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Tun-hwa Ko and Yu-ming Shaw

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Preface

The free nations of the Pacific Basin have begun to assume in the global system a strategic importance commensurate with their economic role. The United States, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the Republic of China will face new challenges in the advent of the "Pacific Age." Perhaps the most important challenge will be that of maintaining the free and secure use of Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC). These ocean routes connect the Pacific Basin nations with their worldwide allies, customers, and suppliers. The free nations of the area have begun to realize that their stewardship of the SLOC has global implications.

SLOC security, long a concern for naval strategists and informed statesmen, has become a major issue not only because of the rise of Asian economic activity, but also because of the increased threats to the region. There exist several possibilities for conflict: North and South Korea, Communist China and the Republic of China, and an aggressive Vietnamese regime in Indochina. In each case a strategic strait or passageway is at stake. A recent and most disturbing development has been the expansion of the Soviet fleet and its activities in the region. A feasible solution to SLOC security remains unformulated.

To attempt to fill this dangerous void, The Conference on Sea Lane Security in the Pacific Basin, the first of its kind, was held on September 23-25 in San Francisco. The conference, which was sponsored by the Institute for Contemporary Studies (San Francisco, USA) and the SLOC Study Group of the USA, was attended by senior naval personnel, scholars, and diplomats from the United States, Japan, Republic of Korea, and the Republic of China. The participants, many of whom are members of SLOC Study Groups in their respective nations, presented papers and engaged in discussions which brought to light many facts and insights gained through years of experience in varied fields.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank a number of people who made this conference possible. Ambassadors U. Alexis

Johnson and Leonard Unger, co-chairman of the SLOC Study Group of the USA, made all the arrangements with the Institute for Contemporary Studies, which shouldered the responsibilities of sponsoring the conference. Dr. Glenn Dumke, president of the institute, Mr. A. Lawrence Chickering, its executive director, and Ms. Ellen L.C. Brown, its coordinator for administration and public affairs, all rendered their indispensable services to the conference. The Honorable Shih Kanemaru, chairman of the Japanese SLOC Study Group, and the Honorable Kwan-shik Min, chairman of the Korean SLOC Study Group, organized their delegations for participation in this conference. Among those who have helped me in organizing and administering the work of the Chinese SLOC Study Group, Admiral Tun-hwa Ko was the most active. It is no exaggeration to say that without the support and efforts of the people mentioned above this conference could never have taken place.

This publication contains the proceedings of the conference. The editorial work was entrusted to the Asia and World Institute of the Republic of China. Its director/editor Dr. Yu-ming Shaw and its editorial members—Dr. Owen Lippert and messrs. Wan-chih Tai and Charles Hintermeister—were involved in the actual editing of the publication. As a member of the Standing Committee of the SLOC Study Group of the Republic of China and president of the Asia and World Institute, I am extremely delighted to see this publication finally appear. I sincerely hope it will break further ground in the study and planning of the advancement of sea lane security in the great Pacific Basin which extends from the United States across to northeast and southeast Asia and down to Australia.

Han Lih-wu

Taipei, Taiwan
Republic of China

September, 1983

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Opening Speech

Han Lih-wu

The Asia and World Institute (formerly called Forum) has attempted to promote understanding and cooperation among Northeast Asian countries through the sponsorship of symposia since its inception eight years ago. In 1979, a symposium on the security of the Western Pacific was held in Taipei at which scholars and experts from the United States, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the Republic of China were present.

It was at this conference that the importance of sea lanes of communications (SLOC) was singled out and stressed as a desirable subject of study. In his paper, entitled "The Security of Northeast Asia in the 1980s," Admiral Kenichi Kitamura, former Commander of the Japanese Marine Self Defense Agency and who is present today made the following statement: "It goes without saying that the defense of extremely long SLOCs cannot be accomplished without the mutual cooperation of the countries concerned. How to defend SLOCs in the Western Pacific must be a serious concern common to Northeast Asian nations. It should be noted in this regard that the U.S. Navy has virtually no capacity to cooperate with us in this area."

At the conclusion of the conference, I thanked the Admiral for singling out so clearly such an important issue, and I humbly declared it would be taken up by the Asia and World Institute for both international study and, hopefully, cooperation.

It happened that after a few months, in January 1980, a four-nation parliamentary conference on Asian and Western Pacific security was held in Washington. Several meetings had been held previously among parliamentary delegations of the three Northeast Asian

nations, but this was the first time that an American parliamentary group was present.

It may be of interest if I cite some of the pertinent points made by the different delegations.

Representative Melvin Price opened his speech with the following words: "You have chosen a momentous time for your conference here in Washington. Events are rapidly moving the family of nations toward a decisive point in world history." Then he continued: "The first and most fundamental change this brings about is a realignment of the security burdens in North and East Asia between America and its allies. By this I do not mean that America should do less, but rather that your countries should be prepared to do more. America will continue to honor its commitments — legal and moral — to those who have stood with us so faithfully, but that guarantee must be supplemented by redoubled effort in your own countries."

Representative Asao Mihara of Japan, while emphasizing that maintenance of close ties with the U.S. is indispensable for the security of Northeast Asia, also stressed that the three Northeast nations "are strategically interdependent and destined to be partners." He continued: "Each country's security is directly related to the others'; they share a common destiny and hence my colleagues and I in the Diet have long stressed the importance of closer relations in dealing with mutual concerns.... More important, Japan must endeavor through diplomatic means to create a positive situation on the Korean Peninsula and in the Taiwan Straits and, at the same time, promote better understanding among our three countries." He further said: "It should be stressed that, while the PRC is of obviously great importance in the global context, Taiwan independent from external control is of even greater importance in a regional context."

The Honorable Shin Kanemaru, who is here with us, was also present at the Washington conference where he acted as chairman.

The leader of the Korean Parliamentary Delegation, the Honorable Lee Byung Heui, pointed out that "Among the four countries represented here, I am happy to note that their mutual relations

have been characterized by friendly cooperation. We have been able to maintain an avenue of dialogue between our nations. However, I feel it necessary to point out that the mechanism for dialogue and cooperation has been, by and large, of a bilateral nature. The problems we face today are common to all of us. They defy an easy solution, and it is mandatory that we devise a new mechanism for cooperation."

In my concluding remarks on behalf of the ROC delegation, I stated: "Cooperation is a word easy to utter but not so easy to implement. However, we recently struck on a common topic, and that is the maintenance and protection of the sea lanes of communication in the Western Pacific, which are essential to trade and to the transportation of goods, men and materials for us all. Not even the Communists could reasonably raise objections to this basic necessity, vital to all nations. In pursuance of this central theme, I proposed the formation, in each of our nations, of a small study group called SLOCSG, that is, Sea Lanes of Communications Study Group. I am citing this as an example of what we can do if we pool our thoughts together for the worthy object of preserving the security of Asia and the Pacific, which should be part of an overall security strategy."

The second four-nation security conference was to be hosted by the Republic of Korea, but because of the political situation there in 1981 and now with the American mid-term election, it is postponed. I understand the Hon. Nae-hink Jung, who attended the Washington conference and who is presently Speaker of the Korean Assembly, is expecting the conference to be held in Seoul in 1983.

It will be useful to have the conference rotated among the four nations in order to provide at least a semi-official mechanism for mutual understanding and for the possible correlation of measures on the vital question of security in the Western Pacific.

Our SLOCSG, Sea Lanes of Communication Study Group, in my humble view, is conducive to producing practical results. It may even be associated informally with the four-nation security conference as a contributing agency.

The fact that the very first session of both the four-nation

security conference and the SLOCSG should have its venue in the United States shows that the participation of the latter is indispensable in any consideration of Asian and Pacific security. There is general acceptance that the U.S. is a Pacific power, and the leading power at that. The U.S. has paramount interests in Asia; the defense of the Pacific is just as important to the U.S. as the defense of the Atlantic.

Seeing the threat of international Communism to Asia, it was John Foster Dulles, the former American Secretary of State who launched the eight-nation defense alliance called SEATO, the first of its kind in Asia.

The Asians themselves did make an attempt to establish an Asian identity and consciousness shortly after World War II. Jawaharlal Nehru sponsored the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi in 1947, and among those present were Sukarno of Indonesia, Romulo of the Philippines and Phya Anuma Rajadhon of Thailand. The conference lasted six weeks and during our many private talks as well as public expressions, our common aspirations converged on future cooperation among Asian peoples for the building of our nations along democratic lines.

I had the honor of being elected secretary general in charge of preparation for the second conference, which failed to materialize. Mainland China changed color in 1949 and the future of Asia was cast in doubt.

SEATO, however limited in effectiveness it may have been during its existence, did inspire indigenous efforts for regional grouping and cooperation. There was ASA, the Association of Southeast Asia which included Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines, then MAPHILINDO, with the addition of Indonesia, and finally ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, with the addition of Singapore. ASEAN is now a viable regional organization with great potential for success in economic, political and even military cooperation. Facing the threat of international Communism, ASEAN recognizes the importance and desirability of American military presence and protection.

The rise and growth of ASEAN has given impetus to other

nations with regional interests or geophysical links to seek mutual cooperation, such as the nations in South Asia and the Eastern Pacific Islands. But the conditions for such associations do not seem to be ripe yet.

On the other hand, there are the developed and newly developing nations of the Pacific Basin, whose economic growth as well as social and political development are attracting world attention. Futurologists rate these nations fairly high in their potentialities. Americans, Japanese, and Australians, whose nations are outstanding ones in this category, have called for the establishment of a Pacific Basic Community. The latest advocate of this is the President of the Republic of Korea who, in early August, suggested a "Pacific summit conference" where the "heads of the Pacific coast states can meet regularly to discuss matters of mutual concern and consult on measures for their cooperation." President Chun Doo-Hwan aims for the creation of a "Pacific Era" in which peace and prosperity will be obtained through the establishment of a "common Pacific community."

It has been at least twelve years since the Japanese broached the idea of a Pacific conference other similar and suggestions to other interested nations and private research institutions. They were all useful and helpful. It may, however, take some time before any concrete steps are taken by governments. Even then private organizations like ours can still be useful, especially as a SLOCSG is more specifically oriented, and therefore conducive to achieving results.

Viewing the whole Asian and Pacific area or any part of it, there are few who would not agree that the Northeast Asia/Pacific region is of primary importance.

Japan, like England, is an island country. An economic superpower, Japan is the principal eastern ally of the U.S. and the cornerstone of the latter's Asia policy. Japan's defense forces and capabilities are being gradually and substantially strengthened, although it is still largely dependent upon the U.S. for her defense. Nevertheless, Japan is expected to assume a continuously increasing role in the defense of its own territory and beyond, especially in the waters around its homeland.

U.S. Secretary of the Navy John Lehman, visiting Japan in August this year, warned that the growth of the Soviet fleet from a guardian of the coasts to an ocean-going powerhouse reflects Moscow's "tremendous new national policy for a bluewater, interdiction naval force." He welcomed Japan's pledge, announced in Washington last year by Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki, to build its military strength so it can defend waters around the country out to 1,000 miles. Shortly afterwards, Thomas Reed, President Reagan's special assistant for national security, said in an interview in Washington that "My goal is to get them to help defend the Persian Gulf." Nothing that Japan had already agreed to defend sea lanes 1,000 miles out, Reed said the U.S. administration wished this could be extended to the Indian Ocean as far as the Persian Gulf.

I believe that Japan, in view of its actual needs, aspirations and sense of international status, will accelerate its military budget and play a more military active role in the years ahead. If I may be allowed to make a personal reminiscence, I remember that in 1974 after the elder statesman Kishi spoke to a group of ROC scholars who were in Tokyo participating in a conference on mainland China affairs, he made the bold prediction that Japan would in the 1980s revise its constitution, or even write a new one, shedding the present strictures on militarization. Mr. Kishi told me that he was going to campaign for rewriting the constitution. I could see the movement gaining official consideration. I, for one, would not be alarmed by Japan becoming a greater military power.

The Republic of Korea is at the forefront of Northeast Asian defense. The strategic Korean peninsula, in unfriendly hands, would point like a dagger at the heart of Japan. The immediate and pressing danger to the ROK is the militancy and aggressiveness of North Korea which is only 20 short miles away from Seoul and has a stronger and better equipped army of close to one million. Hence the necessity and importance of American military presence in the ROK. In a strengthened ROK with a bustling economy and rapid development, South Koreans see themselves as a buffer zone among the United States, the Soviet Union, Communist China and Japan. In this capacity, it is rendering a great service to Asia and the Pacific.

Pacific.

China has historically been a maritime nation. The Shang Dynasty that flourished in the region of Anyang from 1500-1207 B.C. was founded by Shang Tang which literally means "sea trade" or "maritime enterprise." Historical evidence shows that the Shang were a seafaring people similar to the ancient Phoenicians and Athenians. The capital of Anyang was located at the confluence of the north-western and southwestern Pacific areas. The oceanism of the subsequent times was furthered by the increase in Chinese ocean-going ships. The famous Italian, Marco Polo, witnessed and recounted the vigor of China's maritime enterprises. The series of naval expeditions led by Cheng Ho from 1405 to 1433 are well known.

The emergence since 1949 of the modern integral oceanism of the Republic of China on Taiwan is manifested in the transformation of our country into a completely ocean-oriented nation. It has been said by an ocean enthusiast that we are now a country of the ocean, by the ocean, and for the ocean.

The strategic importance of Taiwan was best described by U.S. General Douglas MacArthur, who, after visiting President Chiang Kai-shek in the summer of 1950, described the island as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier." MacArthur said the loss of Taiwan "might well force our Western frontiers back to the coasts of California, Oregon and Washington."

I must point out, however, that modern weapon systems may have changed somewhat traditional strategic views and there are people who hold that Taiwan's importance to the U.S. is not as vital as before. But to say that "Our defense posture in the Western Pacific is based on relationships with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and other countries. It does not depend in any way on Taiwan." as John Holdridge, Assistant Secretary for East Asia and the Pacific, said in January, 1982, is an extreme statement.

To say the least, Taiwan is crucial to the defense of Japan and the Philippines. It links the Pacific and Indian oceans. It strengthens the defense of both Northeast and Southeast Asia. It provides unsinkable runways, shelter for ships and various logistical facilities

as well as sizable and strong combat-ready forces. It has excellent ports for naval operations, including those for training, recreation, drydocking, repairs and refueling.

The Republic of China exercises control not only over the main island of Taiwan and Penghu, but also over a number of other islands such as the the Kinmen, Matzu, Yung-yin Wu-chiu, Paratas and Spratly groups. All these islands are situated nearby the commonly adopted sea trade routes of powered vessels carrying cargoes, passengers and mails between trading ports of developed and developing countries to and from the Pacific and Indian oceans. In other words, any commercial ship plying the shortest trade routes from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific, or vice versa, must pass by either side of Taiwan, or some of the islands under its control.

The safety of the long sea lanes is indeed vital to all of us. The three Northeast Asian nations in the Western Pacific do not have the required naval strength to protect their sea lanes of communications. They have been relying, and have continued to rely, on the U.S. Seventh Fleet's support in making the SLOCs safe, yet the Seventh Fleet's strength is shrinking relative to the strength of the Soviet Pacific fleet. Even though in the future the naval warfare capabilities of the Seventh Fleet may be augmented by newer ships with better weapons systems, numbers do count for everything in warfare. Further, the U.S. fleet does not want to be pinned down at one location. It has to maintain its freedom of movement from one ocean to another. Hence the necessity of cooperation with other friendly navies. And, after all, the Northeast Asian nations have the responsibility of sharing in the burden of their own defense. have the responsibility of sharing in the burden of their own defense.

On December 20, 1979, in the first session of the 96th U.S. Congressional meeting, a resolution was passed calling upon the U.S. administration to consult other friendly nations in order to devise a Sealane Security System whose purpose would be to insure safe, secure and free passage through international sea lanes to East and Southeast Asia.

We are undertaking the above task from an unofficial position as indeed all free men of peace should contribute to this practical

and meaningful cause.

We have four SLOC study groups. The SLOGSG-ROC is sponsored by the Asia and World Institute in conjunction with the Society for Strategic Studies, ROC. The SLOCSG-USA has been taking a leading part in liaison work with the Japanese and Korean groups and I must express my deep appreciation to Ambassador U. Alex Johnson and Gen. Stilwell for bringing our project to its present stage.

I submit for your thoughts that we should study each country's port facilities and actual operations, naval control of shipping organization, communication and information networks of commercial shipping, each country's civil and defense shipping direction, the possible threat from the USSR (either in collusion with the Chinese Communists or with the latter neutral), and scheduled exchange of research and, possibly, visits. We should perhaps discuss and arrive at a consensus on common doctrines for SLOC security.

Annual conferences might be held on a rotational basis. If I may share with you what I have in mind for the future, I believe that in the not distant future study groups will be established in the ASEAN countries, and, eventually, even in the australasian nations.

Before embarking on the next steps, however, our four study groups must produce credible results to justify any expansion.

Opening Speech

Ambassador U. Alex Johnson

First, I am sure that you and your delegations would want to join me in expressing our thanks to the Institute for Contemporary Studies for its invitation to hold this meeting here in San Francisco and for its generous hospitality. Especially, we want to thank President Dumke, Lawrence Chickering, the Executive Director, and Ellen Brown for the excellent arrangements. All of us who have had experience with preparing for such international meetings know that these things just do not happen automatically, but take much hard and detailed work.

We also know the role that Dr. Han Lih-wu has played in bringing about this gathering and we extend our thanks to him. As a member of the American delegation I also want to express my particular appreciation to Mr. Shin Kanemaru and his Japanese colleagues, and to Mr. Min Kwan-Shik and his Korean colleagues for their being willing to undertake the long journey to this country during a particularly busy time for them.

We are here because we share a common interest in keeping open the sea lines of communication, which I might note also embrace the air lines of communication over the seas. This is not any narrow nationalistic interest, but a broad interest shared by all those who believe that their own welfare and that of the rest of mankind is to be found in *the fullest possible exchange of people and goods*. To this end, we have entered into a wide range of economic and financial arrangements that are without precedent in history. However, these arrangements would have little meaning if it were not for the explosion of trade in the last few decades in very large measure facilitated by the new efficiency of ocean transportation and its availability to all. Thus the importance of the continued access of sea lines of communication.

Trade involves not only exports but also imports. As a result modern trade has led not to dependence, but rather to interdepen-

dence. No nation is wholly self-sufficient, and none is wholly dependent on seaborne commerce.

International interdependence has grown enormously in recent years. As far as raw materials are concerned, the efficiency of the big bulk ocean carrier has meant that countries with few or costly raw materials often have an advantage over a country with more resources because it can buy raw materials at the lowest price and transport them around the world. Japan, correspondingly, has containerized and specialized ships that permit fast delivery, low packing costs and minimum damage to cargoes of manufactured products.

The result has been that world exports have risen more than seven fold in the last twenty years. As far as the United States is concerned about one-fifth of our industrial production and one-third of all our agricultural production are now exported. However, interdependence goes far beyond economics, the national security policies of the United States are rooted in common political and military interests with others.

During the course of this meeting we will be examining the vulnerabilities of each of us to interruption of or interference with the sea lines of communication. This, of course, varies with each country. In doing so, to keep the matter in perspective, I suggest that in large and resilient modern economies, trade-offs or substitutions are often possible, even though at a higher cost. Still when imports are large, there is often the presumption of vulnerability.

In the case of the United States because both our imports and exports are dominated by manufactured goods, we do not dependent on seaborne trade for food. As far as energy is concerned, the United States is a large net exporter of coal, and we have been successful in reducing our dependence on imported oil from the Persian Gulf from a peak of almost four million barrels a day, or twenty percent of consumption in 1977, to one million barrels a day, or about seven percent of consumption in the first quarter of this year. Thus, our own vulnerabilities are much less than those of some other countries. However, this does not mean that we are not concerned about the vulnerabilities of others.

In 1980, the total value of exports from all market economy

countries of the world was about 1,200 billion dollars, and from managed economy countries about sixty billion dollars, or only five percent of that of the market economy countries. A reasonable estimate of the proportion of total trade carried by ships is two-thirds so that in 1980 probably 800 billion dollars of market economy trade moved by ship as compared with forty billion dollars of managed economy trade. While these figures are very rough, they serve to illustrate the overwhelming importance of sea lanes to the larger part of the trading world as compared with their lesser importance to managed economy countries. This is not without its effect on the policies of individual countries; though, the Soviet Union is heavily dependent on long and vulnerable sea lanes for movement of much of its domestic traffic between its European and Pacific ports.

While our subject is the sea lanes of the Pacific Basin, in a very real sense they cannot be separated from sea lanes elsewhere in the world. When it comes to security of the sea lanes it is truly one world, just as it is with most other security problems. Mid Eastern oil for East Asia passes through the Indian Ocean and the narrow water passages in Southeast Asia. Correspondingly, manufactured goods shipped between Europe and East Asia largely pass through the same area.

As far as its relative importance to the United States is concerned, our total trade with our twelve most important East Asian trading partners is now greater than our trade with all of Western Europe. Particularly notable is the rapid increase in our trade with the ASEAN countries. Given the high growth rates and expanding populations of East Asia, U.S. trade with that region should continue its rapid growth. This will have a significant impact on our relations with the countries of the area, and on the relative importance of Western Europe in our national policies.

What will happen to sea use in the future? A comprehensive study undertaken a few years ago by the Atlantic Council chaired by Paul Nitze and Leonard Sullivan pointed up that there are four main influences upon ocean activities: world economic conditions, technological developments, international laws of the sea, and domestic policies.

It is, of course, obvious that world economic conditions affect the use of the sea lanes. However, it is an interesting fact that the physical volume of shipping rises and falls faster than world economic activity.

With regard to technological innovation, I have already mentioned the dramatic effects of the big bulk cargo carrier, both tanker and dry cargo, and the innovations in containers and roll-on, roll-off loading which bring the economy of quick turn-arounds.

I hope that during the course of these meetings we can have some discussion on the law of the sea. We certainly will hear some views on the decision of the United States not to sign the comprehensive convention that had been negotiated over a period of years. I am sure you know that that decision did not arise over any issue involving the sea lanes, but rather on the issue of exploiting the mineral resources in the deep sea beds.

With respect to domestic policies which threaten the sea lanes, they can arise from a wide variety of circumstances, both domestic and international. Because of domestic disorder or civil strife, a country may seek to deny access to straits or archipelago waters. While its objective may not be foreign shipping passing in transit, the effects may, nevertheless, be very severe for third parties.

A country may seek selectively to close what it claims as internal waters to the passage of ships of a particular flag. We have seen some examples of this in recent years in the Mid East. However, the perpetrator is usually in danger of retaliation elsewhere.

There is, of course, the possibility of a supply source refusing to sell to one or more consumers. In recent years there have also been examples of this in the Mid East, but this is not strictly speaking a sea lanes problem because the material never gets to sea. The same is true of port closures.

The most drastic of all measures is the blockade, including war at sea against another's ships. A blockade always has been and is still considered an act of war and must be considered in that context rather than a simple sea lanes problem.

These then are some of the questions and issues with which we will be dealing. While they are not new subjects, I am sure that with

the experience and knowledge embodied in this group we will be able *to add to the body of knowledge on* this very important subject.

Discussant of Opening Speeches: Shigeto Nagano

Shigeto Nagano: The two distinguished speakers have both made thoughtful presentations on the strategic background of the sea lanes security problem, and I have no specific criticisms of their respective standpoints. I will, rather, interpret the problem from the viewpoint of Japan.

Both speakers rightly stressed the importance of sea lane protection. It is critically important for Japan to maintain control of its territorial seas and to be assured of the security of the sea lanes connecting her to the western world. Not only is local sea lane security crucial to the livelihood of Japan and its capacity to sustain war, it is also essential to the unity of the free nations of the world.

The Honorable Mr. Johnson touched on the question of blockades, so I will now comment on this. In the event of a crisis, the Soviet Union's Far East armed forces, especially their naval and air branches, would attempt to threaten the sea lanes in the Pacific and Indian Oceans to neutralize the the United States' naval task forces,

Japan and the ROK could control their off-shore waters and the three major choke points in our area, the Soya, Tsugara and Tsushima Straits, and thus hinder Soviet military operations in the Sea of Japan and in the continental Far East. Japan, working with the Republic of Korea, could prevent the expansion of Soviet military power in the Pacific. To do so it is essential that Japan make even greater efforts to increase its defensive capability.

Dr. Han has mentioned that Taiwan is crucial to the defense of Japan, particularly the defense of the Western Pacific sea lanes. Therefore, it is important for Japan and Taiwan to study together the problem of common defense. Also, Dr. Han has pointed out the

need for some kind of security alliance among nations in the Pacific Basin.

All of the Korean representatives who have spoken in previous sessions of this kind have expressed the need for bilateral dialogue and cooperation with America in order to improve security in the region. Japan has already set up a SLOC study group with the U.S. in the interest of establishing a regional "soft alliance."

The Strategic Background: Two Views

Sea Lanes Security Problems in the Pacific Basin

Shin Kanemaru

The Honorable Johnson, General Stilwell and distinguished guests and gentlemen:

It is of great significance that politicians, scholars and professionals from the United States and three nations in Northeast Asia are meeting together here to discuss the security problems of the sea lanes in the Pacific basin at a time when the international situation is becoming increasingly serious.

Our three Northeast Asian nations, Japan, Korea, and the Republic of China, import all their oil and most their important raw materials. Our security and economic survival depends upon direct and indirect cooperation and support by the United States in maintaining the security of the sea lanes. The United States, of course, has a global commitment to the security of the free nations.

Each nation's national interests and security problems vary considerably. Sea lanes, however, must be a common interest for all of us. And if there is any common threat to the sea lanes, it is the Soviet's military threat comprised of its naval power and of its political and psychological pressure. We should first recognize that we have common interests and face a common threat.

The security of the sea lanes is generally taken as a military problem. But it is not feasible for any one nation to defend the sea lanes, so mutual cooperation among the nations concerned is essential. In this sense, the security of the sea lanes is also a political problem.

The establishment of a collective defense system for the security of the sea lanes in the Pacific basin, however, seems unlikely to fense effort by each nation should be made so as to contribute to the security of all sea lanes in this area, and thus to bring about substantial mutual cooperation.

In this respect, I would like to refer briefly to the significance of the planned Japanese defense effort. Japan will take primary responsibility for the defense of its homeland as well as for the defense of the sea lanes within the so-called 1,000-mile zone south of its Islands. Japan will steadily build up its defense capabilities in order to accomplish this task.

If a conventional war between the East and the West should break out, a blockade of the Soya, Tsugaru and Tsushima Straits would doubtless be very effective in maintaining the security of the sea lanes in the Pacific. In order to accomplish an effective blockade of these straits, however, it would be essential for Japan to prevent Soviet forces from acquiring air superiority around Japan or the adjacent seas. This means that the defense of the Japanese homeland, itself, involves the defense of the sea lanes in the Pacific basin.

A second point is that the Japanese sea lanes defense effort within the 1,000-mile zone south of Japan and in the three straits, coupled with possible anti-submarine operations conducted by United States naval forces based in the Mariana Islands and in the Philippines, would substantially contribute to the security of sea lanes of all free nations in the Northwest Pacific and in the South China Sea area.

It is believed that the Soviet threat to our sea lanes may be greatest in the northwestern corner of the Western Pacific. The area is close to the Soviet's home bases and all ships bound for Northeast Asian nations pass through it. Consequently, most of the security problems for the sea lanes in the Pacific basin could probably be solved by the above-mentioned operations of the Japanese and United States forces.

Our success in preserving the security of these sea lanes would rely on our success in denying Soviet naval forces the free use of this area. In other words, the Soviets would be unable to bring their full military force to bear upon any free nation south of the Japanese islands. The Vietnamese would then be unable to contemplate aggressive operations against its neighbors because its logistic support line from Soviet home bases would be cut.

This implies that the Japanese defense effort would contribute

not only to the security of the sea lanes of free nations as a whole, but also substantially to the security of the free nations in East Asia.

It is needless to say, however, that such efforts are not enough to solve all the security problems of the sea lanes. Mutual cooperation among nations concerned is indispensable. While a formal collective defense system aimed at the defense of land territories is politically difficult, substantial informal cooperation for the defense of the sea lanes may be easier both politically and technically. The defense of the sea lanes is primarily a problem on the high seas and does not necessarily need actual joint operations owing to the special characteristics of naval operations.

Finally, we have now many complicated and difficult problems in the political and economic fields. These problems should be solved, of course, as quickly as possible. Our cooperative efforts in coping with our common threat in order to defend our common interests would contribute to the solution of problems in other fields. I do hope this conference brings about fruitful results. Thank you.

A Korean Perspective on Sea Lanes Security in the Pacific

Min Kwan-Shik

As "the last frontier" of our planet or as "the common heritage of mankind," the oceans, forming over seventy percent of the earth's surface, have been increasingly coveted by individual countries and transnational corporations to enhance their wealth, power and prestige. Let me cite Dr. Henry Kissinger, a former American Secretary of State, who, in speaking of our oceans, said that while their promise might be greater than that of the untapped lands of the past century, so too is their potential for conflict.

As one of the crossroads of the world's major shipping routes, the Pacific Basin is no exception. Even on a short swing through Asia, one can sense a tremendous regional and international tension arising from conflicting interests in the use of this area. In the absence of effective international sanctions to keep the sea free and open, the intensity of tension is likely to depend on two main interrelated factors: the activities of major powers, and the ability of Southeast and Northeast Asian countries to institute and implement constructive policies on ocean usage and dispute settlement by peaceful means.

Using this as a starting point, I would like to discuss on-going maritime security problems and their impact on the security of our respective countries.

There is no denying that sea-lane or maritime security is greatly affected by the naval strength of the superpowers. The United States Navy enjoyed an unqualified mastery in the Pacific during at least the first two decades after World War II. However, it seems to me that such dominance no longer exists because of the persistent efforts of the Soviets in recent years to strengthen their naval capability. Reportedly, the Soviet Union has surpassed the U.S. in its construction

of submarines by a ratio of four to one, and of warships by two to one. In the meantime, the U.S. has been reducing the size of her fleets during the last fifteen years. Now the Soviet Union is known to possess 155 submarines carrying guided missiles with nuclear war heads while the U.S. has sixty-eight submarines carrying nuclear weapons.

In particular, we should not overlook the emerging power of the Soviet Navy in the West Pacific. As you all know, the Soviets have doubled their naval forces deployed in the Far East during the past fifteen years. Currently they deploy 785 warships totalling 1.52 million tons in the Far East, while the U.S. Seventh Fleet is composed of fifty-five warships amounting to only 0.6 million tons.

With this recent upset of the balance of naval power, the Soviet Union has gained substantial in influence in the Pacific and the provides Vietnam with 900 million U.S. dollars in aid every year in return for the use of two Vietnamese ports, namely, Da Nang and Cam Ranh. In Northeast Asia, Najin of North Korea has also been used as a commercial base. Moreover, about 200 Soviet warships pass through the Korean Strait every year, demonstrating the growing activity of the Soviet Navy in the Far East.

One can easily perceive that the next target of Soviet expansionism might be control of the Strait of Malacca, which is critical to the economic existence of Northeast and Southeast Asian countries. If the Soviets could gain a hold over the Strait of Malacca, it would certainly create a tremendous threat to the economic and political stability of Asian countries by intimidating the users of the sea lanes which link Northeast Asia to Africa, Europe and the Middle East. Any possible pressure by the Soviet Navy on oil transport from the Middle East to East Asia would jeopardize the economies of Japan, Korea and the Republic of China. Destabilizing this sea lane would also give rise to all kinds of difficulties in Southeast Asian countries, particularly the export of raw materials such as tin, rubber, palm oil and other commodities bound mainly for industrialized countries.

With the increasing importance of sea lanes in the West Pacific, the Reagan administration has made a timely change of defense

strategy as it affects global maritime activity by modifying the so-called "Swing Strategy" of April 1980. According to this strategy, the U.S. naval forces deployed in the West Pacific, namely the Seventh Fleet, would swing to the Atlantic automatically in the event of a total war. However, the new defense strategy called "the Reagan Doctrine of 2.5 Strategy" re-established the defense zone from the Persian Gulf to the west coast of the United States as the unit defense zone. The new strategy places a higher priority on the protection of the oil transport route. The core of "the 2.5 Strategy" is known to establish a defense priority for three major areas: Europe and the West Pacific assigned as one, the Middle East also as one, and Latin America and other areas as one-half.

Here let me now turn to the sea lanes security problems of the Far East. Although more emphasis is given to the defense of the West Pacific by the U.S., it is also true that Northeast Asia is still quite vulnerable and unstable within the complex existing balance of power. The status quo of the region depends, on the one hand, upon the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, the U.S.-Korea Defense Treaty and on recent developments in the possibility of U.S.-China military cooperation. On the other hand, the Soviet Union and China keep a strong military alliance with North Korea, though the alliance between the two socialist major powers has been virtually abrogated. Besides, the Republic of China and Mainland China maintain an antagonistic posture toward each other, as do South and North Korea, giving rise to continuous and formidable tension in this region.

Thus, it is obvious that any disturbance to the current fragile balance of power will substantially change the stability of the region. In particular, the Korean peninsula has attracted close attention because of its highly volatile situation. The potential threat of North Korea making an incursion into the South has been increasing with the risk of the North falling into step with Soviet-engineered expansionism. Of course, the number of submarines in north Korea alone is not negligible compared to those in South Korea.

Nevertheless, in the case of a possible venture by North Korea against the south, several difficulties face the U.S. Seventh Fleet

in taking a rapid deterrent action or launching an immediate retaliation. First, the domestic situation within the U.S. is likely to delay an immediate military response. Second, the reinforcement of defense for the oil-producing countries in the Middle East is also possible, leaving Northeast Asia vulnerable to armed attack. Third, the U.S. has a geographical disadvantage in gaining access to the Korean peninsula compared to the Soviet Union. It is reported that it takes the U.S. about three weeks to put an armed division into Korea by utilizing all landing-ship vehicles or military and civilian aircraft. In the case of an emergency, if the U.S. Navy fails to blockade the base of the Soviet Pacific Fleet and its three possible exits to the Pacific, namely, the Korea Strait, the Tsugaru Strait and the Soya Strait, Japan and the Republic of China will also confront a mounting threat to their national security.

Thus, the threats to the sea lanes naturally are not restricted to local waters even in case of a local war. Although the security of sea lanes in the West Pacific may be ultimately dependent upon U.S. support, each country should also make its own self-defense effort. If we are to preserve peace and the security of sea lanes, I believe that we can only do so by seeking mutual cooperation for collective security and by sharing the burden of military expenditure in the region.

I would be remiss to close my talk without mentioning one more significant recent development relating to our common endeavor. The Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference has adopted the Law of the Sea Convention, a comprehensive ocean constitution which covers all aspects on the use of the sea and its resources. The carefully worded provisions on the passage of foreign shipping craft in territorial seas and international straits are an indication that we are, in fact, engaged in a matter of global concern. A concern that should have sooner been shared by more of us. And finally I sincerely hope that this meeting will be a step forward in making "the sea unite what land divides."

Sea Lanes of Communication in East Asia

William M. Carpenter

I. Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to define the sea lanes of communication (SLOC) problem including its scope and importance, to discuss briefly the threat to the security of the SLOC, and to consider how the future safety and function of the SLOC can be assured. Excluded from this paper is the SLOC problem in nuclear war between major powers. Limited war, or crises of high intensity will be the focus here.

II. Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC): Definition and Importance

Ever since man first ventured out upon the open sea, he has become increasingly dependent upon the sea, for his food, for transport, and for waging war. These three basic functions of movement upon the sea will likely continue to be the principal functions dependent upon the sea lanes of communication. Yet, we must add a fourth: mining the bottom of the sea for the treasure trove of valuable minerals.

Our concern in this paper is with the dependency upon the sea which has been taking shape since the beginnings of the industrial revolution in the 19th century, with the consequent growth of an interdependent world economy. No industrial nation can survive and no developing nation can continue to grow without the materials it imports and exports by sea. Even the minority of nations which are landlocked depend upon access to the sea through the territories of their coastal neighbors.

Annual world trade exceeds U.S. \$2,000 billion dollars in value and continues to grow. Some of this commerce travels by land, and a tiny fraction goes by air, but the great bulk of it goes by sea and

will continue to do so. But the sea extracts a price. During the 1970s over 300 merchant ships were lost annually in groundings, collisions, foundering, and burnings. This seems a high number, but is actually a small fraction of the more than twenty-four thousand merchant ships (of 1,000 gross tons or larger) afloat today. One fourth of these are oil tankers, a third of a billion deadweight tons (half the world shipping tonnage).

New technology has made possible ever larger and more efficient ships, especially the very large crude carriers (VLCCs). These huge hulls are more cost effective, but at the same time the loss of one of them is a greater disaster. The shipbuilding boom of the 1960s and early 1970s got ahead of the demand which caused some painful readjustments by shipbuilders. Nevertheless, as the proper balance is struck between supply and demand, without a doubt the world's merchant fleet will continue to become more modern and efficient. The shipbuilding world is an extremely competitive one, and Asian shipbuilders are in the forefront of this competition. This is probably only natural for a region where dependence upon the sea is so important for survival and growth.

Besides the vital energy supplies, critical materials for industry travel mainly by sea. The United States, for example, is almost totally dependent on imports for its supply of chromite, cobalt, manganese, natural rubber and tin. Asian nations face a similar problem. Stockpiles of materials are maintained for emergency use if supplies should be cut off, but the overseas dependence remains as a long term problem, thus SLOCs will continue to be essential.

Even the Soviet Union is dependent on imports. A recent study by the U.S. Census Bureau says that new information and analysis show that Soviet imports amount to about twenty percent of national income, a figure significantly greater than the three to five percent estimate generally accepted by many Western scholars in the past.¹ The study says that fifteen to twenty percent of all machinery and

1. *Washington Post*, 13 July 1982, p. A1.

equipment put into use in the Soviet Union each year is imported. For the chemical industry, the figure may be as high as fifty percent. Further, the Soviets have imported an average of thirty-seven million tons of grain annually over the last three years, most of which must come by sea. Of course, since approximately half of all Soviet imports come from communist countries, some of the means of transport is by land, but nevertheless transport by sea is a significant factor, and threats to Soviet sea lines of communication have to be given serious consideration in the Kremlin.

Although the SLOC problem is global, we are focussing here on the sea lanes of communication in Asia. The Asian-Pacific region is the area showing the greatest promise for dynamic economic growth in the international scene today. With the appearance of economic power there will be an accompanying growth of political power. Japan's remarkable economic recovery from defeat in war to be the world's second-ranking economic power is well known. In spite of a reluctance to accept a major political-strategic role, Japan's stature in the international system is inevitably increasing. Less well known to much of the world, which continues to focus on Europe, is the economic dynamism of those East Asian nations which are already challenging Japan's economic position; the Republic of China, South Korea, and the small but important economic centers of Hong Kong and Singapore. U.S. trade with East Asia has already exceeded that with Western Europe, and this balance is likely to continue to grow in Asia's favor. The growth, especially in imports, is in fact already a major economic (and political) problem for the United States.

These new and growing Asian economies, and the economies of their other Asian neighbors, who hope to follow a similar path, are vitally dependent upon the security of the SLOC. Taiwan's two-way foreign trade, for example, approximately equals its gross national product, eloquent witness to the ROC's dependence upon the seas for survival.

The concept of a "Pacific Community" has been under consideration for a number of years. If it ever becomes an organizational reality, it is clear that security of the SLOCs in the Western Pacific

will be essential to its functioning and growth. An early attempt to foster regional economic cooperation was the formation in Taipei in 1968 of the Confederation of Asian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (CACCI), whose members include Australia, India, Japan, Korea, Nepal, New Zealand, the Philippines and the Republic of China (Taiwan). ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) was formed in 1967 with similar objectives among its members (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines). A recent step towards the formation of a Pacific Community was the visit of Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser with South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan in May 1982 to discuss the possibility of a summit meeting among the heads of state of the countries along the rim of the Pacific. President Chun has been particularly interested in regional cooperation since his swing through the ASEAN capitals in the summer of 1981. Prime Minister Fraser also visited Japan where he discussed with Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki the prospects for greater economic cooperation among the nations of East Asia and the Western Pacific. That the sea lanes would be important to a regional economic grouping is evident in the fact that nearly half of the trade of the Pacific basin countries is conducted within the region.²

The seas are equally important for security reasons. In the East Asia, a nexus of great-power interests, maritime power is a major factor affecting the security of those nations. But not only the non-communist nations are conscious of the need for open and safe SLOCs. Mainland China, struggling to emerge from its underdeveloped status, also depends upon the sea. Currently, the PRC is expanding its merchant marine in a major attempt to compete in world trade. It too is aware of the danger to its SLOCs, mainly posed by the growing naval and overall military power of the Soviet Union.

2. *Washington Post*, 13 July 1982, p. A1.

It is apparent from a look at the map of the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean that the sea lanes are vulnerable, first because of their proximity to the Asian land mass, but even more importantly because they pass through narrow "choke points." Maritime traffic from Japan and Korea to the south transits either the Taiwan Strait or the Bashi Channel between Taiwan and the Philippines. Ships sailing from the east coast of Korea or the west coast of Japan must first traverse the Strait of Tsushima. Ships of many nations sailing from the Northern Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean or Persian Gulf must either pass through the narrow Strait of Malacca or one of the Indonesian passages: Sunda Strait between Sumatra and Java or Lombok Strait between Bali and Rindjam. At every one of these choke points there is a triple danger: attack from submarines at the entrance or exit from the strait, attack by aircraft while the ship is in the passage and unable to maneuver, and attack by guns or homing missiles launched from shore or from small ships close inshore.

Arms sales to Third World nations in recent years have provided them with modern missiles and the craft from which to launch them. For example, Indonesia acquired between 1979 and 1981 eight fast attack craft equipped with Exocet surface-to-surface missiles.³ While we would not expect an attack by Indonesia on free world shipping under any circumstance we can now foresee, we should consider what could happen in some future scenario we cannot now predict.

Choke points are unavoidable to world shipping and they have for centuries been regarded as vital. No country better understood their importance than England. At the height of the British Empire, most of the key narrow passages were held by the British, e.g., Singapore, Hong Kong, Aden, Suez, Gibraltar, and South Africa. Most of these passages are now in other hands, and the safety of pas-

3. LCDR James A. Hazlett, "Strait Shooting," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, June 1982, p. 72.

sage through them is much more difficult to predict. The Russians, for example, seem to be as keenly aware of the value of choke points as were the British. Soviet ships now have bases and anchorages available to them in Vietnam, Socotra Island off Somalia, at Aden, in Ethiopia's Dahlak Islands in the Red Sea, and in several other advantageous locations, such as in Syria, Yugoslavia and Angola.

III. The Nature of the Threat to the SLOC

The whole problem of the safety of the sea lanes has often been clouded by overuse of imprecise illustrative devices. A favorite device of writers and lecturers in dramatizing the vulnerability of sea lines is to use a chart with bright red ribbons marking the most-used routes across the open oceans and through the choke points. The implication is that these "ribbons" can be cut in much the way a land route may be cut, such as by destroying a bridge blocking a tunnel or by bombing a section of highway. The attacker can thus prevent the vehicles from using the route, without the necessity (or the risk) of an attack on the vehicles themselves. But at sea, the route cannot be cut without attacking the vehicles and the people in them; ships must be either sunk or threatened to be sunk.

Sinking or threatening to sink a ship is of course a very serious matter. For example, a supertanker bound from the Indian Ocean for Japan can be sunk by a submarine torpedo, by a surface-to-surface missile, or by air attack. Or a strait can be mined—and this is the one tactic that is akin to the blocking of a land route—and the ship may be sunk if the mining is in secret, or deterred from proceeding if the mining is announced. But what is important to note in the difference between the land and sea scenarios is the order of magnitude (politically and militarily) between the two. The destruction of a bridge is mainly a matter between the country in which it is located and some adversary, while a ship sunk at sea is of immediate concern to all nations who use the sea.

Hugo Grotius, the 17th century Dutch lawyer and scholar, declared in his *Mare Liberum* that the seas are free to all, and that no state may legally control and rule the open sea. Grotius's principle

has had many qualifications added to it in the ensuing years—as, for example, in the current Law of the Sea negotiations—but nevertheless it endures as a broad concept generally embraced by all nations, and hence any attack upon a ship making its way across man's common highway is at once a cause for alarm by all who send ships to sea.

In the many limited wars around the world since World War II, thousands of bridges, tunnels and railroads, have been damaged or destroyed, but almost no instances can be found of the cutting of sea lines, i.e., by ship sinkings. The opportunity was frequently there to do so. For example, in the Korean War, U.S. Navy combat ships, troop transports and supply ships plied the waters off Korea for many months and on almost any day a submarine could have sunk one or more of them, but it did not happen. The situation was similar off the Vietnam coast in the 1960s.

Regarding this point, it is important to pause here and note what may be an important exception to this post-World War II sanctuary rule of behavior. In the recent Falkland Islands war between Britain and Argentina two potentially significant events occurred. First, the British broke the barrier on ship sinkings by torpedoing the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano, and the Argentines retaliated by sinking several British ships. Second, the ships were sunk by employing modern precision guided munitions (torpedoes and missiles), which when properly or fortuitously used give the attacker something approaching a one shot-one hit advantage. The sinking of the General Belgrano seems to have deterred the Argentine Navy from further engagement. But, the British did not have the option of withdrawing the in ships, so they had to persist with the forces available to them and to suffer losses.

The tactical lessons from the Falklands War are not yet agreed upon, but some early conclusions have been suggested which will probably be included in the final analysis. The British lacked at least three important elements of defense against sea-skimming missiles of the Exocet type: first, an airborne early warning radar to extend the range of detection of approaching aircraft; second, sufficient numbers and type of aircraft with the capability to intercept and

destroy incoming aircraft before they can launch their missiles; and third, adequate weapons systems to destroy the missiles once they near the ship to be attacked. With regard to the value of the latter, it was reported that ships equipped with the Sea Wolf defense missiles were not attacked whether by accident or by choice of the attacking aircraft is not known. In one case, the frigate Plymouth successfully used chaff to create a false target and save itself from an Exocet.⁴ It is also apparently true that the British were saved from what might have been greater damage to their ships as the result of a high percentage of duds in the Argentine bomb attacks.

What these events portend for the use of the sea during future limited wars cannot yet be known, but they do raise the question of whether in another war in another place there will be less motivation to adhere to the sancturary rule than in the past several limited wars. The Falklands War was, of course, a rather special kind of situation, yet it clearly was an SLOC situation for the British who were at the end of a very long SLOC from the homeland. As to the future, will the United States in aid of an ally in a limited war, be able to move naval units into the action zone, and be able to establish a supply pipeline of military logistic ships and merchant ships? Will the U.S. face an attack by its ally's minor power enemy, or by its major power protector? Many smaller nations now have craft capable of sinking large ships. Further, will such attacks possibly extend to other U.S. allies such as Japan even though the latter is not involved in the conflict? Would, for example, a Japanese tanker be sunk in order to pressure Japan into denying the use of its bases to U.S. forces?

It may be that too much significance is being read into the Falklands case. There were of course, previous isolated incidents such as the sinking of the Israeli destroyer Flath off Port Said in October 1967 by a Russian Styx missile fired from an Egyptian patrol boat inside the harbor, the capture of the U.S.S. Pueblo by

4. *The Economist*, 3 July 1982, p. 70

the North Koreans in January 1968, and the Mayaguez incident in the South China Sea in 1975. The Pueblo incident could have been and perhaps should have been—an act sufficient for the declaration of war, but it was allowed to pass. It apparently did not set any major precedent for the future, although without doubt the incident eroded the credibility of U.S. deterrence.

The concept of deterrence brings us back to the original discussion of the pattern of SLOC behavior since World War II. It is intended here to raise the question of what will either induce or deter attacks by these major military powers or by lesser adversaries. In the pre-deterrence period of World War II and earlier, the sea lines were assumed to be a major target in any conflict. In the deterrence era, the sea lines have been strangely immune. Is there a connection, and if there is, can we learn how to protect the SLOC in the future?

IV. The Role of Deterrence

There are measures that can be to minimize the losses along SLOCs in the event of conflict, but the best protection for ships plying the seas is to deter the initial attack on an SLOC. A pertinent comment on the deterrence of limited war was made some years ago by the then speaker of the National Assembly in Korea at the time when President Carter was planning to remove the U.S. ground forces from Korea:

The new argument we hear today is that compensatory arms to Korea constitute a new deterrence to war. Let us not have any illusions about what this means in reality. What it says is that we ought to fight it out if war breaks out. It does not say war will be prevented. Of course we shall fight if war is forced upon us. We will win, too. But the price of victory will be far greater than any price imaginable in the 1950s. We appreciate the consideration and the words of the U.S. government. I wish its efforts were more effectively dedicated to the prevention of war. We appreciate the instruments of defensive war, but I am fervently for stopping it before it starts.⁵

The deterrent that Speaker Paik referred to was the presence of the U.S. Second Division near the demilitarized zone. This location warned Kim Il Sung that any attack on South Korea meant war with the United States. Unless the United States is perceived as strong and willing enough to retaliate if its own or an ally's ship is attacked at sea, their enemies will not be inhibited.

Deterrence of SLOC attack can be of two kinds: general and specific. As to the general, unless the United States, which has a major responsibility for the preservation of security and stability in East Asia, is able to restore its former deterrent posture and credibility the danger to SLOCs is correspondingly going to be increased. A significant part of the restoration of the U.S. deterrent posture would be to implement the new maritime strategy now under consideration. Second, as to specifics, the free nations of East Asia and the United States must together plan a coordinated defense of the SLOCs. Admiral Kenichi Kitamura, who wrote a thoughtful paper on the sea lines problem last year, came to these same conclusions: that the superpower military balance must be restored, and that the nations whose sea lines are threatened must all share in their defense.

Each of these concepts will reinforce the other, increasing the overall deterrent. Knowledge by the enemy of the determination of free nations to act jointly, and the carrying out of specific planning and exercise actions by the threatened nations will be factors that will have to be taken into account by the potential aggressor as he contemplates an attack.

Yet, the problem is not so simple. Ships come in diverse sizes, kinds and nationalities. There are very many places where attacks can occur. Adding to this complex problem is the threat of lesser nations, many of which now possess seagoing craft or aircraft capable of sinking ships. The advent of the fast attack boat with its guided missiles and homing torpedoes and of aircraft with accurate missiles and rockets increase the threat. These nations may act as proxies of

5. Paik Too-chin, in *The Korea Herald*, 1 March 1978, p. 5.

the Soviet Union or on their own initiative. There is as well the potential use of these weapons by non-national political terrorists. The problem of the Third World naval threat was analyzed last year by a former Yugoslavian naval officer, who concluded that the U.S. Navy's response should be to create a counterforce made up of small corvettes, hydrofoil missile boats and mine countermeasure ships for deployment in the narrow seas where such Third World attacks may occur.⁶ It does not yet appear that the U.S. Navy is giving high priority to the problem of warfare in the narrow seas. A few years ago the Navy had planned to build a force of some 30 hydrofoil missile boats of the Pegasus class, but the program was severely curtailed because of cost considerations. Nonetheless, some improvement is planned in mine countermeasure (MCM) capabilities in the form of new MCM ships and helicopters, and in improved mine warfare. While the Navy recognizes that the small navy threat is real and complex, its solution involves a balancing of priorities among all the demands for national security.

There is another threat to the SLOC that should be noted, the imposition of a blockade. It is not strictly speaking a threat to a line of communication at sea, but it does cut the SLOC for a particular country. According to international law, a blockade is not legal unless it is effective, which would mean that only a major power, such as the USSR or the PRC, could impose a legal and effective blockade. This raises the question of whether the USSR or the PRC would sink a ship of a third nation to prevent its calling at a port of a blockade nation presumably involved in a local limited war. As in all other aspects of the SLOC problem, deterrence based on U.S. naval-maritime capabilities and the will to employ them is the most effective way to discourage the imposition of a blockade by the USSR, the PRC or any other adversary.

6. Milan Vego, "The Potential Influence of Third World Navies on Ocean Shipping," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, May 1981, pp. 95-113.

V. Conclusion

Problems with the security of the sea lines of communication are formidable and possessed of unique characteristics. There are the twin dangers of frustration arising out of the magnitude and complexity of the problem may conclude that there is no affordable solution or one may assume an unwise complacency based on the tacit "sanctuary" status that the SLOCs have enjoyed in the era of limited wars. We must avoid falling victim to either of these perceptions.

Deterrence is clearly the best solution if it can be made credible. Once attacks begin on ships in the SLOCs, complete protection can not be managed. Escort of certain high priority convoys over certain vital routes may be feasible, but there will not be enough escort forces for all. As between convoy escort and area search as anti-submarine warfare (ASW) tactics, the experience of World War II showed that area search was the least efficient. This generalization may not be true of the future as the capabilities of weapons expand and the techniques of air, surface and subsurface coordination improve. However, the numbers equation, i.e., the large number of enemy submarines and the vastness of the oceans compared to the limited numbers of ASW forces, leaves us with a formidable problem. One interesting concept for the protection of merchant ships is the Arapaho project, which envisions container ships carrying their own ASW helicopters.

Nevertheless, much can be done. The United States must continue its drive to restore the military balance with the Soviet Union, including the implementation of a naval-maritime strategy capability must be provided to project battle-ready naval forces into Soviet waters through the development of new and better ASW capabilities. In the latter, close coordination between the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force will be necessary. As a part of the deterrent message the Soviets and other adversaries must be made clearly aware of the concurrent vulnerability of their own SLOCs.

There must be an effort by the free nations of East Asia to join forces in preparing to cope with the threat to the SLOCs. There

should be joint consultation on force capabilities and on new acquisitions in order that the forces be complementary. Mission obligations should be mutually understood such as the specific meaning of Japan's intention promise to protect the sea lanes out to 1,000 miles from its shores. While it might in theory be desirable to have a NATO-type military alliance upon which to build mutually supportive contingency plans, this is probably neither really necessary nor politically feasible in the near future. Instead, the imperative should be to act within the existing framework.

Discussion of Carpenter's speech first discussant: Dr. Dalchoong Kim, ROK

I would first like to express my agreement with Mr. Carpenter on his assessment of the nature of the threat to sea lanes of communication, and with his belief that deterrence is essential to their continued security. I will simply add to what Mr. Carpenter said.

The countries of the Pacific Basin have special reasons to be concerned about emerging maritime situation in the region its threats and its opportunities. I believe there are five salient reasons for this concern.

First, the non-communist nations of the Pacific Basin depend very heavily upon the seas for trade and commerce. This dependence is growing. The economic importance of the sea is further compounded by the great dependency of the region on sea resources, especially fish and offshore oil.

Second, against this background of growing economic dependence on the seas, a new legal concept of ownership and access rights has arisen. Irrespective of the progress made in the Law of the Sea Conference, the countries of the region have already established eminent rule as the basis for their extending national sovereignty over adjacent seas. In some cases these claims have paralleled the

standard twelve nautical mile limit for territorial seas, and the 200 nautical mile limit for an exclusive economic zone. Some nations, notably North Korea, have declared fifty mile military zones which exclude all foreign vessels. In virtually every instance, there remains serious unresolved disputes over sovereignty and access rights. In crowded areas such as the South China Sea, legal disputes are directly related to national claims over the exploitation of offshore resources.

Third, for more than five years, the Soviet Union has been increasing and intensifying its maritime presence throughout East Asia. This growth of Soviet power can be demonstrated by its more assertive display for political purposes and by its increasing use of local logistic support facilities, especially in Vietnam.

Fourth, parallel to the Soviet build-up, there has been widespread concern over the future presence of the United States Seventh Fleet, long perceived as the symbol and substance of America's commitment to the security of non-communist countries in the region. This concern reflects wider political and strategic worries over the continued strength and viability of the United States as the leader of the Western alliance.

Fifth, there is no consensus among non-communist countries in the Pacific Basin as to future security strategies.

Given this background, I would like to point out three major problems. First, increased maritime economic competition among the countries in the region coupled with unresolved boundary disputes has, as Mr. Carpenter noted, led to increased investment in maritime military forces. The growth of local navies in the Pacific Basin affects both the regional military balance and the role of external powers. Although at present only mainland China and Japan are capable of deploying full-fledged blue water navies; the smaller nations with their new wealth can purchase only enough of the new weaponry to float effective local fleets.

In the event of an intra-regional conflict, the sea could become a major arena for military engagement. Local naval powers could interfere with each other's commerce thus leading to all out naval battles. Furthermore, the ability of local powers to challenge the United States, and even Soviet Fleets is likely to grow. While this

may have little military impact on either of the super powers' capabilities, it could impose important political constraints on their access in times of crisis.

The second problem is that the growth of Soviet naval power, while real enough in terms of military potential against the local states, has to be seen primarily as a political problem. On the political level, the growth of Soviet maritime power poses a serious potential threat. The Soviet presence in Vietnam signals the non-communist countries in the region that the USSR will provide complete military support for its friends and allies. The Soviet Navy is increasingly able to provide heavy logistic support for its bases in far away regions, including Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and even Latin America.

In short, the Soviet capacity to project decisive military power into regional conflict situations relies heavily on sea power. The political and psychological consequences have already appeared in many places around the world. The Soviet position contrasts sharply with the lack of assertiveness and frequent indecision displayed by the United States. Thus far, using former American facilities at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam, the Soviet Union has demonstrated to local states in that region that the balance of power has indeed shifted in recent years.

Uncertainty and confusion over the role of American military power in the Pacific Basin Region will get worse. In part this reflects uncertainty within the United States as to what its new global role should be, but it also reflects the confusion and indifference of the local powers, most of all Japan and Korea.

The future security of Japan, Korea and the Republic of China depends for at least the next ten years on secure access to Middle East oil. It logically follows that Japan, Korea and the Republic of China should be very concerned over whether the western powers have contingency plans for denying the Soviet Union the ability to control the Persian Gulf. Yet rumors of the new United States Fifth Fleet being deployed in the Indian Ocean were not well received in Tokyo and Seoul out of a fear that some of the new fleet's ships would come from the already-diminished Seventh Fleet. To

this extent, American preoccupation with the military balance in Europe and in the Persian Gulf was seen as in competition with the strategic interests of Japan, South Korea and the Republic of China.

One logical solution would be for Japan, South Korea, the Republic of China and various minor states in the region to play a more equal role in the defense of the West Pacific. These countries have very successfully adopted in the past decade a global economic perspective. I believe it is time for them to develop a more global security perspective.

Second Discussant:
Admiral Ko, ROC

Mr. Carpenter in his paper has made three good points. First, he told us exactly what are sea lanes of communication. Second, he made clear the relationship between SLOCs and security. He pointed out many strategic passages, or "choke points," and how they can be attacked. Third he described ways to protect the SLOCs.

Mr. Carpenter pointed out that many people incorrectly believe the cutting of a sea lane of communication is similar to the cutting off of a road or railroad. In 1958 we had a crisis in the Taiwan Strait which shows the truth of Mr. Carpenter's position. The Chinese Communists suddenly began a very heavy artillery bombardment of the Quemoy (Kinmen) Islands, firing as many as a half a million shells per week. One of their objectives was to cut off the sea lanes of communication between the Quemoy Islands and Taiwan. Before this incident both sides of the Taiwan Strait had not understood just how difficult this was to accomplish.

As Mr. Carpenter told us, a fixed land target such as a road is easy target for anyone who can bring artillery to within the correct range. The target does not move and projectiles leave holes and craters. But a heavy artillery bombardment against targets at sea makes only splashes. One could keep on firing indefinitely, but the sea

lanes would remain intact. During the crisis some of our ships were hit, but the majority made it to the beach and supplied the garrison troops there. The Chinese Communists finally stopped firing largely because it was costing them too much, Civilian casualties in the Quemoy Islands amounted to only five cows and three chickens. This is good demonstration of the difference between land roads and sea lanes. Had the supply lines to the Quemoy Islands been land roads, there would have been no way to supply the troops there.

Third Discussant:
Admiral Kitamura, Japan

I basically agree with Mr. Carpenter, but, because of differences in the international positions of the United States and Japan, there are certain issues on which we differ.

Mr. Carpenter focused on SLOC problems in a limited war or in a crisis of high intensity. This is natural from the viewpoint of the United States which has a global commitment to the security of its friends and allies. Japan, however, has no such commitment and as long as Japan maintains a stable security system, no country would seriously contemplate invading it, regardless of a NATO or Middle Eastern crisis. If however, a large-scale conflict should arise between East and West, perhaps centering around oil-producing areas of the Middle East, it would at once affect the security of Japan. And if the conflict escalated to a general war, Japan, and other northeast Asian nations would inevitably be involved in it.

Mr. Carpenter spoke of a possible proliferation of the threats to SLOCs by ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) nations, but he added that such threats could not be foreseen under the present circumstances. I do not expect it either. Without mutual friendly and cooperative relationships with other countries, the ASEAN nations cannot defend themselves.

Dr. Han suggested that ASEAN nations be included in future

SLOC study programs. I fully agree. But through conversations with politicians and scholars from ASEAN countries, I gathered that some of them have little interest in SLOC problems, particularly the threat of the Soviet Union. During my meetings with them I emphasized the necessity of U.S. naval presence in Southeast Asian waters in order to neutralize Soviet political influence in the area. Many of them strongly requested that Japan export military equipment to them, though it is Japan's policy not to export weapons to any nation. Nevertheless, I believe it is essential that Japan cooperate with ASEAN nations in order to improve their military structures.

My second point concerns the SLOC sanctuary rule during a local, limited war. During the Korean and Vietnam Wars, the sanctuary rule was honored because the United Nations and the United States held an overwhelming naval superiority and because the opposite side had no capability for attacking SLOCs, because their opponents were observing international law and custom.

I agree with Mr. Carpenter's analysis of the Falklands War. It must be noted that as a result of the advent of sea-skimming missiles, developing nations can easily obtain the capability to launch an effective attack against a modern warship, even against one belonging to a superpower. If we take adequate counter-measures, however, we need not be unduly worried about such missiles. An effective missile attack requires not only the missile itself, but also adequate and unified systems for detection, identification, targeting and fire control at a distant range. These capabilities are beyond the capacity of weaker nations.

Finally, I agree with Mr. Carpenter's view that the best solution to the SLOC security problem is to establish and to maintain a unified system of deterrence. This system should include not only nuclear weapons, but also local defense structures.

Proliferation of Threats to Sea Lanes in the Pacific Basin

Kenichi Kitamura

Forward

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the threat during the mid-1980s to the sea lanes of communication (SLOC) and the countermeasures taken to offset that threat. Although the main theme of this conference is "Sea Lanes Security Problems in the Pacific Basin," let us include in our discussion the entire area extending from Northeast Asia to the Middle East, because Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Republic of China (ROC) depend heavily on Middle Eastern oil, and the SLOC security problem in the Pacific Basin is inseparable from the Middle East situation.

The following reflects only my personal opinion, not the views taken by the government of Self-Defense Agency of Japan.

Main Scenarios

The main scenarios under which SLOC security problems are to be discussed are as follows:

- I. A North Korean invasion of South Korea, resulting in a local limited war,
- II. A local armed conflict coupled with Soviet expansionism in the Middle East,
- III. A major military intervention in the Middle East, and its escalation into a general conventional war, and
- IV. Soviet political and psychological maneuvers in East Asia.

North Korean Invasion of South Korea, a Local Limited War

This scenario is a case of a local limited war begun when North

Korea invades the Republic of Korea (ROK) independently of the Middle East situation.

One of the most serious lessons that North Korea must have learned during the last Korean war is that the control of the sea around Korean Peninsula and the interdiction of SLOCs leading to the ROK is essential. It is true that then there existed "sanctuary" for the SLOCs of United Nations forces. This was because the UN forces held an overwhelming naval superiority and North Korea had no capabilities to attack its opponent's SLOCs.

But North Korea now has sixteen submarines and it may be difficult for the United States Navy to provide the ROK with such extensive support as was given during the last war because the U.S. may have to prepare for an unexpected emergency in the Middle East which could happen in relation to a Korean war.

North Korea may secretly mine South Korean coastal waters and attack vessels bound for the ROK within a declared exclusive zone. Even sporadic mining will be effective psychologically because of uncertainty about the position and number of active mines. North Korean-allied superpowers may also support a North Korean effort to interdict the ROK's SLOCs by using their own submarines which are difficult to identify.

The submarines of North Korea and its allies may refrain from attacking Japanese vessels so as to avoid Japanese intervention. Japanese vessels may likewise be careful not to approach an exclusive zone declared by North Korea. Under such circumstances, the Japanese defense attitude may be malleable, depending upon the situation.

On the other hand, it may also be possible that North Korea would attack a few Japanese vessels for the purpose of imposing psychological pressure upon the Japanese people and preventing Japan from providing U.S. forces with bases. But such a North Korean action would justify a Japanese decision to execute its right of self-defense. And if Japan did so, the threat to the ROK's SLOCs could be considerably reduced because of Japan's geographical position and its anti-air and anti-submarine defense capabilities.

A Local Armed Conflict Coupled with Soviet Expansionism in the Middle East

This scenario includes two closely related sets of circumstances. One is a local armed conflict among native nations in the Middle Soviet, in which no superpower intervenes, and the other concerns Soviet political, and potentially military, expansionism in the area.

A Local Armed Conflict

The advent of such precision weapons as anti-air and anti-ship guided missiles and homing torpedoes, as well as fast boats and aircraft equipped with those weapons, has made it easier for even small nations to sink a vessel passing through narrow coastal waters. Small nations can also easily with mines blockade harbors and passages. This fact may on may not point to the proliferation of the threat to SLOCs from Third World nations.

If a local armed conflict involving oil-producing nations in the Middle East should take place, oil-loading facilities might be destroyed by missiles or aircraft, and harbors and approaches to them might be blockaded by mining. Thus oil-loading might naturally be stopped and tankers might be reluctant to approach.

Even such an armed conflict might not invite military intervention by major powers as long as the reduction in oil exports remained tolerable. However, if a transit through the Hormuz Strait and/or the Persian Gulf should be interdicted, military intervention by major powers might be unavoidable. This possibility may deter potential belligerents and thus SLOC sanctuary could be maintained. Such deterrence would be more effective if the major naval powers agreed to keep open the Persian Gulf with naval forces if necessary.

Soviet Expansionism

Soviet expansion of its political influence among the nations in the Middle East through military aid could seriously affect the security of the West if the Soviets gained some control over the oil-producing nations as well as strategic positions over looking vital

SLOCs. If major oil-producing nations should come under Soviet control, industrial nations depending on oil from the Middle East would also eventually be affected by Soviet political influence. It would doubly benefit the Soviets, because some Soviet SLOCs also run through the same area.

There is a possibility that Soviet expansionism may swallow up major oil-producing nations in the Middle East one by one, carefully avoiding United States military intervention. This would drive the West into waging war in order to prevent further Soviet expansion.

Superpowers: Military Intervention in the Middle East and Its Escalation, a General Conventional War

This scenario has two parts; one is a superpower's military intervention in the Middle East and the other is a general global conventional war following a direct military collision between the two superpowers in the Middle East.

A General Conventional War: the Threat to SLOCs in Northeast Asia and the Northwest Pacific

In the case of superpower intervention in the Middle East, a direct military collision between both powers might be avoided through designating two spheres of influence along certain geographic lines. If however a direct military collision between them should happen, escalation into a general war might be unavoidable. The war might be fought primarily with conventional forces and last considerably. Let us, however, discuss the threat to SLOCs in the Pacific basin in such a general conventional war, dividing the region into two sub-regions; 1) around Japan and the Northwest Pacific and 2) around Taiwan and the Southeast Asian waters.

Under this situation, it should be assumed that many of the U.S. attack carriers of the Pacific Fleet may be diverted to the Indian Ocean, while the main body of the Soviet Pacific Fleet may remain in the Sea of Japan, with a considerable number of its submarines being deployed in the Northwest Pacific.

The Northwest Pacific

Submarines

The threat to the SLOCs imposed by submarines in the Northwest Pacific will diminish because of 1) anti-submarine operations conducted by Japanese P3C's and surface units and by American units based on the Mariana Islands and in the Philippines; 2) and the blockade of the three straits. A war games exercise has shown that the threat posed by Soviet submarines based in the Asian theatre could be remarkably reduced in first two or three months of a war. It gives us bright prospects for the security of SLOCs in this sub-region because it is near the enemy's home bases. Also merchant ships bound for northeast Asian nations pass through this area thereby making for a dense geographical distribution of enemy submarines.

Whether "area search" by P3C will be so effective as to render unnecessary the use of merchant ships has yet to be examined in tactical exercises. Whether the crew of a merchant ship will willingly agree to leave port without any rescue arrangements is also another question. Safeguard measures for merchant ships are, therefore, necessary. Japan will have difficulties particularly for vessels beyond the 1,000 nautical mile zone.

Backfire Bombers

The threat imposed by Backfire bombers is a more difficult one to counteract. As long as anti-aircraft defense systems on the Japanese mainland and Okinawa are in effect, it would be difficult for Backfire bombers to fly across the Pacific. But they could freely penetrate this area from the east across Ogasawara Island should no Japanese countermeasures be taken. If an anti-air early warning system were established on Ogasawara Island, information on aircraft approaching from the east could be delivered to surface units operating in this area. Furthermore, if interceptors were deployed on Iwo Jima, penetration from the east would be restricted.

Although anti-air defense for a surface unit can be achieved

with anti-air missiles and on-board close-in weapons systems, the defense of merchant ships from air attacks is impossible.

The anti-air and anti-submarine defense of merchant ships is a serious problem. My idea is that a light cruiser carrying anti-submarine helicopters and anti-air V/STOLs, escorted by several destroyers, and coupled with P3C patrols and a land-based early warning system support merchant ships kept within a 100 mile radius. This concept is called "mobile area search" rather than "convoy escort". Any merchant ship within the circle will be provided with an anti-air and anti-submarine umbrella, as well as rescue service if necessary.

The Blockade of the Soya, Tsugaru and Tsushima Straits

The security of the SLOCs in the Pacific basin in a crisis would depend upon blocking the Soya, Tsugaru and Tsushima Straits to Soviet submarine traffic. The Soviets may naturally contemplate neutralizing the Japanese defense effort with a counter-attack upon the straits. In order to maintain the blockade, therefore, it would be essential for Japan to retain air superiority and control of the sea. This may prove difficult if the U.S. forces in the Pacific including attack carriers are sent to the Indian Ocean to deal with a possible Middle East crisis. Japan's Self-Defense Force may have to combine with the remaining U.S. forces in and around Japan.

In relation to the blockade of the Tsushima Strait, the possibility of a North Korean invasion of South Korea should be mentioned. From the Soviet's viewpoint, such a move would prevent the United States from concentrating its forces in the Middle East. The Soviets may even consider acquiring control of the Tsushima Strait to support the North Korean land operation.

SLOC Interdiction: A Soviet Priority

It is often insisted that the Soviets do not put a high priority on the interdiction of SLOCs in the West. That is a mistaken assumption. Although the Soviets presumably put strong emphasis on the

destruction of mobile U.S. striking forces including attack carriers at the beginning of a war, they will very possibly interdict SLOCs at the next stage. Even at the beginning stage, conventional attack submarines may attack SLOCs.

A General Conventional War: The Threat to SLOCs around Taiwan and in Southeast Asian Waters

There are many choke points in this sub-region: they are the Taiwan Strait, the Bashi Channel and the Malacca, Sunda and Lombok Straits. Both Soviet and Western sea traffic pass through them from the Sea of Japan to the Indian Ocean: the SLOCs of both the West and the USSR penetrate this sub-region from the northeast to the southwest corners. This area is, strategically essential not only from a viewpoint of the security of SLOCs, but also as a source of oil and important materials.

Among ASEAN nations, the Philippines has signed a defense treaty with the United States, and Malaysia and Singapore have made a defense arrangement with Britain, Australia and New Zealand. In this respect, we may expect that the other ASEAN nations will maintain, at least, a friendly neutrality in the case of a general war.

The existence of Vietnamese naval and air forces and the Soviet's use of Vietnamese naval and air bases constitute a potential threat to SLOCs in the South China Sea. But, Vietnamese missile boats and aircraft seem to pose little threat to our merchant ships who do not approach the coast. There would not be a substantial threat from the Soviet armed forces based in Vietnam during a general war because they might easily be contained. Vietnamese naval and air bases might also be neutralized. Supply lines of oil, weapons, ammunition and other military materials from Soviet home bases could be easily interdicted.

Additionally, if ASEAN nations and the PRC cooperate, or at least remain neutral towards each other, and if the West effectively executes anti-submarine operations both in the Northwest Pacific and the Indian Ocean, the threat to SLOCs in the Indian Ocean

would be remarkably reduced in the first two or three months of a war.

Soviet Political and Psychological Moves in East Asia

So far, the threat to SLOCs in a local armed conflict, a local limited war and a general conventional war has been discussed. The Soviet Union, however, seems more likely to try to expand its political influence by political and psychological means, carefully avoiding United States' military intervention. For this purpose, the Soviets utilize their navy as one of their most effective political tools. From a viewpoint of sea lanes security, it should be noted here that the Soviet Union has expanded its political influence over areas well situated to effectively control the SLOCs, in other words to control the choke points. In this respect, the most important Soviet targets in East Asia may be Japan, followed by Southeast Asian nations.

Conclusion and Proposal

1. Conclusion

(1) The advent of weapon systems capable of easily sinking vessels expands the threat to SLOCs by weaker nations. It should be noted, in particular, that the Soviet Union is expanding its political influence through military aid to small nations well-situated for the control of choke points, as well as to the Middle East nations.

(2) Some developing countries do not necessarily observe international law and custom. When they have precision weapons in hand, they may, for a special political purpose, venture a sudden attack upon a vessel or an aircraft passing through their coastal areas.

(3) In a local armed conflict among seaboard developing countries, harbors and approaches may be easily attacked or blockaded. Even in this case, however, international straits and sea lanes on the high seas will presumably be kept open in order to avoid intervention by major powers. In this sense, "sanctuary" of the SLOCs will be maintained there.

(4) If a North Korean invasion of South Korea should take place independently of events in the Middle East situation, the security of South Korean SLOC might be not less serious a concern.

(5) The increase in the number of submarines in the Soviet Pacific Fleet and the deployment of Backfire bombers in Far East with their improved air-to-surface missiles has considerably increased the threat to SLOCs in the Pacific basin in the event of a general war.

(6) It should also be noted that the Soviet Union puts an emphasis on weakening Japan and separating it from the United States and other Asian nations, as well as on expanding its political influence over East Asian nations by combination of ideological propaganda, military demonstration and others.

2. Proposal

(1) If a general war should break out and an actual attack on SLOCs take place, damage and injury effected thereby would be tremendous. The best and wisest policy is to prevent local armed conflicts or wars within the theater extending from Northeast Asia to the Middle East.

To achieve this, it will be necessary for the United States to maintain nuclear parity with the Soviet Union and to build up its rapid deployment forces. Its allies must assume the primary responsibility for their local defense. Each coastal nation should take a primary responsibility for its coastal defense including anti-air and anti-mine countermeasures. Potential naval powers should cooperate with each other to maintain SLOC security on the high seas. The Japanese defense effort within so-called 1,000 nautical mile zone south of Japan would be significant in this connection.

(2) Japan and the United States should jointly study how to defend the ocean SLOCs. A joint study on the defense of the Tsushima Strait is also necessary. If it is difficult for Japan to join it for political reasons, the United States may be able to coordinate a defense effort by all the nations concerned through Japan-U.S. and U.S.-ROK joint study efforts.

Concerning the security of SLOCs in the Pacific, the Republic of China should also participate in a joint study. Because Japan now

has no official diplomatic relations with the ROC, it may be practical to conduct our investigations on a private level and refer our findings to policy makers in each government.

(3) Although the importance of sea lane security is generally well understood, there is a broad divergence in opinion about how to defend them. There are two extreme views currently prevailing: One holds that SLOC defense would be impossible, and the other, more optimistic view, is that a general war will not take place. These extreme views indicate the need for further study of the SLOC problem, the results of which may be implemented by military planners and public policy makers.

Discussion of Kitamura's speech

First Discussant.

Dr. Dalchoong Kim, ROK

While the largest maritime threat is posed by increasing Soviet power, the most immediate source for regional turmoil lies in the tense, heavily-armed stand-off along the Korean de-militarized zone.

The North Korean threat lies in its capability to achieve either a partial or complete victory over South Korea before the needed assistance arrived. Renewed confrontation is a constant possibility. It cannot be assumed that the PRC or the Soviet Union would be controlling such a conflict. All powers in the region would be come involved in a renewed Korean clash. I also see the possibility of a major power confrontation arising out of the situation in Vietnam and Kampuchea, though this seems less likely.

Concerning the threat to SLOC security in the region, particularly the possibility of military conflict in the Taiwan Strait, I have a slightly different view from that of Admiral Kitamura. Considering the PRC's present capabilities and strategies, it is not likely to launch a successful attack upon the ROC. But circumstances could change. For instance, once Peking's "peace offensive" toward the Republic of China has failed, once the ROC is no longer able to

obtain sufficient defensive U.S. military hardware, once the threat to the PRC from Moscow has diminished, and once Peking's military has become stronger through modernization programs, then the Chinese Communist leaders are likely to adopt more militant policies toward the ROC.

There are a whole range of military options Peking's leaders could take: a nuclear attack, an invasion of the island, a large-scale bombardment or seizure of the Quemoy (Kinmen) Islands, or a naval and air blockade. Given the possible changes in mentioned above, we must not exclude the possibility of a strategic blockade of the island. I quite agree with Admiral Kitamura that in this region there is a fairly small chance of a general war developing. The greatest danger to the sea lanes arises from local military conflicts.

Second Discussant:

Rear Admiral Chaung, ROC

As a supplement to Admiral Kitamura's paper, I would like to add that Soviet air force and naval activity has increased remarkably in the Western Pacific recently. It constitutes an even greater than before security threat to Japan, the ROC, South Korea and other Asian countries. I am sure that this increased threat is of great concern to all of us here. It is beyond doubt that the ROC currently controls the Taiwan Strait and the Bashi Channel, the main navigation routes through which Soviet forces move in and out of the Pacific and Indian Oceans. According to our information, Soviet TU 95 reconnaissance aircraft conducted more than one hundred sorties over the air space between Vladivostok and Thailand from March of 1979 to July of 1982. From March of 1980 to the present, Soviet transport planes are known to have flown over 300 sorties in the West Pacific and Indochina.

During this same period Soviet merchant and container ships

made more than 2,500 trips through waters off Taiwan. All of these Soviet movements have been closely monitored by the ROC.

On June 27, 1982, the Soviet Fleet sailed southward through the Taiwan Strait. The Chinese Communists had no particular reaction, and seemed to attach no importance to the Soviet naval activities off their coast.

These revelations deserve our attention. First, before the U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty was abrogated, Soviet ships and aircraft had never conducted such activities in the Taiwan Strait. Second, the Chinese Communists have never reacted to Soviet military activities in this area.

Three years ago when the United States played a more dominant role in the Pacific, Soviet ground, naval and air forces were not a serious threat. Today, however, the Soviet Union has the capability to launch at will either conventional or nuclear attacks on more than one area simultaneously. Their recent military activities in the area have reconnoitered Communist Chinese, American, and Japanese military capabilities and gauged these allies' response to such observations.

Because these activities are designed to enhance the Soviet's capability to strike against the U.S. carrier task force deployed in the area, they threaten the secure use of the sea lanes by western nations, while politically and psychologically influencing neighboring countries. The Soviet Union is sparing no effort to consolidate its offensive capability in preparation for war.

Third Discussant:
Dr. Edward Luttwak, U.S.A.

In the Falklands War we saw the third appearance of an anti-ship air-launched missile. The second time was in September of 1943 when the Germans used a Fritz X missile to sink an Italian battleship.

The second time was in 1967 when a Styx missile was used to sink an Israeli destroyer. In 1982 the Argentinians used an Exocet missile to sink the Sheffield, a British warship.

Please note that when the Italian battleship was sunk in the Mediterranean Sea, it was widely assumed that large ships could no longer be deployed in that area because the Germans could sink them with a single missile. Within three months, however, the Fritz X missile had been completely neutralized. The Fritz X was simple radio-controlled guided missile. It was found that this simple cheap weapons could be neutralized with an equally cheap counter-measure. Ships with space, crews and energy can usually install the correct equipment to neutralize whatever weapon threatens them.

In 1967, a Soviet-made Styx missile sank an Israeli vessel, the *Elath*. During the next Arab-Israeli war in 1973 over fifty Styx missiles were launched at Israeli ships, but not a single vessel was sunk. Even though the Israeli vessels were quite small, they were equipped with the necessary counter-measures.

It is impossible to neutralize a gun in the same way as a missile. Nobody has ever successfully neutralized a gun, but they have done so to missiles. There is a basic rule of strategy that cannot be broken; for every cheap weapon there exists or there can be developed a cheap counter-measure. Many countries around the world are now rushing to buy the Exocet missile, but, by the time they deploy them, the missiles will be ineffective against any serious navy.

The British, as is their tradition, entered this war shockingly unprepared. Last January, I was sent to England by an American commercial company to persuade the British Navy to buy a very simple counter-measure package which was specifically designed to counteract certain anti-ship missiles such as the Exocet. The British received us very warmly, but said that by 1986 or 1987 they will have developed a superior counter-measure package. When they actually began losing ships in the Falklands, they did not even have the kind of counter-measures that were available in 1943.

Another case of their shocking unpreparedness was the sinking of the *General Belgrano*. One reason the British sank the *Belgrano*, instead of the two modern destroyers which escorted it, was that

they did not trust the accuracy of their own twenty-five year-old torpedoes.

The British, nevertheless, have taught us an important lesson. Political scientists have invented the phrase "limited war" which has had a very corrupting influence. Every war is limited; even Hitler refrained from doing certain things. There is no such thing as unlimited war; it is only theoretical. Clausewitz himself, wrote about absolute war as a theoretical event never achieved. The concept to limited war has lulled us into thinking that the proper way to fight a war is half-heartedly. The British did not have modern torpedoes because they had been focussing on anti-submarine torpedoes. But once they were in the Falklands War, they did not fight it as a limited war in the corrupt sense of the phrase. They fought with ferocity. They were willing to suffer casualties; they were willing to take big risks; and they were willing to be very tough on the enemy. There was no limitation in that.

The Argentinians complained that the very sending of the Gurkha regiment was itself an atrocity. Argentinian newspapers carried stories about how the Gurkhas would come at night and cut peoples' throats. This was part of the British strategy. The British were willing to send the SAS commandos to sit at the end of Argentinian airfields to observe — this was the only early-warning system they had. The commandos if discovered were under orders to kill anybody or hijack any aircraft to escape. They were to disperse, but not surrender. If they were captured, there were to deny they were British. There was nothing limited about the way the British fought this war in terms of the risks they took and their willingness to be tough.

Another lesson—which poses certain questions to me—is that these countermeasure packages work, all serious navies must have them. But the size of the countermeasure package depends on the size of the target. I therefore ask myself, what is the explanation for the peculiar passion of both the ROC and the ROK navies to buy our old World War II destroyers? Instead of these bulks peacefully ending as razor blades, they are sold to avid buyers. Is this perhaps a bureaucratic phenomenon in which smaller navies try to imitate

the big power navies? I know how more difficult it is to protect these old destroyers than ships four hundred to nine hundred tons in size.

I would like now to comment some of Admiral Ko's points. In land warfare there are many gray situations, but one can generally tell when there is peace and when there is war. There is an absolute difference. The threat to SLOCs is more finely measured through insurance rates. There is no independent group who can with total accuracy predict the threat of war in a given area, but the people who set insurance rates for ships give us very precise measurements.

Admiral Ko pointed out that the execution of distant blockades requires very elaborate preparations. During the Second World War, the British had to set up a world-wide organization to maintain its distant blockades. The primary instrument eventually used was a safe conduct pass issued through the British consulates. Admiral Ko has pointed out how difficult this would be for the PRC.

If the PRC finds it too difficult to intercept and to examine thousands of ships, it might just sink one then let the rise in insurance rates pose a veritable blockade.

There is a fashion now in America to say that there is no threat to the SLOCs or that the entire SLOC concept was invented by admirals to get more money for the navy, or that the Soviet Union is not interested in attacking SLOCs or that the whole notion of SLOCs is theoretical. These are interesting views given that a SLOC has already been cut not in the middle, but at the source, the Spratly Island SLOC. Also if Iraq makes operational two or three submarines, there would perhaps be wider disturbances in the Persian Gulf SLOC.

One lesson of the Falklands War is that a submarine sinking a single ship makes a great deal of noise. The SLOC issue is very much alive. Yet if one reads through thousands of pages of Soviet naval writings, one would rarely find references to a threat to SLOCs. The reason for this, some say, is that there is no threat to SLOCs. But Admiral Kitamura has pointed out that the reason is that SLOC disruption is taken for granted by the Soviets. They are planning to attack all manner of vessels. To attack a merchant ship is so easy

that it requires no special mention.

In relation to the USSR's strategic needs, its navy is too large, though in the last couple of years its growth has slowed. It is still growing, but at a sharply decreasing rate.

This has taken place in conjunction with a debate within the Soviet Union about naval science. Admiral Gorschkov was disciplined two years ago when he stated his belief that there was such a thing as naval science. He was told that there was no naval science, only military science. This was the Russian way of telling Gorschkov that he was not independent and that his plans were going beyond their strategic needs. The people who told him that there was no naval science argued that navies alone are insufficient.

I am very interested by the Soviet's reaction to the Israeli bombardment of the Palestinian Liberation Organization in Beirut. The PLO were getting shelled by small Israeli gunboats, equipped with little seventy-six millimeter guns. Meanwhile, the large Soviet fleet was only about one hundred and fifty miles away. The Soviets did nothing to implement their promise to Arafat that the PLO would be protected. It is interesting to recall that when Arafat was in Moscow in 1979, Admiral Gorschkov said to him "Remember the Soviet fleet is always behind you." And indeed that is where they were—far behind.

The strategic importance of the Pacific has become a commonplace among Americans in recent years, yet our strategy tends to pull the other way. The reason for this is that Japan, a central country in the region, is itself in a state of dysfunction. Japan's disequilibrium and lack of seriousness over the defense issue has put us in a state of doubt.

Too much of the debate in Japan is conducted in symbolic terms. A case in point is the question of the 1,000 defense mile zone. If Japan takes responsibility for the 1,000 mile zone, we should all applaud; it would be a great step forward, especially if ammunition and missiles are actually bought. The 1,000 mile zone, however, is purely symbolic for the concept implies that somebody could stand 1,001 miles away and start sinking ships. If the U.S. Navy was present, then it would be logical for Japan to take care of

the first 1,000 miles, and the U.S. would take care of the 1,001st mile, the 1,002nd mile, and so on. But we are not 1,001 miles away, we are 5,000 miles away.

Dr. Han Li-wu has asked me to come up with some practical suggestions. One possibility might be to try to form a pressure group or a lobby comprised of East Asian shipping lines and maritime associations. This pressure group might tell Washington and other governments that while they admire and respect the various political schemes, something has to be done to maintain sea lane security. It is in the interest of such shipping lines and maritime associations to lobby for improved SLOC security. They will be receptive when they learn their participation is needed, not their money.

Urgency and Potency of Protecting SLOC in North-East Asia: A Prescriptive Analysis

Sang-Woo Rhee

Introduction

Historically the ocean has served nations as a reliable buffer against foreign invaders as well as a vital link to remotely allies. The English Channel saved the British from Napoleon's and Hitler's armies in the nineteenth and twentieth century respectively, and the Korea Strait stopped the allied forces of the Mongols and the Koreans from invading Japan in the thirteenth century. On the other hand, the sea link across the vast Atlantic made it possible to form the U.S.-European alliances during the two world wars. The situation is not much changed in the nuclear era. The ocean still serves its dual role.

Which role the sea will play is determined by the nation which utilizes it. The sea itself is a neutral entity. It is the will, technology, power and preparedness of nations that make the sea serve their purposes. With a carefully worked out strategy and a well prepared naval capability a nation can turn the sea into an effective defense barrier against foreign intruders and a useful attack route. On the other hand for the ill-prepared nation, the sea opens the doors to outside invaders.

* Prepared for presentation at the conference on "Sea Lane Security Problems in the Pacific Basin," held September 23 to 25, 1982 in San Francisco.

In Northeast Asia there are six nations (*de facto* sovereign states, all of which have access to the ocean. The sea therefore plays a critical role in their economies as well as in their security. Japan is totally dependent on the SLOCs (Sea Lanes of Communications) and ALOCs (Air Lanes of Communications). The Republic of China (ROC) is in the same situation. The Republic of Korea (ROK) is geographically linked with the Asian continent, but effectively it has become an island since its land connection to the continent is completely denied by North Korea. The situation for the ROK is therefore the same as for Japan and the ROC. North Korea, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and the Soviet Union are continental nations, but all of them have access to the sea. They, however do not depend on the sea routes as heavily as the other three.

Out of the fifteen possible dyadic linkages among the six nations only three are by land. These are the dyads between the Soviet Union-PRC, the Soviet Union-North Korea, and the PRC-North Korea. At present the border between the Soviet Union and the PRC is virtually closed due to their on going conflict. Only the land routes which link North Korea to the PRC and the Soviet Union are open.

The United States is about 10,000 km from the center of the North-East Asian region, but it is regarded as one of the regional states because there is no intervening nation in between. So far as the U.S. keeps the sea routes across the Pacific under her control, she can remain an Asian power.

At present regional peace is maintained by complex alliance systems among the nations. There are at the moment four formal alliance systems and two pseudo-alliance systems in effect. The U.S. maintains formal mutual security treaties with Japan and the ROK¹

1. The Mutual Defense Treaty between The Republic of Korea and The United States of America was signed in 1953, and the Japan-U.S. treaty was signed in 1960.

North Korea retains formal alliance relations with the PRC and the Soviet Union.² Beside these, the United States is developing a kind of limited defense partnership with the PRC against the Soviet Union, while keeping her unofficial pledge to protect the ROC.

Of the six nations, three are prone to war. Korean is the most war-prone, and the ROC/PRC are still in half-war situation. The Sino-Soviet relationship also reveals high tension. These local hostilities are kept from developing into active war by precarious local power balances. In the Korean peninsula, the loose balance between the U.S.-ROK alliance and North Korea's separate defense treaties with the PRC and the Soviet Union provide mutual deterrents. U.S. relations with two Chinas serve to keep the inter-China hostility to its current non-violent state.

It is also the U.S. links with the PRC that keeps the Sino-Soviet conflict in its current dormant state. We can say then that the U.S. commitment to defend its allies is the backbone of the regional peace. For the past thirty years since the end of the Korean War, the United States has quite successfully performed her role as the peace keeper.

Unfortunately the *Pax Americana* in Northeast Asia has been shaken. As mentioned earlier, the U.S. can maintain a strong presence in North-East Asia only while she can secure the sea lanes that link the U.S. to the region. The steady and rapid growth of the Soviet navy in the region for the past decade, however, seriously challenges monopolistic control of the SLOCs by the U.S. The U.S. defense commitment to her allies in the region has begun to lose credibility. When the dominant position of the U.S. in the region falters, then the whole regional peace system will erode.

The East Asian nations acute interest in the security of the sea lanes is a natural consequence of rapidly deteriorating American sea control capabilities. Until a decade ago, East Asian nations had

2. In 1961, just after the military took over the Seoul Government, North Korea hurriedly signed mutual defense treaties with the PRC and the Soviet Union.

taken the U.S. presence for granted. Furthermore, they had never worried about their economic and strategic outlets to the world. Now the situation has changed. They have begun seriously to worry about the vulnerability of their vital links to the outside world.

Needless to say, the core of concern among East Asian nations is how to keep SLOCs free from challenges by hostile naval power, and how to sustain long-term SLOC security. I would like to clarify the issues pertaining to the threat to SLOCs in Northeast Asia, and present my personal view on how to work out a system that would provide us with more secure sea lanes for the future.

The Core of the Issues

In regard to Northeast Asian SLOCs (NEASLOC), nations of the region are primarily concerned about two core issues: keeping the flow of merchant vessels free from interruption in peace time, and securing safe sea lanes to obtain necessary logistic supply of war materials and reinforcement units from outside allies in war time. Let us briefly examine the importance of the issues and the problems involved.

Uninterrupted Sea Routes In Peace Time

For the three island nations—Japan, the ROC and the ROK—maintaining uninterrupted sea routes is a vital issue for their survival. All of the three nations depend upon imported oil for the energy necessary to run their industries and to support their energy-consuming life styles. The export-oriented economies of the three nations cannot be sustained when cut off from foreign markets and raw material suppliers.

Japan, for example, imported 235,110 thousand metric tons of oil in 1981, which comprised 99.7% of its total oil consumption.³ More importantly 78.2% of it came from the Middle East across 12,000 km-long sea lanes, and 18.1% from Southeast Asia via 4,000-

3. Hirasato Asonuma, *Si-ren-no anzen* (Security of the Sea Lanes), 1982.

km long sea routes. Japan as a whole imported 567,350 thousand tons of goods and exported 77,350 tons in 1981, and nineteen percent world's total commodities which were transported over the sea either originated from or were headed to Japan.⁴ In this situation Japan simply cannot survive as a viable nation even for a few months if she is cut off from the outside.⁵

The dependence of the ROK on sea transportation is not very different from the Japanese case. The ROK's imported cargo total in 1980 was 71,353 thousand tons and the exported total of the same year was 22,682 thousand tons. Of the combined total, 99.8% was waterborne.⁶ In the same year, the ROK exported commodities worth 17,505 million U.S. dollars which comprised about thirty percent of her total GNP of 57,650 million dollars. The dollar value of imported commodities that year was 22,292 million about thirty-nine percent of the total GNP.⁷ The Korean economy, therefore, is doomed to collapse if its sea routes are sealed. The ROK's dependence on sea transportation is almost the same as the ROK's

Safe SLOCs To Maintain Alliance System

The complicated multi-tiered U.S. alliance systems are the backbone of the regional peace of Northeast Asia. The effectiveness of these alliance arrangements depends upon the U.S. capability for prompt military intervention in the region. If the U.S. is denied the ability to reinforce her military power in the region in a war, it

4. *Yomiuri Shimbun*, August 12, 1982.

5. The anticipated damage Japan would suffer if its oil supply is cut off is vividly illustrated in a work of fiction, *Yudan* (Cut-Off of Oil), written by Sakaiya Taichi in 1979. In this scenario, many thousands of people lose their lives and the GNP drops by sixty-five percent over a span of about 200 days.

6. These statistics were produced by the Office of Maritime and Port Administration, Republic of Korea in 1981.

7. Korea International Economic Institute, *International Economic Report*, 1981, pp. 506-509.

would not be able to cope. In peace, the U.S. maintains only two division-equivalent forces (DEF) in the region, including one combat division in Korea. With these symbolic forces, the United States cannot exert effective military influence in the most heavily armed region in the world.

Logistical supply is more crucial. In modern wars, the consumption rate of war materials such as ammunition, fuel, and equipment is astonishingly high, and without a constant supply of those materials, no nation can sustain a fighting capability. Furthermore, due to the astronomical cost and limited size of the war industries, no nation other than the two super powers can supply needed logistics in a full-scale war. Non-communist nations in the region which face a potential threat from the Soviet Union and her proxies, therefore, would inevitably rely on the U.S. for supply in a war situation.

Despite that the U.S. maintains enormous airlift capabilities,⁸ sea transportation still plays a major role. To move an armored division, for example, an approximately 30,000-ton transport capability is needed. To supply ammunition needed for an infantry

8. In 1976, the total "30-day airlift capability" was 180,000 tons (an average of 6,000 tons per day) including the CRAF (Civil Reserve Air Fleet) capacity. See John M. Collins, *Imbalance of Power*, San Rafael: Presidio Press, 1978, pp. 194-202. In the past five years, the airlift capability has not improved much. The followings are the U.S. Air Fleet's 1981 wartime airlift strength, reported by Department of Defense in the *FY 1983 Report*. In parentheses are the 1976 figures.

C-5	70 (70)
C-141	234 (234)
C-130	218 (234)
*reserved C-130	294
CRAF cargo	109 (135)
passenger	215 (94)

For sea lift, the U.S. maintains the following dry cargo vessels:

Military Sealift Command	24 (27)
Ready Reserve Force	27
NDRF ships	167 (139)
Merchant Marine	270 (268)

division for one day, at least a several thousand-ton lifting capacity should be maintained. The demand, thus, cannot be met by airlift. It is obvious that without relying on sea lift, no major ground battle can be fought effectively. Security of the approximately 11,000 km-long sea lane across the Northern Pacific that links the west coast of the continental United States to Asia is therefore essential to make U.S. defense commitments to her Asian allies credible.

Various Measures to Protect SLOCs

How then can we keep a vital SLOC secured in peace and war time alike? Three basic measures should be considered.

Defense

The first and the most reliable measure is to protect merchant and naval fleets all along the SLOC with effective air and naval forces. Until the time of the Second World War, one of the primary missions of the navy was to protect the merchant fleet in war, and it was a general practice that naval ships escort a convoy of merchant vessels through hostile seas. Usually a squadron of frigates and destroyer-escorts sailed with the merchant fleet all along the sea lane from port to port.

Up to the 1970s, the Northeast Asian SLOC (NEASLOC) had been immune to hostile interdiction because there had been no navy strong enough to challenge the predominant U.S. Seventh Fleet. Now the situation has changed. Over the past fifteen years, the United States has actually reduced her naval strength, while the Soviets have steadily improved their naval fighting capabilities. The Soviet navy has now become second to none in the world. Table-1 gives a rough picture of the changing balance of naval strength of the U.S. and the Soviet Union between 1969-1982.

Especially after the Soviets gained sea-based air support capability with their newly deployed aircraft carrier *Minsk*⁹ in 1980⁹, and

9. The first helicopter carrier the *Moskva* (17,000 ton) was completed in

acquired new naval bases in Vietnam (in Cam Rahn Bay and Danang) and in the Indian Ocean (Socotra and Nacala-a-Velha), the range of their naval operations markedly expanded to cover the whole West

Table 1. Naval Combatant Force Level: 1969-82. The U.S. and The Soviet Union

	1969 US/USSR	1979 US/USSR	1982 US/USSR
Aircraft Carrier	22/ 0	13/ 2	13/ 4
Surface combatant	279/ 220	178/ 269	198/ 274
Submarines	156/ 354	123/ 357	96/ 377
Patrol (PGM)	9/ 148	3/ 120	6/ 145
Amphibious	153/ 103	63/ 91	65/ 66
Mine warfare	74/ 165	3/ 165	3/ 395
Auxiliary	231/ 680	79/ 760	113/ 755
Total			
Active Fleet	926/1670	462/1764	514/2016

* Source: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Department of the Navy, The U.S.A., *Understanding Soviet Naval Developments*, 4th edition, 1981, p. 72, and Caspar W. Weinberger, *FY 1983 Report of Secretary of Defense*, 1982, Appendix, "Soviet Military Power," p. 40.

Pacific and the Indian Ocean. And the recent deployment of Back-fire long-range bombers (Tu-22M/-26) in the maritime province of East Siberia added the new dimension of air threat to SLOCs in the whole West Pacific. The normal effective operation radius of the Siberia-based TU-26 covers the area down to Guam and the Bashi Channel north of the Philippines (about 6,000 km). When the planes are refueled in the air, the range extends to the Hawaiian islands and even to New Zealand. Figure 1 shows the expanding scope of Soviet naval operations in the West Pacific.

1967, and the first fixed-wing carrier, the *Kiev* 37,000 ton) became operational in 1976. The second Kiev-class carrier, the *Minsk* (built in 1978) is now in the Soviet Pacific Ocean Fleet.




Figure-1. Expanded Limits of Soviet Naval Operations


The old idea of bottling up the Soviet Pacific Fleet in the Sea of Japan (The East Sea) and the Sea of Okhotsk also has become obsolete. Until ten years ago, the Soviet Pacific Fleet operated only from Vladivostok and the ships were to be easily stopped at several choke points, such as the Korea Strait, the Tsushima Strait, the Tsugaru and the Soya channels. Also the Fleet could not get any effective reinforcement from other fleets in the western hemisphere. Also, it did not have air cover in the Pacific. As pointed out above, the Soviet Pacific Fleet now uses several ports outside of the choke points such as Petropavlovsk in Kamchatka, and Cam Ranh. The Soviet Union recently opened a new sea route across the Arctic Ocean. She can now adopt her own version of a "swing strategy" between the Pacific, the Indian, and the Atlantic Oceans. Figure 2 shows the locations of the choke points and the new naval bases outside of the old "enclosure."

Increased Soviet naval activities in the Indian Ocean draw a significant portion of the U.S. Seventh Fleet's operational capabilities out of the West Pacific. Now two carrier task forces are tied up in the Indian Ocean, and this means that in the West Pacific only two carrier task forces are available for SLOC defense. Two back-up carrier task forces are in the East Pacific under the Third Fleet.

The introduction of new weapon systems such as long range PGMs (Precision Guided Munitions), attack submarines, and intelligence satellites has made SLOCs more vulnerable. Merchant fleets are now easily detected, and can be attacked from a distant location. The traditional convoy-escort system can no longer ensure safe passage through the SLOCs.

A few years ago, Admiral Sergei Georgiyevich Gorschkov proudly declared that SLOC interdiction had been newly added to the existing missions of the Soviet Navy, and his word is now developing into a serious threat.¹⁰ The task of defending NEASLOC

10. Admiral Gorshkov has recently said; "...the disruption of the ocean lines of communication, the special arteries feeding the military and economic potentials of enemy countries, has continued to be one of the most important of



against the growing Soviet naval power is now beyond the control of the U.S. Seventh Fleet.

Deterrence

When the sea lanes crossing a vast ocean cannot be effectively protected, an alternative measure should be considered. Deterrence is a positive alternative to the direct defense of the naval and merchant fleets in the lanes.

Deterrence in protecting vital sea lanes is quite simple. It consists of the declaration of a firm intention to, and preparation for, a specified retaliation against an enemy attack. This is a preventive measure, discouraging the enemy not to take hostile action.

Deterrence to be effective, must meet three elementary conditions. First of all, sufficient military capability to retaliate has to be retained. The capability should be sufficient to inflict far greater damage than the adversary is able to. Deterrence works psychologically.

The capability to inflict damages on the enemy is different from defending the SLOCs. For example, in retaliation for ships sunk by the enemy, one could choose to bomb enemy ports. Superior air attack capabilities can be made to compensate for weaker naval power.

A second element of effective deterrence is to show our determination to retaliate. If our declared intention is not convincing, the adversary may gamble. We cannot prevent such an adventure in advance. Credibility of retaliation is vital. We should not allow our enemies to misjudge us.

Thirdly, we have to clearly state our plan of action to the enemy. We should inform the enemy of what kind of actions in response to an attack, so that the enemy would have a clear idea of the outcome of its intended actions.

the Navy's missions." See *Understanding Soviet Naval Developments*, op. cit., p. 7 and pp. 10-11.

Can and will the United States protect Northeast Asian sealanes through deterrence? It is very doubtful. Firstly, the U.S. does not have the appropriate means by which to retaliate. Without a commitment to total nuclear war, U.S. has not the military capacity to respond effectively to a Soviet attack on the sea lanes. The ideal formula for deterring a Soviet attack on these vital sea lanes would be to threaten to destroy major naval bases and naval fleet itself.

Yet the U.S. at present does not have sufficient conventional military power to destroy the well-protected naval facilities of the Soviet bases such as Vladivostok. Neither has she sufficient naval units to chase scattered Soviet vessels across the vast ocean. Table 2 shows the number of recorded shipdays of the U.S. and Soviet navies in the Pacific and Indian Oceans since 1965. From this table, we can see that in the Pacific the U.S. has only two-to-one superiority over the Soviets in shipdays, which is not enough to inflict sufficient punishment on the Soviet.

We can consider retaliating against a Soviet attack on our merchant convoys by in turn attacking Soviet convoys. The problem, however, is that the Soviet reliance on her sea lanes is far less than our reliance on ours. SLOCs are vital for the nations linked by the ocean alliance led by the U.S., while the Soviets and their allies can survive with interrupted SLOCs. Unbalanced reliance on SLOCs discourages *quid pro quo* retaliation.

Denial

Another alternative way for us to live with threatened SLOCs is to prepare for their interruption, and to increase our denial capabilities to cope with enemy interdiction. This is a passive measure. If we increase the number of our merchant ships, diversify our sea lanes, and improve the structure of the ships so that they can absorb greater damage, then the Soviets, cannot simply cut off the whole SLOC system. They may sink many of our vessels, but they cannot wipe out all of them.

As of 1981, Japan had 4,226 merchant vessels (greater than 300 gt: a total of 38,830 thousand gt). scattered over oceans and ports of the world. Because one-third of them are technically

Table 2. Ship Days of The U.S. and The USSR Navies. In The Pacific and Indian Ocean

	U.S.			U.S.S.R.		
	total	Pacific	Indian	total	Pacific	Indian
1965	109,500	54,200	1,100	6,300	1,000	0
1969	117,500	62,400	1,100	35,000	5,800	4,200
1972	70,600	47,300	1,100	48,800	5,900	8,800
1974	61,300	34,800	2,600	53,100	7,400	10,500
1976	46,100	19,700	1,400	44,500	5,200	7,300
1979	41,280	17,150	3,520	47,050	8,400	7,600

* Source: Office of the Chief of Naval Operation, Department of Navy, U.S.A., *Understanding Soviet Naval Developments*, 4th edition, 1981, p. 16.

registered as third nation flag ships, it would not be easy for an adversary navy to sort out Japanese ships and destroy them. Statistically speaking, even though we cannot guard all of our ships, we can at least survive the enemy attacks on our merchant fleet. The more ships we have, the more attacks we can absorb. Table 3 shows the sizes of merchant fleets of the Northeast Asian nations. The combined merchant fleet of Japan, the ROK, and the ROC includes a total of 4,956 ocean going ships, numbers which are great enough to withstand Soviet attacks for at least a couple of months.

Diminishing the effect of enemy attacks on SLOCs by increasing damage absorbing capacity is definitely not a desirable measure, but it will be useful in discouraging an enemy attempt to disturb our SLOCs. This kind of resistance strategy, and its underlying concept, is similar to that of the "people's war."

Pertaining to the denial strategy, storing vital materials in peace time should also be considered. If we can survive with stored supply for a few months, it is obvious that we can thereby diminish the effects of the SLOC disruption.

The three D measures — defense, deterrence, and denial—we have considered have are to be utilized in combination. For example, on the one hand we can diversify sea lanes and scatter randomly the merchant fleet to reduce our vulnerability. Simul-

taneously, we can deploy complicated mine networks along the key sea routes and intensify air protection over the most vulnerable segments of the vital SLOCs.

Table 3. The Sizes of Merchant Fleet: The North-East Asian Nations

As of the end of 1981				
	number	x 10 ³ gt	x 10 ³ dwt	% (dwt)
Japan	4,226	38,830	64,835	9.8
ROK	562	4,626	7,834	1.2
ROC	168	1,740	2,742	0.4
U.S.A.	1,063	16,693	25,984	3.9
USSR	2,973	17,629	23,722	3.6
PRC	825	6,919	10,561	1.6
N. Korea	insignificant			

* Based on Bremen *Shipping Statistics*, quoted from *Haeun Tongkye Yoram* (Handbook of Shipping Statistics) published by Korean Information Center for Shipping and Port, 1982, pp. 6-7.

Considering all of these possible countermeasures, to what extent shall we be able to protect our SLOCs? This is hard to predict, since there are too many factors that affect the NEASLOC. First of all, it depends upon the speed of the Soviet naval build-up in the future. If the Soviets increase their naval power rapidly, the NEASLOC will be threatened seriously. Second, the level of naval strength the United States retains in this area will also affect it. If the U.S. sticks to its present Europe-centered policy, the NEASLOC protection system will not be improved. And third, of course, the degree of cooperation among the concerned nations in the area will also be an important element. If the concerned nations share the burden of NEASLOC defense currently borne by the U.S. alone, they can definitely enhance the security of SLOCs in the West Pacific.

Alliance for Free SLOCs

The NEASLOC is now exposed to a serious threat by the Soviet navy, and it has become obvious that the threat level has already exceeded capacity of the U.S. Navy to manage. This means that it is time for us to think of a cooperative security plan among the concerned nations.

As of the end of 1981, the Soviet Pacific Ocean Fleet commanded a formidable armada of 1,580,000 tons of naval ships, while the U.S. Seventh Fleet deployed 650,000 tons of naval ships in the Pacific Ocean. The present imbalance between the deployed naval power of the two super powers is so great that, despite of belated determination of the United States to strengthen her navy, the Soviets will outnumber the U.S. in terms of the number and tonnage of naval ships deployed in the area for at least the next ten years. In this situation, the only quick measure that can close the power gap is to augment the strength of the U.S. Seventh Fleet with the navies of Japan, the ROK and the ROC. Japanese maritime self-defense forces maintains 207,000 tons of modern ships (sixty-four major combatants) while the ROK and ROC navies operate 82,000 tons (twenty combatants) and 180,000 tons (thirty-five combatants) respectively. If we combine the tonnages of the four navies in the area, we would have 1,119,000 tons.

Fighting units in the North Korean navy (67,000 tons) mainly consist of small coastal gunboats (except for nineteen diesel-powered submarines), and its SLOC interdiction capability is limited only to the coast of the Korean peninsula. But, the navy of the PRC (561,000 tons) could play an important role in the interdiction of SLOCs. If the United States can retain friendly relations with her, we may assume that, at least, it will not threaten the SLOCs linking the U.S. to its allies. Table 4 shows the sizes of the Northeast Asian navies in terms of numbers of the major combatants and the aggregate tonnage of the ships.

From these simple statistics we may conclude that if we work out an international cooperative system among the U.S., Japan, the ROK, and the ROC, we can marshal a minimum of SLOC defense

Table 4. Major Combatants of the NEA Navies

	As of 1981							
	US*	JAP	ROK	ROC	Comb.	USR	PRC	N.K.
Submarine/N	26	0	0	0	26	55	2	0
Submarine/D	9	14	0	2	25	45	103	19
Carrier	6	0	0	0	6	1	0	0
Cruiser	14	0	0	0	14	9	0	0
Destroyer	39	34	10	22	105	28	15	0
Frigates	33	16	10	11	70	38	26	4
Total	127	64	20	35	246	176	146	23
Total tonnage x 10 ⁴ ton	65.0	20.7	8.2	18.0	111.9	158	56.1	6.7

* Ships deployed in the Pacific only.

Source: *Military Balance 1981-1982*, The Organization of The Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S., *United States Military Posture For FY 1983*, and *Defense of Japan, 1981 (Japanese edition)*.

force of 246 major combatants against the 176 ships of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, (1,119,000 tons versus 1,580,000 tons). Figure 3 illustrates the relative size of the navies of the North-East Asian nations.

Now let us think of ways to share the burdens of SLOC defense among the four navies.

Division of SLOC Defense Zones

One simple way to share this task is to divide defense zones among the four. For the past few years, the U.S. and Japan have talked of dividing SLOC defense zones between them. In September 1982, both agreed to start "joint research" on the plan.¹¹ Though the details are not available, it seems that Japan will take over primary responsibility to defend SLOCs within 1,000 nautical




Figure 3.
Relative Sizes of Navies in North-East Asia

miles of her land territory which includes the sea lanes between Japan and Guam, Japan and north of the Philippines, and the triangular sea surrounded by these two lines and the twentieth parallel. In this plan, the U.S. is to defend the Southeast Asian and Indian Ocean SLOCs.

Earlier this year, the U.S. Government urged Japan to strengthen her F-15 squadrons, add 125 more patrol planes (including P3Cs), acquire seventy more frigates, and twenty-four more submarines. The U.S. recommended that Japan increase her defense expenditures by fifteen percent per year for the next five years to finance the additional cost of the new responsibility.¹²

The U.S.-Japan agreement for bilateral division of the SLOC defense zones will enhance security of the NEASLOC for the American allies, but it will also arouse suspicion and fears among the Asian neighbors, since all of them have had the bitter experience of having been victimized by a militarily strong Japan. To avoid suspicion and political tension among the U.S.'s friends in Asia, the plan should be expanded into a multilateral burden sharing system. For example, the U.S. and Japan could help strengthen the navies of the ROK and ROC so that they are able to take responsibility for SLOC defense in the area surrounding their own territories. A balanced increase of naval power among Japan's Asian neighbors will diminish unnecessary mutual suspicion.

Functional Division of SLOC Defense

An alternative way to enhance the security of the NEASLOC by joint effort is to share the burden functionally. To defend common SLOCs among the concerned nations, we can establish a joint Northeast Asian SLOC Defense Allied Forces (NEASLOC/DAF) in which each member nation can dispatch special units to a joint force. For instance, one nation may provide air cover, while another will provide submarine escort. And all the member nations

11. The *Dong-A Ilbo*, editorial from September 4, 1982.

12. The *Chosun Ilbo*, February 25, 1982.

would open their naval and air bases for the joint task forces.

There would be many difficulties in operating such a joint task force, but it is a good way to reduce mutual suspicion among the concerned nations.

Declaration of Free SLOC

It is of paramount necessity to keep the NEASLOC open to the nations in the region. Complicated political interrelations among the regional states urge us to consider a legal arrangement for an open NEASLOC system, i.e., a system to keep the NEASLOC free from dominance by any one nation. In other words, the Northeast Asian Sea Lanes should be declared free sea lanes.

According to the *Draft Convention on The Law of The Sea* (Section 3, Articles 17-32), all ships, merchant vessels and warships are entitled to have the right of innocent passage through territorial waters. We should suggest the designation of several specified sets of free sea lanes within territorial seas and on the high seas. The rules for innocent passage should apply to whole stretches of the lanes. In other words, we could jointly declare that on the specially designated sea lanes, military actions which may threaten innocent passage should be prohibited. To enforce the rules, we would reserve the right to use the NEASLOC/DAF forces.

This kind of free SLOC arrangement will not violate the spirit of the freedom of the high seas as designated by Articles 87, 88, and 89 of the Draft Convention. It does not conflict with the provisions of Article 95 since such an arrangement would partially restrict immunity of warships on the high seas.¹³ Considering, however, the vital needs for free SLOCs for the nations in Northeast Asia, we have to overrule some of the universal rules and to work out an exceptional arrangement like this.

13. Article 95: "Warships on the high seas have complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any State other than the flag State."

Summary and Conclusion

The main points of my argument can be summarized as follows:

First, the Northeast Asian nations, especially Japan, the ROK and the ROC see keeping the SLOCs to outside friends secure is vital to their survival.

Second, as the United States loses dominant control of Northeast Asian seas, the vital sea lanes are falling under a potential threat by the steadily growing Soviet navy.

Third, despite renewed efforts by the U.S. to strengthen her naval capability, the security of Northeast Asian sea lanes can not be guaranteed by the U.S. alone. There are clear limits to the U.S. capability to employ the necessary defense, deterrence, and denial measures to secure the sea lanes, and, therefore, we have to think of sharing the burden among the concerned nations.

Fourth, bilateral division of SLOC defense zones between the U.S. and Japan will produce a new dimension of conflict among neighboring Asian nations because unilateral Japanese naval rearmament will arouse suspicion and fear. Multinational cooperation based on functional division of duties is a better alternative.

Fifth, a free SLOC system protected by sufficient force should be considered as a long-term solution to the NEASLOC problem.

Preventing wars is far better than winning them, and therefore, preparing for the anticipated disasters in advance is far more desirable than waiting for them to happen. The SLOC issue contains many conflict-provoking elements which may lead us to war. For all of us, friends and foes alike, a wise solution of the SLOC issue will be beneficial.

We are worried about the use of force by our potential adversary against our sea lanes, and are talking about how to avoid a collision of forces. But we have to recognize the historical fact that peace can be obtained only when the peace seeker has stronger power than the potential peace breaker. If we really wish to maintain peace, then we have to consider seriously ways of making

ourselves stronger. And let us remember that the sea has two distinct roles for us: it divides friends when they are weak, but it serves as a convenient link among scattered allies when they command it. Let us recover our control over the sea and keep an effective alliance relationship among us.

Discussion of Dr. Sang-Woo Rhee's Speech "Urgency and Potency of Protecting Slocs in East Asia: A Prescriptive Analysis"

First discussant: Admiral B.M. Streat, U.S.A.

There are three basic measures to consider: defense, deterrence and denial. The last of which is alternate routing and attrition which is extremely expensive when shipping critical war materials.

In the past, much shipping was lost before an effective defense was developed. As to naval air forces to protect SLOCs, there is a tendency to count all naval forces as available for SLOC protection. There are generally two kinds of combat naval forces, not all of which can be effectively and efficiently used for the purpose we are considering.

The fast attack forces, which include our large aircraft carriers, the major part of our forces, would not and could not be used to directly protect the SLOCs. These forces operate in the forward areas or even behind enemy lines. They launch hit-and-run missions against enemy bases, aircraft and warships. In this way, these forces provide deterrence, or indirect protection for the SLOCs.

Dr. Rhee correctly analyses the effectiveness of these attack forces or deterrent forces as being dependent upon the will to use them and the belief on the part of the enemy that we will use them if necessary. Destroyers, patrol, and escort aircraft, are the only forces available to directly protect the SLOCs.

There are preparatory actions to enhance the safety of convoy

shipping; Dr. Rhee took notice of several of them. In World War II, much shipping was lost because of the incompetence of merchant marine skippers who could not or would not keep in formation or even near other ships. The qualifications of merchant ship officers are a safety factor. The speed of shipping is an important factor also. Since World War II, we have been building twenty knot ships. There should not be any eight to ten knot ships participating in a convoy. This was costly in World War II, but that was all we had.

Critical war materials are so important that every country should have a minimum stockpile capable of lasting the first several months of a war. Then is the time when it is most difficult and dangerous for shipping.

In the event of a need for protection of SLOCs, it is conceivable that the defense, deterrence, and denial, or attrition measures would be used simultaneously in an attempt to keep the sea lanes open. Many ships were lost during World War II in the Atlantic until we gained experience on how to protect shipping. Even then, the losses were great.

As for interdiction of shipping or routes, the Navy has always been most conscious of choke points and has repeatedly tested these points to make sure unfriendly forces were not restricting their international use. The U.S. Navy ten years ago, while a planning round-the-world trip by U.S. Navy ships, started to receive unfriendly noises from Indonesia. Our Chief of Naval Operations held that if the ships did not pass through the Malacca Straits, the trip was not worth the effort. The new and larger territorial water limits of the new Law of the Sea makes choke points more important because there are now less high seas areas. This is important to all countries because it tends to restrict navigation.

The U.S. has for years insisted upon the three-mile limit for territorial waters, but went along with the twelve mile limit as desired by other coastal countries. While the navigational aspects of the Law of the Sea Treaty could be accepted, other aspects concerning the mineral development of the sea beds could not. Even those who believed the U.S. should have signed the Law of the Sea

Treaty agreed the Treaty was mired in complexity and was fatally flawed. They believe the U.S. could have signed then held further negotiations to rid the Treaty of unacceptable regulations, restrictions and dangerous precedents which would make for prohibitive costs and risks to the miner.

In reading the paper made available on this subject by Korea, I have the impression that the navigational and marine life aspects were more important to the national interests of Korea than seabed development.

Protection of the SLOCs will require cooperation and unselfish contributions by all allied nations in the Pacific area. Dr. Rhee's paper emphasizes the need for action.

Second discussant:
Admiral Ito, Japan

Dr. Rhee stated in his paper that the traditional idea of blocking the Soviet Pacific Fleet in the Sea of Japan and the Sea of Okhotsk has become obsolete. I believe, however, that both at present and in the near future, the blockade of the Soya, Tsushima and Tsugaru Straits is, and will be, essential to maintaining SLOC security in the western Pacific area. The following points need remembering.

Soviet vessels from the Petropavlovsk base can enter the Pacific without passing through the above-mentioned choke points. That base, however, is an isolated island for which providing logistic support is difficult. It cannot be supplied by railroad or truck, but only by ships originating in Vladivostok and other eastern Soviet ports. Because much shipping to Petropavlovsk must pass through the Soya or Tsushima Straits, a blockade of these choke points would prove effective in weakening the Soviet's war-sustaining capability. Such a blockade would contribute significantly to the security of SLOCs in the western Pacific. However, the neutralization of coastal Soviet bases such as Vladivostok would be difficult, so the need for s

strait blockade remains.

Another reason for a strait blockade is that Soviet use of the Northern Sea routes, through which they could bypass the choke points, is impossible during the winter. A vessel can, however, pass through the Soya Strait in the winter with the aid of an icebreaker as I have seen many times particularly just before the beginning of winter.

Dr. Rhee mentioned that if we increase the number of our merchant ships, diversify our sea lanes, and improve the ability of our ships to sustain war damage, we can prevent the Soviets from cutting off our shipping. The Soviets may be able to inflict serious damage, but we would still have enough ships and open sea lanes to supply ourselves. This approach to the SLOC defense problem has both positive and negative aspects. One unavoidable problem would be the psychological pressure on merchant crews. Should some of our merchant ships actually be sunk, crews might refuse to leave port without a military escort. If it proved impossible to provide such an escort, our shipping could be severely hampered or even come to a complete halt. In such a case, our efforts to ensure a minimum level of shipping activity through the expansion of our fleet would come to naught.

Finally, we must consider the cost of the proposal. The shipping companies of the Free World are not likely to agree to such a policy without substantial government financial support.

Dr. Rhee rightly pointed out that the division of SLOC defense zones along national lines would produce a new dimension of conflict among Asian nations. He has accordingly suggested that division of duties by function is a more feasible alternative. Needless to say, multinational cooperation in such a program would be essential.

From a military point of view, however, it would be either difficult or impossible to establish such a combined force in the region. Although this concept has long been discussed by navies in the area, the plan is impossible to realize for political reasons. I believe, however, that if Japan and the United States jointly conducted various anti-submarine warfare operations in the western Pacific region, the threat to the SLOCs would be substantially reduced.

I wish to point out that Japan's Self-Defense Agency is in many

respects quite a different organization than the old Imperial Army and Navy. I believe that if in the future Japan becomes slightly stronger militarily, it will not lead to a situation which would inspire fear in our Asian neighbors.

Third Discussant:

Dr. Yu-ming Shaw, ROC

I'm very impressed by Dr. Rhee's emphasis on deterrence as a way to prevent communist aggression in the SLOCs. Sufficient preventive measures coupled with a demonstrated willingness to retaliate can surely maintain the security of the SLOCs. As he said, we must give potential aggressors a very clear message that if they attack a certain place, they are certain to suffer a counterattack. I believe that a Korean scholar makes these suggestions because of the tragic experience of the Korean people in 1950. This calls to mind the ludicrous proposal of the Carter administration, at least at one time, to withdraw U.S. troops from South Korea. This would surely lead to a second Korean War for it would send the wrong signals to the North Korea.

The United States must seriously consider the danger of sending wrong signals to Communist countries before making any major moves or decisions. I therefore endorse Dr. Rhee's proposal that we make certain that Communist nations clearly understand the adverse consequences of aggressive action.

Dr. Rhee's suggestion that the ROC, the ROK, Japan and the U.S. increase their military resiliency by increasing the number of ships in their combined merchant fleets is an interesting one. The tactic, however, of allowing two-thirds or even three-quarters of our merchant ships to be damaged or destroyed by Communist powers is, of course, very costly.

The United States has fought three major wars in Asia over the last forty years. If the U.S. had given Japan the correct signals in

1938 or 1939, the attack on Pearl Harbor might well have been prevented. Before the Japanese moved their troops into Indochina in 1941, they were uncertain about the relative strength of America's commitments to China and of Britain's to Asia.

I think that U.S. decisions in the late 1940s regarding the Chinese Civil War led to the downfall of Chiang Kai-shek's government. I'm not suggesting that had the U.S. given more support to Chiang's government that Nationalist China would have been saved, but only that U.S. decisions and policies at that time did not help the situation. It is also fairly certain that if the U.S. had sent the correct signals to the North Koreans from 1948 to 1950, the Korean War could have been avoided.

The third and most recent war the U.S. fought in Asia was the Vietnam War. Over the last forty years, in spite of a "Europe first" policy, the U.S. wars in Asia have it cost more lives and have lasted longer than any in Europe. The psychological impact on America of the Vietnam War has been very serious and, perhaps, still lingers today. As Professors Gregor and Luttwak clearly pointed out, if a war were to break out in Asia, we are not certain that the United States would defend Asia, irrespective of all the various statements, promises and treaties. As further evidence of the U.S.'s Europe-oriented policies, the U.S. currently has stationed in Europe hundreds of thousands of soldiers, yet questions the wisdom of keeping troops in South Korea.

Unless the United States drastically alters its one-sided, Europe-centered policy and it adopts a balanced policy toward both Asia and Europe, then our efforts here today to devise ways to maintain SLOC security in the Indian and Pacific Oceans are meaningless and futile. We can offer impressive arguments, publish books, organize pressure groups and try to educate congressmen in Washington, but unless the United States, its government and its people develop a genuine awareness that the U.S. is both an Atlantic and a Pacific nation, and that America's future is anchored in the Pacific region, then our discussions here will produce no meaningful results.

As an historian, I tend to be pessimistic. Nevertheless, I would like to re-emphasize Professor Gregor's statement that unless we

help U.S. Congressmen to develop a real awareness of the situation, the importance of the Pacific area to the future will not be fully understood.

With regard to the suggestion that a Northeast Asian SLOC Joint defense force be set up, I cannot comment on the technical military aspects of this proposal. I do want to point out, however, that two of the four powers to be involved in this force—Japan and the United States—do not have diplomatic relations with the Republic of China, and that such an arrangement would certainly be objected to by the PRC.

It is understandable that the United States and Japan de-recognized the Republic of China. Yet if we are really serious about a co-operative security plan participated in by Taiwan, then it will be necessary to help Taiwan regain its international status. I'm not talking about diplomatic recognition because that is over with, but unless Taiwan can achieve an international status that enables it to enter into agreements or treaties with other nations in a SLOC defense force, it cannot participate. The PRC's relentless pressure on the United States and Japan would prevent ROC participation in a serious joint defense effort in the absence of some elevation of the ROC's international position.

Some friends of mine are talking about establishing a Asian-Pacific economic community, though we all know the difficulties involved in that. Japan would have to take the lead in such an organization. But, unless we can first iron out our economic differences, then the idea of a joint defense effort is not realistic.

Dr. Rhee reminded us that when discussing the SLOC problem we must bear in mind the potential for disruption by the PRC navy. At the moment, of course, there is no reason for the PRC to disrupt the sea lanes, though the very existence of the ROC may in future trigger hostilities in the area. The PRC would not take military action to irritate Japan or the United States, but would to destroy the ROC.

Yesterday Admiral Ko gave a very good argument for the futility of a PRC effort to blockade Taiwan and its sea lanes. I agree with Admiral Ko that a blockade, or any kind of hostile act in the Taiwan

Strait, is not going to damage Taiwan seriously. However, such hostilities could cause psychological damage. If, for example, the PRC sank one or two ROC ships, the psychological impact on Taiwan could be major. It is essential to maintain the overall security of Taiwan because any hostilities in the Taiwan Strait will surely disrupt the local sea lanes.

I'm not trying to present a case for the U.S. to sell more weapons to the ROC but it is crucial for America to maintain cooperative efforts in the region for the safety of the SLOCs. The ROC's defense needs should be a concern for each of the four powers represented here.

Lastly, I suggest that we establish a committee with representatives from each of country involved to work on future measures to promote SLOC security. If we hope to convince political leaders in our respective nations of the importance of the SLOC problem, it is important that we produce studies that are truly serious, scholarly and thoughtful. Only in this way that can we influence U.S. foreign policy such that it becomes balanced between Europe and Asia.

The Soviet Pacific Fleet

Tun-hwa Ko

The information contained in this paper is not based on the official sources of any organization. Most data comes from books, newspapers, magazines, and even from television. The facts herein are not necessarily accurate because we are talking about a specific fleet whose ships and aircraft, like those of other navies, are mobile and rotating. The data serves only to give a general picture of the Soviet Pacific Fleet.

As to the purposes of certain unique designs in their ship construction, and as to the missions of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, there are presented here only some plausible guesses based on the assumption that our adversaries have roughly similar goals and tend to choose similar means. The designation of various types of ships is a bit confusing, not only due to the difference in languages. The system of categories of fighting ships is far from universal, and is confusing even among the English-speaking navies. A British "frigate" is not a frigate in the U.S. Navy. The Soviets seem to categorize their ships by function first, and then by size. They have both ASW ships: large anti-submarine warfare ships known as (BPK) and small ASW ships. For the sake of convenience, traditional Western designations are used whenever possible in this paper.

Organization of the Soviet Armed Forces

Before we give a brief description of the organization of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, it might be proper to discuss first the Soviet Command Structure.

Soviet Supreme High Command

Immediate control of Soviet land, sea and air forces is exercised by the Minister of Defense. Within the Soviet government, the

Minister of Defense is a member of the Council of Ministers. He is appointed by and technically answerable to the Supreme Soviet, though in practice he is responsible to the Control Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and its Politburo Marshal of the Soviet Union Ustinov, the current Minister of Defense, is a member of the Politburo. On top is the General Secretary Brezhnev, who, with his key colleagues, have been at the center of power for decades.

At the apex of the Soviet wartime strategic command structure is the State Defense Committee or GKO. Soviet Supreme High Command (VGK) is under the guidance of the GKO.

Underneath the Minister of Defense are the Commanders-in-Chief of each of the five services, namely the Ground Forces, Naval Forces, Air Forces, Strategic Rocket Forces and the Air Defense.

The framework of Soviet Command Structure is intended to accommodate centralized strategic planning with decentralized battle management.

Organization of the Soviet Navy

The Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy is Adm. S.G. Gorshkov, who has held the office since 1956. He is also the Deputy Minister of Defense and holds the rank of Admiral of the Fleet S.U. The Naval Forces afloat are divided into Pacific Fleet, and the Caspian Flotilla. The Northern Fleet, the Black Sea Fleet, the Baltic Sea Fleet.

The Pacific Fleet has 720 ships of various types plus 420 aircraft. Next to the Northern Fleet, it is the largest Soviet fleet. The Northern Fleet is the largest and in many respects the most important fleet. It has most of the navy's strategic missiles, nuclear-propelled submarines, a large number of ocean-going surface warships and a strong naval air arm.

The headquarters for the Northern Fleet is in Murmansk. H. Q. for the Baltic Fleet is in Kaliningrad, and the Black Sea Fleet is based in Sevastopol. The Black Sea Naval Air Force is large and includes a number of Badgers and other attack aircraft which, flying from bases in the Crimea and the Balkans, carry out missions in the

eastern Mediterranean. Black Sea Fleet aircraft also fly over Afghanistan and Iran and support naval operations in the Indian Ocean. Forward bases in Libya, Syria, Iraq, South Yemen (Aden) and Somalia are sometimes used by Black Sea Fleet naval aircraft.

Headquarters for the Pacific Fleet is in Vladivostok, the principle Soviet port on the Pacific and the southeastern terminal of the Trans-Siberian railroad. Among the other naval ports on the Pacific is Petropavlovsk on the frigid Kamchatka Peninsula which has special significance with respect to naval operations. "Petro" is the main base for Pacific Fleet submarines, and can gain access from there to the open ocean without passing through the three Japanese Straits where such access to ships from Vladivostok could be blocked.

The naval forces in the Pacific are organized into two major sections: The northern group, or the Seventh Fleet, and the southern group, or the Fifth Fleet. The northern group is based mainly at Petrovalovsk, while the southern group at Vladivostok off the Sea of Japan.

Current Order of Battle of the Soviet Pacific Fleet

The approximate figures for the current order of battle of the Pacific Fleet is as follows:

Type	Pacific Fleet	Percentage of the Soviet Navy
Submarines		
Ballistic Missile (Nuclear)	25	40%
Ballistic Missile (Diesel)	9	
Guided Missile (Nuclear)	14	30%
Guided Missile (Diesel)	8	
Torpedo Attack (Nuclear)	11	30%
Torpedo Attack (Diesel)	46	
Subtotal	113	
VTOL A/C Carrier		
Guided Missile Cruiser	6	25%
Gun Cruisers	3	30%
Guided Missile Destroyers	10	30%

Gun Destroyers	16	30%
Escort Ships	27	25%
Minor Guided Missile Combatants	48	35%
Patrol Craft	144	30%
Amphibious Ships	20	25%
Mine Warfare Craft	70	
Auxiliaries	112	

The Pacific Fleet is increasing in importance, Right after the WWII, its number of ships were as follows:

The Soviet Pacific Fleet in 1945-46

Cruisers	2
Destroyers	11
Submarines	17

Over the years, the increase has been tremendous. The closing of the Suez Canal during the 1967 Middle East War led to the Pacific Fleet assuming full responsibility for deploying ships into Indian Ocean. The re-opening of the canal in 1975 has not significantly altered that situation, possibly because, in the event of renewed hostilities, the waterway would be vulnerable to Israeli attack. Another factor determining the tasks of the Pacific Fleet is Soviet competition with Red China for influence in North Korea, Vietnam and even Japan. The Soviets must now perceive something important at stake in the Pacific Basin. It has not been given such status since the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905.

The Soviet Pacific Fleet has to look after a coastline of 6,075 nautical miles, as compared to the 1,150 nautical-mile U.S. Pacific coastline.

Ships and Aircraft of the Soviet Pacific Fleet

Submarines

Typhoon, SSNB (Possible deployment in time)

Delta III Class, SSNB
Yankee Class, SSNB
Hotel III, II Class, SSNB
Golf I, II, III Class, SSNB
Echo II, Class SSNG
Victor Class SSN
Alfa Class SSN
November Class SSN
Tango Class SS

A/C Carrier

Minsk ASW Carrier

Surface Combatants

Guided Missile Cruiser CAG
Sverdlor Gun Cruisers CG
Udaloy DDG
Major Soviet vessels spotted around Japan

Air Craft

Backfire
Badger, TU-16 long range attack and reconnaissance A/C
Bear TU-20, ASW
Hormone, Helicopter

Personnel and Training

In the Soviet Pacific Fleet there are about 130,000 sailors and officers, which is about one-quarter of total Soviet naval personnel. 60,000 persons are serving on board vessels, while 12,000 are in the Soviet Naval Air Forces.

It had been said before that the Russians were land animals. This is not true, but has been widely believed due to the fact that Russia has historically been landlocked.

The Soviet Union today has as good a seafaring people as any maritime nation, if not better. The Soviet Navy today has approximately 450,000 uniformed personnel and almost 200,000 in the

Naval Infantry (Marine Corps). All male Soviet citizens are subject to a Universal Military Training (U.M.T.) program. Recruits are called up at the age of 18, but as the number of men ready for service is greater than the number needed, there are deferments for higher education, family economic reasons, and occupations that are important to the state. The basic service requirement is two years plus a period in the reserves, but naval personnel have to serve three years.

In the USSR there are various pre-service para-military activities for young school boys and girls to make them better prepared to enter the services. These are conducted by the Komsomol (Communist Youth League) and DOSSAF (Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Army, Navy and Air Forces).

After being called up by the Navy, recruits usually go through six months of basis training, and then go to sea for two and a half years. A portion of them after serving the first term may be retained and further trained as "michman", which is the equivalent of warrant officer. These sailors have distinctive uniforms, use a separate mess and get higher pay. This rank was founded in 1972 because a better-trained "backbone" of specialized workers was needed. Soviet naval officers are well educated and trained. Many of them begin their naval careers as early as seven years old in one of the four Nahimov secondary schools. The boys there receive academic, political, and military training until they reach the age of seventeen, and then join graduates of other secondary schools and enlisted men at one of eleven naval academies—referred to as "high naval schools".

For the Pacific Fleet, there is S.O. Makarov Pacific Ocean High Naval School in Vladivostok, which provides a five-year course of instruction. Their graduates are normally commissioned as junior lieutenants. The officer corps of the Soviet Pacific Fleet are as professional, dedicated, and physically fit as those of other maritime nations. In many aspects, they are very well educated.

Missions

I. Strategic Nuclear Strike:

This mission entails the use or threatened use of SLBMs against targets in the Pacific region and land targets in the U.S.A. Delta Class SSNB Submarines patrol USSR home waters and can still reach targets on the U.S. West coast. In time, Typhoon Class SSBN submarines will be deployed within the Pacific Fleet. To carry out a strike on the U.S., some SSBN will have to be deployed in the open Pacific, while the rest may initially stay in home waters for safety, and at a suitable moment break through the choke points.

II. Anti-submarine Warfare:

The Soviet Union must have perceived that the greatest threat from U.S. naval forces comes from U.S. submarines, especially after the U.S. Trident Class became operational. Soviet Pacific Fleet exercises have markedly increased the emphasis on open-ocean anti-submarine warfare, approximately thirty major surface combatants are designated as ASW ships. Of its fifty-seven attack submarines, at least half could be suitable for long-distance ASW. In the Pacific, the Soviet Fleet will have to counter the U.S. submarines at a long distance; Polaris Class submarines are capable of launching an attack from 2500 nautical miles away and the Trident from 4000 nautical miles away. U.S. SSNB do not have to approach closer than 1500 nautical miles from Soviet Far Eastern home land. The Soviet ASW forces naturally have to be supplemented by naval aviation and LRAF. For detection, be it of surface ships or submarines, satellites are being used.

III. Anti-Carrier warfare Missions:

The constant presence of U.S. aircraft carriers in the Pacific is a source of much concern to the Soviets. Carrier strike forces are the main element of U.S. surface naval power in the Pacific. Without the support of aircraft carriers, U.S. surface ships would be highly vulnerable to destruction. Most Soviet ships are armed with anti-ship cruise missiles. They keep constant watch on U.S. carriers, and would try to strike at them at the outset of a war. The ACW Operations would be augmented by air attacks. Backfire bombers are also armed with long

distance air-to-surface cruise missiles which can be launched before reaching to the radar range of the carrier strike forces. Submarines with long-distance cruise missiles can also be employed in ACW missions.

IV. Sea Control

War, in a sense, can be said to be a matter of logistics. The shooting part is only the outcome of what has already been decided by other factors, of which logistics carries the most weight.

A nation needs a supply of resources; an army needs supplies to sustain combat. Sea lanes are still the most important means of transportation. To be able to use the sea, and to deny the use of it to the enemy, are still fundamental in warfare. Therefore, the sea control concept remains meaningful in naval operations.

The Soviet Pacific Fleet has its main submarine base in Petropavlosk on the Kamchatka Peninsula where there is no land route connection to the western USSR. The protection of the sea lanes has special importance for the Soviet Union in Siberia. Sea control is also important to support Soviet submarine operations, to counter enemy amphibious operations and to create a favorable operational environment in order to increase the probability of success for a certain campaign.

V. Interdiction of SLOC

The next war may not necessarily be a very quick one. There still exists a variety of ways to wage war. Interdiction of enemy SLOCs remains an integral part of the Soviet Navy's overriding goal to undermine its enemy's potential for waging war, and to destroy its economic strength.

The naval forces assigned to other missions can also be employed for interdicting enemy SLOCs.

VI. Amphibious Warfare Missions

The Soviet Pacific Fleet has only about twenty amphibious ships. Their mission can be reinforced by air-borne troops, air cushion ships, helicopters and a huge number of merchant ships. A quick assault, such as against Hokkaido, or other

choke points in the Japanese Straits, might be needed to secure passages for its own fleet to reach the open Pacific. U.S. amphibious operations as during the Korean Campaign can not be forgotten by the USSR, not to mention the huge Anglo-American amphibious operations that brought the surrenders of both Germany and Japan.

VII. Peace time Instrument of Foreign Policy

This is a mission that the Soviet Pacific Fleet has been performing in recent years. The Soviet Union has learned from the former major maritime powers how to gain influence over smaller nations, win, maintain, or actively support friends, and deter or reverse actions detrimental to Soviet interests.

Deployment

Even though the Pacific Fleet has a great number of ships and aircraft, only about ten percent of its major combatants are normally deployed in "outside" areas in the Northwestern Pacific Ocean. Before 1968, its activities were very limited, and the fleet confined itself to home waters until its first fleet visit to the Indian ocean when eight littoral Indian ocean countries were visited in a period of four months. In that year a total of 1,200 ship-days was recorded in the Indian ocean, and 800 ships-days in the Pacific. It has gradually increased to a record of 5,800 ship-days in the Pacific, and 6,200 in the Indian Ocean. On a typical day in 1976, one might find there were only two major Soviet combatants in the Pacific, and about seven in the Indian Ocean. The reasons for them to send more ships to the Indian ocean than to the Pacific may be to prevent Red Chinese influence in that area, and also because of the importance of the oil in the Persian Gulf. Critical strategic resources from the southern part of Africa and the mineral and oil riches in Indonesia have brought the Soviets' attention.

Ships of a fleet do not maintain a rigid command structure. They can be rotated for the sake of letting their crews get more experience in different maritime environments. Even in the U.S. Navy, a destroyer in the Atlantic Fleet, for example, may get its post-overhaul training and shake-down in the Northfort area, then

sail to the Mediterranean Sea to join the U.S. Sixth Fleet there. Within its schedule of employment, it may be ordered to pass through the Suez Canal and the Red Sea to enter the Indian ocean. During the Vietnam war, she may have gone to the South China Sea for duty, and after that sail to Hongkong for leave. On the way to Japan, she may be assigned to patrol duties. This destroyer may end up in the West Coast of America before the end of its employment cycle, which might be something like 21 months.

Soviet ships do not have the same employment schedule, but they do redeploy ships among the fleets. This might be due to the fact that there are more ships built in Europe than in the Far East. Warships from the Pacific Fleet sailing to the Indian ocean may be met by Northern Fleet and Baltic Sea Fleet ships. From 1968 to 1975, redeployment among fleets become a recurrent feature of Soviet naval activities. During this period twenty-one ships and four submarines sailed around the Cape of Good Hope and then on to the Pacific. Only five surface ships and two submarines returned to their original command. During the Korean War in 1950, the Soviet Pacific Fleet showed little response, even though they had a massive number of submarines in Vladivostok. But in 1968 after the North Korean seizure of the Pueblo, a task force of sixteen Soviet ships interposed between the North Korean coast and the U.S. task force. In 1969, there was a large force operating in the Sea of Japan. In April 1970, as a part of world-wide Soviet fleet operations, there were exercises of twenty surface ships and twelve submarines plus air defense exercises in the Pacific.

In 1970, during *Okean I*, one Soviet task force was operating east of the Philippines. Near Vladivostok there was an amphibious exercise. In 1971, a task force of seven ships, one CCG, two DD, two SS, one SSN and one AG, was operating east of Hawaii for five days. A few months later during the Indo-Pakistani War, the Soviet Navy approached the theater of conflict. When the U.S. navy mined North Vietnam's Haiphong harbor in 1972, the Soviets reacted by stationing naval ships nearby. In April 1974, when the USS Midway sailed into the Sea of Japan, four Soviet task forces showed up 250 miles east of Shanghai, in the north Pacific, 300 miles east of

Japan, and near the Tsushima Strait to carry out exercises and the interdiction of SLOCs east of Japan.

In 1979, as soon as the PRC invaded Vietnam, a Soviet naval task force placed itself between the Vietnamese coast and the Red Chinese Fleet. The purpose was to protect Vietnam's land flank, and to prevent the Red Chinese from launching an amphibious landing behind the front. If Chinese had done that, it would be a copy of General McArthur's landing on the Korean coast; the Vietnamese troops would have been trapped.

CONCLUSION

For brevity's sake, the previous sections give only a brief account of the Soviet Pacific Fleet. It did not describe the bases, repair and building facilities, communications, and all other logistic support. It did not mention the Soviet fishing ships, surveillance ships, and most importantly, the merchant marines. The Navy does not exist alone, but rather must cooperate with the other forces. It needs support from and communications with the interior, in this case, Siberia.

Siberia is no longer unindustrialized. Siberia accounts for less than 11 percent of the Soviet Union's population, and right now only 10 percent of her economic output, but it has received a quarter of all capital investment in the USSR in recent years. The economic potential of the region is immense, since it contains three-quarters of the Soviet Union's mineral, fuel, and energy resources, over half of her hydroelectric resources, about half of her commercial and timber reserves and one-fifth of her cultivable land. During the remainder of this century, Siberia will become an increasingly important strategic and economic asset, and this is likely to shift Moscow's attention toward East Asia.

There are five military districts in this area, namely the Far East, Transbaikalia, Mongolia, Siberia, and Central Asia, with a centralized military command, which was set up not too long ago. This kind of unified yet independent command is something the USSR learned from the lessons of painful wars, and also from her geograph-

hical characteristics; that is, she may have to fight a two-front war.

In the event of a general armed conflict, the Soviet Pacific Fleet would certainly present a challenge to the use of the seas. As to how to meet this challenge, it is up to the countries who have participated in this meeting to study this problem collectively. May we carry on our study projects, and may we some day forge a consensus of opinion.

A Korean Perspective on the Law of the Sea a Private View

Pyong-Choon Hahm

I. Geopolitical and Resource Factors

As a peninsula, Korea is surrounded on three sides by the sea. It is also encircled by three major powers of the world: Japan, China and the Soviet Union. With China and the Soviet Union, it shares land borders, the island chain of Japan surrounds it to the east and the south. All three of these neighbors have regarded the Korean peninsula as of vital strategic value to each of them. Consequently, they have strenuously endeavored to secure predominance on the peninsula to maximize their respective strategic influence throughout the region. At the minimum, they have felt constrained to strive to prevent the other two from gaining superiority in the peninsula. The critical strategic importance of the peninsula as perceived by the three big powers may be summarized as follows.

Japan has viewed the Korean peninsula in the hands of China or Russia as a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan. Both China and Russia have regarded the peninsula under the control of Japan as a bridge over which Japanese expansionism has exploded on the continent. China's (especially, Manchuria's) security would be gravely jeopardized if Russia gained predominance in the peninsula. On the other hand, Russia's influence, if not its expansionism, would be seriously undermined if China acquired paramountcy in the peninsula. The Korea Strait is the critical bottleneck through which Soviet Siberian-based forces have to pass in order to reach the

* The views expressed in this paper are exclusively the writer's own and in no way reflect those of the Government of the Republic of Korea.

East China Sea. China's hegemony over the Korean peninsula would be strategically intolerable to Russia.

Korea has had to search for some means to break out of its encirclement in order to establish friendly relations with distant countries and to restrain its neighbor's destructive behavior, such as using the peninsula as their battlefield. Korea's principal means of reaching outward has lain with the sea. Its political independence and territorial integrity have been closely bound up with its capacity to keep its sea lines of communication open.

Korea's past has inevitably affected its perception of contemporary events and its calculation of security interests. The fact that Korea was a victim of a most brutal form of "gunboat imperialism" has built a certain predisposition into its perspective towards the appearance of foreign warships near its shores. One gunboat, displaying its deadly firepower, could bring down a Korean ruler a century ago. Passage of a foreign warship through its territorial sea or through the nearby straits, consequently, poses a very serious security problem to Korea.

Moreover, as there is only an armistice, not a full peace settlement between the Republic of Korea and North Korea, a state of war still exists technically. As North Korea's military provocations continue through the unlawful seizure of the Republic's fishing boats, the quasi-state of war adds a critical dimension to the security aspects of the Law of the Sea.

The Korean peninsula is very poorly endowed with natural resources. Only a little over one-fifth of its land is arable thus severely restricting its agricultural capacity. The Republic of Korea's land area is approximately ninety-eight thousand square kilometers, whereas the maritime area falling under its national jurisdiction on the basis of delimitation by median-line-equidistance formula is about 317 thousand square kilometers. The maritime space, every part of which can be put to a productive use, is about sixteen times larger than the arable land area. With a fairly large population, the effective management, conservation, and exploitation of living and non-living resources in the off shore areas are of critical importance. The ROK must expand its distant-water fishing, its shipping and

shipbuilding industries and it must carefully prepare with other newly-industrializing Third World countries to exploit deep seabed mineral resources in the sites reserved by the International Seabed Authority.

II. Boundary Delimitation

The Republic of Korea has adopted the median-line and equidistance formula to delimit territorial seas with opposite or adjacent countries as provided for in Article 15 of the Draft Convention. Fortunately, it faces few problems with the delimitation of the territorial sea. It is in regard to the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf that the Republic of Korea faces areas of potential disputes with neighbors. Any problem of delimitation of maritime boundaries with North Korea is being held in abeyance until an overall solution to the problem of the interrelations between the two parts of Korea is obtained.

As for the delimitation question with the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea government has expressed its readiness to engage in mutual consultations and negotiations on several occasions beginning on 16 March 1973. The PRC has so far refused to respond positively to this proposal of the ROK. With regard to the question of delimitation of the continental shelf with Japan, a joint exploration and exploitation agreement has been worked out concerning the shelf area to the south of the Republic. The ROK and Japan are justly proud of this achievement which may serve as a model for international cooperation throughout the world.

But on the question of delimitation of the exclusive economic zone, the ROK has not yet proceeded. Meanwhile Japan will not stake out its exclusive economic zone in relation to the ROK until the latter proclaims its own. The area of potential conflict in this respect is the sovereignty dispute over the island of Tokto in Sea of Japan. In view of the past record of mutual consultation and amicable negotiation between the two neighbors, however, a mutually beneficial solution could be worked out in such a way as not to affect the legal status of the island's existing territorial claims.

It appears that the only possible compromise concerning the formulae of boundary delimitation at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) is to put on equal footing both the "median or equidistance line" and the "equitable principles."¹ The effort of either side to expunge references to the opposing formula from the Draft Convention only delays adoption of the final Convention.

As for the "compulsory conciliation" procedure and the "provisional arrangements" provided for in the Draft Convention, the ROK wanted stronger obligations imposed upon all the states to consult and to negotiate even in the absence of formal recognition between the parties. The reason why is that two of the ROK's big-power neighbors, the PRC and the USSR, have obstinately refused to negotiate maritime boundary delimitations. A consequence of this big-power obstructionism is hinderance of ROK exercise of its national jurisdiction in these maritime zones. Development and utilization of its resources in these zones have been severely hampered. Tension and hostility in the region have increased, jeopardizing peace in an area of the world which contains a quarter of humanity.

III. Straits

Korea borders on two straits: the Korea (the Western Channel) and the Cheju. The former is formed between the Korean peninsula and Tsushima Island of Japan. The latter is formed between the peninsula and Cheju Island, a province of the ROK. Both straits have a width of less than twenty-four miles. The ROK has recognized the

1. The relevant wordings of Paragraph 1 of Articles 74 (the exclusive economic zone) and 83 (the continental shelf) are as follows.

The delimitation of ... shall be effected by agreement in conformity with international law. Such an agreement shall be in accordance with equitable principles, employing the median or equi-distance line, where appropriate, and taking account of all circumstances prevailing in the area concerned.

Korea Strait to be an international strait while refusing the similar status to the Cheju Strait on the ground that a high seas route or a route through an exclusive economic zone of similar convenience is available to international shipping on the seaward side of the island. The Cheju Strait is, therefore, a territorial sea (an inland sea) and subject to the provisions of the Territorial Sea Law (31 December 1977) and its Enforcement Decrees.

In the case of the Korea Strait, the ROK government has claimed² three miles of the territorial sea. This measure, by creating a high seas route has exempted the ROK from submitting to transit passage through the Korea Strait as provided for in Part III of the Draft Convention.³ In view of the quasi-war status between the ROK and North Korea, transit passage of a North Korean, Soviet, or PRC warship cannot be allowed given the security threat.

Inasmuch as both the USSR and the PRC, military allies of North Korea, refuse to recognize ROK's sovereignty the transit passage of their warships through the Korea Strait is an intolerable threat to the sovereignty of the ROK under Article 39 of the Draft Convention.⁴ As a result, once the ROK extends its territorial sea in the Korea Strait to the median or equidistance line with Japan,

2. The three-mile exception to the general rule of twelve miles of the territorial sea is provided for in the two presidential decrees, Nos. 8994, 29 April 1978, and 9162, 20 September 1978.

3. Article 36 provides:

This Part does not apply to a strait used for international navigation if a high seas route or a route through an exclusive economic zone of similar convenience with respect to navigational and hydrographical characteristics exists through the strait.

4. Article 39 provides:

1. Ships and aircraft, while exercising the right of transit passage, shall:

(b) Refrain from any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of States bordering straits, or in any other manner in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations;

it can deny transit to USSR and PRC warships in accordance with the terms of Article 39.

Soviet naval and air power has been expanding at a rapid pace in the Far East. Few warships flying the PRC flag have passed through the Korea Strait. Consequently, whatever impact is produced by the ROK government's application of Article 39 would mostly fall upon the warships and military aircraft of the Soviet Union. It should also be pointed out that it is not the strait state (in this case, the ROK) that refuses to recognize the sovereignty and political independence of the transit state the USSR. All that the strait state demands is a bare minimum of international civility: the recognition of its sovereignty and political independence by the transit state. The pain of being victimized by a neighbor's devastating "gunboat diplomacy" is still vivid in the Korean memory. What the ROK desires as a strait state is not to impede peaceful transit through the strait, but to promote peace and international amity and cooperation in the region by forestalling any threat to its sovereignty.

IV. Territorial Sea

As has been mentioned earlier a territorial sea of twelve miles in width has been declared by the ROK. The United States, as a global naval power and the ROK's most important ally, has expressed misgivings concerning the ROK decision to require prior notification in the case of innocent passage of foreign warships through its territorial sea. But here again its national history and contemporary regional power realities combined thus compelling the ROK to ask the United States to "agree to disagree" on this important issue.

Infiltration of North Korean armed guerrillas into the ROK across its long shoreline continues unabated. North Korean patrol boats frequently violate the ROK waters to seize unlawfully the latter's fishing boats. Under the tense quasi-war circumstances now prevailing on the Korean peninsula, the passage of USSR and PRC, whatever their warships claims to "innocent passage" under the current provisions of the Draft Convention, would gravely jeopardize "the peace, good order and security"⁵ of the ROK. It is out of

genuine concern for regional peace that the ROK has decided to require prior notification, it is as an effective means to prevent dangerous miscalculation and escalation of tension and hostility.

Some delegations at UNCLOS III have argued for prior authorization for passage of a foreign warship through the territorial sea. The ROK deemed such a position to be somewhat overly restrictive for the reason that the requirement of prior authorization might in practice become a source of tension and conflict rather than being an effective way to alleviate them. But, the ROK considers an intrusion of military force into the territory of another country an extremely serious matter under any circumstances. The requirement of prior notification appeared to strike a reasonable and just balance and compromise between the interests of coastal states (especially small and poor former colonies) and the interests of large naval powers.

At the UNCLOS III sessions, the major naval powers of the world have taken the position that the innocent passage regime had been a part of the "package deal," no part of which is amenable to further discussion for fear of undoing the whole package deal, the fragile product of an arduous and long process of negotiation at the preceding sessions of the conference. The opposing voices have denied the existence of such a package deal, pointing out that the issue on which a package deal had been worked out was on transit passage through international straits.

Another favorite argument of the naval powers has been that Articles 18 through 23 carefully circumscribe the right of innocent passage and therefore the rights of coastal states are fully protected without the additional safeguard of prior notification. But a warship which disdains even a minimum of international courtesy and concern for peace, that is argue notification of its proposed passage through the territorial sea of another country, is not likely to respect

5. For example, Paragraph 1 of Article 19 provides:

Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal state. Such passage shall take place in conformity with this Convention and with other rules of international law.

whatever constraints the Convention provisions might impose upon it. One could scarcely imagine a simpler, easier and more effective measure to demonstrate a warship's bona fide commitment to the security of a coastal state than the prior notification of its intended passage.

The naval powers also argue against prior notification by arguing that besides restraining freedom of navigation in case of an emergency, an accidental failure to notify the coastal nation could lead to unwarranted hostilities. But, as a practical matter, an unintentional failure is a very remote possibility, and would only demonstrate cavalier chauvinism and habitual contempt for the coastal state's sovereignty on the part of a warship. Concerning emergencies, it is precisely in a crisis that prior notification performs an essential function of preventing dangerous miscalculation and defusing tension. Although the ROK requires three-day (excluding official holidays) interval between notification and passage,⁶ in a demonstrable emergency, surely, what is crucial is prior notification itself, not how far in advance it is communicated. Whatever is reasonable and feasible under a given set of circumstances should suffice.

In this connection, it is rather curious that a naval power such as the Soviet Union, whose domestic legislation clearly requires "prior authorization," has staunchly supported the adamant refusal of the North Atlantic naval powers even to discuss the prior notification issue at the conference. It will be interesting to witness an abrupt change in the Soviet position on this issue sometime in the future, just as it did an about-face, simultaneously with the United States, on the question of the 200-mile exclusive economic zone a few years ago.

V. Shipping and Shipbuilding

The international trade volume of U.S. forty billion dollars, the import of approximately seventy-two million metric tons a year, and

6. Article 4 of the Presidential Decree No. 9162 (20 September 1978).

the export of about twenty-three million metric tons a year of manufactured goods indicate the vital importance of shipping as a life-line for the country. The ROK is the nineteenth-largest shipping nation in the world and the fourth largest in Asia. Its shipbuilding industry is expanding rapidly. As of 1978, the ROK ranked globally as the tenth largest in shipbuilding capacity, the eighth in actual tonnage built, the ninth in order backlog, and the fifth in orders currently received.

The ROK's interest as a developing shipping nation is somewhat in conflict with its interest as a new and rapidly growing shipbuilding power. Inclusion of strict provisions designed to combat vessel-source pollution in the Convention would inflict severe hardship upon its still young shipping industry, which is still largely composed of aging vessels and equipment. If these old vessels are driven out of commission by the Convention, this would effectively destroy Korea's shipping industry in view of its shortage of capital.

A European delegation at the conference has taken an extreme position by arguing for the power of each state or group of states to promulgate regulations concerning the design, construction, manning and equipment standards for the vessels entering its ports and to deny access to its ports to those vessels which fail to meet such standards. It is obvious that such a drastic measure would place an intolerable strain and impediment upon international trade and commerce. Moreover, it would all but effectively suppress the development of shipping industries among Third World countries, promoting a monopoly on world shipping by industrial powers.

On the other hand, if obsolescence of ships is enforced by the Convention, Korea's shipbuilding industry may derive some benefit from an increased demand for new ships. But the order books of Korean shipyards are already bulging with a backlog of orders, especially for new container-ships and offshore drilling rigs. Therefore, it is highly problematic that the adoption of overly strict pollution control measures in the Convention would benefit Korea's shipbuilding industry.

The security of long sea lines of communication is a matter of utmost concern for the ROK, because its survival as a nation

depends upon it. The ROK, however, has no illusions about its own naval capabilities, either at present or in the future, to safeguard its own long sea lanes by itself. There is a definite need for a multinational cooperative arrangement with those countries which share a common interest in maintaining the safety of sea lanes throughout the world. The ROC also realizes that of all the interests related to the sea, navigation is still the most valuable and primary. The ROK is fully committed to the freedom of commercial shipping throughout the world.

VI. Fishing and Conservation

The efficient management and rational conservation of living resources of the sea is a matter of critical importance to our nation which is the ninth largest fishing nation of the world. During the first half of the 1970s, the annual rate of growth in fishing was posted at six percent. But the combination of the first oil crisis and the extension of the exclusive economic zone by the Soviet Union and the United States dealt a staggering blow to the distant-water fishing of the ROK. Although it is still the third largest distant-water fishing nation of the world, it is yet to recover. Having been excluded from the nearer fishing grounds off the Kamchatka peninsula, Korean fishing boats are being forced to travel longer distances to reach the American zone, causing them to expend more fuel. In the fact of ever rising energy costs, the future hope for Korea's distant-water fishing lies in technological innovations in the area of energy efficiency.

Another difficulty confronting Korea's distant-water fishing is "creeping national jurisdiction" in the name of conservation of fishery resources. The ROK considers any further attempt to expand coastal states' jurisdiction beyond two hundred miles with regard, for example, to the so-called "straddling" stocks of fish as an unacceptable extension of the exclusive economic zone. The present formulation of Paragraph 2 of Article 63 embodies a reasonable balance between the interests of the coastal states and the fishing states and, therefore, should not be altered to expand the coastal

states' jurisdiction any further.

The ROK has concluded a number of bilateral fishery agreements in order to fish in the exclusive economic zones of other countries. In some instances, the licensing and other fees have turned out to be rather exorbitant. Joint ventures and technical assistance have also been tried with success. Fishery immigration has been agreed upon with some South America countries.

In regard to near-shore fishing, aquaculture is assuming more importance as the primary and essential factor in the conservation and utilization of living resources in the nation's sea. The preference of the Korean people for marine vegetation in their diet greatly enhances the economic potential of aquaculture. The success of cultivating prawns in neighboring Japan holds a great significance for Korea. As the protein requirement essential for normal infant brain growth is increasingly realized by Korean families, the productive management and rational utilization of the living resources of the sea have become a policy imperative for the ROK.

Therefore, the ROK is clearly in favor of marine scientific research, provided that the information gathered by the research be fully shared by all the nations of the world. Aquaculture, if it is to be successful, must base itself upon full and accurate research data. Consequently, the ROK attaches a great importance on Part XIII (Marine Scientific Research) of the Draft Convention. In addition, the ROK wishes to see Part XIV (Development and Transfer of Marine Technology) implemented in such a way as to facilitate international exchange of aquaculture technology.

VII. Dispute Settlement Mechanism

Being a small country surrounded by powerful and sometimes hostile neighbors, the ROK would have preferred a more effective mechanism for third-party settlement of international disputes than the one found in the current formulations of Part XV of the Draft Convention. The ROK is aware, however, of the ideological inflexibility among certain delegations concerning third-party settlement

of international disputes which they see as an unacceptable derogation of their national sovereignty. It serves no useful purpose here to engage in polemics on the various theories and doctrines concerning the interrelations between national sovereignty and treaties as international legislation. Suffice to say, the current formulations of Party XV may very well be the best possible compromise under the present configuration of international power dynamics.

The obligation to settle disputes by peaceful means (Article 279) and "to exchange views regarding settlement of the dispute through negotiations in good faith or other peaceful means" (Article 281) would have acquired more substance and efficacy if the articles had clearly provided that the parties involved may not avoid this obligation by using the excuses of a lack of diplomatic relations or an absence of recognition. The ROK has been confronted time and again with the refusal of two of its big-power neighbors to negotiate (on the ground that they do not recognize its sovereignty) coupled with threats of dire consequences if every one of their most high-handed demands are not met. This type of big-power chauvinism is not only inimical to international peace but also renders the elaborate Part XV provisions practically useless.

VIII. Regional and International Cooperation

The Draft Convention encourages international cooperation on a regional basis wherever possible. The ROK has strongly supported this trend because its geography alone makes regional cooperation imperative for the country. The area in which regional cooperation is both indispensable and urgent is protection of the marine environment. Measures designed to protect the marine environment can be effective only on a regional basis. Both the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan which enclose the ROK are themselves semi-enclosed seas.

Although the Sea of Japan is much more fully enclosed (95%) by land, such hydrographic features as its depth and the relatively rapid circulation of its sea water permits it to be somewhat less susceptible to irreparable or permanent pollution damage than the Yellow Sea which is only seventy-five percent enclosed. The latter is

a relatively shallow sea with a large amount of land effluent in the water which has given it its descriptive name. Both of these seas are encircled by land masses which support the world's heaviest concentration of population and industry, and the second heaviest concentration of shipping. Offshore exploration and exploitation of oil and gas are rapidly increasing in this area. Given the magnitude of fishery catches in these seas and its importance as a source of protein for the enormous population, combined with the heavy use of the seas, a major tanker catastrophe, for instance, would spell an environmental disaster with long-lasting consequences for the entire region. The overwhelming need for regional cooperation for the purpose of preventing, reducing and controlling pollution of the marine environment is quite clear.

Unfortunately, two of the ROK's big-power neighbors have so far refused to open channels of communication to discuss possible areas of cooperation. Here again, the ROK would have preferred a more emphatic provision in the Draft Convention in favor of regional cooperation among parties who do not have diplomatic relations. The physical survival of literally hundreds of millions of human beings is involved. As the same seas lap the shores of several different coastal states, every aspect of the Law of the Sea (especially protection of the marine environment) demands regional cooperation.

Another field of international cooperation in which the ROK has a serious interest is deep seabed mining. Under Part XI and Annex III (particularly Articles 8 and 9), developing states are to be given opportunities for "effective participation" in mining activities in "reserved sites." As one of the newly industrializing countries, the ROK looks forward to organizing joint ventures with other developing countries to exploit such sites. In keeping with its industrial development, its consumption demand for mineral resources is bound to increase rapidly. The ROK deems it in its interest to see the development of deep seabed resources take place as soon as possible.

IX. Concluding Observations

In the magnitude and diversity of interests involved, UNCLOS III has no historic parallel. Even the founding of the United Nations itself in 1945 did not have its number of delegations and its sheer complexity of subject matter on which a global solution is being sought. As has often been pointed out, the establishment of the United Nations did not include detailed formulations of new international legal concepts and principles or reformulations of doctrines and definitions of traditional international law. Nor did it take into account the vast expansion in the variety of national jurisdictions: territorial, administrative, economic and environmental. Many of the ideas, concepts and principles now being embodied into the Draft Convention did not even exist in 1945.

The sea, the subject matter of the Conference, is infinitely complex. Much about it remains unknown or only imperfectly understood. The laws affecting the use of its surface are in rapid flux and are dauntingly intricate. The effective conservation and rational management of living resources in the water itself require creative solutions if all mankind is to benefit. The seabeds require a separate legal system quite distinct from that which regulates the exploration and exploitation of the subsoil resources.

Abjectly dependent though he is on his earthly environment, man is above all a polluter of his environment. Since nearly most of the pollution he generates on land eventually washes into the sea, his marine environment is being assaulted from both the land and the sea. By dumping wastes from vessels and offshore installations and by exterminating various species of marine organisms, man is rapidly destroying his marine environment. To protect and preserve this fragile environment requires both intelligence and good neighborliness. Nations and governments must cooperate with one another, irrespective of ideological or political differences. Otherwise, the alternative is too dreadful to contemplate.

If the conference succeeds, it will be a monument to human intelligence and reason. If it fails, world peace would be that much less secure. The ROK has fully participated in the conference. It remains committed to the speedy and successful conclusion of the conference in the form of the Convention of the Law of the Sea.

Korean Ocean Transportation and Sea Lanes of Communication

Dalchoong Kim

Korea has two special reasons to be concerned about the emerging international maritime environment in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. First, Korea depends heavily upon the seas for trade and commerce, a dependency which grows daily. Second, Korea would depend critically upon maritime transportation for moving military supplies in case of war.

Viewed on a global scale, the basic method for moving vast quantities of raw materials and manufactured goods is by water. Water-borne transport is the most efficient and economical means of moving materials. Other transport systems, rail, truck, aircraft, and pipeline, support, augment, and complement shipment by sea. As a result, the worldwide transport system is one based primarily on shipboard carriage.

Ocean transportation plays an important role in the development of our nation's economy. For Korea which has limited land and raw materials and which has to depend on an export-oriented trade policy, the vital importance of shipping has never been doubted. As a result of a series of economic development plans during the past two decades, the Korean economy has achieved remarkable growth. The growth in the trade sector has been especially impressive. Commodity exports increased from fifty-five million U.S. dollars in 1962 to seventeen billion in 1980, an annual increase of about forty percent. Imports also expanded markedly during this same period, rising from \$390 million to twenty-two billion. The Korean Government plans to export fifty-five billion worth of commodities by 1985. Such a growth both in exports and imports has brought about a new challenge in the development of a shipping industry.

Korea is completely surrounded by sea except at its northern

border which is blocked by the armistice line. As a result, South Korea is an insular country. It is, therefore, impossible for Korea to enjoy world trade without an effective merchant marine fleet and safe sea lanes of communication.

Tonnage

The total tonnage as of March 1981 of the Korean merchant fleet amounted to 5,175 thousand gross tons (GT), which shows a startling increase over tonnage in 1961, when the figure was only 113 thousand GT. This latest tonnage figure represents a remarkable growth of 4,500 percent in just twenty years. Table 1 tracks the yearly expansion of tonnage in the oceangoing fleet over the last five years according to vessel type. It shows an almost two-fold fleet expansion since 1976. Table 2 depicts the Korean oceangoing merchant fleet expansion plan as projected by the government: six million GT by the end of 1981, twelve million GT by 1986, and twenty-one million GT by 1991. That is a more than threefold increase of tonnage during this decade of the 1980's.

Figures for 1980 indicate that there are forty-four countries which had more than one million GT of oceangoing vessels in 1980. According to Lloyd's *Register of Shipping Statistical Tables 1980*, the Korean fleet stands nineteenth in terms of tonnage, and comprises one percent of the world's gross tonnage in oceangoing vessels. As listed by *Bremen Shipping Statistics*, Korea stands twentieth and possesses one percent of world gross tonnage. Korea, excluding flag of convenience nations such as Liberia, Panama, and Singapore, stands sixteenth in the world, and fourth in Asia after Japan, the People's Republic of China, and India. Including the tonnage of hire purchase bareboat charter, which is one hundred percent under national control, the Korean fleet comprises 1.2 percent of total world tonnage.

Ports

The Korean peninsula, with its three sides surrounded by water

has a total of 12,788 kilometers of coastline dotted with about 1,800 ports of various size. Table 3 shows the major ports of Korea with their facilities and capacity. Of these ports twenty-two, including Pusan and Inchon, are open to international traffic. They were constructed by and are being operated directly by the Korea Maritime and Port Administration. Those ports open to international traffic are designated as First Class Ports. A second group of twenty-two ports has been designated as Second Class Ports. These Second Class Ports were originally constructed by the Korea Maritime and Port Administration, but the management and operation of the ports have been entrusted to local provincial governors.

The total dry cargo handling capacity of Korean ports in 1980 was eighty-two million tons, twice as much as the 1977 figure of forty-one million tons. By 1991 the cargo handling capacity should be 224 million tons, which would provide sufficient support for the \$100 billion export goal projected for the early 1990s.

The port of Pusan is well qualified to be a first-rate international commercial port both in terms of its size and the variety of cargo being handled there. The port was first opened to international trade in 1876 and since then has served as the main gateway to Korea. At the present time, one fourth of Korea's marine transport cargo is handled at this port. Moreover, the port of Pusan handles sixty percent of total export cargo and ninety percent of all container cargo in Korea.

Table 4 represents vessel entrance and clearance. In recent years the oceangoing ships that have called at Korean ports have gradually become larger. The fact that 19,000 vessels carrying 62 million GT entered and left Korean ports in 1976 in contrast to 19,000 vessels carrying 104 million GT in 1980 clearly evidences that the number of vessels has not increased while the tonnage has escalated by 59.6 percent.

Cargo

The cargo volume carried by both Korean and foreign ships has increased steadily year by year. Table 5 shows total cargo

volume in and out of Korea carried by waterborne transport and airborne transport and the respective percentages carried by each. Merchandise and raw materials imported and exported by Korea move primarily by waterborne transportation. Airborne cargo continues to represent only a minor fraction—0.2 percent—of total import-export tonnage. In 1981 the total volume of Korea's waterborne export and import cargo was estimated to be 110.9 million tons, an increase of eighteen percent since 1980.

Table 6 shows incoming cargo volume according to point of origin. Of a total of seventy-one million tons, twenty-seven million tons (37.7 percent) of cargo originated from Southeast Asia, and twenty-two million tons (30.9 percent) of cargo originated mostly from the Middle East and other regions. Table 7 shows outgoing cargo volume according to destination; 36.8 percent, 28.4 percent, and 2.17 percent of total cargo volume in 1980 went to Japan, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East respectively.

Table 8 shows Korean national flag vessels' share of ocean cartage. It reveals that the level of the home-vessel share of shipment in 1980 for incoming cargo (50.3 percent) was slightly higher than that for outgoing cargo (46.3 percent). The shipment ratio average for Korean national flag vessels reached 49.3 percent in 1980 and was expected to peak at 50.0 percent in 1981 and level off. In the case of tankers, however, sixty percent of the total crude oil was carried by Korean national flag tankers in 1980, or 15.9 million tons out a total of 26.5 million tons.

Shipping Companies

The Korean shipping industry is a private industry. As of December 1980, sixty-six shipping companies were engaged in international trade.

Freight

Merchant ships are important earners of dollars in the international transportation market. In addition to earning foreign ex-

change, they contribute to the balance-of-payment situation by keeping foreign exchange at home. Freight revenue was recorded at \$306 million in 1975. Total freight revenue in 1980 was \$1,895 million, which was more than four percent of the GNP and over ten percent of the total amount of exports in that year. Waterborne freight transport was projected to earn \$2,140 million in 1981; it is hoped that figure will reach \$five billion in 1986 and \$ten billion in 1991.

Manpower

Table 9 shows officer and crew totals for the Korean shipping industry. As of February 1981, more than twenty-one thousand Korean officers and crew members were assigned to 1,016 foreign vessels of thirty-three countries. These officers and seamen on board foreign vessels brought home earnings of over \$166 million in 1980.

Liner Services

Table 10 shows the liner trade routes of the Korean shipping industry. The Korean fleet now provides service on six liner trade routes. They are (1) the Japan route, (2) the Southeast Asia route, (3) the United States route, (4) the Europe route, (5) the Middle East route, and (6) the Australian route.

As of the end of February 1981, 129 vessels, 920,559 GT, were operational for liner service. Among them, sixty-seven percent of the vessels and sixty-two percent of the tonnage were general cargo ships, while only fourteen vessels and twenty-nine percent of the tonnage were container ships.

At present, the container liner services are not fully developed because of the lack of experience and capital. The Korean shipping industry in 1981 planned to put four more container ships into service. It planned also that more than twenty-eight full container ships will be operational on major liner routes by 1986. Table 11 and 12 show five liner routes for container services. One more container liner service route to the Middle East was added in July

1981.

Table 13 and 14 show Korea's sea lanes of communication for importing vital materials, such as crude petroleum, iron ore, potash, and coal. Table 15 and 16 show the record of crude oil imports on import trade routes.

Korean began to import crude oil through major oil suppliers for the first time in 1964. The total volume imported that year was about six million barrels. In 1980 Korea imported about 180 million barrels, an increase of 3,000 percent since 1964, which represents annual increases of twenty-five percent. The value of imported crude oil comprised only three percent of the total value of all imported products in 1964, but in 1980 it comprised about twenty-seven percent. The major crude oil suppliers to Korea are Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iran. These three countries supply 96.3 percent of the total volume of oil imports. Korea began to diversify crude oil purchases in 1979 by importing ten thousand barrels per day from Indonesia. Since 1981, Korea has imported five thousand barrels per day from Ecuador and Venezuela each. Malaysia has been supplying five thousand barrels per day since May 1981.

There is every indication that Korea will increase its involvement in commercial maritime activities in the future. Korea, therefore, depends on its sea lanes of communication for economic survival and national security. Should Korea become isolated from its trading partners and allies, and should its stockpile of raw materials become depleted, the consequences could indeed be severe.

To preserve Korea's distinctive cultural heritage as an independent nation in time of peace or war, it is evident that two critical priorities must be met. First, Korea must be assured supplies of raw materials, manufactured goods, and military equipment adequate to its economic needs and national defense requirements. Inasmuch as the trading partners and the military allies who furnish such vital supplies are globally dispersed, supplies must come to Korea by way of the sea. The sea is without rival as a medium for the efficacious movement of large quantities of cargo. Consequently, from the primary need for imported supplies arises the priority that sea lanes must at all times be kept open and safe for commerce, especially

Table 1. Korean Oceangoing Merchant Fleet

As of March 31, 1981
Tonnage in Thousands

Source: Korea Maritime and
Port Administration

Year	Type N & T Status	Total		Freighter		Container		Lumber C.		Bulk C.		Chemical T.		Oil T.		Others	
		No.	G/T	No.	G/T	No.	G/T	No.	G/T	No.	G/T	No.	G/T	No.	G/T	No.	G/T
1976	National Flag	261	1,636	144	351	26	86	24	96	36	365	8	12	23	725		
	Bareboat charter	160	1,071	51	186	1		48	188	31	396	10	10	19	290		
	Total	421	2,707	195	537	27	88	72	284	67	761	18	22	42	1,015		
1977	National Flag	321	2,292	146	357	39	153	37	145	54	566	16	21	26	1,010	3	40
	Bareboat charter	129	1,085	38	201	2	5	41	166	27	387	9	10	12	315		
	Total	450	3,377	184	558	41	158	78	311	81	953	25	31	38	1,325	3	40
1978	National Flag	396	3,140	174	534	41	186	38	164	88	1,101	20	85	32	1,030	3	40
	Bareboat charter	107	1,023	29	199	2	23	38	156	19	229	10	12	9	404		
	Total	503	4,163	203	733	43	209	76	320	107	1,330	30	97	41	1,434	3	40
1979	National Flag	417	3,609	172	580	47	317	44	184	97	1,243	21	67	33	1,164	3	53
	Bareboat charter	100	1,016	30	217	2	23	29	115	19	254	11	14	9	393		
	Total	517	4,625	202	797	49	340	73	299	116	1,497	32	81	42	1,557	3	53
1980	National Flag	448	4,039	190	780	48	348	46	199	108	1,432	22	27	31	1,204	3	49
	Bareboat charter	88	1,136	34	284	2	20	21	90	15	242	7	11	9	489		
	Total	536	5,175	224	1,064	50	368	67	289	123	1,674	29	38	40	1,693	3	49


in time of war. Keeping its sea lanes open is of vital interest to Korea as a developing nation.

Table 2. Korean Oceangoing Merchant Fleet Expansion Plan

		Tonnage in Thousands				
G/T & No. of C.	Year	1980(A)	1981	1986	1991(B)	B/A
Total G/T		5,175	6,025	11,569	20,645	4.0
No. of Full Container		14	18	28	32	2.3

Source: Korea Maritime and Port Administration

Table 4. Vessel Entrance and Clearances



Source: Korea Maritime and Port Administration

Table 5. Commercial Cargo Totals

		Tonnage in Thousands									
Means	Year	1976		1977		1978		1979		1980	
		Cargo	%	Cargo	%	Cargo	%	Cargo	%	Cargo	%
Total		55,862	100	68,436	100	78,024	100	90,987	100		
Waterborne		55,757	99.8	68,312	99.8	77,882	99.8	90,820	99.8	94,035	
Airborne		105	0.2	124	0.2	142	0.2	167	0.2		

Source: Korea Maritime and Port Administration

Table 3. MAJOR PORTS OF KOREA WITH FACILITIES AND CAPACITY




Table 3. Major Ports of Korea with Facilities and Capacity

Facility Port	Berthing		Anchorage (ship/DWT)	Warfare (m)	Ware- house (m ²)	Open Storage (m ²)	Cargo Handling	
	Quay (m)	Simultaneously (ship/DWT)					Annual Capacity (1,000M/T)	'80 (1,000M/T)
Busan	8,012	52/455,000	48/567,500	6,380	43,305	413,196	14,000	25,590
Incheon	5,420	29/453,000	59/960,000	1,010	54,880	313,220	9,323	21,347
Gunsan	525	5/24,000	5/40,000	606	11,391	198,771	1,540	1,493
Mogpo	320	4/15,000	9/135,000	879		19,642	1,000	966
Yeu-su	1,805	18/113,000	13/51,900	1,961	5,284	94,688	5,722	13,829
Masan	1,575	14/103,500	8/57,000	1,236	6,882	82,000	2,333	2,618
Ulsan	1,041	15/143,000	14/50,600	580		64,600	2,657	17,989
Pohang	2,390	18/393,000	9/300,000	1,266		237,660	22,160	18,725
Bugyeong	1,680	8/160,000	10/200,000	201			8,914	3,280
Jeju	797	6/180,000	63/3,000	361	733	24,530	843	1,116
Others	1,599	22/48,000	7/16,000	12,038	6,870	133,718	13,769	5,933
Total	25,164	191/1,925,500	247/2,381,000	26,518	129,345	1,582,025	82,261	112,886

Source: Korea Maritime and Port Administration

Table 6. Incoming Cargo Totals

		Tonnage in Thousands					
Year	Area	Total	Japan	Southeast Asia	North America	Europe	Middle East & Others
1976	Cargo	41,446	6,386	11,269	5,897	10,597	7,297
	%	100	15.4	27.2	14.2	25.6	17.6
1977	Cargo	51,498	8,196	15,019	8,114	243	19,926
	%	100	15.9	29.2	15.8	0.5	38.1
1978	Cargo	61,843	10,378	18,559	9,803	326	22,777
	%	100	16.8	30.0	15.9	0.5	36.8
1979	Cargo	72,992	9,744	21,801	14,538	531	26,378
	%	100	13.3	29.7	19.9	0.7	36.4
1980	Cargo	71,353	7,646	26,931	14,165	564	22,047
	%	100	10.7	37.7	19.9	0.8	30.9

Source: Korea Maritime and Port Administration

Table 7. Outgoing Cargo Totals

		Tonnage in Thousands					
Year	Area	Total	Japan	Southeast Asia	North America	Europe	Middle East & Others
1976	Cargo	14,311	6,601	3,630	1,580	823	1,677
	%	100	46.1	25.4	11.0	5.8	11.7
1977	Cargo	16,814	7,121	3,674	1,458	437	4,124
	%	100	42.4	21.9	8.7	2.6	24.5
1978	Cargo	16,309	6,497	3,985	1,540	477	3,810
	%	100	39.8	24.4	9.4	2.9	23.4
1979	Cargo	17,828	7,623	5,007	1,597	630	2,971
	%	100	42.8	28.0	9.0	3.5	16.7
1980	Cargo	22,682	8,330	6,438	1,662	1,324	4,928
	%	100	36.8	28.4	7.3	5.8	21.7

Source: Korea Maritime and Port Administration

Table 8. Korean National Flag Vessel's Share of Cargo Tonnage

		M/T in Thousands				
Total	Total Cargo	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
	Tonnage Carried on Korean Flag Ships	50,939	68,312	77,882	90,820	94,035
	Share (%)	19,731	29,009	35,472	43,050	46,390
Export	Total Cargo	38.7	42.4	45.5	47.4	49.3
	Tonnage Carried on Korean Flag Ships	10,858	16,814	16,039	17,828	22,682
	Share (%)	4,401	4,410	5,942	8,137	10,507
Import	Total Cargo	40.5	26.2	37.0	45.6	46.3
	Tonnage Carried on Korean Flag Ships	40,081	51,498	61,684	72,992	71,353
	Share (%)	15,330	24,599	29,530	34,913	35,883
		38.2	47.8	47.9	47.8	50.3


Source: Korea Maritime and Port Administration

Table 9. Officers and Crew Personnel

As of February 28, 1981			
	Total	Officer	Crew
Total	81,149	23,050	58,099
National Flag Ships	18,928	7,180	11,748
Foreign Ships	21,551	6,812	14,739
Fishing Vessels	40,670	9,058	31,612

Source: Korea Maritime and Port Administration


Table 10. Liner Trade Routes of the Korean Shipping Industry



Source: Korea Maritime and Port Administration

Table 11. Container Liner Routes

As of March 31, 1981



Source: Korea Maritime and Port Administration


Table 12. Container Liner Services

As of March 31, 1981

Route	Origin	Destination	Distance (Mile)	Calling Ports	Days	Freight (US \$)	No. Ships	G/T
N. America (East)	Busan	New York	10,600	Kaohsiung, Hong Kong Kobe, L.A., Oakland, Long Beach	32	75/MT	3	75,442 86,950
N. America (West)	Busan	Seattle	9,900	L.A., Oakland, Long Beach	14	75/MT	5	86,950
Europe	Busan	Southampton	10,600	Lehavre, Rotterdam, Felixstowe, Hamburg, Antwerp	34	100/MT	3	82,340
Australia	Busan	Brisbane	5,200	Yokohama, Osaka, Nagoya, Sydney, Melbourne	15	95/MT	1	13,294
Southeast Asia	Busan	Singapore	2,500	Hong Kong, Manila, Kelang, Bangkok, Pinang	15	35/MT	2	8,456

Source: Korea Maritime and Port Administration

Table 13. Routes for Importing Essential Materials (A)



Source: Korea Maritime and Port Administration

Table 14. Routes for Importing Essential Materials (B)

As of March 31, 1981

Route	Origin	Destination	Distance (Mile)	Days	Freight (US \$)	No. of Ships	G/T (Thousands)	Essential Materials
Middle East	Middle East	Ulsan	6,200	20	10/MT	15	1,300	Crude Oil
Australia	Australia	Pohang	4,700	15	11.70/MT	11	486	Iron Ore
India	India	Pohang	4,300	14	7.20/MT			
U.S. (East)	(U.S. (East)	Ulsan	9,400	32	37.65/MT	15	263	Potash
Canada (West)	Canada (West)	Ulsan	4,600	17	32.5 /MT			
U.S. (East)	U.S. (East)	Busan	9,600	32	37/LT			
South Africa	South Africa	Busan	8,200	27	29/LT	10	61	Coal
Asia	Asia	Busan	2,400	13	17/LT			


Source: Korea Maritime and Port Administration

Table 15. Imports of Crude Oil

Year	Kuwait		Saudi Arabia		Iran		Neutral Zone		Others		Total	
	Volume 1,000 b.	%	Volume 1,000 b.	%	Volume 1,000 b.	%	Volume 1,000 b.	%	Volume 1,000 b.	%	Volume 1,000 b.	US\$ 1,000
1964	5,835	100	12,545								5,835	12,507
1965	7,137	63.9			4,033	36.1					11,170	23,677
1966	8,513	59.9			5,689	40.1					14,202	29,803
1967	11,023	59.7			7,435	40.3					18,458	37,909
1968	17,997	49.4			18,412	50.6					36,409	70,683
1969	24,464	43.8	12,545	22.4	18,880	33.8					55,889	97,681
1970	24,998	36.2	21,955	31.7	22,197	32.1					69,150	118,916
1971	43,984	51.6	30,549	35.8	10,892	12.7					85,425	178,761
1972	46,628	50.4	36,867	39.8	2,824	3.1	6,262	6.7			92,581	221,077
1973	19,401	18.8	63,411	61.4	4,554	4.4	15,844	6.4			103,210	305,158
1974	18,886	16.8	73,713	65.4	3,305	2.9	16,799	4.9			112,703	1,107,822
1975	53,637	45.5	51,861	44.0	882	0.8	10,194	8.7	1,221	1.0	117,795	1,328,152
1976	52,407	39.6	52,640	39.7	14,234	16.8	10,901	8.2	2,225	1.7	132,407	1,492,011
1977	49,657	32.1	83,396	54.0	16,766	10.8	912	0.6	3,818	2.5	154,459	1,890,104
1978	50,789	30.5	95,841	57.5	12,912	7.8	3,854	2.3	3,136	1.9	166,532	2,174,000
1979	59,887	32.3	98,865	53.3	19,806	10.7	847	0.4	6,105	3.3	185,513	3,330,000

Source: Dong Sung Cho, *International Resources: With a Focus on Oil Problems*, Seoul: Pakyoung-sa, 1981, p. 203

Table 16. Crude Oil Import Routes



Executive Summary

The delegations from the four countries represented at the Conference on Security in the Pacific Basin Sea Lanes agree to the following general conclusions:

1. The security of the Sea Lanes of the Pacific Basin since the mid-1970s has become a matter of increasing concern to the individual nations of the Basin area. Their high dependency on the import of energy and raw materials, especially strategic ones, is the principal basis for their concern. There, however, remains differences in how each nation perceives the importance of these issues to its national security.

2. The recent growth of the Soviet military in the Far East provides the greatest potential threat to the SLOCs, particularly in case of war.

3. The proliferation of sophisticated weapons and the ease of their acquisition by nations and by non-national groups (e.g., terrorists) constitute a major peacetime threat.

4. The potential for conflict resulting from the policies of Vietnam and North Korea is recognized by the conferees as a regional problem that could escalate and endanger not only the region's SLOCs but international peace.

5. In case of armed aggression by the People's Republic of China against the Republic of China the security of the sea lanes in the Basin would be significantly affected.

6. Knowledge about the growing importance of the SLOCs to the Pacific Basin countries' national economy and security is insufficient, among their leaders in government and industry and among their people. Therefore, there is a need for an educational campaign in each country.

7. There is a need for the U.S. to restore the overall strategic balance between the U.S. and the USSR.

8. There is a need to develop cooperation between the nations of the Pacific Basin to deal with non-nuclear threats to the SLOCs.

9. The establishment of a multilateral collective defense system

for the security of the sea lanes is not believed to be feasible in the near future, irrespective of its desirability. Multilateral cooperation can best be enhanced by dealing with these issues within existing bilateral relationships.

10. The participating organizations agree to appoint a steering committee to develop plans to continue the progress made at the conference through such practical actions as annual conferences, cooperative research, and publications with the overall objective of influencing the national policy of the nations of the Pacific Basin. It is expected that the next conference will be held in 1983 in Tokyo.