

Erica De Bruin
Hamilton College
edebruin@hamilton.edu

Online appendices for “Will there be blood? Explaining violence during coups d’état”

Appendix A. Codebook for Coup Violence Dataset

Overview

This dataset contains information on the level of violence associated with 377 coup attempts between 1950 and 2017.

Definition of coup violence

There are a number of ways in which coup violence could be conceptualized. I focus here on *violent death or homicide that results from contestation between coup plotters and regime loyalists while the coup attempt is underway*. This definition of coup violence excludes deaths that may occur in demonstrations prior to the start of the coup attempt, but includes those that occur while the coup attempt is in progress. It also excludes executions and broader repression that may occur after the coup concludes and control of coup targets is no longer actively contested. Limiting the focus to violence that occurs during the coup attempt captures the type of violence most directly connected to it, providing a reasonable measure of the scale of the violence that can be compared across cases. The focus on violence during the coup attempt captures the type of violence discussed in classic works on the dynamics of coups, including those by Luttwak (1979) and Finer (1962); it is also in line with the definition used by Geddes, Wright, and Franz (2014) in their more recent effort to understand when the end of an autocratic regime involves violence. The perpetrators and targets of violence during a coup attempt are typically part of the state apparatus, including members of the military and security forces, although civilians may also be killed.

Variables

I include two variables capturing coup violence. *Violent coup* is a dichotomous indicator equal to

1 where at there was a least one death linked to contestation between coup plotters and regime loyalists while the coup attempt was underway, and 0 otherwise.

Coup severity is an ordinal scale estimate ranging from 1 to 4, where 1 corresponds to bloodless coups; 2 indicates fatalities ranging from 1-25; 3 indicates 26-999 fatalities; and 4 indicates 1,000 or more. I use dichotomous and ordinal measures of coup violence rather than count variables due to data limitations and validity concerns; the sources of data, described below, do not contain enough detail to be able to reliably construct a count variable across the 377 coup attempts in the dataset. While an ordinal variable entails some loss of data, it allows us to capture distinctions commonly made in other datasets of political violence between low intensity conflicts (26-999 fatalities) and high intensity ones (1,000+ fatalities).

Scope of the dataset

The dataset includes the first coup attempt that occurs in each country in each year in Powell and Thyne's (2011) data set of coup attempts (v11.28.2017). It includes both successful and failed coup attempts. Although excluding coups after the first in a given year entails some loss of data, most independent variables I anticipate the data will be used with are measured on a yearly basis and their values may change after the first coup attempt. A similar approach is taken in Singh (2014).

Source material and coding procedures

There are several challenges inherent in collecting data on violence during coup attempts across multiple countries and decades. International media reports are a common source of information for such data (Powell and Thyne 2011). But reliance on media-reported information alone may introduce measurement error because media outlets may report fatalities associated with some coup attempts but not others. This may reflect a deliberate decision to focus on incidents that will be of most interest to newspaper audiences. Alternatively, media outlets might not report on violence during a coup attempt because information about it does not reach reporters (Earl et al 2004). This has been an enduring challenge in collecting data on violent repression and civil war. Davenport and Ball (2002), for instance, find underreporting of violent repression in rural areas by newspapers as compared to human rights reports in Guatemala; Weidman (2015) finds higher

rates of reporting on insurgent violence cellphone-covered areas in Afghanistan. In comparison, information on violence during coup attempts, which target symbolic centers of power in the capital, are more likely to reach reporters. Yet media sources are still likely to focus on incidents that are of the most interest to their readers, which could introduce measurement error.

To limit bias from any one type of source, I draw upon as wide an array of source material as possible as a form of triangulation. I began with Powell and Thyne's (2011) list of attempted and successful coups d'état between 1950 and 2017 (v2018.07.18). I focus on the first coup attempt that occurs in each country in each year; there are 410 in total. For each coup attempt, I compile estimates of the violence associated with each attempt included in four existing datasets.

The first is the Center for Systemic Peace's (CSP) 2014 Coup d'état Dataset (Marshall and Marshall 2016), which includes an estimate of the "number of persons killed during the coup and/or as a direct result of the coup event (executions of ousted leaders or coup plotters are included as reported)." The estimate is available for 429 of the 547 coup attempts in the CSP coup dataset and missing in the remaining 118. The CSP coup data was originally based on Keesing's Record of World Events, and then cross-referenced to and reconciled with Banks (2011), *Archigos: A Database of Political Leaders* (2004), the State Failure (PITF) Problem Set, Polity IV Country Reports, and Powell and Thyne's (2011) coup dataset.¹

The second is Geddes, Wright, and Frantz's (GWF) dataset of Autocratic Regimes, v1.2, which includes an ordinal variable capturing the level of violence associated with the end of autocratic regimes. The variable captures "deaths that occurred during the actions linked to the ouster of the government, not deaths that occurred as part of demonstrations weeks prior to the ouster and not deaths associated with government repression of opponents in the months leading up to the ouster." For coup attempts that ended autocratic regimes, this includes only deaths that occurred "during the coup and the immediate period of establishing control of the capital." The definition of coup violence used in GWF aligns most closely with the one used here; the same ordinal scale is also used. The sources used include a wide array of country-specific academic works, political handbooks, U.S. Department of State Background Notes, NGO reports, and newspaper

¹ The codebook is available at <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html>.

reporting.²

A small number of coup attempts also show up in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v 17.2 (Gleditsch et al. 2002) and/or the Correlates of War (COW) Intra-State War Data Set v 4.1 (Small and Singer 1982), which are the third and fourth datasets used. In order to be included in the UCDP/PRIO dataset, the coup must have reached 25 fatalities. The minimum threshold for inclusion in the COW data is 1,000. Both focus on battle-deaths. Powell and Thyne (2011) provide a list of violent coups included in both datasets.³

There are several important differences in these datasets in terms of their inclusion criteria and definition of violence. The CSP dataset is the most comprehensive, but it includes executions of coup plotters and ousted executives, as well as broader repression, after the coup has concluded.⁴ There is also a large amount of missing data in the CSP dataset. The other three datasets have more restrictive inclusion criteria. The GWF dataset is only available for coup attempts that ended autocratic regime spells, while COW and UCDP/PRIO include small subsets of coup attempts that reach particular thresholds of violence. In contrast to CSP, however, these other three datasets exclude executions and repression after the coup has concluded.

These differences in inclusion and coding criteria would make it problematic to simply merge the information in existing datasets without additional research to adjudicate between conflicting estimates and ensure that the violence included meets the criteria described above. As a result, coding procedures were as follows. For those coup attempts in Powell and Thyne's dataset for which the CSP dataset provides an estimate of fatalities, I check this estimate against those in the three other datasets, which have more restrictive inclusion criteria in line with those used here (i.e., they do not include executions or post-coup repression). Where at least one other dataset agreed with CSP on the level of fatalities associated with the coup attempt, I included this as the

² See the Autocratic Regimes Code Book, Version 1.2, for more information and the full list of sources. Available online at: <http://sites.psu.edu/dictators/wp-content/uploads/sites/12570/2016/05/GWF-Codebook.pdf>.

³ Available online at: http://www.uky.edu/~clthyn2/coup_data/appendix_T1.pdf and http://www.uky.edu/~clthyn2/coup_data/appendix_T2.pdf.

⁴ For instance, it identifies 115,000 fatalities as associated with the October 1, 1965, coup in Indonesia, which appear to refer to the Indonesian mass killings of 1965-1966, which occurred after the coup attempted ended (see Crouch 2007, Roosa 2006).

estimate of coup severity. Where estimates in the CSP dataset were missing or conflicted with those in the other datasets, I conducted additional research to code the level of fatalities associated with the coup attempt.

The additional research included historical news sources; country-specific academic works on politics and history; historical dictionaries; Library of Congress Country Studies; and reports from non-governmental organizations. The aim, in drawing upon diverse sources of information, was to limit gaps and reporting biases that may be present in any one type of source. Particularly important were conflict narratives from the Dynamic Analysis of Dispute Management (DADM) Project at the University of Central Arkansas (Mullenbach 2018), which were consulted for coup attempts in each country in the dataset. The next most commonly used source, after the DADM conflict narratives, was the *New York Times*, which accounted for 58% of the remaining sources outside of the dispute narratives. A full list of sources used to code the data can be found below.

Examples of coup violence *included* in the dataset

Algeria, 12/14/1967

- “The government suppressed a military rebellion led by Colonel Tahar Zbiri in the El-Affroun-Mouzaiaville district on December 14-16, 1967, **resulting in the deaths of 28 individuals**. Some 193 individuals were arrested for their involvement in the military rebellion” (DADM 2014)
- “Zbiri therefore attempted a coup in December 1967 which failed when Bomedienne sent fighter aircraft against Zbiri’s column of 22 tanks and a battalion of armoured cars. To save his men from slaughter Zbiri sent a message that he was abandoning them and set off by himself on foot. According to official figures **30 were killed** during the incident” (Bidwell 1998, 454).

Coded: Level 3 (26-999 deaths). The deaths of an estimated 28-30 individuals are included; the 193 individuals arrested are not included.

Venezuela, 9/7/1958:

- “According to the Junta, **two attackers were killed** and 40 taken prisoner. Betancourt asserts that **many more were killed**, and 14 cadets and several officers were tortured in the process of interrogation” (Kolb 1974, 99)
- “An attempt to overthrow the provisional regime headed by Rear Admiral Wolfgang Larazabal failed today. An unofficial check of hospitals tonight showed that **approximately twenty persons** had been killed. Military officials said they estimated the casualties at about eighty dead and wounded” (*New York Times* 1958h, 1).
- Center for Systemic Peace estimate: **20 killed**

Coded: Level 2 (1-25 deaths); those killed are included (estimated between 2 and 20); the 14 tortured during interrogation or counted as wounded are excluded.

Examples of coup violence *excluded* from the dataset

Iraq, 1/20/1970:

- “Eleven more men were executed today in Baghdad eight army officers and three civilians—the Iraqi radio said, bringing to 27 the number of persons who have been shot or hanged for their part in an alleged right-wing conspiracy Tuesday night to overthrow the Baathist Government of Iraq” (Schmidt 1970, 4)
- “The government suppressed a rebellion on January 20, 1970. On January 21-24, 1970, forty-four individuals were executed for their involvement in the rebellion” (Mullenbach 2018, n.p.)

Reason for exclusion: Deaths were executions following the conclusion of the coup attempt; did not result from contestation between coup plotters and regime loyalists while the coup attempt was underway

Syria, 3/1/1969:

- “The death—said to be a suicide—early this morning of Col. Abdel Kerim al-Jundi, the Syrian security chief, confirmed today that a struggle for power is still in progress

in Damascus...Colonel al-Jundi was reported to have returned home early this morning and to have shot himself with a revolver” (Schmidt 1969, 11).


Reason for exclusion: Death was self-inflicted; did not result from contestation between coup plotters and regime loyalists while the coup attempt was underway

Appendix B. Additional figures, tables and robustness checks

How do different types of authoritarian leaders fare after coup attempts?

Figure B1 shows the post-coup fate of ousted authoritarian leaders, by regime type. I use Geddes, Wright, and Frantz's (2014) data on autocratic rulers, and limit the focus to leaders removed by domestic military actors, with and without foreign support (exit codes 5 and 6). Leaders ousted from military regimes are more likely to be OK than leaders ousted from any other type of authoritarian regime. Military rulers are killed at half the rate of monarchs and the rulers of single-party regimes; they are killed at one-third the rate of personalist dictators.

FIGURE B1: Post-coup fate of ousted leaders, by regime type



Source: Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014a); coups with and without foreign support are included (Archigos exit codes 5 & 6)

Table B1 presents descriptive statistics on all variables used in the main text as well as the robustness checks used in the online appendix.

TABLE B1: Descriptive Statistics

Variables in Main Text Regressions	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Violent Coup	377	0.454	0.499	0	1
Coup Severity	377	1.679	0.851	1	4
Military Regime	363	0.231	0.422	0	1
Coup Leader: General	394	0.391	0.489	0	1
Coup Leader: Major, Colonel	394	0.302	0.460	0	1
Coup Leader: Below	394	0.178	0.383	0	1
Coup Leader: Nonmilitary	407	0.128	0.334	0	1
Counterbalancing (log)	226	0.632	0.501	0	1.946
Mil. Spending/Soldier (log)	352	7.752	1.154	1.238	11.156
Mil. Personnel (log)	371	3.119	1.574	0	8.132
GDP/capita (log)	394	7.575	0.876	5.275	12.974
Population (log)	394	8.710	1.401	4.111	11.907
Civil War	404	0.205	0.405	0	1
Democracy	404	0.193	0.395	0	1
French African Colony	409	0.286	0.452	0	1
Cold War	409	0.812	0.391	0	1
Variables in Appendix Robustness Checks	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Military Purge	261	0.107	0.310	0	1
Interstate War	346	0.153	0.361	0	1
Party Regime	361	0.186	0.389	0	1
Personal Regime	361	0.269	0.444	0	1
Indirect Military Regime	361	0.025	0.156	0	1
Military Institutional Regime	361	0.125	0.331	0	1
Military-Personal Regime	361	0.080	0.272	0	1
Presidential Guard	226	0.093	0.291	0	1
Affiliated Forces (log)	224	0.274	0.450	0	1.609
New Counterweight	333	0.036	0.187	0	1
Counterbalancing (Belkin & Schofer 2003)	94	-0.298	1.185	-2.987	3.492
Effective Organizations	174	1.590	0.648	1	4.150
Paramilitary Ratio	128	0.582	0.859	0	6.4
ELF	384	0.472	0.281	0.004	0.902
EF	375	0.548	0.242	0.004	1
Plural	383	0.574	0.242	0.004	0.998
Second	383	0.200	0.113	0	0.440
Relfrac	383	0.334	0.218	0	0.783

Can the null findings on counterbalancing be explained by the particular measure used?

I measure counterbalancing using a logged count of security forces that were (a) independent from the military and (b) deployed with access to the centers of power that are the targets of coup attempts. The data is from the State Security Forces dataset (De Bruin 2017; De Bruin 2018). In tables B2-B3, I test whether using alternate indicators of counterbalancing drawn from the State Security Forces dataset yield different results. These include: a dichotomous variable capturing whether the regime employs an independent presidential guard (*presidential guard*); a logged count of the security forces that were tied to the regime through ethnic, party, or personal loyalties (*affiliated forces (log)*); and an indicator for the creation of a new counterweight in the year prior (*new counterweight*). None reached conventional levels of statistical significance.

I also include specifications using indicators drawn from the *Military Balance*, including Belkin and Schofer's (2003) indicator of counterbalancing, which is a ration of military to paramilitary organizations and personnel numbers; Pilster and Bohmelt's (2011) indicator of *effective organizations*, which limits the focus to ground-capable forces; and Powell's (2012) ratio of paramilitary forces to regular personnel. These indicators come from Powell (2012). The only coefficient estimate that reaches conventional levels of statistical significance is the indicator of *effective organizations* with ordinal dependent variable (table B3, model 5). *Effective organizations* is not significant in the specification with the dichotomous dependent variable (table B2, model 5). Overall, the evidence does not support the argument that counterbalancing is associated with more violent coups.

Table B2: Alternate measures of counterbalancing (DV=coup violence)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Military Regime	-0.887** (0.371)	-0.895** (0.374)	-0.759** (0.318)	-2.091*** (0.599)	-0.695* (0.4)	-0.334 (0.437)
Coup leader: General	-1.565*** (0.446)	-1.525*** (0.444)	-1.606*** (0.382)	-2.504*** (0.893)	-1.241** (0.556)	-1.683** (0.776)
Coup leader: Major, Colonel	-0.433 (0.416)	-0.403 (0.415)	-0.706* (0.395)	-1.334** (0.64)	-0.682 (0.521)	-0.863 (0.652)
Coup leader: Nonmilitary	-0.012 (0.619)	-0.166 (0.615)	-0.353 (0.513)	-0.084 (1.053)	-0.146 (0.775)	0.092 (1.192)
Presidential Guard	0.220 (0.596)					
Affiliated Forces (log)		0.401 (0.402)				
New Counterweight			0.029 (0.564)			
Counterbalancing				-0.041 (0.266)		
Effective Organizations					0.391 (0.275)	
Paramilitary Ratio						0.251 (0.245)
Mil. Spending/Soldier (log)	-0.079 (0.138)	0.000 (0.155)	-0.122 (0.123)	-0.343 (0.343)	-0.026 (0.196)	-0.029 (0.207)
Mil. Personnel (log)	0.112 (0.216)	0.055 (0.217)	0.284 (0.2)	-0.591 (0.519)	0.574* (0.334)	0.738** (0.342)
GDP/capita (log)	-0.292 (0.326)	-0.261 (0.336)	-0.435 (0.267)	0.073 (0.594)	-0.964** (0.423)	-0.954** (0.440)
Population (log)	0.326 (0.245)	0.405* (0.237)	0.029 (0.252)	1.801*** (0.636)	-0.204 (0.334)	0.184 (0.373)
Civil War	-0.395 (0.38)	-0.469 (0.388)	-0.206 (0.295)	-0.820 (0.644)	-0.638* (0.36)	-1.180* (0.637)
Democracy	-0.655 (0.526)	-0.633 (0.513)	-0.502 (0.454)	-2.202** (0.996)	-0.874 (0.611)	-0.387 (0.664)
French African Colony	0.513 (0.361)	0.538 (0.378)	-0.079 (0.342)	0.653 (0.677)	-0.335 (0.509)	-0.154 (0.579)
Cold War	0.301 (0.475)	0.507 (0.509)	0.040 (0.346)	(dropped)	-0.077 (0.479)	-0.097 (1.077)
Constant	0.196 (3.578)	-1.483 (3.621)	4.126 (3.184)	-9.571 (7.000)	8.105* (4.326)	4.555 (4.473)
Observations	190	192	258	85	147	109
Log likelihood	-116.634	-115.290	-162.895	-42.525	-88.666	-63.126
Pseudo R2	0.113	0.118	0.087	0.278	0.130	0.163

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table B3: Alternate measures of counterbalancing (DV=coup severity)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Military Regime	-0.952*** (0.355)	-0.938*** (0.363)	-0.864*** (0.302)	-1.812*** (0.48)	-0.614* (0.351)	-0.285 (0.358)
Coup leader: General	-1.285*** (0.399)	-1.230*** (0.399)	-1.312*** (0.338)	-2.130*** (0.776)	-1.078** (0.539)	-1.451** (0.696)
Coup leader: Major, Colonel	-0.205 (0.345)	-0.173 (0.351)	-0.450 (0.351)	-1.102* (0.648)	-0.744 (0.474)	-0.776 (0.556)
Coup leader: Nonmilitary	0.328 (0.57)	0.280 (0.576)	-0.120 (0.421)	-0.801 (0.669)	-0.196 (0.584)	-0.233 (0.727)
Presidential Guard	0.330 (0.535)					
Affiliated Forces (log)		0.382 (0.293)				
New Counterweight			-0.050 (0.575)			
Counterbalancing				-0.051 (0.193)		
Effective Organizations					0.648** -0.298	
Paramilitary Ratio						0.418 (0.258)
Mil. Spending/Soldier (log)	0.055 (0.114)	0.096 (0.136)	-0.002 (0.115)	-0.270 (0.336)	0.172 (0.186)	0.136 (0.21)
Mil. Personnel (log)	0.373** (0.189)	0.307 (0.187)	0.396** (0.172)	-0.030 (0.329)	0.833*** (0.316)	0.874*** (0.312)
GDP/capita (log)	-0.659** (0.3)	-0.622** (0.3)	-0.600*** (0.219)	-0.769* (0.46)	-1.304*** (0.382)	-1.356*** (0.431)
Population (log)	0.006 (0.209)	0.089 (0.199)	-0.101 (0.21)	1.006** (0.409)	-0.552* (0.311)	0.000505 (0.322)
Civil War	-0.454 (0.349)	-0.489 (0.348)	-0.214 (0.256)	-1.235** (0.605)	-0.793** (0.339)	-1.379*** (0.483)
Democracy	-0.641 (0.485)	-0.603 (0.478)	-0.667 (0.411)	-1.579 (1.016)	-0.836 (0.61)	-0.18 (0.744)
French African Colony	0.393 (0.286)	0.406 (0.309)	-0.079 (0.297)	0.091 (0.519)	-0.479 (0.454)	-0.445 (0.537)
Cold War	0.192 (0.408)	0.324 (0.431)	-0.013 (0.309)	(dropped)	-0.151 (0.465)	-0.263 (1.051)
Constant cut 1	-3.903 (3.271)	-2.532 (3.235)	-5.109** (2.406)	-1.316 (4.45)	-11.03*** (3.469)	-7.479* (3.918)
Constant cut 2	-2.339 (3.259)	-0.983 (3.224)	-3.668 (2.375)	0.674 (4.455)	-9.659*** (3.416)	-6.101 (3.825)
Constant cut 3	-0.018 (3.227)	1.337 (3.193)	-1.384 (2.4)	3.298 (4.339)	-7.446** (3.427)	-3.749 (3.791)
Observations	190	189	258	85	147	109
Log likelihood	-189.111	-187.526	-263.972	-76.187996	-151.57289	-107.8548
Pseudo R2	0.084	0.086	0.063	0.1836	0.1003	0.1191

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Selection effects

I test whether the results hold when selection into a coup attempt is modeled explicitly. I use the “probit-probit” variation on the Heckman (1979) suggested by Van de Ven and Van Praag (1981). Because regressors in the second stage must be a strict subset of those in the first, I exclude the rank of coup leaders and replace indicators for recent coups with the years since last coup attempt and associated cubic splines. The results on *military regimes* remain robust to this alternate specification.

Table B4: Two-stage model of coup attempt and violence

Dependent variable	Violent	Attempt	Violent	Attempt	Violent	Attempt
Military Regime	-0.648*** (0.178)	0.380*** (0.076)	-0.681*** (0.179)	0.132 (0.102)	-0.661** (0.258)	0.379*** (0.129)
Counterbalancing (log)					0.0713 (0.199)	0.00642 (0.109)
Mil. Spending/Soldier (log)			-0.103 (0.118)	0.424*** (0.02)	-0.197 (0.26)	0.581*** (0.033)
Mil. Personnel (log)			-0.0744 (0.153)	0.571*** (0.044)	-0.17 (0.265)	0.658*** (0.066)
GDP/capita (log)			-0.0869 (0.134)	-0.269*** (0.052)	-0.123 (0.187)	-0.215*** (0.062)
Population (log)			0.0953 (0.12)	-0.208*** (0.046)	0.226 (0.173)	-0.214*** (0.065)
Civil War			-0.0617 (0.182)	0.150* (0.077)	-0.244 (0.216)	0.153 (0.097)
Democracy			-0.429* (0.256)	-0.320** (0.128)	-0.254 (0.3)	-0.0661 (0.134)
French African Colony			-0.0376 (0.174)	0.198** (0.095)	0.298 (0.23)	-0.0329 (0.157)
Years Since Coup		-0.128*** (0.02)		-0.124*** (0.027)		-0.153*** (0.042)
Constant		-1.125*** (0.057)	1.265 (1.45)	-1.385** (0.615)	1.399 (2.855)	-2.945*** (0.726)
Observations	338	7.526	317	6,407	199	4,208
Anrho	-0.303		-0.265		-0.388	
Rho	-0.294		-0.259		-0.369	
Pseudo log likelihood	-1439.233		-882.137		-450.304	

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Are coups against military regimes still less violent if senior officer coups are excluded?

It is plausible that military regimes only use restraint against coup plotters in coups staged by senior officers. I thus test whether the results on military regimes are driven by senior officer coups. The effect of military regimes remains statistically significant. It does not appear that the effect of military regimes on coup violence is limited to senior officer coups.

Table B5: Excluding coups led by senior-most officers

	Violent Coup		Coup Severity	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Military Regime	-0.867** (0.387)	-1.554*** (0.519)	-1.037*** (0.352)	-1.669*** (0.486)
Coup leader: Major, Colonel	-0.698* (0.36)	(0.483) (0.447)	(0.488) (0.339)	(0.287) (0.384)
Coup leader: Nonmilitary	(0.288) (0.492)	-0.100 (0.687)	-0.164 (0.419)	0.344 (0.583)
Counterbalancing (log)		-0.0122 (0.461)		-0.137 (0.403)
Mil. Spending/Soldier (log)	-0.096 (0.128)	-0.212 (0.178)	0.014 (0.115)	-0.037 (0.166)
Mil. Personnel (log)	-0.013 (0.195)	0.007 (0.266)	0.154 (0.188)	0.423** (0.21)
GDP/capita (log)	-0.072 (0.269)	-0.211 (0.366)	-0.310 (0.239)	-0.764** (0.364)
Population (log)	0.493* (0.263)	0.657* (0.344)	0.242 (0.229)	0.120 (0.239)
Civil War	-0.368 (0.372)	-0.700 (0.531)	-0.195 (0.325)	-0.648 (0.42)
Democracy	-0.793 (0.539)	-0.662 (0.765)	-0.758* (0.437)	-0.400 (0.661)
French African Colony	-0.165 (0.33)	0.863* (0.478)	-0.072 (0.327)	0.756** (0.365)
Cold War	-0.381 (0.472)	0.043 (0.708)	-0.210 (0.365)	0.065 (0.52)
Constant	-1.564 (2.956)	-1.546 (4.193)		
Constant cut 1			-0.757 (2.496)	-4.666 (3.872)
Constant cut 2			0.771 (2.507)	-2.84 (3.814)
Constant cut 3			2.856 (2.523)	-0.532 (3.742)
Observations	184	112	184	112
Log likelihood	-118.636	-66.001	-205.062	-118.04
Pseudo R2	0.0633	0.1336	0.0424	0.0995

*Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, **

Is data on coup violence more likely to be missing in coups staged by low ranked coup plotters?

Another possibility is that bloodless coups by low ranked officers are less likely to receive press or academic coverage and, as a result, coded as missing. If this were the case, it could explain the observed relationship between coup rank and violence. I thus test whether data on coup violence is more likely to be missing in coups staged by lower ranked officers. There is data available on the identity of coup leaders in 394 coup attempts (including 29 of the 33 attempts that are missing estimates for coup violence). 7.1% of coup attempts staged by low ranking officers are missing an estimate of coup violence compared to 7.4% overall. Coups by lower ranking officers are missing violence data at similar rates as those by the highest ranking officers. Nonmilitary coups are more likely to be missing coup violence data than coup attempts from within the military and security services.

Table B6: Missing coup violence data, by coup leadership

	Coup violence data			
	Not missing	Missing	Total	% Missing
Coup leader: General	141	12	153	7.8%
Coup leader: Major, Colonel	112	7	119	5.9%
Coup leader: Lower Ranked	65	5	70	7.1%
Coup leader: Nonmilitary	43	5	48	10.4%
Total	361	29	390	7.4%

I also check whether there is a correlation between missingness and any other independent or control variables and find that there is not:

Table B7: Correlations with missingness

Variable	Correlation with missing
Military Regime	-0.020
Coup leader: General	0.024
Coup leader: Major, Colonel	-0.021
Coup leader: Low ranked	-0.010
Coup leader: Nonmilitary	0.008
Counterbalancing (log)	-0.034
Mil. Spending/Soldier (log)	-0.061
Mil. Personnel (log)	0.022
GDP/capita (log)	-0.047
Population (log)	-0.042
Civil War	-0.027
Democracy	0.076
French African Colony	-0.060
Cold War	-0.020

A more subtle, difficult to detect problem would arise if bloodless coups by junior officers receive so little coverage that they never appear in Powell and Thyne's (2011) dataset in the first place. While this possibility cannot entirely be ruled out, I can check whether the results on rank

hold when using an alternate dataset of coup attempts compiled by the Center for Systemic Peace (Marshall and Marshall 2017). Powell and Thyne exclude 124 of the coup attempts in the CSP data because they were unable to verify them (and includes 72 additional not in CSP). I compiled information on the rank of coup plotters and violence associated with these additional coup attempts. The results on coup rank hold when CSP data is used:

Table B8: CSP Data in place of Powell and Thyne

	DV=violent		DV=how violent	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Military Regime	-0.592*	-0.825*	-0.749**	-1.028**
	(0.353)	(0.487)	(0.323)	(0.442)
Coup leader: General	-1.253***	-1.340***	-1.131***	-1.307***
	(0.450)	(0.504)	(0.385)	(0.463)
Coup leader: Major, Colonel	-0.615	-0.433	-0.395	-0.309
	(0.435)	(0.478)	(0.381)	(0.440)
Coup leader: Nonmilitary	0.483	1.079*	0.509	0.933**
	(0.509)	(0.556)	(0.422)	(0.471)
Counterbalancing (log)		-0.193		-0.359
		(0.385)		(0.328)
Mil. Spending/Soldier (log)	0.156*	(0.151)	0.184**	0.186**
	(0.085)	(0.110)	(0.078)	(0.094)
Mil. Personnel (log)	0.524***	0.484**	0.594***	0.613***
	(0.175)	(0.237)	(0.149)	(0.217)
GDP/capita (log)	-0.666***	-0.814**	-0.776***	-0.935***
	(0.244)	(0.338)	(0.215)	(0.287)
Population (log)	-0.242	0.0552	-0.306*	-0.0528
	(0.222)	(0.259)	(0.183)	(0.226)
Civil War	-0.282	-0.776**	-0.179	-0.593*
	(0.243)	(0.333)	(0.217)	(0.314)
Democracy	-0.636	-0.672	-0.781**	-0.900*
	(0.419)	(0.531)	(0.398)	(0.495)
French African Colony	-0.0743	0.406	-0.0867	0.409
	(0.329)	(0.433)	(0.288)	(0.367)
Cold War	0.53	0.837	0.477	0.518
	(0.359)	(0.515)	(0.343)	(0.484)
Constant cut 1			-5.496**	-4.679
			(2.283)	(3.239)
Constant cut 2			-4.149*	(3.097)
			(2.263)	(3.211)
Constant cut 3			-2.06	-1.074
			(2.283)	(3.190)
Constant	4.562*	3.082		
	(2.762)	(3.844)		
Observations	293	196	296	1196
Log likelihood	-183.704	-114.729	-295.113	-187.569
Pseudo R2	0.096	0.149	0.077	0.116

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Do the results on military regimes and coup leadership hold in militaries that are already divided, such as those that have recently been purged? Do they hold when interstate conflict is accounted for?

I next examine whether the results hold when additional factors are included that may affect the cohesion of the military or its ability to stage a successful coup. It is plausible that soldiers in recently purged militaries may see further violence as less costly. On the other hand, where purges have been successfully carried out, the result should be a more rather than a less cohesive army, which may view violence during a coup as more costly. I pursue these possibilities using Sudduth's (2017) data on military purges to test whether coup attempts that occur in the year following military purges are more violent than those that occur at other times. The variable *military purge* captures whether a dictator replaces, dismisses, or demotes rival elites within the military. It is available for 111 authoritarian regimes. The coefficient on purges is positive and statistically significant. The results on military regimes and coup leadership remain robust to its inclusion.

I also test whether the results hold when controlling for international conflict. Piplani and Talmadge (2015) argue that interstate conflict decreases the likelihood of successful coups in part because it makes gathering accurate information about the preferences of officers more difficult. If this is correct, it suggests interstate war is likely to be associated with more violent coups. I test this argument by including an indicator for ongoing *interstate war*, which comes from Piplani and Talmadge (2015); the indicator is not significant, and the results on the central independent variables do not change.

Table B9: Including controls for military purges, interstate war (violent coup)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Military Regime	-0.899*** (0.341)	-1.164*** (0.37)	-0.917*** (0.334)	-0.814** (0.373)
Coup leader: General	-1.434*** (0.431)	-1.688*** (0.584)	-1.570*** (0.352)	-1.616*** (0.456)
Coup leader: Major, Colonel	(0.636)	-0.386 (0.439)	-0.770** (0.359)	-0.551 (0.427)
Coup leader: Nonmilitary	(0.322)	(0.108)	(0.023)	0.0728
Counterbalancing (log)	(0.578)	(0.613)	(0.507)	(0.674)
		-0.103 (0.356)		0.147 (0.358)
Mil. Spending/Soldier (log)	-0.042 (0.143)	-0.177 (0.186)	-0.005 (0.114)	0.000111 (0.154)
Mil. Personnel (log)	0.036 (0.242)	-0.072 (0.256)	0.274 (0.186)	0.214 (0.23)
GDP/capita (log)	-0.287 (0.309)	-0.168 (0.343)	-0.269 (0.247)	-0.333 (0.335)
Population (log)	0.217 (0.315)	0.662** (0.278)	0.049 (0.246)	0.162 (0.256)
Civil War	-0.223 (0.368)	-0.209 (0.458)	-0.061 (0.279)	-0.383 (0.378)
Democracy	-0.831* (0.427)	-0.681 (0.624)	-0.986** (0.392)	-0.572 (0.552)
French African Colony	-0.033 (0.395)	0.864** (0.383)	-0.036 (0.306)	0.507 (0.363)
Cold War	-0.160 (0.447)	0.546 (0.559)	-0.040 (0.376)	0.312 (0.481)
Military Purge	1.303*** (0.447)	1.639*** (0.593)		
Interstate War			-0.0384 (0.384)	0.476 (0.5)
Constant	1.585 (3.774)	-2.744 (3.652)	1.847 (2.714)	0.878 (3.602)
Observations	200	144	290	180
Log likelihood	-123.442	-82.425	-180.392	-109.953
Pseudo R2	0.110	0.174	0.097	0.115

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table B10: Including controls for military purges, interstate war (coup severity)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Military Regime	-0.905*** (0.312)	-1.163*** (0.307)	-1.005*** (0.324)	-0.896** (0.355)
Coup leader: General	-1.183*** (0.415)	-1.355** (0.545)	-1.265*** (0.323)	-1.260*** (0.399)
Coup leader: Major, Colonel	-0.518 (0.395)	-0.271 (0.41)	-0.483 (0.332)	-0.270 (0.355)
Coup leader: Nonmilitary	(0.29) (0.461)	(0.099) (0.545)	(0.055) (0.394)	(0.549) (0.567)
Counterbalancing (log)		-0.0754 (0.281)		0.0537 (0.31)
Mil. Spending/Soldier (log)	0.057 (0.143)	-0.007 (0.176)	0.076 (0.098)	0.118 (0.129)
Mil. Personnel (log)	0.149 (0.212)	0.170 (0.21)	0.362** (0.164)	0.419** (0.207)
GDP/capita (log)	-0.493* (0.267)	-0.583* (0.34)	-0.431** (0.215)	-0.661** (0.297)
Population (log)	0.031 (0.265)	0.273 (0.232)	-0.079 (0.213)	-0.116 (0.206)
Civil War	-0.274 (0.3)	-0.281 (0.361)	-0.042 (0.247)	-0.416 (0.336)
Democracy	-0.877** (0.423)	-0.616 (0.591)	-1.066*** (0.37)	-0.592 (0.522)
French African Colony	-0.139 (0.355)	0.582* (0.326)	-0.065 (0.275)	0.392 (0.292)
Cold War	-0.116 (0.402)	0.473 (0.495)	-0.027 (0.312)	0.197 (0.391)
Military Purge	0.803** (0.388)	0.876* (0.508)		
Interstate War			-0.153 (0.335)	0.372 (0.38)
Constant cut 1	-3.589 (2.975)	-1.812 (3.727)	-3.106 (2.316)	-4.243 (3.203)
Constant cut 2	-2.035 (2.97)	-0.0811 (3.751)	-1.819 (2.314)	-2.772 (3.187)
Constant cut 3	0.357 (3.023)	2.464 (3.597)	0.38 (2.344)	-0.467 (3.147)
Observations	200	144	290	180
Log likelihood	-205.062	-118.040	-205.062	-118.040
Pseudo R2	0.042	0.100	0.042	0.100

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Are the results robust to the inclusion of other regime variables?

I check whether the results hold when controls for other authoritarian regime types are included. I use Geddes, Wright, and Frantz's (2014) data on authoritarian regime types. The excluded category is monarchy, while military, party, and personal regimes and democracies are included (Models 1, 2). I also disaggregate military regime types into indirect military regimes, military institutional rule, and military-personal hybrids to see whether particular types of military regimes are driving the results (Models 3, 4). Table B11 shows the results for the dichotomous variable *violent coup* while Table B12 shows the results for the ordered variable *coup severity*.

I find that the results on military regimes and coup leadership remain robust to these alternative specifications. In one of the models, personal regimes have a positive, statistically significant ($p < 0.10$) association with whether or not a coup turns violent; there is no relationship with coup severity. When military regimes are decomposed into indirect, institutional, and military-personal hybrids, the signs on all coefficients are negative and those for military institutional rule and military-personal hybrids are significant across all specifications. The coefficient on indirect military regimes is in the expected direction but only statistically significant in one specification.

Table B11: Additional regime variables (DV=violent coup)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Military Regime	-1.283*** (0.437)	-1.086** (0.456)		
Party Regime	-0.310 (0.388)	-0.114 (0.626)		
Personal Regime	-0.637* (0.379)	-0.260 (0.476)		
Indirect Military Regime			-2.066 (1.29)	-1.761 (1.534)
Military Institutional Regime			-0.851** (0.388)	-0.882** (0.444)
Military-Personal Regime			-0.791** (0.346)	-0.858* (0.492)
Coup leader: General	-1.603*** (0.356)	-1.566*** (0.445)	-1.547*** (0.349)	-1.554*** (0.442)
Coup leader: Major, Colonel	-0.668* (0.344)	-0.402 (0.412)	-0.690* (0.355)	-0.405 (0.422)
Coup leader: Nonmilitary	-0.335 (0.495)	-0.168 (0.597)	-0.348 (0.492)	-0.159 (0.607)
Counterbalancing (log)		0.104 (0.352)		0.052 (0.337)
Mil. Spending/Soldier (log)	-0.011 (0.113)	0.012 (0.152)	-0.026 (0.114)	0.006 (0.153)
Mil. Personnel (log)	0.201 (0.175)	0.105 (0.228)	0.231 (0.18)	0.133 (0.215)
GDP/capita (log)	-0.273 (0.244)	-0.321 (0.321)	-0.253 (0.236)	-0.319 (0.315)
Population (log)	0.119 (0.242)	0.350 (0.244)	0.077 (0.244)	0.325 (0.233)
Civil War	-0.069 (0.297)	-0.416 (0.41)	-0.137 (0.29)	-0.448 (0.395)
Democracy	-1.229*** (0.45)	-0.824 (0.672)	-0.923** (0.39)	-0.706 (0.549)
French African Colony	-0.016 (0.304)	0.544 (0.364)	-0.079 (0.302)	0.552 (0.357)
Cold War	-0.047 (0.375)	0.440 (0.493)	-0.002 (0.378)	0.440 (0.488)
Constant	1.911 (2.911)	-0.514 (3.549)	1.775 (2.76)	-0.451 (3.462)
Observations	304	189	304	189
Log likelihood	-189.811	-115.591	-190.495	-115.404
Pseudo R2	0.094	0.116	0.091	0.117

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table B12: Additional regime variables (DV=coup severity)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Military Regime	-1.207*** (0.403)	-0.959** (0.427)		
Party Regime	-0.162 (0.361)	0.119 (0.536)		
Personal Regime	-0.324 (0.366)	0.043 (0.445)		
Indirect Military Regime			-2.173* (1.257)	-1.919 (1.476)
Military Institutional Regime			-0.993*** (0.369)	-0.996** (0.428)
Military-Personal Regime			-0.824** (0.357)	-0.773 (0.517)
Coup leader: General	-1.297*** (0.321)	-1.291*** (0.399)	-1.256*** (0.321)	-1.258*** (0.398)
Coup leader: Major, Colonel	-0.441 (0.316)	-0.206 (0.349)	-0.448 (0.33)	-0.199 (0.368)
Coup leader: Nonmilitary	-0.205 (0.409)	0.277 (0.563)	-0.210 (0.408)	0.286 (0.568)
Counterbalancing (log)		0.012 (0.314)		-0.012 (0.294)
Mil. Spending/Soldier (log)	0.055 (0.102)	0.091 (0.137)	0.047 (0.101)	0.101 (0.133)
Mil. Personnel (log)	0.293* (0.155)	0.359* (0.198)	0.319** (0.156)	0.381** (0.186)
GDP/capita (log)	-0.412** (0.205)	-0.652** (0.287)	-0.403** (0.202)	-0.651** (0.288)
Population (log)	-0.006 (0.208)	0.033 (0.203)	-0.036 (0.207)	0.021 (0.203)
Civil War	-0.070 (0.261)	-0.448 (0.352)	-0.108 (0.261)	-0.468 (0.352)
Democracy	-1.168*** (0.409)	-0.635 (0.613)	-1.019*** (0.363)	-0.712 (0.511)
French African Colony	-0.051 (0.264)	0.428 (0.295)	-0.077 (0.268)	0.447 (0.285)
Cold War	-0.046 (0.329)	0.243 (0.426)	-0.032 (0.341)	0.258 (0.419)
Constant cut 1	-2.920 (2.275)	-3.298 (3.187)	-2.930 (2.249)	-3.288 (3.201)
Constant cut 2	-1.572 -2.274	-1.755 -3.187	-1.582 -2.247	-1.742 -3.196
Constant cut 3	0.627 -2.318	0.560 -3.187	0.622 -2.286	0.571 -3.187
Observations	304	189	304	189
Log likelihood	-309.431	-188.053	-309.041	-187.614
Pseudo R2	0.064	0.084	0.065	0.086

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Are the results on military regimes and coup leadership an artifact of particular combinations of control variables?

In order to test this, I systematically drop each control variable included in the full model.

Table B13: Dropping each control variables (DV=coup violence)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Military Regime	-0.885** (0.366)	-0.864** (0.359)	-0.877** (0.36)	-0.810** (0.365)	-0.830** (0.353)	-0.708** (0.357)	-0.892** (0.346)	-0.856** (0.359)
Coup leader: General	-1.528*** (0.437)	-1.544*** (0.433)	-1.562*** (0.436)	-1.543*** (0.437)	-1.530*** (0.432)	-1.549*** (0.438)	-1.548*** (0.427)	-1.545*** (0.443)
Coup leader: Major, Colonel	-0.411 (0.413)	-0.415 (0.408)	-0.448 (0.422)	-0.432 (0.412)	-0.415 (0.415)	-0.439 (0.414)	-0.436 (0.409)	-0.431 (0.414)
Coup leader: Nonmilitary	0.245 (0.602)	0.007 (0.61)	0.006 (0.606)	-0.006 (0.627)	0.034 (0.614)	-0.030 (0.639)	0.001 (0.603)	-0.058 (0.613)
Counterbalancing (log)	0.174 (0.356)	0.143 (0.335)	0.095 (0.358)	0.139 (0.348)	0.087 (0.348)	0.247 (0.323)	0.222 (0.367)	0.109 (0.343)
Mil. Spending/Soldier (log)		-0.111 (0.131)	-0.152 (0.136)	-0.028 (0.134)	-0.097 (0.141)	-0.115 (0.131)	-0.082 (0.137)	-0.103 (0.13)
Mil. Personnel (log)	0.134 (0.21)		-0.065 (0.175)	0.314* (0.166)	0.044 (0.224)	0.134 (0.235)	0.063 (0.225)	0.090 (0.224)
GDP/capita (log)	-0.356 (0.317)	-0.212 (0.254)		-0.479 (0.296)	-0.221 (0.309)	-0.377 (0.313)	-0.330 (0.329)	-0.272 (0.33)
Population (log)	0.289 (0.24)	0.431** (0.187)	0.507** (0.221)		0.349 (0.255)	0.218 (0.262)	0.319 (0.239)	0.333 (0.239)
Civil War	-0.308 (0.372)	-0.357 (0.388)	-0.302 (0.378)	-0.405 (0.384)		-0.415 (0.408)	-0.425 (0.395)	-0.430 (0.393)
Democracy	-0.683 (0.535)	-0.642 (0.565)	-0.748 (0.531)	-0.416 (0.56)	-0.642 (0.543)		-0.648 (0.547)	-0.610 (0.547)
French African Colony	0.445 (0.361)	0.485 (0.353)	0.547 (0.35)	0.479 (0.348)	0.532 (0.358)	0.530 (0.333)		0.483 (0.345)
Cold War	0.427 (0.459)	0.296 (0.483)	0.252 (0.493)	0.282 (0.458)	0.392 (0.483)	0.292 (0.468)	0.246 (0.471)	
Constant	0.098 (3.626)	-0.832 (2.91)	-2.516 (2.254)	3.403 (2.298)	-0.464 (3.633)	1.741 (3.549)	0.804 (3.52)	0.451 (3.549)
Observations	193	190	190	190	190	190	190	190
Log likelihood	-118.274	-116.724	-117.140	-117.297	-117.151	-117.373	-117.428	-116.823
Pseudo R2	0.115	0.112	0.109	0.108	0.109	0.107	0.107	0.111

*Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.*

Table B14: Dropping each control variables (DV=coup severity)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Military Regime	-1.012*** (0.349)	-0.944*** (0.339)	-0.961*** (0.341)	-0.951*** (0.347)	-0.923*** (0.34)	-0.790** (0.347)	-0.977*** (0.341)	-0.951*** (0.349)
Coup leader: General	-1.255*** (0.384)	-1.206*** (0.393)	-1.238*** (0.381)	-1.296*** (0.397)	-1.268*** (0.397)	-1.312*** (0.382)	-1.275*** (0.39)	-1.284*** (0.395)
Coup leader: Major, Colonel	-0.203 (0.348)	-0.178 (0.351)	-0.220 (0.362)	-0.208 (0.347)	-0.197 (0.352)	-0.244 (0.336)	-0.210 (0.35)	-0.208 (0.35)
Coup leader: Nonmilitary	0.722 (0.518)	0.358 (0.538)	0.410 (0.524)	0.365 (0.544)	0.368 (0.546)	0.318 (0.571)	0.328 (0.543)	0.317 (0.536)
Counterbalancing (log)	0.130 (0.322)	0.115 (0.298)	-0.031 (0.315)	0.045 (0.306)	0.003 (0.297)	0.180 (0.281)	0.129 (0.322)	0.038 (0.304)
Mil. Spending/Soldier (log)		-0.045 (0.122)	-0.099 (0.125)	0.047 (0.114)	0.026 (0.124)	0.019 (0.114)	0.052 (0.114)	0.035 (0.115)
Mil. Personnel (log)	0.339* (0.192)		0.012 (0.135)	0.376*** (0.142)	0.299 (0.203)	0.394* (0.205)	0.335* (0.198)	0.364* (0.197)
GDP/capita (log)	-0.642** (0.305)	-0.343 (0.213)		-0.662*** (0.256)	-0.563** (0.276)	-0.736** (0.288)	-0.689** (0.299)	-0.644** (0.303)
Population (log)	0.053 (0.198)	0.374** (0.15)	0.390** (0.178)		0.054 (0.224)	-0.084 (0.22)	0.001 (0.199)	0.016 (0.199)
Civil War	-0.256 (0.312)	-0.283 (0.352)	-0.212 (0.317)	-0.422 (0.343)		-0.463 (0.362)	-0.444 (0.352)	-0.444 (0.353)
Democracy	-0.691 (0.503)	-0.731 (0.512)	-0.917* (0.475)	-0.627 (0.525)	-0.688 (0.502)		-0.665 (0.52)	-0.639 (0.516)
French African Colony	0.325 (0.309)	0.355 (0.314)	0.538* (0.315)	0.409 (0.281)	0.440 (0.298)	0.436 (0.272)		0.392 (0.272)
Cold War	0.343 (0.418)	0.226 (0.425)	0.148 (0.454)	0.168 (0.385)	0.282 (0.415)	0.165 (0.401)	0.097 (0.385)	
Constant cut 1	-3.683 (3.261)	-0.031 (2.305)	2.171 (1.779)	-4.050** (2.03)	-3.009 (3.249)	-5.312* (3.183)	-4.473 (3.163)	-4.065 (3.127)
Constant cut 2	-2.163 (3.257)	1.512 (2.309)	3.697** (1.817)	-2.49 (1.988)	-1.46 (3.256)	-3.767 (3.173)	-2.925 (3.141)	-2.506 (3.106)
Constant cut 3	0.092 (3.264)	3.789 (2.312)	5.954*** (1.863)	-0.176 (1.98)	0.842 (3.22)	-1.464 (3.154)	-0.615 (3.092)	-0.193 (3.073)
Observations	193	190	190	190	190	190	190	190
Log likelihood	-194.617	-190.698	-192.136	-189.341	-190.044	-190.283	-189.965	-189.406
Pseudo R2	0.089	0.077	0.070	0.083	0.080	0.079	0.080	0.083

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

I next examine whether the results are robust to the inclusion of controls for other indicators of social divisions in place of ongoing civil war. I include indicators compiled by Hegre and Sambanis (2006) in their sensitivity analysis of the determinants of civil war: the commonly used index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization (*ELF*), Fearon and Laitin's measure of ethnic fractionalization (*EF*), the share of the largest ethnic group (*plural*), the percent population in the second largest group (*second*), and religious fractionalization (*relfrac*). As Tables B14-B15 show, the results on central independent variables are unchanged.

Table B15: Alternative controls for social divisions (DV=coup violence)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Military Regime	-0.828** (0.355)	-0.879** (0.362)	-0.898** (0.366)	-0.853** (0.356)	-0.828** (0.363)
Coup leader: General	-1.530*** (0.434)	-1.527*** (0.429)	-1.532*** (0.422)	-1.552*** (0.417)	-1.394*** (0.443)
Coup leader: Major, Colonel	-0.415 (0.415)	-0.340 (0.428)	-0.333 (0.427)	-0.426 (0.411)	-0.276 (0.434)
Coup leader: Nonmilitary	0.033 (0.622)	0.127 (0.644)	0.137 (0.645)	0.030 (0.615)	0.058 (0.625)
Counterbalancing (log)	0.090 (0.354)	0.040 (0.376)	-0.012 (0.388)	0.049 (0.372)	0.047 (0.357)
Mil. Spending/Soldier (log)	-0.096 (0.143)	-0.105 (0.152)	-0.109 (0.152)	-0.085 (0.144)	-0.128 (0.144)
Mil. Personnel (log)	0.041 (0.224)	0.118 (0.225)	0.134 (0.227)	0.070 (0.227)	0.083 (0.226)
GDP/capita (log)	-0.223 (0.318)	-0.182 (0.312)	-0.181 (0.311)	-0.229 (0.307)	-0.111 (0.325)
Population (log)	0.353 (0.244)	0.287 (0.237)	0.282 (0.236)	0.333 (0.256)	0.308 (0.245)
Democracy	-0.642 (0.542)	-0.657 (0.563)	-0.657 (0.568)	-0.661 (0.56)	-0.580 (0.558)
French African Colony	0.532 (0.358)	0.559 (0.362)	0.604* (0.358)	0.547 (0.355)	0.553 (0.362)
Cold War	0.393 (0.484)	0.368 (0.5)	0.362 (0.502)	0.396 (0.481)	0.376 (0.479)
ELF	-0.030 (0.642)				
EF		1.006 (0.801)			
Plural			-1.128 (0.8)		
Second				0.782 (1.682)	
Relfrac					1.131 (0.82)
Constant	-0.463 (3.646)	-0.891 (3.599)	0.344 (3.428)	-0.554 (3.699)	-1.286 (3.719)
Observations	190	190	190	190	190
Log likelihood	-117.149	-116.130	-115.996	-117.021	-116.298
Pseudo R2	0.109	0.116	0.118	0.110	0.115

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Table B16: Alternative controls for social divisions (DV=coup severity)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Military Regime	-0.901*** (0.345)	-0.968*** (0.355)	-0.983*** (0.36)	-0.925*** (0.341)	-0.940*** (0.35)
Coup leader: General	-1.264*** (0.401)	-1.256*** (0.391)	-1.259*** (0.385)	-1.270*** (0.388)	-1.201*** (0.403)
Coup leader: Major, Colonel	-0.188 (0.349)	-0.135 (0.374)	-0.132 (0.371)	-0.197 (0.351)	-0.131 (0.367)
Coup leader: Nonmilitary	0.364 (0.551)	0.435 (0.566)	0.438 (0.562)	0.368 (0.545)	0.369 (0.553)
Counterbalancing (log)	0.026 (0.29)	-0.027 (0.321)	-0.063 (0.331)	-0.001 (0.31)	-0.0237 (0.304)
Mil. Spending/Soldier (log)	0.035 (0.123)	0.013 (0.131)	0.011 (0.131)	0.028 (0.128)	0.00818 (0.126)
Mil. Personnel (log)	0.276 (0.207)	0.355 (0.22)	0.364 (0.223)	0.303 (0.212)	0.32 (0.211)
GDP/capita (log)	-0.587** (0.281)	-0.523* (0.279)	-0.522* (0.278)	-0.564** (0.275)	-0.511* (0.28)
Population (log)	0.083 (0.228)	0.006 (0.233)	0.004 (0.234)	0.052 (0.226)	0.034 (0.229)
Democracy	-0.686 (0.49)	-0.706 (0.53)	-0.702 (0.531)	-0.690 (0.512)	-0.664 (0.511)
French African Colony	0.445 (0.294)	0.444 (0.315)	0.475 (0.307)	0.441 (0.295)	0.444 (0.306)
Cold War	0.281 (0.411)	0.269 (0.429)	0.266 (0.43)	0.283 (0.414)	0.269 (0.414)
ELF	-0.285 (0.569)				
EF		0.771 (0.813)			
Plural			-0.846 (0.807)		
Second				0.111 (1.465)	
Relfrac					0.564 (0.756)
Constant cut 1	-3.042 (3.297)	-2.651 (3.219)	-3.578 (3.224)	-2.994 (3.28)	-2.64 (3.219)
Constant cut 2	-1.49 (3.302)	-1.097 (3.227)	-2.022 (3.226)	-1.446 (3.286)	-1.089 (3.225)
Constant cut 3	0.817 (3.256)	1.209 (3.188)	0.284 (3.22)	0.856 (3.249)	1.207 (3.197)
Observations	190	190	190	190	190
Log likelihood	-189.920	-189.342	-189.286	-190.04106	-189.79678
Pseudo R2	0.080	0.083	0.083	0.080	0.081

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Are the results driven by time-invariant features of states, or temporal dynamics?

I include fixed effects parameters for country and year (replacing the *Cold War* indicator). The results on all variables remain in all but one specification.

Table B17: Country, year fixed effects (DV=violent coup)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Military Regime	-1.190*** (0.412)	-1.033* (0.542)	-0.958* (0.543)	-0.850 (0.667)	-1.747*** (0.618)	-3.487** (1.547)
Coup leader: General	-1.797*** (0.499)	-1.181* (0.617)	-1.837*** (0.493)	-1.666** (0.721)	-2.918*** (0.791)	-3.268* (1.718)
Coup leader: Major, Colonel	-0.376 (0.466)	0.125 (0.592)	-0.441 (0.467)	0.250 (0.705)	-1.014 (0.685)	0.333 (1.495)
Coup leader: Nonmilitary	0.406 (0.601)	0.984 (1.037)	0.262 (0.636)	-0.005 (1.258)	0.061 (0.905)	2.220 (2.224)
Counterbalancing (log)		0.485 (0.833)		0.468 (0.529)		2.884 (2.149)
Mil. Spending/Soldier (log)	0.131 (0.233)	-0.170 (0.378)	-0.243 (0.176)	-0.150 (0.309)	-0.243 (0.176)	-0.150 (0.309)
Mil. Personnel (log)	-0.105 (0.393)	-0.299 (0.622)	0.200 (0.222)	-0.240 (0.386)	0.200 (0.222)	-0.240 (0.386)
GDP/capita (log)	0.426 (0.644)	-0.325 (0.888)	-0.118 (0.309)	0.003 (0.517)	-0.118 (0.309)	0.003 (0.517)
Population (log)	0.795 (1.053)	0.631 (1.796)	0.254 (0.262)	0.841** (0.376)	0.254 (0.262)	0.841** (0.376)
Civil War	-0.475 (0.5)	-0.106 (0.637)	-0.251 (0.342)	-0.638 (0.562)	-0.251 (0.342)	-0.638 (0.562)
Democracy	-1.627*** (0.554)	-1.012 (0.726)	-1.262** (0.492)	-1.130 (0.728)	-1.262** (0.492)	-1.130 (0.728)
French African Colony	(dropped)	(dropped)	-0.105 (0.348)	0.126 (0.611)	-0.105 (0.348)	0.126 (0.611)
Cold War	-0.306 (0.693)	0.120 (0.985)				
Constant	-1.372 (2.071)	0.471 (3.499)	0.953 (3.262)	-5.085 (5.031)	0.953 (3.262)	-5.085 (5.031)
Country FE	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
Year FE	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	253	149	243	137	253	149
Log likelihood	-91.836	-52.915	-141.384	-77.344	-67.736	-26.873

*Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.*

Are the results for coup severity driven by a small number of very violent coup attempts?

I test whether the results on coup severity are being driven by the small number of very violent coups, with over 1,000 fatalities, that are coded 4 in the ordinal measure by combining levels 3 and 4. The results do not change.

Table B18: Alternative operationalization of coup severity (combining levels 3 & 4)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Military Regime	-0.905*** (0.272)			-1.006*** (0.307)	-0.963*** (0.341)
Coup leader: General		-1.023*** (0.332)		-1.309*** (0.329)	-1.325*** (0.408)
Coup leader: Major, Colonel		-0.428 (0.311)		-0.534 (0.33)	-0.265 (0.358)
Coup leader: Nonmilitary		-0.184 (0.377)		-0.223 (0.405)	0.301 (0.56)
Counterbalancing (log)			0.487 (0.318)		-0.008 (0.318)
Mil. Spending/Soldier (log)				0.028 (0.095)	0.052 (0.127)
Mil. Personnel (log)				0.272* (0.16)	0.329 (0.205)
GDP/capita (log)				-0.374* (0.205)	-0.594* (0.303)
Population (log)				0.008 (0.211)	0.058 (0.223)
Civil War				-0.054 (0.248)	-0.388 (0.336)
Democracy				-1.010*** (0.362)	-0.657 (0.522)
French African Colony				-0.062 (0.268)	0.510* (0.304)
Cold War				-0.057 (0.325)	0.184 (0.406)
Constant cut 1	-0.039 (0.123)	-0.378* (0.225)	0.447 (0.291)	-2.655 (2.291)	-3.131 (3.276)
Constant cut 2	1.168*** (0.149)	0.892*** (0.223)	1.746*** (0.301)	-1.298 (2.288)	-1.573 (3.258)
Observations	338	364	210	305	190
Log likelihood	-333.684	-358.447	-210.066	-285.916	-175.008
Pseudo R2	0.018	0.021	0.008	0.066	0.089

*Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.*

Are the findings just capturing states that do not value the physical integrity rights of the population?

Finally, I include controls for state repression from the Political Terror Scale including those scored based on information from Amnesty International's human rights reports and reports produced by the US Department of State (Gibney et al., 2017).

Table B19: Including controls for state repression

	DV=violent		DV=how violent	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Military Regime	-0.641 (0.542)	-1.451** (0.714)	-0.967* (0.522)	-1.833*** (0.704)
Coup leader: General	-2.113*** (0.631)	-1.994** (0.796)	-1.869*** (0.600)	-1.627** (0.697)
Coup leader: Major, Colonel	-0.84 (0.552)	-0.703 (0.443)	-0.903 (0.554)	-0.934* (0.497)
Coup leader: Nonmilitary	0.507 (0.819)	1.208 (1.156)	-0.141 (0.623)	-0.221 (0.687)
Counterbalancing (log)		-1.501** (0.664)		-1.547*** (0.509)
Mil. Spending/Soldier (log)	-0.061 (0.244)	-0.0874 (0.327)	0.0129 (0.219)	-0.257 (0.315)
Mil. Personnel (log)	0.307 (0.375)	0.399 (0.447)	0.540* (0.315)	0.851** (0.420)
GDP/capita (log)	-0.834 (0.521)	-0.54 (0.567)	-0.934** (0.423)	-0.728 (0.540)
Population (log)	0.246 (0.360)	0.521 (0.497)	-0.0359 (0.280)	-0.0863 (0.428)
Civil War	-0.69 (0.584)	-0.984 (0.863)	-0.692 (0.466)	-0.935 (0.677)
Democracy	-0.67 (0.545)	-1.908** (0.878)	-0.676 (0.522)	-1.701** (0.772)
French African Colony	-0.413 (0.483)	0.920* (0.500)	-0.291 (0.453)	0.741 (0.546)
Cold War	0.35 (0.607)	0.821 (0.770)	0.41 (0.495)	0.537 (0.623)
PTS_Amnesty	0.0261 -0.394 (0.367)	0.0853 -0.662 (0.505)	0.0827 -0.358 (0.339)	0.0857 -0.514 (0.280)
PTS_State Department	-0.319	-0.383	-0.29	-0.355
Constant cut 1			-5.299 (3.626)	-6.958 (6.495)
Constant cut 2			-4.095 (3.599)	-5.666 (6.541)
Constant cut 3			-1.665 (3.565)	-2.954 (6.398)
Constant	3.459 (5.290)	-1.146 (7.733)		
Observations	115	80	115	80
Log likelihood	-64.645	-40.527	-112.646	-74.200
Pseudo R2	0.185	0.268	0.117	0.176

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

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