



Pacific Sealane Security: Tokyo Conference, 1983

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Pacific Sealane Security: Tokyo Conference, 1983

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Introduction

Han Lih-wu

In presenting this volume containing the proceedings and the excellent papers given at the Pacific Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) Security Conference held in Tokyo on October 25-28, 1983, a few words of appreciation are necessary. I wish to compliment highly the Honorable Shin Kanemaru and the Japanese Center for Strategic Studies for arranging the conference which was much larger than the previous one in San Francisco, and which I had hoped, but did not expect, could have happened so soon afterwards. Mr. Kanemaru's initiative and statesmanship deserve our special praise. The well-planned program was exemplary. Moreover, I wish to express my gratitude to Admiral Kitamura who devoted himself to the preparatory work. I wish also to make known my warm regards to the Honorable Alexis Johnson, who, as head of the U.S. SLOC Study Group, contributed so much, under often difficult circumstances, not only to the San Francisco, but also the Tokyo Conference. The SLOC Study Group of the Republic of China and The Asia and World Institute are most grateful and we hope that we can contribute our part with the publication of this volume.

Our SLOC study has as its main purpose the planning of means to maintain the freedom of the sea lanes from obstruction, threats, and wars of aggression. Totalitarian or Communist countries are potential dangers to such freedom. Also, there are international terrorists and pirates on the seas who can pose temporary threats to the safety of sea communications.

Nevertheless, it is the Communist threat that is of primary concern to us. Of the Communists, it is the USSR which poses

the greatest threat.

The expansion of Russian military capabilities in recent years, including the increase of its naval power in the Pacific and in particular the ongoing construction of new bases for SS-20 intermediate range nuclear missiles in Central Asia, is a source of great concern to those of U.S. committed to the peace and stability of the region. However, we are glad that the United States in response to the Soviet threat has in the last few years placed more importance on the strengthening of its defense capability in the Pacific and is also helping its allies to be able to better counter any Communist threat.

Indeed, the threat of Russian power is such that no single nation can effectively deal with it, hence the necessity of cooperation. But cooperation in such matters involves the resolution of political, economic and other considerations which usually require some time. Take, for instance, the American proposal for the Japanese to extend their naval defenses to cover 1,000 nautical miles beyond their shores. The definition of the sealanes involving 1,000 nautical miles itself was a subject of consultation which required several geographical redefinitions. According to reports, the sea lanes in question originally were understood to be the two major sea routes extending from Japan toward the southeast and southwest and linking it with the rest of the world. Subsequently the term took on a narrower meaning referring to the area west of Guam and north of the Philippines. More recently, the Japanese and U.S. governments agreed that they meant the waters for several hundred nautical miles around Japan and for 1,000 nautical miles along Japan's main sea routes. In this case, it would mean extending them to the west of Guam, north of Luzon and east of Bashi.

Of course, the defense of the Taiwan Straits and the Bashi Channel is our own national responsibility, but we would welcome cooperation with any friendly country in this regard.

Japan's strengthening its armed forces, has understandably aroused some apprehension on the part of some nations that had bad experiences during the last war with Japanese militarists. The Republic of China should be the one most concerned. I personally

was in charge of an International Committee that established a refugee safety zone for women and children in Nanking and witnessed the so-called "Rape of Nanking." Yet, for one, I strongly support the idea of Japan's taking on an increasing share of the responsibility of defending free Asia from the Communist threat. To be realistic, Japan is an economic super-power. It needs to attain a higher degree of defense capability, one commensurate with its economic power. If it should decide to escalate its military power, it would be only a natural development. I do sense that the new views in Japan against militarism would prevent any excesses on its part.

The Communist threat is not confined to the USSR. North Korea and Vietnam also are threats to the stability of Northeast and Southeast Asia. As to the Chinese Communists, they are always a threat to the Republic of China. Anyway, as a man who used to know and to talk with most of the leaders on mainland China, I cannot honestly reconcile myself to the ideas of those who hope to rely on them to counterbalance the USSR. The fact that they did not side with the West in denouncing the suppression in Poland and that they abstained from the UN votes against the downing of the Korean civil aircraft and the terrorist attack on the Korean delegation visiting Burma are clear manifestations of their intention to remain neutral in any Western denunciation of the USSR, let alone enter into any military confrontation with the latter.

In talking about sealanes, it is natural that great attention is paid to the strategic straits. I mentioned the Taiwan Strait and the Bashi Channel, but there are others in different areas. However, the sealanes, which stretch across open waters, are continuous and long, thus their protection should be given equal consideration. Hence the necessity of real and reliable international cooperation.

The political situation in Asia and the Pacific, however, does not favor the establishment of bodies such as NATO active in the Atlantic. This heightens the desirability and importance of private efforts like ours.

Of course, regional set-ups like ASEAN are helpful in bringing about needed governmental cooperation. If the South Asian

Regional Cooperation launched recently could gradually lead to some action, it could have the beneficial influence of lessening friction and even possibly lead to positive cooperation. But, I am afraid that SARC may not mature without first going through growth pains. As for Northeast Asia, the prospect of a regional set-up is frankly remote. Moreover, even ASEAN is not self-sufficient in the defense of its sea lanes, its cooperation with other nations is essential. The coordination of sea lanes security measures could be arranged through diplomatic channels in some cases, but not all and not in an all-inclusive manner. What I am driving at is that private channels like ours have their definite use in the planning of such coordination.

As was well said in the outline of the main points of discussion for our conference prepared by the host chapter, one of our missions is to educate the general public in each of our nations on the importance of the security of our sealanes to all of our's national existence and economic well-being.

Another of our major responsibility is to be voluntary civilian arms to our governments in the search for visible and invisible dangers threatening our sealanes. We must also devise ways and means to counter such threats. As proverb has it, an ounce of prevention is better than a pound of cure. And so, deterrence should be our watchword.

To fulfil our task which is not a light one, we need many types of talent, and, of course, military strategists. Still, even amateurs like myself have a role to play. Let us therefore pull our efforts together in order to render viable and visible a credible contribution to the peace and stability of Asia and the Pacific.

In closing, I would add my appreciation to not only those who are continuing their contributions made in San Francisco, but also to our new friends from Australia, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand. As these papers demonstrate, their interest and dedication are of considerable value to our increasingly important task. The Asia and World Institute takes great pride in making their work more widely available.

Strategic Concept and Significance of SLOC Security in the Pacific Basin

Francis J. Blouin

I am please to be in Tokyo once again, and for the opportunity to address the conference on "Sea Lanes of Communication Security and Cooperation Problems in the Pacific Basin." There is an ambitious agenda before us, one that matches the vastness of the Pacific Basin in importance and in requirement for breadth of vision. As a retired seaman, then, I shall comment on some of the underlying currents and forces confronting us.

First of all, I wish to make it clear that, in my opinion, the type of conflict which we are considering will not be contained in the Pacific Basin, but would be very likely world-wide in scope. At sea, a multi-ocean conflict, it would involve the critical SLOCs in all oceans, but I recognize for most of us here, we are concerned primarily with the Pacific and Indian Oceans. All of our countries depend greatly on reliable sea transportation — for food, minerals, energy and trade. In this decade the spotlight is on oil, and three-fourths of the world's total oil production comes from nations bordering on the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean. This oil, in adequate supply, is essential in various degrees to all who are here, and certainly emphasizes our concern for the security of the SLOCs.

We in the United States recognize that our allies and many other nations rely on the U.S. to bear the major role in maintaining the security of the SLOCs, and I am confident that we shall never shun that responsibility. However, it is absolutely necessary that each nation contribute its full capabilities to the task.

You have long been accustomed to the U.S. naval presence in your ports and contiguous waters, and in recent years to a growing

Soviet naval presence. Now, both navies reflect their national interests by their presence in the Indian Ocean, presenting to both, severe logistic support problems. U.S. deployments to that area have caused a reduction in commitments to other areas, as a calculated risk. The U.S. is slowly building up its Navy and other powers but I must stress the need and importance of bases and ports in far eastern areas. It is approximately 12,000 miles to the Indian Ocean from either San Francisco or New York. Many days steaming are required to reach the Persian Gulf from Japanese and Philippine ports and even Diego Garcia. The forward basing of U.S. forces greatly reduces the time factors in reacting to unfolding crisis, although it cannot, of course, be a substitute for adequate forces in wartime.

Interestingly, in 1976, Admiral Gorshkov, writing in *Sea Power of the State*, noted, speaking of the Soviet Union:

Our country has built a modern Navy and sent it out into the ocean in order to support our own state interests and to reliably defend us from attack from the vast ocean sectors.

Several years have passed since that statement. In that time, the Soviet naval threat has continued to grow at a significant rate. The "reliable defense" mentioned by Admiral Gorshkov is now capable of roaming far beyond sources of supplies for the Continental Soviet economy enabling them to project power in places distant from the shores of the Soviet Union.

Today, for example, three Soviet Kiev class aircraft carriers are now operating with Soviet fleets, and a fourth ship of this class has been launched. One of these ships, the 36,000 ton *Minsk*, recently conducted extensive operations in the Indian Ocean. For the first time, Soviet sea-based aircraft have intercepted U.S. aircraft at sea. From a variety of indications, it is apparent that the Soviets are developing a larger deck carrier, perhaps nuclear powered, that will support some sixty fixed wing aircraft, and that could be operational as early as 1990.

It is in this context, the context of a steadily expanding Soviet

threat to an area dependent upon the sea for its prosperity and security, that we meet here today to discuss the cooperation and coordination problems for SLOC defense in the Pacific Basin.

Ambassador Mansfield recently spoke of the next decade as a decade of growth for the Pacific Basin. For the region to continue to grow, to prosper, and develop, requires three elements. First, the nations of the region must be *economically* stable. Secondly, regional *cooperation* in all endeavors must continue to grow. Finally, the nations of the region must maintain and increase the ability to *defend* themselves from internal threats and, concomitantly, deter external aggression. These elements are *inter-related*. All are elements of power and form the basis of regional stability.

In varying degrees, our nations already possess the basic strength to enable them to sustain growth to prosper, and to contribute to regional stability. The central question is how the nations of the region use their strengths and adapt to the threat to their continued growth and stability posed by the Soviet Union and its surrogates. The answer to that question will determine if this is truly the "era of the Pacific." Let me suggest some courses we might take as we come to grips with that question.

The Soviet objective in East Asia, as in other regions, is apparently to seek positions of maximum geopolitical strength from which to project power and influence. In the past fifteen years, Soviet ground forces in the Far East have more than doubled from about 200,000 men to about 450,000 today. Nearly fifty divisions, a quarter of their ground force divisions, are deployed in the eastern Soviet Union. Perhaps more ominously, the Soviet Pacific Fleet has grown to over 720 ships, including an ASW aircraft carrier, more than 125 submarines and about eighty surface combatants.

Since 1979, the USSR has deployed the ASW carrier *Minsk* to the Pacific. *Minsk* is capable of carrying forty aircraft including vertical take off fighters. As never before, it can bring Soviet tactical air power to a scene far removed from the Soviet Motherland. The Soviet Pacific fleet also includes a very modern amphibious assault ship, the *Ivan Rogov*, which can carry some 500 troops, thirty

APCs, and ten tanks. Troops and equipment can be put ashore by air cushion vehicles or helicopters. *Minsk* can bring tactical air power to support *Ivan Rogov* in projecting forces ashore — these are revolutionary new capabilities for Soviet armed forces.

The Soviets have also assigned significant numbers of their newest Backfire bombers to the Pacific. This aircraft, which flies at nearly Mach 2.5, has an unrefueled radius of about 2,400 miles. Backfires pose a formidable threat as far south as Midway, Guam, and the Philippines. The net result is a demonstrated Soviet military capability to project power and influence throughout East Asia. Such a *capability* enables them to aspire to political goals. Unfortunately, their political objectives and force capabilities are increasingly well matched.

Soviet objectives which directly affect the countries of the region include:

- Weakening Japan's ties with the U.S. and other regional states by encouraging economic and technological cooperation with the USSR, attempting to neutralize Japan in any conflict.
- Threatening the sealanes and thus putting themselves in the position to interdict vital petroleum and commerce in a period of international crisis or war. The Soviets have considerable capability now. On any given day Soviet air, surface, and sub-surface ships are on station in the Sea of Japan, South China Sea, and the Indian Ocean. They are in place and threaten the vital trade routes among the regional states of the Pacific rim.
- Increasing and maintaining access to Vietnamese air and naval facilities as a means of projecting power and influencing the region, especially the ASEAN states. These bases give the Soviets the capability to sustain a threat to all of ASEAN and the vital straits, the choke points, in the region. I should note that these Soviet bases bring the threat much closer to the U.S. Naval base at Subic Bay and Clark Air Force base in the Philippines. The combination of new capabilities inherent in such platforms as *Minsk*, *Ivan Rogov*, Backfire aircraft and a strong submarine force, along with the bases in Vietnam, establish the Soviets

convincingly as a power to be reckoned with in the Southeast Asia region.

- Reducing ASEAN's link to the West and the determination for cooperation among these nations. This is a long term Soviet objective. The bonds of cooperation formed within ASEAN are a model of regional cooperation. Soviet opposition to any resolution of the Kampuchean problem and encouragement of Vietnam's adventurism in that ravaged country is an example of this approach.
- Seeking to neutralize China, limit her modernization and prevent her western orientation. In this regard, they have exploited trade links with Europe and Japan so as to discourage these countries from improving their links to China. They continue discussions with China in apparent hope of amelioration of differences between the USSR and China in an effort to woo China away from the East Asian region and the west.

Strategically, the diversity of our land areas fronting the Pacific Basin, one side facing the Asian land mass, the other the open ocean, the vast distances separating us, and the variety of economic and social interests dictate our defense be based on cooperation and vigilance. Our very presence here today demonstrates that we recognize our common interests and have the will and capability to cope with any problem.

SLOC security requires cooperation because the nature of the threat is such that we are all concerned. As others will perhaps note in more depth, the threat need not entirely be generated directly and solely by the Soviet Union. Certainly, we cannot dismiss a potential threat from the PRC to ports and approaches to Taiwan. We are all aware that proxies or surrogates have been well employed in applying Soviet pressure in various parts of the world, notably Africa and Southeast Asia as well as the Caribbean. We have no reason to assume that the Pacific Basin, when and if it suits their purpose, would not become a target.

The Soviets obviously intend to maintain a strong presence not only in the Indian Ocean but along the vital SLOCs to the Pacific, as attested by their involvement in Afghanistan, Vietnam,

Ethiopia and South Yemen. They have the capability to threaten our SLOCs by air and sea and fully recognize that only they and the U.S. have a real capability, today, to project military power in the region.

Certainly, military countermeasures can and should be undertaken to contain the threat posed by the exportability of sophisticated weapons that make our shipping vulnerable to remote targeting. There are ways to approach the problem, and all must be undertaken with confidence to be effective.

First, burden-sharing, or allied cooperation, is the useful way of leveraging our limited defense budgets for maximum effectiveness. The United States and Japan have recently agreed to expand the role of Japan in SLOC defense to a distance much further than previously undertaken by the JMSDF. We applaud this development which recognizes the dependence of Japan on imported energy and mineral supplies. We shall all benefit because we are all caught up in the web of interdependence woven by our economic needs and national development.

Also, there should be an organization of shipping, a readily implementable, workable plan to order, convoy, and protect shipping, throughout the Pacific Basin. In this respect, *coordination of shipyard industrial enhancement*, to provide for rapid repair capability in war or crisis situations should be an important part of the plan.

Second, we can examine our military missions and procurement to determine which *functional* areas we are best suited to perform. It may be that a nation's particular geostrategic location provides an advantage to be best exploited by airborne naval reconnaissance. We should look to such areas for accelerated expansion.

Central to this concept, however, must be realization that these functions, born of each nation's capabilities and resources must be complementary, and must, taken together with the mobile and flexible forces of the United States, forces already stretched by multiple demands, be adequate and capable of meeting the threat.

Third, there are areas wherein we can have favorable impact on our own forces *tactical* capabilities. Recent experience has shown

that we need to improve our defense against sea-skimming missiles, upgrade our ASW surveillance and detection, and enhance the long range intercept capability of our interceptors. Timely intelligence is essential to achieve these improvements. As we consider our collective obligation to ensure the viability of the lengthy Pacific SLOCs we must recognize the interrelated nature of these tactical capabilities with timely intelligence. In this way we shall make best use of our capabilities to assure a favorable strategic outcome.

A conventional war involving the superpowers, restricted to the great arc from the Middle East to the Northeast Asia/Northwest Pacific would certainly impinge on all the nations here represented. The situation of Korea, and of a possible conflict on the peninsula where two armies face each other, locked in time, across the DMZ, is an ever present factor. In such an eventuality, decisions made in the early stages of crisis would have lasting impact on the outcome. Operational plans must be kept ready for quick implementation.

All planning must devote sufficient attention to *transition* from peacetime force disposition to crisis footing and then to wartime engagement. In the transition to crisis, and then to warfighting, there is little time for agitation over political decisions, whether to cooperate in defense efforts or to divorce one's nation from the events determining the fate of others. For our nations in the Pacific Basin, astride or adjacent to pressure points, such as straits, or SLOC routing points, such decisions have been made and are critical to the continued security of the SLOCs, and to the success of mutual and cooperative efforts.

Strategic Concept and Significance of SLOC Security in the Pacific Basin

Kenichi Kitamura

Foreword

Sealanes of Communication (SLOC) security has become in recent years a matter of considerable political and military concern for countries in the West. There are, however, a variety of interpretations as to how security can be achieved, even what points are disputed is not always clear.

For example, what exactly does SLOC security mean? Is it nothing more than a political slogan, a strategic problem, or just a matter of tactics? What situation (or scenario) is assumed when considering SLOC security? How are threats to SLOC to be estimated? What sort of operations does SLOC security demand? Similarly, what steps should the Western nations take to protect the global SLOCs as well as their respective regional SLOCs? How can they cooperate and in what way can they contribute to the security of the Western SLOCs as a whole? Are the common defense burdens undertaken by each Western country adequate and feasible, in view of current national and international circumstances? If not, what are the constraining factors and how and to what extent can they be overcome?

We must define the problems to be discussed, and we must clarify them through discussion. However, even without defining them beforehand, SLOC defense issues are still discussed. As a result, with various opinions expressed from different viewpoints, the discussion sometimes results in confusion. Taking these problems into account, the strategic concepts and significance of SLOC

security will be discussed in this paper, primarily from the Northeast Asia/Northwest Pacific position.

The Scope of This Paper

While the definition of "SLOC security" is not always clearly described, it will be defined in this paper as the securing primarily by military means of the freedom and safety of the for military and commercial use.

Sea control is essential for SLOC security. Sea control is generally interpreted as securing one's own use of a sea area and as denying its use to an enemy for a period of time and to a necessary extent. The most effective way to achieve this objective is to destroy enemy forces. SLOC security occupies only a part of sea control. The former, however, is at times understood as synonymous with the latter, as a result, the destruction of enemy forces threatening one's own SLOCs is likely to be emphasized. However, given the geographical conditions and the likely strategic situations in the Pacific basin, it is generally considered that inflicting decisive damage on the enemy forces which threaten SLOCs would be extremely difficult. Consequently, in the area where a threat of unacceptable level still remains, diversified operations, including the protection of shipping, should be implemented cooperatively.

A SLOC defense demands diversified operations over a vast sea area, it is impossible even for super-power to undertake it single-handedly. Therefore, some sort of either direct or indirect cooperation among allies or friendly nations is essential.

Generally speaking, security involves both deterrence of war and implementation of defense operations in the event of war. By the same token, we must consider SLOC security from the position not only of securing SLOC safety in time of war, but also of contributing to the deterrence of war through SLOC defense efforts. This paper will therefore cover both aspects.

1. Crisis Scenario

This paper will look at SLOC security, assuming the scenario

that a U.S.-USSR armed conflict caused by a Persian Gulf dispute involving oil producing countries of both coasts fails to be resolved on a regional basis, and thus expands as far as the Pacific basin.

a. It may not be possible to rule out the possibility of tactical or theater nuclear weapons being used. However, if a balance is maintained between U.S. and Soviet nuclear strength, there might be mutual restraint on the use of such weapons and thus a war would be fought with conventional weaponry. As the use of nuclear weapons is, of course, a source of deep concern to all nations, this paper will concern itself primarily with the prospect of a large scale conventional war, lasting some considerable time.

b. In this situation, it would not be unreasonable to assume that North Korea and Vietnam would join with the Soviet Union. It is quite within the realms of possibility that the Korean Peninsula could become a second war front as the result of either the Soviets' request to North Korea of attacking South Korea or North Korea's own decision to invade independently South Korea, taking advantage of the overall situation.

c. Any actions by the People's Republic of China (PRC) would exert considerable influence on the general situation, as well as SLOC security in Pacific basin. If a second war front was formed, for example, in the Korean Peninsula, the PRC's outlook on her own security would influence her course of action.

d. The threat posed to Western SLOCs by the Vietnamese and Soviet forces deployed in Indochina should also be taken into account. Similarly, military actions taken by them against the ASEAN nations could well indirectly effect the security of Western SLOCs.

However, military actions by the Vietnamese forces and forces deployed in Indochina could be greatly influenced not only by the Western military response, but also by whether the Soviet Union can maintain its own SLOCs between Indochina and its home bases and by what actions the PRC may take.

In this scenario, therefore, the security of Western SLOCs will be influenced by the prevailing situation. That is to say that it would depend on many uncertain factors. However, since it is not

the intention of this paper to make any detailed analyses of possible situations, this paper will simply refer briefly to how we might create a situation which would deter such a war, and should war erupt, how we should respond in order to increase the security of SLOCs.

2. The Threat to SLOCs in the Pacific Basin

(1) Direct threat

The survival and prosperity of the free world nations in the Pacific basin depends on foreign trade which consists mostly of goods transported by sea. This is especially true of the Northeast Asian countries of Japan, the Republic of Korea and the Republic of China, who are poorly endowed with natural resources and whose industries have to rely, to a large extent, on imported materials. Direct or indirect cooperation and mutual support in time of emergency between the free world nations in the Pacific Basin centers mostly on the ocean. SLOC security is therefore a matter of vital importance to the free world nations in the region.

This scenario sees a Soviet naval or air attack as the primary threat to our SLOCs. This includes air and missile attack and the mining of harbors, as well as submarine and air attacks on maritime defense units and shipping.

The military term "threat" is almost synonymous with that of "enemy capabilities" and is also defined as the possible enemy course of action to prevent the accomplishment of our mission. Naturally, we must take appropriate and feasible steps to cope with enemy actions. Therefore, when debating the strategy or policies, it would be more realistic to look at enemy capabilities as a result of interactions, which can be called relative enemy capabilities, rather than to examine unilateral enemy capabilities. This paper examines "threat" from this viewpoint.

a. Because of geographical conditions in Northeast Asia and the vastness of the Pacific Basin, the threat to Western SLOCs will vary in space and time. This constitutes one important reason for the discrepancies between respective countries in the cognizance

of threats to SLOCs and for the degree of their interest in SLOC security.

b. The main threat to SLOCs comes from submarines and aircraft. The submarine threat could be reduced through the efficient defense of the three straits around Japan (they are, the Soya, Tsugaru and Tsushima Straits). The farther the distance from their bases, the less enemy submarines are a threat. Especially, the threat in Southeast Asia and in the Southwest Pacific would diminish as the result of anti-submarine operations in the Northwest Pacific (south of Japan and east of Taiwan and the Philippines) and in the Bashi Channel.

Enemy submarine advances into the Indian Ocean could be made more difficult when faced with appropriate defensive actions taken by the Southeast Asian countries. Neutralization of enemy submarines prior to the opening of a war would reduce the threat to SLOCs.

We can therefore expect submarine threats to SLOCs to diminish with the passage of time and in accordance with the accumulative effect of our anti-submarine operations. Furthermore, at a farther distance from enemy bases, the threat is also apt to reduce.

c. Threats posed by enemy fighter-bombers to SLOCs in and around Japan would diminish in accordance with the efficacy of the Japanese air-defense efforts. However, big enemy bombers (including Backfires) have the capability to detour the Japanese main islands and infiltrate from the area east of the Ogasawara Islands into the area south of the Japanese main islands. If Japan can deploy an anti-air early warning system along the Ogasawara Islands and deploy interceptors on Iwo Jima, then the infiltration could be prevented to some extent. It is, of course, necessary to pay special attention to the remaining threat posed by big bombers to our naval units and shipping in this area. It goes without saying that the range of aircraft is limited by their performances, and even within that range, at a farther distance from enemy bases, threats will diminish more, as in case of submarine threat.

(2) Indirect threat

a. We have so far concentrated on the direct threat to SLOCs. There are, however, other factors which pose threat indirectly to SLOCs. The three straits around Japan (including the Soya Straits) serve as key choke points which can be used to contain within the Japan Sea the Soviet naval units based in Primorskii Krai and to cut off the Soviet's SLOC extending from the Kamchatka Peninsula through the Sea of Okhotsk to Indochina and the Indian Ocean. This can be translated to mean that the Soviets are likely to attach great importance to securing their freedom of transit through these straits, and, if possible, to controlling them. It should be expected that, to achieve this objective, the Soviets would resort to every possible means to secure air superiority and sea control in the Japan Sea. They might even attempt to invade through amphibious and/or airborne landing. If a second war front was established in the Korean Peninsula, the Soviets might support land operations with its naval forces, and might further attempt to control the Tsushima Straits, depending upon the development of their land operations. The Soviet Pacific Fleet is now capable of implementing such operations.

Accordingly, we should secure air superiority and sea control of the eastern and southern half of the Japan Sea or, at least, deny the enemy free access to the strait.

The surface forces of the Soviet Pacific Fleet includes the *Minsk*, cruisers and destroyers heavily armed with SSMs and SAMs, and even a more powerful striking battle group that may be deployed in the future. It may not pose any threat to SLOC security as long as the U.S. mobile-strike battle groups remain in the Far East area. However, they will pose a serious threat to our sea control of the Japan Sea and our defense of the three straits around Japan.

Again, taking a line running from Hokkaido through Honshu, Shikoku and the Tsushima Straits to the Republic of Korea as the first line and another one diverging from Kyushu through the Okinawa Islands to Taiwan as the second line, these two archi-pe-

lago lines will prevent the Soviet military forces from advancing to the ocean. In other words, they form a Great Wall, and the security of them is a decisive factor in SLOC security in the Pacific Basin.

b. So far, we have discussed both direct and indirect military threats to SLOCs in the Pacific Basin. However, the Soviets may attempt, carefully avoiding a direct armed conflict with the U.S., to expand its influence in this region through political, ideological and psychological plots, to dissociate American allies and friendly nations, especially Japan, from the U.S. and to alienate those countries from each other. In such circumstances, it is the usual practice of the USSR to seek, through a powerful demonstration of military might, to exert psychological pressure on the peoples of those countries and to envelope them in a sense of powerlessness and despair. The Soviet naval leaders are constantly heard to stress the importance of using naval power as a political tool in peace time. While we must bear in mind the military might of the powerful Soviet Pacific Fleet in a war we also cannot afford to ignore a political influence of its presence in peace time.

3. General Concepts of SLOC Defense in the Pacific Basin

a. We shall now discuss how to defend SLOC in the Pacific Basin, especially in Northeast Asia/Northwest Pacific. We can roughly divide these operations into three categories, supposing the military balance between the U.S. and USSR be kept and overall sea control in this theater be maintained by the U.S. forces.

The destruction or neutralization of enemy bases and enemy forces in the area:

Enemy bases include both main bases on home territory and advance bases. Neutralization of enemy advance bases facing the ocean is an essential minimum. Operations included in this category would be carried out primarily by land-based and/or carrier-based aircraft.

The protection of SLOCs in the coastal waters of allies and friendly nations:

Operations for this purpose include air defense, harbor defense, mine counter-measures and the defense of straits and other coastal choke points. They also include coastal patrol, anti-submarine operation and the defense of shipping in coastal waters. It is, in principle, understood that the responsibility for these operations will lie with the respective coastal countries.

The protection of SLOCs in the ocean:

Operations for this purpose include area patrol, anti-submarine operations, and shipping escort in the vast ocean. These operations will probably be carried out by several countries, each assuming responsibility for a respective area or function. Burden sharing will depend on the type and extent of a threat, geographical conditions and the capabilities of each country concerned.

b. It is essential that operations 1, 2 and 3 set out above should be implemented in parallel, and that especially 2 and 3 should be put into effect concurrently. If only some of them are implemented, then it would be difficult to secure the safety of shipping. The importance attached to the respective operations is closely related to the type and size of threat and the cost-effectiveness of each operation. As far as the scenario under consideration is concerned, it is certainly true that the destruction or neutralization of enemy advance bases facing the ocean, the protection of the three straits around Japan and the defense of SLOCs in the Northwest Pacific (especially south of Japan's main island and east of Taiwan) are essential for the security of SLOCs in the entire Pacific Basin. This is because we could prevent or restrict enemy naval forces from advancing into the ocean by the defense of the three straits, because we could prevent or restrict enemy units deployed in the ocean from utilizing advance bases by the interception of enemy SLOC leading there, and because we could eliminate enemy units deployed in the Northwest Pacific through SLOC defense operations.

Thus we could bring about a gradual decrease in enemy

forces deployed in the Northwest Pacific. Through these accumulated effects, we could reduce the threat to SLOCs in the Northwest Pacific and beyond. However, the key to such success lies in securing the archipelagic lines; the first running from the Japanese Islands to the southern part of the Korean Peninsula and the second extending from Kyushu to Taiwan. It has already been pointed out that the defense of these two archipelagic lines is supported by the overall sea control of this region held by the U.S. forces. Meanwhile, the safety and freedom of action of the U.S. forces could also be strengthened by the regional defense of SLOCs in this area. Hence, it can be said that the two support each other.

4. Mutual Cooperation among Countries Concerned about SLOC Security in the Pacific Basin

a. It is impossible for any country to defend single-handedly its own SLOCs in the vast Pacific Basin. Some degree of cooperation or coordination is necessary among the allies and friendly nations in the area. For example, for the defense of the Western Pass of the Tsushima Straits (Korean Straits), Japan and Korea (also the United States) must cooperate or coordinate their efforts; similarly, the ROC and the Philippines (plus the U.S.) must do the same for the defense of the Bashi Channel. It is also a matter of course that neighboring countries should cooperate in the same way for coastal defense.

We have the following choices before us to promote multinational cooperation for the defense of Pacific Basin SLOCs.

Option *ONE*: Strengthening the function of existing defense treaties (Japan-U.S., U.S.-Korea, U.S.-Philippine, ANZUS) and the inter-governmental agreements (the five-country agreement among Malaysia, Singapore, Britain, Australia, and New Zealand) within the respective framework.

Option *TWO*: In addition to Option *ONE* above, strengthening unofficial (that is, not based on any official defense treaty or inter-governmental agreement) but substantially effective cooperation, among respective cooperative systems or countries.

Option *THREE*: Establishing a multi-national collective security system similar to NATO.

b. Each country in Northeast and Southeast Asia has its own historical and cultural background, and their political, economic and military conditions also vary. For these reasons, Option *THREE* will probably not be realized in the near future. However, it is clear that the defense of SLOCs spreading widely in the vast Pacific Basin would be difficult to achieve through Option *ONE* alone. Overall, Option *TWO* may be the practical choice feasible at the present. For this reason, it would be appropriate and necessary for the free world nations in the Pacific Basin to have a joint study group and to promote a mutual understanding about the defense burden of respective countries through existing frameworks, as well as to initiate, whenever feasible, cooperation such as education and training. If such preparations for cooperation necessary in emergency were to be made in peace time, government agreement for cooperation to meet the situation would be more easily realized when a war might erupt.

5. The Strategic Significance of SLOC Defense in the Pacific Basin

(1) Contribution to the deterrence of a large scale war

As mentioned at the very beginning of this paper, when discussing SLOC security problems, not only SLOC defense operations in case of war, but also deterrence of such war should be taken into consideration. Deterrence of war in relation to this scenario embraces the deterrence of a large scale armed conflict between the U.S. and the USSR resulting from a crisis in the oil producing areas on both sides of Persian Gulf, as well as the deterrence of the expansion of such an armed conflict to Northeast Asia/Northwest Pacific (in other words, contribution to the settlement of the armed conflict in Middle East as a local issue).

In order to prevent an outbreak of large scale armed conflict between the U.S. and the USSR in the Middle East, it is essential to facilitate the concentration of the U.S. forces in that area, on the premise that an overall balance of power between East and West

would be maintained.

To maintain overall East-West military balance, it is necessary (1) to maintain the balance of U.S./Soviet nuclear power, (2) to strengthen the U.S. mobile-strike and rapid deployment forces as well as (3) to establish defense preparedness of allied countries in the respective theaters. In addition, there is also the necessity (4) to establish SLOC defense preparedness throughout the West. The reasons for the last are because the Western nations base their existence and prosperity on foreign trade, and because their mutual defense cooperation is carried out mainly by sea.

In this sense, it would not be an exaggeration to describe the Western SLOCs as the Achilles heel of its security. Furthermore, the Soviet Union currently has the capability to threaten the SLOCs in an emergency. Therefore, the preparedness to defend the Western SLOCs can be described as one of the indispensable factors in the maintaining of the East-West military balance.

(2) The significance of SLOC defense efforts in Northeast Asia/Northwest Pacific

a. SLOC defense efforts in Northeast Asia/Northwest Pacific contribute to the strengthening of the entire region's security. As a result, should American intervention in the Middle East become inescapable, the redeployment of U.S. forces to the Middle East could be made without seriously jeopardizing the security of this region. Furthermore, the safety of the U.S. SLOC which stretches from its west coast to the Western Pacific would be increased, while the movement of Soviet forces from the Far East to the Middle East by sea could be prevented or disrupted, as required. These would contribute not only to the deterrence of a large scale armed conflict between the U.S. and the USSR in the Middle East, but also to its local settlement should it break out, and thus preventing its spread to Northeast Asia/Northwest Pacific.

b. Should a U.S./USSR armed conflict in the Middle East spread as far as Northeast Asia/Northwest Pacific, then the defense of the SLOCs in Northeast Asia/Northwest Pacific would have the following significance for the security of the region.

The defense of Northeast Asia SLOCs should be basically achieved through the local defense efforts of the regional countries, with American military support given to each of them and under the overall sea control of the U.S. naval forces. SLOC defense efforts in the region would secure the import of materials vital to the survival and defense of the people in the region.

It would contribute, secondly, to the safety and freedom of action of the U.S. forces that operate in or through Northeast Asia and the Northwest Pacific.

c. Success in Northeast Asia/Northwest Pacific SLOC defense likely will reduce the threat to SLOCs in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific. Such success would also secure the first and the second archipelago lines mentioned earlier, thus preventing or restraining the advance of the surface units of the Soviet Pacific Fleet to the ocean; this would prevent or limit Soviet military activities in Southeast Asia and Oceania. The isolation or obstruction of the Soviet SLOCs extending from their main bases to their advanced bases in Indochina, would restrain the activities of both the Soviet forces deployed in Indochina and the Vietnamese forces.

d. Any actions undertaken by the People's Republic of China in this situation would influence the general situation as well as SLOC security in this theater. Conversely, the situation and its development in this theater would also be one of the key factors of the PRC's policies and actions. For example, should a second war front form in the Korean Peninsula, the PRC would be forced to decide whether or not to support North Korea. Whichever choice may be taken, both have advantages and disadvantages. Should the situation in the peninsula develop in favor of North Korea and thus the Tsushima Straits come under Soviet control, the Yellow Sea and the northern part of the East China Sea would also likely fall under Soviet control. Such changes in the strategic environment would certainly have a substantial political and military impact on the PRC. The PRC would analyze and evaluate the advantages and disadvantages to them and decide its course of action in light of its own national interest. Such analysis is not, however, within the scope of this paper's consideration.

The significance of the Western SLOC defense in Northeast Asia/Northwest Pacific to the security of Northeast Asia as well as Southeast Asia and Oceania, has already been discussed. If our operations for SLOC defense were successful, the advance of the Soviet forces to the ocean would be blocked at the line joining Japan and the ROK. Thus the Western control of the straits around Japan would be maintained and the safety of Western SLOCs would also be secured. Provided that the PRC does not assume an adverse posture to the West, the PRC would also be able to profit by the use of the SLOCs secured by the West. In this context, it would not be going too far to say that our effective SLOC defense efforts in the Northwest Pacific could serve as one element to cause the PRC to be deliberate in its actions and, at least, not to assume an adverse posture to the West.

6. Conclusion

SLOC security is an important and common interest for all the countries whose survival and security depend on the free use of the seas. It is essentially a matter of the security of the high seas. The high seas do not belong to the sovereignty of any one country, rather they are the communal assets of all nations. Accordingly, it can be said that SLOC security is a problem of a different dimension from the usual security problems related to territory and individual national sovereignty. In this sense, multinational cooperation in SLOC security can be approached from a different viewpoint from that of collective defense in the past, based mainly on territorial defense. The next century is often described as the century of the Pacific Basin, but that depends upon the security of the Pacific Basin and the cooperation among the area's countries. The security of the Pacific Basin is intrinsically the security of the high seas and that is SLOC security itself.

The Strategic Environment in Southeast Asia and Southwest Pacific: An Australian View

Michael O'Connor

For the purposes of this discussion, I will define the geographic area of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific as that portion of the globe lying between fifteen degrees north of the Equator and the Tropic of Capricorn, and bounded on the West by the entrance to the Malacca Strait and on the East by the International Date Line. The boundaries are arbitrary but they will do in this context.

Within the region, the main shipping lanes are those that transit the South China Sea in a generally North-South direction, principally between Northeast Asia and the ASEAN and Middle East countries. Of critical importance are the ships carrying strategic materials to the economies of Japan, South Korea and the ROC, as well as — in the reverse direction — those carrying exports from those powerful economies.

Secondly, there are the routes primarily from Australia to Northeast Asia which transit the Indonesian archipelago and to the East of the Philippines. Almost twenty percent of Australia's economy depends directly on the free movement of that shipping.

The Australia-U.S. route is of fundamental strategic importance to Australia's security, while similar routes from the U.S. West Coast to the ASEAN nations are assumed to be equally as important to each of those countries. In Australia's case, the supply of military equipment and a wide range of munitions is U.S. based. In any conflict, Australia would be dependent, at least in the early stages of an extended dispute, on the security of that route.

Finally, archipelagic nations such as Indonesia and the Philippines depend heavily on seaborne transport for internal communica-

tions and trade. However, because the variety of routes is so great and the ships involved relatively small, the cost-benefit of attempting to interdict such routes is much less.

SOURCES OF INSTABILITY

Probably the one single event of recent times which has led to a concern for the security of searoutes of communication in the region was the Soviet's OKEAN 75 exercise. That part of the exercise which was conducted in the East Philippine Sea concentrated heavily on the interdiction of merchant shipping. It might also be commented that the interdiction of merchant shipping is the primary weapon of a continental power against a maritime power since there can be no response in kind, at least of any significance.

Adding weight to a Soviet threat against such shipping has been the development of operational facilities for the Soviet Pacific Fleet in Vietnam and the obvious capacity for the Soviets to increase the scale of operations from those bases AT THE TIME OF THEIR CHOICE. In any period of increased tension between the USSR and the West, it could be expected that the Soviets would increase their deployment to Vietnam, if only to reduce the threat of Japanese closure of the exits from the Sea of Japan.

The role of the PRC cannot be predicted with any confidence. Talks between the PRC and the USSR are continuing and these are aimed at restoring a de facto alliance between these two major powers. If that alliance is restored, the threat to shipping would increase substantially as the sea denial forces of the PRC were committed to any conflict.

From an Australian point of view, the intrusion of Cuba into the Southwest Pacific is a matter of concern. Cuba has opened an embassy in the minuscule State of Vanuatu, a move which I suggest is more related to Soviet interests in the region than to Cuba's.

At the same time, the decolonization process in New Caledonia provides possibilities for Soviet mischief-making through the agency of Vietnam. It is not well known that New Caledonia boasts a sizeable Vietnamese minority, imported as laborers by the French

in the late nineteenth century. New Caledonia and Vanuatu are strategically vital to Australia. I cannot see how any Australian or New Zealand government could be indifferent to political and military developments in those countries where Soviet client states are involved.

Finally, there must be concern at the growth of internal problems in the Philippines. Not only does a breakdown in internal security encourage outside mischief makers but it can engender a growth of piracy by dissident and criminal elements. This would be of serious concern to all maritime nations whose shipping passes through the archipelagos.

COMPLICATING FACTORS

There are a number of domestic political factors which work to hinder the development of a coherent and cooperative approach to sea lane security within the region. These include:

- a. political pressures within the Philippines and perhaps the United States to close down U.S. bases at Subic Bay and Clark Field. If these go, the principal restraints on Soviet power within the region will have been removed.
- b. a preoccupation — and a perfectly understandable one — on the part of the ASEAN nations with the land threat from Vietnam.
- c. public and private resistance within the ASEAN nations, and probably Australia at present, to an increased Japanese military presence within the region.
- d. finally, and very regrettably, an almost total lack of concern in Australia at the scale of the potential threat to fundamental Australian interests. Since the issue was first raised in Australia in about 1977, there has developed what might almost be called an industry designed to "prove" that no such threat exists. The advantage of such "proof" is that money does not have to be spent on adequate maritime forces and hard political decisions about relations with potential allies and enemies do not have to be taken.

The great advantage of a conference such as this is that it

focuses attention on the threat to shipping. If that threat can be defined, documented and demonstrated, there will be a chance that constructive action will be taken by responsible governments. Maritime threats are easy to ignore but they can cripple nations more surely than battlefield defeats.

Defense of Japan and the Security of the Sealanes of Communications

Ryohei Oga

I. Introduction

"Defense of one thousand miles of sea lane," as an important defense theme, has become a political issue between Japan and the United States of America and consequently has been the subject of mass media speculation since the Spring of 1982.

This was triggered by Mr. Caspar W. Weinberger, U.S. Secretary of Defense, when he visited Japan in March of that year and requested the Government of Japan to improve its defense capability, saying that the "defense of one thousand miles of sea lane was a commitment made by Japan to the U.S."

The statement came as a follow-up to Japan's Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki's speech made at the National Press Center earlier in May 1981 when he was in the country as a guest of President Reagan. Mr. Suzuki had said to the effect that the several hundred miles from Japan proper and the one thousand miles of sealanes of communications were objectives for the planning and consolidating of Japan's defense capability.

This statement became the basis of Japan's commitment to the U.S. referred to earlier.

Actually America's signal to Japan to increase its defense capability has been made earlier.

In the fall of 1979 when Dr. Harold Brown, Secretary of State in the Carter Administration, stopped over in Japan on his way back from Korea, a member of his delegation released the following: So far it had been the view of the U.S. Government

that Japan was better off left on its own in defense matters than making explicit demands on it. This was changing, he said, as America will be putting forward demands in the future.

The existing Security Treaty between Japan and America was signed in September 1951 in San Francisco at the same time as the Peace Treaty. It was updated in 1960 as a new Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. It may be recalled that when the Treaty was ratified in June, demonstrators opposing it broke into the Diet and as a result President Eisenhower's scheduled visit was cancelled resulting in a diplomatic anomaly. Incidentally, this incident is called the 1960 Security Treaty Riot.

Partly because of this domestic situation, activities related to defense on the part of both the Japanese and American authorities have been low profile. There has not been any efforts to draw up Japan's defense plan or even initiate consultation or studies.

It was in summer 1975, that Japan's Defense Minister (Director-General) Sakata and U.S. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger agreed to conduct studies and consultation on military cooperation between the two countries. The defense issue was a focus of public interest when Saigon fell on April 30, and the U.S. troops withdrew from Indochina.

A guideline for Japan-U.S. joint study and consultation was established in November 1978 in accordance with the 1975 agreement. Finally Japan-U.S. military cooperation was in orbit.

In May of the same year, the NATO summit in meeting in Washington decided on a three percent annual increase in defense expenditures in real terms. This decision naturally had repercussions on Japan. And when Japan's Foreign Minister Ito was in Washington in the Spring of 1981, Secretary of Defense Weinberger, according to the Japanese newspapers, pressed Japan to strengthen Japan's sea and air defense and the "improvement of defense capabilities in the sea area west of Guam, and north of the Philippines." The suggested defense burden-sharing in the sea excited argument.

Clear and explicit demands made by the U.S. on Japan on defense matters appeared, in part, to reflect increased public support for defense forces and although extremely gradual, a maturing

attitude among the public vis-a-vis defense. On the other hand, it reflects the fundamental changes in East-West military posture and the substantial increase in Soviet military power.

II. East-West Military Posture and the Soviet Military Power in Northeast Asia and the Northwest Pacific

Post-WW II peace has been maintained by the U.S. nuclear war potential and its naval superiority.

The Soviet Union, after suffering a humiliating defeat over Cuba in 1962 vowed to strengthen its nuclear war potential and maritime strength. Through the SALT I Agreement it had, by the second half of the seventies, gained nuclear parity with the U.S. Its naval power, by maintaining its presence in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean, and by using its influence on the Middle Eastern and African countries, had grown to the level of being able to restrict the movements of the American fleets.

The rapid increase in Soviet global military strength and its parity with the U.S. has prompted the West, hitherto dependent on the U.S.'s global deterrence, to review its military strategy.

As long as the global deterrence of the U.S. functioned effectively, deficiencies in theater nuclear weapons and conventional war capabilities could be supplemented by it.

The review of the Western military strategy had resulted in the decision to increase NATO spending and the proposal made by Dr. Kissinger on European theater nuclear power on the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of North Atlantic Treaty Organization in September 1979 in Brussels. The decision by German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt to deploy Pershing II missiles in Western Europe and the NATO decision to start negotiations on the reduction of theater nuclear arms were also part of this review.

The collapse of the Palavi regime in Iran in January 1979, Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in December, and the political crisis in Poland in the Summer of 1980 have all but deepened the sense of crisis in the West and prompted a further review of conventional arms and the strategy for their use.

The formation of NATO was prompted by the Soviet move following WW II to form the Eastern European bloc for the purposes of Soviet defense and of the expansion, at the same time, of its spheres of influence.

Europe has since been the center of East-West confrontation for the last three decades. While the Soviet-Warsaw Pact forces have superiority in conventional war potential, there is, in a sense, a balance because of the saturation of military power and the established spheres of influences. Therefore, short of a critical change in the present East-West setup, such as the collapse of a Soviet Eastern bloc regime, there is an effective deterrence against a war originating in this area.

On the other hand, the Soviet Union reinforced its land forces along the Soviet-China border, when its relations with China worsened beginning the late sixties to early seventies. Today its forces account for 460,000 men in fifty-one divisions.

As a last step to increasing its peripheral forces, the Soviet Union, from the position of parity, strengthened, beginning in the second half of the seventies, its air and maritime war potential in its Maritime Provinces and in the Northwest Pacific.

For example, Backfire bombers deployed in the Far East beginning 1978 are said to number seventy or more, and the deployment of SS-20s east of Siberia is said to number anywhere from 108 to 130.

In July 1979, the USSR added to its Pacific fleet a Kiev class aircraft carrier, the *Minsk* a Kara class cruiser, the *Petropavlovsk*, and its newest landing ship, *Ivan Rogov*.

In this manner the Soviet Pacific Fleet has become its largest along side its Northern Fleet.

Its forces consist of 135 submarines (of which 65 are nuclear powered), a total of approximately 800 craft including a dozen large new craft with 1.6 million tons and a total of two thousand aircraft including 430 bombers including Backfires and 1500 third generation fighter-bombers, large enough to counterbalance the U.S. naval power in the Seas of Japan and Okhotsk and the Northwest Pacific.

The Soviets deploy forces from this Fleet in the Indian Ocean as well as in the South China Sea which is served by Cam Ranh Bay. The total number of craft in this area amount to approximately thirty including the submarines.

The Soviet naval buildup does not stop there. It has added a 30,000 ton Typhoon class SSBN, a 15,000 ton Oscar class SSGN, a Alpha class SSN with a speed of 40 knot plus and a submarine with cruising depth of 2,000 feet plus and is in the process of building a 75,000 ton nuclear powered aircraft carrier, a Kirov class cruiser-battleship, and still newer cruisers, all aiming to counterbalance the U.S. aircraft carrier fleet's surface strike potential. In the nineteen-nineties the USSR is expected to reach parity with the U.S. navy in all fields of naval power.

The West was greatly alarmed by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979; it deepened the sense of crisis as the event was taken as the Soviets' first step in gaining access to the Southwest Asian and Middle East regions. This region is important because it supplies the world, and the Western bloc in particular, with petroleum. The complex racial and religious conflicts in the region, as well as the immaturity and uncertainty of its nation states, makes it a grey zone in the East-West confrontation.

Militarily, the Soviet Union shares frontiers with the nations in the region and has been historically proven to possess ambitions to the south. In WWII, it had occupied the northern half of Iran.

The United States of America, the only force able to counterbalance the Soviet strength in the region, must depend on a long line of logistical support practically half way around the globe putting it at a gross disadvantage vis-a-vis the Soviets.

To overcome this difficulty, the United States has organized a central force around the Rapid Deployment Forces (RDF), and has sought cooperation with NATO countries and Egypt with regard to primary deployment of war materials and the use of military bases.

True, the tension in the area is less urgent today due to the continuation of the Afghanistan struggle and the shifts within in the Soviet regime including the turmoil in Poland and the change

in leadership, but that does not alter the basic military disadvantages of the West in the region.

III. Security of Japan and the Significance of SLOCs

Japan being a typical trading nation imports 570 million tons of food and resources and exports seventy-eight million tons of products or thirteen percent of its import, to maintain the livelihood of its people and national economy.

In other words, the total of the 650 million tons of Japan's maritime trade accounts for nineteen percent of the world's total maritime haulage of 3,460 million. In terms of mile-ton maritime traffic, it accounts for twenty-three percent of the world total, approximately one in every four ocean going vessels is transporting Japan's cargo.

Incidentally, forty million gross tons of Japan's merchant marine accounts for ten percent of the world's total and places it third after Liberia and Greece.

Japan's enormous dependence on foreign sources for raw materials is reflected in the following figures: petroleum, 99.7% (78% from Middle East and 18% from Southeast Asia); iron ore, ninety-nine percent (mostly from Australia); coal, seventy-seven percent (from Australia and America); nickel and bauxite one hundred percent; manganese and copper, ninety percent plus; soybeans and wheat, ninety-seven percent from America.

Furthermore, fifty percent of all imported raw materials are supplied from the Middle and Near East and Southeast Asia and thus passing through South China Sea and the Bashi Channel; twenty percent from Oceania, sixteen percent from North America, and nine percent from South America, for a total of ninety-five percent.

Peace-time trans-Pacific routes from the Americas pass through the northern part of North Pacific, but wartime traffic bound for Japan must pass via the Sea of the Philippines if it is to bypass Hawaii, Guam and the South Sea routes.

It must not be forgotten that geographically Japan is located on the periphery of the Asiatic continent and that its partner in

the Security Treaty, America, lies across the vast Pacific.

It follows then, that the maintenance of the Pacific SLOCs guarantees the effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. Security System.

It is this point that former U.S. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger referred to when he said, "trust of alliance will be greatly damaged if there were any doubt as to maintaining the security of SLOCs."

Japan depends on the SLOCs for all economic activities and national survival.

IV. Japan's Defense Strategy and SLOC Security

The defense of Japan is to be carried out in combination with and assistance from the U.S. forces.

That is to say, Japan's Self Defense Forces will carry out air and sea defense over and around Japan, while the U.S. forces will assist SDF operations and implement aggressive operations beyond its capability. (Guideline for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, November 27, 1978.)

The defense concept of Japan is as follows: SDF will confront enemy power from the continent and destroy it as much as possible over sea with the backing and support of the striking power of the U.S. forces in this theater. The three straits of Tsushima, Tsugaru and Soya, linking the bases in the Sea of Japan to the open waters, will be controlled, in order to prevent the deployment of Soviet forces onto the open sea. SLOCs which supply bases on the Kamchatka Peninsula and the Kuriles will be cut so as to neutralize those bases.

On the other hand, Pacific SLOCs will be maintained so as to insure the transport of resources and support from the U.S. necessary to prepare for a protracted conflict. This capability is a principle of defensive strategy.

The military power of the Republic of Korea insures both easing of direct military pressure on Japan from the continent and the securing of control over the Tsushima Strait, thus giving depth and flexibility to Japan's defense concept of reducing a long

defense line along the continent.

If, guided by this concept, the defensive forces around Japan function effectively, Japan will be able to control the Tsushima and Tsugaru Straits through cooperating with friendly countries.

This would allow the Soviet naval forces to pass through the Strait of Soya and to deploy its forces. The forces will come down from the bases on the Kuriles and the Kamchatka via the passages of the Kuriles on the northeast side of Japan.

One thousand miles to the south of Japan will be approximately twenty degrees latitude North, somewhere between the Ogasawara Islands and the Marianas; one thousand miles to the southwest will be the Bashi Channel along the Okinawa Islands. Most of the northern part of the Sea of the Philippines come under Japan's 200 mile zone. All maritime traffic to Japan passes through these areas.

If Japan improved its anti-submarine warfare and air defense capability and thus reduced the Soviet submarine and aircraft threat, the defense line would connect with the American sealane protection line linking Hawaii, Midway and Guam. This would insure the security of SLOCs around Japan. The control of the three straits will greatly contribute to the reduction of threats to the area.

The five year defense buildup plan (1983-1978) adopted in 1981 aims to have these capabilities achieved by the Government of Japan. The plan, however, is pointed out by the U.S. and also by some of the military experts in Japan to be deficient in not only the quantity of the forces allocated but also the logistic capabilities of the war reached including readiness.

The American demand is for Japan to increase by 1990 its defensive capability to a level consistent with its objective including the defense of SLOCs around Japan.

V. Defense of Japan's SLOCs and Relations with Neighboring Countries

Security of SLOCs by ASW air defense and the control of straits around Japan will no doubt have implications for the security

of the neighbouring countries.

That the defense of Korea is deeply related to that of Japan has been previously noted. Control of Tsushima Strait, especially the West Channel, cannot be completed without the cooperation of Japan and Korea. Since there is no military cooperation agreement between Japan and Korea at present, the cooperation of U.S. forces having relations with both is important. In the Korean War (1950), the Tsushima Strait was an important SLOC from Japan to Korea. This situation is unlikely to change in the future. The security of trans-Pacific SLOCs from the U.S. to Japan is at the same time the assurance of the SLOC from U.S. to Korea. Furthermore, the control of the Tsushima Strait also contributes to the Korean strategic naval objective of dividing North Korean naval strength to the east and west.

Japan's control of the surrounding straits and its prevention of Soviet vessels from deploying into the seas south of Japan will help check the advance of Soviet forces into Cam Ranh Bay and the South China Sea. This is because the Soviet submarines based in the Kamchatka Peninsula must cruise south of Japan and those in the Sea of Japan must negotiate the Soya Strait and the Kuriles and sail through the Bashi Channel to the South China Sea.

The Republic of China naval forces controlling Bashi Channel will also have an important role. It follows therefore, that the SLOCs to Japan cannot be secured without the cooperation of the friendly nations of the region.

Submarines advancing to the Indian Ocean must either pass south of Japan and through Lombok and the other straits of Indonesia or head south of Australia to reach destination. As stated previously, it must not be forgotten that fifty percent of its important resources including petroleum is transported to Japan from the Middle East via Malacca-Singapore Straits or from the Southeast Asian countries via South China Sea and the Bashi Channel.

VI. Conclusion

The importance of SLOC security to Japan and Japan's military

response have been the subject of this paper. The subject is at the same time a basic theme for the security not only of Japan but also of all Northeast Asia and the Northwest Pacific. The area's complete security cannot be attained without cooperative relations with the Southeast Asian countries.

With the exception of the U.S., Japan does not, as a matter of policy, have any direct cooperative military arrangement with any other nations. This may account for some of the lack of understanding among Japan's neighbouring friendly nations where its defense is concerned. However, the maintenance of SLOC security is an overall basic strategy of the Western bloc and a common benefit to the free nations. It requires broad cooperation not just that limited to the military field.

Some Thoughts on the SLOC Security Problems in Northeast Asia and the Northwest Pacific

Tun-hwa Ko

I. Foreword

Admiral Kenichi Kitamura, the key planner of this conference, was right when he said: "The discussion of SLOC security is a big problem . . . , Consequently, the focus of discussion might become dim" Thanks to the foresight and the preconference effort of the Japanese Center for Strategic Studies, schedules and topics for the conference have all been well set, and the whole meeting has been on good track right from the beginning, as far as, the general direction, scope and scenario for discussion are concerned.

Due to the limit of writing space and presentation time, the author of this paper decides just to go along the same laid-down track for discussion, and not to repeat those ideas which had been talked about in our previous meeting, or which may be brought up by other speakers in this meeting, or, of which we must have some understanding in common, if not in total agreement. The author is not to discuss the geostrategic situations in the Northeast Asia and the Northwest Pacific except for stating briefly the role that the ROC on Taiwan may play as a part of the region in the joint effort of trying to make the SLOCs safe in our scenario.

II. The ROC's Role

Taiwan commands the important strategic waterways linking the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean.

The Republic of China on Taiwan exercises juridical control

not only over the main islands of Taiwan and Penghu, but also over such offshore island groups as Kinmen, Matsu, Tung-yin, Wuchiu, Pratas and Spratlys. All of these islands are situated athwart main sea routes between East Asia and the vast world to the west.

The Indian-Pacific Route is the fastest growing of the SLOCs in terms of economic, political and military importance. World III is beyond prediction, but a strategic conflict involving the oil of the Middle East and mineral resources of Southern Africa and Southeast Asia has been under way for some years. The outcome of the resource war could determine whether there is to be another conflict.

Vessels approaching from Indian Ocean will have to pass through the Malacca Strait between Sumatra and Singapore and Malaysia or the Sunda Strait, Lombok Strait or Sumba near Timor. The shortest route is via the Malacca Strait. Vessels passing Singapore and heading for Asian ports will most likely take one of these passages:

(a) The Palawan passage along the Borneo coast and Palawan of the Philippines. It is a narrow passage and any deviation westward poses navigational danger because of many uncharted reefs. Ships making for ports in mainland China, Korea or Japanese ports such as Nagasaki will normally pass through the Taiwan Straits between Taiwan and the Chinese mainland. Others will proceed through the Bashi Channel separating Taiwan from the Philippines. Wuchiu Island is a well known navigational land mark in the Taiwan Straits. With all the modern electronic navigational aides, the sea-going sailors still have the habit of fixing their ship's positions by sighting some good land marks; and Wuchiu is such a kind of navigational mark. Islands such as Kinmen, Matsu and Tung-Ying also keep good watch on ships passing by. The strong military forces of Taiwan together with radar, acoustic detection devices, radio and air surveillance of shipping and aircraft are in a position to exercise good control over transport in this area.

(b) Vessels may take one of several other passages well clear of Natuna Besar and Anabas Kepulauan in order to head for the northern Philippines, Cambodia or Hong Kong.

Regardless of the passage chosen, shipping will have to pass strategically located Tai-ping in the Spratly group. This island is well garrisoned by forces of the Republic of China. Lookouts, patrols, radar and other equipment provide surveillance over traffic between the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

Taiwan has excellent ports to support naval operations, including those of training, recreation, drydocking, repairs and refueling. Bases are essential to a navy, even though a nuclear-powered vessel may circumnavigate the globe several times. A fleet may remain at sea for several months but eventually must put into port to refresh personnel and repair machinery. Fleet and bases are complementary. They are multipliers in the sea power equations. In the past, the greatness of the British Empire was made possible by its control of a huge chain of strategic bases. When the bases were lost, the Empire fell. In the recent war of South Atlantic, British might not have succeeded in Falkland without the logistic support of the Ascension Island.

Taiwan is close to both the Ryukyus and Philippines. As a plane leaves the southern tip of Taiwan, the Philippines come into sight. If any unfriendly power could occupy Taiwan and use the military installations and bases to project its power into the Pacific, then, for all practical purpose, the U.S. would be denied the uses of bases in Philippines and Ryukyus. U.S. may be able to construct alternate bases further east in the Pacific, but it is beyond doubt, that it would be the financial burden that the U.S. just can not afford to take, let alone the disadvantage in time and space for fleet to reach the Indian Ocean from bases further east than the Philippines.

The best way to ensure the SLOC security in the Taiwan Strait and Bashi Channel is to strengthen what are available now for the Free World. ROC's role in this regard is very important.

III. On Cooperation

Our scenario depicts a possible Middle East war which may spill over into Southeast and Northeast Asia. A second front war in

Korea might also spill over from the Middle East war. How shall we protect the sea-borne transportation? It has been pointed out in our papers that the main burden of the sea control, that is, to use the sea, and to deny the enemy's use of the sea, should be carried out by the U.S. Because no minor sea power nations have the capability of doing it. The rest of nations should try to strengthen their own defense capabilities, and should defend the near-by sealanes in cooperation with their neighboring countries.

Granting this is a generally acceptable hypothesis, granting this is a problem of common interests in our conference, then the questions are how shall we proceed from here? How shall we, as a joint study group, think, study, tackle, or analyze the problems together? Perhaps some decisions or decisions on matters similar to these questions have to be made in our conference this time.

An international conference with no intention of international cooperation in mind is just a waste of time for every participant.

A series of annual conference aiming at no practical purpose is like some students point to school every year with no practical aims in mind. Our conference might remain just an annual gathering.

IV. On Merchant Shipping

When we talk about SLOC security, we essentially mean how to protect the sea-borne commerce in war time and or in emergency, and also the wartime movement of armed forces and support at sea. We need to know the situation of merchant shipping first. We have to know in detail the total tonnage of import and export of each country, breaking down in amount and kinds cargoes transported by various types of ships — general cargo ships, bulk dry cargoes, tankers, supertankers, containers, semi-containers, LASH (Lighter Aboard Ship), roll-on roll-off, hydrofoils, hovercraft, and all the surface effect ships, the voyage length to and from various ports, the routes, the densities of ship flow during a certain length of time, and passing certain waterways. We need to know the total tonnage of incoming and outgoing vessels of various ports. We need to know not only the international transports but also the

inter-ports, coastal water communications in each country. What about the port terminal capacities? What about the inland, connecting land transports? We need all these peacetime statistics, but they are not enough.

We have to figure out the capacities in wartime conditions. In the economic field, we need to know not only the daily, weekly, monthly consumptions of all kinds of commodities, but also we have to calculate the supplies needed to upkeep the civilian consumption in wartime, plus the minimum strategic supplies needed to keep the war-fighting machines going. In order to know all that, we need the best method of simulating the ship-loss, and probabilities of cargoes loss in sealanes under attack by enemies. That involves good imagination and cool calculation of a sea war, and we would also need good preparation for replacing this loss of ships, as well as the prewar stockpiling of critical strategic materials, before the enemies's trying to cut off our SLOCs.

What about the enemy's bombing of our storages and production plants? In our conference, for the sake of brevity and orderly discussion, we limit our thoughts to a simple sealane scenario, but an anti-shipping war can never be confined in a sea war only. It will soon be escalated into a sea-air, and full scale war, as shown in the WW II, (but let us keep it conventional for the time being). The enemy will not only try to destroy our shippings at sea, but will also destroy our industries and stockpiling at home. So here we need all the calculations in a wartime situation before we can derive our strategies independently or collectively on how to make our SLOCs secure, and on how to minimize our damages at sea in war time. Merchant shippings are one of the key factors in studying the SLOC problems.

V. On Direction and Control of Shipping

Two things are prerequisite for multi-national combined operations: Number one, mutual trust, number two, joint-study in advance. In order to make our SLOCs safe, we have to work hand

in hand together, and start studies now in peacetime. If we do it well, we might even prevent the war from happening. From the experience of the Western Allied nations of the WW II, the efficient use of merchant ships must be handled by a centrally organized agency. For this reason, civil direction of shipping authorities is carried out by civil shipping authorities, while control of the movement of merchant ships is carried out by naval authorities of the Allied powers.

Each nation may have its own civilian organization, or several organizations in handling shipping, but the tasks have to be functioning "isomorphically," to include all matters pertaining to the use and management of merchant ships, to the allocation of destinations and ships to particular tasks, to the determination of destinations and voyages, and to all harbor movements, including loading and unloading, that is, all matters related to the employment and terminal processing of shipping.

Here we are not gathering together for discussing matters of military operations, even though the protection of sealanes are, by nature, military problems. We may not have to discuss here the Naval Control of Shipping. All we have to say here is to clarify that the term Naval Control of Shipping includes all matters pertaining to routing, reporting, convoy organization, and tactical diversion of the shipping of allied nations and neutrals under charter. Or, in short, the term refers to matters related to movement of shipping. It does not include cognizance or control over the assignment, employment, operations or tactical procedures of patrol or escort forces which are related but separate functions of the naval commanders of each nation. In other words, we should leave the tactical matters related to the protection of shipping at sea to different meetings.

But, something broader in scope and which does not come within the definition of naval control, has to be studied and mutually understood, not only among participants from different countries, but also among different governmental agencies within a country.

In wartime, responsibilities for the direction and control of merchant ships rests on two shipping organizations — the Civil

Direction of Shipping Organization and the Naval Control of Shipping Organization.

In peacetime, an overall strategy, has to be formulated, nations who may have to work together in wartime have to coordinate and plan with common effort, basing these pre-war agreements on an overall strategy.

In SLOC cooperation, statistics on merchant shippings have to be exchanged. Joint studies are needed for making policies on forming a central ship pool. Joint studies may also be needed on how to train the merchant sailors on a standardized operation procedure, on using the same communications methods and equipment, and signal codes. This has to be done on a national level first, and then on the regional or multi-national level. Councils and exercises on these matters are to be taken in peacetime. Joint schools may also be needed first to prepare the materials, then to train the merchant sailors.

All these mutual exchange and understanding of merchant ships in peacetime would also help in promoting better movement of goods between friendly countries.

An ad hoc study group should study more about each other's port clearance procedure, port access, cargo sharing and even the freight rates. In peacetime, it helps promote better trade, and improve better balance-of-payments. In wartime, it helps good shipping control in SLOC security.

VI. Conclusion

Due to the foresight and good pre-conference work of the Japanese Center for Strategic Studies, the author of this paper presumes that all the participants would agree to confine their discussion to set scenarios; and the author also presumes that the general viewpoints on the geo-strategic situations among the participants would not differ too much from each other. Therefore, this paper, except for the pointing to what role the ROC on Taiwan could play in the Pacific region, lays emphasis on practical steps for SLOC cooperation. Joint studies and exchanges of data are needed;

especially in the matters of Civil Direction and Control of Merchant Shippings.

The suggestions are based on the experience of Allied Nations in the "Battle of Atlantic" which was a deadly but successful struggle against the German's desperate effort to cut off Allied SLOCs in WW II.

PROPOSALS SLOC STUDY GROUP, ROC

The success of the four-nation SLOCSG joint meeting held in San Francisco in 1982 and of the enlarged conference in Tokyo this year will lay a foundation for the future planning and implementation of concrete proposals designed to maintain the freedom of the strategic sealanes of Asia and the Pacific.

In furthering our movement, annual joint meetings are both desirable and necessary. It is hoped that the venue of the 1984 meeting can be decided at the Tokyo Conference. Even so, it can be suggested that there be the appointment of a steering committee. It should be enlarged and restructured on the basis of last year's steering committee in order to help both the convening of the next conference and the planning and gradual implementation of concrete steps toward our objective. Such planning is, of course, subject to the final approval of all the members or, at least, those members concerned.

One of the most useful activities which can be implemented early on is the promotion in each country of the general public's interest in and recognition of the importance of the freedom in the sealanes, as well as a better understanding of other countries position and problems in connection with the sealanes. It is, therefore, suggested that efforts be made by the SLOC groups to visit each other's countries and to render aid or facilities to the visits by other SLOC group members to their country.

To facilitate study and research, it is, of course, desirable for each study group to build a reference library. It is proposed that there should be an exchange of publications or, at least, notification

of the existence of useful reference publications. It is hoped that study groups will help each other to make available xerox copies, at cost, if requested by a fellow group.

The unfortunate frequency of air and sea accidents in the sealanes has raised the question of whether systematic international cooperation in the areas of rescue communications and Search and Rescue (S. and R.) may prove to be of considerable worth in the protection of life and property. To pursue this matter, we raise the question of the formation of a study committee. This committee would initially focus on the prospects for and the dimensions of an international S. and R. unit operation in Asian waters, which would be equipped with an international crew, the latest technology, and rescue techniques.

SLOC Security Problems in East Asia: The Legal Aspects

Choon-ho Park

First of all, I wish to join the other participants at this meeting in expressing my sincere thanks to the Japanese Center for Strategic Studies for the hospitality it has extended to us and for the efficient organization of this meaningful event.

In the surroundings here today, I do not think it necessary or appropriate for me to deal with the topic in general terms. I will therefore confine my presentation to the legal aspects in the Northeast Asian region.

Geographically, maritime access to and from some Northeast Asian ports requires passage through straits used for international navigation. To reach any of the ports facing the Sea of Japan, for example, shipping craft have to use one of the three straits, namely, the Soya, Tsugaru, or Korea, or four if the Eastern and the Western Channels of the Korea Strait are counted separately. This means that, in this region, sealane defense involves highly complicated and sensitive problems of strait passage as well. But, of the four waterways in question, either channel of the Korea Strait can be sampled out as one representing a cross-section of what relates to the defense of the sea lanes in this region. For this reason, a brief observation will be attempted of the problems of the Korea Strait mainly with reference to the legal aspects, and, in doing so, reference will be made to the provisions in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea regarding the passage of foreign shipping craft through straits used for international navigation.

The coastal states as well as other users of the Korea Strait have been increasingly obsessed with the potentiality that, in case

of a local or global emergency, the Strait might be blockaded for purposes not directly related to their shipping or maritime trade. It is plainly clear that such drastic measures would be intended to frustrate or even immobilize the Soviet Pacific Fleet based in Vladivostok. Since the blockade or the threat of blockade would not be conceivable under normal circumstances, they are concerned not only with the blockade itself or its immediate impact on their foreign trade, but also with the tension that would build up to cause it and the worse situation that could result.

It may be recalled in passing that at the 1951 San Francisco Peace negotiations with Japan, the Soviet Union proposed that the La Perouse and Nemuro Straits be demilitarized along the entire Japanese coast and be opened to passage by the merchant ships of all nations and only to the passage of warships of nations bordering on the Sea of Japan.

Specifically, the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union or between Japan and the Soviet Union would have to deteriorate to the point of a clash before the blockade of the Strait could actually take place. Between the two super-powers, Japan might then find its vitally important sealanes vulnerable to interdiction by "unidentified" or piratic elements in spite of its alignment with the United States or even in consequence of such alignment. South Korea would be in a similar situation as Japan's while the other countries in the region would also not be free from such concern. But, partly due to the smaller volume of their maritime trade than Japan's and partly due to their different political alignments with either super-power, they would find themselves involved to a lesser extent. No longer an academic question, the blockade of the Korea Strait could thus take place from both regional and extra-regional causes because the problems of the Strait and the sealanes linking Northeast Asia with the rest of the world are closely interlocked and, in time of local or global tension, such a situation could threaten to cause the former to be closed in order for the latter to be open.

The legal aspects of sealane defense in Northeast Asia may now be looked at with reference to the Korea Strait. Relative to the

Malacca Straits, its geographical circumstances are simpler, being easier for ships to negotiate through. The Eastern Channel is about twenty-five nautical miles wide and the Western Channel about 22.75 n. m. at its narrowest, with the water depth nowhere exceeding 200 meters except at a narrow strip along Tsushima in the Western Channel.

The 1982 UN Law of the Sea Convention authorizes coastal States to claim the limit of their territorial sea up to twelve n. m., and also provides for the regulation of passage by foreign vessels through such straits. If, therefore, both Japan and South Korea claimed the twelve n. m. limit in the Korea Strait, approximately 18.5 n. m. of the Western Channel would fall completely under their territorial sea regimes (see map). However, the two coastal States apply the three n. m. limit to both Channels (as well as to Japan's Ohsumi, Soya, and Tsugaru Straits), so that there would be "high seas" corridors open for foreign vessels to pass through. Elsewhere along their respective coasts, the twelve n. m. limit applies, in Japan since 1977 and in South Korea since 1979.

If, for any reason, foreign ships chose to pass through the territorial sea of China, North Korea, or South Korea, however, some problems would be conceivable, because these countries demand a petition of permission or advance notice from foreign non-commercial and military vessels on passage, a practice which the UN Convention does not recognize. All that is required of them is "to comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal States concerning passage through the territorial sea," in the name of what is called the "transit passage." It now remains to be seen how these coastal states are going to adjust their related domestic laws with what they have signed as the new law of the sea, on or following ratification of the Convention. It should be noted that the USSR state Border Law of March 1, 1983, no longer requires permit or advance notice.

At this point, it would be appropriate to look at the differences between the so-called *innocent passage* and *transit passage*. In this connection, I wish to cite Professor Horace Robertson, a retired rear-admiral from the U.S. Navy and currently teaching at Duke

University Law School:

Transit passage under the 1982 UN Convention differs from innocent passage in the following principal ways:

1. Innocent passage does not include freedom of overflight. Although no international convention dealing with innocent passage specifically abrogates this right for aircraft, there is no accepted principle of international law that provides for freedom of overflight in the territorial sea.

Transit passage, on the other hand, does apply equally to aircraft. Article 38(1) states that all ships and aircraft enjoy the right of transit passage, and Paragraph 2 of Article 38 defines transit passage in terms of both navigation and overflight.

2. Submarines in innocent passage are required to navigate on the surface and show their flag. This was specifically set forth in the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, Article 14, paragraph 6, and is carried forward into the Convention on the Law of the Sea in Article 20.

Submarines exercising the right of transit passage, on the other hand, are not required to operate on the surface but may transit submerged.

3. In innocent passage, the coastal state has competence to determine whether that passage is non-innocent and deny passage on this basis. This determination could be based on subjective factors. In the transit passage articles, on the other hand, the requirement for the transiting ship to observe certain coastal State rules for ships in passage are "delinked" from coastal State enforcement of those rules. A ship in violation of its obligations might be legally liable or make its flag state legally responsible, but it would not forfeit its right of transit passage.

4. Innocent passage may be suspended under certain circumstances. Transit passage, on the other hand, cannot be suspended.

As a usual pattern, the defense of sealanes is argued in the inoffensive language of law and diplomacy. But the very need for such defense would presuppose the advent of a situation short of peace, such that the situation could deteriorate to one

that would defy settlement as a legal issue involving rights of passage through straits or designated sealanes. In the final analysis, therefore, the best deterrent against sealane interdiction should be found either in physical preparedness or, paradoxically, in the fear of the grave situation that might result from actual interdiction by either side. In other words, it can be said that sea powers the more they can interdict, the less desirous they are of doing so.

SLOC Security in Northeast Asia and the Northwest Pacific

B.M. Streat

It is a pleasure to be back in the Western Pacific where I spent two tours of duty in our Seventh fleet including one tour as the ASW Force Commander concerned with a mission that is a central theme in this conference.

Recent events emphasize the importance of the threat to the Northeast Asia region and to the SLOCs. They also emphasize the foreboding nature and ruthless character of those in charge of the forces which constitute the threat. Not only do Soviets have large and modern forces, but they have proven that they will use them with little provocation or warning in an uncivilized manner if they consider it in their interest. Free world Asian forces must be strong enough, ready to deter aggression, and if necessary, counter Soviet actions.

Soviet Military Forces and the SLOC Threat in Northeast Asia

The Soviet military capabilities in the Pacific region continue to increase. The Soviet Pacific fleet now totals over 700 modern ships, including approximately 120 submarines of which about forty are SSBNs; an ASW carrier, the *Minsk*; over eighty cruisers, destroyers and frigates; over 300 amphibious ships and craft; mine warfare ships; and patrol boats. Homeported in Vladivostok and Petropavlosk, the Soviet navy and other military forces are a threat to the security of all free Asian nations, especially those of Northeast Asia, threatening the freedom of the seas surrounding the indu-

striated nations of this region. These nations depend on the seas for the transportation of fuel, food, and raw materials, all vital to their economic well being.

In the past, the vast majority of Soviet fleet concentrated their operations in the sea of Japan, the Sea of Okhotsk, and waters extending 400 miles eastward from the Kamchatka peninsula. Soviet naval forces were ostensibly dedicated to the defense of Soviet territory. Since the nineteen-sixties, the Soviets have dramatically increased their forces, with modern ships, aircraft and equipment. This modification or, indeed, radical change in their force structure enabled Soviet naval strategists to conduct progressively more open ocean operations. A primary mission now appears to be the defense of the nuclear missile submarine forces which will operate in the Sea of Okhotsk during action with targets 5000—6000 miles away. The inordinate and excessive remaining number of Russian submarines, about eighty in number, can be a serious threat to free world shipping in the event a confrontation develops with U.S. or Japan.

Considering the proximity to their land masses and their two naval bases at Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk, the Soviet forces are capable of controlling the Sea of Okhotsk as well as the air over the sea. While U.S. forces conduct periodic exercises in these seas, to demonstrate and insure freedom of the seas, the Sea of Okhotsk is virtually a Russian lake completely surrounded by Soviet territory and islands under their control except for Hokkaido. In these areas, Soviet forces now operate at will, unhindered in these waters. The only restriction is the passage between the two seas, Japan and Okhotsk, the Soya Straits. However, with Sakhalin Island opposite Hokkaido and with overwhelming Soviet naval and air forces in that area, it would appear they are capable of controlling the air and the sea and maintaining freedom of passage at least in the first stage of any conflict.

It is possible, at least for the most part, that the Sea of Japan could also be controlled by Soviet naval and land based air forces hindered only by the presence of a U.S. carrier battle group.

The Soviet Union must, in order to achieve its war aims,

effectively organize forces in the open ocean originating from the Sea of Okhotsk and the Sea of Japan. Control of the straits of Soya, Tsugaru, and Tsushima must be a prime objective of the Soviet forces as well as the Allied navies. Without that control by the allies there can be no effective containment of the threat. The alternative is to embark on the much more difficult problem of open ocean localization and conflict.

Further, Allied failure to limit or control access to those straits increases the likelihood that the key military and economic SLOCs, passing via the great circle route from the U.S. to the industrialized nations of the Northern Pacific Basin, can be interdicted. At the very least, attrition to shipping in that area could be significant.

Beyond interdiction of the SLOCs themselves, key ports and transshipment facilities would very likely be subject to destruction and thereby lost to Allied efforts during the crucial early days of conflict.

The means to accomplish such a campaign are already at hand. Sophisticated Soviet submarines, launching sea launched cruise missiles from beneath the surface of the sea, as well as Backfire bombers operating at both refueled and unrefueled ranges, are in place to be the instruments of such a campaign of destruction. In addition, potential surface task forces, utilizing surface-to-surface missiles could by themselves inflict grave damage to the SLOCs.

Most Soviet non-ballistic missile submarines operate from ports in the Sea of Japan. The Japanese press has also reported the development of submarine support facilities in the Kuriles. An analysis of their submarine employment indicates one third of the submarines are intended to or could be deployed against the SLOCs. An analysis of the surface threat indicates that one Kiev class cruiser, ten each of CG, DDG, and FFG ships plus four CLs and five DDs are candidates for anti-SLOC roles under the umbrella of Soviet naval aviation. The air threat to the SLOCs is considered to be the SNA Backfire aircraft and Badgers in the Soviet Pacific fleet, now estimated to total 150 aircraft of which 110 are bombers or ASM carriers. As time goes on, the percentage of Backfires will grow. Badgers will probably be phased out later in the decade

although the Soviets have shown in the past a tendency to retain older aircraft longer than we might expect them to. As more tactical precision guided missiles (PGMs) appear on Fencers and other fighter bombers they will increase the threat to SLOCs. The introduction of the Soviet full deck carrier late in the decade will bring a sea-based air threat to the SLOC. However, it seems unlikely that the Soviets would be using their carrier against merchant shipping so long as they remain concerned with the viability of their combatant forces. Fortunately, it probably will take several years after completion before this carrier is fully operational. The Soviet carrier will probably operate in the Sea of Japan or Okhotsk as will the *Minsk* in an ASW or air control capacity in conjunction with land based air cover and not be used in an anti-SLOC role.

While the Soviet carrier is in the future, Soviet Pacific amphibious forces are substantial now. Their intended use is probably to insure free passage through the Soya Straits with the northern tip of Hokkaido as the intended target if necessary. Soviet airfields are closer to the Soya Straits than the northernmost JSDF air base at Chitose and even the bases in their northern territories are closer to the straits than is Misawa where U.S. F-16's reportedly will be based. The Soviets have a numerical superiority even as far south as Chitose and this advantage becomes greater as one goes farther north. When Soviet anti-aircraft defenses in Southern Sakhalin are added to the calculations, the air defense problem for the U.S. and Japan becomes formidable. The control of Soya Straits is probably the key to open ocean operations by the Soviet fleet.

Special Situations and Tsushima

Given the Soviet policy of expansionism and their practice of employing surrogates to support them directly or indirectly or covertly, one possible scenario might involve an attack on South Korea by the PRK. North Korea continues an unprecedented buildup far beyond its defense requirements with a large amphibious capability. Its leadership remains committed to the unification of Korea under communist rule. Under these circumstances, such

an attempt could come at any time and might be a cover for Soviet operations elsewhere (such as interference in the Middle East) or it might be an isolated front with the Soviets feigning neutrality. Many estimates of a U.S. Soviet confrontation suggest that a war in Korea would be likely to break out should a U.S. - Soviet conflict break out anywhere, for instance, in Europe as well as the Middle East. Under such circumstances, the U.S. might be hard pressed to immediately reinforce the ROK beyond present forces. The ROK would need help to protect sea and air SLOCs vital to its continued success in the field. If the Soviets did gain access to South Korean bases, the air threat to Western Japan would approach that now facing Hokkaido and the threat to the Southern SLOCs would correspondingly increase greatly. This turn of events would present difficulties in control of Tsushima Straits and would greatly increase the possibility of Soviet ship transit to SLOC areas. It is incumbent upon the allies not to permit this to happen.

The PRC attitude and actions in the event of a confrontation would depend upon her relationship with Russia at that time. Although the PRC has nuclear weapons, it is not expected to become a direct threat to Japan or the U.S. within the near timeframe. It is assumed that the PRC would remain neutral at the start of any big power confrontation. Considering a worst case scenario where the PRC threw in with the Soviets, a large number of submarines of unknown readiness could interfere with the SLOCs.

Implementation

Past intra-regional political and psychological fears of militarism still exist. For survival in the present environment of potential aggression and demonstrated Soviet ruthlessness, the nations of East Asia must be willing to submerge old feelings in favor of maximum cooperation in readiness for a common defense.

Each country should strive to develop the military capability to defend its interests in any reasonable contingency. When defense requirements exceed local budgets, nations with parallel economic and political interests must cooperate for a more powerful defense

against the common enemy.

We hope that Japan will develop the capability to implement SLOC protection out to 1000 miles. The ROK must have a strong defense, sufficient to protect their coastal routes, harbors and transportation systems.

Established shipping routes, the Southwestern route through the East and South China Sea and the Southeastern route to Guam, are well defined and need to rerouting or altering. The 1000 mile distance extends Japan's area of responsibility to approximately the 20°N latitude line. One possible geographical division of coordinated national interest is the allocation to Japan of responsibility for the area from 20° latitude North and from 160°E longitude West. The U.S. would have the responsibility for the area south of 20°N latitude line and west of 160°E. This region encompasses not only Japan's oil lifeline but a large share of her other trade as well. Japan could also provide repair and training support for U.S. forces. The U.S. would provide the strategic deterrent, SLOC defense beyond 1000 miles, and provide specialized reconnaissance and intelligence. Both countries would share logistic support, collection of intelligence, mutual assistance in technology, training for interoperability, search and rescue and psychological operations.

Preparatory actions could also be taken to enhance the safety of shipping lanes. In WWII much shipping was lost because of the incompetence or lack of instruction of merchant marine skippers. Qualification of merchant captains is a must and a safety factor. Naval control of shipping exercises need to be held.

An intelligence and warning system to collect and integrate all-source information throughout Japan's defense area should be developed. An intelligence interface with the operational commander is essential and needs to be planned. The command structure must be capable of controlling multi-service operations in air defense and ASW.

To prosecute Japan's responsibilities, much hardware is needed. Sufficient tactical aircraft and warships must be procured to cover the sealanes out to 1000 miles. ASW aircraft, sufficient surface craft the prosecution of the submarine threat and for escorting

shipping would be required. It also is assumed that ammunition and equipment would be adequate for readiness for a prolonged situation. Most essential, however, is the existence of qualified, professional navy personnel, such as Japan has provided to man the JMSDF, to maintain and operate those ships at sea.

Conclusion

While SLOC protection *readiness* seems a minor part of war deterrence, it does inform the aggressor that the conflict is likely to be protracted. This is an important deterrent in itself. SLOC defense is expensive but is economical insurance in the event of war or if war is prevented. On the aggressor side, we know SLOC interdiction is considered a high priority mission by the Soviets. Admiral Gorshov has said "the disruption of the ocean lines of communication, the special arteries feeding the military and economic potentials of these enemy countries has continued to be one of the most important of the Navy's missions."

We must recognize that we are not without the means to protect ourselves so long as we individually and collectively demonstrate the resolve to defend our rights as sovereign nations. The essence of deterrence is the will and credible capability to fight if need be to protect those rights. We must maintain the freedom of the seas upon which so much depends.

SLOC Security Problems in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific

Alan Robertson

From my comments in the first session it follows that, if we were prepared to fight a large scale conventional war at sea I believe it would have two beneficial consequences; firstly, possession of an adequate conventional sea assertion capability would spare us the dilemma of having to choose between initiating a nuclear war, or of losing control of the Pacific Basin SLOCs by default. Secondly, and paradoxically, if we were so prepared, then I believe the Soviets would not initiate such a war, even with surrogates, because, to paraphrase Professor Blainey: "Wars usually begin when two sides disagree on their relative strength."¹

I hope you will not regard this as mere hair splitting; it brings me back to the discussion of SLOC security problems in the event of a large scale conventional war. I have merely arrived at the same place but by a slightly different route, but one which, I hope, might help those who would regard such a contingency as too bizarre in the nuclear age.

As to the geopolitical significance of Southeast Asia, may I just add that it produces more than ninety percent of the world's rubber, seventy-five percent of its copra and sixty percent of the world's palm oil and tin. There are high hopes of extensive oil and gas fields offshore. The population exceeds 300 million already.

and this is expected to rise to 450 million before the end of this century. The conventional wisdom is that it will have one of a fastest growing economies in the nineteen-eighties and nineties.

Apart from their external anxieties about Vietnam and the PRC, the countries of Southeast Asia have various perceived internal security problems and nation building tasks including the trans-formation of rural agricultural societies into urban industrialized ones. So that, while the region is archipelagic, and therefore, predominantly maritime in character, most of its individual members' attentions are focused on the land, as the continental structure of their armed forces clearly shows. Furthermore, sea assertion technologies, particularly for open ocean SLOC protection, are at the expensive end of the scale.³

Maritime defense forces in the region therefore come a bad last (as they do in Australia for different reasons) and they have been developed essentially for coastal protection and surveillance, only marginally more than coastguard duties. The almost total absence of mine clearance forces is, however, alarming. Even at the lowest end of the "thermometer of sea control,"⁴ they are affordable and, I suggest, essential for their own self-defense anyway. The vulnerability of the various straits, or "choke points" to mining needs no elaboration. And the provision of mine clearance forces could hardly be portrayed as anything else but prudent self-interest, certainly not indicating any anti-Soviet bias.

Southeast Asia has emerged from its colonial past, not without problems, but on the whole better than many, and with a determination to tackle more problems and work towards the somewhat glittering future which its performance over the last decade suggests is no idle dream. The area is important to the rest of the world for both its products and its market and, of course, the trade which passes through its waters.

1. Blainey, *The Causes of War*.

2. *International Security - the Southeast Asia and Southwest Pacific Region* ed. T.B. Miller.

3. Stanfield Turner, "Designing a Modern Navy," Stockholm Seapower Conference. Adelphi Paper No. 52.

4. Turner, *op. cit.*

The last thing Southeast Asia wants or needs is a large-scale conventional war which would not only destroy its hopes but undo the progress it has already made. Although ASEAN's ZOPFAN proposals have not succeeded, it is easy to see why the attractions of neutrality must be compelling, though as I said earlier I do not think that the Soviets can or will tolerate neutrality in World War III, except as a tactical measure. But, in the near future, this suggests to me that any formal defense cooperation is highly unlikely, and particularly so since proposals for formal defense cooperation between the ASEAN nations themselves have yet to be successful. Nor does Australia and New Zealand's participation in the Five Power Agreement offer much scope. There is probably more scope in the U.S.-Filipino relationship, I suggest, but not too much.

Some part of the risks of a conventional war at sea in the region could be eliminated, of course, by rerouting transient traffic south of Australia, and so avoiding "choke points" for that shipping. Clearly there would be penalties in time, fuel, and expenses and it would not obviate the risks in the Indian Ocean, where, our scenario suggests the war might have begun anyway. Australia-Japan traffic would probably have to go south about too; Torres Strait is too shallow for most big ships.

In all this the attitude of the Soviet Union to neutrals can only be speculative. Would the Soviet/Vietnamese forces respect the neutrality of shipping and the waters of neutrals? Historical precedent of the last fifty years suggests that this is unlikely. But given the ASEAN nations desire for neutrality, I would expect that they would try to stay neutral until forced otherwise. Equally and perhaps more importantly, the Soviet-PRC relationship makes for a lot of ambiguity. My feeling is that the PRC, too, would try to remain neutral and let the Soviets and the United States and their allies weaken each other. For all its abuse the indications are that Peking knows it is under no threat at all from the United States and in fact looks to the U.S. to help guarantee its maritime border allowing it to concentrate its attention on its land borders, with the Soviet Union particularly — and chastened by its recent encounter with the Vietnamese which has called for some soul searching. If

my feeling is correct, would the Soviet Union respect ASEAN neutrality? One can envisage PRC merchant shipping doing great business in the area, but of course, mines are indiscriminate weapons. Nevertheless, I suspect it would be a bold Soviet Pacific Fleet commander who deliberately provoked the PRC into a war and introduced a massive land threat to his essential bases.

Despite some ASEAN nations concerns about the PRC, my opinion, for what it is worth, is that I see little prospect of a Soviet-PRC rapprochement. If it were to occur then that might be a significant indicator of overt war about to begin. After all the Soviets were able to conclude non-aggression pact with Hitler's fascist Germany. But a non-aggression pact would still not necessarily mean that the PRC became an active combatant on the Soviet side, or allow Soviet maritime forces to use PRC bases. I happen to think that the fundamental differences between them are just too deep, and that nationalism is a far stronger force than any commonality in their political ideology.

If it were politically acceptable, the early destruction of Soviet bases in Vietnam would be highly desirable, but it could be precluded by the prospect of counter strikes on Subic Bay and Clark Field. And it is just conceivable that we could find ourselves in a strange stand-off.

Clearly then we have a sort of maze of options among all these uncertainties which could be combined in a wide variety of ways to produce a best case and a worst case with many gradations between. Against this background it is difficult to be specific but some generalizations might stand a range of situations.

Firstly, the current lack of mine clearance forces is very worrying and however our defense relations with ASEAN develop, or do not, the ASEAN nations should be encouraged to do more in this field, if only for their own national purposes. They need no encouragement to provide coastal protection forces.

Secondly, the main Soviet threats after mines, lies in submarines and maritime strike aircraft. I would expect that, after a very brief and intensely worrying period when Soviet surface ships were recklessly used,⁵ a combination of closing off exits from

many bases and hunting them down would get rid of even those impressive Kirovs. So that it is our current lack of sufficient open ocean anti-submarine and air defense forces which worries me. We cannot and should not expect the USN to make up these deficiencies, and that suggests to me that this puts the onus on Japan, Australia (and New Zealand) to do a great deal more, including the provision of air capable sea control ships with ASW helicopters and STOVL fighters⁶. Even if the JMSDF were to be limited to only 1000 nautical miles from Japan it still needs aircraft carriers of some sort in my view. If, for some reason, aircraft carriers are not politically possible perhaps we could use some other technology — say airships, and arm some with the AWG 9 Phoenix Missile combination,⁷ and others with dipping sonar, sonobuoys and towed arrays. I understand Japan is about to buy a modern airship for commercial purposes.⁸ It could be of interest to the JMSDF — as well as Australia. 1,000 n.m. is too far for effective land-based fighter air defense.

Thirdly, the existing naval control of shipping agreement⁹ within ANZUS needs to be extended to include Japan. Despite modern anti-ship technologies we should be prepared to run open ocean convoys. You may recall that the British RAF said in 1938 that convoys would be impossible because of aircraft

bombing.¹⁰ It was an over-estimation, as such assertions have proved to be all too often in the past. The Jeune Ecole lives!¹¹

Fourthly, much, of not all, of these preparatory activities could be put in train without any further formal agreement, thought for my part I would prefer to see some sort of formal maritime defense agreement between Japan and ANZUS, at least, with an opportunity for ASEAN to join later if it wished. There is not enough time to discuss all the consequences of intelligence sharing, command, control and communications; CHOP lines, and all the details implied by this proposal. As Churchill said, the difficulties argue themselves, but they are not insurmountable.

Finally, although this is far too general and a lot more could be said, the important thing is to get started. I agree with McArthur that the whole history of defeat in war is "too little and too late." We have no more time to lose. Whether or not we could persuade ASEAN to provide maritime forces and to look to using their resources to help keep chock points open, it seems to me that the main duty now falls on Japan and Australia, in their own interests, to provide the bulk of the cornerstone sea assertion forces which we now define as surface escorts and air-capable sea control ships. The unpalatable alternative could be a nuclear war, which nobody wants.

5. The Soviet exercise OKEAN 75 provides a pointer for likely Soviet intentions.

6. See Zumwalt, *On Watch*. Arguments about the inadequacy of the sea control ship concept in the light of the Falklands War miss the point. Sea assertion is a very different matter from power projection within range of hostile land based fighters.

7. As fitted in the USN's F14 Tomcat; this proposal is a revival of the old USM Missileer concept but using long endurance air ships rather than fixed wing aircraft.

8. Airship Industries (UK) AD 500 model, and bigger models, the AD 600 and eventually the AD 5000 are under development. The AD 5000 will be about the same size as the USN's ZPG3W airships.

9. Radford-Collins Agreement.

10. Roskill, *The Strategy of Sea Power*.

11. See Ropp, *War in the Modern World*. The Jeune Ecole in the 1880s said the day of the large surface warship was over because of the torpedo boat.

Political Aspects of Australia's Approach to Regional Security

Michael O'Connor

In this comment, I would like to present a brief analysis of the political pressures on regional defense questions in Australia, so that conference delegates might acquire a perspective of the difficulties faced by those groups and individuals in Australia who would wish our country to play a greater regional security role.

Let me make an immediate disclaimer. The association which I represent is not a big one although I believe that it represents a legitimate and responsible, if somewhat radical, view in the Australian context. The Association is totally committed to a regional role in the Western Pacific and more particularly in association with ASEAN and the South Pacific Forum nations. That view is however not generally accepted in Australia, except perhaps in the most token way.

It ought also be said that there are a number of very extreme points of view common in Australia. While they do not have a strong following, they are nevertheless widely articulated in our media, which being virtually totally free but commercially controlled, has a vested interest in publicizing extreme points of view because they are controversial.

What I do want to do is concentrate on the mainstream approaches, essentially those of the main political parties and what I tend to term the foreign affairs/defense establishment.

Australia has been governed for more than thirty years since 1949 by a coalition of conservative parties. Thus, to a large extent, foreign and defense policies have been made by them and only incidentally changed by the Labour party which is now in office.

The great myth of Australian politics is that the Liberal/National Party coalition is committed to strong defense. The reality is quite different. It is also a myth that the coalition parties see Australia's future as being committed to association with Asia. The leadership — and the rank and file — are sentimentally oriented towards the United States and, to a lesser extent now, Great Britain. The single underlying theme in the national security policies of the two coalition parties is to bind the United States ever closer to Australia. Indeed, in recent conversation with a senior party adviser, I was told that the major advantage of a Japanese commitment to sealane security in Northeast Asia would be the freeing of United States resources for sealane security in Southeast Asia. At the same time, he was unperturbed about a withdrawal — or expulsion — of U.S. forces from the Philippines since, in his view, the only place they could go was Australia! He could not conceive that the Americans might in fact go back to the United States.

This attitude lies at the root of Australia's position as the lowest spender in the industrialized world on defense, even after Canada which can at least rely on the perpetual presence of the United States. In the view of my association, Australia as a huge geographical entity with a low population density, high wage structure and extensive overseas trade should be spending very much more on defense. The coalition parties' approach is to avoid spending and provide supplementary forces to the United States, but, even better, to attract a greater United States presence in Australia. While such a presence would be most welcome, in our view, it must not be at the expense of a much greater independent defense capability — with a strong regional commitment, at least of maritime forces. That must be our first priority.

The attitude of the Labour party which is now in office must be seen against the structure of the party — very much a coalition of disparate groups both in the political and trade union fields and with widely differing views of the world.

I want to emphasize this point because some of our friends in ASEAN have been upset by the Foreign Minister's attempts to open negotiations with Vietnam over Cambodia and Australian aid.

There is a significant segment of the Labour party, mainly based on trade unions, which is strongly pro-Soviet. An even larger part thinks that anything Vietnamese is practically sanctified. The policy of the party does reflect these views at present.

They are not the views of the Prime Minister, nor the Foreign Minister and the major part of the federal parliamentary party. However much these men wish to develop closer relations with ASEAN and other non-communist regional nations, they must tread carefully. They must take note of the strongly anti-American elements in the party, those who see the CIA as the de facto government of the United States and the source of all that is evil in the world.

I believe that the top members of the government are determined to pursue a pro-Western and strongly regional policy. They have moved to restore relations with Indonesia and to persuade the United States that the ANZUS alliance is strong and well. I believe they will take a more realistic approach to ANZUS than their conservative predecessors. At the same time, they will try to negotiate with Vietnam not so much in the hope that an accommodation can be reached — because they do not believe that is possible — but to demonstrate to the party as a whole that Vietnam is not prepared to be reasonable.

On the defense side, I doubt whether Labour will do more than their predecessors and that is not very much. Essentially, this bipartisan view is based on a philosophy of a dollar-driven strategy. Governments are locked into a view that the maximum that can be spent on defense is three per cent of Gross Domestic Product. And when GDP is not growing as a result of recession or outdated economic policies, defense spending will not grow in real terms either.

There will be changes in emphasis under a Labour government. The coalition was prepared to do something about regional defense, especially in the maritime sense. Labour will tend to concentrate on continental defense matters and ignore the wider aspects of regional and maritime defense questions.

One reason can be seen in the role of the foreign affairs/

defense establishment in Australia. This comprises the Defense and Foreign Affairs Departments, the Armed Forces and a number of academic and ex-service organizations. Few of these have any large perspective and almost none have any maritime concept. The Armed Forces have always had to struggle both for funds and influence. To a large degree, they have been conditioned by the fact that defense policy was usually made by major allies such as the United States or, before 1942, Great Britain. In particular, the history of the Australian Army has been one of struggle to avoid allied control even of individual battalions and this has given the army a strongly continental defense perspective which was, if anything, intensified by its experience in the Vietnam War.

As a result, the development of a national defense strategy which owes its origins to clearly identifiable national interests has not occurred. What has happened is that strategy is directed first by the dollars available and secondly by the resolution of the never-ending bureaucratic conflicts within the establishment. There is no leadership from the political structures and no determination on the part of the establishment to fight for what is needed. Even when a stronger than usual case is presented, the tradition of non-involvement in matters political generally means that the fight is ineffective.

Our association is determined to reverse that trend. We do not accept that there is not public support for adequate defense in Australia and for an Australian commitment to regional security, at least in the maritime field. We do not believe that Australians will shirk their duty to their friends in the region if that duty is presented to them. What is lacking is leadership and education. Some of that, we will provide as far as our capacity permits. But I suggest that our friends in the region can also contribute by constant pressure on our leaders to recognise their duty.

In our comfortable and isolated world with little or no maritime consciousness, it is easy to regard security problems as something that others have to worry about. I hope that this conference can be used to overcome some of that complacency.

The Significance of the Security of Sealanes in Southeast Asia and Southwest Pacific

Tsung-chin Kuo

I. Foreword:

In the past ten years, the Soviet Navy has ceaselessly expanded its sea power, with its presence now extending from the Baltic Sea, Black Sea, Okhotsk to the Pacific and Indian Oceans. No matter what the objective and interest of Soviet sea power expansion may be, one thing is for sure that the Soviet intends to remain a super-power. The Soviet believes that the maintenance of its super-power position depends on its military achievements, strategic nuclear capability and expansion of its sea power. As to the expansion of its sea power: after the situation worsened in Southeast Asia, the Soviet Navy moved a larger amount of combat ships/crafts to the Southwest Pacific with Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay as its bases. As a result, the presence of the Soviet Navy in this region has become the crucial element affecting the security of sealanes.

II. The Main Sealanes in the Southwest Pacific:

There is no doubt that in the Southwest Pacific the most important shipping sealane is the one starting from Japan, via Ryukyo Islands, Taiwan, the Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia to Indonesia. This sealane connects the Southwest Pacific, South China Sea and Indian Ocean on the one hand, and runs through Southeast Asia and Malacca Straits on the other hand. Moreover, this sealane also serves as a short cut from the Pacific to Indian Ocean. Since this sealane must traverse the Malacca Straits, Bashi

Channel and Taiwan Straits to reach Japan, the United States and the free countries in the Asia/Pacific region must have control over these straits and channels if they want to maintain effectively the security of this area. As a matter of fact, the Free World cannot afford to lose control of any of these straits. If they do, no secure free shipping through these straits can be assured.

Based on the following factors, the U.S. and the free countries in Asia/Pacific region cannot but exert their efforts to keep these sealanes open to free shipping through the Southwest Pacific:

a. If control over these sealanes falls into the hands of the Soviets or of any potential U.S. adversary it would be hard for the U.S. to move freely its Seventh Fleet between the Pacific and the Indian Ocean.

b. Since more than sixty percent of the oil imported by ROC, Japan, and ROK comes from the Middle East, the economy of these countries would face serious problems if free shipping through these sealanes between the Middle East and the Far East were cut.

c. All the free countries in the Asian Pacific area, such as Japan, the ROK, the ROC, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia, heavily depend on these sealanes to maintain their foreign trade relations. If the foreign trade is interrupted, the economies of these countries will without doubt, be severely jeopardized; the longer the interruption the more severe their economic crisis will be. It may even result in political disturbances. Therefore, whether or not the Asian Pacific free countries can maintain their foreign trade through these sealanes will be a vital factor in their survival or downfall.

d. Nations, such as Japan, the ROC, the ROK, Singapore and Indonesia, are all important trading partners with the U.S. Taking 1982 for an example, the total amount of trade between the U.S. and these countries reached 94.7 billion U.S. dollars. From this huge amount of trade, we can easily discern that is interrupted for a long enough time, even the U.S. economy will suffer.

Based on the reasons mentioned above, we can conclude that for strategic and economic considerations, the U.S. and the Asian

Pacific free nations have to secure control over these sealanes of the Southwest Pacific.

III. Importance of the Security of the Taiwan Straits:

The Taiwan Straits and the Strait of Malacca are of same importance in the Southwest Pacific shipping lanes. Taiwan constitutes one of the important island chains surrounding the Asian continent. Should Taiwan fall into the hands of a hostile country, the overall strategic situation of the Asia/Pacific area would be greatly changed.

After the fall of the China Mainland to the Chinese Communists in 1949, Taiwan, under the superb leadership and strenuous endeavors of the Government of the Republic of China, has become a strong anti-Communist bastion. The ROC is comparable to an unsinkable aircraft carrier because she has well-trained armed forces which have provided a security guarantee to the entire West Pacific region and the absolute security of the Taiwan Straits.

In view of the foregoing, the Republic of China has in fact contributed a great deal to the security of the sealanes in the Southwest Pacific, and we hope that all judicious governments of free countries have proper understanding of this fact and thus render their support to us.

IV. Soviet Military Strength in Southeast Asia:

In April 1975, Vietnam was wholly communized and soon afterwards became the Soviets' ally. In December 1978, the Vietcong invaded Cambodia on a large scale employing twelve divisions of approximately 120,000 men. With the establishment of the Heng Samrin puppet regime, Vietnam had Cambodia under its control by the end of January 1979. By that time, Laos had, too, already fallen under the Vietcong's sphere of influence. Therefore, the whole of Indochina became a part of the Communist World under Soviet control.

Seeing that the Southeast Asian situation has turned unfavor-

ably to the free world, the Soviet Pacific Fleet swiftly expanded its activities in the Southwest Pacific Ocean. Since the end of the Vietnam War, Cam Ranh Bay has become one of its permanent naval base. According to recent reports, Soviet military strength in the Far East has been considerably strengthened. Within the last two years, the number of surface vessels in Soviet naval fleet in the Far East has doubled from eighty to 175 units. With the cooperation of the Vietnamese government, the Soviets have been able to utilize the U.S. built facilities at Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang. This has greatly enhanced their strength.

V. Conclusions:

After the communization of the Indochina Peninsula and the crisis in Afghanistan, the United States of America, Japan and the other free countries in the Asian Pacific Area should realize the importance of maintaining the security of sealane transportation in the Southwest Pacific and in Southeast Asia. The U.S. and all the free countries in the Asian Pacific area must have control over these sealanes. At present the Soviet Navy expansion in the Far East and in the Southwest Pacific constitutes a serious threat to these sealanes. In order to thwart effectively the Soviets' growing threat and to ensure the navigation right in these sealanes, the U.S. and the Asian Pacific free countries should exert their utmost efforts in seeking an effective contingency plan.

SLOC Security Problems in Southeast Asia

Boonlert Iamtasna

The first part of my presentation will be about Thailand from the strategic point of view which will serve as the basis for my second part of presentation on the Sealanes of Communication in the Pacific Basin.

If you take a look at the map of Asia, you will see that Thailand is situated in a region which is called Southeast Asia. To the north of the country are Burma and Laos and further north is China. To the west are also Burma and the Andaman Sea which is connected to the India Ocean. To the south is Malaysia and the Gulf of Thailand which is adjacent to the South China Sea which, in turn, is bordered by Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines. To the east are Laos and Kampuchea which separate Thailand from the Vietnamese border.

As you can see, Thailand is surrounded by only friendly countries as well as by Vietnam with which we have no conflict in our vital interests.

But, why do we have cause for concern? Well, Thailand has always had various causes of concern throughout its history; the concerns we have at the present time started after the Second World War. The reason is that the International League of Communism has, from that time, increased its threat to Thailand, starting with political and social and, later on, military activities.

As a matter of fact, the International League of Communism started its work in Thailand in 1917, that is to say during the same period as it did in China. The intensiveness of the work, especially in the field of military activities, reached the highest level after

the Vietnam War, but Thailand has been able to cope with this problem. We may now say that the threat from the international Communism has been overcome, but this does not mean that the detonation fuse has been destroyed.

The threats to Thailand had only just alleviated when they increased again as a result of the Vietnamese occupation of Laos without any world protest and then of Kampuchea. For this reason, Vietnam could, therefore, enlarge and move its military boundary towards Thailand.

With regards to the sealanes, although Thailand has two coasts, namely the Andaman sea coast and the coast in the Gulf of Thailand, most of its maritime communication is carried out from the gulf side and could easily be cut off.

By the said route, we exchange goods with countries around the Pacific Basin which represent more than seventy percent of our dry cargo foreign trade. Therefore, the security of the SLOCs in this region is of a great concern to Thailand. But it is a concern like the one of a person who has no car running on a threatened highway, because only five percent of those goods are carried by Thai merchant ships.

With regard to the solution of this problem, I think that it has been carefully shown by the Japanese Center for Strategic Studies what are the forces and trends of the Soviet naval forces pertinent to SLOC security. The problems and threats have been indicated and the objectives for solving these problems have been clearly defined. The only question remains on what course of action to take to solve this problem which has been left to the consideration of this seminar.

The solutions to the problem thus far seem to stress the use of military power. I personally do not agree with the resolution of the problem by way of power. Military power should be in preparedness in case of necessity, lasting solutions must address the question of stability or instability and should not depend on any one party but should be strived towards by all parties.

At the time when the USSR was reinforcing its naval power, as was its right, which was still far behind the U.S., the whole world

looked on without worry. However, when the U.S. reduced its forces while the USSR continued to reinforce its own, that was another matter.

Looking at the events in the ROK during the last month, it seems as though the Soviets are trying to induce the PRK and ROK in to a destructive war and thus force the U.S. and PRC to confront each other. This could be related to the events in Manila; the purpose of which is to eliminate the presence of the U.S. in this region. All these undertakings could mark the beginning of a new threat and could also develop into a major conventional war which would affect all countries within this region. We have been observing all these events with great concern.

In the draft of items on the agenda for the third session it has been stressed that Southeast Asia constitutes one of the most important strategic areas. The importance of Southeast Asia does not lie alone in its location and resources, but also in the fact that the stability of the Pacific Basin could be affected by the interdiction of the SLOCs passing through the Straits of Malacca, and of the sealanes of Indonesia. If a threatening country could control those straits it would be able to cut off the East and West totally or almost so.

There are several ways to control the Straits of Malacca. The first one I would like to mention is to gain political, social and psychological control over the countries on both sides of the strait through the efforts of the International League of Communism.

The threatening country could also use a proxy war in order to creep southward through Thailand such as what is being done now in Kampuchea. I use the word "creep" because the threatening country does not care much about the time factor knowing that the world community normally will get excited only at the beginning and then get used to and, finally, accept the situation. Some good examples of this are the situations in Afghanistan and Kampuchea.

Another possible way is to take control from a distance by using medium range ballistic missiles or naval forces. This can be seen from the development of the naval base and port facilities at

Cam Ranh Bay, the air field at Kampongson, and the covert appearance of Soviet naval forces west of the Malacca Straits around the Nicoba Archipelago.

But if all of the free nations could control and assure the security of the Sealanes of Communication, both in the Pacific Basin and around the passage area to the Indian Ocean, it would be a good way to encounter the said threat.

The course of action necessary to solve this problem depends upon the creation of cooperation, not only among the Southeast Asian nations but also among the European nations. As this may be beyond the scope of this conference, I only mention it in order to remind you of such a possibility.

SLOC Security Problems in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific

Toshihiko Hozumi

Introduction

SLOC Security in Southeast Asia and in the Southwest Pacific are related, not only directly to the security and survival of the nations of the region but also significantly to the security of the free world.

This is clear once the dire consequences of this region falling under the influence of powers hostile to the West are contemplated along with the attendant possibility of the obstruction of maritime traffic linking the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

This paper reviews the military measures that the nations of the region, their allies and other friendly countries should adopt as well as the mutual assistance possible among the free nations of the Pacific Basin.

Geopolitical Implications of Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia, located at a hinge point between the Pacific and the Indian Oceans contains the bottlenecks in the Straits of Malacca, Sunda and Lombok through which petroleum is transported from the Persian Gulf to the Pacific. The area thus occupies an important strategic position relative to the maritime traffic.

With the exception of Thailand, the Southeast Asian nations having won independence following World War II are in the process of building their nation states. They are overcoming various political and economic problems with their own resources and effort as well

as with assistance from developed nations. Economically, while industrialization has been promoted, generally speaking they are exporters of primary products and importers of manufactured products. Because of this trading pattern they are heavily dependent on Japan, the U.S. and the European countries as trading partners and have extremely limited intra-regional trade.

Following the Cold War period after World War II, the United States' withdrawal from Vietnam, U.S.-China rapprochement and the Sino-USSR confrontation, the Soviet Union seeks today to strengthen its influence in the region by actively appealing to the Southeast Asian nations in political and military matters.

Threats to SLOCs in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific

The free world nations depend on foreign trade for their survival and prosperity. In the event of emergency, their cooperative defense world have to be carried out across the ocean. In this sense, the security of the SLOCs in this region are, needless to say, essential to the security of the nations of the region, as well as to the survival of the nations of the free world.

In the event of a conventional armed conflict between the two super-powers, the U.S. and USSR, triggered by a crisis in the oil fields of Persian Gulf and extending to the Pacific Basin, the Soviet military strategy in the region would be to threaten the Western SLOCs. It would strive to prevent the U.S. Pacific forces from being deployed in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf; the Soviet Pacific Fleet submarines would enter the Indian Ocean in order to maintain the position of being able to attack the U.S. aircraft carrier groups and their military transport ships. In more concrete terms, the threat to the SLOCs in the region would be, first of all an attack on U.S. ships by the Soviet submarines and aircraft as well as mining the ports and harbors and sealanes.

The Soviet submarines and aircraft for this operation must use bases in and around Vladivostok in the Soviet maritime provinces, in Petropavlovsk on the Kamchatka Peninsula, or in Indochina. Submarines based in Vladivostok must pass through the Soya,

Tsugaru or Tsushima Straits and navigate in the sea near Japan to reach Southeast Asia. The aircraft must bypass the air defense coverage over the Japanese Archipelago in order to penetrate to the operating area. This dependency suggests that if Japan controlled the straits for the maintenance of its own SLOC security and implemented an effective anti-submarine and anti-air operations in the adjacent waters, the transit of Soviet submarines and aircraft would be restricted. Consequently the threat to Southeast Asian SLOCs would be greatly reduced.

Petropavlovsk is located on the open sea and must depend on maritime transport for most of its logistical support. The operation of Soviet submarine and maritime forces at Petropavlovsk could be substantially restricted, particularly if the war is prolonged, by the blockade of the Soya and the other two straits; this would choke the Soviet line of supply.

Soviet fleet and aircraft based in Indochina demands vigilance as they constitute a threat to the Southeast Asian SLOCs. The Soviet Union may attempt to strengthen the bases there before the situation becomes crucial by increasing their number of surface ships, submarines, large reconnaissance craft, and fighters. However, unless the People's Republic of China adopts a pro-Soviet policy, the maintenance of the Soviet Indochinese bases will become difficult as fuel and other military materials would have to be supplied by sea. Maritime operations around Japan, by effectively obstructing or interfering with the Soviet SLOCs, could reduce these base's function and thus restrict the maneuverability of the Soviet warships and aircraft. As a result, the Soviet bases on Indochina may be attacked and neutralized in the initial stage of the war.

Secondly, one must give sufficient consideration to the possibility of enemy actions, such as attacks on ships, mine laying, and the destruction of ports and waterways carried out by anti-government guerrilla forces supported by outside powers. There are many areas where mines would be effective, therefore, one must be prepared for SLOC interdiction by mines. Mines are powerful, inexpensive, and easy-to-handle weapons that can be laid with small crafts and junks rather than regular naval ships or aircraft. Even

the old types of mines, when used appropriately, can prove deadly, not to mention the pervasive psychological effects of the information that an area has been mined. Since the Soviet navy has traditionally emphasized mine warfare, there is a large possibility of its having trained anti-government guerrilla forces for this kind of operation.

With the recent availability of high precision guided missiles which can be easily operated by non-regular troops after relatively short period of training, there is a danger of guerrillas using fast attack craft to threaten a SLOC.

The posture of China (PRC) is a delicate question in this scenario and it is difficult to predict its possible course of action. There being a broad range of options. In the event that China (PRC) adopts a pro-Soviet policy, the Chinese naval and air forces will constitute not only a direct threat to our SLOCs but also their support of Soviet bases in Indochina would strengthen Soviet air and sea operations and thereby only increasing the threat to Southeast Asia SLOCs.

From the above analysis, it may be pointed out that unless Soviet operations in the Northwest Pacific are carried out without challenge or unless People's Republic of China takes a pro-Soviet policy, Soviet submarine and aircraft threats to regional SLOCs will diminish. This does not mean, however, that some Soviet submarines may not invade the waters, attack our ships and mine the area. Mines, laid by guerrillas, by commercial ships and not necessarily by submarines, may represent the greatest threat to the SLOCs. There is a need to take precautions against any pirate actions by guerrillas using missile-equipped craft.

Defense of the Coastal Waters and SLOCs by Each Nation in the Region

The foremost consideration in planning the defense of SLOCs must be given to mines. In the context of the present scenario, most mine operations will be either carried out by submarines or by guerrillas using merchant ships or patrol craft, mining by

aircraft will be limited to special cases.

Anti-mine operations may be considered on two levels: the first is preventive and the other is removing them after they have been laid. To prevent mining, patrols must be strengthened and all hostile vehicles entering a possible mine laying field must be arrested. But once the mines are laid, dangerous areas should be clearly designated and the safe routes of navigation defined.

The submarine threat to SLOCs may not be too great as long as anti-submarine warfare is effectively carried out in the Northwest Pacific. However, since the Soviet submarines in the region have the capability of attacking SLOCs, the possibility of attack should not be ignored. For if the anti-submarine capability of the region proves inadequate, the Soviet Union may advance into the region, notwithstanding certain inconveniences in its strategic planning, and strike at Western SLOCs. In order to meet this eventuality, the forces in the region must have the capability for patrol, anti-submarine warfare operations, and escort.

Since the Soviet submarines use this area as a passage to and from the Pacific and Indian Ocean, any obstruction to their transit with mean a significant contribution to friendly forces operating in the Indian Ocean.

Furthermore, in order to assure the safety of SLOCs, there is a need for naval control of shipping, the study of ways to salvage ships in distress, and the establishment of multilateral and common guidelines.

Mutual cooperation among the countries of the region is essential to the maintenance of SLOC security in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific. Given the political and military conditions in the Southeast Asian countries, it is more appropriate that SLOC defense be based on unofficial, but substantial, cooperative relations among the concerned nations rather than on the formal conclusion of treaties, or on a multilateral collective defense system. The following concrete measures may be proposed with a view to seeking the mutual understanding necessary for cooperation in SLOC defense:

- * implementation of joint training programs to improve anti-mine warfare and anti-submarine warfare capability,
- * studying ways to exchange information about ocean surveys necessary in anti-mine and anti-submarine operations,
- * studying ways for joint and cooperative salvage operations.

Cooperation and Assistance Given by Extra-regional Allies

First of all there is a need to reinforce the existing U.S.-Philippines and ANZUS defense treaties and inter-governmental agreements between Malaysia, Singapore, England, Australia and New Zealand within their respective frameworks.

As Japan imports the raw materials and energy and it exports the industrial products necessary for its survival either to and from the region or through it the region, safety is a matter of life and death to Japan. Because of its historical background, Japan now imposes voluntary restriction on its defense activities; it limits the deployment of its forces exclusively for defensive purposes, not pursuing collective defense with other countries, and restricting or virtually prohibiting arms exports. While it is desirable that these policies be improved along more realistic lines, Japan, for the time being, cannot assume direct defense of the SLOCs in collaboration with the Southeast Asian nations. But since Japan's anti-submarine and anti-air operations around its home islands are directly contributing to the reduction of the threat against the security of the SLOCs in the region, one can say that Japan, by improving this capability, will contribute to the defense of Southeast Asian SLOCs.

Also, while in reality Japan may not be able to supply arms and other hardware at the present moment, it can comply with the requests for the education and training of officers and men in the region.

In order for the regional nations to improve their capability to assure the security of the SLOCs, it is proposed that their equipment for anti-submarine and anti-mine operations be updated. For this purpose, low cost and maintenance-free mine sweepers and

frigates appropriate to the region and national conditions are suggested. The possibility of joint development and joint production of these craft deserve our attention and study. Japan may be able to contribute in some way to this joint effort.

For the United States of America, the maintenance of SLOCs in this region is essential to its global strategy. Hence we may depend on U.S. forces to maintain their overall air superiority and sea control of the important areas including the South China Sea.

Since the Soviet bases on Indochina can be a serious threat to SLOCs, it is essential that they are demilitarized at an early stage of any operation.

Australia may be expected as an advanced naval power in the Southwest Pacific to strengthen further its existing defense treaties and inter-governmental agreements, while at the same time participate in regional cooperative programs thus it would play a leading role in improving SLOC defense.

Problems during Peace

The movement of Vietnamese troops and the increasing presence of Soviet forces in Indochina during peace time constitute a potential threat to the Southeast Asian countries. The likely expansion of Soviet influence in Southeast Asia must be contemplated along with the rapprochement between the U.S. and China. As well one must be aware of the effects the Soviet political and military presence up on the region's anti-government forces. For this reason it is desirable for the U.S. to increase its presence in this region.

Conclusion

The safety of the SLOCs in the region is a matter of survival for the free world nations. The nations of the region that have pressing domestic social and economic problems must exert their utmost efforts to maintain the security of the SLOCs while trying to overcome those problems. Only with solidarity among the free

world nations and with appropriate cooperation and assistance from the developed nations can they resolve those issues. Difficulties can be overcome as the nations perceive the mutual problems and prepare to resolve them step by step whenever it is possible.

Southeast Asia and SLOC Security

Lau Teik Soon

Outline of Presentation

1. In the Asia-Pacific region, there are many straits and stretches of water, and the security of these SLOCs are vital to the national development and security of the states in the region.

2. For example, (i) Northeast Asia, (ii) Southeast Asia, and (iii) the Australian-Pacific island region. Clearly, *priority* in the coastal states is to the seas bordering their land frontiers.

3. However, the perception is that only the Soviet Union has the naval capability to threaten the SLOCs of the free economies of the Asian-Pacific region. Hence, efforts of defense are directed at the Soviet Union.

4. For Southeast Asian states, especially the ASEAN states, there is the recognition of the Soviet threat. Thus, in 1971 ASEAN agreed on the Kuala Lumpur Declaration that Southeast Asia should be a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality (ZOPFAN).

5. At same time, the coastal states, viz. Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, agreed on the need for the security and safety of the Straits of Malacca. Both Indonesia and Malaysia asserted their sovereignty over the Straits, while Singapore took note of its ASEAN allies' stand.

6. Both ZOPFAN and the Straits of Malacca statement manifest the serious concern of the ASEAN states. At same time, they recognize the limited resources and capability they possess. Their role can only be supportive of others who have the capability to meet the Soviet threat.

7. Already, ASEAN states have strengthened their military ties with each other and other friendly countries. For example, SEATO (U.S., the Philippines and Thailand), FPDA (ANZUK, Malaysia and Singapore), and the bilateral security cooperation among ASEAN states.

8. Specifically, with regard to SLOC security, ASEAN looks to the U.S. to play the dominant role. But there are certain anxieties about U.S. credibility, particularly its commitment to the defense of the non-communist ASEAN states.

9. Likewise, ASEAN has reservations about the U.S., Japan and Australia's support for its position regarding the Indochina War. For ASEAN, the Indochina War since the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia is a direct threat to their security — both on land and at sea. The battle for the Southeast Asian SLOCs especially the Straits of Malacca began soon after the U.S. withdrawal from Indochina in 1975 and the war is reaching a critical stage.

10. The point is that SLOC security and security of the land territories are indivisible. Control of the land, especially the coastal states, give a power a stronghold over the SLOCs.

11. Thus, the Soviet's subtle approach to SLOC security is to control the coastal states. Aside from the conventional approach, the Soviets are involved in unconventional or guerilla warfare. And this is the threat, faced by the ASEAN states — the threat of guerilla warfare, instigated by the Soviet Union and spearheaded by Vietnam. And this is what, the present conflict in Indochina is all about!

12. The defense of the SLOCs in the Asia-Pacific region is the responsibility of all free economies of the region, but the burden-sharing should be in accordance to each's resources and capability. The U.S., Japan, ROK, Australia and the ASEAN states should all be responsible for the SLOC security in the Northeast and Southeast Asian and the Australia-Pacific areas. As the saying goes, either we swim together towards the twenty-first century, or we sink separately into oblivion and totalitarianism.

SLOC Security Problems: A View From Thailand

Kusuma Snitwongse

SLOCs that pass within and between the coastal waters of most ASEAN countries serve as passage for some eighty percent of the total external trade of ASEAN. They are crucial to the economic and social well-being of these countries. Moreover, these SLOCs also provide the shortest route from Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf to Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, via the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.

In discussing SLOC security problems, threat perceptions by the countries concerned and their political objectives and capabilities need be taken into consideration as well as purely military aspects.

Thailand's traditional security concern has been mainly its land frontiers. This has been reinforced by Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea and its domination over Laos. The Kampuchean conflict has brought in the Soviet Union whose threat has been perceived as indirect through her support of Vietnam. However, the increasing Soviet naval and air force presence in the facilities made available by Vietnam at Cam Ranh Bay, Da Nang and at Kampong Som in Kampuchea, has raised Thailand's consciousness about the Soviet Union as a possible maritime threat. This was underlined by the presence of the *Minsk* carrier in the Gulf of Thailand in October 1980.

Thailand, as a member of ASEAN, sees the best hope for regional security in the idea of ZOPFAN (Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality). While the Kampuchean conflict along with the increasing great power rivalry in the region has made the idea of ZOPFAN appear more remote, it nevertheless remains a consensual

objective among ASEAN countries.

The increasing Soviet naval and air presence and its capability to project power in the Southeast Asian and nearby regions has made the Soviet Union loom largest as a SLOC threat. Nevertheless, one should recognise that Southeast Asia ranks rather low in Soviet priorities of security interests when compared to China, Japan, Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan. Taking into consideration its already stretched naval power, it can reasonably be expected that Soviet action in the region will be opportunistic and involve low risks.

Nevertheless, the military foothold the USSR has gained in Indochina is useful strategically and it will, therefore, try to maintain this as well as extend its influence elsewhere in the region whenever there opens a window of opportunity. While there is as yet no indication that Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang are fully fledged Soviet bases, the facilities available at Cam Ranh have allowed for the regular deployment of Soviet naval vessels in the South China Sea and the airbase at Da Nang could facilitate anti-ship operations. In May 1980 it was reported for the first time that the Soviet Union had stationed nuclear powered attack submarines in the South China Sea while submarine tenders had been sighted at Cam Ranh Bay earlier in the same year. Thus Soviet ability to disrupt SLOCs is no longer in doubt. Nevertheless, it is also in the Soviet Union's maritime and naval interest to keep the SLOCs through the Straits of Malacca open in peace time.

Another fact that should be kept in mind when considering the Soviet threat is that despite its increased capability, the Soviet Union does not yet enjoy naval dominance. In event of war, in the opinion of many experts, her naval and air facilities in Vietnam could be rapidly destroyed by U.S. forces based in the Philippines or Guam. Cam Ranh Bay is also easy to mine, having been constructed without much thought about defending it from the sea.*

* While the PRC is perceived as a threat to varying degrees among ASEAN countries, her naval capability is still limited to coastal defense and while she has displayed some deepwater capabilities it is still insignificant in the foreseeable future.

Only after taking the above into consideration can one usefully construct scenarios in which to discuss SLOC security problems.

In the context of a local crisis, one most likely scenario would be a conflict between Thailand and Vietnam over the Kampuchea problem. While such a conflict will be mainly on land, Thailand's major maritime concern will be the security of her off-shore gas rigs and pipelines. There is little likelihood that Vietnam or the Soviet Union would try to disrupt SLOCs as this could be expected to bring about strong reaction from the United States and could be considered as an act of war. Moreover, it is also in the Soviet commercial and strategic interest to keep SLOCs in the region open in peace time. Soviet low-risk preference in the region was seen at the time when the PRC attacked Vietnam in 1979. At the time Moscow did provide arms, but did not apply military pressure on the Sino-Soviet border. There is, however, a possibility that the Soviet Union might choose to use its naval power as a political instrument to intimidate Thailand and her ASEAN partners. The appearance of the *Minsk* in 1980 augured such a possibility.

In the scenario of a large scale conventional war between the United States and the Soviet Union, it can be expected that the Soviet Union will try to disrupt the SLOCs through blocking the Straits of Malacca and Lombok and to harass ships in the region with submarines. In such a scenario, ASEAN's navies, while possessing missile crafts and can thus assume a limited anti-ship role, cannot provide countervailing force against Soviet submarines for lack of ASW strength. However, U.S. air and naval assets based in the region, as well as those in Australia are capable of interdicting Soviet forces.

Another scenario in which SLOCs in the Southeast Asian region could be disrupted would be when a littoral state through whose territorial water pass the SLOCs should refuse passage. This could happen should there be a change in the regime of one of the ASEAN countries to one that is unfriendly to the free nations.

Proposals for SLOC Security in Southeast Asian Region:

1. Taking into consideration ASEAN's declared objective of

ZOPFAN, attempts should be made to discourage great-power rivalry in the region. The first step should be to attempt, difficult though it may be, a settlement of the Kampuchean problem with the hope that Vietnam will be less reliant on the Soviet Union. Simultaneously, one should guard against any increases in military power that could be seen as an effort to reorder the power balance in the East Asian region thus bringing about a corresponding Soviet increase. In this regard, an increase in Japanese military capability should be carried out with care so as not to bring about arms race in the East Asian region with possible repercussions in Southeast Asia.

2. In order to minimize great-power rivalry in the Southeast Asian region and providing for the security of the SLOCs, ASEAN's capabilities in surveillance and control over maritime activities in and near their territorial waters should be enhanced along with greater intra-ASEAN cooperation but should be short of turning ASEAN into a security organization. Suggestions have been made in this regard which include the setting up of an ASEAN coastguard (Robert W. Barnett), and over-the-horizon radar system, serving the whole ASEAN region coupled with systematic use by the five members of maritime patrol aircraft, supported by fast patrol craft for checking and intercepting likely causes of trouble (Robert O'Neill). Friends and allies of ASEAN countries could help by providing military and economic aids geared at building up ASEAN's capability to defend SLOCs. Such measures would help ASEAN's member countries toward greater defensive self-reliance, a desirable alternative from ASEAN's point of view to the injecting of new external military power into the region.

3. In view of the increasing capability of the Soviet Union to project power into the Southeast Asian region and the possibility of that power using its navy to intimidate ASEAN countries, existing commitments including the Manila Treaty and the 1971 Five Power Agreement should be maintained and their reliability reassured by both the United States and Australia so that Soviet attempt at intimidation can be neutralized. This can be enhanced by the maintenance of an acceptable level of naval power in Southeast Asia by the United States and by Australian support of ASEAN's

security policy in the region.

4. Since freedom of passage through the Southeast Asian waters depends on regional stability, it should be the policy of countries as Japan and the United States to help build the internal stability of the ASEAN countries. This can be done through promotion of economic growth with equity, greater political participation and aid to ease other adverse effects of modernization on internal stability. This will coincide with ASEAN countries' major security concern, often referred to as national resiliency.

5. A great deal of time and energy have been spent discussing about how to secure SLOCs in Northeast Asian, Southeast Asian and the Western Pacific regions through the building up of and increasing effectiveness of cooperative military measures, but a question might be raised here whether it is too early to start thinking about the possibility of arms control in these regions.

SLOC Security Problems in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific

Edward N. Luttwak

The very subject assigned by the conference organizers tells us a great deal: if the Soviet threat to oceanic communications affects even the Southwest Pacific — so very remote from the territory of the USSR — then indeed we are dealing with a global oceanic threat.

In view of the abundance of naval expertise at this meeting, I am taking the liberty of addressing the generic Soviet threat to the SLOCs, with only small reference to Southeast Asia and none to the Southwest Pacific.

The habit of thinking of the Soviet Union as a continental "land" power still persists, but over the last two decades or so we have, of course, witnessed a spectacular increase in the Soviet strategic reach, manifest also at sea. A great power ever since the seventeenth century, a world power ever since the beginning of the nineteenth century, a nuclear super-power ever since the nineteen-fifties, the Soviet Union has now become a global power also. Naturally Soviet military power becomes narrower in scope and less easily applicable as the distance from the Soviet core regions increases; naturally there are still places in the world where the Soviet Union cannot bring to bear any appreciable conventional strength (e.g. in the arena of the Falklands conflict). But the days when Soviet military power was essentially continental in nature are gone, and with it the easy security of the "deep rear" of the industrial democracies which was made of the United States and of the oceans themselves.

The first attempt of the Russian people to "globalize" their

armed strength was catastrophically defeated by the Imperial Japanese Navy not quite eighty years ago. The second attempt that is not unfolding before us is as artificial as the first, but far more powerful in relative terms and also much more broadly based: obviously it is not purely by naval means that the Soviet Union nowadays achieves its strategic reach.

Artificiality and its Consequences.

The *artificiality* of the global diffusion of Soviet military power arises of course from the disproportion between the strategic reach of the Soviet Union and its *relative* insignificance in all the non-military spheres of international relations. In this regard it is important not to misunderstand the meaning of the Soviet Union's undoubtedly large and growing use of the oceans for its own commercial sea transport, fishing and other activities: these are not maritime activities to be sure and nor are they to a large extent international.

When the Dutch spread their naval power across the globe, Dutch international finance was supreme, Dutch international trade was dominant and Dutch culture had immense prestige all over the world. (Amsterdam was the book-publishing capital of the world in the seventeenth century; not only Japan but the entire civilized world was studying "Dutch learning.") Likewise there was a very fair proportionality between the global reach of the Royal Navy and that of British finance, trade and culture, as there is now for the United States.

Such proportionality has three consequences:

First, broad and deep non-military international connections create a web of interests in the *status quo*, in international stability and in the prosperity of peaceful commerce. Thus the naval power that is best equipped to attack the SLOCs also has the strongest interest in the safety of SLOCs. Both the Dutch and British if not the Americans began their oceanic experience as pirates, only to become the foes of piracy. They soon learned that to protect their own trade

they had to protect everyone's trade because it was all ultimately interconnected.

Second, such broad non-military relations bring with them a broad understanding of international society and of particular countries. Thus the naval power that can best disrupt the intercourse of the nations can also best appreciate the full meaning and ramifications of doing so. In other words, the non-military relations add greatly to the intelligence picture and to a sensitivity; firepower is balanced with the restraint brought by knowledge and some understanding.

Third, because the military instrument grows out of broad non-military sources ("the flag follows trade" much more than the other way around), it is much more resilient. The same broad interests that motivated the original impulse to acquire the military instrument will cause it to be sustained: let a fleet be lost in battle and another will soon be built.

The implications of the absence of any such proportionality are obvious: plainly the Soviet Union does not have a deep and broad interest in the security of the SLOCs; it does not have a broad and deep international sensitivity (hence Moscow's plain surprise at the world-wide reaction to the shooting down of KAL 007), and if the newly-made Soviet oceanic fleet were to be lost another would not automatically be rebuilt; instead the Politburo would have to debate whether such a navy is needed at all.

The Broad Array of Soviet Global Power

At least equal to the United States as a nuclear super-power, superior in continental land power in both Europe and East Asia, the Soviet Union is not yet its equal as a global power, but it is catching up fast.

The expansion of the Soviet navy has justifiably attracted much attention, but the rise of the Soviet Union to global power has *not* been brought about by the growth of its naval forces as such, and certainly not by the expansion of the Soviet surface fleet. On the contrary, the Soviet Union has gained much from the *relative* decline of the importance of naval strength (and especially surface strength)

within the sum total of the capabilities that provide strategic reach, and which constitute the attributes of "global" military power.

In the days of the last czar, surface naval forces were still the only significant instrument of global reach, and therefore the Russian quest for extra-continental power was hobbled by the geographic and industrial/scientific limitations that so greatly constrained the power of the Russian navy. Today, the operations of Soviet warships are subject to the same geographic constraints, and even the industrial/scientific limitations on the growth of the Soviet Navy remain quite severe — at least as compared to the capacities of the United States.

But of course naval strength is no longer the only instrument of global power, and in fact for the Soviet Union it is not even the most important among the several instruments, all greatly developed in recent years:

A. Client-states and proxy forces: Cuba is not only an unsinkable aircraft carrier, it is a potential platform for future long-range cruise missile (anti-ship) targeted on the Gulf of Mexico-NATO route, and a supplier of versatile proxy forces. Cuba is merely the most useful of a group of extra-continental clients.

B. Transnational subversion: It is truly of global reach (including within the U.S.) and very cheap indeed;

C. Long-range airlift capacity: It is of special value precisely because of tools A & B. Subversion can open the door (e.g. by creating a "government" that invites the Soviet Union in) which the availability of proxy forces makes risky airborne/airlanded operations more acceptable.

D. High combat-value/weight forces: Soviet airborne divisions, "assault" (commando) brigades and diversionary battalions can really make the most of the ton/mile capacity of Soviet airlift and a still limited high speed sea lift.

E. Intercontinental and theater-range nuclear weapons: While these instruments are not of broad applicability there is a synergistic interaction between these fully global capabilities and the other instruments. Nuclear threats, or rather the persuasive capacity to make such threats can alleviate the inherent risk of extracontinental adventures.

Finally within the naval category but not of the sea, and not constrained by the same geographic limitations.

F. Soviet naval aviation: The *Backfire* today already poses a great threat; it is very likely that the future *Blackjack* will also appear in a naval version.

We can consider the Soviet threat to the SLOCs as far more is involved than a purely naval threat. As a matter of fact, in any serious crisis it is the interplay of all these instruments that would have to be weighted by Western decision-makers.

In the Southwest Pacific for example, transnational subversion (instrument B) can create an instant client-state in some island mini-state or other; this client-state can then be consolidated by proxy forces (instrument A) brought in quickly by Soviet strategic airlift (instrument C); the client-state can then in turn offer a base of Soviet naval aviation (instrument F), with the entire politico-military operation being covered diplomatically and also insured strategically by Soviet nuclear strength (instrument E).

Then a few Soviet warships, perhaps neither very powerful in themselves nor very modern can reach the new-made outpost achieved by instruments A, B, C, E and F, and right away an ocean area till then quite secure becomes contested. And of course the Soviet Union can exploit a new base area with much more than a few older ships, it can send there very powerful submarines and indeed a combined surface/sub-surface task-force, perhaps very impressive in itself.

In facing this integrated, multi-dimensional threat the industrial democracies have one great strength and one great weakness. Their strength is the combined power of their naval and naval-air forces. By no means strong enough by any really prudent estimate and certainly sadly inadequate certainly in the Western Pacific, these forces are nevertheless no less than spectacular when compared with the greater inadequacy in the other instruments.

While the Soviet Union has its own intervention forces and also Cuban, Ethiopian, Vietnamese, East German and sometimes North Korean proxy forces, among the industrial democracies only Britain, France and now Italy have any capacity for extra-

continental action aside from the United States itself—and even that counter-intervention capacity is of course very severely constrained in every way. It is clearly politically easier for the Soviet government to keep six divisions in Afghanistan than for the United States to keep fifty-five advisors in El Salvador. Most of the industrial democracies reply to the Soviet Union's direct and indirect intervention capacity by taking pride in their indifference.

There is of course no Western counterpart to the Soviet instrument of transnational subversion. The Latin American operatives, the PLO and the international terrorists stand on one side, with no such instrument on the other. Thus we have to accept passively the subversion of Grenada and Guyana today, and we may have to accept more such subversion in the future. In the meantime, the United States Government has to promise Congress that it is not its policy to overthrow the Sandinistas, even while the Sandinistas try to overthrow all the neighboring governments.

The outlook therefore is not promising: we are trying to do too much with naval power alone. At present, the deficit is showing in the little places and in the marginal places. At the opposite extreme, in an all-out nuclear war, SLOCs would quickly become irrelevant. But if, as many serious people believe we are now entering a period of chronic confrontation with a pessimistic and embittered Soviet regime, a "Time of Troubles" marked by acts of violence and the growing threat of conventional conflict, then the SLOCs would of course become the critical factor in the security of the industrial democracies. Then the imbalance between the Soviet Union's broad array of offensive instruments and our own narrower defense capacity could allow the USSR to exact a very great price—especially because in the last analysis the Soviets have the freedom themselves to dispense with the SLOCs. Thus we ourselves might pay the price of the "artificiality" of Soviet global power.

Main Points of Discussion at Tokyo SLOC Conference

Japanese Center for Strategic Studies

SLOC security is a big problem covering political and military fields. Consequently, the focus of discussion might become dim, discussion might diffuse, and fruitful results might hardly be obtained, if the purpose, scenarios (strategic assumptions under which discussion is made) and main items of discussion would not be made clear. The aim of the following proposal is to make main points of discussion clearer and to help the participants probe problems more deeply. Needless to say, we have no idea to restrict the scope of discussion within the limits of this proposal.

I. General

a. While SLOC security must be a common interest of all the free nations in the Pacific basin simply because each of them depends for its own existence and prosperity upon the peaceful and free use of the oceans, it is also a fact that the threat to the SLOCs is perceived differently in respective region and by respective nations. Rather, generally speaking, the threat is not always so seriously perceived and much attention is not necessarily paid thereto. Therefore, the first step to be taken would be to discuss and confirm the existence of the threat to the SLOCs and then to analyze its character, its extent and its political, economic and military impact.

SLOC security is, by nature, a political and military problem. It can not be solved without appealing to military measures. Consequently, the second step would be to discuss and establish appropriate and feasible military measures to be taken in respective

regions and by each nation, after investigating such general military measures as are needed for the security of the SLOCs in the region as a whole. As a matter of fact, however, defense capabilities of each nation would be limited by its own political, economic, social, and geographical conditions. Consequently, each nation may be obliged to depend upon others for the security efforts beyond the limit of its own capabilities, and the fact means that a nation could also make some contributions to the security of the SLOCs of some other nations.

On the strength of such mutual understandings as suggested above, we could now proceed on to the third step and discuss feasible and practical mutual cooperation for the security of the SLOCs in the region.

b. Concerning the way of military cooperation for the security of the SLOCs in the Pacific Basin, the following options may be suggested; they are:

1) To strengthen the function of existing defense treaties or governmental agreement (such as Japan-U.S., U.S.-ROK, U.S.-Philippines, ANZUS, or Australian and other four nations' agreement for the security of Malaysia and Singapore) respectively within their framework.

2) In addition to 1), to improve informal (that is, not based on formal treaty or governmental agreement) but substantially effective cooperation, among the abovementioned systems or with nations other than mentioned above.

3) To organize such a multi-national collective defense system as NATO.

c. Whichever option of the above may be preferred, maintaining the peace and stability of respective nations and of the region as a whole would be essential as a matter of course. However, it is not the main object of this conference to discuss this problem in detail. Therefore, it is suggested that the discussion on this problem be made primarily on the matters relating directly or indirectly to its military aspect, and that other fundamental matters be only touched briefly.

d. It might be desirable and helpful to define the scenarios

of crisis to some extent so as to make the focus of discussion clearer. Otherwise, fruitful results might hardly be obtained, as each participant may express various opinion from a different viewpoint. For this reason and also in order to help the participants join the discussion with a common interest, it would be appropriate to assume a situation under which the security of the SLOCs in the Pacific Basin is threatened. In this sense, we would propose such a scenario as the following: a conventional armed conflict between two superpowers of the U.S. and the USSR, caused by a crisis in the oil-producing area on the both sides of Persian Gulf coast, fails to solve regional conflict there, and expands as far as to the Pacific Basin. Of course, a local crisis which affects the security of the SLOCs of any other country (or countries) in the Pacific Basin would be an appropriate matter to be discussed here.

II. The First Session - Strategic Concept and Significance of the SLOC Security in the Pacific Basin

a. "SLOC security" means, in a broad sense, not only the security of sea transportation but maritime security. While the free nations in the Pacific Basin depend on each other for their existence and prosperity they are also connected by sea. In this context, "maritime security" is nothing but the security of the high seas (or the common waters of all the free nations), and is a new strategic concept different from the traditional one which aims primarily at the security of land territories and sea-air areas around them.

Now, as is pointed out already, our free use of the oceans is being threatened by the Soviet's build-up of a powerful ocean-going Pacific Fleet and, so, we have to make clear the following:

- * The character and extent of the Soviet's naval threat.
- * Military, psychological and political impact that the Soviet's naval power may impose on the security of our SLOCs and on our inter-dependent relations.
- * How to maintain and strengthen our inter-dependent relations against such a threat?

- * How to deter such a large-scale conventional threat which involves us directly or indirectly and affects our security seriously?
- * How to secure our existence and safety in case of a large-scale conventional war with Soviet's participation?
- b. It is the purpose of this session to discuss such problems as mentioned above primarily from a viewpoint of the security of the SLOCs, and to make clear the significance of such security effort, both in relation to the security of the Pacific Basin as a whole and, in particular, of those nations respectively situated in Northeast and Southeast Asia. With such recognition and understanding, we could proceed on to the following sessions.

III. The Second Session - SLOC Security Problems in the Northeast Asia and the Northwest Pacific

- a. The purpose of this session is to discuss threats to the SLOCs in this region, military countermeasures to be taken against such a threat respectively by Japan, ROC, ROK, and U.S., and problems pertaining to mutual cooperation among those nations. For this purpose, we have to make clear the following:

- * Importance and significance of the Soviet's military operations in relation to its overall strategy in the Northeast Asia and the Northwest Pacific such as the following:
 - Control of the Seas of Japan and Okhotsk
 - Control of Soya, Tsugaru and Tsushima Straits
 - Interception of the Western SLOCs in the Northwest Pacific
 - Destruction of important ports and naval bases in Japan and ROK
- * The Soviet's capabilities for accomplishing above-mentioned operations.
- * In relation to the above, the significance of the Soviet's submarine forces (except its SSBN), surface forces (including the *Minsk*, cruisers and destroyers equipped with SAM and SSM), amphibious forces and Backfire bomber forces.

- * Feasible and effective defense effort to be taken respectively by Japan, ROC, ROK and U.S. for the security of their own SLOCs.
- * Contribution each nation could offer to the security of the Western SLOCs in the Pacific Basin.
- * Cooperation each nation expects to be offered from other nations in this region and the Pacific Basin for the security of the SLOCs.

- b. Linked up with such a large-scale conventional war as is assumed here, the PRK might invade the ROK, and thus the second front might be formed in the Korean Peninsula. Making most of such an opportunity, the USSR might also attempt, in concert with its land operation, to take over the control of Tsushima Strait which has been the Russian aim over long period. So, under such a situation we also have to make clear the following:

- * Threat to the SLOCs in this region
- * How to defend the SLOCs against such threat

There might be another scenario if the PRK's southward invasion remains as a local issue. If that sort of situation should happen, the threat to be presented on the ROK's SLOCs and how to defend the SLOCs would also be important problems to be discussed. Anyway the situation in the Middle East might affect the situation in and around Korean Peninsula in one way or the other.

- c. In case of a large-scale conventional war, the attitude to be taken by the PRC would be delicate and it might affect not a little the security of this region as a whole and of the SLOCs as well. How to cope with such a situation would also be a matter for discussion.

- d. Because the SLOCs extend into broad waters on the one hand and the capabilities of any nation are limited on the other, cooperation of a certain kind and extent among the nations concerned would be indispensable. In this relation, the following should be discussed.

- * Is there any factor disturbing such cooperation?

* In this relation, what is the practical cooperation feasible for the present, and what are our efforts to be taken at present so as to make appropriate cooperation actualized in the future?

e. Defense efforts of the nations in this region for the security of the SLOCs would surely contribute to the security of Southeast Asia as a whole and of the SLOCs in that region especially. Now we have to make clear the strategic significance of the SLOC defense effort in the Northwest Pacific, in order to improve mutual understanding and to promote mutual cooperation among the free nations in the Pacific Basin.

IV. The Third Session - SLOC Security Problems in the Southeast Asia and The Southwest Pacific

a. The purpose of this session is to discuss the threat to the SLOCs in this region, military countermeasures to be taken by ASEAN nations and their friends and allies and mutual support among all the free nations in the Pacific Basin.

The security of the nations and SLOCs within this region is also essential for the security of all the other free nations and their SLOCs in the Pacific Basin, for the simple reason that Southeast Asia is geopolitically one of the most important strategic areas in the world. Consequently, the geopolitical significance of this region should be first discussed in this session.

b. Then, we should discuss SLOC security problems in this region primarily within the content of such a large-scale conventional war as discussed in the former sessions:

- * Threat to the security of the free nations and SLOCs in this region, imposed by the Vietnamese forces and the Soviet's naval and air forces based in Indochina.
- * Defense of coastal areas and SLOCs to be conducted by respective nation in this region.
- * Support to be offered by the allies outside this region under the provision of existing U.S.-Philippine and ANZUS treaties and five nations' agreement concerning the security of Malaysia and Singapore.

* Mutual cooperation among the nations in this region as well as their friends and allies. And cooperation and support to be provided by Northeast Asian nations.

c. In case of a large-scale conventional war, what attitude would the PRC take in this region? What threat would the PRC impose on the security of ASEAN nations and SLOCs in this region? And what countermeasures should ASEAN nations and their friends and allies take to cope with such threat? These problems might also have to be discussed.

d. Even in peacetime, the moves of the Vietnamese forces and the increased presence of the Soviet's naval and air forces based in Indochina as well as the moves of the PRC forces might affect the security of ASEAN nations and SLOCs in this region. Then, what is the possible character and extent of that impact? And what should be the countermeasures to be taken by ASEAN nations against such an impact?

e. Because of the limitations in the defense capabilities of each nation, mutual cooperation of a certain kind and extent among the free nations both in and out of this region would be indispensable. In this relation;

* Is there any factor unfavorable to such a cooperation?

* What is the practical cooperation which will be feasible for the present? And what should be the efforts to be taken at present so as to make appropriate cooperation actualized in the future?

f. The security of the SLOCs in this region is inseparably related to that of the Northeast Asian and Oceanic nations as well as that of the U.S. Consequently, those nations outside this region might speculate about the possibilities of cooperation coming from ASEAN nations. What should be the character and extent of such cooperation?

V. The Fourth Session - General Discussion-Practical Way of Cooperation for the Security of the SLOC in the Pacific Basin

SLOC security problems in the Northeast Asia/the Northwest Pacific and the Southeast Asia/the Southwest Pacific which have been discussed respectively in the second and the third sessions are taken up primarily from a military viewpoint. With recognition and understanding of these problems acquired, we would discuss in this session practical way of cooperation for the security of the SLOCs in the Pacific Basin. Such cooperation would cover political, economic and military fields and should be feasible in the present situation. We would also discuss to find out the way to make some cooperation, even though unfeasible at present, be actualized in the future.

Although this session is oriented to the general discussion, delegate of each country would be requested to prepare own proposal, so that views of all the countries be presented for general discussion.

The final aim of cooperations for SLOC security would be to deter a large-scale war involving all the nations and necessitating the execution of actual SLOC defense operations. In order to achieve this final aim, such preparations enabling us to defend the SLOCs effectively in case of an eventuality should be made in peace time. In promoting such cooperative relations for SLOC security among free nations in the Pacific Basin, we could not only deter a large-scale war in this region but also improve political and economic cooperation on among them and secure the peace and co-prosperity of the Pacific community. Fruitful and productive general discussion would be expected to be held bearing such vision in mind.

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