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This article describes how behavioral scientific concepts of team learning form a link between individual learning and the overall development of an organization. This link is important because it offers some answers to a long-standing industry problem: how to test and demonstrate the large-scale usefulness of research and teaching human relationships. This article also describes a fairly new approach to management development and, more broadly, to the development of the organization. Barriers to success, however, large-scale development of the organization is rare, and the measurement of results is even rarer. Although management has for many years sought to understand and implement important findings of behavioral research, the task was more complex than it seemed at first glance. Many of the findings are subtle and complex. Other findings relate to individual knowledge or knowledge that is difficult to integrate into the flow of an organization's life. In addition, most behavioral scientists better refine technical conclusions with each other than pass the relevance of their research to practitioners. There have been many serious attempts to make behavioral sciences useful for business, government and service institutions. But because of the difficulties, success was unattainable. Consider: In many organizations, pockets of human relationships are enthusiasts form. They tend to find themselves bucking smug or skeptical management. Enthusiasts take revenge by reselling their beliefs (which simply breeds more scepticism) or rejecting accusations that they are soft towards employees, profits and rigid management traditions. Selected managers are referred to governance development programmes that present concepts of human relationships. It is not often that companies send those who need it most. Particularly in the sensitivity of training-type programs, these people are under considerable strain. Although psychiatric problems are rare, they are a source of concern for staff and faculties of such programmes. Companies sometimes inadvertently send men with stories of previous mental illness. In these circumstances, mental problems and reduced program effectiveness can occur for all stakeholders.¹ Other leaders return from human relations programs with great enthusiasm. At least in some of these cases there seems to be real evidence of deeper insight and individual learning. The problem for these people is one of the implementations. If they don't have significant organizational influence and/or a new, supportive climate, they will probably be forced to return to the old behavioral patterns and attitudes. Sometimes, a general working group or department will be provided human relations in the company. At best, these efforts generate high morale and performance within the group. In the worst case scenario the group becomes a target or scapegoat of others in the organization, and intergroup difficulties increase.² As a rule, the company's human relations training programs are set up for promemins or other lower-level managers. The almost universal response of the participants of these programs: I wish my boss could learn what I was learning. Then, as in the famous study of the international harvester program, most students return to work and seem to meet the expectations of their bosses, often through the concepts of human relationships outlined in the program.³ The work of Dr. Blake and Dr. Mouton has moved to the earlier stages of designing concepts and training materials of the management grid, as well as in Part I of the article (after the introduction of the article). that represents the combined thinking of all four authors) they describe briefly the six stages of the Grid program in the development organization. Then the actual program, executed by the Sigma plant management line with minimal help from Blake and Mouton, was independently evaluated by Dr. Barnes and Mr. Greiner as set out in Part II article. Because of this description of the evaluation of the split, the two pairs of authors deliberately limited their roles in the article, just as they sought to avoid influencing each other's interpretation of the company's development as they occur. In this sense, Barnes and Greiner are independent auditors of the program originally developed by Blake and Mouton. For a much more complete development of theory and phases, see Robert R. Blake and Jane S. Mouton, Management Grid (Houston, Gulf Publishing Company, 1964). In short, the overall results of human relationships and behavioral science training are questionable, at best, for at work practitioners. Individual benefits are considered great and personal feedback is entirely favourable.⁴ However, the issue of mobilizing these ideas into collective organizational efforts remains a serious challenge. The step forward of the large-scale program in the development of the organization described in this article can be an important step forward. It was regarded as very successful by both businessmen involved and by outside observers; the results were measured. New to most executives in concept and design, the program uses a management grid approach to more efficient work relationships. Grid helps give businessmen a language system to describe their current management preferences. It also includes educational materials and an educational program to develop more productive problem-solving relationships. More importantly, the program is designed to be trained and used by line managers over a period of time, including six overlapping stages. These stages will be summarized in Part I of this article; here you can see how the management grid must work. Then, in Part II you can see how such a program really worked. The evaluation was carried out at a large plant (about 4000 employees), which was part of a very large multi-faceted company. The parent company will be called Piedmont and the corresponding division of the Sigma plant, for camouflage purposes. The Sigma plant has had a reputation in Piedmont as technically competent and has consistently been able to achieve production goals in recent years. Among Sigma's 4,000 employees, there were about 800 managers and technical staff. Since the end of 1962, all these managers and staff have been subjected to a management network training programme. At the request of the scientific director of the Piedmont Staff Relations Division, an evaluation study was developed shortly thereafter to examine the impact of the programme. The study included questionnaires, interviews, observations and combing of company records in order to separate the effects of the program from non-programmatic effects. The results show that, even with the permission of non-programme effects, the results of the Grid program were impressive. In short: There is some evidence that Sigma's development program is responsible for at least several million dollars of managed savings and increased profits. In addition, the programme appears to be responsible for a significant increase in employee productivity during the first year. Sigma executives started follow-up projects with shared implications for the organization, to some extent never experienced before the organization's development program. The relationship between Sigma and Piedmont has been greatly improved, in part as a result of the program. In addition, both union and community relations are better than in the past. There is some evidence that significant changes have occurred in behavioral patterns, dominant values and attitudes found among managers at Sigma. These shifts were in line with the objectives of the management grid program. Sigma managers reported the improvement of subordinates, groups and intergroup relations. The support of colleagues, according to subordinate managers, seemed more important than the support of the boss as a factor of managerial improvement. Part I: How the grid program should work, the management grid identifies five theories of management behavior based on two key variables found in organizations. One variable reflects concerns about production or production; another variable, caring for people. In this case, the term care refers to a degree of concern rather than actual results. That is, it does not represent a real production or degree in which the needs of human relations are actually met. This points to care about manufacturing and/or people and how they affect each other. The management grid These two variables and some of their possible combinations are shown in the The horizontal axis indicates concern for production, and the vertical axis indicates concern for people. Each of them is expressed on a scale of 1, which is a minimum concern, to 9, which is the greatest concern. Exhibit I. Management Grid Briefly, bottom left corner of the grid chart in The Exhibition I shows 1.1 style. This represents minimal care for production and minimal care for people. The 1.9 style in the top left corner depicts maximum care for people, but minimal care of production. The 9.1 style in the bottom right corner depicts maximum care of production and minimal care of human relations. The 9.9 style in the top right is the maximum concern for both human relationships and production. The 5.5 style at the center of the chart is the middle of the road in both areas of concern. Once managers have studied the training material that accompanies Grid, they may review practices and procedures in order to work towards a 9.9 organizational climate. These efforts use the educational program as a nucleus, as opposed to more traditional ways of obtaining better organizational outcomes (e.g. changing the organizational structure, replacing leadership, tightening accounting controls, or simply pressuring more production). Educational steps Educational steps are simple in concept, although complex in execution. They include the following: investigating each person's own managerial style, using certain management forms of grid analysis. These include self-assessment tools, self-managed training quizzes, basket procedures, and organizational modeling. Detailed and re-evaluate the effectiveness of teams that work with each other. Diagnosing the main problem areas of the organization; for example, long-term planning, profitability, union-management relationships, promotion policies, incentives, product development, truancy, public service preservation, and safety. We must emphasize that this whole approach to the development of the organization is carried out by management on its own, with the exception of periodic consultations on key issues. The management grid approach is now being used by both industry and government. Changes in the near future will be to a certain extent, not in the basic approach. The six phases of the programme we are currently describing these development programs in the organization's perspective in terms of six overlapping phases. Taken sequentially, these phases can span three to five years, but they can also be compressed in a shorter period of time in the company. The Development Manager Six Stages can be divided into two main parts. The first two stages developing governance so that the remaining four phases can help managers work towards the organization's 9.9 development goals. Here are two management controls Stages: 1. Laboratory and Workshop Training. This is a week-long conference designed to introduce the manager to Grid concepts and materials. Between 12 and 48 people are appointed as members of problem-solving teams during each laboratory seminar. These seminars are conducted by line leaders who have already passed through the Seminar and thus know its materials and schedules. The workshop begins with a study and review of the management grid's own behavior, outlined in a series of booklets with a questionnaire filled out by each manager. It continues with 50 hours of intensive problem solving, evaluation of individual and team results, and criticism of the team's work. Problems usually mimic organizational situations in which interpersonal behavior affects task performance. Each team regularly evaluates their behavior and problem-solving capabilities. A team that does a bad job of one problem exercise is able to evaluate and adjust their problem-solving style for the next exercise. In addition, one exercise involves attempting 9.9 feedback from team members to team members to each person regarding team impressions of his managerial styles. While Grid Workshops are sometimes compared to T-Group or Sensitivity Training, the two learning experiences are completely different. The strongest similarity occurs in the face feedback phase #1. Even here, however, management grid workshops take a more structured approach, focusing on management styles rather than on personal performance behaviors that may or may not be related to management. The #1 stage is not intended to improve the organization immediately. Rather, it serves as a trigger that creates a willingness to really work on human production problems. Participation in the network seminar is configured to include a diagonal slice of the organization's chart. No person is in the same group as their boss or direct work colleagues. At the same time, this diagonal arrangement of the slices allows the representation of many organizational levels and departments at each session. 2. Team development. This means extending the phase by #1. A total of 9.9 concepts and personal training grid Seminars are transferred to a work situation after each working group or department decides on its own 9.9 basic rules and relationships. Team development usually begins with the boss and his immediate subordinates exploring their management styles and operating practices as a work team. The basic rules of openness and frankness that were established at the stage #1 can now become the daily work style of the Phase #2.5 Taken together, the Phases #1 and #2 provide the conditions for the development of management that are designed to ... allow managers to learn about management network concepts organizing a framework for thinking about governance practices; ... Increase the increase Personal performance characteristics ... Enhance the manager's willingness to listen, confront and appreciate work-related conflicts, reduce and develop interpersonal tensions, and reject compromise as a basis for organizational decision-making. ... Build closer relationships between groups, colleagues at the same level and between bosses and subordinates; ... make managers more critical of worn-out practices and precedents while expanding their capacity to address problems in interdependent situations. Words such as participation and commitment become real in terms of day-to-day challenges. The Organization for Development The last four phases build on this management development and help managers work towards more complex development goals. Intergroup development. This includes working relationships between groups and focuses on building 9.9 basic rules and regulations outside of a single working group. Situations in which operational tensions between groups have been clarified and investigated by team members and/or their representatives. The goal is to move from a horribly common win-loss model to a problem-solving collaboration. This is possible when competing groups work out their problems before solving through intergroup procedures developed in behavioral research. The second type of intergroup development helps to link managers who are on the same level but belong to different divisions (e.g. promesmen, district sales managers, department managers, etc.). Their competitiveness can improve an organization's productivity, but it can also lead to departments being placed above more important organizational goals. In this area, this problem is once again being addressed through joint efforts to address problems that address interpersonal problems in accordance with 9.9 basic rules and regulations. Setting organizational goals. This relates to issues of great importance to all managers. The development of the organization goes beyond the command areas and move to problems that require commitment at all levels. Such broad problems include cost control, union-management relations, security, promotion policies and excessive profit increases. These problems are identified by special task groups that can once again come from a diagonal fragment of the organization's diagram. Office groups can also help define goals and assign roles. The goals are practical when the leaders who are supposed to implement them also establish responsibility for their implementation. Liabilities received as a result of procedures goals at this stage also avoid the negative responses that are currently grouped in resistance to change. Achieving the goal. This uses some of the same educational procedures used in the #1 phase, but here the issues are major organizational problems and the stakes are real. For example, when problem areas are defined special task forces, other groups are set up throughout the organization. These groups are given a task point that describes the problem and the purpose. Members of the team are also provided with packages of information on the subject, which is being discussed. This information is usually studied overnight, after which individual managers test themselves on a truly false test developed by a special task force. Once individuals have studied the information and the test, the groups begin to discuss the same item by checking the agreed responses to the key response. Thus, agreement will be reached on the nature of the problem and its key aspects. Since then, team members have been working to improve the solution and corrective steps. They are also beginning to assign responsibility for these remedial measures. Stage #5 also relies on the manager acting as coordinator in the #4 and #5 stages. Its main objective is to help achieve the goals set for #4. Its secondary purpose is to help identify previously unrecognized problems. It should not carry either linear or staffing responsibilities in the normal sense, but should hold a position similar to that of an industrial health officer. He will be an expert in the development of the organization and will intervene in those moments when the proposed steps seem incompatible with the theory of 9.9. It will seek action based on understanding and consent rather than on any official powers that it has. This approach, although more complex than access through power, reduces resistance. It also improves the quality of joint efforts. 6. Stabilization. This final phase is designed to support changes made earlier. These changes are evaluated and amplified in order to withstand pressures towards slip back and regression. It also gives management an opportunity to assess their achievements and mistakes within the organization's development program. Summary In this section, we summarized the concepts and milestones that are part of the organization's development program using management grid material. In some respects, the program sounds simple, and yet any manager recognizes the difficulties associated with the influence of a large organizational unit on changes in values and performance. That was the challenge facing Sigma's leadership in 1962. The next part of this article describes how Sigma encountered this problem with the Grid program described above. Part II: How the Network Program Really Worked This Part describes the early findings and conclusions of a study that evaluated the Sigma plant's program in the development of the organization. The assessment was offered by the research manager in the Piedmont Office of Communications. Responsible for the program at the Sigma plant immediately Idea. The research project was presented to The Sigma Management and adopted. In place work began in June 1963 and ended in November 1963. Evaluation Goals Assessment of this large-scale organization development program seemed important for a number of reasons: As noted at the beginning of this article, corporate leadership had trouble transferring behavioral science concepts into organizational action. The Sigma program was a deliberate attempt to move these concepts from class to core of life. The Sigma program was launched by line managers. Even the #1 phase, which introduced the concept of the management grid, was aimed at rotating pairs of line managers. Hr specialists and external consultants played only peripheral roles. Typically, programmes of this nature and scope include significant external guidance and/or training. Any management development program that focuses on introspection and self-in-every-other relationships runs the risk of mental illness. The question is whether the Sigma Management Grid programme has managed to avoid such problems by using management-style exercises, rather than depending on a deeper study of personal characteristics. In total, about 800 managers and technical men have experienced phases of #1 at Sigma. These people were of different ages and backgrounds. They came from all areas and levels of the organization. The Sigma program sought collective group changes, not just individual changes in attitudes and behavior. Most management programs treat a person as a learning unit. The six stages of the Grid program were clearly focused on group and intergroup changes in attitudes and behavior. Consequently, the successful program at Sigma can have important implications for both business and behavioral sciences. Sigma's experience can help answer the following questions implied in the above-mentioned reasons for external evaluation: Can a program based on behavioral science concepts be translated into meaningful organization actions? Can management take primary responsibility for such a program? Can important changes in attitudes and behaviours take place without their psychological threat? Can changing focus from individual to group help collective learning and behavior change? Measuring Problems Given the possibility of Sigma running a successful program, how did we have to determine whether it is really successful? How should the development of the organization be adequately defined and measured? Such questions involve key questions in the methodology of behavioral science, and the answers are complex. Roughly speaking, there is really no satisfactory way to identify and measure organizational change and development. Too many variables are out of control and cannot be isolated. The investigator never knows when extraneous factors are the same for an important conclusion, as well as factors identified in his study. However, this complexity makes no excuse for not trying to evaluate such programmes. It is important to approach the project with some remorse and exercise caution. Based on this, we hope to show how the various measures of the Sigma program provide enough evidence for readers to piece together what happened before and during the program. These indicators include performance and profit indices, opinion polls and attitudes from management members, as well as evidence of behavioral changes taken from interviews and conversations. None of these indices is satisfactory in itself, and even when shared they require careful use. Each find can only be seen as part of a common puzzle. It is the consistency and direction of many different conclusions that lead us to believe that something important is happening at the Sigma plant. The decision on the program historically happened that the management of the Sigma plant was influenced by a number of factors when deciding to conduct a development program for the organization. The new policy First important factor occurred in the early 1960s. At that time, Piedmont was merged with another company. This merger broke the long-standing relationship between the Sigma plant and its parent organization. Among other things, the merger ended the previous contract, which for more than 25 years guaranteed Sigma a profit in plus costs. It also brought with it a new headquarters management that stressed the autonomy of the plant. From now on, important decisions, which were previously taken almost exclusively by the headquarters management, had to be delegated to the plant level. However, difficulties arose when headquarters adopted its new hand-off management policy. The headquarters expressed the hope that Sigma's leadership would use its autonomy to address chronic problems that had been shifted from the earlier leadership directive. The most serious problem is the use of Sigma's labour force for the construction of new power units. One of the headquarters managers described the situation as follows: We have heard from people of higher levels that Sigma has too much manpower. Our reaction, I suppose, was that this should have been reduced to a merger. But we're faced with it. And the Sigma plant told us they were in balance. We received long memos from them, and finally the issue began to deal with the use of labor for construction work. This practice has been typical of several factories in our organization, but Sigma seems to be defensive, implying that they could do all the construction work better than the contractors. It was the summer of 1961. We weren't sure of the true answer either, though I think we thought they had a lot of people. Also, the vice president in charge of our group is not one to come out and directly tell someone to do something. He'd rather let them find for yourself, and then seek help. I believe that. So we would prod Sigma and ask questions. But I think we weren't always too thin. They became defensive, and some of our later sessions became emotional. Relationships within the plant The second important factor that helped create the basis for the Sigma program is related to the strained relations between different departments and levels within the plant. The main operational and engineering departments were on the defensive. Accusations of building an empire were not uncommon. Lower-level managers continued to feel somewhat alienated, as senior management in the past often overturned their decisions on union complaints. In short, while Piedmont was concerned about Sigma's major decisions, Sigma management was more concerned about day-to-day operating problems. This factor was all the more important because of the complex technology of the Sigma plant, a technology that required constant interagency cooperation. The mistakes were costly and even dangerous. As a result, Sigma's leadership felt considerable pressure to resolve departmental differences and improve coordination. Nevertheless, these differences persist, to the disappointment of many people. The plant manager Another key factor in creating the conditions for the development program was the attitude and reputation of the Sigma plant manager.

Prior to commissioning the plant in 1959, he worked at Vimont's headquarters on the reorganization research committee, and before that he was director of research at Sigma. Because of the many important technical contributions he has made to the company, he is highly regarded at the Sigma plant. In his new role as plant manager, he tried to identify and fix the problems facing the plant. However, it was difficult for him to obtain full recognition and cooperation on these desired improvements. One of the plant's key subordinates described his reaction to the plant manager's methods: The plant manager would walk in and ask people, "What would you think if I made such a decision?" He always wanted people to agree with him. And the first level manager made this particular comment: The plant manager came down and gave us a lot of the company's philosophy. We started with his Black Book, he wrote it. It was pretty positive. He told men to make decisions. But a new union has just entered it, and many people are suspicious of him, saying he wants us to make tough decisions, not fair ones. The director of the plant reported a cautious and cautious reaction to the 1960 merger. This attitude divided the majority of The Sigma leadership. When the representatives of Piedmont asked plant that he considers curiously curious he reacted quite strongly, how Horatio defended the bridge, as he later described it. The plant's previous experience is another factor in the past efforts of Sigma management to meet production needs. The plant was noted for its management and training of workers. Like all Piedmont factories, Sigma has directed managers to university curricula, as well as working in factory training programs with and unaided. These efforts were aimed at complementing the already high level of education at the factory, where more than 48% of the 800 managers and managers at all levels have higher education, including 80 with diplomas. In addition, Sigma was often described as a family and meeting factory, where cooperation was considered important. However, as with many other organizations, Sigma did not have a consistent way to fit these issues together for performance and people. Instead, Sigma appears to have emphasized one or the other, depending on the headquarters directives and other pressure on it at different times. Consultant Entry Finally, consultant, Dr. Blake, should be seen as a key factor. Blake had an impressive reputation as an analyst organization with leadership in other parts of Piedmont. The headquarters management asked him to visit the Sigma plant, subject to the approval of the plant manager. The factory manager described Blake's record as follows: I think we decided on some kind of legal marriage with Blake... I said, "Why don't you look at us and we'll see you. During this trial period he began to look at our relationship headquarters and came to the conclusion that there were real problems. He then asked if we wanted to explore these issues at a joint meeting with headquarters. I was impressed with that meeting. He did some really good. I think the staff at the end of the first day was ready to call the dogs. We had a lot of misconceptions about the personnel problem - a lot of people at headquarters thought we couldn't handle it. I think one of the most enlightening things was when we started to get our hair down on the second day of these sessions, when the vice president of production said: How should I know what Sigma is doing about the workforce when they haven't told me? I would have asked the same thing if I had been in his situation. But it shocked us. I'm not too clear what happened from here. But I feel like we've started to establish a relationship that we didn't have before. We have ironed out a lot of misunderstandings on both sides. There was no more sense of trust between us. This session convinced me and the whole group that Blake's methods helped us, at least on this issue. It made us see that conflict is what you get on the table. Then four of us went to a seminar outside the grid. We invited one manager from group to go with us, and he did. All these decisions were made here in Sigma, mainly by a group of sixteen people. It was a group decision to send the four of us to a networking seminar. We went back and reported then we had a few more discussions, and finally we developed a development program. The milestone of significant #1 Sigma's development program began in November 1962, when 40 managers participated in a week-long management grid workshop. This phase lasted until the summer of 1963, by which time 800 managers and technicians had completed it. Meanwhile, earlier participants began the later stages of the organization's development programme. Data collection began around the same time. These data, accumulated over the next four months on the ground and reports after that, show significant changes in Sigma's activities. Both the operation of the plant and internal external relations were affected. In this section, we will describe these changes and try to show how the organization's development program has affected them. The data includes changes in: Performance and Profit. Perception, attitude and values. The analysis of this data goes from a rigid, relatively objective material related to profit to softer, more subjective data, such as relationships. Important things for readers to ask: Do different conclusions seem consistent? Do they strengthen each other? And do they suggest that the development program played an important role in Sigma's own development? A. Productivity and Profits were a significant increase in productivity and profits during 1963, when the organization's development program was in effect. Exhibit II indicates that total production has increased slightly (with fewer employees) and profits have more than doubled. At first glance, it would seem that Sigma hit gold, that his worries were over, and that the development program was very effective. But that in itself would be a gross simplification. Exhibit II. Relevant Operating Performance, 1960-1963 For starters, Sigma's business includes broadly fluctuating market prices, raw material costs and other uncontrolled factors. Higher revenues or lower material costs may explain the increase in profits. In addition, new automatic equipment and new investments in plant equipment may be sufficient reason to reduce labour and increase profits. Finally, there has been an overall reduction in the labour force (involving more than 600 staff), which in itself may explain the increase in the profit picture in 1963, especially if the increase in overtime costs (one and a half times) was distributed to the remaining labour force. These capabilities overshadow simple causal conclusions about Sigma's development program and operating Managed Factors At the same time, time, these uncontrollable factors can be investigated and assessed for their contribution to profit. For example, uncontrolled factors may be separated from controlled factors. At Sigma, changes in some uncontrolled factors - income, depreciation, taxes and raw materials - accounted for about 56% of earnings growth, despite the fact that uncontrolled spending generally increased. The remaining 44 per cent of the profit growth was due to a reduction in controlled costs, i.e. wages, operating materials, utilities and fixed overheads over which the plant management oversaw decision-making. This reduction in controlled costs resulted in millions of dollars in profit. At the same time, net investment did not increase markedly (1.5 per cent in 1963), while overtime increased only slightly (5 per cent compared to a small base). Consequently, it appears that a significant part of The increase in Sigma's productivity and profits in 1963 was due to controlled factors. In addition, this increase is not due to the addition of more efficient equipment or an increase in working hours. The next question, then, is: how much of this increase in profits was associated with a reduction in the workforce, and how much to increase productivity on the part of the rest of the staff? Company reports show that 69% of managed savings were based on a reduction in the workforce. The remaining 31%, which is several million dollars, came from improved operating procedures and higher performance per person-hour. Exhibit III shows how these performance and controlled costs are compared to previous years. (Productivity, in this case, is represented by dividing the number of employees for each year by the number of total production units.) The only truly comparable year in terms of profit growth, according to Exhibit II, was 1961. However, the increase in profits in 1961 was due more to factors other than control of Sigma management than in 1963. Exhibit III shows that in 1961 productivity growth and reduced controlled costs were very small compared to 1963. Most impressively, Exhibit III shows that the productivity index per worker increased from a high in 1962 to 103.9 to a new high of 131.3 in 1963 without the assistance of significant investment in factory and equipment, as shown earlier. Exhibit III. Performance and Controlled Expenditure, 1960-1963 Impact on Profit A difficult problem now is to assess the role played by the organization's development program in improving sigma's productivity and profits picture. As for ourselves only with managed savings and performance, how did Sigma's management take this into account? Workforce savings. The biggest savings were due to a reduction in staff numbers. On this issue, consider the following observations from the speech, the speech, The plant manager at the Piedmont conference: The team's decision-making process on the human resources issue relied heavily on the approaches developed in our development programme. The approaches used stimulated a high interaction of ideas and proposals put forward by different members of the group. It is believed that this has led to the development of group responses that were better than the sum of individual contributions. Ultimately, it was clear that all participants were deeply committed to using the methods and procedures that each of them had helped to develop to achieve or exceed the goals that each of them had helped to establish. One of the key decisions made on the basis of the team was the timing of the announcement. At the beginning of the discussion, much of the group favors a traditional approach, namely that delay the announcement of a voluntary retirement program as soon as possible and delay the announcement of dismissal until the completion of the voluntary program. However, a small minority took the opposite position and finally managed to convince the majority of the sonority of this position. We are convinced that this decision has become one of the main factors contributing to the success of the reduction of the workforce... It is particularly gratifying that 520 of our employees have agreed to early retirement or voluntary retirement, compared with the expected loss of only 196 employees as a result of these measures. As a result, only 84 employees were laid off versus 260 that we had originally planned. The fact that the overall staff reduction was 160 more than expected is particularly important as we predict the continued need to operate our plant with fewer employees. In addition to these numerical results, the program has been successful in other important ways. The relatively small number of employees involved in forced dismissal shows a small bitterness or resentment towards the company. Many staff members expressed appreciation for the length of the advance notice and the assistance provided to the employment office. None of the trade unions opposed the actions of the leadership and no trade union tried to prevent the implementation of the program. The reaction of the public and the press was encouraging. There is some evidence of a trend that the community is moving towards becoming more self-reliant and less dependent on Sigma. Sigma's management is very firmly convinced that the quality of decisions made in connection with the setting of personnel goals and the implementation of the reduction program was largely responsible for the success of the program. He equally strongly believes that the quality of the decisions made has been profoundly influenced by the application of the organization's development principles. Comments from other Sigma managers indicate that they also give high credit to the program for decision to reduce the number of staff. At the same time, such a decision seemed to be inevitable under no circumstances. The head of the plant decided to reduce the workforce before the start of the organization's development program. However, he has not yet reported this to the staff (he did so during the joint meeting of the Sigma headquarters proposed by Blake), and no formal implementation plan has been developed. But here is one of those difficult moments when observers will argue about whether the quality and implementation of this difficult decision was as important as the decision itself. Sigma's management apparently believed they were. Team performance. Another measure of performance and profit consciousness shown in Exhibit IV #1. Each man was asked to compare several performance indicators a year ago with the current figures. Responses were marked on the eighth scale and 606 of them were returned. Exhibit IV shows an expected improvement in all performance-related indicators, including a 30.5 per cent increase in the earnings and loss working group. The least improvement reported in The Boss's Effort, which was the only one of the six points not directly addressed at the #1 training stage. Sigma respondents appeared to see higher productivity growth in areas that were emphasized in the #1 phase than in areas not stressed. Exhibit IV. Alleged changes in the group's performance, 1962-1963 Follow-up projects. The final measure of the programme's contribution to the performance-controlled cost picture is reflected in some subsequent projects that were part of the #4 phases and #5 the Management Grid program. These activities were designed to address specific organizational problems using 9.9 concepts and methods, and in this sense they also represent changes in actual behaviour (more closely examined in the next section). These include some projects that are directly related to productivity and cost improvement, as well as other projects that are less directly related. For example: During the contract negotiations with the union, the management team used problem-solving approaches learned at the grid workshop to keep all levels of management informed of management's position. A development coordinator has been appointed to monitor various future projects. A management team has been set up to develop a programme to reduce utility costs. This team used the concept of the management grid to raise awareness of the problem and present the program to other managers. Another management team has started to reduce the cost of maintenance of materials and materials, again using the use of The Principles of the grid. The new Grid series has been expanded beyond the lower level of executives at the plant. These people included sliding executives who moved back and forth between workers and executives. In addition, an attempt was made to extend the grid concept to the workforce. In this regard, trade unionists (and many have accepted the invitation) were invited to participate in these sessions. A series of half-day sessions were held for second-tier managers to discuss and set guidelines that would improve the relationship between managers and subordinates. These sessions were based on the format of a networking seminar, and both managers and subordinates participated in the discussion. The Grid-based security program was designed to raise awareness of security issues and generate new ideas for improvement. This program was to include all factory workers. The head of the plant initiated a plan under which managers will encourage subordinates to set personal goals for the coming year. This was intended to replace previous performance assessment methods in which the manager set goals and tell the subordinate how he measured them. An example of how one of these subsequent efforts, a program to improve public services, affects the consciousness of profits, is shown below in a conversation between two members of the program committee and a researcher on the ground: Researcher: How is the project improving public services? Manager A: Very good. This morning we took part in a meeting of the established draft committee. They're still a long way off, but they're thrilled. Manager B: They set up a committee with the project's chief executive, John J. They put some real important people on the committee -- all at the level of the head of the department. Researcher: The guide was taken by Jim. from his line of work to full-time? Manager A: Yes, it's off for at least a year. This shows the importance management gives to the preservation of utilities. Researcher: Have there been any noticeable effects of P and L yet? Manager A: Yes, just this morning I got a fuel bill last month and it dropped to the point that if it keeps up, we could save over a billion dollars in a year. Manager B: And the best we can understand is for motivational reasons, because there is little else that can explain the fall. B. Practice and Behavior Because the study was started after the start of the Sigma development program, we have only a few accurate indexes of changes in practice and behavior. However, the available indicators are important indicators of changes taking place at the plant. These include: Increasing the frequency of meetings. Changing management evaluation criteria. Increase transfers within the plant and into other parts of the organization. Additional Meetings Exhibition V increase in meeting schedules from a representative of the 30 Managers of Sigma. Calendars of these men showed a 31% increase in official meetings scheduled during the summer week in 1963 compared to the year before. The survey data also showed that managers report an average of 12.4% more time at meetings to solve team problems. Exhibit V. Participation in managers' meetings The fact that the nature, as well as the frequency of these meetings is changing, is evidenced by the following statement by a representative of the piedmont headquarters, previously very negative towards the management of Sigma: I think that the recent change in the way Sigma is managed is the most drastic case. You just go to a meeting now and you see it. I was sitting at a recent meeting. People talk as if they make decisions and they are. It's never happened before. The meeting usually ends with the reaction of the plant manager. You damn well knew he made the final decision. There was no meeting he wasn't in. You'll never be able to get it. Now he's the most affordable guy on the spot. Exhibit V also shows the discrepancy between the findings for administrative managers and for technical managers. (Administrative managers are line and full-time employees whose work is mainly related to day-to-day operational matters; technical managers are employees who deal primarily primarily with long-term technical problems. Administrative managers have shown more frequent meetings and more than the number of technical managers in a year. Similar trends persist throughout these findings. Administrative managers constantly report behavior that consistent with Sigma's trends and are more positively focused on the organization's development program. Promotion criteria One of the reasons for this difference appears in Exhibit VI, which shows the second indicator of actual behavior change. This suggests that the criteria for promotion are changing at Sigma, as evidenced by the profile of the 50 most highly rated managers. Youth and line positions (mostly held by administrative managers) now seem to be better predictors of success than the higher age, seniority of the company, and the position in the organization of personnel (mostly populated by technical staff). Exhibit VI. Attributes of the 50 most highly rated managers These figures show a shift in qualifications for promotion in a changing organization. They also involve a change in the capacity structure of the plant, with executive officials receiving higher remuneration than technical managers. So we're starting to understand one of the possible reasons for the broader recognition administrative leaders. For them, the potential for remuneration was relatively high. The Manager mobility Exhibition VII shows the third indicator of actual change. Dispatcher not increasing dramatically in total, increased by 52% compared to 1962 transfers inside and outside the factory. The number of transfers in 1962 was usually typical of previous years. The increase in internal traffic indicates greater flexibility within the plant, and the increase in transfers to external units indicates a strengthening of links with headquarters and other operating enterprises. The company's records also show that managers usually conducted (and would like to spend) their careers at the factory. Lately, however, managers have been promoted from Sigma. In support of the conclusion that the plant has developed stronger external connections, we find that in 1962 only 18% of the men transferred were rated among the top 50 managers at Sigma. In 1963, 38% of the translated were in the top 50. Exhibit VII. Changing the mobility of management staff impact on behavior In the previous section on productivity and profit, we saw evidence that subsequent savings projects were credited mainly to the organization's development program. The same can be said about the new emphasis on teamwork and problem solving. Again and again, specific behavioral changes have been attributed to the effects of the Sigma staff program. For example, one higher-level manager commented: We had a very good example of group action here last Friday night. We had a staffing problem; and if the problem had arisen a couple of years ago, they would have used 9.1 on it, said the complainant, to get back to work and that would be the end. I've been involved myself and ever since. My two leaders brought me and the other person together and used Grid's ideas. They gave us a chance to talk. Anyone can say what he wants. We have a bit of a personal, but it works. It works because each of us got some stuff off his chest. I made a mistake a long time ago without reporting the trouble I had. When they cut out another man, he was able to tell us what he thought was wrong. The lower level manager described the consequences of the phase #1 thus: As I see it, we had an old philosophy from which we had to leave... It's time the atmosphere is country club, do nothing and just have a good time. Well, there are two ways to change: one is that you can do it by exhaustion, but it takes too long. The other is that you can do it as the Chinese do it-by brainwashing. Now this may seem cynical, but I don't mean it that way, but that's how the grid curriculum was done. You do not under pressure and you kept getting these theories repeated with you over and over again and it worked. I don't think it's so much that people have changed, but the philosophy has definitely changed. Why, there is one department where he once had a dog dog with them. But since March we have been able to work together much better. And I am. This is a change to the program because the change is so uniform in this department. It couldn't have been done by one person in the department, because then the difference would have been more inconsistent. Finally, the first-tier leader and former union member commented: It's just here in the last year or so that company officials branched out and let lower-level people have a word in things. I think I would say, and all of us working to make things different, that I'm making 90% more decisions now compared to ten years earlier. Regularly, we have a lot more responsibility now. It used to be that the solutions came down from above - it was all cut and dried, and you did it. In the past year, in particular, leaders have given us much more authority and better cooperation. They give a person a chance to do the job. It seems that they keep bringing things in and out getting us to do more. With regard to the increase in the number of meetings, managers tended to have mixed feelings. Their time was valuable, and some of their new problem-solving meetings were unable to provide answers. In addition, they, like many managers today, felt sensitive to criticism of the committee and group think. At the same time, the management grid workshop provided broad support for team-to-team approaches and problem-solving, as they provide opportunities to address problems that had previously been avoided or unrecognized. C. Attitude and Values Anonymous survey questionnaire asked each manager to report their views on organizational relationships in the fall of 1963 compared to the year before. Exhibition VIII shows that improvements have occurred between bosses and subordinates, in departments and between working groups. Exhibit VIII. Changes in Working Relationships, 1962-1963 Note: Based on a questionnaire that asked each respondent to compare in three separate questions: a) how he works with his boss, (b) how his working group works together, and (c) how his working group works with other groups. The expected improvement was highest in intergroup and interagency relations, although impressively high in other areas. The improvement was again seen as higher in the administrative line than in the field of technical personnel, as shown in the exhibition VIII-B. The change in the basic rules Of these supposed improvements, in theory, came from more fundamental changes in values and approaches between managers and technical people. In order to verify this, we have developed a game in which each member of the senior management committee (N No. 19) has chosen from a deck of 132 cards those statements that best describe the management's basic rules and values, as they were five years ago, today, and for the future at the Sigma plant. A selection of 19 managers showed a 26% jump from either or compromise card statement integrative synthesis (as shown in IX). They hoped to see an even bigger shift (17%) to integrative values and basic rules in the future. Exhibit IX. Perceived changes in management values Note: Each manager was asked to select those cards that were closest to the perception of the conventional wisdom among most managers about how a particular manager should behave, and to believe if he wants to get approval and/or avoid disapproval from other managers at the plant. It was made three kinds: one five years ago (1958), one to date (1963), and one for personal preference in the future. Thirty-three management practices were described in a deck with four randomly distributed cards showing different approaches to each. Hard refers to those polarized statements that imply strong control, narrow borders, independence from higher power and concern for tasks. Soft refers to those statements that imply lack of control, several restrictions, dependence on higher power, and concern about sociability. To the extent that they mattered or or still existed (as shown in small circles), they changed the direction they came from five years ago. Current polarized values tend to emphasize stronger governance. Five-year values tend to emphasize a weaker direction of management. This weakness appears to be attributable to the strength of headquarters management and the lack of incentives provided by the contract costs plus. After the 1960 merger, the harder line was followed by the plant manager, although this was not enthusiastically received by suspicious lower-level managers, as we have seen earlier. By 1963, however, an integrative value system had emerged, backed up by rigid problem-oriented values. This exhibit shows that the changes in the basic rules of management were both rapid and extreme. The soft practice was condemned in the value system of 1963 by sigma's top management. Preference was given to integrative values; but where they are not currently practiced, management sees rigid values as preferable to soft five years ago. Influence on attitudes How did these perceived changes affect the organization's development program? Evidence presented in the survey shows some impressive links. To begin with, the changes were directly in line with the 9.9 concepts #1 phase of the Sigma program. The integrative values were disguised but consistent examples of 9.9 basic rules and norms. Polarized examples were similar to 9.1 and 1.9 procedures and beliefs. Statements of compromise are, of course, akin to 5.5 practices and values. #1 Grid tends to reward 9.9 and 9.1 behaviors over and above other management styles. The same two models appear to be most widely practiced in 1963, according to management team that sorted 132 cards in the game described earlier. Boss's behavior. Another proof of change directly in accordance with the concept of phase #1 shown in exhibitions X and XI. Exhibit X. Alleged Changes in Boss Behavior, 1962-1963 Exhibition XI. Perceived changes in working group norms, 1962-1963 Exhibition X is tabulated from reports of 606 participants about 17 specific changes in the behavior of their boss and working group in 1962 compared to later behavior in 1963. The questionnaire used for this purpose included some items that were appropriate and important for preparations for the #1 stage and others that were equally good but were not stressed in the grid sessions. Exhibit X shows that 10 of the 11 items depicting the boss's greatest improvement reflect ideas taken directly in the #1 learning phase. At the time, only one high point (clearly his views) was not emphasized. As for the other six points, which are not emphasized in training, all of them show only moderate growth. Bosses have improved slightly on these points, according to subordinates, but not as much as on the items considered during the #1 preparation. Exhibition XI also offers a causal link between the Sigma program and changes in the team's behavior throughout the year. This time, the negative rejection of some items (rather than a positive reaction) was considered. We asked which paragraphs describing the working group's practices were the least accepted by the leaders in 1963 compared to those least accepted in 1962. Some of the included items are largely at odds with the concept of phase #1 9.9, although not defined as such. Others are simply less relevant to preparing #1 stage. Exhibition XI shows that the most strongly rejected practice in 1963 were those who disagreed with 9.9 convictions. The irrelevant practice was less strongly rejected or positively accepted. Positive answers. The favorable attitude to the phase of #1 also appear in the 12th exhibition. The results were generally favourable. The most positive feedback came from staff in the two administrative departments. The least enthusiastic responses (and even they were generally positive) came from the staff of the two technical departments. Exhibition XII. Rating Management Grid Workshop Note: Based on data from the questionnaire asking respondents to evaluate the grid workshop for their work related to utility. An eight-point scale was provided. The results were later combined into four categories, 7 to 8 for very high, 5 to 6 for somewhat high, 3 to 4 for a somewhat low, and 1 to 2 for very low. These differences may reflect the fact that administrative men are now a greater share of the remuneration for evaluation and promotion than before. They may also reflect the classic differences in value associated with business on the one hand, and science on the other. Some survey data show that technical staff valued individualism over the organization's development strategy team. Although many Sigma managers (including the plant manager) were engineers or scientists for training and early work, our data show that they accepted management values when they left the technical departments. In any case, the heads of administrative departments were somewhat more passionate about the Sigma program than the men from the technical departments. In general, the changes reported in the behaviour of bosses and teams, as well as changes in practice (shown in Exhibition IV), are correct in accordance with the 9.9 values and basic rules developed in the #1 training phase. Combined with the enthusiasm for Grid as a learning experience, it is clear that most Sigma participants appreciated the results of their organization's on-site development program. Some of the underlying factors in the material discussed so far indicate that the Sigma programme has made an important contribution; (a) Productivity and profit, (b) changes in practice and behaviour and (c) at least some changes in the attitudes and values of managers. While the main motivation may have existed long before this program, the Sigma program seemed to provide specific means for mobilizing and channelling management energy. Other programs or methods might have worked just as well, although, as mentioned, Sigma and other Piedmont plants have been seriously engaged in a number of them without comparable results in the past. In addition, the policy of the new headquarters group has not received much improvement in Sigma, even more than the more policy line adopted by the previous headquarters group. In addition, the plant manager's early management endurance received resistance as well as slow results. So what were the causal factors in and around the organization's development program that allowed it to contribute to Sigma's improved position? To study these (and gain an even greater understanding of the impact of the program), we draw our attention next to a review of evidence and opinions that describes the main factors that seem crucial to the Sigma program and its contribution. Headquartered Role Earlier, we described the events that led Piedmont to put pressure on the management of the Sigma plant to improve productivity. In some respects, the pressure may have been too thin. Sigma's management did not fully appreciate how important some issues were to headquarters until these issues were discussed in public. This was the first time during a three-day meeting proposed by Blake. As a result of the meeting, staff at the they sought to be, not the ambiguous threat they were. At the same time, the headquarters left the implementation, including the organization's development program, in the hands of the management of the Sigma plant. The results of this new relationship appear to satisfy the headquarters leadership. At the end of 1963, a verdict was reached that Sigma had made significant progress and that relations between headquarters and the plant had improved. After the first year of the Sigma program, the management of Piedmont expressed strong pleasure and partial surprise at the improvement of Sigma's position. The contribution of consultants At the moment the work and reputation of Blake and Mouton provided a specific point of departure for the organization of development efforts. Their previous design of the mesh workshop and their six-phase concept of the organization's development represented a significant contribution, even though they themselves spent little time at the plant. The support of the plant manager early and especially important factor was the support and subsequent participation of the plant manager. His enthusiasm became a strong incentive and model for the rest of the plant. He remained in the middle of the program, not outside, where he may have guided the effort with impersonal mechanisms. More importantly, he made some significant changes in his behavior. These changes in the behavior of the plant manager can not be called serious changes in personality. Instead, they seem to reflect a change in his conception of working with others on governance issues. Most of the changes were consistent with the behavior he had practiced in the organization for a long time. He had a reputation as the creator and protector of new projects. He always did not like to be second in the opinion of others. He has a deep respect for science and has expanded some of this respect for behavioral sciences. Finally, he always explained and showed his ideas to others before implementing them. During the program, the plant manager found that while the basic rules of relationship management had changed, none of them had violated his core beliefs. One of his top subordinates made the following comments: He certainly took a hard look at how he conducts his business and tries to change. I think he's trying to attract more people and be more attentive to others. It's not so much a change, however, as it's an admission that others once misunderstood it. I think he found that others saw him as intolerant because of his enthusiasm. I always saw it as a pretty strong '9.9', but no one else seemed to recognize it. He has a real strong '9.1 backup theory', though. I think his experience in the management grid session made him stop and think; being a real intelligent man, he has changed. He learned to listen and be more patient. In addition, we have learned to speak better and insist that your word. Word. street with two sides. The participation of the top management group Sigma top management soon took part in the discussion of the program. More importantly, they decided to participate not only as students in the #1 phase, but also as rotating instructors for two weeks. Our material shows that this group is a key supporter of the program and plays an important role in future projects. In addition, the role of training and training provided further evidence of the impact of the program. Using the questionnaire data, we removed the most improved and least improved categories from weighted estimates taken from the subordinate improvement estimates. 16 of the 22 instructors were among the 87 most improved bosses assessed by their own subordinate managers. Only one instructor was included in the 35 least improved chiefs. This finding indicates that, as an instructor in phase #1 served to strengthen a person's understanding of 9.9 principles, as well as to assist him in working practice. The commitment of this group of 9.9 appears to have been reinforced by their early successes in reducing the labour force in difficult environments in communities and unions. When 9.9 problem-solving methods helped them meet the difficult task of reducing staff, a group of top managers became strong supporters of the organization's development program. Given their participation and support, what did this group look like in action? Were they now a collection of 9.9 superman? Have each of them made significant changes to their behavior? These questions are important, and there are no answers. Instead, the senior management team collectively (and continued to strengthen) a set of 9.9 basic rules among themselves. However, the balance was unsustainable. Two or three key individuals appear to be the most respected as 9.9 interpreters and supporters. Some other members were members focused on responsibility and tasks that continued to show respect for the 9.9 basic rules. Still others helped to formulate questions restlessly. The bond that connected the group together was its overall commitment to 9.9 concepts and practices. As long as this tie held on, members seemed to feel that they could continue their role in the organization. Learning Readiness Factors identified above appear to affect men on or near the top of the Sigma organization. However, these factors were not sufficient to explain the different approaches of managers. There were less obvious forces that affected every manager at the plant. One was the attitude of some managers, who made them more willing than others to learn at the stage #1 and after. Exhibits V, VIII-B and XII-B have already shown that technical staff tend to be less involved and enthusiastic than administrative Exhibition XIII shows that technical managers have been seen as less improved by their subordinates as well. In general, technical managers from research and development B, engineering and production planning received less ratings of improvements from subordinates than other managers. Exhibition XIII. Boss Self-Assessment compared to grid ranking team Exhibition XIII also shows how these on-the-job improvement ratings match the self-esteem of the boss prior to the #1 training phase, and his team evaluating him during the #1 training phase. (These two assessments were made using a grid of educational material available to us.) Analysis of this material shows that: technical managers and staff tend to rate themselves as less than 9.9 before the stage #1 than their counterparts during the preparation #1 stage. In other words, technical people tend to get over the part of their colleagues. Administrative managers typically rate themselves as more than 9.9 prior to the #1 phase than their counterparts during the #1 training phase. In other words, the administrative staff were not huge to their colleagues. According to Exhibition XIII, it was the administrative managers who were under-represented by their teams who showed more improvements than the technical managers who were overworked. Why? One explanation is that the administrative managers, rating themselves as 9.9 from the start, have been given incentives to improve the sobering comments of their workshop teammates. Technical managers, who usually didn't consider themselves 9.9 from the start, got little incentive to improve because their teams told them they were better than they thought they were. However, there seems to be such a thing as too much underachieving (note the recession curve on the right in Exhibition XIII). If the executive's self-esteem of 9.9 was too much higher than the score his Seminar team gave him, his subordinates tended to find him less improved than those managers (at the peak of the curve) who were a little disturbed at the Workshop. In other words, some participants in the #1 phase seem to be more willing and receptive to learning the management grid than others (although even they have been seen as improved by subordinates, according to Exhibition XIII). Higher-readiness students described themselves as 9.9 managers before training and were given a team impulse to move forward. Students with lower readiness, with little team momentum to improve, are usually technically (not managerial) oriented. In a later interview, one of these technicians said, I don't see the point in scientists speaking in this course. We believe in the results of reproducible experiments and can be informed and convinced without personal experience. Data from other experiments will do the job... The program gives understanding people who can discuss Shakespeare endlessly, or who can enjoy baseball without paying attention to any other sport. You can get into the habit of enjoying one activity, except for everything else. Give the program enough time on this course and we can become so interested in interpreting management actions that we can play happily in this for years and forget all about the realities of management. The increased effort of the final factor underlying the plant change in Sigma occurred after the #1 training phase. This included the extent to which the boss and colleagues stepped up the manager's efforts to change their behaviour. To show the importance of this gain, we can examine its presence among the most improved and least improved managers (according to the weighted ratings of their subordinates). Exhibition XIV shows that 77% of the 87 most improved managers were bosses, who were also the most improved. This suggests that a superior person is a major force in his training and improvement until we notice that 55% of the 35 least improved managers were also bosses who were most improved. Apparently the boss improvement was not the most important reinforcing agent, although it seems to have exerted some effect. Exhibition XIV. The relationship between the improvement of the manager and the excellent support of a colleague (Assessments subordinates) Exhibition XIV also shows that the reinforcement of colleagues may have been a more important key than the reinforcement of the boss. Of the most advanced managers, 92% worked in an environment where the most advanced colleagues outperformed the least improved, while only 26% of the least improved managers worked under similar conditions. A closer analysis of these 26% of least improved managers in the most improved groups shows that their number exceeded the number of most improved colleagues by only 2.55 to 1. In contrast, 92% of the most improved managers worked in an environment where the majority outperformed the smallest in a ratio of 3.41 to 0.33. This suggests that the chances of improving the manager in the eyes of subordinates were greatest when the manager worked with a large number of others who also sought to improve. Or, in other words, perhaps one least improved cynic was enough to dampen the enthusiasm of his comrades and therefore their chances of being among the most improved. This possibility is borne out by the fact that 60% of the most improved managers worked in conditions where there were no least improved colleagues to disappoint the 9.9 atmosphere that is being built. These data suggest #1 phase, plant manager, and boss man all played secondary roles when it came to taking phase lessons #1 stick. The most important reinforcements the manager's own colleagues, who either encouraged and supported him or discouraged him from his efforts. The conclusion we can return now to the reasons for studying the Sigma program that were given at the beginning of Part II. Now, after reviewing the program and its consequences, even the conservative answer to this question would seem to be yes. The program became part of the day-to-day management activities at Sigma. In both view and behavior, most managers approved the work models presented at the #1 network seminar. The second reason for studying the Sigma program was the unusual role of learning adopted by the line management. Evidence suggests that, at the #1 stage, not only do senior line managers take on key coaching roles, but they later stood out as among the most advanced managers in the eyes of their subordinates. It seems likely that the instructor's role helped bolster his attempts at 9.9 behavior back to work. With regard to the mental difficulties that were another problem in the sigma study, we know that among the 800 men who participated in the programme, there was no evidence of any such problem. This suggests that #1 Grid training was relatively safe in this company's setting because of its emphasis on management styles rather than on personal introspection. The final reason why Sigma was given was the question of groups as units of instruction compared to individuals. As we have seen, training (improvement in the eyes of subordinates) was greatest when it was strongly supported by colleagues of values and norms. Where this reinforcement was weak or not present, managers were much more likely to be rated as the least improved by their subordinates. Consequently, groups of colleagues seem to play a crucial role in helping individual learning in the development of the organization. The chances are pretty strong that this deciding factor is lacking in countless new organization development programs, including previous efforts at Sigma and Piedmont. In all these cases, the supporting basis of shared values is likely to have been ignored or too abstract to be realized. The implications for the management of the Lessons of this study are also associated with a number of implications for entrepreneurs. Initially, it seems that behavioral science and human relationship education can help with the large-scale development of an organization under certain conditions. These conditions, as our data show, include: a demanding but tolerant headquarters. Enthusiastic and engaged top manager and senior management group. An educational strategy that effectively and continuously builds team-to-team solutions and mutual support in work-related solutions. work that requires some interdependent effort shared values. This study shows that management and team efficiency can be taught by leaders with external help. In addition, such an education strategy appears to have contributed significantly to the organization's effectiveness. This in itself seems to be an important lesson for leadership to be recognized and used in its future efforts to build stronger organizations. 1. See Chris Argyris, T-Group for Organizational Efficiency, HBR March-April 1964, page 60. 2. See Alex Bavelas and George Strauss, Group Dynamics and Intergroup Relations, in W. F. White, Melville Dalton, et al., Money and Motivation (New York, Harper and Brothers, 1955), p. 90-96. 3. E. A. Fleischerman, E. F. Harris and E. H. Burt, Industry Leadership and Oversight (Columbus, Personnel Research Council, Ohio State University, 1955). 4. Cases of individual training are described in Kenneth R. Andrews' HBR series, See: Is Management Training Effective? 1. Assessment by leaders and instructors, January-February 1957, page 85; Is management training effective? II. Measuring, Purpose and Policy, March-April 1957, page 63; and Reaction to University Development Programs, May-June 1961, page 116. 5. See R. R. Blake, J. S. Mouton, and M. G. Bluntsfield, How a training executive team can help you and your organization, the Journal of the American Society of Directors for Training (now called Training Directors Magazine), January 1962, p. 3. A version of this article appeared in the November 1964 issue of Harvard Business Review. Reviews. breakthroughs book pdf. health breakthroughs book. health breakthroughs 2020 book. breakthroughs in diabetes 2018 book. books about medical breakthroughs

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