

2019 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
ON THE **EU CYBERSECURITY ACT**

EUROSMART

The Voice of the Digital Security Industry



RED ALERT LABS
IoT Security

E-IoT-SCS

Eurosmart

IoT Security Certification Scheme

[Roland Atoui](#) - Managing Director, Red Alert Labs

[Ayman Khalil](#) - COO & Managing Partner, Red Alert Labs

Nov 2019

SINCE 1995




**Non-Profit
Organization**


The Voice of the Digital Security industry
is an association gathering technological experts in the field of the
Digital security

Members are: manufacturers of secure element, semiconductors, smart cards, secure software, High Security Hardware and terminals, biometric technology providers, system integrators, application developers and issuers; Laboratories, Research organizations and Associations.

Companies



Laboratories




(TIC) Testing, Inspection, Certification

Associations



Academics and Research Organisations







RED ALERT LABS
IoT Security

HOME ABOUT US ▾ WHAT WE DO ▾ SOLUTIONS BY INDUSTRY ▾ PRICING PLAN BLOG KNOWLEDGE ▾ Q [GET IN TOUCH](#)

MEASURE YOUR SECURITY

What are the metrics and measures of the IoT security with which the technology's adopters and integrators would be able to determine that an IoT system can be trusted? there is no way to measure our progress in keeping IoT secure without these metrics


[GET STARTED](#)

We act as a trusted partner to help you **create**, **reach** and **maintain**
your **IoT security goals**
and
ensure that your **IoT product/solution** meets the industry leading cybersecurity
standards:




Whether you're designing, implementing, integrating, selling or using IoT
products/solutions, Red Alert Labs is here !

<https://www.redalertlabs.com>



Typical IoT Infrastructure



A lot of Benefits ... with high security risk !



Fraud & Misuse



Privacy




Safety

**~25 billions
in
2021**

Gartner forecast 2019

Vendors Problems !



Users/Service Providers Problem !





“**TRUST** should be further **strengthened** by offering information in a **transparent** manner on the **level of security** of ICT products, ICT services and ICT processes ...”

“An **increase in trust** can be facilitated by **Union-wide CERTIFICATION** providing for **common cybersecurity requirements** and **evaluation criteria** across national markets and sectors.”

EU Cybersecurity Act – Section (7)

CERTIFICATION → TRUST

WITH THE NEW EU CSA REGULATION WE NEED A NEW CERTIFICATION SCHEME FOR IoT TO TACKLE :

- **Cost, time, validity**
 - Can't be applied to the 25 Billion IoT product market ! Not enough resources to do that...
- **Subjective**
 - What is the credibility of the evaluation lab/pentester/etc.? What does secure mean? Can we compare more or less secure products?
- **Scope**
 - Silo Approach - they often cover part of the problem, specific to an industry (banking, ID) but security & privacy is now a concern of every business and citizen.
- **Poor Security Definition**
 - There is no common and holistic approach to define security requirements per profile taking into account the threat model & risks due to the intended usage

AT EUROSMART WE HAVE PREPARED :

A Tailor Made
IoT Device
Certification
Scheme

SOLVING BOTH **VENDORS** and **USERS** PROBLEMS...

Eurosmart IoT Security Certification Scheme

E-IoT-SCS



The scope of this certification scheme is the **IoT device** while taking into account the full threat model (from Chip to Cloud) with a focus on the **Basic & Substantial** security assurance level as defined by the **Cybersecurity Act**.



The purpose is to ensure that IoT devices certified under this scheme comply with **specified requirements defined in a risk-based approach and supported by the industry** with the aim to protect the availability, authenticity, integrity and confidentiality of stored or transmitted or processed data or the related functions or services offered by, or accessible via IoT devices **throughout their life cycle**.

3 Security Assurance Levels — From Basic to Substantial

- **Basic**


- Minimize the known basic risks of incidents and cyberattacks

- **Substantial**


- Minimize the known cybersecurity risks, and the risk of incidents and cyberattacks carried out by actors with limited skills and resources

- **High**

- Minimize the risk of state-of-the-art cyberattacks carried out by actors with significant skills and resources



Multi-Sensor — Sigfox




Custom antenna
Great performance for all Radio Configurations



250mAh battery
Enough for several months of lifetime
(depending on the use case)



Micro-USB port
Recharge the device and dump firmware



Central RGB LED
Improves user experience




STM32 micro-controller
Controls the device




TI CC1125 radio transceiver
The core of the unique multi-RCS RF design


SMART SPEAKER - Wifi



MODULAR TOE



TARGETED AUDIENCE



IoT
DEVICE
VENDOR



IoT
PRODUCT
VENDOR



IoT
SERVICE
PROVIDER




IoT
DEVICE
OWNER

SPONSORS

CONSUMERS

VENDOR'S STEPS



A security profile looks like this:

EUROSMART
The Voice of the Digital Security Industry

security profile

CATEGORY	Remote Terminal Unit (RTU)	DOMAIN	INDUSTRIAL	ASSUMPTIONS				SECURITY FEATURES				
USAGE	<ul style="list-style-type: none">* Collect Measurements from sensors* Execute logic & control calculations* Modify processes using control commands* Communicate with external applications/devices* Admin functions to configure RTU functionalities			<ul style="list-style-type: none">* No -Secured Physical Location* Yes -Data-in-Transit encryption* No -Admin Interface authentication* No -Credentials & Cryptographic Keys protection* No -Secured debug ports						<ul style="list-style-type: none">* Malformed input management* Secure authentication on administration interface:* Access control policy* Configuration access control* Secure communication* Command authorization* Secure storage of secrets* Secure Update* Logs integrity* Secure Boot and Trusted Boot		
				ASSETS	<ul style="list-style-type: none">* Process Control-Command* Data-in-Transit* Admin Interface* Data-at-Rest	<ul style="list-style-type: none">* OS/Kernel/Firmware* Configuration Data* Credentials & Cryptographic Keys						

Threat Id	Threat	Asset	Asset Value	Vulnerability	Impact	Likelihood	Total Risk	Security Goals	Security Requirements	Security Assurance Activities
T_FMN_01	Modifying the configuration of the RTU	Device Configuration	Integrity, Availability, Authenticity	WEAK AUTHENTICATION, IMPROPER ACCESS CONTROL	Severe	Very Likely	SUBSTANTIAL	SECURITY DATA MANAGEMENT; IDENTIFICATION & AUTHENTICATION	EIA_SF.10; EIA_SF.68; EIA_SF.69	SEE SF_REQUIREMENTS
T_FMN_02	Destroy, Remove or Steal RTU	Physical Device	Availability	IMPROPER PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL	Severe	Likely	SUBSTANTIAL	ACCESS CONTROL	EIA_SF.23; EIA_SF.24 EIA_SF.25; EIA_SF.26 EIA_SF.63	SEE SF_REQUIREMENTS
T_FMN_03	Replacement of original RTU with a compromised one	Physical Device	Integrity, Authenticity	IMPROPER PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL	Severe	Likely	SUBSTANTIAL	ACCESS CONTROL PHYSICAL SECURITY SECURE INTERFACES & NETWORK SERVICES	EIA_SF.54; EIA_SF.83	SEE SF_REQUIREMENTS


RISK-BASED - SECURITY ASSURANCE ACTIVITIES

SUBSTANTIAL

IMPACT VS LIKELIHOOD	UNLIKELY (1)	LIKELY (2)	VERY LIKELY (3)	ALMOST CERTAIN (4)
SEVERE (4)	CA.DocumentationReview CA.CompositionAnalysis VA.VulnerabilityScanning	CA.DocumentationReview CA.SourceCodeReview CA.FunctionalSecurityTesting CA.CompositionAnalysis VA.VulnerabilityScanning VA.BasicRobustnessTesting	CA.DocumentationReview CA.SourceCodeReview CA.FunctionalSecurityTesting CA.CompositionAnalysis VA.VulnerabilityScanning VA.BasicRobustnessTesting VA.NonIntrusivePentesting	CA.DocumentationReview CA.SourceCodeReview CA.FunctionalSecurityTesting CA.CompositionAnalysis VA.VulnerabilityScanning VA.BasicRobustnessTesting VA.AdvancedRobustnessTesting VA.NonIntrusivePentesting VA.IntrusivePentesting
MODERATE (3)				
MINOR (2)		CA.CompositionAnalysis	CA.CompositionAnalysis VA.VulnerabilityScanning VA.BasicRobustnessTesting	CA.FunctionalSecurityTesting CA.CompositionAnalysis VA.VulnerabilityScanning VA.BasicRobustnessTesting
LOW (1)	CA.DocumentationReview CA.CompositionAnalysis	CA.DocumentationReview CA.CompositionAnalysis	CA.DocumentationReview CA.CompositionAnalysis VA.VulnerabilityScanning	CA.DocumentationReview CA.CompositionAnalysis VA.VulnerabilityScanning

- **Conformity Analysis** (Doc Review, Source Code Review, Composition Analysis, Security Functional Testing)
- **Vulnerability Analysis** (Scanning, Basic Robustness Testing, Non-Intrusive Pentesting)

Attackers Profiles are methodologically selected for Each Security Profile in a risk-based approach



- **REMOTE SCALABLE ATTACKS**
 - (Covered by default)
- **SOFTWARE ATTACKS**
 - (Might be covered)
- **BASIC PHYSICAL ATTACKS**
 - (Might be covered)

Temporary Mitigation/Patching


- **Application Layer:**

- patching with Integration mechanisms are verified once for all by the CAB

- **Core, ROE, HW Layers:**

- patching first... evaluating later !
 - if and only if the vendor demonstrated a secure maintenance life-cycle process satisfying the flaw remediation requirements.
- temporary measures will be deployed by the vendor within the time as specified in the Vulnerability Triage Protocol.

ADAPTED ASSURANCE CONTINUITY



KEY BENEFITS



AUTOMATISATION & AGILE METHODOLOGY

01

Security
Reqs/Questionnaire
acts as guidelines, not
much overhead
evidence docs, and
reduced testing time

7-15 m/d w/ security
profile



RECOGNIZE EXISTING EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

02

Requirements could
be simply mapped to
other certification
schemes allowing
recognition of existing
methodologies by
composition such as
SOGIS CC evaluations
for underlying
platforms. In any case
all types and formats
of evidence could be
reused as is under this
Scheme.



REDUCE COSTS

03

The evaluation
addresses priorities
and is time-
constrained, thus
limiting its delays and
cost, but still offering
a guarantee that
experts have spent
time analyzing the
product most valuable
security functionalities

7K€ – 15K€
(in average)



COMPARE IOT DEVICES

04

The accurate
evaluation scope
coupled with the
security functionalities
and the defined set of
security requirements
are a result of
accurate security
analysis/threat
modelling, The
Evaluation metrics
and ratings are simple
and expressive



REQUIREMENTS TAILORED TO THE INTENDED USE

05

the scope of
evaluation focuses on
the HW & SW forming
the IoT Device but the
threat model covers
the operational
environment including
the final application,
interfaces and other
components
connected to the
product if any..

KEY BENEFITS



COST-EFFICIENT CERTIFICATION MAINTENANCE

06

This Scheme provides a smart framework to define, attest and maintain the certificates delivered for IoT devices after issuance. Patching & Temporary Mitigation are allowed.



CREATE INCENTIVE FOR VENDORS

07

Minimum Effort required on providing evidence, simple metrics, clear requirements, security valued by customer



INVOLVE IOT SERVICE PROVIDERS

08

Expressing SUBSTANTIAL Level Rating + Community creating awareness. IoT Service Providers and Customers trust the vendors



SIMPLE METRICS

09

Requirements and Test Procedures are expressed in simple wording allowing the vendors and CABs to implement and test efficiently.




CYBER SECURITY ACT COMPLIANT

10


This Scheme is a first world-wide to be created while incorporating the Cybersecurity Act principles by design.

EU CYBERSECURITY ACT - ARTICLE 54		COVERAGE BY THIS SCHEME
(a)	subject-matter and scope of the certification scheme, including the type or categories of ICT processes, products and services	[TR-E-IoT-SCS-PART-1], Chapter 1 + Executive Summary
(b)	a clear description of the purpose of the scheme and how the selected standards, evaluation methods and assurance levels correspond to the needs of the intended users of the scheme.	[TR-E-IoT-SCS-PART-1], Chapter 1 + Executive Summary
(c)	references to the international, European or national standards applied in the evaluation or, where such standards are not available or appropriate, to technical specifications that meet the requirements set out in Annex II of Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 or, if such specifications are not available, to technical specifications or other cybersecurity requirements defined in the European cybersecurity certification scheme;	[TR-E-IoT-SCS-PART-1], Section 1.3
(d)	where applicable, one or more assurance levels;	[TR-E-IoT-SCS-PART-1], Section 1.1 (BASIC & SUBSTANTIAL LEVEL)
(e)	an indication of whether conformity self-assessment of conformity is permitted under the scheme;	[TR-E-IoT-SCS-PART-3] , SECTION 4.2.3 and SECTION 4.2.10
(f)	where applicable, specific or additional requirements to which conformity assessment bodies are subject in order to guarantee their technical competence to evaluate the cybersecurity requirements;	[TR-E-IoT-SCS-PART-5]
(g)	The specific evaluation criteria and methods to be used, including types of evaluation, in order to demonstrate that the specific objectives referred to in Article 51 are achieved;	[TR-E-IoT-SCS-PART-3]
(h)	where applicable, the information which is necessary for certification and which is to be supplied or otherwise be made available to the conformity assessment bodies by an applicant;	[TR-E-IoT-SCS-PART-1], Section 4.1 [TR-E-IoT-SCS-PART-3] and [TR-E-IoT-SCS-PART-9]
(i)	where the scheme provides for marks or labels, the conditions under which such marks or labels may be used;	[TR-E-IoT-SCS-PART-7]
(j)	rules for monitoring compliance of ICT products, ICT services and ICT processes with the requirements of the European cybersecurity certificates or the EU statements of conformity, including mechanisms to demonstrate continued compliance with the specified cybersecurity requirements;	[TR-E-IoT-SCS-PART-1], Section 4.2 and [TR-E-IoT-SCS-PART-6]
(k)	where applicable, the conditions for issuing, maintaining, continuing and renewing the European cybersecurity certificates, as well as the conditions for extending or reducing the scope of certification;	[TR-E-IoT-SCS-PART-1], Section 6
(l)	rules concerning the consequences for ICT products, ICT services and ICT processes that have been certified or for which an EU statement of conformity has been issued, but which do not comply with the requirements of the scheme;	[TR-E-IoT-SCS-PART-1], Section 6.1.4.4
(m)	rules concerning how previously undetected cybersecurity vulnerabilities in ICT products, ICT services and ICT processes are to be reported and dealt with;	[TR-E-IoT-SCS-PART-1] Section 6.1 , 6.1.4 and [TR-E-IoT-SCS-PART-6]
(n)	where applicable, rules concerning the retention of records by conformity assessment bodies;	[TR-E-IoT-SCS-PART-1], Section 4.2
(o)	the identification of national or international cybersecurity certification schemes covering the same type or categories of ICT products, ICT services and ICT processes, security requirements, evaluation criteria and methods, and assurance levels;	Refer to "e-IoT-SCS Candidate Certification Scheme Pre-Study – v1.0 RELEASE" – [Deliverables Annex], and [TR-E-IoT-SCS-PART-3]
(p)	the content and the format of the European cybersecurity certificates and the EU statements of conformity to be issued;	[TR-E-IoT-SCS-PART-9]
(q)	the period of the availability of the EU statement of conformity, technical documentation, and all other relevant information to be made available by the manufacturer or provider of ICT products, ICT services or ICT processes;	[TR-E-IoT-SCS-PART-1], Section 5.2
(r)	maximum period of validity of European cybersecurity certificates issued under the scheme;	[TR-E-IoT-SCS-PART-1], Section 6
(s)	disclosure policy for European cybersecurity certificates issued, amended or withdrawn under the scheme;	[TR-E-IoT-SCS-PART-1], Section 7
(t)	conditions for the mutual recognition of certification schemes with third countries;	[TR-E-IoT-SCS-PART-1], Section 1.7
(u)	where applicable, rules concerning any peer assessment mechanism established by the scheme for the authorities or bodies issuing European cybersecurity certificates for assurance level 'high' pursuant to Article 56(6). Such mechanism shall be without prejudice to the peer review provided for in Article 59;	N/A – Not relevant to the Basic & Substantial level
(v)	format and procedures to be followed by manufacturers or providers of ICT products, ICT services or ICT processes in supplying and updating the supplementary cybersecurity information in accordance with Article 55.	[TR-E-IoT-SCS-PART-1], Section 4.1 [TR-E-IoT-SCS-PART-3] and [TR-E-IoT-SCS-PART-9]


CERTIFICATION EXPECTED DURATION SUBSTANTIAL



CERTIFICATION EXPECTED DURATION BASIC



JOIN THE PILOT CERTIFICATION PHASE (EXTENDED)



JOIN → <https://www.eurosmart.digital/eurosmart-iot-certification-scheme/>

All Documents are
FREE for
Download Online

[https://www.eurosmart.digital/
eurosmart-iot-certification-
scheme/](https://www.eurosmart.digital/eurosmart-iot-certification-scheme/)

OPEN SOURCES

The END...





www.eurosmart.com



[@Eurosmart_EU](https://twitter.com/Eurosmart_EU)



[@Eurosmart](https://www.linkedin.com/company/eurosmart)

Red Alert Labs

3 rue Parmentier | 94140 Alfortville | FRANCE



contact@redalertlabs.com



Tel. +33 9 53 55 54 11



www.redalertlabs.com



[@RedAlertLabs](https://twitter.com/RedAlertLabs)

Eurosmart

Rue de la Science 14b | 1040 Brussels | BELGIUM



pierrejean.verrando@eurosmart.com



Tel. +32 2 880 36 35



www.eurosmart.com



[@Eurosmart_EU](https://twitter.com/Eurosmart_EU)



RED ALERT LABS
IoT Security

R



2019 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
ON THE **EU CYBERSECURITY ACT**

ANNEX

Reference	Name/Description
[TR-e-IoT-SCS-Part-1]	E-IoT-SCS Process & Policy - This document defines the policies and processes that govern the IoT device certification scheme.
[TR-e-IoT-SCS-Part-2]	<p>E-IoT-SCS Generic Protection Profile + Security Requirements Methodology - This document is a generic representation of common security requirements on IoT devices. It is based on a security risk analysis approach of an IoT Device operating in a typical infrastructure without considering a specific type of data or a context for risk calculation.</p> <p>The main output of this document is a list of security goals and requirements qualifying the need to counter security threats identified on a typical IoT device.</p>
[TR-e-IoT-SCS-Part-3]	E-IoT-SCS Evaluation Methodology - Document defining the evaluation activities to be performed by an evaluator and links between them in order to conduct properly an evaluation. It lists evaluation evidences required to perform actions as defined in the security assurance requirements. It defines way to report evaluation results in Evaluation technical report and observation report. It also provides rules to define verdict and criteria of failure.

E-IoT-SCS Documentation

CABs Accreditation

Reference	Name/Description
[TR-e-IoT-SCS-Part-4]	CABs Agreement - Guidelines listing the rules for setting up agreement between CABs and Certification Scheme stakeholders (e.g. other CABs – CAB reviewer, CAB evaluator, NABs, etc.)
[TR-e-IoT-SCS-Part-5]	CABs Accreditation Policy - Guidelines describing policy for CABs accreditation

Certification Secure Life-Cycle Management

Reference	Name/Description
[TR-e-IoT-SCS-Part-6]	Vulnerability Management, Maintenance & Continuous Assurance Policy: Document describing vulnerability management procedures and the life-cycle management of the Certificate after issuance
[TR-e-IoT-SCS-Part-7]	Mark & Certificate Usage Policy for e-IoT Certification Scheme: Document describing the procedure and conditions which govern the use of the e-IoT SUBSTANTIAL mark and certificate by IoT device vendors, CABs and end-users
[TR-e-IoT-SCS-Part-8]	The Metadata Certification Policy for e-IoT Certification Scheme: Document describing the Metadata Certification Concept and Requirements guaranteeing the relevancy and Authenticity of the Certificates.

Supporting Documents

Reference	Name/Description
[TR-e-IoT-SCS-Part-9]	Templates (Vendor Questionnaire, Impact Analysis Report, Security Profile, Evaluation Report, Mapping Table Concept)
[Informative Annexes]	A set of informative annexes complementing the e-IoT Security Certification Scheme deliverables such as the “e-IoT-SCS Candidate Certification Scheme Pre-Study – v1.0 RELEASE”, or “Risk Assessment Methodologies”.

KEY DEFINITIONS

Generic Protection Profile (GPP)

This General Protection Profile (GPP) is a technical report which is based on a generic security risk analysis approach of an IoT Device reference architecture without considering a specific type of data or a context for risk calculation. The main output of this document is a list of security goals and requirements qualifying the need to counter threats identified on a typical IoT device.



[TR-e-IoT-SCS-Part-2]

VENDOR QUESTIONNAIRE

A Vendor Questionnaire (VQ) is a technical document including questions and instructions addressed to the vendor who's implementing the ToE. Responses to these questions are considered as evidence materials and must be provided by the vendor to support the evaluation process. The goal: allow the Vendor to reformulate and refine the security requirements of a Security Profile.

It will draw a list of questions and actions for both the Vendor and the CAB

- VA = actions addressed for the Vendor
- CA = actions addressed for the CAB




The Voice of the Digital Security Industry
[TR-e-IoT-SCS-Part-9]

SECURITY PROFILE

A refinement of the GPP to address specific problem definition of a type of ToE (thermostat, smart cam, etc.) while considering the type and sensitivity of data and the context of the operational environment (e.g. Consumer, Enterprise, Industrial) and the risk factor.

They help to scale security controls and security-related process activities in accordance to the identified risks

A standardized security profile saves a detailed risk analysis for every new product instance.

3 step approach (collect, define and decide)

Risk-based Methodology



[TR-e-IoT-SCS-Part-2]

KEY DEFINITIONS

IoT SERVICE PROVIDER

The IoT Service Provider (IoTSP) could be the IoT device vendor itself or a third-party service provider such as IoT Cloud Platforms (e.g. Azure, AWS IoT, GE Predix, Oracle IoTCS, Google Cloud IoT, IBM Watson IoT, Microsoft Azure IoT Suite, PTC ThingWorx, Kaa Platform, Overkiz IoT Platform, etc.)

METADATA CERTIFICATION STATEMENT

An IoT Metadata Certification Statement (MCST) is a document containing information about a device's characteristics, features and capabilities arranged in a structured manner that can be read and understood by IoT service providers. The reporting format of the metadata statement is generic and therefore can be used to describe any device from any vendor



[TR-e-IoT-SCS-Part-8]


METADATA CERTIFICATION SERVICE

The IoT Metadata Certification Service (MCSE) is a web-based tool where CABs can, on behalf of IoT device vendors, upload signed metadata statements for IoT service providers to access and use as a source of trusted information about a specific device model. Service Providers for IoT Devices will naturally want to be able to trust a device that attempts to make use of their services this makes the deployment of "device metadata service" very useful, secure and scalable in quickly determining if a specific device model is trustworthy to access a resource.



[TR-e-IoT-SCS-Part-8]

SECURITY PROFILE ?



Example of Security Goals


Security Goal (Sample)	Basic	Substantial	High
Strong Authentication		X	X
Firmware Integrity			X
Communication Integrity			X
Strong Encryption		X	X
Data Confidentiality		X	X
IP Protection	X	X	X
Data Availability		X	X
Data Privacy	X	X	X
Human Safety			X

Example of Security Requirements

Requirements (sample)	Basic	Substantial	High
Secure Manufacturer-based Identity & Certificate Storage		X	X
Secure Storage (Tamper Resistant)			X
RNG (FIPS or AIS)		X	X
SHA-256 at least		X	X
Secure Onboarding		X	X
Secure Firmware/SW update (digital signature)		X	X
Secure Event Logging		X	X
Limited Data Collection	X	X	X
End User Data Removal	X	X	X
Secure Cloud-Based Management Services		X	X
Active Product Incident Response Team		X	X
Secure Development Lifecycle (SDLC)			X
Data Privacy (Manufacturing)	X	X	X

IoT Devices may operate in different Operational Environments → each type of IoT device might have several Security Profiles

For Verticals



Ref. based on ECSO WG1 sources

Vendor Questionnaire ?



A Vendor Questionnaire (VQ) is a technical document including questions and instructions addressed to the vendor who's implementing the ToE. Responses to these questions are considered as evidence materials and must be provided by the vendor to support the evaluation process.

Each requirement has an associated instruction which the vendor must follow while providing responses. (explains how to respond)

You will provide your responses inside this column corresponding to each requirement.

VQ looks like this: →

Ref	Security Requirement Questionnaire	Security Goal	Vendor Instructions	Evaluator Instructions	Vendor Responses	Evaluator Feedback
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT						
EIA_OE.1	There must be a person who is capable of taking the ownership and also the responsibility of the TOE, its service and to provide business level security.	PERSONNEL				
EIA_OE.2	Audit logs are required for security-relevant events and must be reviewed by the auditors.	PERSONNEL				
EIA_OE.3	An authentication data management policy is enforced to ensure that users change their authentication data at appropriate intervals and to appropriate values, such as proper lengths, histories, and variations. This assumption is not applicable to biometric authentication data.	PERSONNEL				
EIA_OE.4	Competent administrators, operators, officers, and auditors will be assigned to manage the target of evaluation and the security of the information it contains.	PERSONNEL				
EIA_OE.5	All administrators, operators, officers, and auditors are familiar with the certificate policy (CP) and certification practices statement (CPS) under which the target of evaluation is operated.	PERSONNEL				
EIA_OE.6	Proper disposal of authentication data and associated privileges is performed after access has been removed, such as for a job termination or a change in responsibility.	PERSONNEL				
EIA_OE.7	Administrators, operators, officers, auditors, and other users notify proper authorities of any security issues that impact their systems to minimize the potential for the loss or compromise of data.	PERSONNEL				
EIA_OE.8	The users who require access to at least some of the information managed by the target of evaluation are expected to act in a cooperative manner.	PERSONNEL				
EIA_OE.9	A competent person is assigned the role of maintaining & monitoring an	PERSONNEL				

You will find the list of requirements here

Different tabs for each aspect of evaluation. You have to select corresponding tab for providing the responses



The Security Profile contains pointers to all ToE relevant requirements (from the exhaustive list contained in the reference VQ) that must be considered by the Vendor.

What Else ?

IOT SECURITY CERTIFICATION SCHEME COMPARISON

CRITERIA	SESIP L1+	E-IOT-SCS	ARM PSA L2
MARKET	ENTREPRISE, INDUSTRIAL	CONSUMER, ENTREPRISE, INDUSTRIAL	ENTREPRISE, INDUSTRIAL
USERS	IoT Chip Vendor, IoT ROE/RoT Dev, IoT OS/FW Dev	IoT ROE/RoT Dev, IoT OS/FW Core Dev, IoT Application Dev, IoT Product Integrator, Vendor IoT Service Provider	IoT Chip Vendor, IoT RoT Dev
TARGET OF EVALUATION	Chip Level, RoT Level, OS Level	Chip Level, RoT Level, OS Level, Application Level	Chip Level, RoT Level,
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT CONSIDERATION	No	Yes	No
GOVERNANCE	Private	Public	Private
CERTIFICATION VALIDITY	2 years	No limitation (with change management process)	No limitation?

What Else ?

IOT SECURITY CERTIFICATION SCHEME COMPARISON

CRITERIA	SESIP L1+	E-IOT-SCS	ARM PSA L2
VULNERABILITY MNGT PROCESS	Partially	Yes	Partially
CERTIFICATE MAINTENANCE	Yes	Yes	Yes
COMPARABLE CERTIFIED PRODUCTS	Partially	Yes	Partially
RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS	Partially?	Yes	No
RISK-BASED EVALUATION METHODOLOGY	No	Yes	No
METADATA CERTIFICATION SERVICE	No	Yes	No
ASSESSMENT STYLE	3 rd Party	3 rd Party	3 rd Party
PENTESTING STYLE	Time-Limited	Risk-Base + Time-Limited (per Profile)	Time-limited
CERTIFICATION LEVELS	Pre-defined Substantial Level (one size fits all)	Risk-based Substantial Level (per security profile)	Pre-defined Substantial Level (one size fits all)

What Else ?

IOT SECURITY CERTIFICATION SCHEME COMPARISON

CRITERIA	SESIP L1+	E-IOT-SCS	ARM PSA L2
SECURITY/PROTECTION PROFILE	Yes	Yes	Yes
SECURITY/PROTECTION PROFILE CREATION METHODOLOGY	No	Yes	No
ATTACKERS PROFILE	Fixed Attackers Profile per Level	Varies Per Security Profile	Fixed Attackers Profile per Level
COMPOSITION	Yes	Yes	Yes
OTHER SCHEMES EVIDENCE RE-USE	Partially	Yes	?
EVIDENCE FORMALISM	Partially (CC + Natural Language)	Natural Language	Natural Language
EVALUATION COSTS	>20K€ ?	7K-12K€	?
CERTIFICATION COSTS	9,5K€ - 16,5K€	2-4K€	?
SECURITY/PROTECTION PROFILE	Yes	Yes	Yes