Preventing Coups d'état: How Counterbalancing Works

Erica De Bruin
Assistant Professor of Government
Hamilton College
198 College Hill Road
Clinton, NY 13323

edebruin@hamilton.edu
(917) 439-4506

Word count: 10,881

Preventing Coups d'état: How Counterbalancing Works

Abstract

Although coups remain a pressing concern for rulers across the globe, the mechanisms through which common coup-prevention strategies operate have not been well theorized or rigorously tested. This article analyzes how "counterbalancing" the military with other security forces prevents coups. Using new cross-national time-series data on state security forces along with qualitative evidence from eight case studies, the article demonstrates that counterbalancing reduces the likelihood that coup attempts will succeed, and that it does so primarily by creating incentives for some soldiers to resist the coup, rather than by creating barriers to coordination between forces. However, counterbalancing is not associated with fewer coup attempts. In fact, the creation of a new security force increases the odds of a coup attempt in the following year. The findings suggest that opening up the black box of the state's security sector is crucial for understanding the sources of political stability in developing states.

Introduction

Preventing coups d'état remains a pressing challenge for rulers across the developing world. Since 2010 alone, soldiers in 17 different states have attempted to seize power in a coup (Powell and Thyne 2011). Among the most common strategies rulers employ to prevent coups involves "counterbalancing" the military with one or more security forces independent from the army, navy, and air force that constitute a traditional military.[1] These forces include civilian militia, such as the Bolivarian National Militia Hugo Chávez created in Venezuela; national or

[1] While rulers have also used units within the army to counterbalance, independent security forces are the focus here because this form of counterbalancing is the most likely to be effective.

republican guards, such as those built up under Saddam Hussein in Iraq; militarized police, like those supervised by the Ministry of Interior in Russia; and presidential guards, such as Kwame Nkrumah's President's Own Guard Regiment in Ghana.

While the causes of coups have been the subject of an immense body of research in political science and sociology, important gaps remain in our understanding of coup-prevention strategies. In particular, the mechanisms through which counterbalancing operates have not been well theorized or rigorously tested. This article analyzes whether and how counterbalancing works. Using new data on state security forces, combined with qualitative evidence from eight case studies, it demonstrates that counterbalancing reduces the likelihood a coup attempt will succeed—and that it does so not primarily by creating barriers to communication and coordination between forces, but by creating incentives for officers in security forces outside the military to defend the regime. In contrast to existing empirical studies, the article also demonstrates that counterbalancing does not deter coup attempts. In fact, the creation of a new counterweight is associated with an *increased* risk of coups in the following year.

Despite the recent proliferation of research on strategies of coup prevention or "coup-proofing," central works on counterbalancing in particular remain largely descriptive in nature. Horowitz (1985), for instance, includes counterbalancing in his catalog of strategies to counter a coup but does not develop a causal argument about how it is supposed to work. Quinlivan (1999) similarly describes the use of what he calls "parallel militaries," but does not spell out the mechanisms by which they might prevent coups. Partly as a result of this under-theorizing, there is no consensus about whether counterbalancing is effective. Case studies of long-standing civilian regimes frequently highlight the role of counterweights in preventing military intervention in politics (e.g., Frazer 1994, Bruce 1992, Quinlivan 1999, Belkin 2005). However,

pointing to the failure of counterbalancing to prevent coups in Pakistan, Indonesia, and elsewhere, other scholars are much more skeptical (e.g., Nordlinger 1977; Farcau 1994; Geddes 2009). Statistical evidence has been mixed at best. Powell (2012) finds that counterbalancing reduces both the number of coup attempts rulers see and how likely those attempts are to succeed, but the results are significant in only half the specifications presented. Meanwhile, Böhmelt and Pilster (2015) find evidence of a U-shaped relationship between counterbalancing and coup attempts, but not coup outcomes.

One important limitation of existing research stems from the empirical approaches used. Many studies of successful counterbalancing explicitly select cases on the dependent variable, which may be appropriate for theory building but less so for theory testing (Geddes 1990, George and Bennett 2005). Quinlivan (1999), for example, focuses on Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Syria precisely because their leaders were able to prevent coups for decades. Frazer (1994) similarly focuses on Kenya because it is an outlier in Africa, having maintained civilian rule for decades. This method of case selection makes it difficult to know whether it is counterbalancing or some other factor underpinning regime stability.

Efforts to test theories of coup prevention more systematically have been hindered by poor quality data. Existing analyses depend almost exclusively on the *Military Balance*, an annual defense review published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. However, widespread inaccuracies, inconsistencies in criteria for inclusion, and the narrow temporal and geographic scope of the *Military Balance* limit its utility.[2] Coverage of developing states is particularly poor before the 1990s, given the review's focus on the balance of power

[2] For an in-depth analysis of how these issues distort *Military Balance* data on expenditures and personnel in Venezuela, see Colgan (2011).

between NATO and Warsaw Pact members.[3] In the countries that are included, estimates of the number and strength of security forces in the *Military Balance* are often highly misleading. Many security forces are missing, while others are included years after they have been disbanded. Some unarmed groups, such as agricultural work forces, are also included.[4] Compounding these inaccuracies, prior editions of the publication not updated when new information becomes available. These problems mean it is not clear how correlations between indicators based on *Military Balance* data and other variables of interest should be interpreted. As a result, both whether and how counterbalancing works remain open questions.

This article makes three central contributions. First, it draws upon existing work on the causes and dynamics of coups to spell out, in a systematic way, the multiple mechanisms through which counterbalancing might affect both the outcome and incidence of coup attempts. Doing so is important because it can help resolve conflicting theoretical expectations about whether and how counterbalancing can prevent coups.

Second, the article introduces a new, cross-national time-series dataset on state security forces in developing states, 1960-2010, which offers several advantages over *Military Balance* data for testing predictions about the relationships between counterbalancing and coups. These include the use of consistent criteria for which security forces are included; the triangulation of over 1,200 primary and secondary sources, which reduces measurement error; and expanded temporal and geographic scope. Because the dataset includes detailed information about command and deployment of state security forces, it also allows me to construct more precise measures of counterbalancing than those possible using *Military Balance* data. These

[3] I am grateful to Jonathan Powell for emphasizing this point.
[4] In Cuba, for instance, the *Military Balance* includes as a security force the Youth Labor Army, an unarmed agricultural work force, yet the Ministry of Interior's Special Operations Troops never appear (see: Fermoselle 1987).

improvements result in different substantive findings than previous quantitative studies of counterbalancing.

Finally, the article presents the first empirical test of the specific mechanisms linking counterbalancing and coup outcomes. Because testing these mechanisms in a large-n study would require high-quality information on the dynamics of a large number of coups, which is difficult to collect systematically, I evaluate them using careful process tracing in eight case studies of coup attempts. The evidence in these cases suggests that counterbalancing reduces the likelihood a coup attempt will succeed primarily because counterweights actively defend the regime, rather than by creating coordination problems. This finding is important, in part, because it suggests that coups staged against regimes that counterbalance will be more violent than those staged against regimes that do not.

The article proceeds as follows. In the next section, I identify the causal mechanisms linking counterbalancing to coups and generate hypotheses about how it affects their outcomes, incidence, and dynamics. The third section introduces the new data on state security forces, describes the empirical strategy employed, and presents the results of the statistical analysis along with a number of robustness checks. The fourth section tests the predictions about the specific mechanisms linking counterbalancing to coup outcomes in eight case studies. A final section concludes with implications and suggestions for further research.

Causal Mechanisms of Counterbalancing

The aim of a coup is to seize executive authority in a state. Classic "how-to" manuals for coups suggest that doing so involves two phases: attack and consolidation (Malaparte 1932, Goodspeed 1962, Luttwak 1968). In the attack phase, conspirators seek to capture symbolic centers of

political power, such as the presidential palace and parliament, or the executive himself, as well as television and radio stations that allow them to broadcast their actions. In capturing these targets, tactical considerations, such as location, timing, speed, and coordination between co-conspirators, are key. Coups can fail in the attack phase due to tactical blunders. Because the targets of coups are small in number and concentrated in the capital, a successful coup does not require a large military force. Indeed, the more conspirators that are involved, the more likely the plot will be detected and coup-plotters intercepted before seizing their targets.

In the consolidation phase, the task of coup plotters is to signal that the coup has *already* succeeded and that resistance to the new regime would be futile. They do so largely through radio and other media broadcasts. Singh (2014, 8) memorably calls this process "making a fact." In this phase, the dynamics of coups closely resemble "coordination games," in which each actor bases his or her decisions on beliefs about what others are going to do, and the outcome is determined when the beliefs of relevant actors converge (Geddes 1999, Singh 2014). The relevant actors in the context of a coup are almost entirely within the state's security forces. As Luttwak (1968, 58) describes, political opposition outside the security forces will "largely subside when we have substituted our new status quo for the old one, and can enforce it by our control of the state bureaucracy and security forces."

While their individual political preferences may vary, military officers join coup plots they think will succeed and oppose those they think will fail. This is because professional soldiers tend to value the institutional interests of the military above all else (Janowitz 1960, 1977; Needler 1975; Nordlinger 1977; Stepan 1971; Geddes 1999; Finer 2002). In the wake of a failed coup, the punishment for participants is typically harsh and the military as a whole may face a loss of prestige, discipline, resources, and political standing (Kebschull 1994). For

example, in his detailed study of the failed August 1991 coup in the Soviet Union, Taylor (2003) concludes that "the belief that a coup attempt would fail and that the instigators of a military putsch would be punished" was the central determinant of soldiers' behavior. Interviewing officers that participated in six different coups in Ghana, Singh (2014, 6) finds that time and again, those officers "felt it was wrong to use their troops, possibly endangering their lives, to support the side they preferred if it was likely to lose." Such concerns keep the vast majority of military officers on the sidelines while a coup is underway.

Counterbalancing may affect the outcome of a coup in one of two ways. First, counterbalancing might create obstacles to communication and coordination between forces that complicates coup-plotters' efforts to seize their targets. Where rulers counterbalance, coup-plotters must recruit or neutralize any security forces that could block their access to key targets (Luttwack 1968). However, bringing them on board may make the execution of a coup more difficult. According to Luttwak (1979, 149), "the active phase of a coup is like a military operation—only more so" because it occurs in such a compressed time frame. As such, the same coordination problems that plague coup-proofed armies on the battlefield (Biddle and Zirkle 1996; Pilster and Böhmelt 2011) may also affect the ability of coup-plotters to seize their targets. Powell (2014, 1024) emphasizes that counterbalancing "undermines the fighting capacity of a military by creating coordination challenges. This is as true for waging battle as it is for attempting a coup."

The difficulty of coordinating between multiple forces is exacerbated by the fact that security forces outside the military are typically trained and equipped in different ways, making it harder for them to work together. Joint training exercises that might ease coordination problems are rare precisely because rulers are concerned about collusion between forces. As a

result, coups staged against regimes that counterbalance are likely to encounter difficulties coordinating troop movements and involve more tactical errors than those staged against regimes that do not.

Second, counterbalancing may reduce the likelihood a coup will succeed by increasing the likelihood that coup plotters will face armed resistance. If coups are akin to coordination games, counterbalancing can be thought of an effort to add additional players, which do not have the same incentives to move in concert with other actors, to the game. Over time, security forces outside the military develop their own organizational interests distinct from those of the armed forces. Rulers can help foster diverging interests by staffing or paying security forces differently than the military. Since personnel changes are easier to make in new forces than in the army, where existing positions are already filled, filling counterweights with co-ethnics or party loyalists is common (Horowitz 1985, 547; Harkness 2014). Counterbalancing forces are frequently paid at higher rates than the regular army. The Jatiyo Rakkhi Bahini (JRB) in Bangladesh, for example, received "preferential budgetary allocations," which deepened its rivalry with the military (Kabir 2006, 44). Rulers can also facilitate diverging interests by compensating different forces for different tasks—paying the army to defend the capital from rival states, for instance, and the police to monitor the army (Feaver 2003, 83). These efforts encourage officers in counterbalancing forces to view their interests as distinct from those of the military.

In part because of the distinct interests different security forces develop, coup plotters from within the military cannot credibly commit to refrain from dissolving other security forces or incorporating them into the military if the coup succeeds. Their very presence outside the military chain of command challenges the military's core interest in preserving a monopoly on

legitimate use of force (Needler 1975, Nordlinger 1977). As Horowitz (1985, 547) describes it, "what is attractive about such units to political leaders is exactly what is provocative about them to military forces;" in particular, organizing forces outside the military chain of command "infuriate[s] regular military officers." It is thus no surprise that military regimes frequently abolish their rivals upon coming to power.[5] This creates powerful incentives for officers in those forces to actively defend the regime against coups—incentives regular military officers do not have.

Where counterweights decide to resist a coup attempt, they can do so in at least two ways. First, counterweights may physically interpose themselves between coup plotters and their targets or launch counterattacks to recover those captured by coup forces. Given the small number of targets in question, and how concentrated they are, "even *one* single formation loyal to the regime could intervene and defeat the coup attempt" (Luttwak 1968, 68). Second, counterweights can reduce the likelihood a coup will succeed by using radio or television broadcasts to offer a counter-narrative to that being provided by coup plotters. In doing so, they can help undermine efforts to convince other officers that the coup has already succeeded, thereby encouraging further resistance.

Taken together, this discussion suggest the following hypothesis about counterbalancing and coup outcomes:

> **Hypothesis 1**: Coups are more likely to succeed against regimes that do not counterbalance than those that do.

It also generates two different predictions about *how* counterbalancing reduces the likelihood a coup will succeed:

[5] For example, the presidential guard was disbanded following the 1978 coup in Afghanistan. Similarly, the Argentinian *gendarmerie*, which had been operating as an independent force since 1938, was placed under military command after the coup of 1975.

Hypothesis 1a: Counterbalancing decreases the probability a coup will succeed by creating barriers to communication and *coordination* between forces.

Hypothesis 1b: Counterbalancing decreases the probably a coup will succeed by increasing the likelihood that coup plotters will face armed *resistance* to the coup.

How then does counterbalancing affect the incidence of coup attempts? Theories about the causes of coups suggest that where norms of democratic, civilian control are lacking, officers stage coups when they have both the disposition and ability to do so (Feaver 1999). If counterbalancing reduces the military's ability to intervene successfully, as the discussion above suggests, it should also deter potential coup plotters from staging them in the first place. Even where coup-plotters believe they would eventually be victorious, the prospect that counterweights will defend the incumbent regime raises the risk that they will need to injure or kill other soldiers. Take the case of counterbalancing under Sukarno, Indonesia's first president following independence. As Crouch (1978, 198) describes, despite mounting tensions, "the reluctance of the army leadership to force a final showdown with the president was due primarily to their concern to avoid an outbreak of fighting" with the mobile police brigade he had built up as a counterweight.

However, the effects of counterbalancing on the military's disposition to intervene are more ambiguous. In some circumstances, counterbalancing may reduce military grievances that otherwise would have led to a coup. This may be the case where counterweights take over domestic security duties that were a source of conflict between military and civilian leaders, In Malawi, for instance, President Hastings Banda was able to use Special Branch and Mobile Unit

paramilitary forces for the "more onerous political duties" that would have sullied the army's popularity (Decalo 1988, 88).[6]

In most cases, however, as described above, counterbalancing also directly challenges the institutional interests of the military, generating new grievances, and, on occasion, even provoking the very coups it was intended to prevent. The 1977 coup in Pakistan was staged, in part, to disband President Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's Federal Security Force, which the military viewed "as a potential rival institution—a threat to their autonomy and monopoly of coercive power" (Shafqat 1997, 718). In Nigeria, the military intervened to disband President Ibrahim Babangida's new National Guard force less than a year after it was created (Radio Ghana 1993). Discussing motives for the 1964 coup in Bolivia, an army commander explained that the regime had armed militias, demonstrating that it "wanted to put an end to the army" (quoted in Needler 1969, 241).

The grievances generated by counterbalancing are likely to be sharpest immediately following their creation. There are also important reasons to expect that the deterrent effects of counterbalancing will not develop overnight. Potential coup-plotters may wager that a new force is less likely to resist a coup than a more established one for two reasons. First, new forces take time to train and equip, and thus be less confident in their ability to confront the military directly. Second, the institutional interests of new forces are less well developed. As a result, there are fewer incentives to "fight to the end" for newly established forces. Even where counterbalancing forces anticipate that they will be disbanded or incorporated into the army, this is not as dire a prospect when the force has only just been established. In other words, the new grievances

[6] Although it is outside the scope of this article to test, counterbalancing may also affect the likelihood of intervention in politics in a much more indirect way. Wilkinson (2015, 145-146), for example, describes how, in creating the Central Reserve Police Force in India, one aim "was to relieve the army of having to carry out prolonged aid to the civil deployments that might, potentially, draw the force into a larger political role."

created by counterweights are most likely to outweigh their deterrent effect when they are first established. This discussion leads to two hypotheses about counterbalancing and coup attempts:

Hypothesis 2: Counterbalancing does not decrease the likelihood of coup attempts.

Hypothesis 3: The creation of a new counterweight increases the risk of a coup.

Assessing Empirical Effects

Testing hypotheses about whether counterbalancing works requires detailed data on how states organize and deploy their security forces. In doing so, I draw on a new State Security Force Dataset, which includes information 264 security forces in a random sample of 65 developing states, 1960-2010.[7] I use a random sample because of the time intensiveness of coding the internal structure of state security forces over time. Using a random sample means that differences between the sample and the population are unlikely to be related to the use of counterbalancing. A list of countries included and comparison between the sample and population can be found in the online appendix (Tables A1-A2).[8]

The security forces in the dataset include presidential guards, interior troops, militarized police, border guards, and national militia.[9] For each security force in each year, I collect data on the government body that exerts operational control over it and where it is deployed. Each observation was hand coded using over 1,200 primary and secondary sources, including national defense legislation, government websites, and other primary source documents; academic

[7] I expect the arguments above to hold only outside long-term consolidated democracies, where norms of civilian and democratic control constrain soldiers from staging coups. I thus exclude from the analysis states that have been democratic for more than 50 years in 2010.

[8] States were randomly selected for inclusion in two draws. In the first, I selected states via a simple random sample from the population of developing states with more than 250,000 inhabitants in 2000. In the second, I selected states from among those remaining with a population of more than 5 million. The increase in the population threshold was due to the time intensity of collecting data on smaller countries.

[9] I include those police forces with organizational indicators of militarization, including command and control centers, the use of elite squads patterned after military special operations, barracked housing, and/or long-range deployment capabilities (Rantatalo 2012).

accounts; historical news sources; annual defense assessments; and reports from non-governmental organizations.[10]

The Independent Variable: Counterbalancing

From this dataset, I identify as "counterweights" forces that fulfill the following criteria: (1) the forces are independent from military command. Instead, operational control, which refers to the ability to initiate and terminate military operations, rests with the executive, interior ministry, or other government body besides the defense ministry, which controls the military. (2) The forces are deployed within 60 miles of the capital. In practice this excludes border and frontier guard forces in most years, as well as rural militia.

In the analysis below, I use two measures of counterbalancing. First, I create a dummy variable for *counterbalancing*, which indicates whether the regime in power employs more counterweights than the sample average. Second, I construct a count variable of the *number of counterweights (log)* in each state in each year. I log the number of counterweights because I do not expect that the addition of a new counterweight to an already very divided security sector would have the same effect as it would where the military has a monopoly on the use of force.[11] In testing hypothesis 3, I also use a dichotomous indicator for the creation of a *new counterweight*, which is equal to 1 in the year a new counterweight is created. These variables capture the extent to which rulers counterbalance their militaries with additional security forces. They do not capture the relative strength of different security forces. Theoretically, because

[10] A list of sources can be found on the author's website: xxxx.

[11] The criteria used are more restrictive than those used in other measures, which include forces controlled by the military and outside the capital. As a result, the correlation between the *number of counterweights (log)* and Pilster and Böhmelt's (2011) measure, for instance, is only 0.0748.

coups can be staged (and prevented) by even a small number of men, we should expect the logic of counterbalancing to hold no matter the size of the counterweight.

The Dependent Variables: Coup Success and Coup Attempts

The data on coups comes from the coup d'état dataset from the Center for Systemic Peace (Marshall and Marshall 2014). The first dependent variable is *coup success*, which is defined as a forceful seizure of executive power by a faction within the country's ruling or political elites, in which a new executive exercises effective authority for at least one month. The second dependent variable is *coup attempts*, a dichotomous indicator equal to 1 in any year in which one or more coup attempt occurred. Coup plots and rumors are excluded.

[Table 1]

Table 1 provides support, at a coarse-grained level, for hypotheses 1-3. It shows that where regimes do not counterbalance, coup succeed some 46% of the time; where they do, this figure drops to 31%. In other words, counterbalancing is associated with a 33% reduction in the likelihood a coup succeeds. However, counterbalancing is not associated with fewer coup attempts. Finally, the creation of a new counterweight is associated with an increased risk of coup attempts. The risk of a coup in the following year jumps from 6% to 13%—an increase of some 117%— when a leader creates a counterweight. In what follows, I show that these patterns hold up under more complex statistical investigation.

Model Specification

In estimating the relationship between counterbalancing and the success of coup attempts, I use a model that takes the following form:

$$Coup\ success_t = \alpha + \beta Counterbalancing_{t-1} + \gamma X_{t-1} + \eta_i + \varepsilon,$$

where *t* indexes each year; *i* indexes each unit; *counterbalancing* is a either a dummy variable capturing whether a country engages in counterbalancing or the logged number of counterweights employed; *X* is a vector of control variables included in some specifications; α, β, and γ are the parameters to be estimated; η represents fixed effects parameters, which are also estimated in some specifications; and ε is the error term. All right-hand side variables, with the exception of those capturing the rank of coup leaders, are lagged one year. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at country-level. Since the dependent variable is dichotomous, I estimate the equation using a logit model.[12]

I control for additional factors that likely influence the outcome of coup attempts. Coups succeed where leaders are able to quickly capture symbolic centers of political power and/or the executive himself and consolidate power by convincing other soldiers that victory is imminent. The rank of the coup leader is particularly important in signaling the likelihood of success. As Singh (2005, 6) argues, "While all coup makers are trying to 'make a fact' the resources they have for doing so vary with their position within the military hierarchy." He identifies coups from the top (those carried out by generals) as most likely to succeed, followed by those from middle ranking officers such as majors and colonels. I coded the rank of coup leaders from the CSP data, which identifies the leaders of each coup attempt. *Coup from the top* is equal to 1 where the coup was led by at least one military officer with the rank of general. Those in which coup leadership included at least one major or colonel are coded as *coup from the middle*.[13]

[12] Model specification tests indicate that the logistic regression model fits the data well (Pregibon 1981; Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000).
[13] Coups led by junior officers, enlisted men, and non-military elites, or where coup leaders are unspecified, are coded as 0 for both variables.

Regime type is also likely to affect the ability of soldiers to plot in secret and their ability to consolidate power. If democratic governments are perceived as more legitimate than non-democratic ones, coup plotters should have a harder time convincing other soldiers that the new government will not face opposition domestically. Conversely, Geddes (2009) points out that less repressive political system makes plotting relatively safe and may enable more consultation and coordination before the coup is under way, which would suggest coups against democratic states would be more likely to succeed rather than less. Democracies are also less likely to coup-proof (Pilster and Böhmelt 2012). I thus control for whether or not the coup is staged in a *democracy.* The indicator for democratic regimes is a dummy variable equal to 1 when a state's PolityIV polity2 score is +7 or higher.[14] *Military regimes* are more likely than other types of regimes to be concerned, above all, with maintaining the unity of the armed forces; they may therefore be more likely to resign in the face of a coup than other types of regimes (Geddes 1999). The indicator for military regimes comes from Geddes, Wright, and Franz (2014).

The ability of coup plotters to consolidate power is also likely to be a function of how the coup will be received by domestic and international audiences. Coups in poorer states, with weaker political institutions, are more likely to succeed (Londregan and Poole 1990; Finer 2002). Economic downturns may also spark popular dissatisfaction with the regime that increase confidence that the coup will find public support (Johnson, Slater, and McGowan 1984; Fossum 1967; Thompson 1975). To capture these dynamics, I include controls for the annual *change in GDP* as well as a log of *GDP per capita*, in real 1996 dollars (Gleditsch 2002).

The recent past may also affect soldiers' estimations of the coup's outcome. Recent successful coups are likely to raise expectations about the prospects of future coups. I thus

[14] Although consolidated democracies are excluded from the analysis, 26% country-year observations have polity scores of 7 or higher.

include an indicator that is equal to 1 if there was a *recent successful coup* in the past three years. Where coups are a regular feature of politics in surrounding states, soldiers may also be more likely to believe they may succeed (Li and Thompson 1975). *Recent regional coup* is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if there was a coup attempt in the region within the last three years. Politically relevant regions are identified from Teorell et al. (2011).

Coups staged in the wake of successful revolutions are much less likely to succeed than those staged at other times because they typically involve reorganization and weakening of the armed forces (Horowitz 1985; Farcau 1994). *Recent revolution* is an indicator equal to 1 if the government of a state in the past three years transformed the existing social, political, or economic relationships of the state (Colgan 2012). Finally, I include a control for *Cold War* equal to 1 in the years 1960-1991. During this period, the United States and former colonial powers in Europe frequently intervene in coup attempts, sometimes helping them along and sometimes thwarting them (Thyne 2010). Since the end of the Cold War, however, international opposition to coups may thwart the ability of coup-leaders to consolidate their power, and those that do succeed in face increasing international pressure to hold elections (Marinov and Goemans 2014).

To address the question of whether counterbalancing can effectively deter coup attempts, I estimate the relationship using a logit model that takes the same form of that for coup success. Standard errors are again corrected for clustering at country-level, and fixed effects parameters included in some specifications. I control for variables that shape norms governing intervention, the military's disposition to intervene, and/or its ability to do so successfully. To capture normative theories of coups, which emphasize that coup attempts are likely where norms of civilian and democratic control are absent, I include indicators of *democracy* and *military*

regimes. Military regimes are thought to be particularly vulnerable to coup attempts (Geddes 1999). As military budgets are a particularly frequent source of conflict between military and civilian leaders that affect the disposition to intervene (Thompson 1975, Nordlinger 1977), I control for *changes in military spending* from the previous year, taken from the Correlates of War capability (CINC) military expenditure component variable (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972), as well as *expenditure/soldier*.

Also included as controls are economic indicators of regime legitimacy including *GDP/capita (log)* and *change in GDP*. One of the strongest findings in the empirical literature is that coup attempts are more likely in poorer states (Collier and Hoeffler 2007, Londregan and Poole 1990). Economic crises are also expected to increase the incidence of coup attempts (Galetovic and Sanhueza 2000). Other types of political crises and signs of public discontent with the regime may also increase the incidence of coup attempts. Svolik (2012, 2013) argues that military intervention is politics is most likely where regimes face moderate levels of mass threats. I thus include controls for domestic political *instability* in the form of strikes, riots, and demonstrations (Banks 2003). Revolutions frequently generate a backlash from within the armed forces, which may result in more frequent coup attempts in the years immediately following. I thus also include the indicator for *recent revolutions*.

Some scholars have suggested that larger military are more likely to stage coups (e.g., Bienen 1969), although the theoretical link is weak (Belkin and Schofer 2003). It is plausible, however, that larger militaries could be a signal of the military's political strength. I thus include an indicator for *military personnel (log)* (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972). Finally, several studies have identified a link between previous coups and subsequent ones (e.g., Londregan and Poole 1990). I include a control for a country's prior history of coups (*years since coup*), along

with associated cubic splines, in line with Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998). Descriptive statistics for all variables used in the analysis can be found in the appendix (Table A3).

Results

Table 2 shows the results of four models examining the relationship between counterbalancing and coup success using both measures of counterbalancing. Models 1 and 3 are core models, which include only counterbalancing and the rank of the coup-leader. Model 2 and 4 include the additional controls. All four regressions show the expected results: the estimated coefficient on counterbalancing, whether measured as a dichotomous indicator for counterbalancing or the logged number of counterweights, is negative and statistically significant. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, coups staged against regimes that use a high level of counterbalancing are less likely to be overthrown in the event of a coup attempt than those that do not. These results hold when controlling for a number of other factors likely to affect both counterbalancing and the outcomes of military coups. Moreover, the size of the effect is substantially large. When rulers do not counterbalance, the odds a coup will succeed are 2.11 times larger than when they do. The association between the number of counterweights and coup success, explored in models 3 and 4, is also negative and significant, which suggests that not only are coups less likely to succeed in the presence of counterweights, but the also that the likelihood of success decreases as the extent of divisions in the state's security sector increases.

[Table 2]

The results on control variables for coup success generally behave as expected. Several other variables are significant predictors of whether or not a coup will succeed. In particular, these results confirm the importance of the rank of the coup leader as a determinate of successful

coups. Coup attempts staged from the top are most likely to succeed, followed by those staged from the middle. As expected, coup leaders in wealthier states are less likely than those in poorer states to succeed in taking power. Coups are less likely to succeed in the years following a successful revolution. The associations between democracy and coup success are positive in both models 2 and 4, in line with Geddes's (2009) argument; however, they does not reach statistically significance at standard levels. The sign on coefficients on other control variables, including military regimes, GDP growth, recent successful coups, and recent regional coups are in the expected direction, but not statistically significant.

Table 3 shows the results of six regressions estimating the effect of counterbalancing on the incidence of coup attempts. Models 1-3 examine the bivariate relationships between counterbalancing and coup attempts. Models 1 and 2, which use *high counterbalancing* and the *number of counterweights*, respectively, show no clear relationship between counterbalancing and coup attempts: the coefficient on *high counterbalancing* is positive, while that on *number of counterweights* is negative; neither reaches statistical significance at conventional levels. Model 3, which regresses coup attempts on the dummy for *new counterweight*, indicates a positive and statistically significant relationship between the two. In models with the main independent variables and no controls (models 4-5), the findings remain the same, although the significance is higher for new counterweights. These general patterns hold in the fuller analysis with control variables (Models 6-7). As predicted by Hypothesis 2, counterbalancing is not associated with fewer coup attempts. By contrast, and consistent with Hypothesis 3, the creation of a new counterweight is associated with an increased risk of a coup in the following year. In particular, the odds ratios from models 6 and 7 suggest that the creation of a new counterweight makes a coup in the following year over 2.1 times more likely.

[Table 3]

The results on control variables for coup attempts are also generally as expected. Wealthier states see fewer coup attempts. Coups are also much more likely following revolutions. The longer it has been since a coup, the less likely another attempt will occur. While the estimated coefficients on other control variables do not reach standard levels of statistical significance, the direction of associations are largely as anticipated: the coefficients on changes in military expenditure, expenditure per soldier, military personnel, democracy, wealth, and changes in GDP/capita are all negative, while the coefficient on instability is positive. The findings on military size and spending variables in particular are in line with other recent statistical analyses (e.g., Powell 2012; Singh 2015), which find only inconsistent support for a relationship between them and coup attempts.

Robustness Checks

I have outlined above several mechanisms that suggest the negative correlation I find between coup success and the use of counterweights is likely to be a causal one. However, one plausible alternate interpretation is that leaders are only able to create counterweights where the military is too weak to object—and that it is this weakness that accounts for the increased likelihood that coups will fail. If this argument is correct, military strength should be positively correlated with coup success and negatively correlated with counterbalancing. However, common indicators of military strength, including military spending and personnel, are very weakly but *negatively* correlated with coup success (Singh 2014, Powell 2012, Collier and Hoeffler 2007). Furthermore, the relationship between military strength and counterbalancing is, if anything, a

positive one. As Table A5 in the online appendix indicates, none of the correlations between indicators of military strength, counterbalancing, and coup success are greater than 0.1.

In analysis presented in Table A6, I test this alternative argument more systematically, finding that the relationship between counterbalancing and coup success is robust to the inclusion of controls for military strength. Another possibility is that the relationship between counterbalancing and coup success is driven by military dictatorships, in which the unusually strong position of the military simultaneously reduces counterbalancing and increases the likelihood of successful coups. In order to test for this possibly, I exclude military regimes from the analysis, and find that the negative association between counterbalancing and coup success remains. Taken together, the findings in Tables A5-A6 suggest that military strength is unlikely to be resulting in a spurious correlation between counterbalancing and coup success.

I next examine whether selection effects explain the association. If potential coup-plotters from within the military take the likelihood of success into account when deciding whether to intervene, then it may be that the only coups staged in the presence of counterweights would be those in which coup-plotters had some other reason to expect victory. Importantly, however, this type of selection effect would attenuate the estimated effect of counterbalancing on coup success. That I find a negative and statistically significant effect despite this expectation should increase our confidence in the result.

Furthermore, the negative association between counterbalancing and coup success remains when I model selection effects explicitly using two-stages model of coup attempts and outcomes (Table A7-A8). A Heckman (1979) model first estimates the likelihood of a coup attempt and then includes the selection hazard as an independent variable in a second model, which estimates the outcome of a coup attempt. Because the traditional Heckman model uses

ordinary least squares, which may be inefficient given that the dependent variable is dichotomous, I use the "probit-probit" variation suggested by Van de Ven and Van Praag (1981). Because regressors in the second stage must be a strict subset of those in the first, I exclude the rank of coup leaders and replace indicators for recent coups with the years since last coup attempt and associated cublic splines. The negative association between counterbalancing and coup success remains statistically significant.

For coup attempts, it is also reasonable to wonder whether the results are driven by the characteristics of particular countries or by temporal dynamics. However, the positive association between the creation of a new counterweight and incidence of coup attempts is robust to the inclusion of country and year fixed effects (Table A9). This finding helps eliminate concern about omitted variable bias resulting from temporal dynamics or time-invariant characteristics of states.

In Tables A10 and A11, I examine whether particular coding decisions in the CSP coup data might be driving the results by re-estimating the main text models using only those coups that are also in Powell and Thyne's (2011) dataset. Although the two datasets show broadly similar trends in coups over time, there are a number of differences between the datasets that reflect, in part, different definitions of what constitutes a successful coup. CSP requires a new regime to remain in power for at least a month, while Powell and Thyne require only one week. As Tables A10-A11 show, the main results are unchanged.

In interpreting the positive correlation I find between new counterweights and coup attempts, I have described above theoretical reasons to expect that the relationship is a causal one. However, it could be could be leaders are most likely to create new counterweights when they perceive the risk of a coup to be high, but that counterweight creation does not itself affect

the likelihood of a coup attempt. As an additional robustness check, I use a two-stage selection model that accounts for selection into the extent of counterbalancing a regime engages in (Table A12). In the first stage, I include controls for a number of factors with theoretical links to counterbalancing, including whether the state is a former French colony, the risk of international conflict, and whether the state has a defense alliance with a major power (Horowitz 1985, Frisch 2002). I find that when selection into the number of counterweights is accounted for, new counterweights are still associated with a positive, statistically significant increase in coup attempts in the following year.

In Tables A13-A15, I re-estimate each model after removing each control variable. The central results remain unchanged in 29 of the 30 regressions in these tests, suggesting that the findings are not simply an artifact of including particular control variables. Finally, in Table A16, I substitute more indirect measures of mass threats, which capture economic inequality, for *instability*, in the regressions for coup attempts. These include the Gini coefficient and Theil statistic (Svolik 2013). The results remain unchanged. All told, these efforts to address potential sources of spurious correlation and selection effects, and to ensure that the findings are not merely the result of particular coding or modeling decisions, increase confidence that the results presented above are not illusory.

Case Evidence on Mechanisms

The results above identify a negative, statistically significant association between counterbalancing and the likelihood a coup will succeed. In this section, I examine evidence on the specific mechanisms linking counterbalancing and coup outcomes in eight cases of coup attempts. The cases were selected from the CSP's 2014 list of attempted and successful coups

between 1960 and 2010 on a "most likely" basis, in which a hypothesized causal relationship is deemed most likely to be found (Eckstein 1975). All are cases in which the regime in power at the outset of the coup engaged in counterbalancing. Six are "on-the-line" cases, in which rulers counterbalanced and the coup failed, as predicted by hypotheses 1, and two are "off-the-line," in which the coup succeeded despite counterbalancing (Lieberman 2005).

A most-likely method of case selection would be inappropriate if the aim were to uncover a correlation between counterbalancing and coup failure. However, given that the statistical analysis has already established a correlation, a most-likely method enables me to identify which of the proposed causal mechanisms linking counterbalancing and coup outcomes are plausible and, if a mechanism is not observed in this set of cases, it enables me to infer with a high degree of confidence that it is unlikely to be more generally valid. Uncovering the internal validity of the link between counterbalancing and coup outcomes in a number of cases can also ease suspicions of spurious and reverse causation.

Short case narratives describing each coup attempt can be found in the appendix. The narratives identify the causes of the coup and how it progressed, highlighting in particular the role, if any, played by counterbalancing forces. If counterbalancing decreases the probability a coup will succeed by creating barriers to coordination between forces, we should observe coup plotters making tactical errors and encounter difficulties in timing attacks concurrently or coordinating troop movements. If counterbalancing decreases the probably a coup will succeed by creating incentives for armed resistance to the coup, we should see counterweights take up arms to defend key targets, such as the presidential palace, parliament, radio stations, airports, or other symbolic seats of power; and/or use radio and television stations to provide a counter-narrative to that of the coup-plotters.

[Table 4]

Table 4 summarizes the findings about the causal mechanisms observed in the eight cases. Counterbalancing directly contributed to the inability of coup-plotters to seize power in four of the six cases of failed coups. It did so through the mechanism of resistance (hypothesis 1A). In Afghanistan, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Kenya, security forces outside the military moved to interpose themselves between coup-plotters and key targets and to launch counterattacks on targets seized by coup forces. In the March 7, 1990, coup in Afghanistan, for instance, it was the military police and secret police, both under the Ministry of Interior, that successfully blocked conspirators from seizing the palace, and eventually pushed them out of the capital (Burns 1990). Similarly, it was Daniel Arap Moi's paramilitary General Services Unit that "ultimately crushed" the August 1, 1982, rebellion in Kenya by retaking targets captured by coup forces (Decalo 1998, 243). Counterweights in both the Dominican Republic and Afghanistan also attempted to counter the narratives offered by coup-plotters. During the April 4, 1965, coup in the Dominican Republic, the National Police gave a radio address denying that the regime had been overthrown (Lowenthal 1972). Meanwhile, in Afghanistan, the head of Ministry of Interior forces took to the radio to demand the capture of the coup leader "dead or alive" (Burns 1990).

In one of the two cases of failed coups in which counterweights did *not* offer resistance to coup plotters, the August 15, 1975, coup in Bangladesh, the inaction of the JRB in particular can be can be partially explained by the fact that the force's commander was unexpectedly out of town with the coup occurred, disrupting the normal chain of command through which orders to resist normally would have come. The ousted executive, Sheik Mujibar Rahman, attempted to reach another senior office to rally the force to his defense, but was unable to get through. The

result was a tense standoff between the military and the JRB in which neither side fired (Mascarenhas 1986).

Furthermore, in both of the "off-the-line" cases of coup attempts, which succeeded despite the rulers' efforts to counterbalance, counterweights either actively defended the regime or served as a key source of post-coup resistance. Kwame Nkrumah's President's Own Guard Regiment was eventually overpowered during the February 24, 1966, coup attempt in Ghana, but only after exchanging fire with coup forces (Garrison 1966). In North Yemen, tribal militias used by Imam Muhammad al-Badr's regime as counterweights to the regular army, and stationed just outside the capital, fled when coup forces took the presidential palace during the 1962 coup. However, the Imam survived the initial attack and rallied tribal militias to form the core of the rebel army he used to challenge the new coup-appointed government. While the coup was considered a success, counterweights thus helped prevent the new regime from effectively consolidating power (Clark 2010, O'Ballance 1971).

However, there is little, if any, evidence of the coordination mechanism (hypothesis 1B). Coup plotters in Haiti, which involved the Leopards and Dessalines battalions, both of which had been separated from the army chain of command, do not appear to have been hindered by the need to coordinate the actions of multiple forces. The 1991 coup in the Soviet Union is a more ambiguous case. The coup was staged by top ranking officers in security forces organized under three different ministries: the military, Interior Ministry, and KGB. Odom (1998) attributes the failure of the coup, in part, to poor planning that resulted from the complexity of coordinating three different security forces. Singh (2015, 202) also emphasizes how "tactically awkward" it was to use all three forces together. However, it is not clear that it was the participation of multiple forces that accounts for the coup's failure. Instead, the coup seems to have collapsed

because of the decisive action taken by Boris Yeltsin, then President of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic of the Soviet Union, who acted quickly to denounce the coup and called for a general strike in response. In the wake of Yeltsin's denunciation, the military faced a series of munities that eventually doomed the attempt (Kellers 1991).

Overall, the case evidence should increase our confidence that the negative association between counterbalancing and coup success identified in the statistical analysis is a casual one. These eight cases furthermore suggest that when counterbalancing works, it does so primarily because counterweights actively defend the regime by defending key targets or provide counter-narratives to those offered by coup plotters, rather than by creating logistical barriers to communication and coordination between forces.

Conclusions

Does counterbalancing prevent military coups? If so, how? Using new measures of counterbalancing drawn from original data on state security forces in the developing world, I find that counterbalancing does help insulate leaders from coups. However, in contrast to existing research, I find that it does so by reducing the success rate of coup attempts, rather than by reducing the number of coup attempts that leaders face. Indeed, the creation of a new counterbalancing force *increases* the odds of a coup in the following year. These findings were robust to a number of different estimation methods and the inclusion of potential confounders. I also test the mechanisms by which counterbalancing decreases the likelihood a coup attempt will succeed with evidence from eight cases, finding that counterbalancing works primarily because counterweights use force to defend incumbent regimes, rather than by creating barriers to

coordination and communication between forces. A troubling implication of this finding is that counterbalancing is likely to be associated with more violent coups.

This article suggests a number of areas for future inquiry. In establishing the relationship between counterbalancing and coups, this article has ignored some interesting variation across security forces used to counterbalancing the military. Some are elite forces, trained and equipped on par with the regular army, while others are comprised of civilian recruits. Some are comprised of soldiers with ethnic, religious, or political ties to the incumbent regime, while others are not. Future research may examine whether potential coup-plotters within the military respond similarly when faced with different types of counterweights. I also argued in this article that given the small number of troops required to stage (and prevent) coups, the logic of counterbalancing should hold regardless of the configuration of power between different security forces. Efforts to gather additional information about the size and strength of security forces would enable testing the assumption these security forces can be thought of as equivalent in terms of their potential to impede coups.

Moving beyond the relationship between counterbalancing and coups, this research highlights the importance of opening up the "black box" of the state's security sector to examine how states organize, staff, equip, and deploy their security forces. Recent work has explored the consequences of rebel group fragmentation (e.g., Bakke, Cunningham, and Seymour 2012), as well as the proliferation of paramilitaries and militias (Jentzsch, Kalyvas, and Schubiger 2015; Carey, Mitchell, and Lowe 2012). This project emphasizes similar variation in the number of armed actors that can be present within a state's security sector. In addition to the incidence and outcome of coup attempts, future research may explore whether such divisions affect the use of repression, conduct of counterinsurgency, or the outcomes of civil wars.

References

Bakke, Kristin M., Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, and Lee J. M. Seymour. 2012. "A Plague of Initials: Fragmentation, Cohesion, and Infighting in Civil Wars." *Perspectives on Politics* 10 (2): 265-283.

Banks, Aurthur. 2001. *Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive*. Binghamton: Computer Systems Unlimited.

Beck, Nathaniel, Jonathan Katz, and Richard Tucker. 1998. "Beyond Ordinary Logit: Taking Time Seriously in Binary-Time-Series-Cross-Section Models." *American Journal of Political Science* 42 (2): 1260-88.

Belkin, Aaron. 2005. *United We Stand? Divide-and-Conquer Politics and the Logic of International Hostility*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Belkin, Aaron and Evan Schofer. 2003. "Toward a Structural Understanding of Coup Risk." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 47 (5): 594-620.

Biddle, Stephen, and Robert Zirkle. 1996. "Technology, Civil-Military Relations, and Warfare in the Developing World." *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 19 (2): 171-212.

Bienen, Henry. 1969. "Foreign Policy, the Military, and Development: Military Assistance and Political Change in Africa." In *Foreign Policy and the Developing Nation*, edited by R. Butwell, 67-111. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press.

Böhmelt, Tobias, and Ulrich Pilster. 2015. "The Impact of Institutional Coup-Proofing on Coup Attempts and Coup Outcomes." *International Interactions* 41 (1): 158-182.

Bruce, Robert H. 1992. "Keeping the Military at Bay with Countervailing Force: The Utility of Indonesian Civilian Leaders' Use of Paramilitary Police." Indian Ocean Centre for Peace Studies Occasional Paper no. 20. Nedlands, W.A: Indian Ocean Centre for Peace Studies.

Burns, John F. 1990. "In Power Still, Afghan Can Thank His 4-Star Aide." *New York Times*. (May 10).

Carey, Sabine C., Neil J. Mitchell, and Will Lowe. 2013. "States, the Security Sector, and the Monopoly of Violence: A New Database on Pro-government Militias." *Journal of Peace Research* 50 (2): 249-258.

Clark, Victoria. 2010. *Yemen: Dancing on the Heads of Snakes*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Colgan, Jeff. 2011. "Venezuela and Military Expenditure Data." *Journal of Peace Research* 48 (4): 547-556.

———. 2012. "Measuring Revolution." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 29 (4): 444-467.

Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler. 2007. "Military Spending and the Risks of Coups d'état." Manuscript, Oxford.

Crouch, Harold. 1978. *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Decalo, Samuel. 1998. *The Stable Minority: Civilian Rule in Africa, 1960-1990*. African Studies Series, no. 1. London: FAP Books.

Eckstein, Harry. 1975. "Case Studies and Theory in Political Science." In *Handbook of Political Science*, vol. 7, edited by Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, 79-138. New York: Addison-Wesley.

Farcau, Bruce W. 1994. *The Coup: Tactics in the Seizure of Power.* Westport: Praeger.

Feaver, Peter D. 1999. "Civil-Military Relations." *Annual Review of Political Science* 2 (1): 211-241.

———. 2003. *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations*. Cambridge:

Harvard University Press.

Fermoselle, Rafael. 1987. *The Evolution of the Cuban Military: 1492-1986*. Miami: Ediciones Universal.

Finer, Samuel E. 2002. *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc.

Fossum, Egil. 1967. "Factors Influencing the Occurrence of Military Coups d'etat in Latin America." *Journal of Peace Research* 4 (3): 228-51.

Frazer, Jendayi E. 1994. *Sustaining Civilian Control: Armed Counterweights in Regime Stability in Africa*. PhD diss., Stanford University.

Frisch, Hillel. 2002. "Explaining Third World Security Structures." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 25 (3): 161-190.

Galetovic, Alexander, and Ricardo Sanhueza. 2000. "Citizens, Autocrats, and Plotters: A Model and New Evidence on Coups d'état." *Economics & Politics* 12 (2): 183-204.

Garrison, Llyod. 1966. "Army in Control After Ghana Coup Topples Nkrumah." *New York Times* (February 25).

Geddes, Barbara. 1990. "How the Cases you Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in Comparative Politics." *Political Analysis* 2 (1): 131-150.

———. 1999. "What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 2 (1): 115-144

———. 2009. "How Autocrats Defend Themselves Against Armed Rivals." Paper prepared for the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Toronto, Canada.

Geddes, Barbara, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz. 2014. "Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set." *Perspectives on Politics* 12 (2): 313-331.

George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennett. 2005. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Science*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede. 2002. "Expanded Trade and GDP Data." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46 (5): 712-24.

Goodspeed, D.J. 1962. *The Conspirators: A Study of the Coup d'etat.* London: MacMillan & Co.

Harkness, Kristin A. 2014. "The Ethnic Army and the State: Explaining Coup Traps and the Difficulties of Democratization in Africa." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*: 0022002714545332.

Heckman, James J. 1979. ''Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error.'' *Econometrica* 47 (1): 153-61.

Horowitz, Donald L. 1985. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Hosmer, D. W., and Stanley Lemeshow. 2000. *Applied Logistic Regression*. New York: WileyJames.

Janowitz, Morris. 1960. *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.

———. 1977. *Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Jentzsch, Corinna, Stathis N. Kalyvas, and Livia Isabella Schubiger. 2015. "Militias in Civil Wars." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*: 0022002715576753.

Johnson, Thomas H., Robert O. Slater, and Pat McGowan. 1984. "Explaining African Military Coups d'Etat." *American Political Science Review* 78 (3): 622-40.

Kabir, Bhuian Md. Monoar. 2006. *Politics and Development of the Jamaat-e-Islami, Bangladesh*. South Asian Publishers.

Kebschull, H.G. 1994. “Operation ‘Just Missed’: Lessons From Failed Coup Attempts.” *Armed Forces and Society* 20 (4): 565-579.

Kellers, Bill. 1991. “Sporadic Mutinies Rack Soviet Army.” *New York Time* (August 21).

Li, Richard P. Y., and William R. Thompson. 1975. “The ‘Coup Contagion’ Hypothesis.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 18 (1): 63-88.

Lierberman, Evan S. 2005. “Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Research.” *American Political Science Review* 99.03 (2005): 435-452.

Londregan, John B., and Keith T. Poole. 1990. “Poverty, the Coup Trap, and the Seizure of Executive Power.” *World Politics* 42 (2): 151-183.

Lowenthal, Abraham F. 1972. *The Dominican Intervention*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.

Luttwak, Edward. 1979. *Coup d’État: A Practical Handbook.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Malaparte, Curzio. 1932. *Coup d’État: The Technique of Revolution*. New York: EP Dutton & Co.

Marinov, Nikolay and Hein Goemans. 2014. “Coups and Democracy.” *British Journal of Political Science* 44 (4): 799-825.

Marshall, Monty G., and Donna Ramsey Marshall. 2014. “Coup d’Etat Events, 1946-2013.” Vienna: Center for Systemic Peace.

Mascarenhas, A. 1986. *Bangladesh: A Legacy of Blood*. Hodder and Stoughton Sevenoaks.

Needler, Martin C. 1969. “The Latin American Military: Predatory Reactionaries or Modernizing Patriots?” *Journal of Inter-American Studies* 11 (2): 237-244.

———. 1975. “Military Motivations in the Seizure of Power.” *Latin American Research*

Review 10 (3): 63-79.

Nordlinger, Eric A. 1977. *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc.

O'Ballance, Edgar. 1971. *The War in the Yemen*. Shoe String Press, Inc.

Odom, William E. 1998. *The Collapse of the Soviet Military*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Pilster, Ulrich, and Tobias Böhmelt. 2011. "Coup-proofing and Military Effectiveness in Interstate Wars, 1967–99." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 28 (4): 331-350.

———. 2012. "Do Democracies Engage Less in Coup-Proofing? On the Relationship between Regime Type and Civil–Military Relations." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 8 (4): 355-372.

Powell, Jonathan M. 2012. "Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups d'état." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56 (6): 1017-1040.

Powell, Jonathan M., and Clayton L. Thyne. 2011. "Global Instances of Coups from 1950 to 2010: A New Dataset." *Journal of Peace Research* 48 (2): 249-259.

Pregibon, Daryl. 1981. "Logistic Regression Diagnostics." *Annals of Statistics* 9: 705-724

Quinlivan, James T. 1999. "Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East." *International Security* 24 (2): 131-165.

"Radio Ghana Reports National Guard Dissolved" [Radio Ghana]. 1993. Accra Ghana Broadcasting Corporation. Federal Broadcast Information Service Daily Report. FBIS-AFR-93-208. October 29.

Rahman, M.A. 1984. "Bangladesh in 1983: A Turning Point for the Military." *Asian Survey* 24 (2): 240-249.

Rantatalo, Oscar. 2012. "The Miscellany of Militaristic Policing: A Literature Review." *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism* 7, no. 1: 51-65.

Shafqat, Saeed. 1997. *Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: From Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to Benazir Bhutto*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. 1972. ‘‘Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and War, 1820-1965.’’ In *Peace, War and Numbers*, edited by Bruce Russett, 19-48. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Singh, Naunihal. 2014. *Seizing Power: The Strategic Logic of Military Coups*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Stepan, Alfred. 1971. *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Svolik, Milan W. 2012. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2013. “Contracting on Violence The Moral Hazard in Authoritarian Repression and Military Intervention in Politics.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 57 (5): 765-794.

Taylor, Brian D. 2003. *Politics and the Russian Army: Civil-Military Relations, 1689-2000.* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Teorell, Jan, Nicholas Charron, Marcus Samanni, Soren Holmberg, and Bo Rothstein. 2011. *The Quality of Government Dataset*, version 6 Apr 11. University of Gothenburg.

Thompson, William R. 1975. “Regime Vulnerability and the Military Coup.” *Comparative Politics* 7 (4): 459-87.

Thyne, Clayton. 2010. “Supporter of Stability or Agent of Agitation? The Effect of United States Foreign Policy on Coups in Latin America, 1960-1999.” *Journal of Peace Research* 47 (4): 1-13.

Van de Ven, Wynand P., and Bernard M. Van Praag. 1981. “The Demand for Deductibles in

Private Health Insurance: A Probit Model with Sample Selection." *Journal of Econometrics* 17 (2): 229-252.

Wilkinson, Steven. 2015. *Army and Nation: India's Military and Democracy Since Independence.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Tables and Figures

Table 1: Counterbalancing and Coups

	Counterbalancing		New counterweight		Total
	No	Yes	No	Yes	
Total observations	1,982	996	2,881	97	2,978
No coup attempts	1,857	925	2,698	84	2,782
% country years with attempts	*6%*	*7%*	*6%*	*13%*	*7%*
Coup attempts	125	71	183	13	196
Failed	68	49	108	9	117
Successful	57	22	75	4	79
% coup attempts successful	*46%*	*31%*	*41%*	*31%*	*40%*

Table 2: Effect of Counterbalancing on Coup Outcomes

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Counterbalancing	-0.667**	-0.747*		
	(0.288)	(0.400)		
Number of counterweights (log)			-0.611**	-0.772*
			(0.278)	(0.418)
Coup from top	2.064***	2.040***	2.031***	2.015***
	(0.364)	(0.414)	(0.361)	(0.406)
Coup from middle	0.666**	0.628*	0.616*	0.598*
	(0.322)	(0.352)	(0.329)	(0.358)
Military regime		0.166		0.250
		(0.429)		(0.447)
Democracy		0.355		0.443
		(0.438)		(0.463)
GDP/capita (log)		-0.516**		-0.543***
		(0.204)		(0.198)
Ch. GDP/capita		-0.537		-0.420
		(3.115)		(3.09)
Recent successful coup		0.115		0.114
		(0.397)		(0.411)
Recent regional coup		0.388		0.430
		(0.649)		(0.636)
Recent revolution		-1.882**		-1.974**
		(0.807)		(0.819)
Cold War		0.416		0.350
		(0.492)		(0.516)
Constant	-1.003***	1.918	-0.842***	2.316
	(0.227)	(1.809)	(0.262)	(1.804)
Log likelihood	-112.89076	-94.591012	-129.723	-94.178
Pseudo R-squared	0.1457	0.2207	0.018	0.224
Observations	196	179	196	179

*Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*

Table 3: Effect of Counterbalancing on Coup Attempts

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Counterbalancing	0.131			0.080		0.196	
	(0.258)			(0.256)		(0.200)	
Number of counterweights (log)		-0.045			-0.117		0.119
		(0.271)			(0.27)		(0.205)
New counterweight			0.837**	0.811**	0.891***	0.762**	0.768**
			(0.333)	(0.322)	(0.320)	(0.310)	(0.315)
Ch. Mil. Expenditure						-0.002	-0.003
						(0.017)	(0.034)
Expenditure/Soldier						-0.109	-0.106
						(0.095)	(0.096)
Mil. Personnel						-0.001	-0.001
						(0.000)	(0.000)
Military regime						0.203	0.182
						(0.223)	(0.216)
Democracy						-0.105	-0.121
						(0.291)	(0.293)
GDP/capita (log)						-0.205*	-0.204*
						(0.109)	(0.11)
Ch. GDP/capita						-0.147	-0.166
						(1.15)	(1.153)
Recent revolution						0.529*	0.537*
						(0.288)	(0.285)
Instability						0.252	0.244
						(0.224)	(0.22)
Years since coup						-0.335***	-0.334***
						(0.092)	(0.092)
Constant	-2.698***	-2.624***	-2.691***	-2.718***	-2.620***	0.671	0.641
	(0.162)	(0.212)	(0.139)	(0.162)	(0.211)	(0.648)	(0.644)
Log likelihood	-722.339	-722.652	-719.618	-719.489	-719.320	-516.620	-516.931
Pseudo R-squared	0.001	0.000	0.004	0.004	0.005	0.112	0.111
Observations	2,978	2,978	2,978	2,978	2,978	2,114	2,114

*Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Cubic splines are included in each model.*

Table 4: Evidence on Mechanisms of Counterbalancing in Most-likely Cases

	During the coup		After the coup
"On-the-line" cases (failed coups)	Resistance	Coordination	Resistance
Afghanistan, 3/7/1990	Yes	No	--
Bangladesh 8/15/1975	No	No	--
Dominican Republic, 4/24/1965	Yes	No	--
Haiti, 4/2/1989	Yes	No	--
Kenya, 8/1/1982	Yes	No	--
Russia, 8/19/1991	No	Yes?	--
"Off-the-line" cases (successful coups)			
Ghana, 2/24/1966	Yes	No	No
North Yemen, 9/26/1962	No	No	Yes

Online Appendix for "Preventing Coups d'état: How Counterbalancing Works"

Case Narratives

Afghanistan, 3/7/1990

On March 7, 1990, Afghanistan's Defense Minister, Shah Nawaz Tanai, launched a coup to depose President Mohammed Najibullah. The coup was supported by sections of the army and air force, as well as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a mujahadeen leader (Rosenthal 1990; Suhrke 1990). It began with an aerial attack on Najibullah's presidential palace. On the ground, skirmishes between coup forces and those loyal to the president occurred near the airport, Defense Ministry, and government radio station (Coll 1990a). Resistance from within the military was minimal. As Coll (1990b) describes, "a large portion of the air force either defected to Tanai or decided to wait out the coup attempt before taking sides." Instead, coup forces marching on the palace were intercepted by the military police (sarandoy) and secret police (KhaD) (Burns 1990). The police, which were under the command of General Mohammed Aslam Watanjar at the Ministry of Interior, had been built up as counterweights to the military during the 1980s, along with a presidential guard force and communist party militia (Halliday and Tanin 1988; Cordovez and Harrison 1995). They successfully blocked the army from seizing the palace, and by March 8, coup forces had been pushed out of the capital. Najibullah appointed General Watanjar as new Defense Minister, and he gave a radio address ordering the army to capture General Tanai "dead or alive." Tanani fled to Pakistan, although sporadic fighting continued for several days (Fineman 1990).

Sources

Burns, John F. 1990. "In Power Still, Afghan Can Thank His 4-Star Aide." *New York Times*. (May 10).

Coll, Steve. 1990a. "Afghan Leader Says He Crushes Coup Bid." *Washington Post* p. A29.

———. 1990b. "Afghan Plot Leader Flies to Pakistan; Coup Said to Fizzle." *Washington Post* p. A29.

Fineman, Mark. 1990. "Afghanistan Army Units Attempt Coup; President Najibullah Declares Rebellion Was Crushed by Loyal Forces." *New York Times* (March 7).

Suhrke, Astri. 1990. "Afghanistan: Retribalization of the War." *Journal of Peace Research* 27 (2): 241-246.

Rosenthal, Andrew. 1990. "Afghans Report Crushing O_fficial's Coup Attempt." *New York Times,* p. A11.

Bangladesh, 8/15/1975

On August 15, 1975, young officers in the Bangladeshi army began firing at the home of President Sheik Mujibar Rahman and at the homes of his family (Borders 1975a). Tensions between Sheik Mujibar's regime and segments of the former East Bengal Regiment officers that formed the core of Bangladesh's new army rose in the years following Bangladesh's independence over the size of the military budget and the role of a new paramilitary force, the Jatiyo Rakkhi Bahini (JRB), which Mujibar had began diverting resources and recruits to (Khan 1981). This move was widely interpreted as an effort to hedge the power of the military (e.g. Sinha 1979; Rahman 1984; Heitzman and Worden 1989). Crucially, the order establishing the Rakkhi Bahini specified that it

report directly to Mujibar rather than through the regular military chain of command (Rahman 1984). The Rakkhi Bahini quickly came to be known as the "personal security force and political enforcement body of the Awami League" and Mujibar's "private army" (Rahman 1984, 161). As Siddiqi (2010, 10) describes: "the military saw its identity as protector of national interests undermined as well as its corporate interests threatened by the creation of the JRB." A second security force, the Bangladesh Rifles, was created in 1972 as a border guard, but also used to suppress political opposition. In the August attack, coup-plotters planned simultaneous attacks on the president's home, airport, radio station, and the barracks of both the JRB and Bangladesh Rifles. In a fortunate turn of events for the coup plotters, the Rakkhi Bahini commander, Brig. Nuruz Zaman, was unexpectedly out of town when the attempt occurred. As a result, Mascarenhas (1986, 69) describes, "Mujib's elite storm troopers were not geared, as they normally were, for instant action." Coup leaders deployed the few tanks at their disposal to the JRB barracks, anticipating resistance. A tense stand-off ensued, but neither side fired. Meanwhile, coup forces were able to get past the few bodyguards at Mujibar's home. While the siege of the palace was underway, Mujibar reportedly telephoned JRB headquarters, in an attempt to rally the force to his defense, but could not get through to a senior officer (Mascarenhas 1986, 70-75). As a result, the JRB did not move to defend the Presidential Palace, and Sheik Mujibar was killed, along with several members of his family, within the first few hours of the coup. The coup-plotters announced via the radio that the JRB had a new acting commander, Abdul Hasan Khan, and that they had his support (Borders 1975b; "Militiamen Express Allegiance" 1975). While "fighting continued in some areas between forces loyal to the new Government and partisans of Sheik Mujibur Rahman," it quickly petered out as larger-scale resistance failed to materialize (Borders 1975c, 6). In the wake of the failed coup, the JRB was absorbed into the army (JRB Ordinance 1975).

Sources

Borders, William. 1975a. "Mujib Reported Overthrown and Killed in a Coup by the Bangladesh Military." *New York Times*, August 15, p. 1.

———. 1975b. "Leaders of Coup Move to Solidify Bangladesh Rule." *New York Times*, August 16, p. 1.

———. 1975c. "Curfew is Eased by Dacca Regime." *New York Times*, August 18, p. 6.

Heitzman, J., and R.L. Worden. *Bangladesh: A country study.* Library of Congress, 1989.

Jatiya Rakkhi Bahini (Absorption in the Army) Ordinance [JRB Ordinance], 9 October 1975.

Khan, Z.R. "Politicization of the Bangladesh Military: A Response to Perceived Shortcomings of Civilian Government." *Asian Survey* 21, 5: (1981) 551–564.

Mascarenhas, A. 1986. *Bangladesh: A Legacy of Blood*. Hodder and Stoughton Sevenoaks

Rahman, M.A. 1984. "Bangladesh in 1983: A Turning Point for the Military." *Asian Survey* Vol. 24, No. 2: 240-249.

Sinha, P.B. 1979. *Armed Forces of Bangladesh*, Volume 1. Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.

Dominican Republic, 4/24/1965

On April 24, 1965, a group of young military officers staged a coup to oust Donald Reid Cabral from office. Although Reid initially had the military's support, tensions arose over his efforts to exploit rivalries within the armed forces and purge the military of potential opponents. The coup plotters aimed to return former president Juan Bosch Gavin to power. Within the first 24 hours of

the coup attempt, they took control of army headquarters in Santo Domingo, as well as a commercial radio station (Wedge 1969). Lowenthal (1995, 44) describes how, in this initial phase, "no one in the Dominican military establishment, even General Wessin [whose 1963 coup had brought Reid to power in the first place], was willing to exert himself to defend the Reid regime." Instead, it was the National Police, led by the *cascos blancos* riot squad, which had been built up to serve as a counterweight to the military, that intervened, arresting key coup leaders and denying that the regime had been overthrown. In the immediate aftermath of the attack on the palace, "the National Police retook the Radio Santo Domingo studio, arrested Pena Gomez and the others, once again denied that the regime had been overthrown" (Lowenthal 1995, 65). Police opposition prevented coup plotters from a rapid victory, and opened the door to additional factions both within the military and the other security services to throw their hats in the ring. The conflict escalated rapidly, as Bosch supporters began to distribute weapons to civilians (Martin 1966; Bosch 2007, 56). The coup ended when the United States intervened (Moreno 1970).

Sources

Bosch, Brian J. 2007. *Balaguer and the Dominican Military: Presidential Control of the Factional Officer Corps in the 1960s and 1970s*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company.

Lowenthal, Abraham F. 1972. *The Dominican Intervention*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.

Martin, John Bartlow. 1966. *Overtaken by Events: The Dominican Crisis from the fall of Trujillo to the Civil War*. Doubleday.

Moreno, José A. 1970. *Barrios in Arms: Revolution in Santo Domingo.* Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Wedge, Bryant. 1969. "The Case Study of Student Political Violence: Brazil, 1964, and Dominican Republic, 1965. *World Politics* Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 183-206.

Haiti, 4/2/1989

On April 2, 1989, colonels from the small, elite Leopards and Dessalines battalions of the Haitian army, stationed in Port-au-Prince, revolted. Former President Jean-Claude Duvalier (1957-1986) created both battalions, along with the Presidential Guard, to serve as counterweights to the regular army. All three circumvented the army chain of command to report directly to Duvalier (Rotberg 1971, Laguerre 1993). After Duvalier's resignation in 1986, the country cycled through four governments in as many years. President Prosper Avril, former Chief of the Presidential Guard, came to power in a 1988 coup. Under his tenure, the Leopards and Dessalines battalions grew increasingly restless. As Preston (1989b) describes, "the Dessalines barracks, which stands in the shadow of the elegant National Palace, had long been a nest for officers sympathetic to the Duvalierists' tenacious campaign to stage a comeback." That spring, Avril's government had been "slowly advancing toward democratic elections in which, it seemed, allies of the deposed Duvalier family dictatorship would be barred as candidates" (Treaster 1989, A2). In late March, the army dismissed four high-ranking officers, including the head of the Leopards battalion, on charges of drug-trafficking. As the coup got underway, members of the Leopards battalion, supported by the Dessalines, arrested President Avril at his home, and subsequently took over government television and radio stations demanding the restoration of the 1987 constitution and release of the Leopard's commander. The Presidential Guard moved quickly to free President Avril ("Presidential Guard Frees Avril" 1989). But the crisis was not over. On April 5, soldiers from the

Dessalines battalion clashed with the Presidential Guard troops that had defended Avril's regime. The forces exchanged "intense rifle and artillery fire" (Preston 1989a). By August 9, after some 35 people were killed, the Presidential Guard had defeated the Dessalines battalion, and remaining rebel forces indicated they were willing to negotiate a surrender (Treaster 1989). Both the Leopards and Dessalines battalions were disbanded as a result of the coup (Fuller and McCalla 1990).

Sources

Fuller, Anne and Jocelyn McCalla 1990. *In the Army's Hands: Human Rights in Haiti on the Eve of the Elections*. Human Rights Watch. Americas Watch Committee.

Laguerre, Michel S. 1993. *The Military and Society in Haiti*. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan

"Presidential Guard Frees Avril." 1989. Federal Broadcast Information Service. Daily Report, Latin America. FBIS-LAT-89-062 (April 2).

Preston, Julia. 1989a. "Haitian Government Announces Defeat of Mutinous Soldiers." *Washington Post* (April 9).

———. 1989b. "Anti-Duvalierism Said to Gain in Haiti." *Washington Post* (April 17).

Rotberg, Robert I. 1971. *Haiti: The Politics of Squalor.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Treaster, Joseph H. 1989. "Rebellion Troops in Haiti Say They Are Ready to Negotiate." *New York Times* (April 10).

Kenya, 8/1/1982

At 6am on the morning of August 1, 1982, junior officers in Kenya's air force seized control of the Voice of Kenya radio station in Nairobi and announced that a "National Redemption Council" had ousted President Daniel Arap Moi from power. The coup plotters criticized Moi's government for "rampant corruption and nepotism" (quoted in Frazer 1994, 255). In addition to the radio station, the coup forces, which came primarily from the Nanyuki and Embakasi airbases, captured the airport, post office, and telecommunications stations. Although much of the army remained loyal to Moi, for four hours after the announcement, no officers moved to oppose the coup (Decalo 1998, 243). Believing the coup to have been successful, coup leaders began raucous celebrations and looting in the capital (Frazer 1994, 256). On account described: "scenes of wild disorder began in the capital. Road blocks were thrown up by the rebels, cars seized, and drivers robbed" (*Africa Research Bulletin* 1982, 6559). It was the paramilitary General Services Unit (GSU) which had been built up as a "counterweight and rival" (N'diane 2002, 624) to the military, which took "decisive" (*Africa Research Bulletin* 1982, 6560) action, which "ultimately crushed" the rebellion (Decalo 1998, 243). The force was described as "a political force, the regime's coercive arm against its internal enemies" (Tamarin 1978, 301). Moi packed it with members of his own minority Kalenjin tribe (N'Diaye 2002, 627). Based at Gatundu near the presidential estate, the GSU was well positioned to respond to the radio station takeover and also to march on the air force base at Embakasi, on the outskirts of Nairobi (Decalo 1998, 20). After several hours of firing, in which some 300 officers were killed, the coup plotters surrendered. President Moi, who was at his country home when the coup began, returned to the capital that evening to reassert his control.

Sources

Africa Research Bulletin 1982. Political, Social, and Cultural Series. Vo. 19, No. 1. (February). Africa Research Ltd. England.

Decalo, Samuel. 1998. *The Stable Minority: Civilian Rule in Africa*. Gainesville, FL: Florida Academic Press, Inc.
Frazer, Jendayi Elizabeth J. 1994. *Sustaining Civilian Control: Armed Counterweights in Regime Stability in Africa*. PhD Diss., Stanford University.
N'Diaye, Boubacar. 2002. "How Not to Institutionalize Civilian Control: Kenya's Coup Prevention Strategies, 1964-1997." *Armed Forces and Society* 28 (4): 619–40.
Tamarkin, Mordechai. 1978. "The roots of political stability in Kenya." *African Affairs*: 297-320.

Russia, 8/19/1991

On August 19, 1991, a group of hard-liners within the Soviet elite, including top-ranking officers in the military, Interior Ministry (MVD), and KGB, staged a coup to remove Mikhail Gorbachev from power (Clines 1991). The coup occurred in the run-up to the signing of a new Union Treaty, which coup-plotters believed would result in a break-up the Soviet Union (Taylor 2003). For decades, the military had served as a senior partner in Russia's Communist Party regime, albeit one the party leadership was wary of. A number of different security forces were built up during the Soviet period, including the troops MVD and the KGB, at least in part to serve as counterweights to the military, although a provision remained in place for their control to revert to the military in times of war (Shelley 1996). This provision was scrapped in 1989, formally separating the Internal Troops, Border Troops, and Railway Troops from the rest of the armed forces (Turbiville, Jr 1991). Several of these forces participated in the August coup, which began when coup-plotters declared a state of emergency, moved troops into Moscow, and placed Gorbachev under house arrest. However, coup plotters do not appear to have developed a list of targets to seize in Moscow until the coup itself was underway (Odom 1998). At that point, a joint army-MVD-KGB operation to storm the White House was planned for the next night (Taylor 2003, 235). Odom (1998, 311-312) argues that one of the reasons "for disorganization is that the coup attempt involved three different military forces—the KGB, the interior ministry, and the regular armed forces—which added an extra level of complexity to the planning." Singh (2015, 202) also describes the plan to use multiple forces as "tactically awkward." When the military did produce a plan, it was a "a poorly developed one with virtually no coordinating arrangements" (Odom 1998, 319).

Yet there is no evidence that tactical mistakes doomed the coup. Instead, it seems to have failed because of the decisive action taken by Boris Yeltsin, then President of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic of the Soviet Union, who acted quickly to denounce the coup and called for a general strike in response. As Kellers (1991, A1) describes it, in the wake of Yeltsin's denunciation, the military was "shaken by sporadic mutinies…with individual servicemen and some entire units defection to defend anti-coup forces rallying around President Boris N. Yeltsin of the Russian republic." Soon, the military units ordered to protect the coup leaders defected, and arrested coup participants. Yeltsin acted swiftly to blame the coup on the Communist Party, outlaw its operation in Russian Republic, and secure Gorbachev's resignation (McFaul 2001).

Sources

Clines, Francis X. 1991. "Gorbachev is Ousted in Apparent Coup by Soviet Armed Forces and Hard-Liners." *New York Times* (August 19).
Kellers, Bill. 1991. "Sporadic Mutinies Rack Soviet Army." *New York Time* (August 21).

McFaul, M. 2001. *Russia's Unfinished Revolution: Political Change From Gorbachev to Putin*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Odom, W.E. 1998. *The Collapse of the Soviet Military*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Shelley, Louise I. 1996. *Policing Soviet society: The evolution of state control*. Psychology Press.
Taylor, Brian D. 2003. *Politics and the Russian Army: Civil-Military Relations, 1689-2000.* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Turbiville, G.H., Jr. 1991. "Soviet Security Forces and the Army: Hidden Dimensions of Interaction, Subordination, and Control." *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 4 (2): 278-298.

Ghana, 2/24/1966

The first of Ghana's ten coup attempts occurred on February 24, 1966. The coup was staged by a small group of young army officers and police seeking to oust President Kwame Nkrumah from power. They objected to both the country's drift towards socialism, and to Nkrumah's efforts to build up parallel security forces as counterweights to the military (Welch 1976; Baynham 1978, 1985). These included the President's Own Guard Regiment, which reported directly to him, and a new People's Militia, "also separate from the army designed as a counter to it" (Garrison 1966b, 2). One of the participants in the coup described: "in all this plan to build a second Army one thing stood out prominently: and that was a plan gradually to strangle the Regular Army to death" (Ocran 1968, 37). The coup began when Col Emmanuel Kotoka, commander of the army's Second Brigade in Kumasi, 100 north of capital, began to move his brigade towards Accra. The coup was timed to coincide with Nkrumah's trip abroad to Vietnam so that "the overthrow could be undertaken with a minimum of resistance and bloodshed" (Garrison 1996b, 2). Coup forces surrounded Flagstaff House, the presidential palace, as well as the Ministry of Defense, radio station, and post office. The President's Own Guard Regiment, stationed at the Flagstaff House, defended it, exchanging fire with coup forces (Africa 1966; Garrison 1966a, 12; Garrison 1966b). However, coup forces quickly secured the rest of the city. By the next day, "a late diplomatic report said only a small group of Nr. Nkrumah's party diehards and civilian security men were still resisting" (Garrison 1966a, 1). Eventually they were rounded up as well.

Sources

Afrifa, A.A. 1967. *The Ghana Coup: 24th Februrary 1966.* Frank Cass.
Baynham, Simon J. 1978. "Soldier and State in Ghana." *Armed Forces & Society* 5 (1): 155-68.
———. 1985. "Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?: The Case of Nkrumah's National Security Service." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 23 (01): 87-103.
Garrison, Llyod. 1966a. "Army in Control After Ghana Coup Topples Nkrumah." *New York Times* (February 25).
———. 1966b. "Coup in Ghana: Elaborately Organized Upheaval." *New York Times* (March 5), pp. 2.
Horowitz, Donald L. 2000. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict.* 2nd ed. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Ocran, Albert Kwesi. 1968. *A Myth Is Broken: An Account of the Ghana Coup d'Etat of 24 February 1966*. Longmont, Green, & Co., Lt.
Singh, Naunihal. 2014. *Seizing Power: The Strategic Logic of Military Coups*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Welch, Claude. 1976. *Civilian Control of the Military: Theory and Cases from Developing*

Countries. Albany: State University of New York Press.

North Yemen, 9/26/1962

On September 26, 1962, a group of officers in the Yemeni military staged a coup to overthrow Imam Muhammad al-Badr in Yemen. The young Imam had been in power less than one week. At the time, multiple, independent coup-plots were brewing. A small group of officers went forward with their plans despite the change in leadership (Stocky 1978). The coup began with a failed assassination attempt by one of Badr's bodyguards, which was not recognized at the time as part of a larger plot. In hours that followed, coup-plotters seized control of Sanaa's radio station and airfield, and then moved towards the palace. Once the coup was underway, Abdullah Sallal, a "trusted confidant" of al-Badr took charge (Clark 2010, 63). A firefight between presidential guards and coup forces ensued at the palace. Elsewhere in the capital, the coup-plotters took care to station troops outside the main army barracks in Sanaa to deter any soldiers that might have been inclined to resist from doing so (Stookey 1978, 231). A tribal militia used as a counterweight to the military was stationed outside of Sanaa, too far away to intervene. The streets surrounding the palace were too narrow for tanks to approach closely, enabling the Imam to escape. By morning, coup forces had taken the capital and claimed that the Imam was killed in the fighting (Associated Press 1962). Militia forces fled when coup-plotters announced the Imam's death, and remaining holdouts in the army threw their lot in with the new regime (O'Ballance 1971, 76). In the following days, however, when the new coup government could not produce al-Badr's body, opposition to the regime rose. The Imam escaped to northwest Yemen, where he was able to rally supporters to challenge the new coup-appointed government ("Yemen Forces Mobilize" 1962). The result was a bloody and protracted civil war. The tribal militias, which failed to prevent the coup plotters from seizing power, formed the core of al-Badr's post-coup resistance (Corstange 2007).

Sources

Associated Press, The. 1962. "Imam of Yemen Reported Slain in Coup After a Week on Throne." *The New York Times* (September 28).

Clark, Victoria. 2010. *Yemen: Dancing on the Heads of Snakes*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Corstange, Daniel. 2007. "Yemen (1962–1970)," in DeRouen, Karl and Uk Heo, eds. *Civil Wars of the World: Major Conflicts since World War II*. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO: 809–827.

O'Ballance, Edgar. 1971. *The War in the Yemen*. Shoe String Press, Inc.

Stookey, Robert W. 1978. *Yemen: The Politics of the Yemen Arab Republic*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

"Yemen Forces Mobilize." 1962. *The New York Times* (October 7).

Tables and Figures

Table A1: List of Countries Included in the Analysis

Africa	Asia	Europe
Angola	Afghanistan	Belarus
Benin	Bangladesh	Georgia
Botswana	Cambodia	Hungary
Cameroon	China	Latvia
Cape Verde	Fiji	Russia (Soviet Union)
Chad	Indonesia	Serbia (Yugoslavia)
Cote d'Ivoire	Kazakhstan	Ukraine
Djibouti	Korea, Republic of	
Ethiopia	Myanmar (Burma)	
Ghana	Pakistan	
Liberia	Singapore	
Mali	Taiwan	
Mozambique	Tajikistan	
Nigeria	Timor-Leste	
Sierra Leone		
Tanzania		

Latin America	MENA
Argentina	Algeria
Brazil	Bahrain
Chile	Egypt
Colombia	Iran
Cuba	Iraq
Dominican Republic	Israel
Ecuador	Jordan
El Salvador	Lebanon
Guatemala	Libya
Haiti	Morocco
Mexico	Saudi Arabia
Nicaragua	Sudan
Panama	Syria
Peru	
Venezuela	

Table A2: Comparing the Sample to the Population

Variable	Sample	Population
Africa	25%	29%
Asia	21%	22%
Eastern Europe	12%	18%
Latin America	22%	17%
Middle East/North Africa	18%	13%
Polity IV Polity2	-1.7	-1.2
Full democracy	26%	29%
Full autocracy	47%	45%
GDP/capita	3085.625	3198.753
Population	44026.74	31846.54

Table A3: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Coup variables					
Coup attempt	2,978	0.066	0.248	0	1
Coup success	196	0.403	0.492	0	1
Coup from top	196	0.316	0.466	0	1
Coup from middle	196	0.209	0.408	0	1
Counterbalancing					
Counterbalancing	2,978	0.334	0.472	0	1
Number of counterweights	2,978	1.129	1.060	0	9
Number of counterweights (log)	2,978	0.634	0.498	0	2.303
New counterweight	2,978	0.032	0.177	0	1
Control variables					
Military regime	2,798	0.128	0.334	0	1
Democracy	2,978	0.263	0.440	0	1
GDP/capita (log)	2,588	7.390	1.190	4.364	10.364
Ch. GDP/capita	2,341	0.018	0.065	-0.386	0.636
Ch. Military expenditures	2,296	1.052	41.115	-0.875	1965.292
Expenditures/soldier	2,312	8.433	1.240	0.933	12.732
Military Personnel (log)	2,374	236.015	632.121	1.000	4749.998
Recent revolution	2,909	0.037	0.188	0	1
Recent successful coup	2,978	0.158	0.365	0	1
Recent regional coup	2,978	0.684	0.465	0	1
Instability	2,978	0.211	0.408	0	1
Cold War	2,978	0.548	0.498	0	1
Additional variables used in robustness checks					
Powell and Thyne coup attempt	2,978	0.057	0.231	0	1
Powell and Thyne coup success	169	0.485	0.501	0	1
Inequality (Gini)	1,320	43.115	9.632	17.775	65.688
Inequality (Theil)	901	41.296	6.999	22.100	64.360
French colony	2,978	0.199	0.399	0	1
Probability of international conflict	2,316	0.230	0.156	0.021	0.915
Defense alliance	2,978	0.334	0.472	0	1

Table A4: Full List of Coup Attempts and Counterweights

Country	Year	Success	Counterweights	Country	Year	Success	Counterweights
Afghanistan	1973	1	1	Cambodia	1991	0	0
Afghanistan	1978	1	2	Cambodia	1997	1	0
Afghanistan	1979	1	3	Cambodia	2000	0	0
Afghanistan	1990	0	3	Cameroon	1984	0	1
Afghanistan	1992	1	3	Chad	1971	0	1
Afghanistan	2002	0	1	Chad	1975	1	2
Algeria	1965	1	0	Chad	1976	0	2
Algeria	1967	0	0	Chad	1977	0	1
Angola	1977	0	1	Chad	1982	1	0
Argentina	1961	0	0	Chad	1989	0	2
Argentina	1962	1	0	Chad	1990	1	2
Argentina	1963	0	0	Chad	1991	0	3
Argentina	1966	1	0	Chad	1992	0	3
Argentina	1970	1	0	Chad	1993	0	2
Argentina	1971	1	0	Chad	2006	0	2
Argentina	1976	1	0	Chad	2008	0	2
Argentina	1990	0	0	Chile	1973	0	1
Bangladesh	1975	1	2	Cote d'Ivoire	1980	0	2
Bangladesh	1976	1	2	Cote d'Ivoire	1991	0	2
Bangladesh	1977	0	2	Cote d'Ivoire	1995	0	2
Bangladesh	1980	0	2	Cote d'Ivoire	1999	1	2
Bangladesh	1981	0	2	Cote d'Ivoire	2000	0	2
Bangladesh	1982	1	2	Cote d'Ivoire	2001	0	2
Bangladesh	1996	0	2	Djibouti	1991	0	1
Bangladesh	2007	1	3	Djibouti	2000	0	1
Benin	1963	1	0	Dom. Rep.	1961	0	0
Benin	1965	1	0	Dom. Rep.	1962	0	0
Benin	1967	1	0	Dom. Rep.	1963	1	1
Benin	1969	1	0	Dom. Rep.	1965	1	1
Benin	1972	0	0	Ecuador	1963	1	1
Benin	1975	0	0	Ecuador	1966	1	1
Benin	1977	0	0	Ecuador	1972	1	1
Benin	1988	0	2	Ecuador	1975	0	1
Benin	1992	0	2	Ecuador	1976	1	1
Benin	1995	0	0	Ecuador	2000	0	1
Brazil	1964	1	1	Ecuador	2010	0	1
Cambodia	1970	1	0	El Salvador	1961	1	0
Cambodia	1975	0	0	El Salvador	1972	0	0
Cambodia	1976	0	0	El Salvador	1979	1	0
Cambodia	1977	0	0	Ethiopia	1974	1	0
Cambodia	1978	0	0	Ethiopia	1977	1	0

Country	Year	Success	Counterweights	Country	Year	Success	Counterweights
Ethiopia	1989	0	0	Iraq	1992	0	1
Fiji	1987	1	0	Iraq	1995	0	2
Fiji	2000	0	0	Korea, Rep.	1961	1	0
Fiji	2006	1	1	Korea, Rep.	1979	0	0
Georgia	2009	0	3	Lebanon	1961	0	2
Ghana	1962	0	0	Lebanon	1976	0	2
Ghana	1966	1	1	Liberia	1980	1	0
Ghana	1967	0	1	Liberia	1985	0	1
Ghana	1972	1	0	Liberia	1994	1	0
Ghana	1977	0	0	Libya	1969	1	2
Ghana	1978	1	0	Libya	1993	0	2
Ghana	1979	0	0	Mali	1968	1	3
Ghana	1981	1	0	Mali	1969	0	2
Ghana	1982	0	0	Mali	1978	0	1
Ghana	1983	0	0	Mali	1991	0	1
Guatemala	1963	1	1	Morocco	1971	0	2
Guatemala	1982	1	1	Morocco	1972	0	2
Guatemala	1983	1	1	Myanmar	1962	1	0
Guatemala	1988	0	1	Myanmar	1988	1	0
Guatemala	1989	0	1	Nicaragua	1967	0	0
Guatemala	1993	0	1	Nicaragua	1978	0	0
Haiti	1968	0	3	Nicaragua	1980	0	2
Haiti	1970	0	3	Nigeria	1966	1	1
Haiti	1988	1	3	Nigeria	1975	1	1
Haiti	1989	0	3	Nigeria	1976	0	1
Haiti	1991	0	1	Nigeria	1983	1	1
Haiti	2000	0	1	Nigeria	1985	1	1
Indonesia	1965	0	2	Nigeria	1990	0	1
Indonesia	1966	1	2	Nigeria	1993	1	2
Iran	1980	0	2	Pakistan	1977	1	1
Iran	1982	0	2	Pakistan	1984	0	0
Iran	1984	0	2	Pakistan	1999	1	0
Iraq	1963	1	0	Panama	1968	1	0
Iraq	1964	0	0	Panama	1969	0	0
Iraq	1965	0	1	Panama	1988	0	0
Iraq	1966	0	1	Panama	1989	0	1
Iraq	1968	1	1	Peru	1962	1	2
Iraq	1973	0	2	Peru	1963	1	2
Iraq	1979	0	2	Peru	1968	1	2
Iraq	1984	0	2	Peru	1975	1	2
Iraq	1991	0	1	Peru	1992	0	1

Country	Year	Success	Counterweights
Russia	1991	0	2
Sierra Leone	1967	1	0
Sierra Leone	1968	1	0
Sierra Leone	1971	0	0
Sierra Leone	1987	0	1
Sierra Leone	1992	1	1
Sierra Leone	1995	0	1
Sierra Leone	1996	1	1
Sierra Leone	1997	1	1
Sudan	1966	0	2
Sudan	1969	1	2
Sudan	1970	0	3
Sudan	1971	0	3
Sudan	1975	0	3
Sudan	1976	0	3
Sudan	1977	0	3
Sudan	1985	1	3
Sudan	1989	1	2
Sudan	1990	0	4
Sudan	2008	0	4
Syria	1961	1	0
Syria	1962	0	0
Syria	1963	1	0
Syria	1966	1	0
Syria	1970	1	1
Syria	1982	0	4
Tajikistan	1992	0	0
Tanzania	1964	0	1
Tanzania	1980	0	2
Timore-Leste	2008	0	1
Venezuela	1992	0	0
Venezuela	2002	0	0

Table A5: Correlations Between Counterbalancing, Coup Success, and Military Strength

	Mil. Expenditures (log)	Ch. Mil. Expenditures	Mil. Personnel (log)
Counterbalancing	0.056	-0.015	0.046
Number of counterweights (log)	0.035	-0.026	0.018
Successful coup	-0.021	0.125	-0.001

Table A6: Controls for Military Strength, Excluding Military Regimes

	Controls for military strength			Excl. mil. regimes
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Counterbalancing	-0.793*	-0.892*	-0.733*	-0.857*
	(0.468)	(0.476)	(0.388)	(0.496)
Military expenditure (log)	0.0123			
	(0.100)			
Ch. Mil. Expenditure		0.509		
		(0.564)		
Mil. Personnel (log)			-0.0142	
			(0.092)	
Coup from top	2.029***	2.031***	2.017***	1.805***
	(0.408)	(0.415)	(0.431)	(0.492)
Coup from middle	0.692**	0.651*	0.613*	0.522
	(0.334)	(0.34)	(0.349)	(0.421)
Military regime	-0.0179	0.0446	0.168	
	(0.452)	(0.489)	(0.427)	
Democracy	0.313	0.428	0.370	0.716
	(0.504)	(0.454)	(0.479)	(0.461)
GDP/capita (log)	-0.424**	-0.430*	-0.502**	-0.437*
	(0.204)	(0.22)	(0.201)	(0.239)
Ch. GDP/capita	-0.762	-0.752	-0.312	1.933
	(3.146)	(3.643)	(3.157)	(2.851)
Recent successful coup	0.260	0.223	0.116	-0.0518
	(0.391)	(0.43)	(0.392)	(0.538)
Recent regional coup	0.318	0.323	0.329	0.121
	(0.713)	(0.763)	(0.676)	(0.626)
Recent revolution	-1.933**	-1.957**	-1.867**	-2.333**
	(0.791)	(0.862)	(0.776)	(1.051)
Cold War	0.509	0.623	0.400	0.939
	(0.558)	(0.707)	(0.491)	(0.577)
Constant	1.238	1.168	1.94	1.349
	(1.856)	(2.093)	(1.835)	(2.099)
Log likelihood	-91.227	-86.887	-94.337	-71.377
Pseudo R-squared	0.214	0.233	0.214	0.247
Observations	171	167	177	143

*Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*

Table A7: Two-stage Model of Coup Attempts and Outcomes, Counterbalancing

Dependent variable	Success	Attempt	Success	Attempt
Counterbalancing	-0.392**	0.0746	-0.397*	0.128
	(0.191)	(0.079)	(0.219)	(0.095)
Military regime			0.224	0.112
			(0.339)	(0.111)
Democracy			0.374	0.0104
			(0.321)	(0.131)
GDP/capita (log)			-0.226	-0.0951
			(0.222)	(0.058)
Ch. GDP/capita			1.303	-0.189
			(1.466)	(0.611)
Recent revolution			-1.126***	0.344**
			(0.348)	(0.170)
Ch. Mil. Expenditure				-0.000682
				(0.004)
Expenditure/Soldier				-0.0736
				(0.058)
Mil. Personnel				-0.000186
				(0.000)
Years since last coup		-0.195***		-0.156**
		(0.051)		(0.078)
Constant	0.097	-0.880***	2.215***	0.287
	(0.622)	(0.086)	(0.772)	(0.369)
Observations	196	2,978	166	2,114
Antrho	-0.116		-0.483	
Rho	-0.115		-0.449	
Pseudo log likelihood	-781.205		-619.878	

*Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Cubic splines are included in the estimations for coup attempts.*

Table A8: Two-stage Model of Coup Attempts and Outcomes, No. of Counterweights (log)

Dependent variable	Success	Attempt	Success	Attempt
Number of counterweights (log)	-0.393**	0.0282	-0.425**	0.0964
	(0.177)	(0.074)	(0.209)	(0.092)
Military regime			0.257	0.103
			(0.331)	(0.113)
Democracy			0.422	-0.000231
			(0.314)	(0.131)
GDP/capita (log)			-0.235	-0.0945
			(0.221)	(0.058)
Ch. GDP/capita			1.239	-0.192
			(1.457)	(0.612)
Recent revolution			-1.170***	0.353**
			(0.359)	(0.17)
Ch. Mil. Expenditure				-0.000685
				(0.004)
Expenditure/Soldier				-0.0726
				(0.058)
Mil. Personnel				-0.000183
				(0.000)
Years since last coup		-0.197***		-0.156**
		(0.051)		(0.077)
Constant	0.152	-0.870***	2.398***	0.263
	(0.622)	(0.093)	(0.792)	(0.368)
Observations	196	2,978	166	2,114
Antrho	-0.089		-0.487	
Rho	-0.088		-0.452	
Pseudo log likelihood	-781.208		-619.566	

*Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Cubic splines are included in the estimations for coup attempts.*

Table A9. Country and Year Fixed Effects

	Country FE		Year FE		Country and year FE	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Counterbalancing	0.081		0.170		0.085	
	(0.293)		(0.201)		(0.315)	
Number of counterweights (log)		-0.195		0.072		-0.252
		(0.358)		(0.203)		(0.388)
New counterweight	0.916**	1.008**	0.824**	0.844**	0.909**	1.024**
	(0.384)	(0.415)	(0.347)	(0.349)	(0.449)	(0.482)
Ch. Mil. Expenditure	0.036	0.040	-0.073	-0.075	-0.016	-0.004
	(0.148)	(0.147)	(0.136)	(0.135)	(0.163)	(0.162)
Expenditure/Soldier	-0.075	-0.082	-0.142	-0.138	-0.102	-0.122
	(0.119)	(0.122)	(0.117)	(0.118)	(0.148)	(0.154)
Mil. Personnel	0.00183**	0.00185***	-0.001	-0.001	0.00139*	0.00136*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.)	(0.)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Military regime	-0.093	-0.111	0.072	0.040	-0.142	-0.178
	(0.264)	(0.261)	(0.253)	(0.247)	(0.298)	(0.294)
Democracy	-0.221	-0.235	-0.048	-0.066	-0.234	-0.263
	(0.369)	(0.365)	(0.318)	(0.322)	(0.397)	(0.392)
GDP/capita (log)	-0.714***	-0.683**	-0.227*	-0.227*	-1.036**	-1.052***
	(0.274)	(0.282)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.408)	(0.393)
Ch. GDP/capita	0.635	0.523	0.340	0.324	1.350	1.224
	(1.229)	(1.209)	(1.239)	(1.24)	(1.438)	(1.412)
Recent revolution	0.868**	0.849**	0.362	0.363	0.783**	0.751**
	(0.337)	(0.339)	(0.29)	(0.285)	(0.349)	(0.345)
Instability	0.357	0.350	0.318	0.311	0.390*	0.378
	(0.23)	(0.231)	(0.219)	(0.216)	(0.235)	(0.238)
Years since coup	-0.217**	-0.216**	-0.371***	-0.370***	-0.236**	-0.235**
	(0.106)	(0.107)	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.099)	(0.1)
Constant	1.265	1.185	0.561	0.558	3.182	3.469
	(1.227)	(1.243)	(1.015)	(1.019)	(2.342)	(2.298)
Log likelihood	-452.500	-452.389	-490.130	-490.424	-426.331	-426.143
Pseudo R-squared	0.137	0.137	0.138	0.137	0.166	0.166
Observations	1,521	1,521	1,957	1,957	1,412	1,412

*Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Cubic splines are included in each model.*

Table A10: Powell and Thyne Data, Coup Outcomes

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Counterbalancing	-0.862***	-1.015**		
	(0.325)	(0.438)		
Number of counterweights (log)			-0.914***	-1.109**
			(0.339)	(0.46)
Coup from top	1.526***	1.582***	1.460***	1.522***
	(0.452)	(0.516)	(0.45)	(0.505)
Coup from middle	0.335	0.446	0.252	0.394
	(0.409)	(0.465)	(0.411)	(0.472)
Military regime		0.0246		0.116
		(0.425)		(0.424)
Democracy		0.320		0.397
		(0.443)		(0.455)
GDP/capita (log)		0.548		0.247
		(3.763)		(3.554)
Ch. GDP/capita		-0.393**		-0.398**
		(0.200)		(0.200)
Recent successful coup		-2.326***		-2.504***
		(0.872)		(0.831)
Recent regional coup		0.289		0.288
		(0.373)		(0.384)
Recent revolution		0.129		0.207
		(0.681)		(0.631)
Cold War		0.358		0.292
		(0.54)		(0.585)
Constant	-0.331	1.884	-0.0106	2.277
	(0.293)	(1.842)	(0.302)	(1.876)
Log likelihood	-90.472	-77.921	-89.884	-77.234
Pseudo R-squared	0.099	0.173	0.105	0.181
Observations	145	136	145	136

*Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*

Table A11: Powell and Thyne Data, Coup Attempts

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Counterbalancing	-0.220			-0.270		-0.209	
	(0.28)			(0.287)		(0.248)	
Number of counterweights (log)		-0.275			-0.342		-0.070
		(0.254)			(0.261)		(0.218)
New counterweight			0.689**	0.779**	0.852***	0.698**	0.664**
			(0.308)	(0.325)	(0.325)	(0.28)	(0.279)
Ch. Mil. Expenditure						-0.236	-0.233
						(0.153)	(0.154)
Expenditure/Soldier						-0.071	-0.080
						(0.112)	(0.111)
Mil. Personnel						(0.001)	(0.001)
						(0.)	(0.)
Military regime						0.228	0.263
						(0.204)	(0.199)
Democracy						0.096	0.123
						(0.302)	(0.299)
GDP/capita (log)						-0.171	-0.172
						(0.123)	(0.122)
Ch. GDP/capita						0.851	0.888
						(1.032)	(1.047)
Recent revolution						-0.018	-0.021
						(0.335)	(0.332)
Instability						0.262	0.273
						(0.187)	(0.185)
Years since coup						-0.373***	-0.373***
						(0.097)	(0.097)
Constant	-2.742***	-2.645***	-2.841***	-2.760***	-2.641***	0.285	0.317
	(0.163)	(0.2)	(0.134)	(0.161)	(0.2)	(0.691)	(0.671)
Log likelihood	-648.175	-647.498	-647.285	-646.084	-645.078	-480.971	-481.408
Pseudo R-squared	0.001	0.002	0.003	0.005	0.006	0.103	0.102
Observations	2,978	2,978	2,978	2,978	2,978	2,114	2,114

*Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Cubic splines are included in each model.*

Table A12: Two-Stage Model of Counterbalancing and Coup Attempts

Dependent variable	Coup Attempt	Counterweights	Coup Attempt	Counterweights
New counterweight	0.540***	5.755***	0.376*	5.568***
	(0.191)	(0.117)	(0.224)	(0.106)
French colony		0.427***		0.442***
		(0.089)		(0.089)
Probability of international conflict		1.206***		1.176***
		(0.206)		(0.211)
Defense alliance		-0.411***		-0.415***
		(0.075)		(0.075)
Ch. Mil. Expenditure		-0.00123***	-0.0456	-0.00125***
		(0.)	(0.111)	(0.)
Military regime		-0.446***	0.261	-0.441***
		(0.085)	(0.192)	(0.085)
Democracy		-0.092	0.0115	-0.0863
		(0.084)	(0.165)	(0.084)
GDP/capita (log)		0.185***	-0.184***	0.177***
		(0.035)	(0.06)	(0.035)
Ch. GDP/capita		-1.612***	-0.126	-1.599***
		(0.463)	(0.785)	(0.468)
Recent revolution		-0.569***	0.358	-0.568***
		(0.161)	(0.246)	(0.161)
Instability		0.0592	0.109	0.0672
		(0.072)	(0.126)	(0.072)
Years since last coup	-0.193***	-0.0371	-0.174***	-0.0346
	(0.061)	(0.04)	(0.064)	(0.04)
Constant	-0.986***	-0.904***	0.258	-0.856***
	(0.147)	(0.259)	(0.425)	(0.257)
Observations	1,333	2,066	1,333	2,066
Antrho	0.363		0.046	
Rho	0.348		0.046	
Pseudo log likelihood	-1526.899		-1521.318	

*Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Cubic splines are included in the estimations for coup attempts.*

Table A13: Systematically Dropping Control Variables for Coup Outcomes, Counterbalancing

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10
Counterbalancing	-0.519	-0.738*	-0.763*	-0.775*	-0.781**	-0.643*	-0.737*	-0.745*	-0.604*	-0.748*
	(0.386)	(0.393)	(0.39)	(0.4)	(0.365)	(0.389)	(0.39)	(0.405)	(0.338)	(0.4)
Coup from top		1.792***	2.022***	2.068***	1.985***	1.870***	2.053***	2.016***	2.073***	2.107***
		(0.421)	(0.404)	(0.423)	(0.419)	(0.395)	(0.415)	(0.418)	(0.392)	(0.423)
Coup from middle	-0.278		0.616*	0.648*	0.583*	0.572*	0.634*	0.637*	0.587*	0.687*
	(0.351)		(0.352)	(0.36)	(0.345)	(0.32)	(0.354)	(0.35)	(0.334)	(0.358)
Military regime	0.395	0.143		0.127	-0.124	0.259	0.204	0.146	0.495	0.231
	(0.346)	(0.421)		(0.433)	(0.398)	(0.411)	(0.389)	(0.428)	(0.408)	(0.415)
Democracy	0.73	0.425	0.497		0.358	0.716	0.35	0.347	0.541	0.263
	(0.526)	(0.45)	(0.431)		(0.469)	(0.514)	(0.429)	(0.445)	(0.468)	(0.447)
GDP/capita (log)	1.792	-0.504**	-0.509***	-0.519**		-0.508***	-0.527***	-0.530***	-0.569***	-0.584***
	(3.139)	(0.201)	(0.197)	(0.204)		(0.192)	(0.195)	(0.205)	(0.202)	(0.182)
Ch. GDP/capita	-0.466**	-0.0753	-0.613	-0.729	-0.584		-0.568	-0.5	-0.752	-0.489
	(0.202)	(3.074)	(3.115)	(3.137)	(2.918)		(3.117)	(3.077)	(3.074)	(3.092)
Recent successful coup	-1.970***	0.145	0.223	0.108	0.289	0.163		0.176	-0.238	0.0194
	(0.657)	(0.389)	(0.353)	(0.398)	(0.345)	(0.376)		(0.373)	(0.338)	(0.379)
Recent regional coup	0.321	0.418	0.237	0.378	0.495	0.0609	0.43		0.366	0.428
	(0.343)	(0.603)	(0.6)	(0.634)	(0.628)	(0.627)	(0.621)		(0.689)	(0.655)
Recent revolution	0.111	-1.858**	-1.942**	-1.916**	-1.992**	-1.493**	-1.831**	-1.881**		-1.813**
	(0.448)	(0.834)	(0.79)	(0.823)	(0.811)	(0.749)	(0.776)	(0.807)		(0.784)
Cold War	0.896*	0.524	0.616	0.367	0.856*	0.473	0.377	0.442	0.184	
	(0.504)	(0.5)	(0.504)	(0.478)	(0.479)	(0.517)	(0.457)	(0.504)	(0.481)	
Constant	2.073	1.937	1.849	2.035	-1.916**	2.03	2.001	2.332	2.276	2.654*
	(1.646)	(1.76)	(1.811)	(1.781)	(0.781)	(1.698)	(1.749)	(1.662)	(1.83)	(1.446)
Log likelihood	-106.397	-95.531	-95.906	-94.738	-97.181	-98.877	-94.627	-94.769	-98.655	-94.903
Pseudo R-squared	0.123	0.213	0.226	0.220	0.199	0.204	0.220	0.219	0.187	0.218

Table A14: Systematically Dropping Control Variables for Coup Outcomes, Number of Counterweights

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10
Number of counterweights (log)	-0.624*	-0.777*	-0.824**	-0.786*	-0.749**	-0.696*	-0.765*	-0.764*	-0.575*	-0.791*
	(0.376)	(0.409)	(0.402)	(0.414)	(0.38)	(0.393)	(0.411)	(0.42)	(0.341)	(0.42)
Coup from top		1.778***	2.016***	2.047***	1.949***	1.848***	2.027***	1.988***	2.043***	2.071***
		(0.424)	(0.399)	(0.414)	(0.405)	(0.394)	(0.406)	(0.411)	(0.386)	(0.415)
Coup from middle	-0.302		0.588	0.621*	0.554	0.543*	0.603*	0.609*	0.549	0.644*
	(0.364)		(0.359)	(0.367)	(0.352)	(0.324)	(0.361)	(0.356)	(0.34)	(0.362)
Military regime	0.437	0.231		0.211	-0.0277	0.32	0.287	0.232	0.581	0.301
	(0.355)	(0.433)		(0.449)	(0.415)	(0.428)	(0.402)	(0.446)	(0.421)	(0.429)
Democracy	0.779	0.504	0.549		0.439	0.779	0.436	0.442	0.625	0.371
	(0.54)	(0.465)	(0.448)		(0.493)	(0.524)	(0.452)	(0.47)	(0.48)	(0.471)
GDP/capita (log)	-0.483**	-0.532***	-0.528***	-0.547***		-0.528***	-0.554***	-0.559***	-0.590***	-0.601***
	(0.194)	(0.196)	(0.194)	(0.198)		(0.184)	(0.191)	(0.2)	(0.198)	(0.176)
Ch. GDP/capita	1.776	0.0249	-0.522	-0.662	-0.463		-0.448	-0.374	-0.642	-0.385
	(3.16)	(3.022)	(3.076)	(3.107)	(2.882)		(3.096)	(3.045)	(3.017)	(3.08)
Recent successful coup	0.329	0.14	0.238	0.104	0.292	0.165		0.18	-0.248	0.0357
	(0.356)	(0.404)	(0.36)	(0.413)	(0.355)	(0.391)		(0.385)	(0.344)	(0.39)
Recent regional coup	0.157	0.461	0.301	0.426	0.542	0.103	0.471		0.392	0.463
	(0.452)	(0.593)	(0.578)	(0.619)	(0.622)	(0.609)	(0.605)		(0.687)	(0.642)
Recent revolution	-2.050***	-1.941**	-2.067**	-2.014**	-2.058**	-1.591**	-1.924**	-1.969**		-1.927**
	(0.673)	(0.835)	(0.809)	(0.834)	(0.801)	(0.761)	(0.791)	(0.818)		(0.81)
Cold War	0.831	0.449	0.538	0.294	0.819	0.413	0.311	0.378	0.132	
	(0.51)	(0.519)	(0.522)	(0.501)	(0.51)	(0.535)	(0.476)	(0.526)	(0.506)	
Constant	2.392	2.342	2.218	2.44	-1.760**	2.37	2.397	2.768*	2.566	2.951**
	(1.587)	(1.745)	(1.809)	(1.769)	(0.8)	(1.666)	(1.752)	(1.67)	(1.818)	(1.431)
Log likelihood	-105.727	-95.027	-95.363	-94.408	-97.033	-98.384	-94.392	-94.373	-98.555	-94.395
Pseudo R-squared	0.129	0.217	0.230	0.222	0.201	0.208	0.224	0.223	0.189	0.222
Observations	179	179	183	179	179	183	179	179	179	179

*Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*

Table A15: Systematically Dropping Control Variables for Coup Attempts

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10
Counterbalancing	0.264	0.169	0.190	0.126	0.206	0.188	0.196	0.186	0.179	0.263
	(0.196)	(0.193)	(0.203)	(0.199)	(0.193)	(0.202)	(0.195)	(0.204)	(0.196)	(0.226)
New counterweight	0.712**	0.749**	0.710**	0.754**	0.752**	0.794**	0.775**	0.805**	0.743**	0.896***
	(0.315)	(0.313)	(0.305)	(0.308)	(0.313)	(0.31)	(0.312)	(0.325)	(0.306)	(0.286)
Ch. Mil. Expenditure		-0.035	-0.001	-0.019	-0.002	-0.001	-0.002	-0.002	-0.005	-0.002
		(0.115)	(0.002)	(0.121)	(0.019)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.11)	(0.003)
Expenditure/Soldier	-0.099		-0.140	-0.124	-0.110	-0.210***	-0.111	-0.120	-0.111	-0.167
	(0.097)		(0.096)	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.075)	(0.098)	(0.098)	(0.094)	(0.108)
Mil. Personnel	-0.001	-0.000576*		-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.000)	(0.000)		(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Military regime	0.273	0.214	0.181		0.209	0.184	0.211	0.202	0.224	0.338
	(0.225)	(0.225)	(0.221)		(0.228)	(0.207)	(0.226)	(0.215)	(0.234)	(0.292)
Democracy	-0.115	-0.112	-0.134	-0.130		-0.167	-0.104	-0.122	-0.069	-0.277
	(0.287)	(0.288)	(0.288)	(0.292)		(0.298)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.296)	(0.322)
GDP/capita (log)	-0.192*	-0.268***	-0.172	-0.203*	-0.209**		-0.214**	-0.198*	-0.189*	-0.340**
	(0.103)	(0.087)	(0.115)	(0.11)	(0.105)		(0.109)	(0.106)	(0.11)	(0.137)
Ch. GDP/capita	0.064	0.021	-0.258	-0.379	-0.132	-0.227		-0.190	-0.153	-0.667
	(1.062)	(1.16)	(1.167)	(1.159)	(1.152)	(1.196)		(1.178)	(1.158)	(1.229)
Recent revolution	0.494*	0.547*	0.494*	0.506*	0.532*	0.512*	0.535*		0.527*	1.076***
	(0.28)	(0.281)	(0.292)	(0.284)	(0.289)	(0.284)	(0.291)		(0.287)	(0.266)
Instability	0.217	0.256	0.227	0.242	0.244	0.210	0.256	0.250		0.325
	(0.224)	(0.224)	(0.223)	(0.232)	(0.228)	(0.221)	(0.224)	(0.218)		(0.238)
Years since coup	-0.328***	-0.335***	-0.341***	-0.356***	-0.337***	-0.339***	-0.334***	-0.367***	-0.335***	
	(0.086)	(0.093)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.091)	(0.091)	(0.084)	(0.093)	
Constant	0.500	0.254	0.655	0.846	0.701	0.127	0.729	0.834	0.646	1.101
	(0.687)	(0.571)	(0.648)	(0.628)	(0.629)	(0.57)	(0.647)	(0.629)	(0.644)	(0.715)
Log likelihood	-529.564	-517.194	-519.213	-534.314	-516.690	-518.328	-518.535	-518.297	-517.396	-535.604
Pseudo R-squared	0.112	0.111	0.107	0.108	0.112	0.109	0.116	0.109	0.111	0.079
Observations	2,146	2,114	2,114	2,203	2,114	2,114	2,172	2,116	2,114	2,114

*Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Cubic splines are included in each model.*

Table A16: Controls for Indirect Measures of Mass Threats

	Gini		Theil	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Counterbalancing	0.492		0.0765	
	(0.317)		(0.348)	
Number of counterweights (log)		0.327		0.358
		(0.340)		(0.342)
New counterweight	1.544***	1.531***	1.376**	1.260**
	(0.448)	(0.458)	(0.565)	(0.578)
Ch. Mil. Expenditure	-0.0652	-0.0766	-0.0368	-0.0341
	(0.199)	(0.201)	(0.203)	(0.201)
Expenditure/Soldier	-0.147	-0.144	0.0199	0.00095
	(0.148)	(0.17)	(0.176)	(0.173)
Mil. Personnel	-0.000473	-0.000443	0.000219	0.0002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Military regime	0.351	0.309	0.312	0.452
	(0.288)	(0.277)	(0.338)	(0.336)
Democracy	0.249	0.247	-0.404	-0.429
	(0.625)	(0.614)	(0.852)	(0.861)
GDP/capita (log)	-0.164	-0.145	-0.136	-0.122
	(0.136)	(0.152)	(0.176)	(0.178)
Ch. GDP/capita	-0.0584	-0.110	-1.557	-1.436
	(2.692)	(2.633)	(1.827)	(1.805)
Recent revolution	0.316	0.366	0.550	0.632
	(0.452)	(0.443)	(0.521)	(0.522)
Inequality	0.166	0.183	0.587	0.547
	(0.186)	(0.183)	(0.414)	(0.405)
Inequality2	-0.00168	-0.0019	-0.00667	-0.00621
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Years since coup	-0.460***	-0.455***	-0.287*	-0.273
	(0.111)	(0.110)	(0.172)	(0.17)
Constant	-3.308	-3.792	-13.73	-13.35
	(4.504)	(4.457)	(8.722)	(8.51)
Log likelihood	-257.352	-258.231	-174.586	-174.108
Pseudo R-squared	0.151	0.148	0.142	0.145
Observations	1,150	1,150	847	847

*Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Cubic splines are included in each model.*