

Patrick Lahr

Economic Theory, Mechanism Design

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Current Position

ENS Paris–Saclay, Postdoctoral Researcher

since 2023

Education

Ph.D. in Economics, *University of Bonn*

2016–2023

M2 Probability and Statistics, *University of Paris XI*

2011–2012

MASt in Mathematics, *University of Cambridge*

2010–2011

B.Sc. in Mathematics, *Goethe University Frankfurt*

2008–2010

Research Visits

Trimester Program: Advances in Mechanism Design, *HCM, Bonn*

scheduled for 2026

Visiting Assistant in Research, *Yale University*

2018–2019

Research

Job Market Paper

Extreme Points in Multi-Dimensional Screening (with Axel Niemeyer). *Extended Abstract, ACM EC 2025*.

Abstract. We characterize the extreme points of the set of incentive-compatible mechanisms for screening problems with linear utility. Our framework subsumes problems with and without transfers, such as monopoly pricing, principal-optimal bilateral trade and barter exchange, delegation and veto bargaining, or belief elicitation via proper scoring rules. In every problem with one-dimensional types, extreme points admit a tractable description. In every problem with multi-dimensional types, extreme points are dense in a rich subset of incentive-compatible mechanisms, which we call exhaustive mechanisms. Building on these characterizations, we derive parallel conclusions for mechanisms that can be rationalized as (uniquely) optimal under a fixed objective. For example, in the multi-good monopoly problem, mechanisms that uniquely maximize revenue for some type distribution are dense among all incentive-compatible and individually rational mechanisms. The proofs exploit a novel connection between menus of extreme points and indecomposable convex bodies, first studied by Gale (1954).

Working Papers

The Fragility of Specialized Advice (with Justus Winkelmann). *Revise and Resubmit, RAND Journal of Economics*.

Work in Progress

Generic Optimality of Infinite Menus in Multidimensional Screening (with Axel Niemeyer), 2025.

Recent Talks

Conferences: Econometric Society European Winter Meeting, Nicosia (scheduled); Econometric Society World Congress, Seoul (2025); Economic Design, Essex (2025); European Workshop on Market Design, Mannheim (2025); AFSE Annual Congress, Paris (2025).

Seminars and workshops: PSE TOM seminar (2025); Dauphine–PSL LEDa seminar (2025); Paris Game Theory Seminar (2024); Paris 1 Theory Seminar (2024).

Teaching

Teaching Interests

Microeconomics: mechanism design, game theory, industrial organization, social choice.

As Lecturer

HEC Paris, Microeconomics, third-year undergraduates Fall 2024

As Teaching Assistant

University of Bonn, Microeconomics II, Ph.D. sequence Spring 2022, 2021

Yale University, Intermediate Microeconomics (ECON 121) Spring 2019

Yale University, Introductory Microeconomics (ECON 115) Fall 2018

Thesis co-supervision

Under Prof. Kräkel: 17 B.Sc. theses and 1 M.Sc. thesis 2022–2023

Awards and Funding

German Academic Scholarship Foundation, undergraduate scholarship;
additional grants for study periods at Cambridge and Paris XI

University of Bonn Ph.D. funding: scholarship, then research position

Yale visit funded by a Bonn scholarship and a TA position

Service and Professional Activity

Conferences: Program Committee for EC'26 (scheduled).

Seminars: Virtual MD Seminar Series since 2024.

Referee: Journal of Economic Theory; International Journal of Game Theory; Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.

Past Positions

McKinsey & Company (Berlin), Consultant 2013–2015

Other Information

Citizenship: German

Languages: German (native), English (fluent), French (intermediate)

References

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Yale University

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University of Cologne

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