO "guidelines": "Japan will repel limited or small-scale aggression by itself in principle. In case this is difficult because of the scale or type of aggression, Japan will repel the attacking force with the cooperation of the U.S."<sup>11</sup> That it is likely to be "difficult" for Japan to defend itself was illustrated in a recent military exercise, in which Japanese forces were defeated in seventeen minutes.<sup>12</sup>

The NDPO also replaced the five-year plans with a flexible system intended to decide details of the defense buildup for each year, consistent with the longer-term National Defense Program Outline. This results in a Defense Agency intradepartment document whose purpose is to serve as a reference when the Defense Agency draws up its annual programs and budgetary requests. Two such documents, entitled "Mid-Term Defense Program Estimate" have been formulated since 1976. But it is clear that even the modest military improvements in the Japanese Self-Defense Forces those documents called for have not obtained. This results from the decision, also taken in 1976, to hold Japanese defense spending to one percent or less of gross national product.

The failure to meet the force goals stipulated was anticipated since successive Japanese governments have adhered to the one percent of GNP limitation on defense expenditures. In 1982 the U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy testified that to reach the force goals set in 1976 by 1987, Japanese defense spending would need to approximate 1.3 percent of GNP in the 1983-87 period. Of course the amount of money spent on defense represents an "input," not an "output." Nevertheless, it takes money to raise and equip military forces and, however crude as a measurement, resource allocation ultimately determines the acquisition of both weapons and personnel.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 203.

12. "Soviet forces defeat Japanese in 17 minutes," *Jane's Defense Weekly*, (January 12, 1985).

As the Undersecretary stated:

While the fulfillment of the 1976 outline would increase significantly Japanese capabilities, it would not provide air and naval forces adequate to defend Japan's territory or its sea lanes against the threats of the 1990s.<sup>13</sup>

Successive Japanese Defense Agency "White Papers" confirm this judgement: indeed, there is no attempt on the part of Japanese officials to conceal their utter dependence for national security on the United States. Military analysts, both Japanese and American, with a numbing monotony and consistency, find the JSDF seriously deficient in virtually all aspects of war-fighting capabilities. A former chief of the Secretariat of the Japanese National Defense Council declared in 1973 that the SDF "could hold out for no more than a matter of days against the Soviet Union."<sup>14</sup> A year later, a staff member of the Japanese Defense College would warn that the SDF's wartime role was simply one of "buying time until the United States steps in the mediate Japan's surrender."<sup>15</sup> In 1975, an American analyst asserted that

The United States may hold that conventional defense of Japan "is entirely now a Japanese responsibility," but this is not even remotely possible against a conventional Soviet attack or even a significant Soviet attack on Japan's air defense or sea lanes. Japan could not retain supremacy in the air and command of the seas even around the home islands during the early stages of an air attack.<sup>16</sup>

In 1980 two government reports, one American and the other Japanese, pointed in a clear and unambiguous fashion to the exten-

13. Testimony of Fred C. Ikle, U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *East-West Relations: Focus on the Pacific* (June 10, 1982), p. 23.

14. Osamu Kaihara in *Mainichi Shimbun* (January 13, 1973), as cited in Frank B. Weinstein (ed.) *US-Japan Relations and the Security of Asia: The Next Decade* (Westview Press, 1978), p. 59.

15. Makoto Momoi, "Pax Russo-Americana and Its Theoretical Impact on Japan's Defense Concept" in Robert Pfaltzgraff, Jr. (ed.), *Contrasting Approaches to Strategic Arms Control* (Lexington Books, 1974).

16. Fred Greene, *Stresses in US-Japanese Security Relations* (Brookings Institution, 1975), p. 80.

sive deficiencies of the JSDF.<sup>17</sup> In a 1981 study prepared by the Japanese Center for Strategic Studies, it was argued that given the current deficiencies, it was quite conceivable that a major portion of Japan would be devastated in the early stages of a war.<sup>18</sup> In 1982, an Assistant Secretary of Defense testified that owing to significant shortcomings, "the Self-Defense Forces do not constitute effective deterrence."<sup>19</sup> In 1983, the outgoing U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) testified that

the Japanese military forces have insufficient stocks of equipment to sustain combat. They also have inadequate force levels, particularly in air defense and in anti-submarine warfare. The modernization of their ground forces is not adequate to handle a high threat situation today. They also do not have the necessary command and control, in my judgement, to effectively fight and sustain a war in their own self defense.<sup>20</sup>

Current Japanese-American naval cooperative arrangements assign two important missions to the Maritime Self Defense Forces (MSDF) in the event of war with the Soviet Union: closing three straits connecting the Sea of Japan with the Pacific Ocean, thus preventing passage of Russian ships to the open waters of the Pacific; and protecting the sealanes out about 1000 miles south of Tokyo. This latter task is exceptionally important since it includes the vital oil routes from the Persian Gulf and Southeast Asia to Japan. But there is unanimous agreement that the Japanese armed forces cannot now, nor will in the foreseeable future, be able to successfully undertake either of these burden-sharing tasks.

History teaches that Japan could contribute very importantly to

17. Japanese Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan 1980* (Tokyo, n.d.); and U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Japan's Contribution to Military Stability in Northeast Asia* (June, 1980).

18. Japanese Center for Strategic Studies, *The Defense of Japan: An Alternative View from Tokyo* (Translated at the Heritage Foundation, Washington, 1981), p. 13.

19. Testimony of Francis J. West, Jr., U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Hearings* (March 1, 1982).

20. Testimony of Admiral Robert Long, U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, *Hearings on Military Posture*, (March 8, 1983), p. 1231.

deterrence. In the late fall of 1941, for example, despite that fact that German armies were at the gates of Moscow, the Soviet government maintained the elite Far Eastern Army with some thirty to forty divisions in Siberia to guard against Japanese attack, even though a desperate Stalin had persuaded Japan to sign a non-aggression pact the previous April. When the Soviet government became convinced that Japan was going to strike the U.S. and Britain instead of the USSR, some eighteen divisions with 1700 tanks and 1500 aircraft were transferred from the Soviet Far East to the western front. This enabled the Russians to deliver the counterstroke which would save Moscow.<sup>21</sup>

So it is today that Japan as a military power would become in terms of the military balance a de facto member of the NATO alliance, contributing significantly to deterring a Soviet invasion of Western Europe as well as helping to maintain stability in Northeast Asia. If Japan were to make military efforts comparable to those of the West Europeans, it is not an exaggeration to say that the Soviet Union, confronting possible conflict on multiple fronts, would have to come to terms with the non-communist world. This indeed is the objective of the U.S. Maritime Strategy—to re-establish the balance of power, which was destroyed in 1945, on both ends of the great Eurasian continent. Whether U.S. Maritime Strategy, even with a 600-ship navy, is capable of attaining this goal without a greater Japanese contribution is problematical.

#### IV

Soviet naval strategy in the Pacific is, to a large extent, the mirror image of that of the United States. That is to say, despite the fact that Soviet military doctrine stresses the offense, the Russian Navy's concept of wartime operations, influenced by geographical factors,

21. John Keegan, *Barbarossa* (Ballantine Books, Inc., 1979), pp. 154-158.

is largely defensive in character. Moscow confronts four separate maritime frontiers: the Arctic-North Atlantic; the Baltic; the Black Sea; and the Pacific. Because these frontiers are separated from each other by considerable distance—especially the Pacific—the USSR has developed, in essence, four navies, each of which has two dominant missions: homeland defense and the protection of the ballistic missile submarines located in its particular theater of military operations (TVD). Seven particular wartime missions are common to all four fleets, although emphasis on particular missions vary from one TVD to another. These seven missions are: to protect the Soviet strategic ballistic missile submarines; to counter enemy sea-based strategic forces; to secure the sea approaches to the USSR and Warsaw Pact countries; to conduct operations in selected areas in order to deny enemy forces freedom of action; to support Warsaw Pact ground forces operations in continental theaters of military operations; to protect Soviet sealines of communication; and to interdict enemy sealines of communication.<sup>22</sup>

The Pacific Ocean Fleet is a well-balanced naval force which includes substantial strategic nuclear assets, and anti-surface and anti-submarine forces. Essential to Soviet strategy in wartime would be to establish and maintain sea control, including the Sea of Okhotsk, the Japanese Sea, and the Western Bering Sea. Neutralizing Japan would be an important goal in a superpower conflict since the Japanese archipelago forms an arc embracing the Sea of Japan. The southernmost island, Kyushu, borders the Korean peninsula across the Tsushima Strait, the only southern exit from the Sea of Japan. Hokkaido in the north reaches close to Soviet Sakhalin, with the Soviet-occupied islands of Kunashiri and Etorofu enclosing the Sea of Okhotsk. Should war occur, the U.S. and Japan, assuming Japan was a belligerent, would attempt to block the Soya and other passages to the open Pacific. The Soviet Union might respond by an invasion of Hokkaido.

Currently the Soviet Union maintains an 16,000-man Army division

22. U.S. Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power* (GPO, 5th edition, 1986), p. 88.

in the Northern Territories, equipped with 24 ground-attack helicopters and long-range 130mm howitzers. Forty MIG-23 jet fighters are on Etorofu and there are three Soviet naval installations and seven airfields on Sakhalin.<sup>23</sup>

Since November 1985, three new principal surface combatants were transferred to the Pacific Ocean Fleet. These ships were a KIROV-class nuclear-powered guided-missile cruiser, and two guided-missile destroyers. These additions upgrade considerably Soviet capabilities in both anti-surface and anti-submarine warfare.<sup>24</sup> As can be observed from Table I, the U.S. has lost relative standing in the naval balance in the Western Pacific.

In 1985, Soviet forces conducted a large-scale landing exercise that simulated an amphibious invasion of Hokkaido<sup>25</sup> and in August 1986 a major Soviet naval exercise involving fifteen major surface combatants and at least an equal number of submarines took place in the waters north of Hokkaido on both sides of the Kurile Island group. The forces assembled were formidable indeed, including the KIROV battlecruiser, a number of other cruisers, Backfire and Bear aircraft, and the helicopter carrier KIEV. It is believed that the force was exercising the formation of a defensive perimeter barrier to protect sea approaches to Soviet submarine bases in the area.<sup>26</sup> It is also likely that the activities were intended as part of the Soviet campaign to intimidate Japan and attempt to coerce Japan into neutrality. This campaign has taken the form of numerous violations of Japan's airspace, negative attitudes with regard to fishery talks, unwillingness to even discuss the Northern Territories issue and barely concealed threats to use nuclear weapons on Japan unless Japan abandons its alliance with the United States in case of

23. Katsuro Sakoh, "More of Japan's GNP Must Go for Defense," *The Wall Street Journal* (March 30, 1987).

24. Department of Defense, *Soviet Military Power 1987* (GPO, Sixth Edition, March 1987), pp. 68-69.

25. Sakoh, "More of Japan's GNP Must Go for Defense," *op. cit.* The Soviet landing ship, the IVAN ROGOV, is also in the Pacific Fleet.

26. International Forum for Maritime Power, *The Naval Balance 87* (November 1987), p. 158.

[Table I] US-USSR Naval Balance in Northeast Asia-Western Pacific

| Naval Capabilities      | US<br>WestPac/EastPac |     | USSR | US<br>Standing |
|-------------------------|-----------------------|-----|------|----------------|
| Hvy. & Med. Bombers     | 14                    | 0   | 100  | -86            |
| Fighter/Attack Aircraft | 467                   | 365 | 1230 | -398           |
| ASW Aircraft            | 36                    | 81  | 70   | +47            |
| Aircraft Carriers       |                       |     |      |                |
| Multipurpose            | 2                     | 4   | 2    | +4             |
| Helicopter              | 1                     | 5   | 0    | +6             |
| Battleships             | 0                     | 2   | 0    | +2             |
| Cruisers                | 5                     | 13  | 15   | +3             |
| Destroyers              | 8                     | 21  | 25   | +4             |
| Frigates/Corvettes      | 12                    | 35  | 54   | -7             |
| Submarines              |                       |     |      |                |
| Strategic               | 0                     | 7   | 32   | -25            |
| Attack                  | 9                     | 40  | 83   | -34            |
| Amphibious Ships        | 5                     | 20  | 20   | +5             |

Sources: John M. Collins, *US/Soviet Military Balance* Congressional Research Service Report No. 87-128-S (Washington: April 3, 1987); International Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1986-87* (London: Autumn 1986); and "The Naval Balance in the Indian-Pacific Ocean," *Naval Forces Special Issue: The Naval Balance '87* Vol. VIII. No. II/1987.

war.<sup>27</sup>

Japan, of course, has closely monitored the Soviet buildup and intimidation campaign. In August 1986, the Japanese Defense Agency *White Paper* spelled out the buildup, comparing Soviet Military forces in the Far East at the time of the formulation of the National Defense Outline in 1976 with those in 1986. As indicated in Table II, the increase in Soviet forces has been very substantial. It is clear that, although Japan's defensive posture is regarded in the United States as inadequate, it is sufficient to cause Moscow concern.

Cam Ranh Bay is now the largest Soviet military base outside of

27. With regard to airspace violations, see successive annual issues by the Japanese Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan*. Regarding Soviet nuclear threats, see, for example, Celestine Bohlen, "Gorbachev Warns Japan on U.S. Plans," *Washington Post* (August 6, 1985).

[Table II] Trends in Deployment of Soviet Far Eastern Forces

| Item                              | 1976                                              | 1986                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces | SS-20 0<br>TU-22M<br>Backfire 0                   | SS-20 more than 162<br>TU-22M<br>Backfires approx. 85                                                                                                                                                                                    |
| Ground Forces                     | 31 divisions with approx. 300,000 troops.         | 41 divisions with approx. 370,000 troops. (Firepower and mobility were improved by introduction of e.g. T-72 tanks and armored infantry fighting vehicles.)                                                                              |
| Air Forces                        | Task force—approx. 2,030 combat aircraft.         | Task force—approx. 2,390 combat aircraft. (Replacement with sophisticated aircraft of high performance, including TU-22M Backfire bombers, MIG-23/27 Flogger, SV-24 Fencer and MIG-31 Foxhound fighters.)                                |
| Naval Forces                      | Approx. 755 vessels of approx. 1.25 million tons. | Approx. 840 vessels of approx. 1.85 million tons. (Additional sophisticated vessels are deployed, including Kiev-carriers, Kirov-class nuclear missile cruisers, Kira-class missile cruisers, and Sobremenniy-class missile destroyers.) |

Source; Japanese Defense Agency, *Summary of Defense of Japan* (Tokyo: August 1986), p. 11.

the Soviet Union and from this base Soviet forces can threaten the SLOCs as they pass through chokepoints from the Indian to the Pacific Oceans. Unquestionably in the event of war, U.S. air and naval units based in the Philippines will attack Cam Ranh Bay immediately. This situation heightens the importance to the U.S. of retaining the Philippine bases since no other base location would serve as well.

The Soviet Union might also threaten the lifeline from the Persian Gulf to the Far East from facilities in the Indian Ocean-Gulf area. Despite the January 1986 coup in Aden, the USSR retains considerable influence in South Yemen. It is also believed that the Soviet

government may be constructing an airbase in Ethiopia. Finally, if Moscow ever succeeds in fully pacifying Afghanistan, Soviet forces will be in a better position to threaten not only Pakistan but the Gulf area as well. Accordingly, despite the evident emphasis given to the Northern Fleet with regard to SLOC interdiction, Indian and Pacific Ocean SLOC threats potentially exist. This may be a special problem for the U.S. since the Indian Ocean is 24 steaming days away from either the West or East coasts of the United States. In fact, the Gulf region is the most remote of any world region from the United States which impacts significantly on American capability to defend the area.<sup>28</sup>

## V

Although, allegedly, China (PRC) has placed military modernization as fourth among the "four modernizations," there is little doubt that PRC armed forces are becoming more professional, better equipped, and more technologically comparable to the military forces of the industrial nations. Table III lists a recent inventory of the PRC Navy (PLA-N), which is divided into three fleets. While in the past the PLA-N could be considered only a coastal defense force, the current five-year plan (1986-91) will certainly end with the PRC having the capability to project power considerable distances off shore. In fact, in April and May 1987, the PLA-N conducted the first large-scale combined arms exercises in the Western Pacific, with the May exercise involving numerous units and lasting ten days.<sup>29</sup>

28. Watkins, *The Maritime Strategy*, op. cit., p. 10. Use of the Suez Canal would reduce transit time from the East coast to the Indian Ocean from 24 to 18 days.

29. "Chinese Armada Conducts Drills in the Pacific Ocean," *Korea Herald*, June 2, 1987.

[Table III] Naval Balance Among Nations in Northeast Asia-Western Pacific  
(Excluding the US and USSR)

| Naval Capabilities              | PRC   | Japan | Taiwan | DPRK | ROK |
|---------------------------------|-------|-------|--------|------|-----|
| Hvy. & Med. Bombers             | 170*  | 0     | 0      | 0    | 0   |
| Fighter/Attack Aircraft         | 600** | 223   | 347    | 400  | 260 |
| ASW Aircraft                    | 8     | 94    | 9      | 0    | 18  |
| Cruisers                        | 0     | 0     | 0      | 0    | 0   |
| Destroyers                      | 15    | 34    | 26     | 0    | 9   |
| Frigates/Corvettes              | 31    | 18    | 13     | 2    | 11  |
| Fast Attack Craft***            | 777   | 5     | 53     | 335  | 11  |
| Attack Submarines               | 115   | 15    | 2      | 25   | 0   |
| Amphibious Ships<br>(LST & LSM) | 61    | 6     | 26     | 6    | 8   |

\*Includes bombers deployed with Air Force and Naval Air Force.

\*\*Includes only those assigned to Naval Air Force.

\*\*\*Includes all types: those armed with missiles, guns, and torpedoes.

Sources: See Table I.

Submarine forces are being given special priority; currently, there are four on-going submarine development programs including the Xia-class, twelve tube ballistic missile submarines, of which three are already operational, and an additional four and possibly more planned.<sup>30</sup> Along with a small ICBM force, this will give China a limited but respectable nuclear deterrent capability.

The interesting question is why the PRC apparently is investing so much of its scarce resources in upgrading its navy. One could speculate that there are at least five separate reasons, three of which involve the Soviet Union. First, China regards the 1986 agreement between North Korea and the USSR to permit Soviet use of the western coast of Korea as Soviet infringement within the Chinese security zone. Second, the obvious Soviet interest in the ministates of the Southwest Pacific clearly concerns Beijing as well as Australia and New Zealand; the PRC regards itself as a Pacific Basin country and resents possible Soviet penetration of the area. Third, the

30. Bradley Hahn, "China's Seapower—A Force in Transition," *Special Report* (SRI International, March 31, 1987).

possibility exists that a superpower arms control agreement would remove intermediate-range nuclear weapons from Europe but leave 100 or more Soviet SS-20 missiles in Asia, which poses a direct threat to China as well as Japan<sup>31</sup>; the development of an SSBN as well as an ICBM force would help offset this situation.

A fourth reason the PRC desires a more capable navy is to prevent any state from attempting to change the status of the South China Sea islands, which are perceived to be of great economic value for their mineral resources.

Finally, there is the question of the future of the Republic of China on Taiwan. Should the PRC decide to use force against Taiwan, it could take the form either of an invasion or a naval blockade of Taiwan's west coast. Either of these two actions are very unlikely. It is a general consensus that the PRC would act against Taiwan in only two circumstances; these are a declaration of independence by Taipei, or the cultivation of close cooperative relations between Taiwan and the Soviet Union. The ROC government has no desire or intention to move into a close relationship with the Soviet Union. As regards a declaration of independence and the establishment of a Republic of Taiwan, there is undoubtedly a small minority which favors this course of action. The majority and the ROC government, however, are firmly committed against independence and there is no possibility that this will occur in the foreseeable future, if ever. Therefore, in summary, barring quite unexpected developments, it is unlikely, although possible, of course, that the PRC will use its growing military might against Taiwan.<sup>32</sup> Beijing knows that an attack on Taiwan would so disrupt its ties with both the United States and Japan as to, in effect, isolate the RPC in its confrontation with the USSR. This is too dangerous a price to pay to bring Taiwan under its control.

31. Recent negotiations include removing the Soviet SS-20 missiles from Asia as well as Europe.

32. See William Carpenter, et. al., *Republic of China: Strategic Forecast and Potential for ROC-U.S. Naval Cooperation* (SRI International, 1985), p. 123, *passim*.

## VI

It is apparent to all observers that East Asia and the Western Pacific will become increasingly important as the twentieth century ends. Japan is already the second-largest economy in the world, and China has nearly one-fourth of the world's population. The four "little dragons"—South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore—are developing at breakneck speed. While currently politically stable, a region already heavily militarized is becoming more so. Tensions are building between the United States and its Asian allies, especially with Japan. Soviet military power in the region continues to grow. Given these circumstances, one may expect heightened interest by all the states concerned in the naval postures and strategies of the four Pacific great powers: the USSR, China, Japan, and the United States. As time goes on, the previously Euro-centered American strategy is likely to undergo further de-emphasis as American foreign political and economic policies become evermore oriented to the Pacific Basin, now clearly the most dynamic region in the world.

Since military operations in the Pacific will be dominated by naval forces, Asia's increased and growing importance underscores the necessity to emphasize a strong Navy in U.S. defense planning. The U.S. Navy will need to guarantee the safety of the highways across the seas over which will flow the supplies to American and allies forces. But the Maritime Strategy and its Siamese twin, horizontal escalation, are much more than insuring that the voracious appetite of modern war is satisfied. Maritime Strategy is an offensively-oriented concept; utilizing forward basing and strong battle groups built around fifteen aircraft carriers, the U.S. Navy will seek out and destroy the Soviet fleets. If successful, the Soviet Union will be contained, isolated and cut off from the world beyond Eurasia.

This will not win the war. The Soviet Union is too far from the heart of American power, too large in size, and too populated to be defeated in a conventional conflict. This is also the case for the

United States. Peace after a Soviet-American conventional war will be a negotiated one; unconditional surrender by either superpower is unthinkable.

One side or the other, however, may be in a sufficiently superior position to obtain a somewhat more favorable peace settlement than the other. Of course an American Maritime Strategy presupposes that allies countries both in Europe and in Asia bear the brunt of the defense of their particular regions. This means that Japan especially must begin shouldering a significantly larger share of the mutual defense. Such a posture will contribute very importantly to deterrence and make war much less likely. If war nevertheless occurs, a global Maritime Strategy for the United States, coupled with strong regional defense by American allies, offers the best hope that Washington and not Moscow will obtain the most favorable war termination terms.

**PART IV**

**NAVAL CAPABILITIES AND STRATEGIES  
OF REGIONAL POWERS AND THEIR  
IMPLICATIONS FOR SLOC SECURITY**

## THE NAVAL CAPABILITIES AND STRATEGIES OF AUSTRALIA AND ASEAN

*Michael O'Connor*

### I. Introduction

This paper will briefly describe the naval capabilities of Australia and the members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Because the treatment must necessarily be sketchy and because of the nature of this conference, I will try to focus on the capabilities for the defence of sea lanes of communication.

One disclaimer should be made at the outset. There is, as far as I am aware, no ASEAN naval strategy. As its members insist, ASEAN is not a military organization. There is certainly some military co-operation on a bilateral basis and within such formal structures as the Five Power Defence Arrangement which links Malaysia and Singapore with Australia, New Zealand and Britain.

It would, however, be naive to believe that there are no discussions about military co-operation between the various members of ASEAN and I would expect that the development of an ASEAN approach to such issues as the defence of SLOCs would only be a matter of time.

The point should also be made that, outside the Five Power Defence Arrangement and some limited bilateral co-operation with the other members of ASEAN, there is no formal Australian commitment to security in the ASEAN area. On the other hand, the Defence White Paper published by the Australian government in March this year

makes a powerful statement of Australian interest in the security of the ASEAN area against external aggression.

Finally, in this introduction, I will consider for the purposes of the paper only the five original members of ASEAN, thereby excluding Brunei which does not have a significant maritime capability, although it does have a substantial interest in secure SLOCs.

## II. Naval Capabilities

One of the hallmarks of naval—or maritime—power is flexibility. For the planners though that hallmark is achievable only in the larger navies. Small navies must inevitably make do with limited budgets and some basic needs. It is easy to switch those maids-of-all-work, the destroyer/frigate type, from one task to another if there are plenty available. On the other hand, relatively short-range fast attack craft designed for anti-shipping operations are of limited value for anti-submarine warfare or for defence against hostile air attack.

The force structures in terms of ships and naval aircraft are set out in the [Table I] have not included land-based fighter aircraft for reasons which will be discussed later.

In general terms, the force capabilities can be described as follows:

### 1. Australia

(1) *Forces*: The Royal Australian Navy, founded in 1911, is one of the oldest in the region. As befits its historical development, it is essentially a long-range force based upon 12 multi-purpose escorts and six submarines. Seven of the 12 destroyer/frigates have an area air defence capability based upon the US Standard SAM. Eight are fitted with the Australian-designed Ikara long-range anti-submarine missile while the four newer FFG-7 frigates have both Harpoon SSM and, eventually, two Seahawk helicopters as well as Standard SAM.

[Table I]  
Naval Capabilities—Australia and ASEAN

(items known to be on order are indicated by + ×)

| Naval Capabilities | Aust.   | Indonesia | Malaysia | Philip.  | Singap. | Thailand |
|--------------------|---------|-----------|----------|----------|---------|----------|
| Destroyer/Frigate  |         |           |          |          |         |          |
| Area SAM           | 7       | —         | —        | —        | —       | —        |
| ASW                | 8       | 3+4       | —        | —        | —       | —        |
| SSM                | 4+1     | 4         | 2        | —        | —       | +2       |
| Total              | 12+1    | 15+4      | 3        | 7        | —       | 6+2      |
| (pre-1970)         | 6       | 9         | 1        | 7        | —       | 6        |
| Submarines         | 6       | 2+1       | —        | —        | —       | +2       |
| Fast Attack Craft  |         |           |          |          |         |          |
| (M)                | —       | 8+8       | 12       | —        | 6       | 7        |
| (G)                | —       | —         | 6        | 3+3      | 6       | 3+3      |
| (T)                | —       | 6+4       | —        | —        | —       | —        |
| Patrol vessels     |         |           |          |          |         |          |
| (large)            | 15      | 10        | 20+2     | 22+6 (4) | —       | 23       |
| (small)            | 5       | 14 (3)    | 14       | 37+50    | 12      | 61       |
| MCM                | 2       | 2+3       | 6        | —        | 2       | 10+3     |
| Amphibious         |         |           |          |          |         |          |
| —ship              | 1       | 18        | 2        | 31       | 6       | 10+1     |
| —craft             | 4       | 34        | 29       | 71       | 8       | 50       |
| Oiler              | 1       | 1         | —        | 2        | —       | 1        |
| Miscellaneous      | 8       | 10        | 3        | 5        | 1       | 5        |
| Aircraft           |         |           |          |          |         |          |
| LRMP               | 20 P-3C | 19 Nomad  | 3 C-130  | 3 F-27   | —       | 19+3 (5) |
| Strike             | 22 (1)  | —         | —        | —        | —       | —        |
| ASW helo           | 26 (2)  | 14        | —        | —        | —       | —        |

Notes: 1. F-111C. However, one squadron of F/A-18 Hornets with tanker and AEW&C support could be earmarked for maritime tasks.

2. Includes 10 Seaking Mark 50 and 16 Seahawk.

3. Indonesia has many other light craft available or on order.

4. 12 of these are very old ex-US WW2 or USCG vessels.

5. Includes F-27, S-2 and Nomad.

The destroyer/frigate force is ageing. Half the ships are more than 20 years old and another two are more than 15 years old. Two more FFG-7s are under construction and plans have been announced for eight of a new class of long-range light patrol frigate but these will lack the sophisticated missile systems.

The force lacks integral air cover. The aircraft carrier capability which the RAN had from 1948 was scrapped in 1983 and no replacement is in view. This generally means that the RAN is limited to operating within range of shore-based aircraft, especially the new F/A-18 Hornets of the Royal Australian Air Force. The navy is unhappy about the ability of the RAAF to provide that air cover and certainly the RAAF would need access to bases outside Australia if the navy is to fulfil all the tasks discussed below.

Nevertheless, in regional terms, the destroyer/frigate force is powerful, can operate over long distances with its own afloat support and is well able to provide powerful back-up for the ASEAN navies.

The submarine force will be replaced in the 1990s, and later. The present force consists of six diesel-electric boats of the British Oberon class. They have a good anti-ship and anti-submarine capability and two boats can be maintained on station virtually anywhere in the region.

The air force provides 20 P-3C Orions under navy operational control for ASW, anti-shipping and surveillance operations. These aircraft also use Harpoon ASMs, while the Barra directional sonobuoy enhances their detection capabilities. The Orions operate from Singapore, Butterworth in Malaysia and Fiji as well as mainland bases.

Up to one squadron of Hornets and 22 F-111C fighter-bombers also with Harpoon ASM missiles can be available for maritime tasks.

The RAN is moving to overcome some serious weaknesses in its mine countermeasures capability. New minesweeping techniques are being developed and two prototypes of a new class of GRP minehunting catamarans are undergoing trials.

The amphibious capability is limited and there are no fast attack craft, these being generally unsuited for the long range operations required even around Australia's coast.

(2) *Personnel*: The personnel strength of the RAN is about 15,500 with a further 2,500 reserves. While numbers are small, the level of training and expertise is generally high. The RAN has a strong tradition of successful and sustained operations in two world wars and several minor conflicts.

(3) *Bases* (see map p. 126): The navy's principal bases are in the south of the continent at Sydney on the east coast and Garden Island, near Perth, in the west. Smaller bases at Darwin and Cairns in the north plus the afloat support available from one replenishment ship and an escort maintenance ship provide the ability to deploy long-range forces from northern areas. The map will indicate some of the distances over which the RAN must operate. Generally, operating concepts require a cruising radius of around 5000 km. so that such bases in the north are essential to support operations in south-east Asia or the south-west Pacific.

## 2. Asean

For obvious reasons, comment on ASEAN forces will be less specific than for the Australian navy. The comments are also based less on the sort of public discussion of defence matters that occurs in Australia than on an analysis of the apparent force structure from a distance.

(1) *Forces*: Again, it is necessary to refer to the Table.

The ASEAN navies generally are of comparatively recent formation. With the exception of the Royal Thai Navy, all were formed after World War II following the withdrawal of the colonial powers. The Royal Thai Navy and the Philippines Navy still retain ex-World War II US naval craft acquired as a result of their participation in SEATO from the 1950s to early 1970s.

Most are being rebuilt around a core force of fast attack craft, increasingly armed with modern SSMs such as the Israeli Gabriel or the French Exocet MM38. The RThN has Harpoon missiles on order.

Such destroyer/frigate types are old and of the most limited capability. Only Indonesia has an anti-submarine capability in the new escorts on order. None have an area anti-aircraft capability although there are some point defence systems such as Seacat.

Indonesia has two small German Type 209 submarines with another on order while Thailand has two submarines on order. Malaysia is considering acquiring submarines—and a shore-based air arm—but economic constraints are inhibiting the development at this time.

Geographic realities dictate force structures to a very large extent. The archipelagic nature of countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines call for large numbers of small patrol vessels for sovereignty and law enforcement functions. Thailand's rivers require large patrol forces. Quite large amphibious forces for the movement of troops and supplies to undeveloped regions are a feature of ASEAN navies.

Mine countermeasures forces are underdeveloped but some attention is being given to these in Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia.

All except Singapore have some maritime surveillance aircraft of limited capability. Singapore's plan to acquire four Hawkeye AEW & C aircraft has been deferred. In general, the mission of all these navies is the control of the sea approaches to their territories, plus law enforcement in a maritime environment. This will include, in the case of Malaysia and Indonesia especially, an ability to dominate the approaches to and control traffic in the key straits of Malacca, Sunda, Lombok and Makassar.

There are, however, significant weaknesses in surveillance, anti-submarine, anti-air and mine countermeasures capabilities which impact so strongly on the protection of sea lanes of communications. It would be fair to point out that the relatively narrow seas involved give some chance for the reasonably well-equipped fighter forces of the air forces to establish air superiority.

The weaker of all the navies in terms of the responsibilities faced is the Philippines. It is difficult to see how the capability can be enhanced given that country's extreme economic difficulties and the preoccupation with internal troubles.

Malaysia and Indonesia have cut substantially their defence pro-

grammes as a result of economic difficulties resulting from the recent collapse of oil prices.

(2) *Personnel*: Personnel strengths of the ASEAN navies are as follows:

- Indonesia — 37,000 including 12,000 marines plus coastguard and customs forces.
- Malaysia — 9,000 plus marine elements of the Police Field Force.
- Philippines — 28,000 including 9,600 marines and 2,000 coastguard.
- Singapore — 4,500 including 1,800 conscripts but not including marine police forces.
- Thailand — 32,000 including 900 naval air personnel and 13,000 marines.

I am not able to comment on the state of training of these navies. Malaysia's is probably the most experienced having gained some operational experience in the Konfrontasi conflict with Indonesia in the 1960s. While all carry out exercises from time to time with more sophisticated navies of United States, Britain and Australia, they lack the traditions based on extensive combat operations.

(3) *Bases*: The bases of the ASEAN navies are shown on the attached map. Note worthy is the focus by Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore on the Malacca Strait while other Indonesian bases are well placed to service forces designed to dominate the other key straits.

Indonesia's navy is divided into two fleets, Western and Eastern, based at Jakarta and Surabaya respectively.

The RThN is deployed primarily to dominate the approaches to the Gulf of Thailand. It has only one based on the West coast overlooking the entrance to Malacca Strait.

### III. Naval Strategies

It is a moot point whether strategies are determined by capabilities or by need. Certainly, security needs should determine strategies and

thus capabilities but other considerations will apply. Historical factors have a habit of influencing naval capabilities and a nation's strategy will be influenced by what is in the inventory rather than some external threat. As we all know, it takes a long time to change the shape of a navy to meet new demands, so that a navy formed by past experiences and imperatives may not be suitable for today's or tomorrow's threats. This is especially true of the smaller forces.

### 1. Australia

Australian naval strategies are largely determined by the traditional national strategies of attempting to maintain combinations to keep the peace. In past times, this strategy was interpreted primarily as combining with the British and, subsequently, the United States in support of their global strategies.

In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, Australian strategists and political leaders sought security in a degree of isolationism from regional problems. In the past twelve months, this policy has been reversed with a recognition that Australia's security cannot be divorced from that of south-east Asia. An element of this recognition is that Australia's security is affected by the security of the sea lanes of communication in the south-east Asian region.

Naval strategy recognises the need to protect sea lanes of communication and the importance of projecting maritime power into south-east Asia and the south-west Pacific in support of friends in both regions. In south-east Asia, this includes all the members of ASEAN.

Australia's alliance relationship with the United States has tended to drive force development and naval strategy in a number of ways. As part of the alliance arrangements, the *Radford-Collins agreement* of 1951 gives Australia responsibility for ASW operations in significant areas of the south-west Pacific and eastern Indian Oceans. In particular, Australia has the responsibility for ASW in the north-east quadrant of the Indian Ocean, i.e. in the approaches to the Indonesian straits. It should be emphasised that in the alliance con-

text, this strategy is based upon a perceived threat from Soviet submarine operations.

Clearly though, Australian planners have been concerned about the air threat, and the development of the Soviet bases at Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang have reinforced that concern.

In recent years, much of the force development has been designed to provide an interdiction capability to deal with maritime forces approaching Australia from the north. This has led to some concern among sections of the Indonesian military who see Australian developments as indicative of an irrational fear of Indonesia. As well, Australian possession of Cocos, with its airfield, and Christmas Island in the north-east Indian Ocean have led some to conclude that Australia wishes to dominate the approaches to the Indonesian straits.

There is no doubt that Australian policy is designed to contribute to control of the passages between the Indian and Pacific Ocean in support of US (or Western) global strategies. At the same time, the force development has given Australia the ability to combine with regional powers to defend sea lanes in the region and contribute to maritime security generally against threats external to the region.

That the political arrangements which would commit this capability have not been made does not nullify the potential that exists. Australian relations with Singapore and Malaysia have been close although somewhat neglected in recent years. Relations with Indonesia have not developed as far as I would like and there have been some strains in recent months. These seem to be under control at this time and Australia's recently stated commitment to regional security should generate the right conditions for closer co-operation in the future.

What is important is that the force capability to play an important role in surveillance, ASW, strike and interdiction and the protection of shipping does exist. The biggest gaps are in mine countermeasures and air defence of surface forces.

## 2. *Asean*

As emphasised in my introduction, there is no ASEAN naval strategy as such. Naval strategy in the region is very much a product of the individual perceptions of each nation. These vary considerably and are driven largely by national rather than regional or global perceptions.

Singapore is essentially concerned with protecting its seaward approaches. Singapore pays close attention to surveillance, traffic control in the straits and law enforcement. It possesses a small striking force of missile and gun-armed fast attack craft to be used against any force assaulting Singaporean territory. In terms of SLOC defence, it has virtually no capability as such.

Indonesian and Philippines strategies are largely governed by the archipelagic nature of their territories. Much of their naval capability is directed to law enforcement among the very heavy shipping traffic which conducts internal communications.

Indonesia is however moving towards the development of a force capable of exercising control over naval and merchant traffic transiting the principal straits of Malacca, Sunda, Lombok and Makassar. The acquisition of small missile-armed escorts, fast attack craft and submarines will supplement the efforts of smaller patrol craft designed primarily for sovereignty patrols. The strategy is still primarily centered upon internal waters but capabilities for out-of area operations are growing.

Some of the escorts have ASW helicopters and there is a useful air surveillance capability. Air defence will however be dependent upon land-based fighter aircraft as there is no area SAM capability in the navy.

Unfortunately, economic and internal security problems have left the Philippines virtually devoid of a naval capability and strategy except for very limited law enforcement. It is probably fair to say that the Philippines needs to devote more resources to make the law enforcement function operate more efficiently. In my view, assistance to the Philippines should focus upon developing the efficient interdiction

of gun-running as a basic defence against the current insurgency.

Thailand is clearly preoccupied with protecting its seaward flank on the Gulf of Thailand by exercising sea control over that stretch of water. Its Indian Ocean shore obviously rates a low priority at this time. Given the lack of port facilities on the west coast and the concern with the threat from Vietnam, this is understandable provided no change in the Indian Ocean threat becomes obvious. Any change to the economic infrastructure as would occur with the construction of the proposed Kra Isthmus oil pipeline could also force a change in naval strategy.

Malaysia is concerned with the protection of its sea lanes connecting East and West Malaysia, as well as the protection of off-shore oil installations. Traffic control and law enforcement in the Straits of Malacca are a significant task.

Nevertheless, the Malaysians understand that their maritime forces are inadequate for the sea control task that faces them. They need a greater surveillance capability, anti-air and ASW capabilities as well as more escorts. There is concern in Malaysia at the implications of the growth of Indian naval power. Financial considerations clearly limit Malaysia's ability to do more.

The ASEAN picture is one of fragmented effort. Naval capabilities are not insignificant but are directed more towards protection against each other or from other regional countries—such as Vietnam—than from any out-of area or large power threat. With combined forces, complementary force development and greater integration of air and surface forces, they could present a substantial deterrent to such threats, especially given support from Australia.

## IV. Conclusion

Let me conclude with a few thoughts about the kind of scenarios which could impact upon the navies of Australia and ASEAN.

The first is that if the United States is forced out of its bases in the

Philippines the regional navies will have to face the maritime threats on their own. Australia is under no illusion even publicly that the US bases are vital to regional security.

The ASEAN nations would like to remain publicly at least ambivalent, to suggest that the issue is not important. Privately, I believe they would not wish to see the US pull out and I have no doubt that they will be telling President Aquino so.

None of the countries in the region, Australia included, show any sign that they would provide alternative facilities for the US.

The second factor is that of India. India has developed a large Fleet based upon two carriers operating fixed-wing strike aircraft as well as ASW helicopters. The fleet is powerful, efficient and well-supported. India's strategy remains the principal regional uncertainty. What is certain is that it can exercise at the very least a powerful coercive factor in support of Indian foreign policy.

Speaking at a symposium in Canberra in 1984, retired Indian Vice Admiral M.P. Awati indicated that India would support the aspirations of the Third World against those of the developed nations. His warning was blunt enough but not very specific. What could be said about that threat in the context of SLOC security is that, for the Indians, the targets will include the US, the NATO countries, Japan and Australia. They may also now include the Republic of Korea and Republic of China as newly industrialised countries.


All that is very speculative. What it does mean though is that the strategy of securing the Indonesian straits could become meaningless if the Indians can dominate the approaches to those straits with their strong surface forces and submarines. For Australia, its task in securing control of the north-east quadrant of the Indian Ocean would be dependent upon shore-based fighter support which might not do as well as the airmen think against ship-borne Harriers.

Thirdly, unless the Philippines navy and coastguard can alone or with friendly help prevent the supply of heavy weapons to the New Peoples Army, that country could become a hostile power capable with Vietnam and the USSR of closing the South China Sea to all but their clients.

In those circumstances, the SLOCs which currently pass through the archipelagoes may be forced to reroute south of Australia and well to the east of the Philippines with serious cost penalties for Japan, ROK, ROC and Australia. For ASEAN though, the problem would be greater. It could well mean the end of the dream of economic prosperity and political freedom.

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## CHINA AS A POTENTIAL MARITIME POWER

*Tun-hwa Ko*

### I. Foreword

The term "China", within the scope of this paper, is treated apolitically; that is to say the author is not particularly concerned with trying to connect the studies with the current political matters on the two sides of the Taiwan straits. The author is trying only to examine the necessity, desire and possibility of China's becoming a strong maritime power by looking at the land, resources, people, national character, and cultural and historical background of China, pertaining to the development of maritime affairs.

One may argue that, perhaps, China is already in the front rank of maritime powers. The author is trying to merit some discussion and judgements based on broader and more permanent factors than what is seen at present.

### II. Elements of Maritime Power

The term "maritime power" in its broadest interpretation must be taken to mean not only the naval power of a nation but its total strength at sea.

Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, U.S. Navy, was the first to

coin the term "Seapower" in his famous book, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*, published in 1890. Some years later, he recalled that he was in a hurry to use the term 'Seapower', because his publisher in London wanted to have his book printed as soon as possible. Many scholars and keen students of Mahan today seem to prefer the use of the term "Maritime Power" rather than Seapower.

Mahan in his time studied the great seapowers of the world, especially England, during the period 1660-1783. Mahan noted that the great seapowers had six common elements which conditioned their growth. These were:

1. Geographical Positions
2. Physical Conformation (including natural resources, products, and climate.)
3. Extent of territory
4. Population
5. National Character
6. Character of the Government and National Institutions.

Maritime power means a nation's capability to make use of the oceans. These uses may be political, psychological, economic or military—in peace and in war, to support a nation's power in achieving her national objectives. The main parts of maritime power are: naval power, ocean science and technology, ocean industry and ocean-borne trade. The naval power is made up of many things which include combat ships, naval aircraft, auxiliary ships and craft, seamen and marine corps, bases with ship construction yards, repair and maintenance facilities, communications centers, hospitals, training schools, supply depots, etc. The naval power includes also a nation's merchant fleet, fishery vessels as well as oceanographic research ships.

Of all the above-mentioned elements, it is generally believed that the geographic position might be the most important element. Natural and human resources might be the next. The system of its government together with the understanding and will of the leadership in developing the maritime power are also dominating elements in the growth of maritime powers.

So much about the leading thought on maritime power by the great authority—Mahan. What about the Chinese original concept on maritime power? Maybe the earliest scholarly works in China concerning the defense of the maritime borders, and also concerning the knowledge of the outside world beyond the horizon of the sea, were made by a Chinese named Wei-yuan (1794-1857).

Wei-Yuan was one of the early thinkers and advocates of the importance of the maritime relations of China and the outside world. He was a statesman, reformer, activist and classical scholar. His book '*Haiquo Tuzhi*' (Illustrated Treatise on Sea Kingdoms) was the foremost declaration of Chinese maritime concept and policy ever written.

Wei and his contemporary scholars, like the majority of Chinese, were shocked by the Opium War, and the onslaught of the Western naval guns and ships. Wei responded by looking beyond the Chinese maritime borders, from where the new invaders of China were coming.

Wei had collected, to the best of his ability, the books, maps, atlases, descriptions and reports available in his time to learn systematically about the world outside the sea frontiers, of which the rulers of China before his time were totally at a loss.

Wei made the effort not only to understand the external situations but also to suggest the foreign policies and military strategies for dealing with the 'Sea Kingdoms'.

His strategies for China, in short, were "to learn the TECHNOLOGY from the 'Sea Kingdoms' and fight them with the same weapons."

His books on 'Sea Kingdoms' and his other writing, '*Sain-Wu-Chi*' (a book aiming at pointing out how to make a nation strong) influenced not only China but also, perhaps even more, Japan when her doors were also being knocked upon by the 'Sea Kingdoms.' That was also how the idea of 'the modernization of China' was first initiated in China, around 1852—a process which is still going on in the mainland and in Taiwan, with Taiwan scoring more success economically.

### III. An Overview

Here is an overview of China's conditions for maritime development. Based on Mahan's opinion on the elements of seapowers and the Chinese concept, let us look at China's geographic position first.

China is centrally located in Asia. She has an area of about 3.7 million square miles which is about equal to that of the United States of America (3.6 million square miles). Both occupy similar latitudes on the Northern Hemisphere. America has two ocean coasts, the Atlantic and the Pacific, while China is closely linked with the Pacific and the Indian Oceans.

Along the Chinese borders, there are two national doors: The front door and the back door. The front door is facing the Pacific Ocean, while the back door is looking towards the Asian interior. Until recent centuries, visitors and invaders of China did not come through her front door. Traditionally, the Chinese have been preoccupied with the back door where uninvited Mongols, Tartars, Turkic peoples and other 'barbarous' tribes had often come into China. Through her back door, the Chinese had used, as early as the second century, the overland caravan route to trade with the outside world, including far-off Rome. Both the front and the back doors have given the Chinese benefit and trouble. But it is the front door that has awakened and forced China to realize the importance of 'modernizing' herself. The reasons might be simply due to the fact that the American, European and Japanese visitors calling on the eastern and southeastern sea borders are 'Sea Kingdoms' with a higher level of technology, while, in the historical past, the invaders by the back door were inferior to the Chinese in culture and in technology.

The Chinese maritime border embraces a large body of water known as the China Sea. The China Sea ranges from the Korean Peninsula in the north to Singapore in the south, and is bordered on the east by a chain of islands consisting, from north to south, of Japan, the Ryukyus, Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia. This chain of islands is the crescent rimland of Asia.

Chinese divide the China Sea into four portions: The Yellow, the East, the South, and the Pohai Bay. Pohai is a pocket of water shut in by Shantung and Liaotung peninsulas with an opening of about 70 nautical miles. The point at the mouth of the Yangtze River divides the East China Sea from the Yellow Sea to the north. Pin-Hai, in Fukien is the place where the East and the South China seas are divided.

China has a continental coastline of about 11,900 km (or 7,378 miles, or 6,173 nautical miles). It begins at the mouth of the Yalu River in the north, and ends at the Peilun River in the south. The continental coastline has two parts: the coastline to the north of Hang-Chou Bay, Cheokian, is a sandy coast (with the exception of some portions in Shangtung and Liaotung coast); the coastline to the south of Hang-Chou Bay is rocky.

Among the northern harbors, only a few are not frozen in the winter; the rest are closed for two to three months each year by ice. Along the southern rocky coast, there are many good harbors. The good northern harbors are: Ta-Lien, Port Arthur, Yen-tai, Wei Hai Wei and Ching Tao, of which Ching Tao is the best known. The good southern harbors are: Lien-Yuin, Shanghai, Ningpo, San Sha Wan, Fuchou, Hsin Hwa Wan, Amoy, Swatao, Hong Kong, Kuang-Shou-Wan, and Hai-Kou. Some southern harbors are among the best in the world. In Taiwan, harbors like Keelung and Kaohsiung rank very high among the harbors in the world in total tonnage hauled each year and in terminal facilities.

There are more than 3,500 islands along the Chinese coast, of which Taiwan is the largest with an area of 36,000 square kilometers, and Hai Nan the second in size with 32,000 square kilometers.

China's geographical position shows clearly that she has all the physical conditions needed for becoming a strong maritime power. It also shows that she has to defend herself against an overseas attack.

What about her people? Are there enough seafaring people? Can they manage modern technical skills? The answer is positively yes. Out of a population numbering more than a billion, it is easy to choose people for all kinds of trade with all kinds of qualifications. Even in Taiwan, with a population of only 19 million, the number of registered

seamen in the Seamen's Association was 35,000 in 1981<sup>1</sup> which is larger than the number of seamen in the United Kingdom, a traditionally reputed maritime nation. In the ROC Navy on Taiwan, on board a destroyer, for instance, you can find a great number of the enlisted men having B.S. degrees or higher. A majority of them are graduates from polytechnic colleges. They are as well educated, if not better educated than most other navies in the world. It is only a matter of national education program. Hypothetically speaking, and from the manpower-supply point of view, China could supply seamen for the merchant fleet of the entire world, if so demanded by the world job market. During World War II, when the German submarines inflicted heavy toll on Allied merchantmen, there were 20,000+ Chinese merchant seamen who joined the Allied merchant ships. Among them, Mr. Lum Po kept himself alive for 132 days alone after his ship was sunk in the Atlantic. Lum was one of the heroes who received the highest medal in W.W.II.

There is no problem as to whether Chinese sailors can absorb modern maritime equipment. One must not forget that the Chinese were the first builders of many maritime artifacts, such as the balanced rudder, compartmentalized ships, Navigational Compass, and non-fouling metal anchor. The Chinese are not non-inventive people, and they are always keen to learn new things.

For China's plan of developing a large merchant marine, she will need only 40,000 seamen which is very small percentage of her population. In the western countries, well-to-do people would go boating or sailing for holiday-making. In China, for centuries and centuries, everyday there have been people who sail on board the Chinese Junks up and down the Chinese coast, not for pleasure-making but for making a living. For anyone who comes near the Chinese mainland coast, one is bound to see hundreds of Junks sailing together. There must be more seafarers in China, especially in the southern part of China, than in any other part of the world, if we include those Junk people. (Some of them have their whole families on board—including

1. Data report by The National Seamen's Union, 115 Hangchow S. Road Sec. 1, Taipei, 1981.

the newly born babies. Small children are always attached to the boats by strings, so that they can be recovered when they fall overboard.)

Among the Han Chinese, it has been the southerners—the Fukienese and the Cantonese—who have had the spirit of adventuring out into the seas. The Southern Chinese who would go to the foreign lands as traders, entrepreneurs before and after Cheng Ho's famous voyages to the South Seas. Some of them even attacked places in Southeast Asia, and made themselves kings in some S.E. Asian countries.<sup>2</sup>

By generally accepted views on the elements of maritime power, China has most of the prerequisites for becoming a maritime power with only one thing undecided. That is the decision and support from the government. Throughout history, individual seafaring Chinese have reached all corners of the oceans, yet, there have been few government directed efforts to become a maritime power, excepting a few incidents which will be briefly mentioned later.

When the European traders, explorers and colonists came to the Eastern Seas, after Cheng Ho's voyages to the Indian Ocean, the strongest opposition and resistance they met came from the Chinese chiefs and individuals who settled in S.E. Asia. In the past, Chinese have proved to the world that they are not only land dwellers, but can also be amphibians.

#### IV. Does China need to be a Maritime Power?

China was totally unprepared for meeting the Europeans in the nineteenth century. The Manchu rulers of China were poor in knowledge of the outside world and were unskillful in diplomacy. Some of the early wars with the oncoming maritime nations could have been avoided, if the rulers were more knowledgeable and tactful. They were ignorant and arrogant at first, angry and impulsive in the next period, frustrated and scared stiff in the end. The shock of

2. Pai-Lum Loui, *Chinese Culture and Chinese Soliders* (Chinese Language), Wen Lien Chin Book Store, Taipei, 1974, pp. 191-2.

humiliation at the hands of Europeans still scars the Chinese psyche. Reaction ever since has been what Wei-Yuan said in his book 'Haiquo Tuzhi', as quoted in Section II of this paper—to learn the TECHNOLOGY from the Sea Kingdoms and to fight them with the same weapons.

As the threats to China have come from the sea, China has to defend herself at sea. As of today, the reality is that the enemies of China can attack her from the air, space, land and the sea. For deterrence China needs the capabilities of blue water mobile naval forces with the capabilities of launching SLBMs from SSBNs. In order to do that, she needs a full-fledged balanced navy for sea control, because the enemies of China can project their power at distances from the Pacific and Indian Oceans. If this logic is sound, as it was sound when the Chinese decided before that they did not want to have the "underpants" but the "bombs", we shall not be surprised to learn that China is building her first aircraft carrier. She may want to surprise the world, and her own people, by having an aircraft carrier operating one day. Even if she is not preparing for fighting a war, a strong navy will be useful as an instrument for carrying out her foreign policy, for carrying more weight at the bargaining table, for protecting her fishing vessels, merchant ships and offshore oil facilities. The offshore oil means so much for China's whole program of modernization because on-shore oil production is declining slowly due to depletion.

The coastal water of China has been overfished for a long time. In order to obtain more food from the sea, fishing ships have to operate further out to sea. According to United Nations sources, China ranked third in fish catches, behind Japan and the USSR. Their 200,000 or so fishing ships and boats, organized into 'fishing commands,' also serve as part of the maritime militia in close coordination with the PLA Navy. China will try to protect its economic right of the 200 mile economic zone, and at some other locations, the right of continental shelves when they are more than 200 miles away from shores. For all that, she needs a strong navy to reinforce her claims. In the South China Sea, there are territorial disputes among China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia. Someday, especially if oil is found

in one of the disputed areas, China will take action in no time. At this moment, the ROC on Taiwan is garrisoning the main Island—Tai Ping.—in the Spratly group.

China already has a large merchant fleet of her own. Presently she ranks within the top ten shipping fleets of the world. China owns about 30,000,000 tonnage of commercial transport. With her low labor cost and low oil price, she has every advantage in competing with other nations in cargo transportation rate. China has not joined the freight price-fixing conference by regional shippers, a practice that passes on the expense of inefficiencies and high labor cost to the consumers of goods being transported. China might well become a primary carrier of international trade goods worldwide.

She will have to protect her Sea Lanes of Communications; even though it is hard to say which sea route will be the most important to China's economy, and how much interdependency China will share with the world economy. But, one thing can be said for certain: for national survival under the modern and future ways of waging war, China needs to be a maritime power.

## V. Will China want to be a Maritime Power?

In our previous discussions, the author held the opinion that China needs to develop her maritime power, and has the prerequisites for doing so. Yet, it does not follow that she will go ahead with a program of developing the maritime power. The reason is simple. Because the first premise concerning China's needs belong to the author of this paper, not the leadership in mainland China. Even if the leadership in China sees the need, they may not want to do it. Being a strong maritime power, a nation would enjoy many advantages, but would also encounter some disadvantages that will come along with this status.

If China stretches out too much into the Pacific, she will have to clash more with other maritime powers, like Japan did in World War II. In the Pacific, Japan had to fight against Americans, British, Dutch

and French. If Japan had not plunged into the Pacific, she would have only had to take on China. After the Pacific war, Japan has not been aggressive; and she has become prosperous. So it may not always be desirable to become a big maritime power. A wise nation should get all the benefits out of the oceans, and avoid their negative side-effects. It is a matter of choosing the optimal strategy that would suit each nation.

Let us look again into China's past history to see what she did before. It has been pointed out earlier in this paper that China had lacked, in past dynasties, the governmental effort to extend her power far into the ocean except perhaps in a few incidents.

During the Yuan Dynasty, the Mongols sent the first expedition to Japan in 1274 A.D. Using Korean ships, the Mongols captured the island of Tsushima and Iki. They landed at Hakata Bay (Ajikozaki) in northern Kyushu. Part of the invasion fleet was wrecked in a storm. The Mongols returned to Korea.<sup>3</sup> The second Mongol expedition occurred in 1281. The army sailed in immense fleet, probably about 50,000, chiefly from Fukien province. Two admirals—Aleuhan and Hoan Wen-hu—one a Mongol and the other a Chinese, were put in command of the expedition. Unfortunately the former died at sea, but the fleet reached Japan in safety and over a hundred thousand troops landed from the ships. Scarcely had this been accomplished when, again, a tremendous storm arose which shattered the Mongol and Chinese invasion.<sup>4</sup>

The second incident of maritime exploration in Chinese history happened early in the Ming dynasty, under Yung Lo and his immediate successors, between A.D. 1405-1433. The Ming court sponsored a number of powerful naval expeditions to the Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf, Red Sea and neighbouring seas. The expeditions were large and powerful, more than 70,000 men embarked in fleets of specially built great ships of their time. They were commanded by a

3. R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, *The Encyclopaedia of Military History*, New Moon Printing Co. Ltd. p. 352.

4. Rev. J. Macgowan, *A History of China*, Kegan Paul Trench, Trubner and Co. Ltd. London, 1897, p. 437.

court eunuch, the celebrated Cheng Ho who made seven voyages all together at about two-year intervals. Cheng Ho was the main inspiration for these expeditions which lasted as long as he remained active, but ceased with his death.<sup>5</sup>

The last incident involved General Cheng Ch'eng-Kung (also known as Koxinga) who conducted incessant warfare on behalf of the Ming against both Manchus and Europeans in China. In 1661-1662, he attacked Fort Zelanda (at Anping, Taiwan) compelling the Dutch to capitulate.

Will modern China want to do it again? Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the national leader of 1911 revolution, in a letter that he wrote to his close associate, Mr. Liao Chun-kai, mapped out a plan for the national defense of China.<sup>6</sup> In that plan, there were:

Program No. 22, For the development of a Chinese Navy.

No. 45, To train 30 million qualified persons for defense needs and 10 million engineers for defense work.

No. 58, Plan for naval construction.

No. 59, A training program for the Navy, Army and Air Forces.

In a speech which Dr. Sun gave in the Navy yard, Mawei, Fukien on 21 April, 1912, he advocated that China should build a navy that would equal those of the major powers in the world.<sup>7</sup> Had Dr. Sun Yat-sen lived longer, and had the situations confronting China in his time permitted, China might have had a bigger navy than she had before.

Now, in mainland China, the navy ranks first in the world in numbers of fast attack craft, second in numbers of missile launch platforms, and third in submarine strength. Naval personnel strength amounts to 350,000 officers and men, including 38,000 Naval Air arms, and 38,000 Marines. The number of destroyers is less than that of the R.O.C. Navy on Taiwan. For the detailed orders of battle,

5. C.P. Fitzgerald, *China, A Short Cultural History*, Wen Sing Book Store, Taipei, 1977, p. 473.

6. Chi-yun Chang, *The Complete Work of Dr. Sun Yat-Sen*, 3rd. Edition, Institute of National Defense, Taipei, 1963, pp. 168-1.

7. *Ibid.*, pp. 487.

please see Appendix I. Current shipbuilding capacity exceeds 800,000 tons annually. Business relations have been established with more than 100 firms in some 40 countries.

If China could make good progress in her four modernization programs without having major internal crises because of power struggles among the 'left' and the 'right', or whatever the outsiders may like to name them, the PLA Navy may have 1,000 ships or so early in the next century.

The real question is: Will China want to challenge the other Maritime Superpowers in the Pacific, as well as the sum of regional Maritime Powers?

Nobody can predict the future with good accuracy. But, perhaps, we can say that China has also to obey the dictate of an Iron Law of International Politics, which states that nations seek to expand their interests and their influences to the extent that their absolute power increases. In other word, states expand the range of their interests commensurate with the increase of their national power. China was not originally "born" with her current size. Step by step, she has grown and expanded to what China is today. Like other big nations, China has been growing according to the Iron Law. Her process of growth has not entirely been achieved by her military power, more often it has been on the basis of her cultural strength. But, to date, China is no longer, sitting in the middle of Asia, surrounded by 'barbarians' whose cultures are inferior to that of China. China is today confronted by the superpowers, and the other regional states who can grow fast too, and some states faster.

China has all the potentials for growing; but, she will not be the NEPTUNE of the world oceans.

## VI. Conclusion

This paper is an apolitical study on China's potential to develop her maritime power. It is found that she has most of the prerequisites

for a maritime power. Since the Opium War, it has been the wish of Chinese people to modernize China, as suggested by Wei Yuan's book—to learn the TECHNOLOGY from the Sea Kingdoms.

At present, China can be attacked from the land, the air and the sea. For survival she needs the capabilities of deterrence, including the launching of SLBMs from SSBNs. She also needs the maritime power for protecting her economic activities, protecting her fishing and merchant fleet, and offshore oil. She may also want to use the maritime power as an instrument for furthering her foreign policies.

Maritime power would bring a lot of advantage to a nation who has it, but there are some disadvantages that would come along with it. What has been good for America may not also be good for China.

China already ranks high among the maritime powers. By early next century, she may have a navy of 1,000 goods ships. The other regional Asian states, however, can also grow fast.

China may not want to be and can not be the Neptune of the World Ocean.

## APPENDIX I. NAVAL BATTLE ORDER OF CHINA (MAINLAND)

### Naval Battle Order

Manpower: 350,000 officers and men, including 38,000 Naval Air Force and 38,000 Marines.

Reserves: About 350,000 trained reservists.

Conscripts service period: 5 years.

Fleet:

Destroyers:

- 14 Luda class DDGs with CSSN-2 (HY-2, Styx) type missiles
- 4 ex-USSR Gordy class with Styx missiles

Frigates:

- 5 Jiangnan class

- 2 Jiangdong class with SAMs
- 4 ex-USSR Riga class (Styx equipped)
- 11 Jianghu class (Styx equipped) with 2 under construction
- 4 Chengdu class (with Styx)

#### Submarines:

- 3 Han class nuclear-powered
- 2 Ming class
- 1 Gold class (with ballistic missiles)
- 79 ex-Soviet Romeo class
- 21 Whiskey class
- 1 Xia class with CSS-N-3 strategic missiles

#### Light forces:

- 114 Soviet Osa and 1 Chinese Hela class FACs (Styx equipped)
- 4 Soviet Komar and 100 Chinese Hoku class FACs (Styx equipped)
- 10 Shanghai class FACs type 1 (gun equipped)
- 305 Shanghai class FACs types II, III, IV and V (gun equipped)
- 60 Swatow class FACs (gun equipped)
- 140 Huchuan class FACs (gun equipped)
- 70 P4 class FACs (torpedo equipped)
- 80 P6 class (torpedo equipped)
- 15 Huang class FACs (gun equipped)
- 2 Shandong class FACs (gun equipped)
- 28 Hainan class patrol craft
- 20 ex-Soviet kronstadt class patrol craft
- 40 Yulin coastal patrol
- 30 Beihai coastal patrol
- 4 Taishan coastal patrol

#### Mine warfare forces:

- 23 Soviet T43 class ocean minesweepers

#### Other equipment:

- 9 escorts of various types (mostly ex-Japanese)
- 150 LCMs
- 300 LCUs
- 60 Amphibious Warfare Forces

- 1 submarine support ship
- 16 survey and research ships (3 Soviet T 43 class)
- 4 range instrumentation ships
- 24 supply ships
- 2 icebreakers

Several hundred armed trawlers

Various other vessels including oilers, boom defense vessels, repair ships, training ships, tugs, armed junks, and up to 225 armed motor craft of other types, plus 150 service craft and miscellaneous boats.

#### Deployment:

- North Sea fleet, about 500 vessels
- East Sea fleet, about 750 vessels
- South Sea fleet, about 600 vessels

#### Naval aviation:

About 38,000 officers and men, and about 800 aircraft make this a considerable land based naval air force.

#### Organization:

4 bomber and 4 fighter divisions, including 148 Il-28/B-5 torpedo-carrying, Tu-16 and Tu-22 light bombers  
Some 600 fighters, including MIG-17/-19/-21; 10 Be-6 Mail aircraft for maritime patrol, 50 Mi-4 Hound and 16 Super Frelon helicopters.

NB: A missile was reportedly test-fired from the one Golf-class submarine, though some authorities question this. Extensive fleet tests continued on the 3 Han-class nuclear attack sub-marines; reportedly two more are planned when funds are available. Bugs in the reactors are now believed to have been ironed out. A new surface-to-surface guided missile is also under development for 1989 (the CSSX-N-5) with a range of 60 kilometers. Sonars, Mark 42 torpedoes, and Pbalanx anti-missile systems may be purchased from the US to modernize the destroyer fleet. There large ocean-going oilers and four 12,500 ton support ships recently joined the fleet, adding to its long-range capability. The Chinese aim eventually at a blue water fleet.

Major naval bases: Amoy, Zhanjiang, Chou Shan, Fuzhou, Huangpu, Lushan, Shanghai, Taku, Tsamkong, Qindao, Whampoa, Dalian.

**Source:**

Defense and Foreign Affairs Handbook, 1986, The Perth Corporation, Washington D.C. p. 153.

## THE ROLE FOR THE TWO KOREA'S NAVY AND DEFENSE OF THE SLOC

*Choung-il Chee*

### I. Introduction

When the Korean War broke out on June 25, 1950, both North and South Korea fought the war primarily on land without much of naval support of their own. It was a classical war of land-dominated military conflict. The navies of both South and North Korea were ill-equipped and ill-prepared for any important role to play during entire period of the Korean War. Consequently, the naval role was primarily assumed by the navies of the United States and other countries which had participated in the Korean War. A lack of any significant naval power by North Korea meant that the entire area of the Korean coast was dominated by the navies of the United Nations forces, free from any interference by the North Korean navy. The entire military strategy of North Korea during the Korean War was based on a quick and decisive thrust on land with the support of the air force while her navy was to play little or no role in the battle against South Korea. This land-based military strategy of North Korea was little changed when the Chinese voluntary forces (hereinafter cited as the PRC forces) did not bring in her naval component to the Korean War.

A lack of naval power by both North Korea and the PRC forces in

the Korean War was due to the fact that both countries had not had a chance of building up their navies by the time of the Korean War in 1950, as they had become independent in 1948 and 1949 respectively. A lack of naval power by North Korea and the PRC did have significant impact for the outcome of the War. Namely, it ensured an uninterrupted and continuous flow of military supplies for the United Nations forces via sea routes, a successful aid to the decisive amphibious landing operations in Inchon, an adroit evacuation of the United Nations forces from Hungnam, and the naval bombardment of the eastern coast of the Korean peninsula which caused the North Korean and PRC forces to bring in their supplies through Seoul, thus, enabling the United Nations air forces to interdict supply lines of communication from the air. It would have been impossible to do this without the mastery of the coastal water of the Korean peninsula by the United Nations naval forces. Had the naval forces of both North Korea and the PRC been sufficiently strong to interfere with the sea lane of communication for the United Nations forces, the war effort by the United Nations would have faced an extremely difficult task in prosecuting the war. But fortunately, the United Nations forces never lost the command of the sea during the entire period of the Korean War, thus enabling the United Nations forces to preserve its sea lane of communication without interruption and at the same time to conduct naval operation virtually unopposed.

## II. The Navy of Two Koreas and the United Nations Naval Operations During the Korean War

When South Korea became independent in 1948, she had practically no naval ships worthy of reference except several patrol boats left by the Japanese and virtually all the naval operations during Korean War were carried out by the United States and British navies as part of the United Nations naval force while navies of other countries taking part in the Korean War had borne relatively a little

role. Thus the history of the Korean War shows that the Korean navy played an insignificant role during the Korean War. The position of North Korean navy was no better, in the sense that the North Korean navy played a very small role in the war effort against the United Nations forces apart from mine laying in Wonsan harbor and the part it played in escorting small numbers of amphibious forces which were being carried by North Korean ships headed toward the South.

It should be pointed out that even the role played by the United Nations naval forces, while important enough, could be regarded as subsidiary when compared to the major war burden assumed by the United Nations ground forces as the war strategy developed. For the strategy of both sides was shaped mainly along the order of the land battles. The intervention by the PRC forces in the Korean War did not alter the naval supremacy enjoyed by the United Nations forces as the PRC had brought in only ground and air forces without naval units.<sup>1</sup>

There were basically three parts of the naval role played by the United Nations that could be referred to as significant parts of the military role that the naval component of the United Nations forces played in the Korean War. First of all, they consisted of the role for providing assistance for the decisive part of the entire military campaign in the Korean War, the Inchon landing, by providing the sea transportation and protecting the landing forces for the X corps of 71,000 troops with 230 ships. The naval support during the Inchon landing was not just confined to the transport of the troops being landed. It also included the preliminary naval bombardment against the coastal defense. Another role of notable importance that the United Nations navy played in the Korea War was that of assisting the evacuation

1. The MiG 15s of the PRC airforce in the Korean War were said to have been operated by Chinese, Soviet, and Polish Pilots. In particular, it has been observed that "there is substantial reason to believe that most of the fighter squadrons actively engaging the F86's were Soviet Squadrons being rotated through the front at about six-week intervals." See William W. Moyer. *Airpower in Three Wars (WW II, Korea, Vietnam)*, 1978, p. 114.

of 100,000 U.N. troops with their equipments by sea, which has been considered as one of the masterly military feats of the war. Out of those naval roles, perhaps the most significant and important role played by the United Nations' navy was that of interdicting the supply line of communications of the communist forces. For this role, the naval aviation played a main part. It has been thus observed that:

The communists' advantage in numbers was more than offset by their difficulties in keeping themselves supplied. Seventh Fleet bombardments of coastal roads forced them to rely on inland communications. Strikes by carrier- and land-based UN planes so successfully interdicted use of the inland trails, roads, and rail-roads by day that the Reds had to depend largely on supplies transported by night, and often backpacked. Seventh Fleet carrier planes, in their campaign against communist supply route, performed the extraordinary feat of bombing three of the Yalu bridges with such precision that only the Korean halves were destroyed, thus avoiding violation of Manchurian airspace. The Reds, denied adequate ammunition and other supplies, could not maintain an offensive. Hence the well-supplied UN forces were able to turn the tide and drive their opponents back to the 38th parallel, inflicting heavy casualties.<sup>2</sup>

Not only did United States naval air forces disrupt the supply lines of the communist forces, but they also gave air support to the Eighth Army at the Perimeter, "an employment for which the Air Force had not been trained for."<sup>3</sup>

The point to be remembered from the experience of the Korean War concerning the supply routes and the Sea lane of the communication is that, while the United Nations forces had to rely on their supply from the sea routes in the Pacific, North Korean and PRC forces depended for their supply on the land route from Manchuria. There was also a significant difference, in the supply situation between the United Nations forces and North Korean and the PRC forces: namely, while the United Nations forces enjoyed complete

2. E. B. Potter, *Sea Power: A Naval History*. 2nd Edition (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1981), p. 368.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 365.

freedom from any harassment or interdiction from the air or the sea on their supply lines, the North Korean and the PRC forces were constantly subjected to interdiction by the United Nations air and naval forces. Keeping the sea lanes open from interdiction by the communist forces was one of the decisive factors that contributed to the military success of the United Nations forces in the Korean War.

Two lessons that could be drawn from the naval role during the Korean War are the importance for the control of the sea near and far from the Korean coast to keep the sea lane of communications open, and the importance of naval airpower in gaining mastery of the air. In particular naval air power seems to have had a decisive impact in interdicting the supply lines of the communist forces and in providing support for the United Nations' ground forces. In this, carrier based naval air power seems to be more mobile and flexible in its ability to deal with the land forces and their supply lines than the land based air forces, which could easily be subjected to air attack by the enemy due to the fixed position of its air bases.

### III. Current and Future Roles for the Two Koreas' Navy

#### 1. The Future War Scenario in Korea

When one speaks of military strategy, it should be noted that in the present age of total war, one cannot conceive an independent service strategy, divorced from other service strategies. In this respect, it could be held that the naval strategy represents but one component of the entire military strategy. This view is echoed in an apt observation by Captain F. Brook, who has been serving as the Director of Defense Program at the staff of the National Security Council of the United States. Captain Brooks thus states:

Both uniformed and civilian experts agree that the days of separate land, sea, and air strategies are long gone. No meaningful single-service is possible in the modern era, a fact that the Navy has recognized both in its increasingly frequent references to the Maritime Strategy as the

"maritime component of the National Military Strategy" and in its explicit inclusion of the contribution of Army and Air Force operations in describing the strategy.<sup>4</sup>

It would be therefore necessary to consider an entire military Strategy of adversaries in the Korean peninsula before considering only the naval component of the military strategies of the parties involved, including the issue for the defense of the sea lane of communication (it will be hereinafter the SLOC).

Currently, the immediate parties to the potential military conflict in the Korean Peninsula are North Korea on the one hand, and South Korea and the United States on the other. Of course, the alliance factor of North Korea with the Soviet Union and the PRC could not be discounted from the anticipated military strategy of North Korea. To sum up the military strategy of both sides in short terms, it may be maintained that the North Korean military strategy is based on several elements:

- 1) Surprise attack by concentrating more than 50% of forces within a few miles of the DMZ (demilitarized zone along the armistice line), which include air forces and an army equipped with tanks,
- 2) Suppressive firepower and armed breakthrough on selected narrow fronts by picking two to three decisive points of attack,
- 3) Rapid armed advance, and impregnable rear defense to make North Korean air forces and other supply depots immune from air attack by digging in caves and tunnels.<sup>5</sup> That North Korea has the military capability of launching an independent military strike has been well recognized by military experts, and it has been estimated that North Korea's capability could last for at least three months according to the estimate of an expert.<sup>6</sup> However, it has been observed that North Korea basically aims at a fighting military campaign of a quick and short duration before any reinforcement could arrive from the outside. To

4. Linton F. Brooks, "Naval Power and National Security: The Case for the Maritime Strategy," *International Security*, (Fall 1987) Vol. II, No. 2 (Fall 1987), p. 59.

5. Larry A. Niksch, "The Military Balance on the Korean Peninsula *Korea and World Affairs*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Summer 1986), pp. 261-267.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 267.

counter North Korea's strategy of blitzkrieg, the United States and South Korea have devised a strategy of quick riposte based on the "forward defense strategy." This strategy of "forward defense" strategy has been known to have been devised by the American General, General Hollingworth, former commander of I corps, a joint unit of American and South Korean forces. General Hollingworth talked of a nine day-scenario. "South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan has spoken of the first three days as the decisive period, and the South Korean Defense Minister of a 5-7 day North Korean operation plan for an attack."<sup>7</sup> Professor Pfaltzgraf notes that the seven-day war strategy by North Korea is more likely.<sup>8</sup>

The strategy of "forward defense" contemplates "the defense of the two invasion routes leading to Seoul. The key to the "forward defense" strategy is firepower so massive that it would repel an invasion no more than a few miles south of the DMZ. Three elements of firepower are envisaged: (1) tactical air support from fighters and fighter bombers based in Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and with the Seventh Fleet; (2) artillery and anti-armor assets with R.O.K. (Republic of Korea) and U.S. ground units; and (3) massive air strikes from B-52 bombers based on Guam."<sup>9</sup> One significant feature of both North Korean and U.S.-South Korean strategies is that both sides contemplate a quick and short period of military campaign without anticipating reinforcements from outside. It can be readily seen from such scenario that both sides are not dependent on the need for reinforcement from the outside for a decisive result.

Under this scenarios, a need for reinforcements from outside would not arise as the decisive phase of a military campaign would be over before any reinforcements could be brought in from outside. However, if the military conflict is to last for a sustained period of indefinite duration, troop reinforcements and logistical supply would definitely be needed in the case of U.S.-South Korean forces

7. *Ibid.*, p. 271.

8. Robert L. Pfaltzgraf, Jr., "Soviet Strategy and North Korea: Implications for Relations between the Republic of Korea and the United States in the Late 1980s," *Korea and World Affairs*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Summer 1986), p. 341.

9. Niksch, *op. cit.*, pp. 270-271.

from the sea route, forcing the defense of the SLOC.

## 2. *The Roles for the Two Korea's Navy*

Before going any further in the study of naval role for the two Koreas, one basic point to be emphasized is that both South and North Korea's navies are coastal navies and not blue water navies. In this context, it may be noted that in today's East-West strategic dimension, the two superpowers alone possess blue water naval capability in the truest sense. And the navies of other countries are basically tailored to play the role of coastal navies. Because of the fact that both South and North Korea's navies are coastal navies, their roles are primarily geared to the defense of the respective coastlines and their naval operations are confined to the areas of their respective coastal waters of the Korean peninsula. And as such, their naval capabilities are limited to the coastal areas and its neighboring areas of the sea even for the defense of the SLOC.

The structure and composition of the two Korea's navy and a lack of outside naval bases in the Pacific Ocean for both navies could easily demonstrate the limited roles that both navies would play in the future conflict in the Korean peninsula. According to the *Military Balance 1986-87*, published by the London based International Institute for Strategic Studies, South Korean navy has 9 destroyers, 6 frigates, 11 fast attack craft, 136 patrol crafts. Other features of note in South Korea's naval force are its amphibious landing capability with 23,000 marines and 27 landing and other supporting crafts. To deal with North Korea's 25 submarines, the South Korean navy has 13 helicopters, flights, and aircraft for anti-submarine warfare. Total naval manpower of the South Korean navy consist of 25,000 personnel. On the other hand, North Korea has 25 submarines, 2 frigates, 335 various fast-attack and patrol crafts with guns, missiles, and torpedoes. The North Korean navy also has 128 high-speed landing craft.<sup>10</sup> It has been reported that

10. International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Military Balance 1986-87*, London, pp. 160-61.

these landing craft have the transport capacity of 3,000 troops.<sup>11</sup> The total manpower of North Korean naval forces consists of 35,000 personnel.

The force composition of the navies of both South and North Korea clearly demonstrates that both navies are structured primarily for the capability of coastal defense role, the coastal defense against infiltration tactics, and minor tactical amphibious capability. Further roles for both South and North Korea's navies could, again, be deduced from the structure and composition of their naval forces: namely, the North Korean navy appears to strive for interdicting the sea lane of communication by denying South Korea an access to the sea routes which would provide for the necessary SLOC for the logistical supply and troop reinforcements. This task could be accomplished by eliminating the surface navy of South Korea and blockading South Korean ports by laying mines in South Korean harbors and ports. On the other hand, the numbers of destroyers (Second World War vintage) possessed by the South Korean navy point to the tactics for the control of surface water by dealing with the submarine forces of North Korea and the numerically superior North Korean fast attack craft forces. The 23,000 strong marine forces of South Korea appear to be designed for a surprise assault landing on any point of choosing in the Korean peninsula to achieve a role of surprise. Meanwhile, the South Korean navy could also count on the support of the Seventh Fleet of the United States whose naval airpower had proved to be such a decisive factor in winning the naval war during the Korean War.

## 3. *A Threat of Soviet Naval Intervention*

So far, the naval role of the two Koreas in the anticipated war scenario has been based on North Korea Vs. South Korea and U.S. forces without taking into account the potential role of the Soviet navy in a future military conflict in the Korean peninsula. However, in view of the 1961 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance between North Korea and the Soviet Union, however,

11. Nicksch, *op. cit.*, p. 257.

a possibility of Soviet naval intervention in case of an outbreak of war in the Korean peninsula could not be ruled out. Article 1 of this treaty provides that:

In case one of the contracting parties becomes the object of an armed attack by some state or a coalition of states and as a result finds itself in a state of war, then the other party will immediately render it military and other assistance with all means at its disposal.<sup>12</sup>

The above provision should not be regarded as meaningless statement that should be dismissed at ease. It is quite possible that both the Soviet Union and the PRC might dissuade North Korea from taking any military adventurism against South Korea on the ground that such adventurism may escalate into a nuclear conflict with the United States, in view of the fact that the United States has currently deployed tactical nuclear weapons in Korea. However, North Korea "might employ a 'hostage theory': once North Korea attacks South Korea, the Soviet Union and the PRC would find it necessary to lend support to North Korea if only in order to preserve a modicum of political influence with respect to the Soviet Union."<sup>13</sup> If the Soviet Union is to intervene in the Korean War, her naval and air power based on Vladivostok would prove to be a grave threat to the supply line of communication via sea routes from the Pacific for the South Korean-U.S. forces in Korea, with the effect of preventing possible reinforcement of forces and continued supply of military materials for the South Korea-U.S. forces. This possibility of Soviet naval intervention has been demonstrated by the recent close military cooperation between the Soviet Union and North Korea as, evidenced by the opening of North Korean ports to the Soviet navy and Soviet naval visits to North Korean ports. The Soviet naval intervention with her naval and air units in the Korean war may mean that the

12. North Korea also has a similar treaty of mutual military assistance with the PRC, which was concluded in the same year 1961, as the year when the treaty with the Soviet Union was concluded. See Article 2 of the treaty.

13. Peter Pofomka, "Two Koreas: Catalyst for Conflict in East Asia," *Adelphi Papers*, No. 208 (Summer, 1986), p. 29.

South Korean and U.S. forces in Korea have to fight with what they have in Korea for some time until the United States is able to send reinforcements and supplies through the sea route in the Pacific.

#### IV. A Defense of the SLOC: Scenario for South Korea Contribution

As has been discussed previously, the current war scenario in the Korean peninsula anticipates South Korean-U.S. forces fighting against North Korea alone without the Soviet factor. Under such a scenario, it could be easily envisaged that the South Korean-U.S. forces could gain air and sea supremacy in the Korean peninsula. However, if the Soviet Union is to intervene either directly or indirectly in the Korean War on the side of North Korea as has been anticipated, the conflict could easily escalate into a nuclear conflict, forcing the South Korean-U.S. forces to use the tactical nuclear weapon currently deployed in Korea to counterbalance the North Korean superiority in conventional forces and the Soviet forces. On the other hand, the Soviet Union's military support for North Korea may take an indirect form of merely supplying arms and other war supplies needed for the North Korean war effort. In such case, there would probably be a limited war to be fought with conventional weapon on both sides. In either case, be it a nuclear war or conventional war, a question may be asked whether South Korean-U.S. forces would have a need to protect the SLOC.

##### 1. Nuclear War

In the event that a military conflict in Korea escalates into a nuclear war between the South Korean-U.S. forces on the one hand and North Korea and the Soviet Union on the other, it could easily be speculated that an outcome of the war would be decided in a short period of violent campaign in view of the destructive power of nuclear weapons. And, if a war is going to last for a short duration,

a legitimate question may be raised as to whether a defense of the SLOC would be necessary. For the defense of the SLOC could only be meaningful if a military conflict is to last for a sustained period of time requiring additional supply troop reinforcements. If the war is to be over without a need for additional supplies and troop reinforcements, logic dictates that there would not be any need for a defense of the SLOC.

As for the possibility of an outbreak of a nuclear war in the Korean peninsula, it may be held that such a possibility is remote, as the Soviet Union regards Europe as her first strategic priority in spite of her recent naval build-up in the Pacific, unless she is forced into a nuclear war by North Korea. However, this assumption may be refuted in view of the fact that the Soviet Union has stationed her SS-20 missiles, in view of the presence in South Korea of an American nuclear capability which could strike the Soviet Union.<sup>13</sup> The presence of the Soviet SS-20 missiles could certainly impose a constraining factor on the part of the United States for the use of the tactical nuclear weapons in Korea for fear of nuclear retaliation. A consequence of this nuclear capability in the Korean peninsula by both United States and the Soviet Union is that it would offset each other's nuclear capabilities for fear of mutual retaliation. This conclusion leads to the observation that any military conflict that may take place in the Korean peninsula would take a form of limited war with conventional weapons.

## 2. Conventional War

A limited war with conventional weapons appears to be a more likely a war scenario that would take place in the Korean peninsula. In a war of such type, a need for the defense of the SLOC could arise in the event of military conflict for a fairly long duration, say, for three months to keep South Korean- U.S. forces supplied through sea routes in the Pacific. But as has been observed earlier, current war scenarios for a war in Korea has been based on a short term scenario which may last less than ten days. Under such a scenario, a need for the defense of the SLOC may be questioned. This has been

pointedly observed by leading British maritime strategists who stated that "the trouble with the proposition that maritime communication need protecting, though is that it assumes sustained conflict of some kind. But if, on the other hand, the war was short and violent, possibly involving the destruction of ports and perhaps the use of nuclear weapons, the protection of commerce would hardly seem an important priority."<sup>14</sup> On the other hand, the validity of this observation could be challenged on the ground that "most short-war predictions of the past have been wrong."<sup>15</sup> Furthermore, even if a war strategy is planned for a short-war, such strategy may not be desirable in view of the fact that "even the strictest military possibilities are sufficiently diverse to make it seem unwise for navies to plan for the single contingency of a short sharp war and to let trade protection go largely by default. In the universe of military affairs, after all, nothing is more likely to make a thing happen than openly failing to plan for it."<sup>16</sup> The task for the naval strategists, then, is to anticipate an accurate scenario of the contingency under which a need for the defense of the SLOC is met while planning at the same time for the unexpected.

There are basically two types of situation under which an issue for the defense of the SLOC could be raised. One type could be that of a war situation, in which some or all of the SLOC states could be involved. Under this situation, each party should bear a burden, proportionate to their economic and military capability. Who is going to do what would be the issue for the respective party involved. In a war situation where the defense of the SLOC becomes a strategic issue, it would become imperative to protect the maritime commerce, and to preserve the sea route for an access to the supply of war materials as well as troop reinforcements. A division of the sea war zone for the respective allies, or the formation of a convoy system for safeguarding the supply lines for the belligerents could be considered. The

14. Geoffrey Till & et al., *Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age*. 2nd Edition (London: Mcmillan Press, 1982), p. 194.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 195.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 194.

other type of situation under which a need for the defense of the SLOC would arise, could be a contingency short of war, under which maritime commerce would need a protection. This is one of those situations that have been taking place in the Iran-Iraq War. So far, 300 oil tankers of various nationalities have been subjected to armed attacks by the Iraqi and Iranian air forces and 100 innocent lives of the ships crews have been lost. This is one of the strangest case where no one has raised an outcry about an offense against the law of nations and even the United Nations has been silent on this flagrant violation of international law: namely, armed attacks on neutral maritime commerce.<sup>17</sup> This strange episode in the history of human conflicts should certainly not be left without any defensive measure by the international community and in particular, by the SLOC states in Northeast Asia, who depend very heavily on the supply of oil from the Persian Gulf.

In preparing counter-measures for the violence committed against innocent neutral shipping in violation of international law, two measures could be contemplated. One would be a joint diplomatic action for putting pressure on Iran and Iraq, including legal action before the International Court of Justice for committing lawless and illegal armed attacks on the maritime commerce of neutral states in violation of international law. Or the SLOC states could also initiate an action to be brought before the United Nations. The other measure that the SLOC states could conceive is that of forming an armed convoy by invoking the right of self-defense authorized under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and the customary rule of international law. The latest news report that the United States is sending her naval forces, including aircraft carriers to the Persian Gulf at the request of the Kuwaiti government for the protection of Kuwaiti oil tankers against possible missile attack from Iran, who has placed missiles aimed at Kuwaiti oil tankers and the oil tankers of other countries as well, is encouraging news.<sup>18</sup> But it

17. L. Oppenheim, *International Law*, in H. Lauterpacht (eds.), 7th edition (Longman & Green, 1952), p. 676.

18. *Chosun Ilbo* (daily newspaper), March 21, 1987. p. 4.

should be pointed out that protecting the oil tankers in the Persian Gulf is not just the United States' responsibility alone. Rather it should be the concern of all states and to this extent, all nations affected by the shipping of the oil from the Persian Gulf should give moral or other necessary assistance to the United States action in the Persian Gulf for protecting the shipping of oil.

On last point that needs to be considered in connection with the defense of the SLOC in Northeast Asia is that of sharing the burdens for the defense of the SLOC. In this connection, I would like to bring your attention to the suggestions that were made in 1982 by Professor Sang Woo Rhee, a Korean Member of the SLOC, at the first meeting of the SLOC in San Francisco. Concerning the sharing of burdens among the SLOC states, Professor Rhee made suggestions for the division of a sea defense zone as well as functional defense of the SLOC. In particular, his suggestion for the division of sea defense zone is worthy of our perusal. To a certain extent, it is submitted, this suggestion has already been adopted as far as Japan is concerned when she has declared her readiness in 1981 for defending the sea defense zone in the Pacific up to 1,000 nautical miles from her coastline. This assumption of burden has been reiterated by Japan. With her economic resources and technological capability, Japan could certainly assume such a burden. But what about the ROC and South Korea? Should they be assigned certain areas of the Pacific Ocean for SLOC defense? Answering this question would basically depend on the economic resources of the respective countries. It should be noted in this connection that South Korea already spends more than 35% of her total yearly budget for the defense and any drastic addition to her defense budget would strain her economy, gradually eroding her defense capability through economic dislocation.

## V. Conclusion

The naval role for both South and North Korea is restricted to coastal operations along the Korean peninsula for good reasons on both sides. For the part of North Korea, she does not have to worry about sea lines of communication as her war supplies and reinforcements from outside would come from the land routes in Manchuria and Vladivostok, and she is not heavily dependent for her commerce on maritime routes. Moreover, North Korea's military strategy against South Korea is based on a blitzkrieg for a short duration before any reinforcements could reach Korean peninsula for the South Korean-U.S. force. It is for these reasons that the North Korean navy is composed of forces designed for a coastal operation to deny the coastal sea to South Korean-U.S. forces, including the cutting off of sea lines of communication for South Korean-U.S. forces in Korea. The 25 submarines and more than 350 fast attack craft of North Korea seem to be designed for accomplishing such objectives.

On the other hand, the South Korean-U.S. strategy of "forward defense" along the DMZ zone area seems to be geared to land and air dominated military defense. The surface navy of South Korea meanwhile has to deal with the numerically superior North Korean fast attack craft forces and 25 submarines which would attempt to interdict supply line along the coastal sea. As the North Korean strategy is based on blitzkrieg, South Korean-U.S. forces in Korea are forced to meet such a strategy contemplating a war of short duration on land, hence, the so-called "forward defense" strategy. As the current "forward defense" strategy of the South Korean-U.S. forces in Korea contemplates a short and violent conflict for a period of less than ten days, it appears that South Korea is not seriously concerned with the protection of the SLOC. As part of the naval component of a land dominated "forward defense" strategy, the South Korean navy seems to be basically interested in the defense of South Korea's coastline and for preventing the North Korean navy's attempt to deny an access to the SLOC for South Korean-U.S. forces. These

reasons make both the South Korean-U.S. navies, and the North Korean navy oblivious to the defense of the SLOC.

A short war scenario contemplated by both the South Korean-U.S. forces as well as North Korean forces appears to dispense with a need for the defense of the SLOC in the Pacific. However, as has been pointed out, there is always a possibility that the military conflict would take a longer period than an expected short period of time. In such event, it need not be said that a protection of the SLOC for the smooth and continued flow of war materials and troop reinforcements from outside would be critical for the survival of South Korea. As the economic resources of the United States begin to be stretched out, her capability to protect the SLOC in the vast area of the Pacific Ocean would become limited. Consequently, there is a definite need for a burden sharing for the defense of the SLOC. It is for this reason that the Japanese assumption of burden for the SLOC for 1,000 nautical miles sea defense is a welcome gesture. What is needed, is to put more substance in to such a policy. But what about South Korea? As has been pointed out previously, South Korea can contribute to the defense of the SLOC would depend on how much she could allocate of her economic resources to the defense of the SLOC. As South Korea's economy expands, South Korea would gradually be able to absorb the needed expenditure for the defense of the SLOC. It should be pointed out in this connection that in general a navy is a very expensive proposition, requiring a very high expenditure. At the moment, however, what South Korea could do to contribute to the defense of the SLOC would be to provide highly trained manpower for the SLOC states assuming her share of burdens in defense of the SLOC.

**PART V**  
**PEACE-TIME INTERNATIONAL  
COOPERATION FOR SLOC SECURITY**

# SLOC SECURITY IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

## —An Observation of Problems of Territory and Transportation in the Region

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### I. Introduction

The South China Sea is the biggest of the China Sea. It is located south of the Taiwan Strait, east of Vietnam, north of Brunei and west of the Philippines, with about 2 million square km surrounded by six ASEAN states, namely, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Philippines, and Borneo; three Communist states, namely, Communist China, Vietnam and Cambodia; and Hong Kong and the Republic of China. However, it is a disputed place, seriously threatening the security of sea lanes of communications (SLOC) of this water area. Many factors are involved with this complex situation. As far as the states bordering the South China Sea are concerned, there are some striking similarities and some equally noteworthy dissimilarities. However, one of the most controversial issues influencing the SLOC's security is the issue related to territorial disputes. Some controversies are involved due to archipelagic concept, others belong to the 200-mile exclusive economic zones. The new rules governing the formerly international straits have prompted wide challenges from interesting states.

Besides, the neutral idea to set up a Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in order to achieve the purpose of a nuclear free

zone has been raised by some states. However, because of different opinions among ASEAN states, no conclusion thus far has been drawn.

This author is attempting to analyse the disputes concerned which affect SLOC security in the South China Sea.

## II. Disputes on Four Shas

The first dispute was focused on the claim of the territorial sovereignty over the Four "Shas" (沙) in the South China Sea out of which fifteen had been given Chinese names officially by the government of the Republic of China:

1. the West Sha (or Hsisha [西沙] in Chinese or Paracels in English)
2. the East Sha (or Tungsha [東沙] in Chinese or Pratas in English)
3. the South Sha (or Nansha [南沙] in Chinese or Spratlys in English); and
4. the Middle Sha (or Chungsha [中沙] in Chinese which is in the process of rising and not yet broken the surface; or Macclesfield Bank in English).

As a matter of fact, the real trouble in the South China Sea stems from the controversy over the territorial sovereignty on the Hsisha and Nansha Islands. With regard to the Tungsha and Chungsha Islands, so far they are not trouble spots because of their relatively limited size. This paper is directed to the problems of the Hsisha and Nansha Islands.

### 1. *The Disputes of the Hsisha Islands*

The Hsisha Islands are a group of small Islands, sand, banks etc., about 200 miles northeast of South Vietnam and also 200 miles south of Hainan Island of China.

According to Chinese historical records, the very origin of the Hsisha Islands might be traced back as far as to the Han Dynasty (206

B.C. to 220 A.D.). However, no people were reported to live there permanently. People were reported to have settled down beginning with the Yen Dynasty. Chinese sailors and fishermen visited the islands quite often. Since then the Chinese governments had viewed these islands as its territory and met no opposition from the outside world.

During the Second World War period, the Hsisha Islands had been occupied by the Japanese. It was not until August 17, 1945, that the Japanese Government returned the Hsisha Islands back to the government of the Republic of China. Administratively speaking, the Hsisha Islands had been placed under the Province of Kwang Tung in early 1946. In the same year, a naval fleet of four warships, "Taiping," "Yung Hsien," "Chung Chien," and "Chung Yeh" was dispatched to the Hsisha Islands by the R.O.C. government to demonstrate its sovereignty. It was reported that fifty-nine naval officers had landed on the islands as guards by 1950.

After the Chinese mainland fell to the Chinese Communists, the P.R.C. army still claimed the territory of the Hsisha Islands. In 1959 the P.R.C. navy sent its forces to land on the island as a demonstration of its legal territorial sovereignty to other countries, particularly Vietnam, who claimed them.

However, on the other hand, according to a Vietnamese historical book, "Ta Nan I Tung Tzy", the Hsisha Islands were discovered in the 19th century by Emperor Hsia Kung. In 1830, the Hsisha Islands were covered in the Vietnamese map when Vietnam, a vassal state of the Ching Dynasty, presented its territory to China. When confrontations between Vietnam and P.R.C. became apparent, President Dgo Dinh Diem following the P.R.C.'s military action of 1959, had signed a bill to annex the Hsisha Islands to its territory. Administratively, it was under the jurisdiction of Kwang-nam Province.

The Vietnamese unilateral declaration of annexation of the Hsisha Islands had aroused strong protests from both the R.O.C. and P.R.C. governments. Basically, the military clashes only occurred between the South Vietnamese Government and the PRC. The R.O.C. government merely lodged its oral protest against Saigon because of

political consideration, namely, a joint anti-communist front between the two.

In early 1974, both sides demonstrated their military strengths in order to protect their sovereignty over the Hsisha Islands. On the part of the PRC, eleven warships were dispatched to patrol around the Hsisha Islands in order to reaffirm the Chinese sovereignty over the islands territory. Almost at the same time, the Vietnamese navy also sent its six patrol ships to the scene in order to maintain surveillance of the Chinese actions. It was reported that the most well-equipped patrol boat of the Vietnamese navy (2,800 tons) was among the fleet.

On January 19, 1974, the military confrontation broke out between Communist China and Vietnam because the Vietnamese landed on the Hsisha Islands on January 15, 1974. It was said that warships of both sides were sunk. The PRC navy even fired a small-sized missile to attack the Vietnamese patrol boat. Hundreds of sailors and naval officials were killed and wounded, it was reported. On the other hand, the PRC army, under the cover of MIG-21's and MIG-23's, also landed on the islands and forced the Vietnamese armed forces to withdraw.

## 2. *The Disputes of the Nansha Islands*

Just two weeks after military confrontations in the waters of the Hsisha Islands on February 1, 1974, about 200 South Vietnamese armed forces with three ships were dispatched by President Nguyen Van Thieu to land on five uninhabited islands of the Nansha Islands (the Spratlys).

The Nansha Islands are a small uninhabited group, mostly low-lying coral reefs, sandbars, islets, etc. Their location is roughly 250 miles east of Vietnam, 200 miles west of the Philippines, 700 miles south of Mainland China and 1,100 miles south of Taiwan. The biggest island is Taiping, where 500 R.O.C. army have been stationed since 1956. The Philippine army was reported to have occupied five of the other small islands, for which both the Republic of China and

Mainland China claimed sovereignty.

On the part of Republic of China, the government had been confronted with a policy dilemma. Basically, the R.O.C government had diplomatic relations with the Philippine and South Vietnamese governments and would not like to offend mutual friendship by applying concrete actions against anyone. Ostensibly, the R.O.C government had to make diplomatic gestures to complain about violations of territorial sovereignty by both countries. The R.O.C navy even dispatched two warships to follow the Vietnamese naval vessels, but not stop their actions. On the other hand, the Vietnamese government also maintained its peaceful maneuver, not to fight with the R.O.C government, but declared that it would fight with P.R.C for the sovereignty of the Hsisha and Nansha Islands. The Saigon government even suggested that a joint front be formed by the R.O.C, the Philippines and the Vietnamese Republic to fight back in case the P.R.C should become involved with the sovereignty issue. Of course, the P.R.C had lodged a strong protest against the Vietnamese accusing the latter of invading the Chinese territorial sovereignty.

The Philippines had claimed sovereignty over the Nansha Islands for a long time, as became apparent is 1978. On June 11, 1978, President Marcos signed an executive order No. 1596 to annex several small islands in the waters of the Nansha Islands to its territory. It was said that the reason that the Philippines was trying to claim the sovereignty this time was intended to get some benefits from the pending discussions of the law of the sea in the United Nations.

1982 was the year that the sovereignty disputes over the Nansha and Hsisha Islands became more vigorous and severe. The Republic of China first took action, placing the Nansha and Hsisha Islands under the jurisdiction of the City of Kao Hsiung. On the part of P.R.C, its Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, Yang Tai-tzy, had visited the biggest island of the Nansha, Yen Hian island, in early 1982. Following action was taken by the Philippine Primere who had landed on some of the small islands of the Nanshas on April 25, 1982, and renamed a big island as "Liberty Island."

It seemed to the Philippines that the United States would come to

its aid in the dispute of territorial sovereignty because of the U.S.-Philippine Defense Treaty. However, the U.S. State Department declared that the United States would not be under any obligations to assist the Philippines in territorial disputes. It was United States policy not to get involved with the territorial disputes of the Asian countries. However, there was no doubt that the United States had expressed its deep concern over the P.R.C.'s actions in the territorial disputes, which would cause instability in the South China Sea.

The Vietnamese claimed sovereignty over the Nansha Islands, too. It was reported that some of the islands had been controlled since the late 1970s, and the Communist Chinese had sent some troops to occupy at least one. However, both sides clashed recently when Vietnam sent troops to Baojiao island on April 15, 1987. The Chinese Communists condemned Vietnam for its "illegal invasion" of Chinese territory. The P.R.C Ministry of Foreign Affairs furthermore indicated that the islands are an extension of the also disputed Paracel further to the north, where Chinese troops are permanently stationed. "China reserves the right to recover these occupied islands at an appropriate time."

According to the 1982 situation to which the islands were occupied, the Philippines had seven, the Vietnamese held six, and the ROC and the PRC controlled one individually.

### III. Territorial Claims among ASEAN States

Another impediment to the peace and security of the sea lanes of communications in the South China Sea is the maritime disputes concerning the archipelagic conception, the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and the continental shelf. The controversies over territorial possessions seriously affected relations among the ASEAN states, all of which border the South China Sea. Before their independence, little attention was paid to boundaries in pre-colonial times when the vague concept of frontier was much more applicable. Their people moved easily from side to side, place to place, traded, intermarried, and even

settled in another territory. Generally speaking, the atmosphere of the South China Sea was peaceful.

However, borders have recently made territorial disputes among the ASEAN states much less volatile than more recent claims with economic overtones. They are struggling for the natural resources, particularly reserves of oil, near the disputable territories.

As far as the security of sea lanes of communications in the South China Sea is concerned, the controversies over territorial possessions by four ASEAN states, namely, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and the Philippines, would be considered as the key actors influencing the peace of this area.

The archipelagic conception of territorial delimitation is the top dispute in the waters. The Philippines and Indonesia hold different opinions on territorial possession. According to the accepted rule of international law, an archipelagic state claims the right to draw a straight baseline between the outmost points of the outmost islands and reefs, declaring all water and land within this area to be under the sovereignty of that state. Therefore, Indonesia has incorporated in its national jurisdiction an area of 999,000 square nautical miles. However, on the other hand, the Philippines has incorporated 148,920 square nautical miles in its territory. Actions of both states had been described as "cartographic imperialism", and has met strong oppositions from the rest of the ASEAN states. As a matter of fact, it seems, Indonesia has strategic considerations for insuring an integral unity of its 13,000 islands and the connecting waterways.

On the same level, Indonesia had extended its jurisdiction to some islands, including the Natunas and the Anambas, which brought her into conflict with Malaysia in the area of the South China Sea. Indonesia's unilateral action placed its territorial boundaries between West and East Malaysia. Before a treaty was signed in 1976, both sides had seen 19 years of simmering animosity. Although Indonesia's claim on territorial sovereignty over these disputable areas was recognized, Malaysia in return was granted free passage, fishing activities, the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and marine research.

Nevertheless, there is no guarantee that the controversies of the territorial claims in the South China Sea would not be escalated when Indonesia seeks to develop the archipelagic concept by including other islands in its jurisdiction.

The controversies of the exclusive economic zone has increasingly becoming a hot potato on the world scene, particularly in the area of the South China Sea. According to the generally-accepted principle of international law, the so-called EEZ extends a coastal state's jurisdiction by 200 nautical miles "from the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured." However, no concrete agreement has been achieved on baselines and the contours of the continental shelf. As a result, nine littoral states had transformed the South China Sea into a national lake with widely overlapping sea borders by their rather loosely interpreted application of the principle.

The Philippines was the first state to declare the EEZ in August 1979, which brought Manila into direct conflict with the Republic of China on Taiwan. Of course, Vietnam and Communist China also expressed their oppositions to the unilateral declaration. In meeting these challenges the Republic of China had also adopted counter-measure to declare its EEZ in which an overlapping area exists in the Bashi Channel.

Then, Indonesia followed in March 1980 and Malaysia two months later. Thailand declared EEZ in 1981. All four ASEAN states established their EEZ by unilateral declarations. Although disregarding international recognition, they offered to negotiate on any problems of delimitation. On this assumption, an agreement was reached between the Philippines and Republic of China on non-governmental basis for mutual fishing rights. As a matter of fact, the EEZ declaration is not the only cause for conflict, but presents another dimension of problem. As Prof. Hans H. Indorf indicated, "vast stretches of national ocean have further imbalanced economic systems in Southeast Asia, raising the spectre of unnecessarily restrictive national shipping and pollutions laws, and exacerbating financial and security burdens for surveilling an as yet uncontrollable area. National capacities cannot yet match national aspirations."

Here a word should be mentioned about mutual clashes over the territorial claims which characterized the confrontation of the ASEAN states. The disputes of the Commodore and Reef between the Philippines and Malaysia were typical. The Philippines had protested the inclusion of these islands in Malaysia's territorial waters, complaining "an invasion of Philippine sovereign rights with a foreign flag marker and the accosting of Philippine fishing boats in adjacent waters." These disputable areas were held as part of the Philippine Kalayaan Province, 200 miles west of Palawan. If Provincial shores were used as baseline for measuring the EEZ, it would seriously conflict with Malaysia's stake in the area.

It seems, the Philippine-Malaysian clashes are the most deep-seated. The territorial disputes are probably just symptomatic of more far-reaching cause centering around Sabah and the Muslim secessionist movement in Mindanao of the Philippines. As the case has less influence on SLOC's security in the South China Sea, I will not elaborate here.

Besides, Indonesia and Malaysia had also struggled over the territorial sovereignty of the islands of Ligitan and Sipadan in the South China Sea. Indonesia expressed strong opposition to Malaysia's 1979 map which showed these islands as being located in Indonesia's continental shelf between Sabah and Indonesian Kalimantan. Indonesia had taken military action, capturing 18 Malaysian fishing trawlers "illegally" fishing in its territorial waters.

On the other hand, Malaysia's 1979 map also brought keen conflict with Singapore over the island of Pulau Batu Puteh, an island east of the southern tip of Johore. Apparently, Singapore expressed particular concern over the boundary between Singapore and Malaysia which is the deep-water channel between Singapore and Johore. It is no doubt that two states are the troubled beneficiaries of formerly colonial borders.

In short, bilateral interactions for maritime objectives are affected by consideration of security and the acquisition of natural resources. For the past years, the ASEAN organization has tried whatever it could do to accommodate mutual disagreements on unilateral and

competing boundary claims, but the result of a regional consensus remains open to question. The controversies of territorial claims are still one of the sources to produce insecurity in the waters of the South China Sea.

#### IV. Status of the Straits of Malacca

It is generally held that vessels approaching from the Indian Ocean will have to pass through the Straits of Malacca between Sumatra and Singapore and Malaysia or the Sunda Strait, Lombok Strait or Sumba near Timor. The shortest route is via the Straits of Malacca. However, the extension of territorial seas from three to twelve nautical miles has eliminated any residual illusion of its being an international waterway. The legal status of the Straits of Malacca now becomes a crucial one for any states wishing to enter the waters of the South China Sea. According to the newly signed 1984 Law of the Sea, "all ships and aircraft in transit shall enjoy the same freedom of navigation and overflight as they have on the high seas." Nevertheless, the situation is now different from before. That means that all ships in transit are now committed to the laws of the coastal states bordering the Straits of Malacca regarding safety, fishing, and pollution, among others.

Three ASEAN states are immediately concerned with the status of the Straits of Malacca. They are Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia. However, they held different views on the legal status of the Straits.

Singapore is the only state to hold the Straits fully open to all ships in transit. This is because Singapore depends upon free trade for the survival of its economy, any measures blocking the sea lanes of communication would be a contradiction to Singapore's national interests. Therefore, commercial sea traffic in whatever form and for whatever reason, generally speaking, is upheld.

On the other hand, Malaysia has a different viewpoint. By emphasizing the states jurisdiction, Malaysia was much more concerned with

navigational safety and marine pollution. However, Malaysia paid its respect to rules established by the customary international law: the right of innocent passage in the territorial waters of other states.

Indonesia took the position that the Straits of Malacca are its internal waters where sovereignty is supreme. Therefore, all ships in transit must be subject to the rules of the littoral states. Free passage is not a right originating from international law, but a kind of concession from the littoral states.

In March 1970, Indonesia and Malaysia made an implicit challenge to the traditional concept of free passage in the Straits of Malacca, by delimiting the territorial waters of the Straits, ignoring the opposition of Singapore. Furthermore, a joint tripartite statement was made in November 1971 concerning traffic separation, including reference to the Straits as not being international in nature, Singapore only took note of the position of its neighbours on this point. In a speech before the Singapore Parliament, Foreign Minister Rajaratham clearly indicated that Singapore stood for the "unimpeded passage of all ships of all nations through the Straits." As a member state of ASEAN, Thailand's position may be crucial. It is held that Thailand is prepared to seek recognition as a coastal state of the Straits with concomitant rights of consultation. Basically, the consideration of the legal status of the Straits of Malacca will affect the SLOCs security of the South China Sea, particularly when the big powers held firm position to keep this Straits completely open.

#### V. Conclusions

SLOC security is an important and common interest for countries in the area of the South China Sea, whose survival and security depend on the stability of the waters of the area and free, peaceful use of the seas. As we know from the above analysis of the disputable problems of the area, SLOC security is a problem of a different dimensions ranging from the usual security problems related to territory and

transportation, to national sovereignty related to natural resources. Of course, its strategic importance makes the South China Sea more vital to the countries in the region as well as the other countries of the world.

It is no doubt that, judging from the current world situation, we found that only the Soviet Union has the naval capability to threaten the SLOCs of the free trade and economies of the countries bordering the sphere of interests of the South China sea. Therefore, efforts should be made for the protection of this area and measures be taken to prevent the Soviet Union of invading the region.

On the other hand, with regard to SLOC security of the South China Sea, ASEAN member states and other coastal states of the region look to the United States to play the dominant role on defense. But there are considerable anxieties about U.S. credibility to defend this area, particularly its commitment to the allied countries of the region. After the U.S. withdrawal from Indochina in 1975, SLOC security of the South China Sea has become a greater concern for the states in the region.

As we know that SLOC security and security of the island territory are indivisible. It becomes a strategic arrangement that control of the land, especially the coastal states as well as islands, gives any powers a stronghold over the SLOCs. Therefore, the disputes over the four "Shas", territorial claims among ASEAN states, and the legal status of the Straits of Malacca have become the most important subjects for concern. The recent clashes over the Nansha Islands between Vietnam and Communist China serve as an alarming signal for the instability of the area. Under existing conditions cooperation and compromise through negotiation are imperative to solve the common problems.

## COOPERATION FOR SLOC SECURITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA —The Experience of Asean—

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This paper seeks to address some problems related to the security of sea lane of communications (SLOCs) in Southeast Asia, especially in the ASEAN region and its efforts to secure the benefits of the lanes to the users. The waters of Southeast Asia, particularly those straits that facilitate international navigation for surface and submarine ships connecting the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, constitute one of the major networks of sea lanes of communications in the world for economic and military activities of many states.

The security of SLOCs in Southeast Asia is increasingly important for various other reasons. The littoral states of Southeast Asia are increasingly engaged in maritime activities for trade and exploration as well as exploitation of marine resources. Thus they all have major interests and high stakes in the maritime Southeast Asia. Great external powers, particularly Japan, the United States and the Soviet Union, have for long used Southeast Asia's SLOCs for their merchant ships, oil tankers and warships. In addition, the modernization efforts and development strategies of certain states are likely to involve the exploitation of the marine richness of the region. Finally, conflicts may arise from territorial claims over islands or groups of islands and resources available therein made by neighbouring countries and adjacent states.

Accordingly, the member-states of ASEAN are fully aware of the

need to maintain the security of the sea lanes in the region for the benefit of all those concerned.<sup>1</sup> Considering that there is no single state in the region by itself capable of securing the SLOCs in Southeast Asia, it would make sense to promote some form of multilateral cooperation to serve the purpose. However, such cooperation would be possible only in the basis of some common understanding or perception of the possible sources and forms or nature of threat to the security of the sea lanes.

### I. Threats to the Security of Sea Lanes in Southeast Asia

A few words will be addressed to the notion of security before dealing with the nature of threat to the sea lanes of communications in peace time in Southeast Asia. In its simplest sense, security can be understood as a guarantee for safety, politically as well as militarily. Applied to the sea lanes of communications, it means the safety of navigation free from obstruction, interruption, threats of war, or a combination of these elements, created by objective conditions, human behaviour, or states' politics and actions. The increase in the world's merchant shipping, marine exploration and exploitation, and the maritime interests of many states has made security requirements a greater concern of the littoral states as well as other interested parties. Indeed, the security of the sea lanes of communications is of paramount importance for countries whose survival and strategy are directly linked with the use of sea lanes.

Because of their intensive use for communications, by littoral as well as other states, the SLOCs in Southeast Asia which are among the busiest in the world, are no exception. The interests of those countries will be jeopardised should the security of the sea lanes in the region be threatened. Exports and imports of energy, raw materials, manufacturing and industrial products and food of the maritime countries can be hampered. Naval activities, particularly of major maritime powers, may be disturbed, harmful not only to

their interests but also to those of the littoral states. Depending on the nature of threat to the security, the interests of some or many parties can be impeded. Thus, what kinds of threat to the security of SLOCs in Southeast Asia in peace time—in the sense of the absence of a major military conflict or war—may arise?

Before we define such threats, it seems proper to identify first the important straits and seas in Southeast Asia that are suitable for international communications. As a corridor from the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf and Europe, and vice versa, Southeast Asian waters provide several more direct alternative routes that can be used by merchant ships, oil tankers and warships than such other routes as the Tasman Sea in Australia. For vessels passing through those two oceans, the use of Southeast Asian waters will be the most economical in terms of costs, time, and distance.

Traditionally, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are the most used and the shortest passage connecting the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean and the East Asian region. But there are also a number of straits in the region that can be used for international navigation which are currently under the national jurisdiction of Indonesia, namely, the Sunda Strait between Sumatra and Java, the Lombok Strait between Bali and Lombok, the Makassar Strait between Kalimantan and Sulawesi, and the Ombai-Wetar Straits between Timor and its northern islands. As for seas, the major seas for international navigation are the South China Sea, the Celebes Sea and the Sulu Sea. In addition, vessels using those straits and seas between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean could take their most direct routes through Indonesia's waters such as the Java Sea, the Flores Sea and the Maluku Sea. However, the use of these seas and straits is subject to the new regime of the law of the sea.<sup>1</sup>

1. Archipelagic state such as Indonesia may designate a selected number of sea lanes suitable for the continuous and expeditious passage of foreign ships and submit to competent international organization with a view to their adoption. See, *United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea* (Doc. A/CONF. 62/122, 7 October 1982) Art. 53 par. 1 and 9. For a discussion on Indonesia's position, see Noegroho Wisnoemoerti, "Indonesia and the Law of the Sea," paper presented at the International Conference on East Asia and the Law of the Sea in Seoul, July, 1984.

Threats to the security of SLOCs in Southeast Asia can arise from several possible sources. A distinction can be made between primary threats and secondary threats. Primary threats may result basically from divergent and conflicting political and military policies adopted not only by littoral states but also by external major maritime powers. The failure to reach an agreement or accommodation between them on solving their differences would likely threaten the security of the sea lanes damaging the interests not only of the littoral states but also other states whose vessels use those sea lanes of communications.

One can identify the sources of primary threat to the security of sea lanes in Southeast Asia, particularly in ASEAN waters, also as arising from domestic political crises and instability in the littoral states;<sup>2</sup> from national policies to control "normal" passage of SLOCs on the basis of their perceived security and national interests; from inter-state conflicts in the region; from regional conflicts involving regional state(s) and extra-regional power(s); and from rivalries or conflicts between extra-regional powers, particularly the major powers and the superpowers. Indeed, these sources of threat to the security of sea lanes in the region are complex in nature and need to be discussed in depth. It is clear that the ASEAN region and Southeast Asia at large, are not free from such possibilities.

Thus it can be argued that the sources of primary threat to SLOCs in Southeast Asia, as indeed in all parts of the world, are a reflection of political factors and non-maritime developments. The 1975 Mayaguez incident for instances, where Kampuchean patrol boats seized an American ship, could not be separated from the struggle for power in Kampuchea involving the Khmer Rouge whose policy was hostile to the United States because of the latter's support for Lon Nol. When Indonesia and Malaysia extended the limit of their territorial waters to twelve nautical miles and made an attempt "to impose restrictions on naval passage in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore" on the basis of their security interests and considerations

2. See, for instance, Agerico O. Lacanlale, "Domestic Instability and Security of Sea Lanes in Southeast Asia," *Asia Pacific Community* (Spring 1982), pp. 25-39.

the United States and the Soviet Union demonstrated their attitude by sending naval forces into the Indian Ocean during the 1971 Bangladesh War,<sup>3</sup> which signified their dependence on these waters. When Indonesia adopted a policy of confrontation against the formation of Malaysia, a series of naval actions were taken against Malaysian vessels by Indonesian patrol boats. Likewise, the Iran-Iraq war has proved the threat to security sea lanes arising from an inter-state conflict. During the Cuban missile crisis, President Kennedy ordered the US Navy to blockade Cuban waters against Soviet vessels. These illustrate the importance of political factors and non-maritime developments.

Secondary threats to the security of SLOCs in the region may arise from objective navigational or environmental conditions. The safety of international navigation through Southeast Asian straits, all situated in the ASEAN region, is subject to the conditions and characteristics of the straits such as their depth, width and length. The number, speed, size and types of vessels passing through are other elements important to safety. These factors, individually or collectively, may present dangers of collision and grounding of vessels which can impede normal passage. In addition, piracy and pollution of the marine environment may become other sources of threat to the security of SLOCs in Southeast Asia. Increasing efforts to explore and exploit marine resources also fall into this nature of threat though it cannot be separated from primary sources referred to above.

Although intensively used as international navigation, particularly the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, almost all the straits are narrow and some are not suitable for very large vessels.<sup>5</sup> The

3. Michael Leifer, *Malacca, Singapore and Indonesia* (Alphen aan den Rijn, the Netherlands: Sijhoff & Noordhoff, 1978), pp. 107-8.

4. Lacanlale, "Domestic Instability and Security of Sea Lanes," pp. 35-6.

5. For a description of important straits in Indonesia and the Philippines, see Leifer, *Malacca, Singapore and Indonesia*, pp. 51-85, and Phiphat Tangsubkul, *ASEAN and the Law of the Sea* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982), pp. 24-40.

density of traffic along the Straits of Malacca and Singapore,<sup>6</sup> the mining for tin, the exploration and exploitation of petroleum in the area, and a number of serious accidents such as the supertanker *Showa Maru* collision, are only some examples by which the safety of navigation could be endangered.

## II. The Importance of SLOCs for ASEAN

It is well recognized that Southeast Asian waters constitute choke points linking the Indian and Pacific oceans which are increasingly important oceans in the strategic as well as economic sense. From the strategic point of view, the waters are of major importance to the security of the littoral states and external powers, particularly major powers, whose interests are directly linked with the region. Thus a guarantee for innocent passage<sup>7</sup> for vessels of these states is of prime importance. Interruption of passage or closure of the waters, for whatever reason, would damage the interests of many countries whose economic and military activities require the use of these waters. Japan, Korea, Taiwan, the PRC, Australia, the United States and the Soviet Union, for example, and almost all ASEAN countries will in varying degrees suffer from such possible incidents.

All ASEAN member countries are concerned over the sensitivity of the waters surrounding them for political and security reasons. Any of them is vulnerable to naval harassment, blockade, interdiction and assault by neighbouring as well as distant, especially major, powers. Though recently there are signs of naval build-up by

6. According to a survey conducted in 1980, 184 vessels of various types travelled the straits each day. Quoted from Phiphat Tangsubkul and Frances Lai Fung-wai, "The New Law of the Sea and Development in Southeast Asia," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXIII, No. 7 (July 1983), p. 863. Consult also Tsuneo Akaha, "Japan's Response to Threats of Shipping Disruptions in Southeast Asia and the Middle East," *Pacific Affairs*, 59/2 (Summer 1986), pp. 255-77.

7. For the meaning of the regime of innocent passage, see *United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea*, Art. 19.

some ASEAN member countries,<sup>8</sup> basically their naval and military capabilities in general, are limited, especially in comparison with those of the major maritime powers. While perceptions of external threats may vary from one state to another,<sup>9</sup> none of the ASEAN member countries perceive any imminent invasion, especially one which may be launched from the sea, in the near future. Meanwhile, political accommodation and cooperation that have been reached among the ASEAN countries have reduced the possibility of the use or threat of military force to settle potential or real disputes among them. But one should not totally rule out the possibility, however remote, of different, less peaceful course of action that may be taken in the face of conflicts in the distant future.

With regard to security threats, the ASEAN countries have shown their concern over the rivalry between external major powers and its direct and indirect impacts on them individually as well as collectively. Of particular importance is their concern over possible external interference in their domestic affairs, smuggling activities especially of arms into the countries of the region, illegal border-crossings, and drug trafficking.

Considering that in some countries domestic political and security problems have not been thoroughly resolved, such as in the Philippines and Indonesia,<sup>10</sup> external intervention, infiltration and arms smuggling may prompt these countries to take actions at sea which may have certain direct consequences for the security of the sea lanes. Indeed, domestic political and security problems may invite external interference through the seas forcing those countries to adopt policies as

8. Changes of each ASEAN countries' naval forces and procurements in the last ten years can be found in various issues of *The Military Balance* (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies) published since 1976. See also Robert Rau, "Present and Future Maritime Security Issues in the Southeast Asian and South China Sea," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* (June 1986), pp. 46-51.

9. See, for instance, Robert O. Tilman, *The Enemy Beyond: External Threat Perceptions in the ASEAN Region* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1984).

10. See, for instance, J. Soedjati Djiwandono, "Indonesia's Security Concerns and Responses," *The Journal of Asiatic Studies*, Vol. XXVII, No. 2 (1984), pp. 227-38.

a precaution. In this light, therefore, it seems understandable that Indonesia and the Philippines have strongly pursued their respective policies as an implementation of the archipelagic principle particularly as regards maritime activities in their archipelagos. Indonesia had a number of bitter experiences in which its national unity and integrity was threatened from the sea, such as during the war of independence and during the period of regional rebellion. Today Indonesia still has a continuing concern over security, especially in Irian Jaya and East Timor. Meanwhile the Philippines has to deal with the southern part of the country in the face of the New People's Army on the one hand, and the Moros' demand for Mindanao autonomy and some separatist movements on the other. It is more likely that external arms supplies to these groups are provided mainly through the sea. It must be recognized, however, that their efforts to implement the archipelagic principle, particularly by Indonesia, have created problems with major maritime powers.<sup>11</sup>

With regard to economic considerations, the countries of Southeast Asia, especially the ASEAN states, not only provide raw materials and markets for the industrialised world but they are also, at the same time, heavily dependent on maritime activities. For their economies, particularly trade, they have a great stake in the world markets. While the lions share of their trade percentage is with the industrialised countries and other non-ASEAN countries,<sup>12</sup> intra-ASEAN trade has also an important place in their economies. All these trade activities are highly dependent on the security of the sea lanes. Even inter-insular trade in some countries—Malaysia, the Philippines and especially Indonesia—is also highly dependent on the sea lanes.

ASEAN's trade with Japan, the United States, Western Europe, Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan constitute an intensive web.

11. See, Hasjim Djalal, "The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention: A Southeast Asian Perspective," *The Indonesia Quarterly*, Vol. XIII, No. 1 (January 1985), pp. 59-73.

12. Data of ASEAN external trade can be found in Hadi Soesastro, "ASEAN's Participation in the GATT," *The Indonesian Quarterly*, Vol. XV, No. 1 (January 1987), Tables 3 and 4, pp. 114-116.

But the ASEAN countries need also to have access to markets in the Socialist and developing worlds considering they now have consciously adopted an export-oriented strategies in their economic development.<sup>13</sup> This means that ASEAN economies are increasingly dependent on the sea lanes.

Furthermore, the link between politics and security on the one hand, and between politics and economy on the other, has been realized by the ASEAN countries, which face the problem of strengthening national stability on the one hand and creating a more conducive environment for further progress on the other. Indeed, they have a large stake in the security of the sea lanes for their economies with implications for their political and security problems. Economic difficulties caused by the possibility of a prolonged disruption of the sea lanes in the ASEAN region would create social, political, and security problems. It is therefore in the interest of the ASEAN countries to maintain the security of the SLOCs particularly in the waters of Southeast Asia.

With these in mind, however, to describe differing security perceptions among the ASEAN member countries with regard to sea lanes, and thus their interests in the Law of the Sea,<sup>14</sup> a brief review is in order. Indonesia is more preoccupied with problems related to its national unity, political stability, economic and social development and national defence and security. As waters surrounding its islands constitute assets for further development as well as at the same time liabilities, as experience has shown, Indonesia gives top priority to the realization of the archipelagic principle (*Wawasan Nusantara*) particularly with regard to the use of its territorial seas for international sea lanes of communications. Indonesia adopts the regime of innocent passage for vessels passing through the territorial waters in accordance with that principle. Therefore Indonesia is opposed to attempts to apply the regime of freedom of navigation as proposed by certain states. The *Philippines* has, more or less, a

13. *Ibid.*, pp. 111.

14. For detailed discussions, see Tangsubkul, *ASEAN and the Law of the Sea and Leifer, Malacca, Singapore and Indonesia*.

similar position.

*Singapore* and *Thailand*, because of their disadvantaged geographic locations,<sup>15</sup> have some similarities in their positions with regard to SLOCs. Being a state almost totally dependent on international trade, Singapore subscribes to a position close to those of major maritime powers, i.e., to have the regime of freedom of navigation in ASEAN waters, especially the straits of Malacca and Singapore. Similarly Thailand's interest in the freedom of navigation in the same waters is dictated by its need for the sea lanes connecting its Western with its Eastern coastlines. Moreover, both Singapore and Thailand are interested in maintaining and promoting their access to marine resources in their neighbouring waters for fishing and possible exploitation of their living and non-living resources. *Brunei* seems to follow the United Kingdom in these respects.

On the other hand, in several respects *Malaysia* shares a similar position to that of Indonesia with respect to the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. But since Malaysia is not strictly an archipelagic state, it seems to maintain the regime of freedom of navigation beyond the territorial sea limit. On the issue of national unity, however, Malaysia seeks guarantees from Indonesia's application of the archipelagic principle so not to undermine its vital interests especially with regard to Peninsula and Eastern Malaysia (Sabah and Sarawak).

### III. Security Foundation of ASEAN

For the reasons mentioned above, the ASEAN countries have also directed their energies and efforts to the search of a security foundation for Southeast Asia in general and the ASEAN region in particular. The basic objective of such an endeavour is to find ways and means for avoiding conflict within the region and unwarranted

15. Thailand is a less disadvantaged state than Singapore.

interference by external, especially major, powers in regional affairs so that the interests of regional and external powers can be best served in harmony.

Turning back for a while to the political and security environment in Southeast Asia preceding the formation of ASEAN in 1967 and the development thereafter, some aspects need to be taken into account in order to appreciate current ASEAN position. Intra-regional conflicts such as Indonesia's policy of confrontation against Malaysia, the Malaysian-Philippines dispute over the status for Sabah and the North-South Vietnam conflict dominated the scene of the region. At about the same time that the United States was becoming increasingly involved in mainland Southeast Asian political and security affairs, symbolized by its military presence in Thailand and military action in Vietnam. The Soviet Union and the PRC were competing for influence in the region, especially in Indonesia and to lesser degree in North Vietnam. It was clear that regional conflicts intermingled with the antagonism among the great powers—the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and the PRC—clearly endangering and threatening the security and stability of the Southeast Asian States. In the meantime, domestic conflicts in many Southeast Asian States—providing a favourable environment for external interference—were rampant with disastrous effects.

The establishment of ASEAN in 1967 was surrounded by an environment that could affect regional security in general and the security of sea lanes in the region in particular. The United States had just intensified its bombings on targets in North Vietnam, and the mining of Haiphong Harbour in June 1967 where a Soviet ship, the *Mikhail Frunze*, was hit,<sup>16</sup> but apparently these did not attain Washington's objectives. Then came what is known as Nixon's Guam Doctrine in 1969 which in essence stipulated that the United States would, instead of direct military engagement, provide more economic and military hardware for its allies and friends in Asia and

16. See, Gareth Porter (ed.), *Vietnam: A History in Documents* (New York and Scarborough: Meridian, 1981), p. 463.

would give more emphasis to its off-shore strategy.<sup>17</sup>

While for the ASEAN countries the Guam Doctrine would only strengthen their conviction that regional security is mainly a regional responsibility, the very same doctrine implied the United States' need for continuing freedom of navigation for its naval forces throughout all the world's waterways. It is likely that the United States at that time had recognized the complicated problems for its naval movement and deployment in the future posed by the declaration on the extension of the territorial sea to twelve miles. In other words, the recognition by the international community of the 12-mile territorial sea would make many important straits of the world fall under the national jurisdiction of littoral states with the effect that the regime of freedom of navigation will cease and that it will be replaced by the regime of innocent passage as stipulated by the 1958 Geneva Convention. With regard to the ASEAN region, the same problems would arise as the Philippines and Indonesia had sought recognition of archipelagic principle since the 1950s.

The problem faced by the United States became more apparent for at least two other factors. The first was the British Government's 1967 decision to withdraw its forces from East of Suez, which would be completed by 1971. Such a decision worried Western countries especially the United States not only because of the continuing decline of British influence in the Indian Ocean region and the expected end of its permanent naval presence from East of Suez, but also because of a fear of vacuum of power, which implies that it needs to be filled. The second factor was the development of Soviet naval power, dating from the 1960s, sooner or later, would challenge Western naval supremacy. Since the end of the 1960s it has been clear that Soviet naval task forces have been deployed in the Indian Ocean overshadowing Western forces and Western interests in the region.

17. A careful treatment of the Nixon Doctrine with respect to Southeast Asian security is Melvin Gurtov's "Security by Proxy: The Nixon Doctrine and Southeast Asia," in *Conflict and Stability in Southeast Asia*, edited by Mark W. Zacher and R. Stephen Milen (New York: Anchor Books Edition, 1974), pp. 203-36.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union need Southeast Asian waters for their naval communication and deployment free from impediment or obstruction. In one respect, though their naval and maritime interests are competing, there is a common interest between the United States and the Soviet Union with regard to free passage. Therefore, it is not surprising if the two countries together should put pressure on the ASEAN countries in maritime politics.<sup>18</sup>

It was against that background that the five initial ASEAN countries produced a declaration to establish the Southeast Asian region as a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality (ZOPFAN). It has become one of the principles upon which the ASEAN member countries pursue their respective foreign policies with regard to regional security and external powers' interests in the region. On the one hand, the declaration reiterates the Bangkok Declaration (the basis of the ASEAN establishment) that states "that the countries of Southeast Asia share a primary responsibility for strengthening the economic and social stability of the region and ensuring their peaceful and progressive national development, and that they are determined to ensure stability and security from external interference in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their national identities in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples." On the other hand, they believe that "the recognition of, and respect for Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, free from any form or manner of interference by outside powers" are essential conditions to ensure peace and stability in the region.<sup>19</sup>

As the declaration of ZOPFAN has not as yet provided proper and concrete ways and means to respond to the dynamics of political and security development in the region, ZOPFAN is more likely to be ASEAN's long-term strategy in dealing with stability and security issues. Further efforts to create the basic mechanisms are to

18. Lefier, *Malacca, Singapore and Indonesia*, pp. 107-27.

19. *Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration (Kuala Lumpur Declaration)*. Cited from *ASEAN Documents, Series, 1967-1986* (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 1986).

be made with a view to attaining a more predictable behaviour in inter-state relations in the region. To embark on such efforts, the ASEAN member countries have produced the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia and the Declaration of ASEAN Concord. While the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation emphasises friendship, cooperation and peaceful settlement of disputes between Southeast Asian countries, the Declaration of ASEAN Concord is specifically meant to strengthen ASEAN cooperation in various fields. Such mechanisms are important in order to promote and to strengthen regional resilience while each country in Southeast Asia undertakes efforts of strengthening national resilience through social, economic and political development and reconstruction.

How those general principles are to be translated into maritime policies, depends on certain political factors perceived by each member state of ASEAN and their willingness to apply, as in political matters generally, to the maritime affairs. For one thing, it seems now that the ASEAN member states have committed themselves to peaceful means in settling disputes among them. In fact, the ASEAN countries have shown the usefulness of cooperation in dealing with problems relating to security and political issues ranging from illegal border crossings to territorial jurisdiction, from smuggling and environmental pollution to exchange of information on military and intelligence matters. The basic guideline for cooperation in the security field between the ASEAN member countries is "cooperation on a non-ASEAN basis between the member states" in accordance with their mutual needs and interests.<sup>20</sup> Therefore, it is unlikely that ASEAN will proceed, at least in the near future, to pool its resources into a collective and regional cooperation to the maintenance of the security of SLOCs in ASEAN waters.

It can be argued, therefore, that although there are indications in ASEAN of moving toward stronger regionalism especially in the political, economic and socio-cultural fields, the ASEAN countries are likely to maintain a cautious attitude toward a regional

20. *Declaration of ASEAN Concord*, Bali, 24 February 1976.

approach to the security field. Instead, bilateralism and non-ASEAN type of cooperation in that field will continue to prevail.<sup>21</sup>

#### IV. Cooperation in ASEAN for the Security of SLOCs

Even though the ASEAN countries have different security perceptions, a convergence of interests may result in a cooperation on the security of SLOC's beneficial not only to those countries involved but also to the international community in general. They all want to have a secure maritime environment to serve their respective interests. Such a cooperation is a logical consequence of their overlapping interests, such as those caused by the extension of territorial limits to twelve miles, their limited capabilities for safeguarding their interests, and their inclination toward peaceful settlements of disputes, and their share in the primary responsibility for the security of their territorial waters. Any two, and possibly more, countries in ASEAN facing a common problem may initiate bilateral and other non-ASEAN cooperation to deal with it.

The cooperation between Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore on the safety—thus also the security—of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore is a noted example. In 1971 they issued a joint settlement which stated, *inter alia*, that the safety of navigation in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore is the responsibility of the coastal states concerned and they agreed on the need for tripartite cooperation on this subject. Through a series of negotiations they finally agreed to propose the Traffic Separation Scheme of the straits including the provision on an Under Keel Clearance of 3.5 meters in 1977 which was then endorsed by the Maritime Safety Committee of IMCO.<sup>22</sup> The agreement will certainly strengthen the security of navigation

21. For further discussion, see Hans H. Indorf, *Impediments to Regionalism in Southeast Asia: Bilateral Constraints Among ASEAN Member States* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1984).

22. For background, see Tangsubkul, *ASEAN and the Law of the Sea*, pp. 25-35.

through the straits because the negotiations involved not only the question of technical requirements but also issues of territorial jurisdiction, political and security concerns and navigation.

Bilateral cooperation between ASEAN countries as a response to their common problems which may have a direct or indirect impact on the security of sea lanes can be found in other fields. For example, responding to reports on piracy against tankers in the Phillip Channel leading to the Singapore Straits in the latter part of 1981, Indonesia and Singaporean authorities cooperated in maritime policing.<sup>23</sup> With regard to Indonesia-Malaysian relations, especially in reference to Malaysia's legitimate interest in its national unity and traditional fishing, the two countries signed a treaty which declared Malaysia's recognition of, and respect for Indonesia's application of the archipelagic principle. It also stated that Indonesia would continue to respect existing rights and other legitimate interests which Malaysia has enjoyed and exercised in the territorial sea and archipelagic waters of Indonesia. Another agreement is the Malaysia-Thai joint authority for exploitation of seabed resources in the Gulf of Siam which will settle their overlapping claims regarding the boundaries of their continental shelves and the exploitation of living and non-living natural resources in the disputed area.<sup>24</sup>

It is such forms of cooperation between two or more states of ASEAN on non-ASEAN basis that have operated so far in view of the complexity of security problems confronted by ASEAN. They can be extended to other areas with a view of strengthening the security of the ASEAN region in general and those of the sea lanes in particular. It is not inconceivable, for example, to develop closer cooperation between ASEAN countries on search and rescue (SAR) operation in maritime affairs, hot pursuit against smugglers and pirates, and in removing sunken ships and other related activities which would significantly improve the security and safety of navigation.

23. Michael Leifer, "The Security of Sea-lanes in South-East Asia," *Survival* (January/February, 1983), p. 16.

24. Tangsubkul, *ASEAN and the Law of the Sea*, pp. 130-3.

What seems to be remote from ASEAN's interest is therefore multilateral cooperation in security in its narrower sense, i.e., in the defence and military fields. Indeed, there have been a number of cases where the navies of two ASEAN states conduct joint exercises in ASEAN waters. But the purpose of such joint exercises is not specifically to ensure the security of the sea lanes of communications. Rather, it has been meant to familiarize themselves with each other's procedures in military operation, to familiarize their younger officers with each other so as to increase knowledge and promote understanding of their immediate neighbours and to reduce the costs of military exercises. If there is any benefit for the security of the sea lanes in the region resulting from such bilateral naval exercises, this can be seen as no more than a welcome additional bonus.

## PEACE-TIME INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION FOR SLOC SECURITY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

*R.P. Anand*

### I. Geopolitical and Geostrategic Importance of the Indian Ocean

Extending over almost 76 million kilometers in area, ranking in size after the Pacific and the Atlantic, the Indian Ocean is the third largest ocean in the world. But unlike the Atlantic or the Pacific, the Indian Ocean is surrounded by four continents—Africa, Asia, Australia and the frozen continent of Antarctica—which contribute to its geopolitical and geostrategic importance. Moreover, unlike the two larger oceans, the Indian Ocean region, consisting of 36 independent littoral and 11 hinterland states (with no access to the sea), presents a vast and varied kaliedoscope of political societies at very different levels of development. Besides the white nations of Australia and New Zealand at the Southern end of the littoral, and South Africa, most of the countries are newly-independent developing nations immersed in dimensional domestic problems. The vast mineral resources and commercial crops add to the strategic importance of the region. The nations of the Indian Ocean account for half the oil produced in the non-Communist world, two-thirds of uranium production and one-third of its gold output. The rich endowments of the area include tea, coffee, cotton, coal, iron, bauxite, copper lead and manganese. About a quarter of the world's trade is handled in the ports of the Indian Ocean. But it is significant to note that, as a legacy of the colonial age,

almost 90 percent of the trade of the littoral countries is west-oriented; intra-and inter-regional trade is insignificant.

While the island nations of Southeast Asia, lying at the crossroads of the East and the West are trying to cooperate through ASEAN and forge some kind of an economic, though non-political, unity, the nations of South Asia, with small island states of Maldives and Sri Lanka on the one hand, and the massive landmass that absorbs India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Bhutan, Nepal, and also indeed Afghanistan, present a picture more of discord than of cooperation.

To the west is the sprawling strategic region of West Asia and the Gulf. If most of West Asia is Mediterranean, the Red Sea and Aden are part of the Indian Ocean. The Gulf carries the world's largest deposits of petroleum on which the industrial civilization of Europe and Japan is largely dependent. The most inflammable natural resource has made the area politically inflammable too.

The African portion of the Indian Ocean littoral, extending from the Horn to the Cape, is inhabited by a cluster of states in various degrees of instability—Ethiopia, Somalia, Mozambique. Added to this is the almost a perpetual state of warfare between Ethiopia and Somalia. And finally there is South Africa, "the time bomb" that may "explode one day with unpredictable ferocity."<sup>1</sup>

Compared to other oceanic geo-political regions, the Indian Ocean area is distinguished by a multiplicity of conflicts and discords. The states are enormously different in size, population and natural resources. The only on-going war in the world today is being waged almost endlessly in this region between Iran and Iraq. More weapon systems and dangerous arms have been pumped into the Indian Ocean littoral in the last two decades than in any other Third World region. Despite some regional cooperation organizations like ASEAN, SAARC and GCC, the Indian Ocean region is deeply fragmented and exposed to power imbalances.

1. Bhabani Sen Gupta, "Politics of Indian Ocean," *World Focus* 83-84, Annual Number (Nov-Dec. 1986), p. 45.

It is important to note that the Indian Ocean provides vital trade routes and sea lanes of greater strategic importance to the major powers than are available in any other region. It provides an important line of communication between the Atlantic—and through the Suez Canal—between the Mediterranean and the Pacific. This is the reason for the importance of the various gateways to the Ocean: in the west via the Cape of Good Hope, in the north-west through the Suez Canal, the Red Sea and the Bab-er-Mandeb strait, in the east via the Malacca strait, further south-east via the Indonesian islands, such as Lombok and Sunda straits, as well as straits on the north and south of Australia. Besides, the importance of Hormuz strait, which provides the entrance to the Persian Gulf, has dramatically increased during recent years.

Every year more than 30,000 ships, including some 1,500 tankers, travel the sea routes through the Indian Ocean, through the Suez canal and the Bab-el-Mandeb strait, around the Cape of Good Hope and through the Malacca strait. On an average, two tankers an hour pass through Strait of Hormuz, forty ships a day through the channel between Mozambique and Madagascar, and more than 100 through the Malacca straits.<sup>2</sup> Lying between the Indonesian island of Sumatra and Malaysia to the East, and the Indonesian archipelago and Singapore to the west, Malacca straits provide a vital link of the Indian Ocean with South China Sea and the Pacific.

## II. International Straits

Since the main points of access from and to the Indian Ocean are international straits, unless these narrow natural passages are kept open and free, they can act as bottlenecks for navigation and communication between states. A relatively narrow waterway lying between areas of land, a strait may be a channel between continents, a

2. See Dieter Braun, *The Indian Ocean: Region of Conflict or 'Peace Zone'?* (Delhi, 1983), p. 8.

continent and an island, or two islands connecting two oceans, two adjoining parts of the same ocean, two by-oceans, or an ocean and a by-ocean. Ranging in breadth from 800 yards to 150 miles,<sup>3</sup> these more than two hundred waterways all over the world—some important, some not so important—must be open for navigation for ships of all states for the freedom of the seas to be meaningful. The strategic character of a strait is based on the fact that passage through the strait saves time, cost and distance for commercial and military ships. Some intercontinental straits, like Bab-el-Mandeb, Hormuz, Gibraltar, Dardanelles, are strategic because an alternate-route does not exist. In some straits, like Malacca and Hormuz, the amount of traffic is very heavy because of their convenience and unavailability of alternate routes. Others may not be so critical though still important for international traffic. Without going into the geographical details of these various straits,<sup>4</sup> it may be asserted that they are all important as corridors of international maritime traffic and essential for the freedom of the seas.

### III. Freedom of the Seas in Historical Contexts

It is interesting to note that the debate royal on maritime navigation and freedom of the seas started in the seventeenth century over the claims to occupy the Indian Ocean. Inspired by the maritime practice of free navigation among Asian states in the Ocean, Hugo Grotius propounded his doctrine of the Freedom of the Seas or *Mare Liberum* in the wake of Portuguese attempts to occupy the Indian Ocean and its

3. At its narrowest point, the Dardanelles Strait is only 800 yards wide. On the other hand, the Hudson straits are about 155 miles wide. See K.L.Koh, *Straits in International Navigation Contemporary Issues* (1982), p. 11.

4. See Robert W. Smith, "An Analysis of the Strategic Attributes of International Straits: A Geographical Perspective," *Maritime Studies Management*, vol. 2 (1974), pp. 97 ff; R.H. Kennedy, *A Brief Geographical and Hydrographical Study of Straits which Constitute Route for International Traffic*, Preparatory Document No. 6, 1958 UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, (hereinafter UNCLOS) UN Doc.A/CONF.13/16, 23 Oct 1957.

claims to be the 'owner' of these warm waters on the ground of discovery and occupation, papal donation and prescription.<sup>5</sup> Although Grotius eventually proved successful in the "battle of books" that followed in the din of actual wars for nearly two centuries among European powers—Portugal, Holland, England, France—for supremacy over the oceans, it was not until the late eighteenth or early nineteenth century that freedom of the seas came to be accepted as a general rule of international law. Even at that time the doctrine came to be accepted not because European countries became convinced of the rational and sound arguments of Hugo Grotius, but because it became necessary and useful in the wake of the industrial revolution in Europe. The needs and demands of the industrial revolution—surplus capital which required to be invested, search for new markets for European goods, and voracious demands for raw materials for the European industries—all led to the vast expansion of Europe and acceptance of the freedom of the seas. After unsuccessful attempts by various European states to establish their monopolies of maritime trade in the 17th and 18th centuries, Britain emerged as the greatest maritime power in the 19th century and also became the strongest champion of the freedom of the seas.<sup>6</sup> With British supremacy firmly established and relative calm at home after the Napoleonic wars, freedom of the seas and free trade became the watchwords, and Europe embarked upon joint exploitation of Asia and Africa.

Intent upon exploiting their colonies in Asia, and later in Africa, as far as possible, jointly and in cooperation with each other, it is not surprising that European countries wanted the oceans as safe as possible and serve as free highways. Ever since its inception in 1776, first as a neutral and later as a major maritime power, the United States had also been interested in the freedom of the seas. With the increasing European need and demand for trade in an era of expanding

5. See R.P. Anand, "Maritime Practice in Southeast Asia until 1600 A.D. and the Modern Law of the Sea," in his *Confrontation or Cooperation? International Law and the Developing Countries* (New Delhi, 1986), pp. 60 ff.

6. See R.P. Anand, *Origin and Development of the Law of the Sea: History of International Law Revisited* (The Hague, 1982), pp. 89 ff.

economies, it came to be asserted that there was a divine right to trade every where and "that it was unnatural for governments to close their countries to the free flow of trade."<sup>7</sup> Freedom of the seas was the necessary condition for such trade and it came to be accepted as an incontrovertible sacred doctrine, almost a dogma, which no one dare challenge.

#### IV. Excess of the Freedom of the Seas Doctrine

The purpose of European maritime powers in the nineteenth century, it is important to mention, was not merely peaceful navigation. Their "freedom of the seas", therefore, had wider connotations. The hallmark of this law was and has been, in accordance with the spirit of the time, "freedom", meaning essentially non-regulation and *laissez faire*. Beyond a limited area near the coastline for the protection and security of the coastal states and for the enforcement of their customs, health and fiscal regulations, the vast oceans remained free to be used and abused, explored and exploited by the maritime powers according to their selfish interests. Freedom of the seas was used not only for the perfectly legitimate purpose of navigation, but more often than not it was interpreted by the militarily strong European powers as permitting them to move across the wide open sea to threaten small states for their own ends, or to subjugate and colonise them. There is no dearth of cases of trigger-happy naval commanders using naval ordnances against what came to be considered as the "backward" peoples of Asia on the smallest excuse or no excuse at all. It was the classic age of punitive or military bombardments. Often a show of strength was enough to force the small coastal state to comply with the demands of European powers.<sup>8</sup> It is significant that in the last two decades of the nineteenth century, the so-called "advanced countries partitioned

7. K.M. Panikkar, *Asia and the Western Dominance* (1954), pp. 45 ff. For further details see Anand, *Ibid.*, pp. 131 ff.

8. See for reference to several such cases R.R. Palmar and Joel Colton, *A History of the Modern World* (Third ed.) (New York, 1965), pp. 548-49, 617; See also Anand, n.6, pp. 131 ff. 152-53.

most of the earth among themselves."<sup>9</sup>

Freedom of the high seas was also transformed into a licence to overfish, especially near the coasts of other countries. The invention of the steamship and new trawling methods for catching the fish led to the establishment of big fishing, industries threatening the small countries' fisheries at long distances.

Freedom of the seas has always meant unequal freedom or only freedom for the few. It came to be used by maritime powers, especially during wars, to close large areas of the ocean. In fact, by the Second World War, with advancing technology and continued misuse of absolute freedom by the big powers, it had become anathema for smaller states even in Europe. The conditions became even more acute after the Second World War and smaller states got increasingly concerned about a number of activities that had been continuing in the name of the freedom of the seas: activities such as naval military operations and manœuvres; testing rockets and missiles; using the high seas as a dumping ground, particularly for radioactive wastes; stationing and operating nuclear-powered submarines armed with nuclear missiles; so-called data-gathering by electronic procedures along the coasts of other countries. Under these conditions it is not surprising that freedom of the seas came to be considered as a form of "tyranny", and its continued validity in this form began to be increasingly questioned.<sup>10</sup>

#### V. Passage Through International Straits

A necessary concomitant of the freedom of the seas, has been the freedom of passage or navigation through international straits, as we have mentioned earlier. Under the patronage and active participation

9. Palmar and Colton, *ibid.*, p. 615.

10. See R.P. Anand, "Tyranny' of the Freedom of the Seas Doctrine," *International Studies*, vol. 12 (1973), pp. 416-29; Strong criticism of the freedom of the seas was common during the three UN Conferences on the Law of the Sea. See for details, R.P. Anand, "Winds of Change in the Law of the Sea," in R.P. Anand (ed.), *Law of the Sea: Caracas and Beyond* (New Delhi, 1978), pp. 36-61.

of the big maritime powers all these strategic waterways—even those lying within the territorial waters of coastal states—were sought to be kept open by agreement or otherwise. A number of agreements were concluded in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to declare freedom of passage through straits such as the Turkish straits, the straits of Magellan, the straits of Gibraltar, the Danish straits, which are deemed to be valid even today.<sup>11</sup> Not content with natural channels, the maritime powers constructed artificial straits or waterways of Suez and Panama to serve the same purposes in terms of economics, geography, and navigation.

But despite the importance of straits for navigation and communication between states even in the heyday of the freedom of the seas, there was always some hesitation on the part of numerous strait states—which are generally smaller and weaker countries—to accept the unquestioned right of all ships to pass through their waters irrespective of their security and other interests.

Most of the strait states claimed territorial sea jurisdiction in straits unless the straits were much wider than double the territorial sea claimed by them. The big maritime states disagreed, contending that if a strait was wider than double the limits of the so-called traditional territorial sea of three miles claimed by them, i.e. broader than six miles, there was supposed to be a high seas corridor in the strait, open to free navigation by the ships of all nations. This, in practice, was never accepted. Indeed, coastal states generally claimed jurisdiction over the entire strait beyond even the limits it normally claimed for its territorial sea. Thus by a Protocol of 10 March 1873, the United States and Great Britain fixed the northwest water boundary between the United States and Canada as a line running midway in the Strait of Juan de Fuca which ranges between 10 and 15 miles in width.<sup>12</sup> In his exhaustive study on straits in 1947, Bruel said that the situation in which a strip of high seas runs through an entire strait, "rather belongs

11. See for details R.P. Anand, "Transit Passage and Overflight in International Straits," *Indian Journal of International Law*, vol. 26, Nos. 1 & 2 (January-June, 1986), p. 74.

12. R.R. Baxter, *The Law of the International Waterways* (1964), p. 5.

to the literature than to reality".<sup>13</sup> Especially during the war the strait states' concern was to protect their territories or to maintain their neutrality and they could not permit unrestricted navigation through straits and subject themselves to the crossfire of belligerents just because nature had put them on the crossroads of the world's oceans.<sup>14</sup>

The tension between the demands of the international community, especially the maritime powers, to keep the straits open and free for navigation, on the one hand, and demands of the coastal states to protect their security, economic and other interests, on the other, continued and became even more pronounced after the Second World War. Further, while it was generally conceded that warships had a right of passage through straits, in times of war as of peace, this was tied to the question of innocent passage of warships through the territorial sea. Moreover, the concept of "innocent passage" through territorial waters was not clear, and the limits of these waters remained a subject of intense dispute among states.

## VI. Territorial Waters

Ever since the acceptance of the utility of the freedom of the seas in the nineteenth century, the maritime powers, interested in keeping the vast expenses of the ocean open, wanted the territorial sea to be as narrow as possible. While the maritime powers, such as Great Britain, France, Germany, Holland and the United States, following the so-called "cannon-shot rule", adopted three miles as the limits of territorial sea, this was not a universally accepted rule. The Scandinavian countries extended their maritime zone to four miles; Spain and Portugal claimed six miles; Italy ten miles, and Russia 100 miles and, after 1912, 12 miles. The disagreement continued through the twentieth century with states adopting various limits as suited their interests or whims. It is not surprising that no agreement could be

13. Bruel, *International Straits* (1947), p. 41.

14. Chile declared the Strait of Magellan as part of its territorial sea for the purpose of defending its neutrality. See Baxter, n. 12, p. 7.

reached at the Hague Codification Conference in 1930.

This disagreement increased after the Second World War with the developments in science and technology and revelations of a new undersea world full of natural resources beyond the wildest dreams of man. It is only natural that most states sought to extend coastal jurisdiction for the exclusive exploitation of these resources. Both the 1958 and 1960 UN Conferences on the Law of the Sea failed to reach an agreement and merely encouraged smaller states to claim wider limits. Thus, the number of states claiming a 12-mile territorial sea increased from 13 in 1960 to 54 in 1974 on the eve of the first substantive session of the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea at Caracas. Another 17 states claimed territorial waters ranging from 15 to 200 miles. But 25 states, including most of the Western maritime powers, continued to cling to the largely discredited three-mile formula.<sup>15</sup> However, despite the hesitation of the western maritime powers to adopt both the 12-mile territorial sea and 200-mile exclusive economic zone, these concepts came to be accepted at the UNCLOS-III. An agreement on the limits of the territorial sea was reached for the first time in history and is contained in Article 3 of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea which provides:

Every State has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea upto a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles measured from the baselines determined in accordance with this convention.

It is important to note that although this convention has been signed and accepted by more than 130 states, some of the Western maritime powers, like the United States, Germany and England, have refused to accede to the Convention and continue to regard three miles as still the limits of territorial sea.

15. See Anand, n. 11, p. 78.

## VII. Innocent Passage Through the Territorial Sea

Just as nations disagreed throughout this century on the territorial sea, they also disagreed about the right of foreign ships to navigate through these waters. Although everyone agreed and accepted the concept of the freedom of innocent passage through the territorial sea, the meaning of "innocent passage" was not clear and there was a continuing controversy about the passage of warships. Because the chief, or perhaps the sole, reason for the acceptance of a right of innocent passage was "because of a recognition of the freedom of the seas for the commerce of all states,"<sup>16</sup> this right came to be confined to merchant vessels or other governmental vessels, and did not extend to warships. As the Harvard Law School Draft on Territorial Waters declared in its commentary on the eve of the 1930 Hague Codification Conference:

There is... no reason for innocent passage of vessels of war. Furthermore, the passage of vessels of war near the shores of foreign states and the presence without prior notice of warships in marginal seas might give rise to misunderstanding even when they are in transit. Such considerations seem to be the basis for the common practice of states in requesting permission for the entrance of their vessels of war into the ports of other states.<sup>17</sup>

These rules,<sup>18</sup> forming part of customary law, came to be codified for the first time in 1958 in the Convention on Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. Guaranteeing ships of all states the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea under Article 14(1), Article 14(4) declared a passage to be "innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal state. Such passage shall take place in conformity with these articles and with other rules

16. Philip C. Jeosup, *The Law of Territorial Waters and Maritime Jurisdiction* (New York, 1920), p. 120.

17. See "Harvard Law School Draft on Territorial Waters," *American Journal of International Law* (Supp.), vol. 23, p. 245; see also C. Colombos, *The International Law of the Sea*, 6th Ed. (London, 1967), p. 261.

18. See for further details, Anand, n. 11, p. 80.

of international law." Because no specific criteria existed or could be laid down as to when a passage was prejudicial to the peace, good order and security of the coastal state, it left a wide latitude to a coastal state to declare a passage non-innocent. If the coastal state did decide that a particular passage by a foreign vessel was not innocent, under Article 16(1), it might "take the necessary steps in its territorial sea to prevent such passage." It might also under Article 16(3), "without discrimination amongst foreign ships, suspend temporarily in specified areas of its territorial sea the innocent passage of foreign ships if such suspension is essential for the protection of its security. Such suspension shall take effect only after having been notified."

While exercising their right of innocent passage, submarines were "required to navigate on the surface and to show their flag [Article 14(6)]"; if they acted otherwise, their passage would be non-innocent.<sup>19</sup>

So far as warships were concerned, most of the delegates agreed with the International Law Commission which in its draft presented to the 1958 UN Conference on the Law of the Sea suggested that:

The coastal states may make the passage of warships through the territorial sea subject to previous authorization or notification. Normally it shall grant innocent passage subject to the provisions of Articles 17 and 18.

However, this draft, which favoured the policies of the Soviet bloc, was strongly opposed by the Western maritime powers, especially the United States, and could not be included in the final convention. The Convention, therefore, shelved the issue and remained silent on the subject. This could not be interpreted to mean that the Convention guaranteed warships an untrammelled right of innocent passage through territorial waters without notification or authorization, as claimed by a few scholars and statesmen. It merely relegated the question of innocent passage to customary law.<sup>19</sup>

The 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, while defining innocent passage in Article 19(1) in the same terms as the 1958 Convention, unlike the earlier treaty, contains a catalogue of actions,

19. See Anand, *ibid.*, pp. 81-84, for details about the controversy.

applicable to all ships, that may render the passage non-innocent. The adoption of this catalogue, therefore, seem to presume the right of innocent passage for warships, because the activities generally concern the mode of passage of warships.<sup>20</sup>

### VIII. Navigation Through Straits in UN Conference on the Law of the Sea

Following the judgement of the International Court of Justice in the *Corfu Channel case*,<sup>21</sup> the 1958 Geneva Convention provided in article 16(4):

There shall be no suspension of innocent passage through straits which are used for international navigation between one part of the high seas and another part of the high seas or the territorial sea of a foreign state.

But the 1958 Convention, in accordance with the past practice, dealt with the question of straits in the context of innocent passage in the territorial sea. As many states started extending their territorial waters jurisdiction from 3 miles to 12 miles after 1960, they threatened to enclose within their territorial sea limits another 116 straits which under the three mile rule would have, at least theoretically, a strip of high seas between them. Freedom of navigation through several strategic straits, such as Bab-el Mandeb, Hormuz, Gibraltar, Dover and Bering, became more precarious because they came under the coastal states' problematic territorial sea jurisdiction and discretion. The territorial sea regime required submarines to come up on the surface and show their flag and there was no right of innocent passage for aircraft over the territorial sea. Moreover, this regime left the coastal states with wide discretion to declare any particular passage, such as passage by nuclear-powered ships or big oil tankers, as non-innocent.

It is also important to recall the changed political environment after

20. See Anand, *ibid.*, pp. 84-85 for details.

21. *Corfu Channel Case* (Great Britain Vs. Albania), *I.C. Reports*, 1949, p. 28.

the two UN Conferences on the Law of the Sea. Before the Second World War, most of the strategic and vital straits, especially in the Indian Ocean, were under the control of the maritime powers interested in keeping them open and claiming narrow territorial sea of three miles. With the collapse of colonialism, new states emerged which were more concerned about their own security and economic interests and were not enamoured by the "freedom of the seas" doctrine which had for a long time been used and abused to their disadvantage. Indeed, feeling that unlimited freedom of the seas was against their interests, they wanted to curb it. Some of these newly independent states were strait states now able and willing to control these important waterways to protect their vital interests. The threat of oil spills, dumping on the high seas, and other sources of pollution in a period of growing ecological concern, added still another reason for expanded jurisdictional claims by coastal states. As the trend to extend territorial waters gathered momentum after 1960, most of these straits became part of the territorial seas subject to numerous controls and limitations imposed by the coastal states. In fact, some of these states went further and sought to make certain important straits internal waters subject to their absolute sovereignty. Thus, Indonesia and the Philippines, two newly independent archipelagic states, sought to employ the method of strait baselines joining the outermost points of the outermost islands of the archipelagoes for delimitation of their extended territorial waters<sup>22</sup> thereby enclosing some of the most important straits, e.g., Sunda, Lombok, Ombai-Wetar, Macassar, and Malacca. Indonesia enjoys a monopoly over all deep water straits between the Asian mainland and Australia connecting the Pacific and the Indian Oceans. The closure of those straits like Sunda, Lombok, Ombai-Wetar or Macassar would necessitate a diversion of traffic around Australia or through the Panama Canal resulting in time delays, higher consumer prices, and the reduced mobility and flexibility of naval forces.

22. See R.P. Anand, "Mid-Ocean archipelagos in International Law: Theory and Practice," *Indian Journal of International Law*, vol. 19 (1979), pp. 238-42.

## IX. U.S.—U.S.S.R. Agreement on Keeping Straits Open

This trend was totally unacceptable to the maritime powers. The Soviet Union, which until the 1958 Geneva Convention was opposed to a special regime for straits, quietly changed its position and became interested in keeping the straits as free as possible. Concerned about the increasing prospects of their closure, both the USSR and the United States agreed in 1967:

- 1) to fix the maximum breadth of the territorial sea at 12 nautical miles; and
- 2) to preserve explicitly in international straits traditional freedoms of navigation as had existed in the pre-12-mile territorial sea regime.

As the Seabed Committee (established by the General Assembly to prepare for the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea) started functioning, the maritime powers made clear their intention to keep the straits open. In 1970 ocean policy statement, President Nixon emphasized the need for a treaty establishing a 12-mile limit for territorial seas and "free transit through international straits."<sup>23</sup> The maritime powers realized, however, that in spite of their strong intention to retain a three mile limit, they could not force others to roll back their territorial sea. The United States, therefore, suggested the right of coastal states to extend their territorial sea to 12 miles provided:

In straits used for international navigation... all ships and aircraft in transit shall enjoy the same freedom of navigation and overflight as they have on the high seas. Coastal states may designate corridors suitable for transit by all ships and aircraft through and over such straits...

The United States representative said in Sub-committee II of the Seabed Committee that "in addition to the importance of sea navigation for their international trade, many states depended upon air and sea mobility in order to exercise their inherent right of individual and

23. Subcommittee II of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed, UNGA Official Records, Session 26, Supp. No. 21A/8421, p. 241, UN Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.48.

collective self-defence."<sup>24</sup> He pointed out that "the security of the United States and its allies depended to a very large extent on the freedom of navigation and on the overflight of the high seas. More extensive territorial seas, without the right to free transit of straits, would threaten that security."<sup>25</sup> The United States maintained that the invulnerability of its nuclear missile submarines (SSBNs)—currently the Polaris/Poseidon fleet—and hence their indispensable role in an adequate second strike force depended on their right to pass through straits submerged and unannounced.<sup>26</sup> In the U.S. view, the right of free transit through straits was "an indispensable adjunct to the freedom of navigation and that of overflight on the high seas themselves." Moreover, the regime of innocent passage provided for in the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea was "inadequate when applied to international straits" because it was a subjective standard subject to abuse. Some states, he said, had in fact claimed that certain types of passage—by nuclear-powered ships and super tankers—should be considered as non-innocent *per se*.<sup>27</sup>

The United States made it clear time and again that it would not accept any extension of the territorial sea from three miles to twelve miles unless the right of free passage through international straits was accepted. It demanded freedom of unobstructed passage for warships, including nuclear submarines, on the surface or submerged, without notification and irrespective of mission. Further, it wanted freedom of civilian and military flights through the superjacent airspace. All these rights were claimed not only in those straits that were wider than six miles and were supposed to have, at least theoretically, a corridor of high seas in their mind, but in all straits irrespective of their breadth or importance.

The United States was willing to accept and "observe reasonable traffic safely and marine pollution regulations that is to say regulations

24. Stevenson (USA), UN Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.8, pp. 45-47, 3 August 1971.

25. Stevenson (USA), UN Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.37, p. 65, 28 July 1972.

26. Robert E. Osgood, Ann L. Hollicks, Charles Pearson and James C. Orr, *Toward a National Ocean Policy: 1976 and Beyond* (Washington, D.C. 1975), p. 45.

27. Stevenson, n. 25, p. 63.

that are "consistent with the basic right of transit." The safety standards to be applied in straits, however, should be established by international agreement and should not be unilaterally imposed by the coastal state.

As to the free transit of aircraft, the United States stated that civil aircraft already enjoyed transit rights over national territory of other states under the Convention on International Civil Aviation and the International Air Service Transit Agreement. But such rights were not available to state aircraft. The United States demanded a right of free transit for all aircraft over straits, but also stated that such aircraft need not be routed over the strait itself but, at the coastal state's discretion, could be directed through "suitable corridors over land areas."

The United States was supported on this issue not only by the Western maritime powers, like the United Kingdom, France, West Germany and others but also by the Soviet Union and Communist bloc countries which also insisted that the limited right of "innocent passage" was not sufficient and "had never been and could never be applied to such straits as those of Gibraltar, Dover, Malacca, Singapore and Bab-el-Mandeb, where freedom of navigation had always been enjoyed."<sup>28</sup> In accordance with these views, on 25 July 1972, the Soviet Union proposed "Draft Articles on Straits used for International Navigation."<sup>29</sup>

Although "the coastal state should be given appropriate guarantees of its security and protection against pollution of the waters of its adjacent straits", the Soviet Union, like the United States, was absolutely convinced that "the concept of innocent passage could not be accepted as applying to the principal straits used for international navigation because it was too widely interpreted as a concept giving, so to speak, the last word to the coastal state or states concerned." Refusal to recognize the principle of free passage would mean, according to the Soviet Union, "establishing the domination of only 12 to 15 states adjacent to straits over the passage of vessels of some

28. See Kolesnik (USSR), UN Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.69, pp. 2-4/(24 July 1973), also Sazhnikov (USSR), UN Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/SR.71, p. 23 (8 August 1973).

29. UN Doc. A/AC.138/SC.II/L.7 (25 July 1972).

130 states of the world."<sup>30</sup> The reversal of the Soviet Policy from its stand in 1958 was, of course, the result of the emergence of the Soviet military capability—naval, fishing and merchant marine.<sup>31</sup>

## X. Transit Passage

Skeptical about the true intentions of the maritime powers and fearful for their own security and sovereignty, the small coastal and strait states strongly objected to the right of free passage, instead of "innocent passage," through international straits. But in spite of all the misgiving and apprehensions of the strait states expressed at the UNCLOS-III, the maritime powers were not prepared to give up their demands. Both the super powers and their allies left no one in doubt that "unless unimpeded passage on, over and under straits used for international navigation was conceded to all commercial vessels and warships, including submarines, there was simply no possibility of coming to an agreement on the subject of national jurisdiction and other issues."<sup>32</sup> They were prepared to make concessions on other issues, e.g., the exploitation of deep seabed resources and to accept wide coastal jurisdictions, even the claims of archipelagic states, provided their naval mobility was not affected.<sup>33</sup>

Over the objections of the strait states, an agreement was reached and the 1982 Convention provided for a non-suspendable "transit passage" through straits. As laid down in Article 38(2), transit passage is defined as

the exercise in accordance with this part of the freedom of navigation and overflight solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious transit of the strait between one part of the high seas or an EEZ and

30. See Kolesnik, n. 28.

31. See M. Janis, *Sea Power and the Law of the Sea* (1976), p. 31.

32. John R. Stevenson and Bernard H. Oxman, "The third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 1974 Caracas Session," *American Journal of International Law*, vol. 69 (1975), p. 5.

33. See Anand, n. 11, p. 94.

another part of the high seas or an EEZ. However, the requirement of continuous and expeditious transit does not preclude passage through the strait for the purpose of entering, leaving or returning from a state bordering the strait, subject to the conditions of entry to that state (Art. 38(2)).

Article 39 lays down the duties of ships and aircraft while exercising the right of transit passage, such as to proceed without delay through or over the strait; (2) refrain from use of force against the sovereignty, integrity or independence of the bordering states, or in any manner in violation of the principles of international law; (3) refrain from any activities other than those incidental to their normal modes of continuous and expeditious transit unless rendered necessary by *force majeure* or by distress. The ships and aircraft are also expected to comply with the generally accepted international regulations, procedures, and practices for preventing collisions and avoiding pollution; and aircraft must comply with the rules of the air established by ICAO or otherwise [Article 39(2) (3)].

The coastal states have been authorized under Article 41 to designate sealanes and prescribe traffic separation schemes for navigation after receiving the approval of the IMO. They may also adopt rules and regulations regarding navigation, pollution, fishing, and loading and unloading in transit.

Thus, while for the first time separate regimes for "innocent passage" through territorial sea and "transit passage through international straits have come to be provided in an international convention and the maritime powers have essentially got what they wanted and bargained for, the United States and some other Western maritime powers have refused to sign the Convention because of their objections to the Convention's deep seabed mining provisions. This has not only left other countries in bad taste, but since the Convention was accepted as a "package deal" they may refuse to accept provisions relating to transit passage through straits as binding in law as regards non-parties. The latter cannot take benefit of certain provisions without accepting the burden of others.

This is exactly what the United States seeks to do. While main-

taining the breadth of the United States territorial sea at 3 nautical miles, the United States insists that it will not accept the 12-mile territorial sea adopted in the 1982 Convention unless its freedom of transit passage recognized in the Convention is also accepted. But as Pirtle has pointed out that, "when it is realized that 64 states had claims to a 12 nautical miles territorial sea prior to UNCLOS-III. . . U.S. arguments against the legality of such claims rang hollow,"<sup>34</sup> Moreover, the continued insistence of the United States on a 3-mile territorial sea can be, as Burke noted, "laid solely to considerations of superior strength and not to expectations about conduct in conformity with law."<sup>35</sup> To say the least, the non-acceptance of 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea by the foremost maritime power and some of its allies has rendered the law relating to passage through straits as provided in the 1982 Convention largely uncertain and controversial.<sup>36</sup> Under the circumstances, the strait states may legitimately claim that law relating to navigation through straits is still the old customary law as found on the eve of the 1930 Hague Codification Conference and reflected in the 1958 and 1962 Geneva Conferences.

## XI. Indian Ocean: Zone of Peace or Conflict?

As we have noted earlier, Great Britain had emerged as the strongest maritime power after the Napoleonic wars. By the end of the nineteenth century it had not only consolidated its Indian Empire, but taken over a large number of colonies in the Indian Ocean, controlling all the vital routes to the Indian Ocean. By 1900 Britain had turned the Indian Ocean into a British lake and had military control over all the important approaches and exits. This control largely continued until

34. Charles E. Portle, "Transit Rights and US Security Interests in International Straits: The Straits Debate Revisited," *Ocean Development and International Law Journal*, vol. 5 (1978), p. 479.

35. W.T. Burke, "Submerged Passage through Straits: Interpretations of the Proposed Law of the Sea Treaty," *Washington Law Review*, vol. 52 (1977), p. 194.

36. See Anand, n. 11, pp. 99-105.

the Second World War which weakened not only Britain but other European colonial powers as well resulting in the process of decolonization and withdrawal from the Indian Ocean. Beginning with the independence of the Indian sub-continent in 1947, British decline culminated with its decision in later 1960's to withdraw completely her naval power from "east of Suez" by the end of 1971. France lost her major military presence in the area with her withdrawal from Indo-China and then Madagascar. The Dutch left Indonesia, and Japan, having lost the war, was no more in a position to assert itself militarily in the area. With the disintegration of colonial empires, 36 littoral and 11 hinterland states which had so far no status and no voice, emerged as independent actors. But with the exception of Australia and South Africa, they were all developing countries concerned about their domestic economic, social and political problems.

In the meanwhile, the cold war rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union which had emerged as the strongest powers after the Second World War, continued to escalate. After the withdrawal of the European colonial powers, they stepped in the Indian Ocean seeking new alliances and taking measures to strengthen their presence. History was thus repeating itself. Non-littoral powers were once again asserting their authority, and were extending their conflicts and their rivalry on the ocean and on its littoral.

The United States justified its increasing presence in the Indian Ocean to protect its vital interests and those of its allies, such as oil resources of the Gulf, strategic minerals of Africa, secure sea-lanes, and the need to deter Soviet global geo-political momentum.<sup>37</sup> In the American strategic thinking, the Indian ocean offered some striking advantages—perhaps more than other oceans. First, the narrow and easily manageable waters at the northern entrance make it possible to exercise a control over the Ocean itself. Any power which is able to control the Suez canal, the Malacca, and other Indonesian straits is able to control all the major movements of its adversaries. Secondly,

37. See C. Raja Mohan, "Indian Ocean: Zone of Peace or Conflicts," *Strategic Analysis*, vol. 10 (3), (New Delhi, June 1986), p. 267.

the physical configurations of the Indian Ocean are such that they can be used for strategic weapon deployment against the Soviet Union but cannot be so used against the USA as the latter is in a different hemisphere. Thus when the Polaris A-3 version of underwater ballistic missiles, with a range of 2500 nautical miles, became operational in 1963, the Indian Ocean acquired prime importance exposing the Soviet Union to additional dangers. All areas between the western-Soviet border and Eastern Siberia, including major industrial centres, became vulnerable.<sup>38</sup>

The American deployment led the Soviet Union to strengthen her anti-submarine warfare capability because in the new Soviet perception the best platform for combating the rapidly developing American underwater capability of launching ballistic missiles was no longer strategic weapons but submarines. Since the early 1960's, therefore, the Soviet naval build up in the Indian ocean has been phenomenal.<sup>39</sup>

In this action-reaction cycle, the super powers have been engaged in tremendous arms build up in the Indian Ocean much against the wishes and aspirations of the littoral and hinterland states. Thus following its 'forward base' concept, possibly to fight another war, if necessary, away from home, the United States has built over 60 naval bases in foreign countries. One of the most important such bases is the strategically located 11 sq.miles Diego Garcia Island which was detached from Mauritius in 1965 and bought by the British and later leased to the United States. The United States has recently enlarged facilities on this island for anchorage of a large number of ships, including the largest aircraft carrier and nuclear submarines, an airfield complex for long range reconnaissance aircraft, supply aircraft and strategic bombers and the necessary support and logistic facilities.<sup>40</sup> Besides Diego Garcia and Mahe—two major centres—the United States has acquired access to facilities in Bahrain, Berbera,

38. See Harish Kapur, "Great Powers and the Indian Ocean: A Non-aligned Perspective," *Round Table*, No. 297, (New Delhi, 1986), p. 52.

39. See for details, Kapur, *ibid.*, p. 53.

40. See S.N. Kohli, "Indian Ocean: An Area of Tension and Big Power Pressures," *India Quarterly*, vol. 42 (April-June 1986), p. 158.

Masirah, Mombasa and Singapore.<sup>41</sup> The United States has also set up a separate Indian Ocean command and Rapid Deployment Force of 230,000 men. To make the RDF fully effective, it needs huge stockpiles of combat-ready arms within the area and base facilities for its aircrafts and ships. For this purpose, the United States has acquired the necessary bases or base facilities in Egypt, Morocco, Kenya, Oman and Somalia. Their most important base for effective use of RDF is Israel.<sup>42</sup>

In face of all these preparations by the United States, the Soviet Union could not remain behind. Besides, the only all-year sea route between two flanks of the USSR passes through the Indian Ocean and it wants this route to be kept open and usable. Since its entry into the Indian Ocean in 1968, the Soviet Union has succeeded in obtaining temporary naval bases or base facilities at Soeotra, Hodeida, Massawa, Umm Qasir, and Seychelles. Soviet control of the ports of Massawa and Assab in Ethiopia allows domination of the approaches to the Red Sea.<sup>43</sup>

## XII. Reaction of the Indian Ocean Countries

The awesome super power destructive potential concentrated in the Indian Ocean has left the Indian Ocean states angry, helpless and frustrated. None of these states are safe from destruction in the event of a conflict between the two powers. Economically weak and underdeveloped as they are, they need the help and support of all the developed countries rather than getting involved in their ideological disputes and strategic conflicts. The fact that one attributes its presence to designs of the other, each adopting a 'holier than thou' attitude, is no source of comfort for the littoral states of the region which see to their great discomfiture the increasing military presence of both the

41. See Kapur, n. 38, p. 54.

42. Kohli, n. 40, p. 157.

43. See R.R. Subramanian, "Super Power Conflict in the Indian Ocean of the 1980s," *Strategic Analysis*, vol. VIII, no. 1 (New Delhi, April 1984), pp. 975-77.

super powers. The littoral countries have not forgotten that they were colonized and held in subjugation for centuries by countries with powerful navies and strong armed might. These considerations have led them to seek world-wide agreement on the Indian Ocean becoming a zone of peace in which they may be left to their own devices to solve their problems and be responsible for the security of the area.

### XIII. Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace

The idea of the Indian Ocean being accepted as a peace zone was initiated at the 1964 Cairo non-aligned Summit which called for the denuclearization of the oceans of the world, particularly those which till then had been free from nuclear weapons. At the Lusaka summit of non-aligned countries in 1970, the concept was expanded to include not merely denuclearization but elimination of all military bases and great power rivalries from the region.<sup>44</sup> A formal proposal for the declaration of Indian Ocean as a Peace Zone was made by Sri Lanka in December 1971 in the form of a draft resolution. Adopted by 62 votes to none, with 55 abstentions on 16 December 1974, the resolution "solemnly declared" the Indian Ocean "as a zone of peace", and called upon the great powers to halt "further escalation and expansion of their military presence in the Indian Ocean". It also sought elimination of

all bases, military installations, logistical supply facilities, the disposition of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction and any manifestation of great power military presence in the Indian Ocean conceived in the context of great power rivalry.

Since then, Indian Ocean as a Peace Zone resolution has been an annual ritual at the UN General Assembly and it has been a subject of deliberations at the UN Ad Hoc Committee on Indian Ocean formed in 1972. But instead of becoming a zone of peace, through the years Indian Ocean has become a major theatre of big power rivalry. In

44. See Raja Mohan, n. 37, p. 269.

their power game, the small littoral states are being used as pawns. Mini-and micro-states, particularly the island states of the Indian Ocean, are vulnerable to big power pressures for strategic basing access. Even if the UN Conference to declare the Indian Ocean a Zone of Peace is finally convened in 1988—which is by no means certain—nothing very much is likely to result from it.

### XIV. Conclusion

Oceans have always provided mankind not only with precious fisheries and other resources, but acted as highways of the world. They not only divide lands but unite countries. Freedom of navigation over the open sea and through numerous sea lanes helps them in communications and transportation and is essential for all the countries. All attempts to close the seas or monopolise them through the centuries have proved futile because they are against the interests of the wider international community. Properly used, with respect for the interests of other countries, freedom of the seas is a necessity and a blessing for full utilization of the ocean's resources. But unbridled freedom, without regard to the interests of other countries or attempts to subvert them, may lead to tensions and conflicts. Abuses of this precious freedom in pursuit of narrow nationalistic interests can make it a 'tyranny' which cannot be tolerated for too long. Examples of such abuses can be easily found in history which have ultimately led to terrible wars and widespread destruction. A vast majority of small coastal states have been struggling, especially since the Second World War, to claim wider controls near their coastlines for the protection of their vital interests and for moderate use of the freedom of the seas. Although the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea has helped them to some extent by providing them wider territorial sea and exclusive economic zone for the protection of their coastal economic and other interests, freedom of the seas beyond the limits of coastal

45. See Appendix F in Dieter Braun, *The Indian Ocean: Region of Conflict or 'Zone of Peace'?* (Delhi, 1983), p. 214.

jurisdiction is still a problem they have not been able to cope with. Unobstructed freedom of the seas has again become a curse for the small littoral states of the Indian Ocean. In spite of their best efforts, they have not been able to stop the big maritime powers from pursuing their rivalries and playing their war games in their vicinity. Instead of a zone of peace, the Indian Ocean has become a region of conflicts. The only way for small littoral and hinterland states of the Indian Ocean to protect themselves is through regional cooperation. ASEAN, SAARC and GCC are steps in the right direction. But we have still a long way to go.

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**PART VI**

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**REGIONAL COOPERATION FOR SLOC  
SECURITY IN CRISIS OR CONFLICT**

# REGIONAL COOPERATION FOR SLOC SECURITY IN CRISIS OR CONFLICT

—A Japanese Viewpoint—

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## I. Introduction

Due to their geopolitical relations, Japan and the ROK are mutually dependent on each other in terms of national defense. As long as the ROK could prevent communist force from pushing downwards in the Korean Peninsula, Japan would be able to efficiently allocate its limited ground forces against attack from the north of Japan. The control of the Korean Strait is also only possible when Japan and the ROK effectively cooperate. Moreover, in the event that the ROK were attacked at its northern boundary, Japan would be expected to play a key role, as it did at the time of the Korean War in 1950, to support the U.S. armed forces by serving as a logistic support base.

If an armed conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union occurred in Western Europe or the Middle East, and such a localized war could not be settled and spread to Northeast Asia, the United States would fight in cooperation with allied nations in the region. In this event it is, needless to say, indispensable to secure SLOC extending from the U.S. to Northeast Asia. In this regard, SLOC in the Northwest Pacific is of vital importance both for Japan and the ROK.

Furthermore, both Japan and the ROK have scarce natural

resources; thus, they have to import most of their necessary resources and materials to maintain sustainability as well as to secure people's livelihoods. In the case of Japan, almost all petroleum, most the food supplies and mining resources are procured from Pacific and Indian Ocean countries, and the total import volume of these natural resources have amounted to 500 million tons annually in peace-time. Even in a crisis situation, it would be indispensable to import a considerable amount of the required materials. For this reason as well, the security of sea-lanes is of grave importance for Japan's survival.

## II. Threat to SLOC in the Northwest Pacific

It seems that the Soviet Union's strategy in Asia is an intent to impair U.S. influence in the region. To this end, in Northeast Asia, the Soviet Union tries to isolate the PRC from the West, and to neutralize Japan and the ROK through all possible political, economic, and military measures.

If a military conflict breaks out in the Middle East and spreads to Northeast Asia, it is anticipated that the Soviet Union would attack the SLOC in the Northwest Pacific, aiming at the elimination of Japan and the ROK and the prevention of U.S. support to those two countries.

The Soviet naval force has 70 attack submarines in the Far East, and 40 Backfire bombers, which are capable of attacking Japanese ships and vessels and laying mines in ports in the Northwest Pacific and the Philippine Sea.

The North Korean naval force is equipped with 19 attack submarines. Many of them are old and their capability is limited. It is estimated that they can operate only within the waters surrounding the Korean Peninsula.

In turn, Communist China has about 100 attack submarines, third only to the Soviet Union and the United States. The capability of

these submarines is unknown in terms of SLOC attacks in the ocean. However, were an armed conflict between the East and the West to occur, China's naval force could be a potential threat depending on the course China decides to take.

## III. Japan's Sea-Lane Defense

For Japanese security, the assurance of sea-lane safety is critically important. The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force fully recognizes this fact. Thus, it has improved a wide range of defense capabilities since its establishment in 1952. Emphasis is placed on anti-submarine capability against the Soviet submarine force, which is the greatest threat to the sea-lanes in the Northwest Pacific as well as on anti-mine capability to protect major ports in Japan from Soviet attacks.

Major sea-lanes in the Northwest Pacific pass through the southern waters of Japan surrounded by the Ogasawara and Ryukyu Islands, the Philippine Sea and extend to Hawaii and Australia, and to the Indian Ocean. Therefore, if control of Japanese peripheral waters and Philippine Sea is secured, overall security of the sea-lanes in the Northwest Pacific could be assured. It is a matter of course that Japan, which has the most crucial geographical position, would assume charge of defending the sea-lanes in the region. When visiting Washington in May 1981, Mr. Suzuki, the then prime minister, made a speech at the National Press Club, announcing that Japan considered a few hundred nautical mile area surrounding Japan and the 1000-nautical-mile sea-lanes vital for Japan's security, and that Japan would build up its defense force for the purpose of defending those sea-lanes. The U.S. Secretary of Defense responded that the U.S. Government considered it a major Japanese commitment to the United States and hoped Japan would carry it out without fail. This is the area mentioned above.

The sea-lane defense by Japan consists of the following three strategies:

- (1) To carry out anti-submarine and anti-air operations in order to protect ships and vessels in Japanese home waters and the 1000-nautical-mile sea-lanes.
- (2) To control three vital straits: Soya, Tsugaru, and Tsushima/Korean. By doing so, Japan would try to minimize the number of Soviet submarines penetrating Japanese sea-lanes.
- (3) To conduct anti-mine operations in major ports in order to assure safe traffic of ships and vessels.

If Japan can control the above three straits, the Soviet threat to Japan's sea-lanes would be substantially eliminated. It seems to be possible to have control of the eastern water of the Tsushima Strait by the Japanese Self-Defense Force alone while the Korean Strait, which is between Tsushima Island and the Korean Peninsula, can be controlled with the cooperative defense of Japan and the ROK. However, it is not at all an easy task for Japan to acquire control of the Soya Strait. Needless to say, the Soya Strait is strategically important for the Soviet Union in terms of both nuclear strategy and naval operations. Based on last year's statistics, it was reported that 65% of all Soviet naval ships which went through the above three straits used the Soya Strait. It is said that laying mines is the most effective way to blockade the Soya Strait. However, in order to lay mines, Japan would have to at least have temporary air supremacy in the area. To do so, it would probably be necessary to destroy the Soviets' air bases in this area. Such an operation could not be achieved solely by Japan's military power. Because it is so strategically important, it is likely that the Soviet Union would attempt offensive operations against Hokkaido to secure the free passage of the strait.

In addition to control of the above three straits, it is important to reduce the threat level by searching for and attacking enemy submarines operating in the ocean. At the same time, it would be necessary to establish a naval shipping control system to notify ships of allies and friendly nations the positions of enemy submarines and to safely guide them to less threatening areas. By doing so, it would be possible to reduce damage to our ships and vessels and to

increase the destruction rate of enemy submarines. Japanese anti-submarine capacity has gradually improved through the employment of P3-C anti-submarine patrol planes and escort warships equipped with helicopters. Japan should make further efforts to continuously build up its defense capabilities which are essential for protection of the 1000-nautical-mile sea-lanes.

To date, Japan has been upgrading its maritime defense forces, placing emphasis on anti-submarine operations and anti-mine setups. The Soviet Union has recently increased the number of Backfires stationed in the region, which are able to fly out to the Northwest Pacific and the Philippine Sea to directly attack our sea-lanes, bypassing the Japanese and Korean air defense zones. This has created a new serious threat to Japan. Admiral Gorshikov stated that Germany's submarine operations in World War II failed partly because they carried out the operation by submarines only and without air backup. This statement suggests that future Soviet attacks on Sea-lanes would be carried out through airplane and submarine coordination. The present Japanese air-defense force is not capable of effectively repelling Backfires in the Philippine Sea. However, it would provide a positive solution to the sea-lane air defense problems if Japan were to improve its anti-air defense barrier utilizing the Ogasawara and Ryukyu Islands, and at the same time improve equipment systems to combine small-size aircraft carriers, with anti-air and anti-submarine planes, and early warning planes to promptly detect possible air raids.

#### IV. Issues on Regional Cooperation for Sea-Lane Defense

##### 1. Problems in Japanese Defense Policy

Japan takes a position that, in the field of sea-lane defense as well, Japan will exercise the self-defense right only within the individual and independent defense right and it is not allowed to exercise collective

defense under the present Constitution. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that a nation cannot protect its valuable sea-lanes by its own efforts. Moreover, most of the sea-lanes which are vital for Japan, the ROK, and the ROC are located in the same area. Therefore, it is desirable to establish a cooperative defense system among relevant nations. However, it is hardly possible to establish a collective defense system like NATO, and apply the system to sea-lane protection in the Northwest Pacific.

Nevertheless, the possibility of actual cooperation in a crisis situation still remains if regional or functional distribution, as well as an information exchange system are established in peace-time in order to effect substantial cooperation even if no defense treaties or agreements are concluded beforehand. To do so, the ROK, the ROC, and Japan should have a mutual understanding of, and guidelines about, sea-lane defense in the Northwest Pacific and establish well-coordinated defense plans. It is an urgent requirement for those countries to begin discussion on cooperative defense setups based on such plans. Through open discussions, mutual understanding will be enhanced and problems concerning cooperative measures and solutions to problems would hopefully be proposed. Under the present circumstances, however, Japanese efforts to protect its 1000-nautical-mile sea-lanes is substantially contributing to the security of ships heading for the ROK and the ROC because of Japan's geographical position.

## 2. Naval Control of Shipping in Times of Emergency

In order to effectively execute sea-lane defense operations, an organization would be required which would be capable of controlling ship traffic, including control of departures and arrivals at ports, the assignment of sea routes, and information transmission. In the case of NATO, areas are allocated to allied nations and a commander of the appointed nation's naval force is given authority to control shipping in the designated area. In addition, necessary rules to conduct such operations have been established and agreed

upon by member countries.

In Japan, there are no comparative measures for traffic control of vessels. Nor have arrangements been made between Japan and Western allies in the Northwest Pacific region.

Unless a system to control sea traffic is established, it is almost impossible to secure the safe passage of ships other than naval vessels in case of emergency.

Based on the SAR Treaty (International Treaty on Search and Rescue), the Maritime Safety Agency established the JASREP system, in 1985. Under this system, all ships going through the sea area for which Japan is responsible (north of Latitude 17 N. and west of Longitude 165 E.) should report their current positions and navigation plan to the Maritime Safety Agency. The purpose of this system is primarily designed to promptly commence rescue activities when a shipwreck or other sea disaster takes place. However, this system has developed as an international network so that it can be applicable and utilized in a time of crisis by enlarging its functions.

## 3. Defense of the Tsushima and Korean Straits

Needless to say, it is necessary to have some kind of cooperative arrangement among Japan, the ROK and the United States concerning the control of Soviet submarines going through the west waterway of the Tsushima Strait (i.e., the Korean Strait). Since the Tsushima and Korean Straits are both vital areas for the ROK, assurance of safety of those two straits is critically important for collaborative military operations between the United States and ROK.

According to records disclosed by U.S. military forces, during the Korean War in 1950 a total of 309,314 measurement tons of military supplies, about 10,660 measurement tons a day, were shipped from the United States and Japan to be landed at the Port of Pusan during the period July 2 and July 31. Under the U.S. occupation, Japan served as a logistic support base, storing military supplies needed on

the front lines in Korea and producing and repairing weapons and vehicles. It is also reported that almost all the ammunition the U.N. forces used during the first three months were supplied from stocks in Japan. These supplies were all transported from Japan through the Korean Strait. This example clearly describes the distinctive importance of the security of the Tsushima/Korean Strait for the defense of ROK.

If an armed conflict were to again break out in the Korean Peninsula, it is uncertain whether or not Japan could directly contribute to the military operation as it once did in 1950. However, in order for ROK to develop and effectively carry out defensive operations in cooperation with U.S. forces, it is obvious that security of the Korean Strait and its surrounding waters is even more important than it was in 1950. Japan and the ROK should fully realize this fact and have close discussions regarding sea control in this region during ordinary times, and set up necessary measures to protect this vital sea area.

#### 4. *Defense of the Sea-Lane in the Surrounding Waters of the ROC*

The ROC's geographical position is extremely important for sea-lane defense in the Northwest Pacific. The Taiwan Strait and Vashi Channel, north and south of the ROC are considered choke points. The Soviet base in Cam Rahn Bay is not too far. This area is connected to the 1,000-nautical-mile sea-lane for which Japan has the responsibility to defend. In this regard, the defense of sea-lanes in Taiwan waters will greatly contribute to the security of sea-lanes in the Northwest Pacific as a whole.

The United States is concerned with the security problem of the ROC under the Taiwan Relation Act, while Japan has no formal diplomatic relations with the ROC. The cooperation between Japanese and Taiwanese troops, including military coordination and mutual exchange of information, would be required at a boundary in the sea area where Japanese and Taiwanese defense zones meet.

Therefore, it is an urgent requirement for Japan and the ROC to establish a system of cooperation through the intermediation of the United States.

#### 5. *Defense of the Sea-Lanes Beyond 1,000 Nautical Miles from Japan*

There is no clear policy and understanding about the defense of sea-lanes beyond 1,000 nautical miles from the Japanese main land. It is a matter of course that the 1,000-nautical-mile sea-lane defense by Japan would also be effective in preventing Soviet submarines from going down to the area south of Japan. Effective and efficient anti-submarine operations in Japanese peripheral waters would deter enemy submarine penetration into Southeast Asia, and effectively lower the threat level; thus contribute to the sea-lane defense in that region.

It was reported that the United States proposed to Japan at the Hawaii Conference in 1982 that it would take care of the defense of sea-lanes beyond 1,000 nautical miles if Japan would protect its 1,000-mile sea-lanes by its own efforts. Details of the discussion were not revealed, but the underlying idea of the U.S. proposal is probably that the United States will assume responsibility as a coordinator to establish a cooperative relationship among related nations for the defense of sea-lanes beyond 1,000 nautical miles. If this materializes, dependability of the security of sea-lanes in the Pacific and the Indian Ocean would be markedly improved, and would contribute to the deterrence of armed conflict in the region.

### V. Conclusion

The safety assurance of sea-lanes is crucial not only for the security of Western allies but for the the safety of all other countries which have friendly relations with the West. This does not directly

suggest that sea-lane protection should be accomplished by group defense involving those friendly nations. Yet, it is obvious that long stretched sea-lanes can never be protected by the limited efforts of a small number of countries. Thus, all nations which are concerned about sea-lane defense should vigorously and academically study and discuss problems concerning regional cooperation so as to establish a cooperative relationship based on mutual understanding.

In order to promote such studies, the role of the United States as the coordinator is extremely important. With careful consultation and cooperation with the United States, Japan should strengthen the defense of its 1,000-nautical-mile sea-lanes. By doing so, there is no doubt that Japan can make a powerful contribution to the security of the whole region.

## INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION FOR SLOC SECURITY OF ASIA-PACIFIC IN CRISIS OR CONFLICT

*Leonard Unger*

We meet again to consider the Sea Lanes of Communication in the Western Pacific. How do the nations of that region communicate among themselves and with the world outside their region, by sea and also by air? What is the nature of the traffic that moves over these routes and what is its importance to those nations within the region and also to their friends and neighbors, nearby in the Asian-Western Pacific realm and farther afield as well? Are those sea lanes under threat, actual or potential, and if so, from what powers? How serious are the threats, how imminent, and how can they be guarded against by the countries of the Asia-Pacific Region itself, and with what outside support and participation? Under what circumstances is the security problem a local and regional problem, and under what circumstances may it become widely international? Finally, what are the remedies available to assure or restore security—remedies that are political or in the last analysis may also call for security and military support.

On Tuesday and earlier today we have examined these questions. First we have looked at individual country situations and especially those of our hosts here in Korea, and then those of Japan, and of the Republic of China; and finally a look farther afield toward Southeast Asia and Australia. Our examination has started with an identification of the Sea Lanes of Communication and their role and a

measure of their importance to the nations of East Asia. It goes without saying that those nations, perhaps as much or more than any others in the world, are heavily dependent on the traffic that moves by sea, that provides them with indispensable imports, most notably petroleum and its products, and that carries their ever-expanding exports to major overseas markets from which they must derive the commodities and the income to pay for those commodities.

Next we turned to considerations of security: what are the threats to the physical security of the indispensable lines of communication? How serious and imminent are such threats and what is required either to contain and deter them or, if they become real and must be faced in military terms, what is the strategy to be followed, what are the forces and facilities available within the region to handle such problems and, if needed, what resources, assistance, and forces if need be, can be called on from farther afield to supplement the defenses locally available.

It should be understood at the outset that our examination addresses the subject of "international cooperation". It, therefore, is premised on the existence of an international crisis, however it may have originated, which has grown to such proportions that the support of allies and other friends has become a necessity to face the threat or the actual attack which has developed on the East Asian scene. History, including the history of not too many decades ago, has taught that situations of that gravity and extent cannot be ruled out and that a realistic acceptance of such threats and a demonstrated readiness, if necessary, to face them has proved to be the most effective deterrent to irresponsible, dangerous actions by any potential enemy in the region which may harbor hostile and aggressive intentions.

We have moved in our discussion from "regional cooperation for SLOC security in crisis or conflict" to "international cooperation for SLOC security of Asia-Pacific in crisis or conflict." "Regional cooperation" naturally brought into play in the first instance Korea and Japan and the Republic of China. Near at hand, and almost inevitably involved because of location and facilities involved, are

the nations of ASEAN, and especially the Philippines with their bases vital if not indispensable to any effective participation in the region's defense by the United States. Australia—and perhaps New Zealand—also enter the discussion. They and many of the other countries already identified have long had to accept that defense is not a parochial or local matter that can be left to be handled by a friend or ally under pressure or indeed under attack, but that security is a common regional or even wider concern and that all must share in the efforts to preserve or, if necessary, restore it.

Let us review also the kinds of *international* political and/or security crises or conflicts we are considering here, and what kinds of threats are envisaged.

Here in Seoul, one cannot avoid, considering what for the Republic of Korea has been and continues to be the central security preoccupation, namely aggression from the North and a resumption of the conflict with North Korea. Assessments both of the gravity of the military threat and the possibilities of having to face an attack once more have underlined what must continue to be a basic concern here in Seoul, namely a constant state of readiness to face an assault that could come with little notice and with a potential enemy, ready and well-armed (including an expansion\* of its holdings of MIG-23s) not many miles distant. A prompt and adequate international response would be indispensable, and this has received considerable attention in our earlier sessions. The gravity of a North Korea threat was considerably heightened in earlier years when PRC support for the North had to be assumed; in today's international setting this seems unlikely, but that leaves open for speculation another unknown, namely the position and actions of the Soviet Union. The 1950-53 experience, as well as most subsequent indications, suggest that Moscow would not wish to involve itself that directly unless it was ready for a major conflict, possible of world-wide dimensions, something that does not presently seem probably.

If however, that contingency should have to be faced, i.e., of a direct Soviet assault as part of the outbreak of world conflict, it is

entirely possible that Korea would become an important theater of conflict given the prime Soviet targets of South Korea itself, Japan and, also quite probably, the PRC. This puts us before the gravest possible world security crisis and we must assume that our area of concern would be one of the most, if not the most, directly involved theater of war, inevitably involving massive forces and, in all likelihood, a considerable number of nations both within and beyond the region itself.

With all these possible critical developments in mind, but continuing to weigh the probabilities realistically, let us address the subject of "International Cooperation for SLOC Security of Asia-Pacific in Crisis or Conflict".

There is nothing new in the principles of collective security which became recognized truths as a result of World War II and its origins, and once more when United Nations forces joined the Republic of Korea in 1950 to help preserve its independent existence. Since then the knowledge that international cooperation of a real and tangible sort would be available to help face and deter—or if need be, to resist—international aggression, has helped to preserve the security and peace of the nations in the Western Pacific—albeit with one notable and unhappy exception in Indochina.

When we address the question of "international" cooperation the first entity that comes to mind and that must play some role, and often the key role, in such cooperation, is the United Nations. Here, in the Charter of the U.N., from early post-World War II crisis, notably in Korea, and from the subsequent history of U.N. actions and handling of dangerous international crisis, we derive a pattern of debate and action (or sometimes "inaction") which represents "international cooperation for security 'whether of the SLOC or some other threatened entity or international 'person' in Crisis or Conflict". Needless to say, it was the intention of the U.N. Founding Fathers and of responsible leaders ever since to utilize the U.N. and any and all other available bodies, governments, persons or other factors in the situation to bring about a negotiated, peaceful termination to such crises or conflicts. Unless, however, it has been

recognized and accepted that in the absence of such solution and in the event that an aggressor turns to military action, such action will be met with united and powerful opposition, by force if required, then it is doubtful that there will be an effective deterrent.

A discussion of these issues and situations here in Seoul is particularly pertinent and interesting. As already noted, it was not very many miles away in June of 1950 that the United Nations was first put to test in an international crisis. While it was Korea, and especially the South, which bore the brunt of the war that followed, it was the United Nations' actions that told the world that naked aggression was not tolerable or acceptable to the world community and would meet with armed resistance, and this was supplied by numerous allies and led eventually to victory and the preservation of South Korea's independence.

It would be comforting if one could say that the lesson which the forces of aggression should have learned from the Korean U.N. experience, has stayed with them and deterred them from contemplating or indeed engaging in aggression elsewhere in the years that have followed. The fact remains that there is a moral authority still represented by the U.N. and there is machinery and a will that several times in history has been mobilized to assist countries to preserve their national independence and territorial integrity. Fortunately when the U.N. is able to speak with unity and, therefore, authority, the potential aggressor or aggressors have usually been deterred. So international cooperation for SLOC security of the Asia-Pacific region first must take into account this central piece of world machinery for preserving, or if necessary, restoring peace and redressing wrongs that may have been inflicted on any of its members.

International experience since the close of World War II has unfortunately also included situations and crises in which the U.N. has been impotent, or by-passed or otherwise been left unable to play the role envisaged for it by its founders and its supporters today and over the years since it began to function. It was the experience in Indo-China that, among others, illustrated the ways in

which U.N. action could be frustrated and in which other approaches to collective security had to be devised.

International Cooperation, therefore, had to be organized among likeminded nations in other ways to assure that potential aggressors would be deterred by the knowledge that such cooperation would frustrate their aggressive actions. Bilateral and multilateral international cooperation has found means to express its resistance to aggression in the region and, when tested, to demonstrate its capacity to defeat aggression. Thus, in the Asia-Pacific region there has grown up, starting in the 1950's, a pattern or international cooperation for SLOC security of the Asia-Pacific region.

My predecessor has spoken to "regional cooperation for SLOC security in crisis or conflict" and my topic is "international cooperation for SLOC security of Asia-Pacific in crisis or conflict". So my emphasis should be toward cooperation that is "international" as opposed to "regional", I take that to mean world-wide or at least involving nations and forces beyond the immediate region of the Western Pacific, and therefore bringing in ANZUS, i.e., Australia and New Zealand and, especially, the United States, and also in some cases Canada and other Pacific nations. By the same token, the U.N. enters the picture here, too, even though the U.N. naturally must concern itself with an international crisis or conflict whether intra-regional or going beyond such confines.

At this point it would be useful to identify the "crises or conflicts" arising in the Asia-Pacific Region which have called for and received international attention and cooperation in order to restore or establish security to inter alia, the Sea Lanes of communication vital to the countries of the region.

Perhaps the first situation germane to our study was that created a number of times in the period 1950 to 1970; roughly, when the Mainland or the People's Republic of China by various actions, military and otherwise, sought to expel the forces of the Republic of China, from certain islands in the Formosa Straits and most notably the islands of Quemoy (Jimmen) and Matsu. In that period, particularly its earlier years, the actions of Mainland China were

seen to be not only an effort to clear ROC forces from island territory lying in close proximity (2.5 kms. at nearest points) to the mainland of China but also as a potential threat to vital shipping lines passing through the strategic straits, (and perhaps also a first step toward an attempted invasion of Taiwan). Those are the lines which serve Korea and Japan and carry, inter alia, the indispensable supplies of oil and its products to those countries.

It was the forces of the ROC which resisted the pressures from the Mainland and held the offshore islands. Those islands had become, in response to the threat from the Mainland, the Republic of China's "Rocks of Gibraltar" on which (and indeed, in which) thousands of military personnel on 24-hour guard, prevented assaults from gaining any foothold. This enabled the Representative of China to hold/use the islands as bases for harassing bombardment of nearby Mainland China locations.

In today's more calm and peaceful circumstances in the Formosa Strait, the islands are generally quiet, albeit alert, but their military equipment including much that was provided by international (i.e., U.S.) cooperation and their posture continue in a readiness state.

While the offshore islands provided what may be the most dramatic expression of SLOC security directly relating to the Republic of China, there are innumerable other locations and circumstances which have relevance to this. I believe it is fair to say, however, and I believe it is of fundamental significance for our discussion and study at our meeting, that the international situation in the Straits and the posture of Mainland China have evolved in such a way that the threat which it represented in our discussions and considerations in earlier years has to be seen as much less immediate and grave than it was for a number of decades of dangerous confrontation.

On the other hand the potential military threat represented by the Soviet Union continues to require our close attention and attention to the international cooperation which must be maintained and enhanced to provide SLOC security. Indeed, the military observers and reporters have warned us repeatedly that the capacity of Soviet

forces in the Far Eastern area has been increased and their capabilities have risen steadily. I am not in a position to quote chapter and verse but it is in the face of this substantial and growing capability that we must consider the enhancement of international cooperation.

This serves to introduce certain international issues which directly involve several of the nations participating in our meeting here in Seoul and which pose in various ways the kinds of security issues and the ever-present threat of crisis which we are addressing.

There is no way for any reasonably alert visitor here in Seoul to remain unaware of the continuity of the political and military threat which has hung over this city and South Korea ever since the close of World War II. This was intensely heightened, of course, when the threat turned into a military attack in June of 1950 and South Korea was invaded and almost overcome. The determination and courage and strength of our Korean friends in the defense of their homeland gained world-wide respect and helped to rally the support in the United Nations and in due course, in concrete form, in the U.N. forces which helped restore the independence of the Republic.

The Korean War provided the first serious test of the collective security which the United Nations was created to provide, among its other purposes. Here was a prime example of "international cooperation for Korean security in crisis and in conflict!" And in the course of the Korean War the importance of the Sea Lanes of Communication was clear to all. Military—and also economic—help for Korea had to come in substantial part from about 7000 miles away, over what could have been vulnerable Sea Lines of Communication. Our military and logistic friends at the meeting here can enlarge on the immense difficulties of supplying the forces—and the civilian population—over thousands of miles of sea lanes, vulnerable to surface, air and submarine attack through much of the territory traversed. Fortunately the U.S. and allied naval position in the Western Pacific in that day was such that the Sea Lanes of Communication were never seriously threatened. A major factor in that regard is the absence of the Soviet Union and its forces from the

armed struggle. Our discussion here over recent days certainly suggests that in a similar military confrontation today in which the Soviet Union was actively involved militarily the supply problems would be vastly more complex and difficult. Even had it been involved militarily then, the Soviet naval capability in a relative sense as well as in sheer numbers, modernity, firepower, etc., presented much less of a threat than do those forces today.

It was the mechanism of the United Nations that made that cooperation to face and, ultimately, to defeat the enemy in Korea a practical possibility. Parenthetically, it seems to have been somewhat an accident, that Ambassador Gromyko's deliberate absence from the Security Council, I believe, made it possible to gain the Security Council endorsement and support for U.N. collective action which, had he been present, he surely would have vetoed. No one, the Soviet Union included, is likely to make that mistake again! There are of course ways to circumvent the veto in such a case but it has to be recognized that in the U.N. of today support for a U.N. concerted action, including a U.N. military force is a dim prospect.

Therefore, international cooperation rests more heavily on the various bilateral security treaties and understandings that have been concluded among the Pacific nations and which have been the subject of discussion on many occasions in our deliberations here and at earlier meetings. Also, in our previous agenda item, on "regional cooperation for SLOC security in crisis or conflict" the agenda made specific provision for that discussion and I will not venture onto that ground.

In conclusion, then, I have to say that the prospects for *international* cooperation—as opposed to *regional* cooperation—for SLOC security of the Asia-Pacific region in crisis or conflict are not promising if action in the United Nations is what is primarily contemplated. In that forum, a registered disapproval of what can be clearly identified as completely unprovoked military action by one member against another can be expected. U.N. action, however, seems quite improbable if this were expected to include a forthright

condemnation of the aggressor, to say nothing of collective military action to support the part or parties attacked.

On the other hand, international (as opposed to regional) co-operation for SLOC security of the Asia-Pacific in crisis or conflict calls into play the various mutual security treaties and agreements to which the United States is party, and which involve, in individual cases, Japan and the Republic of Korea, in Northeast Asia, and the Philippines and Thailand in Southeast Asia (The mutual security treaty of the United States with the Republic of China—Taiwan—came to an end, in accordance with procedures contained in the Treaty, on December 31, 1979).

It must be assumed that the violation of any or all of those treaties by the Soviet Union or North Korea, as long as the continue in force, would bring a virtually automatic military—as well as political—response from the United States.

What that would entail in concrete terms—weapons, men, ships, planes, equipment, financial and diplomatic support, etc.—would take me beyond my prescribed subject, but I feel sure that those specifics will have been addressed in some of the other papers presented.

International action in the event of aggression against the Republic of China (Taiwan) also calls for our consideration, although fortunately under present and foreseeable circumstances this does not, in my judgment, appear likely to arise. As I noted earlier, action to bring about the mutual security treaty's termination was commenced by the U.S. when on December 31, 1978, the Treaty's termination clause was invoked. In accordance with that clause, the Treaty was terminated on year later on December 31, 1979, nevertheless the U.S. Congress in the Taiwan Relations Act (April 10, 1979) has made abundantly clear the U.S. interest in the security of the Republic of China; indeed, the Congress in its prefatory declaration described the Act as:

An Act to help maintain peace, security, and stability in the Western Pacific and to promote the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing the continuation of commercial, cultural and other relations between the people of the United States and the people of Taiwan,

and for other purposes.

In the Act itself Congress indentifies, among other purposes,

to help maintain peace, security, and stability in the Western Pacific. . .

The Congress also declared that it is the policy of the United States,

- (2) "to declare that peace and stability in the area are in the political, security, and economic interests of the United States, and are matters of international concern;
- (3) to make clear that the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means;
- (4) to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States;
- (5) to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and
- (6) to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.

The Act then provides for the "Implementation of U.S. Policy with regard to Taiwan" and spells out the means for providing to Taiwan the wherewithal to assure its effective defense and, finally, calls on "the President. . . to inform the Congress promptly of any threat to the security or the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan and any danger to the interests of the United States arising therefrom. The President and the Congress shall determine, in accordance with constitutional processes, appropriate action by the United States to any such danger."

I have not provided full texts or the details of the other mutual security arrangements to which the United States is party and which also involve Korea and Japan, as well as the Philippines and Thailand in Southeast Asia. Suffice it to say, and knowing that all of us participating in this meeting are thoroughly conversant with their terms, they represent a series of vehicles for international cooperation—should the need for such arise—to assure the preserva-

tion of peace in Asia and the Pacific or to respond to aggression against the allies, friends and associates of the United States, if that should occur.

To conclude this review of international cooperation for SLOC security of the Asia-Pacific Region in crisis or conflict, it seems useful to set down briefly a review of the actual international arrangements—whether bilateral, as in most cases, or multilateral—which are pertinent to maintaining the safety and security of the relevant Sea Lanes of Communication. For the most part these provide, in varying modes and to different degrees, for joint and collective action to meet aggression or the threat of aggression.

It is the United States which is a party to each and all of these agreements, most of which are bilateral and also involve an East or Southeast Asian ally of the United States. If we extend our consideration farther south, however, we come upon two collective defense agreements, namely ANZUS and a loose British Commonwealth—"five-power pact" involving Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, Singapore, and—to a more limited degree in reality—the United Kingdom. The United States is a party to the former ANZUS—but not the latter.

The operative document in the case of the Republic of China was concluded in 1954, December 2; as noted earlier, that treaty was denounced by the United States at the end of 1978 and, in accordance with the Treaty's terms, its application was concluded one year thereafter. In this connection, though, the unilateral U.S. statements of policy and intent mentioned above which are contained in the Taiwan Relations Act represent a less formal but probably equally effective replacement.

The pertinent history with regard to Japan is much more complicated, but suffice it to mention the 1952 and 1960 security treaties, the latter more formally the "Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security." It is provided that Japan "relies on the United States to supplement its domestic defense capabilities in dealing with nuclear threats or larger scale conventional aggression". The complex of arrangements and agreements, formal and informal,

which have given specificity and application to the basic treaties need not take our attention here; suffice it to say that an extremely close political, economic and security relationship has grown up between these two major allied North Pacific powers and the close relationship in the security realm has provided essential underpinning therefore. Thus, a central and indispensable foundation has been put in place over the years for SLOC security of the Asia-Pacific region.

In the case of Korea, any ambiguity that may have started to grow up in the years immediately following World War II concerning the interest and concern of the United States in the security of South Korea was promptly dissipated in the reactions following the invasion of North Korea in June of 1950. Ever since, the South Korean-U.S. security relationship, among several important relationships that bind the two countries together, has been a major and continuing tie. The central Mutual Security Agreement was concluded in 1953 and has been supplemented by a series of agreements and mutual programs which have provided assurances of United States support in the event of a repetition of the 1950 experience or aggression in another form or from another quarter. Fortunately the PRC which was for long regarded as a serious, continuing threat appears in recent years to have moved substantially away from its earlier aggressive posture.

In Southeast Asia an important associate of the United States in the security field—as well as in a number of other fields—is Thailand. It is the Manila Pact of 1954, also known as the SEATO Treaty, which establishes the Thai-U.S. security relationship; the provisions of the Pact were reinforced as between Thailand and the United States by the Rusk-Thanasit Communiqué which was issued as a matter of clarification in the Spring (March) of 1962. The SEATO organization has ceased to exist as such but the Treaty remains in force as between those parties who have not denounced it. The original membership included Thailand, the U.S., the Philippines, Pakistan, Australia, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and France. By virtue of the Rusk-Thanasit Communiqué, the U.S. commitment to the independence and integrity of Thailand is reaffirmed as vital

to the U.S. national interest and world peace. "In case of aggression, the United States . . . would act to meet the common danger with Thailand without prior agreement of all SEATO members since the Treaty obligation was individual as well as collective."

Finally, there is the question of international security ties for the Philippines. The SEATO Treaty just mentioned is relevant here as well, but in the case of the Philippines the ties exclusively between the United States and that nation are quite numerous, including in the security field. Given the U.S. military bases in the Philippines, most notably at Clark Field and Subic, and given the close historical relations between the two nations, there are treaties, agreements, protocols, etc. which are premised on close Philippines-U.S. cooperation, including direct U.S. military support, in case of military aggression (usually identified as "Communist") against the Philippines. In the several years ahead the future status and functions of the U.S. built bases in the Philippines will be coming under discussion. The questions to be examined are, many of them, highly political and sometimes quite sensitive in the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, in the United States. The friends and allies of those two nations in the Asia-Pacific region must also be concerned, since the U.S. capacity to provide military support and respond to enemy action depends heavily on the availability of the bases and their facilities. This issue, coming to crisis stage in the early years of the next decade, is of fundamental importance to SLOC Security of the Asia-Pacific Region.

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## PART VII

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### SUMMARY & CONCLUSION

# REPORT ON MARITIME TRANSPORT AND RESOURCES

*Malcolm J. Kennedy*

## I. Introduction

The most important reality of the past two decades in the Asia-Pacific region, has been the rapid and sustained growth of the transport of imports and exports between the region and the rest of the world and between the nations of the region. The rationale for trade and maritime transport—the creation of wealth, the mutual enrichment of our nations and the sustained improvement in the standards of living of our citizens—leads to the concern for security of the sea lanes of communication. In this regard the member nations of this conference have much of which they can be proud. The growth of trade between our nations has, by and large, been accompanied by greater mutual understanding and co-operation. To ensure the continued progress of our nations it is essential that further co-operation and joint efforts be made to enhance and extend the security of the sea lanes of communication.

This report seeks to highlight the main areas of success and concern that have been noted and discussed in the first chapter of the conference.

## II. Current Problems

The most significant maritime transport problem in the world today is the lack of effective international pressure being brought to bear upon the attacks made on shipping in the Persian Gulf. Dr. Choung-Il Chee pointed out in his paper "some 300 oil tankers of various nationalities have been subjected to armed attack. . ."<sup>1</sup> There has been no legal or military force brought to bear by the United Nations or any other international body or group of nations to overcome the very real threat to the oil supplies of Europe, Japan, Korea and other Asia-Pacific nations. Perhaps the most alarming aspect of this situation is the possible creation of quasi-legal acts of war that may become more widespread if they are not challenged and prevented. The United States, at the time of writing, was the only nation seeking to restore the basis of international law in the right to free passage of the seas.

The projection of Soviet maritime power is also a matter of some considerable concern. There is now adequate evidence to show that the Soviet strategic planners have begun to project Soviet military power into the world's oceans. They have shifted their focus from the struggle for dominance of the landmass to the dominance of the oceans. The Soviet threat has been made more acute in the Asia-Pacific region by the Soviet expansion of its bases in Vietnam and by the increased deployment of advanced weapons platforms in the region. Soviet strategic planners have publicly noted the importance of increasing the pressure upon the identified maritime and resource vulnerability of free nations in the Asia-Pacific region.

The third most important problem in our region concerns the rapid growth in the size and number of ships carrying oil, gas, chemicals, minerals and food through the region. Serious environmental and economic damage could be caused by accidental pollution, sabotage or acts of terrorism against these ships. Further

1. Chong-Il Chee, *The Role for Two Korea's Navy and Defence of the SLOC*, p. 7.

co-operation by nations in the region in ship control and reporting can enhance security and reduce these risks.

## III. Successes in Maritime Transport

There is much that we can be pleased with in the co-operation and inter-government support for the safe passage of shipping in our region. It is, very largely, from the continued expansion of trade and shipping that the standards of living of the people in the Asian-Pacific shall improve, since the most important role of maritime transport in man's history has been to acquire and generate wealth.

Admiral Yoshida's paper highlighted the extent to which freedom of shipping, market freedom and access to resources has provided a fundamental basis of Japan's success as an industrial nation. He notes Japan relies on foreign sources for 100% of her supply of aluminum, nickel, coal, wool, cotton, and for 95% of her oil, iron, copper, tin, soybean, and for 90% of her natural gas and 80% of her lead, wheat, and salt. In addition many other materials and food stock have similar high level import dependence.<sup>2</sup> It is essential for Japan and, by connection, for Japan's trading partners that the sea lanes of communication remain free from threat or interdiction.

The success in shipping millions of tons of food, minerals and raw materials to Japan, Korea, and other nations in our region without serious accidents, conflict or war has been a singular achievement. Yet the very success of this trade legitimately generates concern of the continuation of safe passage. It would be foolish of any government not prepare to counter threats to the nation's vital interests. Admiral Yoshida's concern for the free passage of shipping is more acute in the light of the attitude of the Soviet Union to waters under her control and the recent events in the Persian Gulf. He stresses Japan's concern for the flow of a minimum tonnage of essential

2. Manabu Yoshida, *Resources, Maritime Transport and SLOC Security-Japan's Perspective*, pp. 2-4.

import, maintenance of a capable merchant marine and the ability to secure the sea lanes of communication from interdiction or attack.<sup>3</sup> These basic needs are also vital to the survival of the Republic of Korea and China. Dr. Seo-Hang Lee has noted that the Republic of Korea was crucially dependent upon shipping and her exports increased from over 9 million tonnes in 1975 to over 31 million in 1985 while imports rose from 35 to over 100 million tonnes in the same period.<sup>4</sup> In turn suppliers of minerals and food stocks like Australia, New Zealand and the ASEAN nations have shipping levels of equal significance.

#### IV. The Development of Maritime Transport Capacity

The building and crewing of national maritime fleets has been given emphasis as a means of increasing the security of trade. Although Japan has a relatively young fleet, Admiral Yoshida noted, that there has been a considerable increase in the use of foreign bottoms and the 1985 proportion was 53% foreign to 47% Japanese owned ships.<sup>5</sup> Dr. Seo-Hang Lee's paper provided an excellent overview of the shipping capacity of the Republic of Korea but noted that national flag ships carried only 48% of imports and 43% of exports.<sup>6</sup> It is important to note that Japan, the Republic of Korea and Thailand have explicit policies to promote national flag capacity and crewing. The economic case for national flag shipping is still a matter of debate but nations which adopt such a policy contribute significantly to their overall security. One lesson of the Persian Gulf is that flag of convenience ships do not continue to sail in areas where attack is a possibility. Moreover the increase in insurance rates on shipping has been dramatic. The possibility of re-

3. *Ibid.*, p. 1.

4. Seo-Hang Lee, *Maritime Transport and National Development: The Experience of Korea*, p. 5.

5. Yoshida, *op. cit.*, pp. 6-7.

6. Seo-Hang Lee, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

routing ships in the Asia-Pacific area in the event of the closure of the key straits has to be evaluated in terms of real and final costs. It is clear that extensive re-routing would cause Japan, the Republic of Korea and the Republic of China great economic harm as it would their main suppliers.

#### V. Maritime Transport: Co-operation and Security

Dr. Jiun-han Tsao and Mr. Malcom Kennedy showed that there were nations in the region who do not seek to co-operate in the normal exploitation of the seas and resources. The Spratly islands remained a potentially high risk zone for conflict between Vietnam, the PRC and other nations.<sup>7</sup> Mr. A. R. Sutopo provided a detailed explanation of the concerns of the ASEAN nations over the passage of the straits and narrow waters in their area and their concern for future developments.<sup>8</sup> His calls for greater co-operation and the careful use of these waters was shared by all the nations represented.

The main conclusions of the conference in considering shipping, resources and the possibility of conflict included the following:

- (a) that increased communication between our nations can improve the security of the SLOC;
- (b) that security and co-operation can be improved by the extension of sea control and reporting systems;
- (c) that there needs to be greater communication between our member nations in the planning for great security measures and to prevent events like those in the Persian Gulf; and
- (d) that the main threat to SLOC security, at present, comes from the actions and professed intentions of the Soviet Union and her client states.

7. Jiun-han Tsao, *SLOC Security in the South China Sea*, p. 9.; Malcolm Kennedy, *Resources, Sea Lanes of Communication and the Potential for Future Conflict in the Asia-Pacific Basin*, pp. 13-4.

8. A. R. Sutopo, *Co-operation for SLOC Security in Southeast Asia: The Experience of ASEAN*, pp. 12-4.

Neutrality might be a philosophically pleasant view to hold in the management of maritime transport. However, neutrality has been an historical reality created by a powerful nation or nations which have provided it for others. The papers reviewed here provide strong support for the view that our nations must develop, stage by stage, increased levels of maritime transport co-operation, backed by greater co-operation in naval matters to provide protection for the SLOCs. In this way, as Admiral Yoshida noted "... this will also contribute to the deterrence against... war."<sup>9</sup>

9. Yoshida, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

## REPORT ON SLOC SECURITY

*William M. Carpenter*

The fact of our presence at this Fifth International Conference on SLOC Security is witness to two key premises: first, the Asia-Pacific region is a dynamic area of increasing importance in the international arena; and, second, economic development, the free flow of trade and the protection of national security are factors of common concern to the nations of the free world—and especially to those nations assembled here. We have met five times in formal sessions and we look forward to another assemblage next year, when we shall continue the quest for closer cooperation and deeper understanding of the issues that bear upon our futures.

Were this a perfect world, and were all nations and persons within those nations motivated by altruism and rectitude, there might be less urgency for our being here than is the case in the reality of life as we know it. The lessons of history teach us that valuable assets must be safeguarded lest they be taken away from us. The free and common use of the high seas, although a basic right long understood and accepted within the community of nations, cannot be assumed to be freely guaranteed to us. In the imperfect world around us, crises and confrontations arise from conflicts of interests of nations and of groups within nations; the latter sometimes include dangerous and unpredictable perpetrators of violence against international order and safety.

In sum, our concern here is to be informed about and to seek cooperative ways to cope with those things that pose dangers to the sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) that join us together in our

national and international efforts to enhance and safeguard our futures. It is safe to say that we do not know all the answers, but we have come to know many of the pertinent questions.

In the welcoming and keynote speeches that opened this conference, the speakers, who had individually prepared their remarks, showed a reassuring unanimity of views on why we are here, what we have accomplished in the past, and what we hope to accomplish in the future. These presentations set the stage for the more detailed menu of topics subsequently taken up in accordance with the well-planned agenda prepared by our hosts at this conference. It is timely and productive to focus in this, the fifth gathering, on the critical issues of assurance of access to natural resources, on the means of transport of these resources to and from our individual nations, and on how important SLOC security is to these issues.

Dr. Kwan Shik Min, a founding member of the SLOC Study Group, Korea, welcomed the participants and congratulated the Korean group under the leadership of Dr. Dalchoong Kim who organized the current conference. Dr. Min reminded the conferees that the study of SLOC security in Asia is of increasing importance because of the remarkable economic growth of East Asia and its growing strategic importance. He set the tone for a realistic and productive examination of the salient issue to come before the conference.

The two keynote speeches were given by General Richard G. Stilwell, former Commander of U.S. Forces in Korea, and the Honorable Shin Kanemaru, President, Japanese Center for Strategic Studies and former Director General of the Japan Defense Agency. General Stilwell reviewed the strategic situation in the Western Pacific, noting the importance of the lifelines at sea and of the threat embodied in the growing military power of the Soviet Union in Asia, especially in the Soviet fleet. He reminded the conferees that deterrence of aggression is never risk-free, and that therefore all the free nations must stand together in a common defense effort. He spoke of the current challenge to freedom of the seas taking place in the Persian Gulf.

Mr. Kanemaru's remarks were read by the Honorable Masao Horie, Member of the Japanese House of Councillors. Mr. Kanemaru's message called attention to two new problems for SLOC security: the need to improve ASW capabilities and air defense capabilities of ASW forces against the threat of Soviet Backfire bombers, and the problem of defending the forces that will attempt to control the three exist straits from the sea of Japan. He noted that on the Japanese side there are improvements ongoing in the Japan Self-Defense Forces to improve capabilities to meet these problems. Mr. Kanemaru stressed the need for all to be aware of the growing Soviet threat, and in such conferences as this one, to find better ways of cooperation to deal with the threat.

The subject of SLOC security was highlighted in Part III, IV, V, and VI, but Part III also touched on security and therefore the Part II papers are included in the following summary.

Part II dealt with resource rivalry, access and dependency, and the problem of maritime transport. Admiral Manabu Yoshida presented Japan's perspective on resources, maritime transport and SLOC security. Japan, as a resource-poor country, is heavily dependent on sea transport. For example, it is important for Japan to increase its reserve petroleum storage to survive in a crisis. The Japanese merchant marine formerly carried most of Japan's imports and had built up to a leading world position in the 1960s, but in the 1970s there began to be an over-supply of ships, especially oil tankers. Japan has been forced by stiff competition and high Japanese labor costs to go to transporting nearly half of Japan's trade in chartered ships. It is urgent for Japan to reverse this trend, for control of security at sea, and for economic growth. To carry out Japan's commitment to defend its SLOCs out to 1000 miles to the south of Japan, a buildup of the Maritime Self-Defense force is needed, not only increasing ASW forces but for acquiring greater general fleet capabilities against air and surface attack.

Dr. Seo-hang Lee gave the Korean experience of a nation rising rapidly to modern industrial status and with a concurrent major expansion of its merchant marine. With government support and

direction, Korea has increased its national flag share of trade. Recent maritime concern focuses on the threat from the Soviet Union and north Korea, especially from north Korean submarines and fast attack craft.

Mr. Malcolm Kennedy of Australia spoke on the problems in transporting food and other resources and of the potential for conflict at sea. Food and critical materials travel mainly by sea in East Asia, and interruption of the SLOCs could cause great harm to the economics of the regional states. Oil and natural gas and other vital resources could be the cause for conflict if there is serious disruption of the supply.

Part III was devoted to discussion of naval capabilities and strategies of major powers and their implications for SLOC security. Vice Admiral Kenichi Kitamura spoke on the naval capabilities and strategies of the Soviet Union and their implications for SLOC security. Control of the Sea of Japan is sought by both the Soviets and the free world allies, especially control of the exist straits. Soviet surface ships, submarine and bombers are all potent threats to the SLOCs: to defend, not only must capabilities to control the straits be acquired, and ASW and escort potentials be increased, but the vital role of air defense of ASW units must be improved to thwart the Soviet bomber thrust to their survival.

Dr. Stephen Gibert was unable because of illness to attend the conference; his paper was presented by William Carpenter. The paper examined the naval strategies of the three major powers: the Soviet Union, the Peoples Republic of China and the United States. The greater stress was on U.S. naval strategy, and in addition to the discussion of the three major powers, Japan's strategic role was introduced as a necessary element to understanding the East Asian situation. The region is relatively stable, but there are potential sources of conflict, e.g., on the Korean peninsula, at the Soviet-Chinese border, or between China and Vietnam. The U.S. relies on a forward strategy to deter conflict, and under the concept of the U.S. maritime strategy, could even carry the fight to the Soviet Union in Asia if U.S.-Soviet war were to break out elsewhere, such as in Europe. A

major U.S. objective would be to get control of the sea worldwide, then proceed to exploit sea control to contain the Soviet Union and terminate the war. The Western Pacific and East Asia are of increasing critical importance in the world power structure.

Part IV dealt with naval capabilities and strategies of regional powers and their implications for SLOC security. Mr. Michael O'Connor spoke on the naval capabilities and strategies of Australia and the ASEAN states. Australia, which went through a period of leaning towards isolationism in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, has now reversed that policy and recognizes that there is a need to protect its SLOCs and to cooperate with allies. A special responsibility is protection of the sea passages between the Indian and the Pacific Oceans.

ASEAN is not a military alliance but must consider military threats, including threats to its SLOCs, because of high reliance on sea transport. Their naval efforts are somewhat fragmented and their forces have limited capabilities. Combining their efforts could increase their deterrent value.

Vice Admiral Tun Hwa Ko discussed China as a maritime power in a regional context. The PRC has the prerequisites (geography, size, national character, etc.) for maritime power, and these are present-day reasons for expanding its naval forces, such as protecting its 200-mile economic zone. Admiral Ko noted that China already ranks high among the maritime powers and may, by the next century, have a navy of 1000 ships, but in his view, will not become the "Neptune" of the world's oceans.

Dr. Choung-il Chee examined the role of the navy of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the SLOC defense problem. In any war between north and south Korea, the land battle will be decisive, but the coastal navies will be important participants. North Korea will try to cut south Korea's SLOCs, mainly to cut off support for the U.S. and south Korean forces. The role of the ROK Navy will be to cooperate with the U.S. Navy in defeating north Korea's sea-denial strategy. The U.S. Navy will have many sea-control requirements extending out long distances from Korea, and will need the ROK Navy's assistance in the local area to protect the SLOCs.

The subject of Part V was peace-time international cooperation for SLOC security. The first paper was by Dr. Jiun-han Tsao of the ROC, who spoke on SLOC security in the South China Sea. This strategically-located body of water is transited by a high volume of sea traffic and is a point of vulnerability for SLOCs. The situation in the South China Sea is complicated by disputed territorial claims to the many islands and by overlapping claims of territorial waters and economic zones. The Soviet Union has the greatest capability to threaten the SLOCs, and the U.S. is their best defender, but the nations surrounding the South China Sea are unsure of the U.S. commitment.

Dr. A.R. Sutopo of Indonesia also examined SLOC security in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean, from the perspective of ASEAN. He identified SLOC threats as arising from local and domestic crises and policy conflicts as well as great power interactions. When ASEAN was formed in 1967, there were many problems of regional war (Vietnam) and conflicts of national interests, and against that background the ASEAN member states sought to establish Southeast Asia as a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality (ZOPFAN), and this is likely to be ASEAN's long-term strategy.

Peace-time international cooperation for SLOC security in the Indian Ocean was examined by Dr. R.P. Anand of India. He emphasized the geopolitical and strategic importance of the Indian Ocean, crossed by vital trade routes and surrounded by four continents with greatly different interests and levels of development. He described the traditional doctrine of freedom of the seas as beneficial but also used at times in the past by strong sea powers to exploit their own interests at the expense of lesser powers. He described in detail the many facets of the Law of the Sea negotiations, concluding that the right of free passage is a great blessing to all nations, but "unbridled" freedom could lead to tensions and conflicts among nations.

In Part VI Vice Admiral Toshihiko Hozumi gave the Japanese perspective on regional cooperation for SLOC security in crisis or conflict. Threats to SLOCs can come from the Soviet Union, north Korea, or possibly China. Japan has agreed to protect its sea lanes

out to 1000 miles south of Japan, with the U.S. talking up the mission beyond that point. In regional cooperation for security of SLOCs, the coordinating role of the U.S. is extremely important.

Ambassador Leonard Unger spoke on international cooperation for SLOC security, examining especially the political interactions of the nations concerned. A logical vehicle for cooperation would be the United Nations, the unifying organization that fought the Korean War, but in these times and the prospective future, relying on the U.N. is not a promising solution. Rather, the several mutual security treaties can be called into play, and even the Taiwan Relations Act between the U.S. and the R.O.C. can be an instrument for taking action to protect the SLOCs.

Part VII was a summary and conclusion series of reports. Mr. Malcolm Kennedy reported on the results of examining maritime transport problems, and this paper contains the conference summary and conclusions on SLOC security.

Reviewing the discussion of the conference as a whole, each nation has its own set of resource requirements. Some are more dependent than others on import of critical minerals and materials, but no nation is completely self-sufficient in today's complex and technological world. It is one of the ironies of our world that one of the chief adversaries of our security and well-being, the Soviet Union, comes very close to being self-sufficient in raw materials. This is a strategic advantage for the USSR, but the free nations must recognize it and cope with it as they address their own resource access problems and their relationship to SLOC security.

There are only three modes of transport of peoples and things: by land, by sea and by air. A few nations are fortunate in their geography and in their possession of natural resources to be able to utilize land transportation extensively. For the transport of limited numbers of people and of high priority materials of comparatively small size and light weight, aircraft are useful and in fact indispensable in many situations. For most free nations, however, the great bulk of transport must go by sea. There are no scientific or natural substitutes for the economy and capacity of sea transport so

far as can be seen into the future. The sea is our life line. We have learned to build bigger, faster and more technologically sophisticated ships to carry the enormous volumes of trade among nations, but they must still traverse the long distances across the oceans and pass through the many narrow straits that cannot be avoided. It is, of course, at these critical "choke points" or in such confined areas as the Persian Gulf that our SLOCs are especially vulnerable. Nations, or subgroups within nations, who wish us ill, can concentrate their assaults at these points that they know we must traverse. SLOC protection is thus vital at such points.

We have discussed, at this and at previous conferences, two general methods of dealing with SLOC security: to deter and to defend. We have generally agreed that to deter is best. The vast distances along the SLOCs, the huge numbers of ships traversing them, and the uncertainties of detecting and coping with the various kinds of threats that may be brought to bear against the SLOCs, make on-scene protection a task so formidable that the assets that would be required are going to be beyond what we could afford and devise. That is, of course, an across-the-board generalization. There are instances and places where we can and should apply protective measures for our SLOCs; these will be of very special interest and value, and are feasible if we put our time and talents to the task.

We must, however, as a basic strategy, band ourselves together in a common determination to deter threats against our SLOCs. Both military and political assets are available to us, and by allied efforts, the effectiveness of these assets can be enhanced. Credible military capabilities, an essential element of the broadly understood and required international security assets of the free and independent nations of the world, are a basic underpinning for deterrence of threats to the SLOCs, as a part of overall deterrence of aggression. Coming to the specifics of SLOC protection, the military assets that should be available to us (and visible to any adversary), will be mainly sea and air forces, carrying out surveillance, exchange of intelligence, and effective interdiction when appropriate. The political will within nations to acquire these necessary military assets

(in peacetime, before they are necessary in war) is a national decision that must be addressed responsibly and in a timely fashion. The corresponding political commitment to join with allies in a unified effort to deter and defend against threats to our SLOCs is likewise a must. The interactions at these conferences, as unofficial convocations of persons knowledgeable in and concerned about SLOC security, have had and can continue to have significant influence on the national decisions that are essential to make SLOC security a reality.

Remembering that individual nations cannot effectively provide for SLOC security on their own calls to mind a remark made a long time ago by an American statesman. Exactly two hundred years ago the Founding Fathers of what was to be the United States of America were gathered in Philadelphia to draft a constitution. The thirteen former British colonies had just fought a war to gain their independence from England. The newly-freed and rather independently-minded states had sent their delegates to Philadelphia instructed merely to amend the national charter (the Articles of Confederation) they had used through their War of Independence. But the delegates saw a large vision: a completely new constitution that would bind the states together in a strong union. This was a politically dangerous undertaking but one that had great promise. It was this situation that prompted the elder statesman, Benjamin Franklin, to remark, "Gentlemen, we must all hang together, or, most assuredly, we shall all hang separately!" For SLOC security in this key world region, the like-minded free nations should "all hang together."

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