

CHAPTER SIX

Intellectual History and History of the Book

JACOB SOLL

Introduction

In a now classic 1971 review in the *Journal of Modern History*, Robert Darnton attacked the field of intellectual history. In particular, he questioned the methods of Peter Gay's *The Enlightenment: An Interpretation*. Calling for a 'social history of ideas', he criticised Gay's work for taking the words of great philosophers to be too 'pristine,' and not doing justice to the complexity of Enlightenment culture (Darnton, 1971: 114). Darnton was equally dissatisfied with the work done by book historians in François Furet's 'Livre et société' group in Paris. He found their work too statistical, 'smothering' the Enlightenment with the 'quantitative analysis' of book production (Darnton, 1971: 128). Both schools, Darnton warned, represented an 'armchair phase' of the 'social history of ideas.' What was needed was more 'grubbing in the archives.' In short, for Darnton, the history of ideas and the history of books were separate things and neither was adequate to study more earthy and popular intellectual context (Darnton, 1971: 132).

In 1990, Darnton repeated the same idea, warning that 'a malaise was spreading amongst the intellectual historians of the United States' (Darnton, 1990: 191) who, he claimed, saw a need for intellectual historians to think more about social history. Intellectual history, he predicted, would 'drift' from an interest in high culture to low culture, in a quest to understand the 'mentalities' of common people (Darnton, 1990: 216). In spite of Darnton's predictions, by 1996 intellectual history had not disappeared, and studies of elite philosophy persisted. Nonetheless, Darnton yet again critiqued what he saw as an ongoing crisis in intellectual history as a dichotomy between the history of great books and the history of books. Darnton opposed the histories of 'discourse,' or the study of ideas by authors in dialogue with each other, against 'diffusion,' or the history of books, their production and circulation (Darnton, 1996: 169–197). Yet again Darnton, a historian of books, tried to distance himself

from both methodological approaches, proposing the nebulous study of the ‘communications networks of everyday life’ as the only way to understand the history of ideas.

Reading Darnton’s 40-year-old critique of schools of intellectual history, it is fascinating to see the contrast between his predictions, the continuity of his calls for a study of popular culture, and the persistence of discourse-focused intellectual history (McMahon and Moyne, 2014: 24). But what is equally interesting, and even perplexing, is that, in spite of the failure of Darnton’s predictions, his methodological dichotomy – the perception that the history of ideas and the history of the book are distinct fields – remains accepted by many as methodological writ. While Quentin Skinner and J. G. A. Pocock have moved on to much wider approaches in their own work – neither Skinner’s work on Hobbes, nor Pocock’s work on Gibbon constitutes pure discourse history – their followers still continue with the methodological linguistic apparatus designed more than 40 years prior. Lucien Febvre, Robert Scribner, Henri-Jean Martin, Elizabeth Eisenstein, Roger Chartier, Anthony Grafton, Robert Darnton, Noel Malcolm, Adrian Johns, Ann Blair, Margaret Jacob, Lynn Hunt and Sophus Reinert are just a few intellectual historians who link the study of ideas with the history of books and printing. A close examination shows that the separation of ‘discourse’ and ‘book history’ is artificial. The inventors of intellectual history, in many cases philologists, from the Renaissance to the nineteenth century, never felt the need to make such a distinction.

Philology and the history of ideas

From its origins in the Renaissance, the history of ideas has been rooted in philology, a field that studies ideas in the philosophical and bibliographical context. Beginning in the late 1300s, classical philologists used linguistic, bibliographical and archeological methods to verify the words and meaning of ancient and medieval texts. Figures such as Lorenzo Valla not only studied the structures and origins of language, but also the historical evolution of the meaning of words (Turner, 2014: 35). In this way, they were the pioneers of discourse history. But for a figure like Valla, whose historical translation of the *Donation of Constantine* (circa 1440) showed it to be a fake, thus undermining the papacy’s claims to dominion over the western Roman Empire, this meant not simply the analysis of words, but also antiquarianism: the material study of historical texts and artefacts, such as chalices and vestments to date and understand them (Valla, 1993: 107). What were figures such as Lorenzo Valla, Angelo Poliziano, Desiderius Erasmus, Marc-Antoine Muret, Guillaume Budé and Justus Lipsius (to name only a few of the great philologists) if not contextualisers of words and ideas? And Humanist philologists were faced with the many of the same challenges faced by intellectual historians today: how to understand the meaning of texts in context, often poorly translated, with unclear authorship or intention and readership. Even more, they had to reconstruct poor translations of fragmented texts with missing passages and words. One can only think of Erasmus’s translation of the Bible and his quest to historically understand the meaning of the words and the incalculably immense consequences of his accurate translations on the religious life of his time.

With masterful philology, historians of ideas shook the world. The stakes of Biblical and legal translations were such that no good philologist simply focused on words alone. They had to be archeologist bibliographers, verifying texts by examining handwriting, paper, provenance, bindings, signatures, stamps and marks. This was both a linguistic and a bibliographical undertaking that was used, as the evolution of philology, to verify texts on which legal, religious and dynastic rights depended. And the masters of Europe took note of this powerful tool of knowledge, paying Mabillon and other textual verifiers – the great philosopher Leibniz among them – to assemble in-house royal library teams to read, interpret, verify and catalogue and store these essential texts (Barret-Kriegel, 1988: 3, 95). The work of Mabillon and his team of Benedictine monks would inspire the creation of the Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres, the Cabinet des Chartes, pan-European eighteenth-century antiquarianism and the work of pioneers of intellectual historians like Bernard de Montfaucon, Johann Joachim Winkelmann, Edward Gibbon, Augustus Boeckh and Leopold von Ranke. The genealogy takes us through the doorstep of modern intellectual history.

Modern linguistic theory has some basic elements from philology. The procedure allows the historian to track words in their own time, across varying uses and definitions. It also permits historians to track the change in meaning over time. For example, the idea of prudence meant several things in the seventeenth century – which we can see by comparing the works of numerous scholars of the time – but, by the same token, something quite different by then end of the eighteenth century. This is clear from both writers discoursing on the subject and from the evolution of the word in dictionaries.

In other, fundamental ways, linguistic history does away with many of the basic practices of philology, which sought textual and linguistic verification at the same time. While doing these close readings takes skill and a deep knowledge of canonical texts, linguistic history is based on the assumption that books are relatively stable, and that the texts in question are stable and straightforward in their meaning. By definition, philologists assume the opposite. Thus the critiques of book history sound very much like the questions philologists would pose.

Roger Chartier and linguistic history

One of the most eloquent critiques of linguistic history was made in 1991 by Roger Chartier in *The Cultural Origins of the French Revolution*. Chartier's goal was not to supplant a purist linguistic history of ideas (which he notes is necessary and effective), but rather to complicate it with precisely the sort of analysis central to philology. To truly understand ideas, Chartier insists, historians need to differentiate between the world of 'abstract, literary politics' and other modes of expression (Chartier, 1991: 11). This means that even if historians can identify ideas in books, it doesn't necessarily mean that their meaning was limited to only linguistic context. Tocqueville made this very point: that the government did not use only the high philosophical language of politics, but also legal, technical and administrative terms (Tocqueville, 1967: Bk 3, ch. 1) and that theory and practical knowledge had to be taken together and compared. Chartier's concern was that what is written is not always stable and

does not always represent what is thought or happens in real life. 'Opinion,' he insists, 'is in no way a receptacle, nor is it a soft wax to be written upon' (Chartier, 1991: 19). For readers, texts are 'unstable' and their 'migrations within a given society produce interpretations that are mobile, plural and even contradictory' (Chartier, 1991: 19). Along with doubts about the reliability of definitions and uses of words in a given context, Chartier also questioned the assumption of authorial intention. The ownership and control of the meaning of a text by and author needs to be established, and more, the original meaning of that text – written or printed – would have to be verified *beyond* simply looking for a first edition.

Chartier's premise was that printed texts in particular had to be treated as unstable and not necessarily under the control of original authorial intention. Repeating one of the most central commonplaces to philology he insisted that the changing form of a printed text can subtly or even drastically change its meaning (Chartier, 1992: 27). Chartier built on the work of the Oxford professor of bibliography, D. F. McKenzie, who, in his *Bibliography and the Sociology of Texts* (1986), warned of the difficulty in discerning stable meaning or authorial intention from a single printed text taken without a social, historical bibliographical context. In short, to understand the meaning of a word, one also had to understand linguistic history, while also examining the history of the meaning of words within the history of the book that contained it. Bibliography, he insisted, was a necessary tool of verification. Again, this was the essence of philology.

Examining William Congreve's *The Way of the World* (1700), McKenzie showed how printers could change the meaning of a text by simply changing page layout, punctuation, the used of capitalisation, spacing between words and paragraphs and italics. In this case, McKenzie found, Congreve's publishers changed his original introductory lines: 'He owns, with Toil, he wrote the following scenes' to 'He owns with Toil he *wrought* the following scenes.' The two words, of course, have different meanings. Furthermore, the publishers removed the original commas, thus removing Congreve's characterisation of his own writing as deliberate (McKenzie, 1991: 41). McKenzie, therefore, insisted that before interpreting authorial intention, it was necessary, to the furthest extent possible, to establish the text closest to the author's intent, and to do that, an initial study in material bibliography was necessary.

Chartier not only agreed with McKenzie; his unease with both the coherence of interpretive communities and with authorial intention was based on further caveats. Authors and editors, he showed, filled their books with 'paratexts' – to use the term of the literary theorist Gérard Genette (1982) – dedications, advertisements, introductions, commentaries and notes of various sorts. They also authored translations and, in what was a stock form of authorship in the Early Modern period in Europe, compendia, extracts, compilations, collections, adages etc. Intellectual history, at least as seen by linguistic historians, is so tightly defined and connected to modern concepts of a singular book or clear authorial manifesto that it rarely considers such works as authored texts. And yet, early modern readers, such as Montesquieu, were fully aware that compilers, translators and commentators were writing ideas. Even more, the humanist trained, eighteenth-century reader like Montesquieu was attuned to the fact that different editions and translations of a text – for example Machiavelli's *The Prince* – had different meanings. For this reason, in his library at La Brède, Montesquieu owned

numerous versions of *The Prince* and annotated them enough to reveal that he knew that the editions were different and had possible different meanings.

For many intellectual historians in fields like the history of science, mathematics and humanism, the separation between words and books never happened. Historians of Copernican and Galilean science work much like their eighteenth-century and nineteenth antiquarian predecessors, for example the German historian Augustus Boeckh (1785–1867) who believed that philology was necessary to understand not just ideas, but ancient society too: studying words, texts, numbers, calculations and annotations in a wider intellectual and social context. Indeed, following the very methods of Baconian science, historians of science must study idea and experiment alike. Discourse and diffusion are questions among many for those who study the history of telescopes, air pumps or Biblical chronology for that matter (an intellectual tradition which uses theology, history, mathematics and astronomy).

Grafton, Jardine, Waszink and Lipsius

In the same year Chartier published his *The Cultural Origins of the French Revolution* in English, Lisa Jardine and Anthony Grafton published ‘Studied for Action: How Gabriel Harvey Read His Livy,’ in *Past and Present*. In it, they showed that the way a figure like Harvey read (or annotated his text of political history), revealed his political beliefs and even intentions. Reading, for Jardine and Grafton, was an ideological act (Jardine and Grafton, 1991: 33). Thus to understand what Livy meant in the sixteenth century, it is not enough to study his linguistic significance. He must also be put in the context of how his text was read. In this case, noblemen and gentry with high political offices hired scholars to read for them. The excerpted sections of Livy (or Tacitus, just to take two examples) showed what topics he was interested in, but that Harvey was a professional reader whose ‘trade’ was to turn classical books into what he believed would be concrete political actions (Jardine and Grafton, 1991: 129). Thus to understand how the ideas would be used, Jardine and Grafton illustrated that reading notes could give context that fleshed out one-dimensional word matrices, and that the social context of reading – for it was often done collectively, or in various modes of consultation (aristocrats had their own professional readers like Harvey).

Reading was not, as Grafton says, ‘the experience we know. It was carried out in conditions of strenuous attentiveness. It involved as much writing as it did looking and reflecting’ (Grafton, 2014: 2). Grafton contends that intellectual historians must go back to bibliographical analysis: examining marginalia that flesh out the ideas on the page, showing ‘direct’ and immediate ‘response’ to texts, and following those marginal notes into correspondences and other writing. This means scouring editions, examining multiple readings, and, like the readers of the time, taking into account the physical specificity of each book (Grafton, 2014: 5). Such an enterprise is, as Lipsius suggested, a complex fusion of the study of ideas, their historical, social and bibliographical context. We can give it modern names: discourse history, the history of books and reading, the social history of ideas, or, we can simply use the technical term for such deep contextualisation: philology.

Although it would probably come as no surprise to any intellectual historian that there were different editions of different books, there is still a reluctance to employ all the tools of material bibliography and the histories of printing and reading in establishing so-called authoritative editions. Most notably, *Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought*, self-proclaimed on its title pages as 'now firmly established as the major textbook series in political theory, in the anglophone world. These original works by philosophers provide only what bibliographical information their editors deem necessary. Often, it is a matter of simply establishing the first manuscript or edition of a book. But the problem is not what the collection contains, but rather what it omits. Some editions have philological introductions, establishing a definitive text, or the lack thereof but some do not. Indeed, William Connell's Bedford/St. Martin's edition of *The Prince* gives much more in the way of textual and bibliographical context than Quentin Skinner's Cambridge edition, clearly showing how unstable the text and its interpretations were and have remained.

Also notably absent from the enormous series are highly influential composite works which made up a huge part of what early modern readers read as books of philosophy. For example, the series contains works by the British moral philosopher Moses Hess, but omits works like Justus Lipsius's *Politica* (1589), which was, with Machiavelli's *The Prince*, one of the most widely read works on politics at the turn of the sixteenth century. Lipsius – as did authors as diverse as Erasmus and Pierre Bayle – considered himself the author of his patchwork book, and bibliographers agree. He is listed as the author of the *Politica*. Lipsius's work, was in his own words, a commonplace book, a series of translations of sentences and maxims taken from classical authors, and distributed with his commentaries. This kind of political writing was common in early modern Europe to the extent that many of the most popular works of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were collections of adages, maxims or, what we would call quotations. The *Politica* contains hundreds of citations of more than a dozen classical authors and Christian texts, and thus poses a challenge for historians of ideas. It is not easy to study a philosopher like Lipsius who used *ideas out of context*, often misrepresenting figures like Cicero, and mixing citations from his work with those of Lucretius, Tacitus and even Machiavelli to make statements about the necessity for states and princes to use Christian forms of reason of state and Machiavellian prudence. Indeed, he also considered himself the author of his translation of Tacitus's works, another of the most read and cited books of its era, and a book filled with highly influential sixteenth-century political philosophy. And yet, in notable cases, linguistic historians avoid such works for they clearly do not neatly fit into their modern definition of authorship. Despite this, authors like Lipsius openly stated that the study of printing and bibliography was necessary to understand the meaning of books. This alone informs the modern historian that they must follow Lipsius's lead and integrate reading methods and bibliographical standards into linguistic study.

Lipsius was deeply concerned about how his book would be printed and read. Even more, the Catholic Church banned the book, having done a close reading of the text. Figures as high up as Vatican censors, Cardinal Bellarmine and even pope Clement VIII took an interest in a work they considered of the utmost importance and they worked with Lipsius and his printers to ensure that a suitably Catholic edition of the work would follow the ban of the first edition of 1589.

Lipsius began his book, right after the title page, not with high words of political philosophy but with a note to all printers of the book. Lipsius states that the printed form of the book would affect its meaning:

Printer, whoever you are, I ask you not to reprint this work without/consulting me or without having obtained my orders to do so.
I have maintained small distinctions in this work, in the Punctuation, the Spaces between items, in the Notes and in the distinctions of Words, which are not easy for you to reproduce, but which cannot be neglected or upset without damage to the work. (Lipsius, 2004: 225).

Not only did Lipsius consider the printing specifications of his book essential for its meaning, he also included in his front matter a detailed guide to reading the book. His ‘Monita,’ was an ‘admonition or warning,’ as he put it, about how to read the book to obtain what he considered to be the ideal interpretation. He instructed the reader to ‘repeat’ readings in order to pay attention not only to the distinctions between words, but also to

observe the partitions within the text: that is, the commas, semicolons, full stops or colons placed at the end of every clause. Because in accordance with these, you must finish the entire sentence or suspend it; you will see that we have carefully subdivided the entire exposition in this way, by its part and periods (Lipsius, 2004: 237).

Lipsius further insisted that the reader ‘consult the notes’ which he placed at the side margins,

which you will find build up into an interconnected whole, and, to your great profit, always contain a summary of the entire content: you will find that the content is often somewhat more closely circumscribed by them and explained. I beg you, study them. And also this, that you do not neglect the headings prefixed to the chapters, to the same end (Lipsius, 2004: 237).

Finally, Lipsius addressed the question of the meaning of the ideas he cited. He recognised that many might question the reliability of his translations and interpretations of ideas. To that he responded that the very fact that he had ‘weaved a Cento (for that is what this work is), in which these departures from the original meaning are always allowed and often praised,’ which was a ‘delightful game’ and part of writing ‘cryptic’ books. He even admits inflecting ‘Case or Tense, according to the make-up of my arguments.’ In the end, he hoped what he writes will help overcome ‘civil strife’ and that the reader will follow this reading ‘agreement.’ (Lipsius, 2004: 237, 239, 241).

Obviously, no modern reader can completely understand the text precisely in the way Lipsius hoped, but following Lipsius’s instructions gives a kind of reading very different from the purely linguistic analysis of modern historians of ideas. However, we know that Ben Jonson followed many of Lipsius’s instructions and underlined his entire edition of the *Politica*. Studying how Jonson read his *Politica* reveals the extent to which readers followed (or did not) reading instructions, typographical cues and humanist reading practices. Indeed, Lipsius cared about words like ‘prudence,’ but he

also cared about how they were presented on the page. He didn't call it book history, but it had to do with printing and reading. Lipsius was not a lone figure. If Lipsius worked closely with his printer, it was no accident. Though many early modern texts began as manuscripts to be printed later, many of the great printers, from Aldus and Juntas to Robert Estienne commissioned and printed authoritative texts of classical, Biblical and even modern *books*, working themselves as philologists, translators and, by association, authors. Such was the symbiosis between writing, printing and reading, that early modern writers worked closely with their printers, and also lived with them, as did both the French publicist and translator of Machiavelli, Abraham-Nicolas Amelot de La Houssaye (1634–1706) and his correspondent, the French philosopher, Pierre Bayle (1646–1706). We have yet to create a series of modern critical editions of early modern critical editions – Lipsius was most famous for his critical translation of Tacitus – but if we are to understand the history of ideas and philosophy, surely this very difficult task is necessary, and a new generation of philologist-intellectual historians will be needed for the task. In some ways, historians of Tacitus have done such a work precisely because of the printers' and readers' instructions so carefully laid out by translator-editor-authors like Lipsius or Amelot.

Considering that between 1640 and 1678, at least 40 Latin re-editions of the *Politica* appeared, primarily published in France, Holland and Germany, and that the book was cited and used by major political philosophers for the next century, it is surprising that no critical English edition would appear until 2004, published in Holland by the scholarly press, Van Gorcum. The book poses the problem of not only being a collection of citations by authors spanning more than 1600 years, along with citations from the Bible as well as Lipsius's own writings. To contextualise all these citations in their original meanings, as well as deciphering what Lipsius meant when he employed them was a complex job. It was undertaken by the Dutch scholar, Jan Waszink, a trained classicist and a sixteenth-century political historian. Following Lipsius's lead, Waszink pays close attention to the book history of the *Politica* – from various editions, paratexts, punctuation and spacing, to the correspondence of Lipsius with his censors and printers. Waszink is also skilled in bibliography. One reason for this is that he had a classical Dutch education, learning ancient languages and philology at Leiden University before studying the history of political thought at Cambridge University. Thus Waszink brings many traditional humanist interpretive traditions to the table of modern intellectual history.

As translator and editor, Waszink first approaches the book like a philologist: to establish the edition closest to Lipsius's original intention and to understand, as Waszink puts it in his introduction, how Lipsius 'constructed' his text (Lipsius, 2004: 59). Waszink's edition of Lipsius's *Politica* straddles both the history of ideas in the limited sense proscribed by Quentin Skinner, and a historically sensitive history of Lipsius's intentions and process of textual creation: how the book was conceived, written, printed, discussed, censored, edited, and reprinted, all with Lipsius's attempt to control the process.

Lipsius's process of writing involved weaving extracts (reading notes) from classical and Biblical authors – Tacitus, Sallust, Cicero, Aristotle and dozens of others – into a 'cento,' or commonplace book with his own commentary peppered between the lines. This process of writing was not straightforward. As Lipsius himself noted in the introduction, all of the book was by him, and, at the same time, nothing was. He did

not write like modern political scientists or intellectual historians. Therefore, to understand Lipsius's intellectual context, Waszink studied the words of Lipsius and those by the various authors he cited. The only way to understand this vast tapestry is to understand all the authors cited and Lipsius's own milieu.

In this case, Waszink had the tools: Lipsius's notes, correspondence with authors, censors and printers. There was a vast textual edifice around Lipsius text, some of it high intellectual discussion amongst peers and, indeed, censors and critics, but also, with his printer, Moretus and his Leiden office of the Plantin-Raphelengius press (Lipsius, 2004: 166). Waszink shows from his correspondence that Lipsius was unhappy with his printer's first edition and its errors. Comparing the first two editions of 1589 with the subsequent editions of 1590, as well as Lipsius's own commentaries on his errors, Waszink discovered Lipsius's various corrections had indeed been made by his printer, and his direct involvement in the minutiae of printing. These included corrections to spelling, punctuation, marginal notes, references, and even the vertical spacing of the text. Using material bibliography, Waszink showed the extent of Lipsius involvement in the printing of the book, and his struggle to make the 'Monita' stick.

Even more, Waszink found that after the Vatican placed the *Politica* on the *Index of Prohibited Books* in 1590, Lipsius, at the demand of the Church, produced an expurgated version of the book in 1596 (Lipsius, 2004: 173). Reading notes on the book made by the Sancta Congregatio Indicis, as well as correspondence between Lipsius and Francesco Benci, a member of this council, Waszink also found that Lipsius worked hard to meet their requests, and also to circumvent them, all the time, working with local censors so the Plantin printer Jan Moretus would print his version of the corrected text without direct interference of the censors. This process not only led to Clement removing the book from the Index in 1596, it also reveals how Lipsius sidestepped his censors.

Cardinal Bellarmine, Benci and the principal Consultor of the committee, Laelius Peregrinus – a Church philosopher – sent Lipsius a list of 'further refinements,' needed to make the book acceptable to the Vatican. Bellarmine and Benci insisted that those things that 'taste of Machiavellism must be seasoned (or tempered) with the salt of Catholicism' (Lipsius, 2004: 180). Peregrinus insisted that Lipsius not refer to Machiavelli in a positive manner, praising him as 'intelligent or clever' (Lipsius, 2004: 179). Lipsius should not, he insisted, recommend the tolerance of heresy or of 'silent sinning' to promote civil peace. Peregrinus further asked Lipsius to temper his critiques of Church ritual and its use of torture (Lipsius, 2004: 180).

The reason that Lipsius's notes to the printer Moretus are key here, is that they show his clear intention to subvert these demands. We need not simply extrapolate this from linguistic analysis of the discourse of the *Politica*, but also from the express will of Lipsius to his printer who he knew would create the text. A chain of intellectual communication, negotiation, repression, rewriting and production went from pope Clement VIII, Cardinal Ballarmine, Benci, local censors to Lipsius and the printer Moretus, and they all played their part in creating the definitive version of the *Politica* (Lipsius, 2004: 177).

Waszink's study of subsequent editions not only show Lipsius's long-term success, but that it was based on the expurgated version, which, along with the 'Monita,' printers used into the eighteenth century. All this bibliographical analysis permits Waszink to make a conclusion with serious ramifications for the meaning of the

Politica, that ‘for Lipsius, the *ratio* and *institia* of the prudence rule reside in the wait it serves utility, i.e. the interests of the subjects, understood as *actual* peace, order, safety, and morality it brings’ (Lipsius, 2004: 199). Here is linguistic analysis, but based on a remarkably wide study.

It should be noted that intellectual history is not practised in the same way in every country. In the UK and the US, the discourse vs. diffusion dichotomy can, sometimes, be the reality, especially for historians of political thought. But in Holland, where Waszink trained, it is less common. Still grounded in the philological tradition, Waszink’s rich philological edition is more part of a common scholarly landscape. Given the remarkable richness of Waszink’s edition of the *Politica*, it does make one wonder if it would not be useful to break the dichotomy and use all scholarly tools available. This is precisely what Noel Malcolm did with his edition of Hobbes’s *Leviathan*, treating the work as both a linguistic and cultural artefact.

The artificial boundaries of discourse versus diffusion history still exist. As the history of the book has branched into more ambitious and wide-ranging social histories of knowledge and information (to use the words of Peter Burke), the linguistic school still will not look beyond its own boundaries, even when relevant bibliographical and social data are available. This still produces great work which we often call ‘political science’ (Justus Lipsius, Gabriel Harvey and Abraham-Nicolas Amelot de La Houssaye would not have characterised it so) or still, ‘intellectual history;’ the conscious omission seems startling. Why would any scholar dedicated to the quest for the truth reject tools which can help us get closer to deeper, more accurate understanding? It is hard to imagine fields in the natural sciences ignoring major tools of analysis for any sustained period – the speed of methodological change in the sciences is such that the idea of a single method lasting, unchanged, for more than 40 years is unthinkable. Like natural scientists, intellectual historians, too, should constantly push the boundaries of their methods. This is what classical philologists like Lorenzo Valla did in the 1400s to revolutionary effect. Naturally, that means that some studies are simply of words and discourse, but without the philological work, historians can never be fully sure that they are indeed reading and responding to words in books in the way intended by their author. The history of intellectual history and philology shows that there should not be separate fields like ‘intellectual history,’ or ‘history of the book.’ There is only one quest to find historical meaning and that involves every possible historical tool available.

References

- Blandine Barret-Kriegel, *Les historiens et la monarchie. Jean Mabillon*, 4 vols. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1988).
- Peter Burke, *A Social History of Knowledge from Gutenberg to Diderot* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000).
- Roger Chartier, *The Cultural Origins of the French Revolution*, trans. by Lydia Cochrane (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991).
- Roger Chartier, *L’Ordre des livres. Lectures, auteurs, bibliothèques en Europe entre XIVe et XVIIIe siècle* (Aix-en-Provence: Éditions Alinea, 1992).
- Robert Darnton, ‘In Search of the Enlightenment: Recent Attempts to Create a Social History of Ideas,’ *The Journal of Modern History* vol. 43, No. 1 (March 1971), 113–132.

- Robert Darnton, *The Kiss of Lamourette: Reflections in Cultural History* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1990).
- Robert Darnton, *The Forbidden Best-Sellers of Pre-Revolutionary France* (New York: Norton, 1996).
- Gérard Genette, *Palimpsestes: La littérature au second degré* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1982).
- Anthony Grafton, 'Life in the margins,' Unpublished Paper, Sydney Network for Intellectual History Conference, 11 August 2014.
- Lisa Jardine and Anthony Grafton, 'Studied for Action: How Gabriel Harvey Read his Livy,' *Past and Present* 129 (1991), 30–78.
- Justus Lipsius, *Politica. Six Books of Politics or Political Instruction*, ed. and trans. by Jan Waszink (Assen: Van Gorcum, 2004).
- Darrin McMahon and Sam Moyne, eds, *Rethinking Modern Intellectual History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
- D.F. McKenzie, *La bibliographie et la sociologie des textes. Préface de Roger Chartier*, trans. by Marc Amfreville (Paris: Éditions du Cercle de la Librairie, 1991).
- Alexis de Tocqueville, *L'Ancien Régime et la Révolution Française* (Paris: Gallimard, 1967); trans. by Stuart Gilbert (New York: Doubleday, 1955, 1983), part 3, chap. 3.
- James Turner, *Philology: The Forgotten Origins of the Modern Humanities* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014).
- Lorenzo Valla, *Treatise on the Donation of Constantine*, ed. and trans. by Christopher B. Coleman (Toronto: Renaissance Society of America, 1993).

Further reading

- François Furet *et al.*, *Livre et société dans la France du XVIII^e siècle*, 2 vols. (Paris: Mouton, 1965, 1970).
- Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan. 1. Introduction*, ed. by Noel Malcolm (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).