




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Deontology vs utilitarianism pdf

Deontological ethics is a system of ethics that evaluates the right or wrong action on the basis of a moral code. The consequences of these actions are not taken into account. This ethics system is designed for accurate and book. Doing the right thing means following proper rules of conduct and thereby promoting fairness and equality. Immanuel Kant, a prominent proponent of the ethics system, formulated the most influential form of secular deontological theory of morality in 1788. Unlike religious deontological theories, the rules (or maxims) of Kant's deontological theory come from the human mind. (Shakil, 2015) Deontology works great in theory, but in the real world, it's hard to observe it. What happens when you have to choose between two ashes? What happens when we can't be objective? What happens when the situation is not black and white? On the other hand, utilitarian ethics means that action should be taken, taking into account the most positive result. This system of ethics is more accurate when it comes to dealing with complex situations whose solutions are not so trivial. Initially, Jeremy Bentham, the founder of utilitarianism, defined utility as a cumulative pleasure after deducting the suffering of all participants in any action. (Wikipedia, 2015). However, the fall of this system of ethics is not about justice. To better understand deontology versus utilitarianism, let's use an example that has a moral dilemma. Peter is a father, and his son is very ill. Peter took his son to the doctor and learned that his son needed a very expensive operation. Peter does not have enough time to earn the money needed for the operation, because his son is in critical condition. Peter, not knowing what to do to save his son, decides to lie. Peter goes to the bank and asks for a personal loan designed to invest in a new business that will generate a lot of revenue. Peter gets money, goes to the hospital, pays for the operation and saves his son's life. According to Kant, Peter shouldn't have lied. According to Bentham, Peter did the right thing because he ultimately saved his life. What do you think you would do if lying was your only choice to save a life? As we see in this example, ethical dilemmas are not easily solved. Ethics depends on the moral framework. We make decisions based on what we think is right and what is best for us, but not necessarily for everyone else. In some situations we decide with the heart, in other situations with our brain. Being human is part of the dilemma. Inquiries: Article ID: DE197-1 Author: J.P. Moreland Below is an excerpt from the DE197-1 article from the Christian Research Institute. The full PDF can be viewed by clicking here. Theories of Ethics- Utilitarianism Vs. Deontological Ethics There Are Two Major Ethics Theories an attempt to flesh out and justify moral norms and principles: utilitarianism and deontological ethics. Utilitarianism (also called consequence) is a moral theory developed and refined in the modern world in the writings of Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873). There are several varieties of utilitarianism. But in principle, a utilitarian approach to morality implies that no moral action (such as an act of theft) or rules (e.g. Keep Your Promises) is inherently right or wrong. Rather, the validity or wrongness of an act or rule is solely a matter of the common non-moral good (e.g. pleasure, happiness, health, knowledge or satisfaction of individual desire), narrated or followed by the consequences of this act. In general, according to the utilitarianism, morality is a matter of immoral good, which is the result of moral actions and rules, and moral duty plays an important role, not an internal role. Morality is a means for any other purpose; it is in no way an end in itself. Space does not allow you to criticize utilitarianism in detail here. Suffice it to say that most moral philosophers and theologians considered it inferior. One of the main problems is that utilitarianism, if adopted, justifies both morally appropriate things that are clearly immoral. For example, utilitarianism can be used to justify punishing innocent people or enslaving a small group of people if such actions are hung to maximize the consequences. But these actions are clearly immoral, no matter how fruitful they may be for the greatest number. For this and other reasons, many thinkers advocated the second type of moral theory, deontological ethics. Deontological ethics in accordance with Scripture, natural moral law and intuition from common sense. The word deontological comes from the Greek word deon, which means mandatory debt. Deontological ethics has at least three important features. First, the debt must be fulfilled for the sake of debt. The validity or wrongness of an act or rule, at least in part, is a matter of internal morality of such actions or governance. For example, acts of lies, breaking promises or killing are inherently wrong, and we must not do so. This does not mean that the consequences of the acts have nothing to do with the assessment of these acts. For example, a doctor may be required to benefit the patient, and he or she may need to know what the medical consequences will be as a result of different treatments in order to determine what will and will not benefit the patient. But the consequences are not that to make the act right, as is the case with utilitarianism. Rather, at best, the consequences help determine which actions are more in line with what is already our duty. The consequences help us find what is our duty, they are not something that do something of our duty. Second, people should be treated as objects of internal internal The value that is, as in itself, and not as a mere means for any other purpose (say, general happiness or well-being). As we shall see in the second part, this concept is very difficult to justify if we abandon the theological doctrine of man, made in the image and likeness of God. However, justified or unjustified deontological ethics implies that people are goals in themselves that have inherent value. Third, moral principle is a categorical imperative that is universal: that is, it should be applicable to all those who are in the same moral situation. Moral utterances do not say: if you want to maximize pleasure against pain in this case, then do such-and-such. Rather, moral statements are imperatives or commandments that are used for all examples of an act taken into account, such as telling the truth. Moral statements say: keep your promises, not murder, and so on. Utilitarianism is an ethical philosophy that states that total well-being or good should be maximized and that suffering or bad should be minimized. This usually contrasts with the deontological philosophy, which states that there are unchangeable moral rules that do not change depending on the situation (Greene, 2007b). From a utilitarian point of view, murder can be justified if its benefits outweigh the costs, for example, if killing a dangerous criminal saves lives. From a deontological point of view, the act is simply right or wrong, despite its consequences. Deontologists argue that if in one situation it is possible to inflict moral damage, it can be violated in any situation, and therefore cease to be a moral rule. For example, don't kill is a classic absolute deontological rule, and so killing is always wrong from a deontological point of view, even if it saves lives. For utilitarian, the goals justify the means while for a deontologist they don't. In recent years, these two moral preferences have been explored in the field of moral psychology through vignettes, stories and dilemmas (e.g. Bartels and Pizarro, 2011; Jerioutat and Tremolier, 2014; Lee and Gino, 2015; see Christensen and Gornall, 2012 for review). The type of stimulus material most commonly used sets of dilemmas that pit utilitarian and deontological inclinations against each other in an emotionally appealing way. These dilemmas often describe a situation where a moral agent (or participant) has the ability to kill an innocent person by his actions in order to save the lives of several others. Such dilemmas, with an apparent utilitarian motivation to cause harm, have been called high-conflict dilemmas because they require emotional taxation of personal involvement. That is, they conflict between utilitarian and deontological tendencies, comparing them on one continuum (e.g., Greene et al., 2008; Lee and Gino, 2015). In contrast, the dilemmas when harm indirect (caused by proxies), or has no utilitarian motivation, have been called low level of conflict because they do not require the same type of personal involvement. However, the response to high-conflict dilemmas is theoretically more interesting, as they are much more diverse than reactions to low-conflict dilemmas (Greene, 2007b), and can be used to measure the strengths of two moral inclinations or poles (Cushman and Greene, 2012). Indeed, the most commonly used set of moral dilemmas are high-conflict moral dilemmas. In addition, high-conflict moral dilemmas are likely to indicate that a unitary cognitive resource (Mr Factor) may be behind both types of moral and cognitive preferences. A classic example of a high-conflict dilemma is the dilemma of a pedestrian bridge when a runaway trolley is about to run over and kill five people. The participant has the opportunity to push an innocent passerby down from the footbridge in front of the trolley, killing a passerby, but saving five more people from a certain death. Participants are usually asked whether it is permissible to push a random passerby to their death; accepting a victim is considered a utilitarian response. If the participant concludes that this action is unacceptable, their decision is considered deontological. A single scale can be used to describe the level of utilitarianism compared to deontology in these responses, where, as in the case of a runaway trolley, preferences are mutually exclusive. Utilitarian preferences were positively associated with all three measures of the Dark Triad (Psychopathy, Narcissism and Machiavellianism; Bartels and Pizarro, 2011) and negatively with honesty-humility and harm/care ethics (Jerioutat and Tremolier, 2014). Neuroscience studies have also shown that people with specific damage to the prefrontal cortex prefer utilitarian variants in these dilemmas (Koenigs et al., 2007); especially if the limbic areas are unable to provide emotional information for rational prefrontal areas. In accordance with the above, people with more able-bodied memory were more utilitarian (Moore et al., 2008). Overall, it was stated that deontological responses to the aforementioned dilemmas are instinctive, emotionally based gut responses, and that utilitarian responses take more thought as a more rational or biased decision (e.g. Green, 2007a). However, Bauman et al. (2014) expressed concern about the external validity of moral dilemmas as a tool for measuring moral judgments. Bauman et al. (2014) said that some moral dilemmas are more suited to philosophical discussion than to actual measurement, since dilemmas do not resemble everyday life in a meaningful way. On the other hand, Cushman and Green (2012) claim to be clear -- and therefore somewhat The nature of moral moral that is why it sheds more light on the basic structure underlying moral thought. To clearly measure utilitarian and deontological trends, it may be that very hypothetical scenarios are needed to get clear signals regarding the structure of our moral cognition. Although until now there has been no standard way to pose dilemmas or measure utilitarian or deontological preferences. Preferences were measured using dichotomous measures (the most common) or Likert scales (see Christensen and Gomila, 2012 for review). Moreover, there is not yet a single standard set of dilemmas; at least three different sets of dilemmas have been used in previous studies (e.g. Greene et al., 2008; Bartels and Pizarro, 2011 and Lee and Gino, 2015), while these sets overlap partially. However, as far as we know, there has not been an extensive psychometric assessment of the validity of weights as psychometric instruments. Given the aforementioned link between moral inclinations, emotions, memory, personality, and brain lesions, it is becoming increasingly important to have proven measurement tools. Although dilemmas are in general shape, they describe different situations and thus have qualitative differences. It is possible that some elements are better at measuring moral inclinations than others. In addition, some of them may form separate subfrazis related to moral thought. In the following three studies, we used a set of 12 high-conflict dilemmas developed by Greene et al. (2008) to measure moral inclinations and to examine the factor structure of responses to these dilemmas. We chose this set as it has been used in several other studies and uses a more interesting type of dilemma. We started with the standard assumption made in literature that these dilemmas are part of the same measurement model; i.e. they measure the same utilitarian and deontological inclinations. Various alternatives to this assumption are being explored in the future. Experimental research / Calibration of the devices We have collected a small sample to check if our initial assumption regarding the non-name structure behind the dilemmas will be supported. In addition, we wanted our analyses to be empirical. The Ethical Statement All local ethics laws for social science research have been fully complied with. All participants were completely voluntary and participants were informed of their right to opt out at any time without penalty. All materials and protocol of the study have been reviewed and approved by the Ethical Review Board of the University of Helsinki for Humanities and Social and Behavioral Sciences. Methods Participants and Procedures Fifty-Seven Finnish People recruited for anonymous internet research on Facebook. No identification information, not even gender, was After granting their informed consent, participants read the instructions and answered 12 moral dilemmas using the 7-degree Likert scale (Greene et al., 2008). Materials Moral Preference Measure We used 12 highly conflicting moral dilemmas taken from Green et al (2008). The dilemmas are presented in additional materials. In each of the dilemmas, the participant was tasked with taking on the role of moral agent in the script. Moral dilemmas relate to topics ranging from military emergencies to traffic accidents and even situations where an agent should consider donating to his own child. Each of the dilemmas described a morally ambiguous situation where a moral agent must judge how acceptable it is to kill or injure one person to save several others (or prevent human suffering before imminent death). The utilitarian option in each dilemma has a moral agent to carry harm with his own hands - for example, pushing a person off a footbridge in front of a trolley. All the questions were framed as follows: How acceptable is it for you to do X, for example, to push a passerby away from the footbridge? By conventional standards, sacrificial dilemmas had good intertemporal reliability (Cronbach's No. 0.92). Since Cronbach in Kew is known to have psychometric problems (e.g., zinbarg et al. 2005; Dunn et al., 2014), we also calculated Tarkkonen's for the elements and their internal reliability (No. 0.87), which also indicates acceptable internal consistency. The results of the experimental study Theoretically, we assumed that there would be only one factor for the dilemmas that were also proposed by Tarkkonen's. Based on the Eigenvalue criterion, the recommendation is a factor and is based on optimal coordinates, acceleration factor and parallel analysis, the recommendation is also a single-factor solution. We also conducted a Maximum Probability (ML) assessment of the research analysis of factors using the VARIMAX rotation on our pilot data. According to the analysis, all items are loaded on one factor (all loads 0.55 euros) with eigenvalue 6.6, while the next possible extracted factor had eigenvalue 0.85. We have come to the conclusion that small sample experimental data suggest that it is worth making a single-factor solution for the factor structure of the 12 most common dilemmas in the field of moral psychology. An example of a graphic presentation for parallel analysis is the results of Study 1. Study 1 Since our experimental study was a special online study, we decided to collect large laboratory data in combination with others (reported elsewhere), assuming that laboratory data would be less noisy and more evenly controlled environment than what we would in online questionnaires. Participants and participants were recruited through social media and from public libraries in downtown Helsinki. One hundred and fifty-six (N No 156; 65 men; Magician No. 26.83; SDage No 8,81; in laboratory experiments, where they filled moral dilemmas in conjunction with other tasks unrelated to the objectives of this study (i.e. assessing facial emotions and other emotional intelligence tasks), people in the range of 18 to 62 people participated. All dilemmas were presented in a fully randomized manner. Participants answered the dilemmas in their native language and received compensation of an average of 2.5 euros for their time. Materials Moral Preference Measure We used the same materials as in the experimental study above. A full description of the materials can be obtained in the experimental study and additional material. By conventional standards, high-conflict dilemmas had good inter-mentioned reliability (Cronbach's No. 0.89). We also calculated Tarkkonen's (No. 0.82), which also pointed to an acceptable internal sequence. Theoretically we assumed that there would be only one factor, as was also suggested in Tarkkonen's. In addition, we conducted a parallel analysis to confirm this result. Based on the Eigenvalue criterion, the recommendation consisted of two factors and was based on optimal coordinates, acceleration factor and parallel analysis, one factor (see figure 1). FIGURE 1. The results of a parallel analysis on a number of factors for the data presented in study 1. We then analyzed the research factors for a one-phase factor solution. All goods are loaded on a factor with decent values (0.45 - 0.74). We also conducted two- and three-pointer analyses without rotation, varimax and promax rotations (see tables 1 and 2 for the full load of factors). TABLE 1. Solutions of research one-dimensional and two-dimensional analysis of factors. TABLE 2. Solutions for research three-dimensional factor analysis. The results of non-protective two- and three-factor solutions indicate that there will be only one factor in which all goods will be loaded with decent values (from 0.45 to 0.77), while all other loads on other factors will be relatively weak (0.42). The rotations of Varimax and promax suggest that the second factor will consist of four elements: Crying Baby, Footbridge, Donation, and Sophie's Choice. Three of these four points relate to situations where the participant has to think about donating to children (own or not). However, since the pedestrian bridge dilemma has nothing to do with children, there is no theoretical reason to separate these four points from the other eight. Varimax's three-dimensional solution was the most ambiguous theoretically. This decision assumes that euthanasia, boat life, safari and underwater dilemmas will be factors, and four dilemmas that had been extracted in the previous previous (Crying Baby, Footbridge, Sacrifice, and Sophie's Choice) will consist of one factor, with everyone else (Lawrence of Arabia, Son of a Terrorist, Vaccine, and Vitamins) forming the third factor. We were unable to find a significant interpretation of the decision, as it also had two relatively heavy cross-loads. In particular, Footbridge's dilemma was not only related to the dilemmas of child sacrifice, but also to the factor of Lawrence of Arabia, the Son of a Terrorist, Vaccine and Vitamins; see also the load for the Safari dilemma. The three factors turned by Promax were more significant because it suggested that the three dilemmas associated with child sacrifice (Crying Child, Sacrifice and Sophie's Choice) formed a single factor, and two dilemmas embedded in the military context (Euthanasia and Submarine) would form another factor, with all other dilemmas forming a third factor. Finally, we analyzed the Schmid-Leiman factor with promax rotation, suggesting that there would be a common factor behind the proposed two- and three-factor models for the study; if any of the elements has a greater strain on subfence than on the overall utilitarian factor. In our analysis, we found that for both two- and three-factor solutions, the g factor was the largest Eigenvalue (4.15 and 4.08, respectively). Only Factor 1 in the two-role decision had Eigenvalue slightly more than one, indicating a marginal opportunity for an independent factor. However, since all elements of this factor have a greater strain on the g factor, there is no reason to separate the factors from each other. All other factors had Eigenvalues less than 1, indicating that these subfactors contain less information than the original elements, and thus support a single-factor solution (see table 3). In addition, none of the elements are loaded more on subfactors than on the common factor. TABLE 3. Schmid-Leiman analyzes factors for two and three factors with promax rotation. Study 1 provides moderate support for a one-factor solution to 12 high-conflict dilemmas. Particularly parallel analysis, along with non-protective two- and three-factor solutions and analysis of the Schmid-Leiman factor, seems to support a single-factor solution. The results also seem to imply that no item should be removed or removed from the measuring model. There is a small chance that emotional intelligence tasks can prime participants to give more deontological answers to dilemmas. However, since research factor analytical methods usually ignore the interception of elements, this problem is unlikely to cause significant bias in the analysis. In addition, since all items were presented to participants in a randomized manner, the possible effects of the primer are equally dissipated all the points. Accepted Accepted The results of the first study provide moderate support for the assertion that there may be a unitary cognitive mechanism associated with how people respond to these moral dilemmas. We also found that the three counts concerning the sacrifice of children (see Baby Crying, Sacrifice, and Sophie's Choice in Additional Factors) appear to be more or less systematically related to each other. We have taken this into account in our subsequent studies. Since an analysis based on a single laboratory data set provides only limited support for any conclusions, we have gathered another given to examine whether the results will be replicated in the Confirmed Factors Analysis (CFA). Study 2 Study 1 partly implies that a unitary single-factor structure is behind the subjects that measure utilitarianism in sacrificial moral dilemmas. So we decided to run the CFA, assuming that all items would be loaded onto one hidden factor. Our hypothetical model is represented in figure 2 below. In this model, we also included a priori assumptions that errors between the three elements relating to child sacrifice would correlate. We made this assumption based on our observations from our first study, where these three paragraphs were repeatedly linked to each other but would not come out as a complete independent factor of their own either for technical reasons (Eigenvalues No. 1) or for significant reasons (relation to the Footbridge dilemma). FIGURE 2. A priori model of confirmed factor analysis for study 2, based on the results of Study 1. All participants were e-mailed to student unions in Finland. Three hundred and forty-six people (N No 346; 54 men; Magician No. 25.23; SDage No 5,85; range No. 18 - 65) successfully completed correlation studies prepared with commercial software of the questionnaire Kvalitrik. By giving informed consent, participants adopted a number of research measures unrelated to this study (i.e. the perception of childhood time and stability) and then accepted the dilemmas of high levels of conflict. Participants had a chance to win one of the five cinema tickets in the lottery as compensation. Materials Moral Preference Measure We used the same materials in Study 2 as we did previously. A full description of the materials can be obtained in the experimental study and additional material. Cronbach's No. Confirming the analysis of the factors and the criteria for its evaluation for our CFA, we used the statistical programming language R and a peer-reviewed library of structural modeling equations called lavaan (Rosseel, 2012). Lavaan is open source alternative to Mplus and provides the same criteria for evaluating the model. Here we report on the most common ones recommended by Kline (2010), which are: (1) X2; (2) (2) Fit Index (CFI); (3) Root means square approximation error (RMSEA); and (4) Standardized root means square residual (SRMR). We also report TLI in what is recommended by Byrne (2012). X2 is traditionally used in the CFA as a fit index, and it is expected that it will be as close to zero as possible and thus is not expected to be significant (i.e. the p-value should be 0.05 euros); however, in practice, with a sample size of 200 euros, it is almost always statistically significant. However, the X2 can still be useful in evaluating fits between multiple models. CFI is an index that receives values from 0 to 1, measuring the discrepancy between the hypothetical model and the actual data. CFI does not depend on the sample size, 0.90 is generally considered a passable value, but values above 0.95 are usually expected in peer review. The RMSEA is an absolute indicator of a fit model that improves as the number of variables in the model or the number of observations in the sample go up. Cut points of 0.01, 0.05 and 0.08 were offered, corresponding to excellent, good and mediocre seizures,

respectively (MacCallum et al., 1996); confidence intervals should be used to understand the size of the sample error (the upper limit should be preferable to 0.1). SRMR indicates the difference between observed and projected values; zero, indicating the perfect fit; no.0.08 is considered appropriate (Hu and Bentler, 1999). The TLI, or Tucker-Lewis Index, is a similar measure for the CFI, but it imposes harsher penalties on complex models; 0.95 is considered a cut point for a good fit (Hu and Bentler, 1999). Results We ran the CFA on the hypothetical model presented in Figure 2 with a reliable maximum probability (MLM) score. This hypothetical original model was indeed satisfied with the assuming model (X2 (51) - 123.38, CFI - 0.96, TLI - 0.95, RMSEA - 0.06, 90% CI - 0.05 - 0.08, SRMR - 0.04). We then proceed to investigate potential model modifications. We decided to add bug quarans between the Life Boat and submarine dilemmas in the model, as both deal with an emergency at sea (Suggested M: 27.67). This increased the model fits statistically significantly (NoX2 and 19.86, p 0.001; X2 (50) - 100.90, CFI - 0.97, TLI - 0.96, RMSEA - 0.05, 90% CI - 0.04 - 0.07, SRMR - 0.036). All model estimates were statistically significant (see Figure 3 below for standardized estimates/coefficient loads). FIGURE 3. Study 2. Study 2 suggests that a unitary single-factor structure is behind the points that measure utilitarianism in highly conflict moral dilemmas. In addition, the hypothetical errors of the corrian were statistically significant. This indicates that, although three which concern the sacrifice of children are not grouped strongly enough to ensure that they are divided into their own factor, they are nonetheless. This may be an indication that the overall mechanism responsible for utilitarian-deontological judgments can take situational signals that change weight in how these judgments were made or made (e.g. Kurzban et al., 2012). Our further modification of the measurement model, adding the term covarianism between the dilemmas of submarine and boat life, was also substantially and statistically justified. Factor loads of measurement models are moderately strong and relatively similar to those found in laboratory data (see Figure 3). However, since this model has been modified and the terms of the ruvarians bugs have been added to the model, we wanted to replicate the results of our CFA with another data set to eliminate the possibility of over-installation of our model. Study 3 Results from two previous studies show that sacrificial moral dilemmas are followed by a single common structure and that the three points relating to the sacrifice of children are linked. In addition, the general term of covarian error between two dilemmas related to the sea was added to the model in study 2. We conducted a third study to confirm the model built in study 2 to rule out possible features or overfitting that could explain the results of Study 2. Finally, we also tested for the equality of the load ratio between studies 2 and 3. The Method Participants and Design Data were collected from the Netherlands (N No. 174) and from Finland (N No. 343). All Dutch participants were recruited through social media. All Finnish participants were recruited from the lists by email of student unions in Finland. To sum up, 570 people in total (N No. 517; 180 men; Mag No 26.30; SDage No 8,42; range No. 18 - 66) successfully completed a study prepared with commercial software of the questionnaire kvalitrika. The data were collected in conjunction with a larger online experiment, the results of which will be reported elsewhere. After giving their informed consent, participants completed some of the research measures (i.e. rating content of the photos and other measures of emotional sensitivity) not related to this study, after which they advanced to sacrificial dilemmas. All participants answered all questions in their native language. Participants had the chance to win one of three cinema tickets in the lottery as compensation. Materials Moral Preference Measure We used the same materials as in previous studies. A full description of the materials can be obtained in the experimental study and additional material. Cronbach's No. A priori Model Testing Results From Study 2 We Ran CFA on Final Model 2 Study 3), with a reliable maximum probability (MLM) score. This original model was indeed satisfactory to fit in (X2(50) - 135.99, CFI - 0.96, TLI - 0.94, RMSEA - 0.06, 90% CI - 0.05 - 0.07, SRMR - 0.04), therefore, we have not started further modification. These results suggest that a single-factor solution found in the previous study was also valid in this data. We then began to test whether the loads of factors between the two data sets were equal. Configuration testing and weak invariance between study 2 and study 3 We combined datasets from Study 2 and Study 3 and launched the CFA for two groups to test the fit of our configurable model. Because the results showed that the configuration model corresponds to the data acceptable (X2 (100) and 236.85, CFI 0.96, TLI - 0.95, RMSEA - 0.05, 90% CI - 0.04 - 0.06, SRMR - 0.03), we have started to check the equality of factor loads between the two models (i.e. weak predation). The results show that the CFA model, where loads are limited to equal groups, fits well into the data (X2(111) - 261.21, CFI - 0.96, TLI - 0.95, RMSEA - 0.05, 90% CI - 0.04 - 0.06, SR - 0.04). Cheung and Rensvold (2002) recommend using changes in CFI to test invariance between groups. This is due to the fact that x2 is carried out by sample size, while KFFI is not (our combined sample for studies 2 and 3 is very large, N q 850). Changes in CFI No. 0.01, as noted here, are considered trivial. In conclusion, I concluded that there were no significant differences in load factors between studies 2 and 3. The full list of estimates and factors loading in Table 4 can be found in Table 4. TABLE 4. Odds from standardized and non-standardized downloads of ingvariance testing factors from combined research data sets 2 and 3. Study 3 results support one factor solution, proposed by study 1 and study 2. In addition, our results suggest that three dilemmas related to child sacrifice should be taken into account when using these subjects as a scale in pilot studies. We also cross-examined the model found in Study 2, which essentially shows that factor loads are stable in different samples and replicated with decent accuracy. General Discussion In three studies (and pilot), we looked at the factor structure of 12 highly conflicting moral dilemmas presented by Greene et al. (2008), asking participants to indicate their level of recognition of deontological impairment on a scale of Likert. The aim was to examine the factor structure of those responses in order to determine whether all dilemmas actually measured the same thing. In all three studies we found support for one-dimensional factor solution using both (multiple) and supporting factor analytical methods, and using an alternative criterion of reliability (Tarkkonen's). The results suggest that a single cognitive mechanism can be used and that none of the items should scale or measurement model. We found that all three dilemmas associated with child sacrifice were related to each other in all three of our studies, but not strongly enough to form their own sub-factor (supporting the moderation hypothesis of family choice proposed by Kurzban et al., 2012). We also found that the two dilemmas established in the maritime context had repeatedly associated residual covarians (Research 2 and 3). We cross-checked/analysed the confidence for factor loads of elements that measured the hidden factor of utilitarian moral preferences, and showed that the results could be reliably replicated (along with control of residual insidious). Future studies that use these dilemmas as dependent measures should take into account errors in the construction of the measurement scale. In addition, the strategy for using a weighted average dilemma rather than a simple average should be seriously considered, since not all elements are loaded on the hidden factor equally. As possible candidates for weight, we offer non-standard factor loads from Table 4. At the time of writing, the field of moral psychology is developing rapidly. While the new revolution in moral psychology began with neuroscience, studies using these highly conflicting moral dilemmas, or their variations, as dependent measures are published in new journals and in new contexts at an increasing rate. In addition, utilitarianism is now correlated with different individual traits and is used in increasingly diverse contexts. Thus, a psychometrically tested and proven instrument should be developed so that the results coming from different works and from different fields can be reliably compared and evaluated in relation to each other. Given that some changes in moral judgment have been associated with psychopathologies (e.g. Koenigs et al., 2011), nervous lesions (e.g. Greene, 2007b; Koenigs et al., 2007), psychopharmacological agents (e.g. Perkins et al., 2012; Terbeck et al., 2013), and personality sizes (e.g. Bartels and Pizarro, 2011), the study became influential enough to have real life implications and perhaps even policy recommendations. Therefore, it does not matter which tools are used and how moral preferences or judgments function for utilitarian or deontological morality. Measuring utilitarian/deontological preferences with a one-dimensional instrument seems justified in view of certain provisions. Given that there are several untested tools to use, the results of various past studies should be interpreted with caution. Caution should also be exercised when interpreting those studies that used the initial set of high conflict dilemmas presented by Greene et al. (2008). Previously, elements of mioks were either dichotomy measures or scales Likert Likert were summed up or averaged together, and the problems with the three child sacrificial dilemmas were not discussed extensively (see Christensen and Gomila, 2012 for review). To our knowledge, the psychometric properties of these dilemmas have not been properly tested with IRT models (for dichotomous versions of dilemmas) or with extensive factor analytical methods (for continuous versions of the Likert scale), prior to our research presented here. Our results provide some evidence that not all dilemmas burden on the hidden factor equally, and so previous studies may have an error component large enough to affect previous statistical significance tests. As with any study, this study suffers from the standard limitations of laboratory and internet questionnaire research. Respondents facing these dilemmas are not randomly sampled from the general population: participants in these studies are more likely to be curious, more patient, and younger than the population average. In addition, questionnaire studies that use self-reporting measures may suffer from different characteristics of demand and positive biases in response. Despite this, we have taken every precaution to minimize this by pouring anonymity on the questionnaire and informing participants that we are not screening individuals or interested in clinical profiling. Our findings imply that there is some general cognitive structure behind the answers to moral dilemmas, and none of our analyses have technically supported the exclusion of any of the 12 dilemmas used, but there may be reasons to separate the dilemmas of children's sacrifice from the other nine or pay special attention to them. However, the exact nature of the overall moral cognitive structure goes beyond this paper. In general, we have successfully shown in three studies (plus pilot) and in cross-analysis checks that there is a unitary common factor of utilitarian/deontological preferences that combines all dilemmas under the same hidden design. We have also demonstrated that factor loads are stable between studies, and have suggested that non-standardized factor load estimates can be used as weights for dilemmas when averaging together in future empirical studies. The author of ML Contributions collected most of the data, analyzed it and wrote the first draft document. JS collected some data, double-checked the tests and supplemented the manuscript. Funding for the study was funded by small personal Ph.D. grants awarded by ML, data collected during the course of the MD-taught period from 2011 to 2014. Statement of Conflict of Interest Authors state that the study was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationship that could be interpreted as a potential conflict of interest. Interests. ML would like to thank the Kone Foundation for funding its doctoral studies in which the data were collected and analysed. ML would also like to thank its research team Moral Intelligent Machines for their support, as well as emil Aaltonen Foundation and Jane and Aatos Ercco Foundation to fund its post-doctoral research, during which this study was completed and published. Additional material for this article can be found online by Links Bartels, D. M., and Pizarro, D.A. (2011). Wrong morality: antisocial personality traits predict utilitarian responses to moral dilemmas. *Cognition* 121, 154-161. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2011.05.010 CrossRef Full text Google Scholar Bauman, C. W., McGraw, A. P., Bartels, D. M., and Warren, C. (2014). 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