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Carter Page worked for a time as Trump's foreign policy adviser. Page lived in Russia from 2004 to 2007 and has ties to Gazprom, Russia's state-owned energy giant. In July 2016, Page visited Moscow and met with Igor Sechin, a close adviser to Putin, who will head Rosneft, Russia's huge state-owned oil company. As Joshua Jaffa notes in *The New Yorker*, There are no such meetings if the Kremlin is not serious about its interlocutor; in Trump's impromptu campaign, find out who was serious and who pretended to be a difficult thing to do. Russia appears to be following in any way possible, including both witty and unwitting accomplices, which has led to influence in the Trump campaign. Page's recent appearance with Chris Hayes on MSNBC has generated further media attention. Page admitted he could discuss Russia with Papadopoulos. The big word in this regard of communication is collusion. Has the Trump campaign worked with a hostile foreign power to influence the U.S. election? The legal answer to this question cannot yet be given. But for many Americans, the confluence of Russia's infiltration of social media, the president's own history that easily goes to Putin, and especially the number of Kremlin-linked campaign associates, can give enough clues to draw their own conclusions. Storage of information or access to information already stored on the device, such as ad identifiers, device identifiers, cookies, and similar technologies. Collect and process information about your use of this service to then personalize ads and/or content for you in other contexts, such as on other websites or apps, over time. Typically, the content of a site or app is used to make conclusions about your interests that inform you about the future choice of advertising and/or content. 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This includes use of previously collected information about your best interests in choosing content, processing data about what content was shown, how often and how long it was shown, when and where it was shown, and whether you took any action related to the content, including, for example, clicking on the content. This does not include personalization, which is the collection and processing of information about your use of the service to then personalize content and/or advertising for you in other contexts, such as websites or apps, over time. Lotame Solutions, Inc. OpenX Software Ltd. and its subsidiaries of The Rubicon Project, Limited Index Exchange, Inc. comScore, Inc. DoubleVerify Inc. LiveRamp, Inc. Taboola Europe Limited PubMatic, Inc. Outbrain UK Ltd. EMX Digital LLC Nielsen Marketing Cloud Google (DFP/AdX) Company Lotame Solutions, Inc. Inc Outbrain UK Ltd EMX Digital LLC Nielsen Marketing Cloud Google (DFP/AdX) Company Lotame Solutions, Inc. OpenX Software Ltd. and its affiliates LiveRamp, Inc. Outbrain UK Ltd Google (DFP / AdX) Company Lotame Solutions, Inc. LiveRamp, Inc. Google (DFP/AdX) Lotame Solutions, Inc. LiveRamp, Inc. Outbrain UK Ltd Google (DFP/AdX) Boris Johnson's Conservative Party received a surge in cash from nine Russian donors who were named in a suppressed investigation into Russia's attempts to undermine democracy in the UK. A report by the parliamentary intelligence and security committee identifies close links between major Conservative Party donors and the Russian government, the Sunday Times reports. The report was due to be published this week but was blocked by Johnson, over fears that the information would damage his chances of winning the upcoming UK general election. Among the donors named in the report is Alexander Temerko, who worked for the Russian Defense Ministry and previously boasted that the prime minister was his friend. Over the past seven years, Temerko has donated more than 1.2 million euros to the Conservatives. Other Russian Conservative Party donors include Lyubov Chernukhina, who is married to Vladimir Chernukhin, a former Putin ally, Chernukhin previously paid 160,000 pounds for a tennis match with Johnson and former Prime Minister David Cameron and donated more than 450,000 pounds last year. It is also reported that the committee heard information about former Russian spy Alexander Lebedev, who owns the Evening Standard and Independent newspapers. Lebedev is not a donor to the Conservative Party. However, his son Eugene is a close friend of the Prime Minister and has repeatedly hosted him at parties at his castle in Perugia, Italy, while Johnson was London Mayor and Foreign Secretary. Concerns were raised about Johnson's decision to attend events in which guests were told there was nothing menu from the moment you are greeted, until you leave. There have previously been fears that Johnson's personal life could make him a security threat because of the possibility of blackmail. There's danger that people leak what they're over him or blackmail him with him, cabinet ministers in Theresa May's government told the Sunday Times earlier this year. The opposition Labour Party accused Johnson of trying to cover up the revelations. The Tories have blocked the report and are opposed to tax transparency so their billionaires can continue to tear us up without problems, said Labour's election co-ordinator Andrew Gwynne. Labour is on the side of the many, not the few, so we will get dirty money out of politics, introduce the oligarch tax and take on the vested interests of selling our people and public services. Edward Cranshaw June 1962 The question is obviously that there is a disagreement within the Kremlin, says EDWARD CRANKSHAW, but it is no longer something to think in terms of crisis, but as an integral aspect of the evolution of power in the Soviet Union. Mr. Cranshaw, a leading authority in the USSR, is the author of CRACKS IN KREMLIN WALL and RUSSIA AND RUSSIANS. Last October, it seemed that the Soviet Union had reached and was about to negotiate, which was a critical turning point in its post-Stalinist evolution. The reason was the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR. There seemed to be no need to hold this Congress just then, unless it was to draw a line under the past and lay a clear direction for the future. The 20th Congress in 1956 was a congress on de-Stalinization, at which Khrushchev's new leadership, first of all, managed to get rid of a large part of the past. He not only rejected Stalin; it has also shaken itself free from the paralyzing Leninist dogmas of the inevitability of war and thus has gained new freedom of manoeuvre in the international sphere. 21st Congress, three years later, was called an emergency Congress; its main goal was to celebrate Khrushchev's victory over the anti-party group in June 1957 and to forget its members, Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich and Shepilov, who joined them. The imaginary goal of the 22nd Congress last October was to discuss and approve a new Communist Party program, a 20-year plan that was supposed to bring the Soviet Union to the brink of the millennium, not in 1984, but in 1981, by Khrushchev's 80th birthday. It was a long struggle for Khrushchev, as in early 1954 he forced Malenkov to step down as prime minister. The secret speech against Stalin in 1956 was a major battle in the campaign. The weakening then led to bloodshed in Hungary and the moral defeat of the Soviet leadership of Gomulka in Poland, as in the late autumn of 1956. She also almost led The fall of Khrushchev. In the winter of 1956, he was desperate; but he fought back, and by the beginning of the summer of 1957 he had won. Despite the fact that people as strongly different in ideas and views as Malenkov and Molotov, came together with the sole purpose of his overthrow, he turned the tables on them, and with the help of provincial party bosses and Marshal Yukov at the head of the army, he scattered his enemies. Shortly thereafter, he managed to get rid of Marshal Sukov. But he was still not an autocrat, as Stalin was an autocrat. Blind devotion and uncritical admiration are not the qualities that Khrushchev inspires in the people closest to him. Nor does he inspire reverence, as Stalin did. A healthy attitude towards his character, fear of his malice, by all means. But don't thrill. Above all, there is a reluctant respect for his genius as a practical policy; he is, indeed, the first real politician, as the West understands, produced by Soviet Russia. In doing so there is a high score of his extraordinary combination of physical endurance, nervous drive, courage and cunning, and agility. At the top of the communist hierarchy, there is no one else who can drive and drive when Khrushchev drives and drives. So the Soviet Union needs it. He's the best head of state they have, and they know it. This does not mean that they approve of everything he does, or that they sometimes fail to test him in full flight. Khrushchev, no doubt, is the main boss, the leader, but he is the boss of the permission of others. His colleagues could easily put him down. But the fact that this can happen does not mean that it is least likely to happen. First, a strong majority must accept that this is desirable; there was also a need to agree on who should replace it. What's the result of this? Of course, it is followed by a kind of democracy - not grassroots democracy, but what can be called the democracy of the higher nations. The decisive point is that if Khrushchev, the leader himself, cannot have his own way in everything, this applies to his closest colleagues and to all members of the communist hierarchy up to the line. There is no unquestioning, authoritative line, as it was in Stalin's time. And, paradoxically, the very fact that Khrushchev is not a complete autocrat makes it difficult for the decisive opposition, a kind of opposition that ends with a putsch or a palace revolution. The counter-workers are not always united against the tyrant; rather, they are free to maneuver among themselves and against themselves. Comrade X will be intriguing for his own advancement and is looking for the boss's favor. Comrade Y will line up with comrades A and B, whom he hates, to put pressure on the boss to do so or stop doing so; And so on. The odds of comrades from A to I all come together to more or less The boss's head is pretty removed, as in Western democracy. Of course, there should be a lack of clear policy, as in Western democracy. The more votes the Soviet leader must have, the less certain and deliberate his policy will be. The line changes that seem to us to be the result of the calculations of the chessboard can be, and sometimes clearly, in fact, because of uncertainty, especially when we think of the new position of the Soviet Union in the communist world. Stalin was not just an absolute master in his own home; he was also a recognized leader of the global communist movement. What is different from Khrushchev, who has clashed head and header with the Chinese, is challenged by Albanians, and largely questioned by other communist parties outside Russia, or elements in them. All this must be established when you think about the differences within the Kremlin. There is clearly a lot of disagreement. The ongoing and sharp disagreements on various policy issues can single-handedly explain the events of recent months. But to pre-assess differences is not a predestination of a clear conflict between Khrushchev and his supporters, on the one hand, and the anti-Russian party on the other. The scene is much more confusing than that. What are the main reasons for the disagreement? There is a China problem. Is Khrushchev right in pushing the Chinese quarrel so far? If he is right, should he push him to a logical conclusion and take responsibility for an open split? If he's wrong, what's the best way to fix the fight? How far should the Soviet Union go, adapting to Chinese ideas for the sake of unity? Should it give China nuclear weapons? Should the Chinese communist, unlike the Russian communist, be recognized as a sphere of influence in Asia? Should it continue to supply materials and technicians to China, even if it is believed that they are being wasted and wrong? There are issues closely related to the Chinese issue, about war and peace, about hard lines compared to soft, Germany, disarmament, nuclear testing, desirability of seriousness to America. There are issues of heavy industry compared to consumer goods, more or less freedom of expression, about the place of the party functionary in a changing society. There is, above all, a big question of food production and how to develop and modernize Soviet agriculture. All these questions, and much more, moreover, give almost endless possibilities for reasoning, as well as for hesitation and confusion. More importantly, there are probably no two individuals who hold the same views on all these issues. Let's have this in mind, look at Congress last October and the strange political vacuum that followed it. It soon became clear that the October Congress was by no means a simple victory parade. Rather, it's in many ways the dramatization of dramatization Fight. Instead of turning away from the past and confidently and calmly welcoming the future, Khrushchev went to war. He pitched into a poor old shattered anti-party group more viciously than ever before; he disgraced the elderly Marshal Voroshilov, still sitting on the platform as a member of the party's presidium; he forced Molotov to be accused of actively conspiring against senior management from his post in Vienna; he brought new charges against Stalin and accused Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Voroshilov and others of participating in some Stalinist crimes. First of all, believing in bold for Enver Hodge and the Albanian leadership, accusing them of the sins that all present knew were in fact peipin's sins, he rediscovered, more publicly than ever before, the great Sino-Russian quarrel that had been on paper more than a year earlier at a Moscow meeting of the eighty-one Communist Party less than a year earlier. To crown everything, with extreme surprise he caused Stalin's body to be banished from the grave, with the wreath chow en-bark resting, still green and fresh, against the bier. Chou En-lai, sharply protesting the attack on Albania, flew home to Peiping with Congress back in session to be defiantly welcomed at Mao Tse-tung airport. In the midst of this outrage, a new party program was analyzed and approved. Madame Furtseva, Khrushchev's formidable, brilliant and attractive protegee, rose to speak and expatiated on the glorious days of the party's 22nd congress, which marked the culmination in the push towards communism. But Ms. Furtseva herself had to turn her back on the joys of the present and the future and take a time-off to accuse the anti-party group of complicity in the murder or execution on false charges of Marshal Tuchachevsky and most of the red army's high command in 1937. She also contributed, like Mikoyan, to a sense of hidden struggle. Mikoyan is not content with Khrushchev's line of coexistence and avoidance of war; he defended it with passion. Who was he defending him against? Ms. Furtseva went even further. She did much more than add her voice to the general chorus of approval; she went wrong to ask the audience, imploring Congress to understand that Khrushchev had had a very hard struggle to overcome enormous difficulties, and her tone was such as to suggest that he was by no means out of the woods. The interesting thing about Madame Furtseva, the first woman ever to reach the level of the party's presidency (the old Politburo), is that she has already lost a lot of land. After her notable speech at the 22nd congress, she was expelled from the Presidency without explanation along with others (Mukhtidinov and Ignatov), who were known to be close to Khrushchev. Soon after, she in a Moscow nursing home, officially suffering from a heart attack, in fact from a nervous breakdown. In March, she disappeared even from the list of candidates for the Supreme Council elections. So did Aristov, a great organizational figure, and Mukhtidinov, who at forty-five was behind Khrushchev and the world. So did Belyaev, one of Khrushchev's right-hand men, who had previously become a scapegoat for the 1960 debacle on the virgin lands. Voroshilov, who was so brutally attacked at the congress, survived. Molotov went as a free man to place his voice. It's not a name loss. What I'm trying to do is show the futility of name-drop. No one has any idea why Furtseva and Mukhtidinov went, or, in fact, what they stood for. No one, to go further back, has no idea why Kirichenko went before them. Kirichenko has always been known as Khrushchev's right-hand man in Ukraine. He was taken to Moscow by Khrushchev and soared to the heights as Khrushchev took off. At the 21st Congress in 1959, he made a more positive contribution than any other person except Khrushchev. However, in a very short time he left. Did he go because Khrushchev decided he was threatening to become a dangerous opponent? He went because others decided that the combination of Khrushchev and Kirichenko is too powerful and should be broken? It's impossible to say. And the real burden of this article is to assume that it doesn't matter anyway. Kremlinology is out of date. There was a time when it served a purpose. He grew up under Stalin. Under Stalin, there was an almost complete lack of hard information about the Soviet Union. The statistics were meager and false. No one ever spoke except Stalin, and he spoke rarely. When he spoke, he had nothing to say about the internal affairs of the Soviet Union, and his statements about international relations were oracle and false. Little could be learned about the state of Russia and Stalin's intentions, it was necessary to painstakingly collect, reading between the lines, and, above all, studying new appointments, actions and demotions. Since the great purges, leading political and administrative bodies - the Politburo, the Secretariat, the Orgburo, the Control Commission - and the police hierarchy have formed a vicious circle, a strictly limited group of men, exclusively added to the exclusively subtract from it, which appears to have engaged in a kind of ritual puppet dance. Over time, it became possible for a close student of this remarkable parade to discover to some extent what these immeasurable people stood for, firmness or softness, self-confidence or paranoia, conservatism or experimentalism, full blood or qualified blood, pragmatism or dogmatism, and so on. As soon as it became known, it was possible about Stalin's mood or intentions, watching the achievements and depressions of these puppet figures, because the master had an interesting habit of presenting them to the public in an ever-changing order of merit. It was the whole point of Kremlin science, which I believe is no longer a useful activity. This is no longer useful, first of all, because Khrushchev, one of the most obsessive interlocutors in the world, constantly shouts out his intentions at the top of his voice and in a stream of nonstop speeches, harangues, interviews and inspired newspaper articles that can be read and digested by everyone who has time. This, of course, does not mean that Khrushchev is not very often misleading. But he says enough to serve as a useful guide. Secondly, The Kremlin's geology is outdated, because you no longer need to try to conform to people's ideas. We, the audience, are concerned not with who adheres to what ideas, but with what ideas and views wins at any given time. There is constant debate in the Kremlin, and this discussion is strongly influenced by views on what can only be called pressure groups from the outside. Many more people are involved in actual policy-making than they were under Stalin; and these people are constantly changing. Belyaev goes, Voronov comes (from where?), Kirichenko disappears, Frol Kozlov soars (why?). We don't even know what Khrushchev himself means. In many cases, it is impossible to say whether any policy he promotes is close to his heart or whether it has been imposed on him by others. For example, Khrushchev speaks to the Central Committee in January 1961. It attacks, and very harshly, those who put too much stress on the heavy industry through food production. Some of our comrades have developed an appetite for giving the country more metal. This is a laudable wish, provided that other sectors of the national economy are not harmed. But if more metal is produced while other branches fall behind, their expansion will be backward. Thus, not enough bread, butter and other food will be produced. That would be a lopsided development. Again, as recently as May 1961, he said, speaking at a British exhibition in Moscow: Soviet heavy industry should be seen as built. Therefore, in the future light and heavy industry will develop at the same rate. But two months later, a new party program was launched, which once again insisted, in old familiar terms, on the paramount importance of heavy industry and would not provide any serious diversion of resources to light industry and consumer goods production. And in March of this year, at the last plenum of the Central Committee, which was announced in advance by the crown of efforts on the national year, we find Khrushchev specifically stating that there can be no increase in investment in Economy in Industry. When it comes to turning more tractors fast, all he can recommend is that a factory that has recently taken to building family cars should immediately return to building tractors. Does this mean that Khrushchev has changed his mind over the past year? Or does it mean that he was redefined by comrades who developed an appetite to give the country more metal? We don't know. How much does this ignorance really matter? At least we know what's going on. We know that Khrushchev is still there as the boss. And we more or less know what kind of person he is. The rest is, of course, the story in the making. The fact is that the Soviet Union is slowly and painfully developing towards a freer and more enlightened society; that, despite the major upheavals, it will continue to evolve in this direction, now faster, now slower, now to step back; that such a development is the result of countless and complex pressures, social, economic, political and military; that it takes a huge amount of balance to keep the country together during this toward; that Khrushchev is the ultimate balancer. It follows, of course, that we should start to change our attitude to the idea of discord in the Kremlin. Disagreement is no longer something to think in terms of crisis (as it certainly was in 1957), but as an integral aspect of the evolution of power in the Soviet Union, should be taken for granted, as we take it for granted in the West. This does not mean that future crises are excluded. On the contrary, at any moment, and on any of a number of issues, Khrushchev can be so badly defeated that he will have to leave. But I believe that the Soviet Union has now reached a stage where this could have happened without a direct change in all Khrushchev's policy or, in particular, a return to Stalinism in any thorough way. Khrushchev could survive the last eight years only because the general circle of opinion in the Soviet communist hierarchy generally sympathizes with his common direction, although individuals or groups may not sharply agree with the way he deals with specific issues. If this view is adopted, and only if it is adopted, we will be able to understand what happened before, during and after the 22nd Congress last October. It is clear that the new party program was not achieved without much debate. It is clear to all those who have studied Khrushchev's speeches over the past few years that the program was not a one-off diktat; rather, it was the fruit of compromise. Moreover, when it comes to light industry and agriculture, the debate is still ongoing so that there is no hard line. But when Khrushchev got up last October to make his report, he knew very well that, despite the opposition in detail, he was master of the situation, and he must have decided that he was strong enough to force a number of questions that were still considered open. I think in particular about the Chinese issue (there is no doubt that the attack on Albania and Molotov was unexpected). I also think of Stalin's symbolic outship and the resumption and ferocious attacks on the anti-party group. Here Khrushchev sought to emphasize past victories and show all dissident elements that, after all, he was the boss and offered to behave like one; that the debate and the opposition were very good to the point, but there were limits; and that he did not intend to put up with any other arguments about issues that had already been resolved, he had crushed the opposition in the past, and he knew how to compromise in the past to ensure his own continued tenure. The lesson of his attack on the anti-party group is that the opposition can be defeated again. But it didn't quite work. Khrushchev spent the day at the congress. But after Congress, obviously some very simple conversation. And followed an unusual period of emptiness and suspense, pierced periodically by strange cries. Some government departments have virtually ceased to function; everyone was waiting for something. The air was thick rumors about the conflict, about the impending layoffs. Madame Furtseva had a nervous breakdown. There were others. Lychev, recently nominated for the post of head of propaganda, the custodian of the Ark of the Covenant, simultaneously shot at the heretics of the right, revisionists (those who want to move too fast) and heretics of the left, dogmas (neo-Stalinists). Towards the end of January, the air began to clear a little, and the rows seemed to begin to close. The truth was strongly in support of Khrushchev's line of coexistence, simply laying it down without arguing about it. Pospelov, never an ardent Khrushchev, made some thoughts about Lenin's journey with heretics, quietly discussing whether it was good to exclude them from the party. After all the confusion about Molotov's future, statements and denials about his return to Vienna, Pravda made a final statement about his sins. It was clear that Khrushchev managed to line up the party behind his back. In December, Illichev fiercely argued on behalf of Khrushchev. Arguments have now given the place a simple instruction. This did not mean that Khrushchev would have his way in everything. He got his way, of course, about his Chinese policy, about a new attempt at treatment with America, very likely about Berlin. However, there are still countless opportunities for discussion. One of them was re-dramatized by Illichev on the one hand and Ilya Ehrenburg on the other. Ehrenburg, with some courage, he turned to write about pasteur's shabby treatment of Pasternak after his death. This nastiness, he said, reflected a certain attitude on the part of certain people and a way of life, which, fortunately, is increasingly receding into the background. He was careful not to say that he had completely retreated. And the reason was clear in Illichka's article about creative freedom in art. Lenin, Illichev agrees, certainly advocated for the creative freedom of artists in expressing their ideals, but, he continued, this could be applied only when the ideals of the individual artist coincided with the ideals of the people as a whole. Ehrenburg, however, survives. Even more revealing was the widely advertised plenum of the Central Committee, which opened on March 5. The purpose of this meeting was to recognize the shortcomings of Soviet agriculture and lay the conditions for a powerful new rise. But Khrushchev was just fiddling with this problem. There were no radical measures that could approach the essence of the matter - the state and mood of the collectivized peasants. Two panacea models were proposed, while in defence the abolition of the lei-agricultural economy and the establishment of special management committees, chaired by local party secretaries. The main problem of how to put the peasants on the side of the regime was not even affected. Why was that? Obviously, because there was no agreement between the comrades. Khrushchev was to be allowed to try a couple of experiments, one agricultural, one administrative, while everyone thought again, and the situation drifted. The evolution of the new democracy of the higher peoples at the higher levels of the Party manifests itself more and more in apparent indecision and drift, as well as in the changes of the line, which should be seen not as deliberate and calculated acts of policy, but rather as temporary expediency. We must get used to manifestations of this kind in the foreign policy of the USSR. We should, I think, welcome them. Their.

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