The Australia-Japan Special Strategic Partnership

Agreements, Joint Statements, and Related Documents

2025 Edition

Michael MacArthur Bosack

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Editor:

Michael M. Bosack

Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies

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For Michelle Bergin & Matthias Kiernan

PREFACE

My experience with the Australia-Japan security relationship began around twenty years ago when I attended the 10th International Cadets' Conference in Yokosuka, Japan. Given the nature of the U.S.-Japan Alliance, it seemed natural that there would be delegates from the U.S. service academies, and I earned the privilege of representing the U.S. Air Force Academy. Of interest to me were the other countries present at the conference, which included the following: Canada, the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, France, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, South Korea, and—one half of this book's focus—Australia. It was from observing my Australian and Japanese cadet counterparts that I began to learn about their interpersonal exchanges and to notice the natural affability that seemed to come from these two Indo-Pacific partners.

My involvement in the Australia-Japan relationship entered a new, formal phase when I took on responsibilities as the tri- and multi-lateral policy coordinator at Headquarters, U.S. Forces, Japan later in my military career. It was my task to facilitate trilateral military activities between Australia, Japan, and the United States. To be a good trilateral coordinator meant studying the bilateral Australia-Japan relationship and to gain an appreciation for the interests and linkages driving their ties. I was also tasked with supporting the functions of United Nations Command-Rear—the rear area, multinational headquarters for the Korea-based United Nations Command that was under the leadership of an Australian Group Captain. Those experiences helped me understand the depth and utility of Australia-Japan ties.

I firmly believe that the Australia-Japan security relationship is undoubtedly among the most important in the world today. With shared values rooted in liberal democracy and influence that extends beyond the region, the Australia-Japan relationship is a force for good amid increased challenges to the rules-based international order.

But for practitioners and analysts, it is not enough to understand the utility of a relationship—it is necessary to have access to the source documents that underpin those ties. Those documents help elucidate the evolution of the relationship while offering a policy and legal basis when considering present and future cooperation. This is especially important for these two special

strategic partners who are blazing the trail in developing a security alignment in non-traditional ways. This book seeks to illustrate the evolution of this relationship over time.

For practitioners actively involved in bi-, tri-, or multi-lateral cooperation involving Australia and Japan, this book offers a handy reference. For those from other countries seeking to foster ties with Australia, Japan, or both, this book presents the blueprint for how Australia and Japan built their relationship so their approach may be replicated elsewhere. For scholars and analysts, it is a one-stop resource for documents and statements related to this increasingly important bilateral relationship.

As with any project, there were many who contributed to this endeavor. I am grateful to John Bradford for suggesting the idea. We had previously worked on a similar book related to the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and when he said, "What about one for Australia and Japan?" it was all the push I needed. I am deeply appreciative of Annette Bradford, who lent her keen eye to copy-editing the book. Similar gratitude is owed to Isak Nordenberg for helping to compile and format several of the documents included in this volume and for reviewing the text. My sincere thanks go to Sonja Halloran and Peter McDermott. Peter was one of the original architects of the Australia-Japan security relationship as we know it, and his writing on the history of the two countries' bilateral security ties is still the seminal work on the subject. While Peter helped form the foundation, Sonja built upon it as a contemporary Australia-Japan policy coordinator. There are more than a few documents in this volume that she had a personal hand in crafting. I am grateful to both Peter and Sonja for reviewing the compiled documents to validate their utility for practitioners and scholars interested in the Australia-Japan relationship. Further, thanks must go to my many Japanese trilateral coordinator counterparts who worked with me closely from 2014 to 2017 in helping to advance many of the initiatives detailed in this book's agreements and joint statements.

Anything good that comes from this book comes from those I have mentioned, the generations of practitioners who developed the documents herein, and the YCAPS volunteers who contributed to this volume—all mistakes are my own.

Michael MacArthur Bosack

EDITORIAL NOTE

This book endeavors to remain as true as possible to the original formatting of the documents, including punctuation and layout. As such, some documents will have different style headings and disparate conventions for spelling and punctuation. This also applies to spelling conventions, where the Japanese government's published texts typically use American English while the Australian government employs British English.

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Introduction:
Defining the Special Strategic Partnership

What does it mean to be in a special strategic partnership? It is not an alliance in the legal sense where there is a treaty underwriting formal defense commitments. It is also not a loose mechanism for transactional cooperation. In the case of Australia and Japan, it is a unique type of relationship founded upon core values and shared interests which underpin collaboration in multiple realms—not least of which being foreign policy and security.

To assess what this means in practice, it is first important to understand the nature of security relationships themselves, because what was true of power and conflict in the 1800s is different from what was true in World War II and in the Cold War era, etc. Accordingly, conceptions of security relationships developed in each of those eras are not necessarily true today. Thus, to gain a viable comprehension of these relationships, it is useful to track the evolution of the security conditions that shaped them.

The security environment is predicated on systems and capabilities. Plainly stated, the "system" is a function of the number and strength of major world powers. While international relations theory offers significant discourse on this subject, the general consensus is that major powers possess the ability to alter the world's security dynamics, influence the status quo, and set rules for lesser powers. The number of major powers determines the system, with multipolar meaning many great powers (as existed prior to World War II), bipolar with two great powers (e.g., the Cold War era), and unipolar with a single great power (which the world experienced immediately after the fall of the Soviet Union).

The major powers earn their place at the top based on their capabilities, but the capabilities that have defined them have also evolved over time. They are constantly advancing, and in the post-World War II era, they have expanded beyond those considered traditionally "military." Under the period often referred to as *Pax Britannica*, it was superior naval capabilities that made Great Britain a superpower. Under the Cold War system, nuclear capabilities underpinned competition between the United States and USSR, and their "nuclear umbrellas" greatly influenced alliance designs. But now,

space, cyber, and other technologies are shaping global security competition. Things that would have been unthinkable a hundred years ago—like expanding territorial claims simply by constructing islands in the middle of the ocean—all have the capacity to influence the security environment on a large scale. Further, it has become the norm for governments to take conscious and deliberate steps towards incorporate all instruments of national power—diplomacy, information, military, and economy—into security competition. In sum, the power that may shape the security environment is now more dynamic. It has created a world where security conflict is more nuanced, has outmoded Cold War conceptions of alliances, and now demands an updated understanding of security relationships.

Rather than immediately reaching for the terms, "alliance" or "alignment," this volume envisions a broader framework for understanding security relationships; after all, even adversaries in great state competition can have a "security relationship" in some form or another, be it in anti-piracy, counterterrorism, etc. The book posits three categories for security relationships predicated on six components. These are indicated in Figure 1 and clarified below:

Figure 1: Categories and components of security relationships



Common Interests: At the core of any security relationship is some overlapping interest. This can be broad in scale, such as a common threat or a desire to change the security status quo. Conversely, it may be narrow in scope, focusing simply on a mutual area of security concern such as counterterrorism or anti-piracy.

Unilateral Policies: These are policies that one state establishes to foster security engagement with another. Examples include Official Development Assistance, budgeting for joint military exercises, invitations for security dialogues, and others.

Routine Security Engagement: This is any activity meant to enhance security that happens with some level of frequency. The term "routine" is important because security relationships are not built on one-off activity. The security engagements that underpin security relationships occur on a regular basis, whether formally or informally. These include exercises, policy dialogues, real-world military or policing operations, among others.

Negotiated Policies: This is when decisions are made with another state's security interests specifically in mind. Importantly, the states themselves communicate those interests through direct negotiations or consultations; absent this key factor, policy-making would simply be unilateral with a "best guess" as to what a security partner may want.

Negotiated Instruments: Negotiated instruments are international agreements, memoranda, operational plans, etc. that formalize policies, institutions, interests, and activities. Examples include but are not limited to the following: Status of Forces Agreements, which provide the legal basis for routine deployment of foreign forces; General Security of Military Information Agreements, which codify the exchange of classified information between states; or non-aggression pacts, which obligate signatories from using force against one another. Negotiated instruments have two important features: (1) formality; and (2) exclusivity. Formality serves as a strategic signal of mutually shared interests and policies, and it provides the legal basis for sustainment of the security relationship. The negotiated rights and obligations presented in the instruments denote a level of exclusivity; i.e., not every state has those same rights and obligations.

Negotiated Alliance Treaties: The ultimate instrument for security relationships is an alliance treaty that incorporates all the aforementioned components in some way or another. It is comprised of common interests, purpose, and rights and obligations. What makes it different from any other instrument is that it contains an obligation for use of military force when a certain threshold—sometimes referred to as the *casus foederis*—is met.

Importantly, the categories of security relationships are based on having all those elements together. An alignment cannot just have instruments, it must have negotiated policies, routine engagement, and common interests that continue to underpin those instruments. Likewise, an alliance is hollow if it does not contain the other components.

Where does Australia and Japan fall along the spectrum of security relationships? The two countries share a variety of common interests. They have both developed unilateral policies aimed at fostering their security relationship. They have undertaken routine security engagement, including "2+2" ministerial level foreign affairs and defense meetings and military exercises. They have

worked on negotiated policies for counterbalancing China in the Indo-Pacific region. A good example of this is their collaboration on an infrastructure investment plan for developing countries that offers an alternative to China's Belt and Road Initiative. In the past decade, they have also negotiated and concluded key instruments for cooperation, including an Acquisitions and Cross Servicing Agreement and a "Reciprocal Access Agreement" (akin to a Status of Forces Agreement).

While the relationship is missing a commitment to employ military force in a specified scenario (the key element of an alliance treaty), the rest of the components indicate a clear security *alignment* between Australia and Japan. This is clearly demonstrated through the agreements, declarations, and joint statements contained in this volume. The two governments' chosen name for their alignment is the "Special Strategic Partnership."

The book proceeds as follows. Section I includes all major bilateral security-related agreements between Australia and Japan. These represent the *negotiated instruments* as indicated on the spectrum described in this introduction. Section II includes the major joint statements from the past thirty years, which clarifies the *common interests*, *routine security engagements*, and *negotiated policies* as determined by the governments over time. Section III covers the major trilateral Australia-Japan-United States joint statements, included in this volume based on the importance of trilateral cooperation in fostering bilateral Australia-Japan ties. Section IV includes the significant joint statements from the Quad—the quadrilateral relationship between Australia, India, Japan, and the United States. Finally, Section V incorporates legacy agreements that provide essential context for modern arrangements.

SECTION I

Security-related Agreements

Prime Ministers Scott Morrison and Fumio Kishida sign the Reciprocal Access Agreement, 6 January 2022 (photo credit: Office of the Prime Minister of Australia)

Security-related Agreements

There are many types of negotiated instruments that underwrite security relationships. The one that most tend to think of first are alliance treaties that include formal defense commitments, but there are many others that are necessary for operationalizing security relationships; after all, a commitment means little if it cannot be implemented.

Key to implementation of security relationships are five core requirements. First, partner forces must have a basis for cooperation. This could be codified via an alliance treaty, but for Australia and Japan's special strategic partnership, it comes in the form of a "Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation." Second, partner forces must be able to exchange information, which Australia and Japan cover in an information sharing agreement. Third, they must have mechanisms for logistical interoperability. In other words, they must have provisions for how they share supplies and military equipment in the execution of their bi- or multi-lateral operations. This is the purpose of the Australia-Japan "Acquisitions and Cross Servicing Agreement." Fourth, there is utility in having arrangements for sharing defense technology and equipment. Australia and Japan cover this under a 2014 agreement between the two governments. Finally, partner forces must be able to operate in each other's territory to carry out the activities they have committed to executing.

All the agreements relevant to these requirements are included in this section. It contains both the original (2007) and updated (2022) "Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation," as well as the 2014 Joint Leaders' statement formally defining the Australia-Japan relationship as a Special Strategic Partnership. It also includes the other agreements that serve as the building blocks for bilateral interoperability.

To note, there are two other security-related agreements which would be relevant to include in this section but whose specific terms are not publicly available. The first is the 2016 Trilateral Information Sharing Arrangement between Australia, Japan, and the United States. While seemingly odd to include a trilateral agreement among bilateral deals, the "TISA" is essentially a bridge for connecting the information which is normally privy to Australia and the United States through the "Five Eye" intelligence sharing framework and to Japan and the United States through their bilateral

intelligence sharing mechanisms. The necessity of the TISA wanes with each new intelligence sharing initiative between Australia and Japan, but it continues to be relevant as the governments navigate the barriers to multilateral intelligence cooperation.

The other agreement is the "Bilateral Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Arrangement" signed in June 2023. Building upon the 2014 agreement on sharing of defense equipment and technology, the 2023 deal calls for the two governments to cooperate in co-research and development. In January 2024, Australia and Japan signed an agreement to embark on a joint research project between Australia's Defence Science and Technology Group and Japan's Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Agency on strategic capabilities in robotic and autonomous systems for undersea warfare. As with the TISA, the precise language of the agreement is not publicly available, but the arrangement is notable for those seeking to understand other building blocks for the security relationship.

This section proceeds in chronological order. This is important for illustrating the evolution of the security relationship over time, as well as the agreements which the two governments prioritized based on their function and their ability to be negotiated, signed, ratified (if necessary), and implemented.

Subsection I-1

Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation

13 March 2007

Background: The 2007 Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation was an epoch-making document for Australia and Japan. For the first time, the two governments signed a negotiated instrument focused principally on their security relationship. The declaration identified the core values and shared interests underpinning their security cooperation, while defining the scope of the activities that the two countries would pursue going forward.

Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation

The Prime Ministers of Japan and Australia,

Affirming that the strategic partnership between Japan and Australia is based on democratic values, a commitment to human rights, freedom and the rule of law, as well as shared security interests, mutual respect, trust and deep friendship;

Committing to the continuing development of their strategic partnership to reflect shared values and interests;

Recalling their on-going beneficial cooperation on regional and global security challenges, including terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, and human security concerns such as disaster relief and pandemics, as well as their contributions to regional peace and stability;

Recognising that the future security and prosperity of both Japan and Australia is linked to the secure future of the Asia-Pacific region and beyond;

Affirming their common purpose in working together, and with other countries through such fora as Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the East Asia Summit (EAS), to achieve the objective of a prosperous, open and secure Asia-Pacific region, and recognising that strengthened bilateral security cooperation will make a significant contribution in this context;

Committing to increasing practical cooperation between the defence forces and other security related agencies of Japan and Australia, including through strengthening the regular and constructive exchange of views and assessments of security developments in areas of common interest;

Committing to working together, and with others, to respond to new security challenges and threats, as they arise;

Affirming the common strategic interests and security benefits embodied in their respective alliance relationships with the United States, and committing to strengthening trilateral cooperation, including through practical collaboration among the foreign affairs, defence and other related agencies of all three countries, as well as through the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue and recognising that strengthened bilateral cooperation will be conducive to the enhancement of trilateral cooperation;

Desiring to create a comprehensive framework for the enhancement of security cooperation between Japan and Australia;

Have decided as follows:

Strengthening Cooperation

Japan and Australia will strengthen their cooperation and consultation on issues of common strategic interest in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond. This includes cooperation for a peaceful resolution of issues related to North Korea, including its nuclear development, ballistic missile activities, and humanitarian issues including the abduction issue. Japan and Australia also recognise the threat to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond posed by terrorism and will further strengthen cooperation to address this threat.

Japan and Australia will also strengthen their cooperation through the United Nations and other international and regional organisations and fora through activities such as peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations. Japan and Australia will work towards the reform of the United Nations, including the realization of Japan's permanent membership of the Security Council.

The cooperation will be conducted in accordance with laws and regulations of each country.

Japan and Australia will deepen and expand their bilateral cooperation in the areas of security and defence cooperation with a view to enhancing the effectiveness of their combined contribution to regional and international peace and security, as well as human security.

Areas of Cooperation

The scope of security cooperation between Japan and Australia will include, but not be limited to the following:

(i) law enforcement on combating transnational crime, including trafficking in illegal narcotics and precursors, people smuggling and trafficking, counterfeiting currency and arms smuggling;

(ii) border security;

(iii) counter-terrorism;

(iv) disarmament and counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery;

(v) peace operations;

(vi) exchange of strategic assessments and related information;

(vii) maritime and aviation security;

(viii) humanitarian relief operations, including disaster relief;

(ix) contingency planning, including for pandemics.

As part of the above-mentioned cooperation, Japan and Australia will, as appropriate, strengthen practical cooperation between their respective defence forces and other security related agencies, including through:

(i) exchange of personnel;

(ii) joint exercises and training to further increase effectiveness of cooperation, including in the area of humanitarian relief operations;

(iii) coordinated activities including those in the areas of law enforcement, peace operations, and regional capacity building.

Implementation

Japan and Australia will develop an action plan with specific measures to advance security cooperation in the above areas.

Japan and Australia will further strengthen the strategic dialogue between their Foreign Ministers, on an annual basis.

Japan and Australia will build on their dialogue between Defence Ministers, on an annual basis.

Japan and Australia will enhance joint Foreign and Defence Ministry dialogue, including through the establishment of a regular Ministerial dialogue.

Signed at Tokyo this 13th day of March, 2007.

SHINZO ABE	JOHN HOWARD
Prime Minister of Japan	Prime Minister of Australia

Subsection I-2

2010 Australia-Japan Acquisitions and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)

Signed on 19 May 2010
Superseded by the 2017 ACSA

Background: An acquisitions and cross-servicing agreement yields the mechanisms necessary for partner forces to provide mutual logistics support. While it would seem natural for Australia Defence Force and Japan Self Defense Force personnel to be able to share supplies and resources when operating together, there are simple questions that must be answered, e.g., *is this reimbursable*, or *are there surcharges or duties levied for provision of this equipment or resources*? These are questions that are unhelpful to answer in an ad hoc manner when operations are already underway, so the "ACSA" is the instrument employed to provide for such arrangements ahead of time. The 2010 Australia-Japan ACSA was a groundbreaking instrument for Japan and a non-U.S. partner and remained in effect until superseded by the 2017 agreement of the same name.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN AND THE GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA CONCERNING RECIPROCAL PROVISION OF SUPPLIES AND SERVICES BETWEEN THE SELF-DEFENSE FORCES OF JAPAN AND THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE

The Government of Japan and the Government of Australia (hereinafter referred to as the "Parties"),

Recognizing that the establishment of a framework between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Australian Defence Force concerning reciprocal provision of supplies and services in the field of logistic support (hereinafter referred to as the "supplies and services") will promote close cooperation between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Australian Defence Force,

Understanding that the establishment of the above-mentioned framework will promote more efficient performance of the respective roles of the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Australian Defence Force in the field of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, humanitarian international relief operations and other operations, and will actively contribute to the effort led by the United Nations toward international peace,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. The purpose of this Agreement is to establish basic terms and conditions for the reciprocal provision of supplies and services, between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Australian Defence Force, necessary for the following activities:

a. exercises and training with participation by both of the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Australian Defence Force;

b. United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, humanitarian international relief operations, or operations to cope with large-scale disasters in the territory of either Party or a third country;

c. transportation of nationals of either Party or others, if appropriate, for their evacuation from overseas in case of exigencies of the situation;

d. communication and coordination or other routine activities (including visits of ships or aircraft of the forces of either Party to facilities in the territory of the other Party), with the exception of exercises and training conducted unilaterally by the forces of either Party.

2. This Agreement sets forth a framework for the provision of supplies and services on the basis of the principle of reciprocity.

3. The request, provision, receipt, and settlement of supplies and services under this Agreement shall be carried out by the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and by the Australian Defence Force.

Article II

1. When either Party requests, under this Agreement, the other Party to provide supplies and services necessary for the activities which are set forth in sub-paragraph 1 a. to d. of Article I, and are conducted by the Self-Defense Forces of Japan or the Australian Defence Force, the other Party, within its competence, may provide the supplies and services requested.

2. The supplies and services related to the following categories may be provided under this Article: food; water; billeting; transportation (including airlift); petroleum, oils, and lubricants; clothing; communications; medical services; base support; storage; use of facilities; training services; spare parts and components; repair and maintenance; and airport and seaport services.
The supplies and services related to each category are specified in the Annex.

3. Paragraph 2 of this Article shall not be interpreted as to include the provision of weapons or ammunition by the Self-Defense Forces of Japan or the Australian Defence Force.

4. The provision of supplies and services between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Australian Defence Force shall be conducted pursuant to the laws and regulations of the respective countries.

Article III

1. The use of supplies and services provided under this Agreement shall be consistent with the Charter of the United Nations.

2. The Party that receives supplies and services under this Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the "receiving Party") shall not transfer those supplies and services, either temporarily or permanently, by any means to those outside of the forces of the receiving Party, without prior written consent of the Party who provides them (hereinafter referred to as the "providing Party").

Article IV

1. The settlement procedures for provision of supplies under this Agreement shall be as follows:

a. The receiving Party shall, subject to sub-paragraph b., return the supplies in question in a condition and manner which is satisfactory to the providing Party.

b. If the supplies provided are consumable or the receiving Party cannot return the supplies in question in a condition and manner which is satisfactory to the providing Party, the receiving Party shall, subject to sub-paragraph c., return supplies of the same type and in the same quality and quantity in a condition and manner which is satisfactory to the providing Party.

c. If the receiving Party cannot return the supplies of the same type and in the same quality and quantity as the supplies provided in a condition and manner which is satisfactory to the providing Party, the receiving Party shall reimburse in the currency specified by the providing Party.

2. In case of the settlement for provision of services under this Agreement, the services provided shall be reimbursed in the currency specified by the providing Party or settled by the provision of services of the same type and equivalent value. The manner of the settlement shall be agreed between the Parties prior to the provision of the services.

3. Internal duties or taxes shall not be charged by either Party for supplies and services provided under this Agreement to the extent permitted by the laws of the respective countries.

Article V

1. The reciprocal provision of supplies and services under this Agreement shall be carried out in accordance with the Procedural Arrangement, as may be modified, which is subordinate to this Agreement and which shall specify procedures and supplementary details of terms and conditions to implement this Agreement. The Procedural Arrangement shall be made between the competent authorities of the Parties.

2. The price of the supplies and the services reimbursed in accordance with paragraph 1 c. and paragraph 2 of Article IV shall be determined pursuant to the relevant provisions set forth in the Procedural Arrangement.

Article VI

1. The provisions of this Agreement shall not apply to any activities conducted by the Australian Defence Force acting as a member of the United Nations Forces under the Agreement Regarding the Status of the United Nations Forces in Japan signed on February 19, 1954.

2. The Parties shall closely consult with each other regarding the implementation of this Agreement.

3. Any matter relating to the interpretation or application of this Agreement and the Procedural Arrangement shall be resolved solely through consultation between the Parties.

4. The competent authorities of the Parties shall settle disputes that may arise concerning the implementation of this Agreement in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Procedural Arrangement.

5. Where a dispute cannot be settled under the provisions of paragraph 4 of this Article, the dispute shall be settled in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3 of this Article.

Article VII

1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date upon which the Parties exchange diplomatic notes informing each other that their respective internal procedures necessary to give effect to this Agreement have been completed. This Agreement shall remain in force for a period of ten years, and shall thereafter be automatically extended for successive periods of ten years each, unless either Party notifies the other of its intention in writing to terminate this Agreement more than six months before the end of each period of ten years.

2. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article, each Party may terminate this Agreement at any time by giving one year written notice to the other Party.

3. This Agreement may be amended by written agreement between the Parties.

4. Notwithstanding the termination of this Agreement, the provisions of Article III, IV, V and paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of Article VI shall remain in force in respect of the reciprocal provision of supplies and services conducted under this Agreement.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE in duplicate, in the Japanese and English languages, both equally authentic, at Tokyo, this nineteenth day of May, two thousand ten.

For the Government of Japan:
岡田克也

For the Government of Australia:
John Faulkner

* * * * * *

Annex

Category

1. **Food**: food, provision of meals, cooking utensils, and the like.
2. **Water**: water, water supply, equipment necessary for water supply, and the like.
3. **Billeting**: use of billeting and bathing facilities, beddings, and the like.
4. **Transportation (including airlift)**: transportation of persons and goods, transport equipment, and the like.
5. **Petroleum, oils, and lubricants**: petroleum, oils, and lubricants, refueling, equipment necessary for refueling, and the like.
6. **Clothing**: clothing, mending of clothing, and the like.
7. **Communications**: use of communication facilities, communication services, communication equipment, and the like.
8. **Medical services**: medical treatment, medical equipment, and the like.
9. **Base support**: collection and disposal of waste, laundry, electric supply, environmental services, decontamination equipment and services, and the like.
10. **Storage**: temporary storage in warehouse or refrigerated storehouse, and the like.

11. **Use of facilities**: temporary use of buildings, facilities, and land, and the like.
12. **Training services**: dispatch of instructors, materials for educational and training purposes, consumables for training purposes, and the like.
13. **Spare parts and components**: spare parts and components of military aircraft, vehicles, and ships, and the like.
14. **Repair and maintenance**: repair and maintenance, equipment for repair and maintenance, and the like.
15. **Airport and seaport services**: services for arrival and departure of aircraft and ships, loading and unloading of cargo, and the like.

Subsection I-3

Information Sharing Agreement

17 May 2012

Background: One of the first hurdles to overcome in deepening security relationships is figuring out how to exchange information related to military operations and intelligence. Governments may not have the same rules related to classification, training, protection of information, or handling of unauthorized releases. To manage these issues, governments will negotiate and conclude information sharing agreements. Australia and Japan's version of such an agreement came five years after the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN
AND THE GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA
ON THE SECURITY OF INFORMATION

Preamble

The Government of Japan and the Government of Australia (hereinafter referred to as "the Parties" and separately as "a Party"),

AFFIRMING their commitment to the promotion of bilateral security cooperation through the implementation of the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, signed at Tokyo on 13 March, 2007;

HAVING a mutual interest in the protection of classified information; and

WISHING to ensure the reciprocal protection of classified information exchanged between the Parties;

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1
Definitions

For the purposes of this Agreement:

a. "Classified Information" means all information which requires protection against unauthorised disclosure in the interest of the national security of the Providing Party and which is subject to a Security Classification and generated by, or for the use of, or under the jurisdiction of, the Competent Authorities of the Government of Japan or the Government of Australia. The

information may be in any form, including oral, visual, electronic, magnetic, or documentary forms, or equipment or technology, and may also include any reproductions or translations;

b. "Providing Party" means the Party which transmits Classified Information to the Receiving Party;

c. "Receiving Party" means the Party to which Classified Information is transmitted;

d. "Security Classification" means the identification assigned to Classified Information by a Party to indicate the necessary level of protection that information must be afforded to prevent it from unauthorised disclosure;

e. "Competent Authorities" means agencies of the Receiving Party which are designated by the Party as authorities responsible for the protection of Transmitted Classified Information. The Competent Authorities shall be specified in the Procedural Arrangement;

f. "Transmitted Classified Information" means Classified Information which is transmitted directly or indirectly between the Parties. Classified Information becomes Transmitted Classified Information upon receipt by the Receiving Party;

g. "National Laws and Regulations" means the laws and regulations relating to this Agreement that include, but are not restricted to:

(i) in relation to Japan, Self-Defense Forces Law (Law No. 165, 1954) and National Public Service Law (Law No. 120, 1947), and

(ii) in relation to Australia, the laws that shall be specified in the Procedural Arrangement;

h. "Third Party" means any government, individual, or entity other than the Parties;

i. "Third Partner" means the government of a third State or an intergovernmental organisation with which the Receiving Party has concluded an agreement or arrangement concerning the protection of classified information;

j. "Personnel Security Clearance" means the eligibility, granted by a Competent Authority of a Party, subject to that Party's procedures, for an individual to access Classified Information to a specified level;

k. "Security Policies" means each Party's policies for the protection of Classified Information and Transmitted Classified Information, including National Laws and Regulations, as specified in the Procedural Arrangement and as may be modified from time to time; and

l. "Contractor" means an individual or entity, including subcontractor, that performs a contract with the Receiving Party.

ARTICLE 2
Protection of Transmitted Classified Information

Transmitted Classified Information shall be protected according to the terms set forth in this Agreement and is also to be protected in accordance with the Procedural Arrangement and any Implementing Arrangements, subject to the National Laws and Regulations in force of the Receiving Party.

ARTICLE 3
National Security Authority and Competent Authorities

1. The National Security Authority for each Party shall be:

a. For the Government of Japan: Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and

b. For the Government of Australia: Attorney-General's Department.

2. The National Security Authority shall serve as a point of coordination and liaison with regard to the implementation and interpretation of this Agreement.

3. The National Security Authority and the Competent Authorities shall monitor the implementation of this Agreement within their competence.

ARTICLE 4
Security Classifications

1. The Providing Party shall mark all Classified Information with one of the following Security Classifications:

a. For the Government of Japan, Classified Information that is designated as "Defense Secret" according to the Self-Defense Forces Law is marked BOUEI HIMITSU (KIMITSU) 防衛秘密（機密）or BOUEI HIMITSU 防衛秘密, and the other Classified Information is marked KIMITSU 機密, GOKUHI 極秘, or HI 秘; and

b. For the Government of Australia, Classified Information is marked TOP SECRET, SECRET, HIGHLY PROTECTED, CONFIDENTIAL, PROTECTED, RESTRICTED, or IN CONFIDENCE.

2. For Classified Information where a marking is not physically possible, the Providing Party shall inform the Receiving Party of the Security Classification. If the Receiving Party so requests, the Providing Party shall inform the Security Classification in writing.

3. The Receiving Party shall mark all Transmitted Classified Information with the name of the Providing Party and the corresponding Security Classification of the Receiving Party, as described in paragraph 4 of this Article.

4. The corresponding Security Classifications are:

In Australia	**In Japan**
TOP SECRET	Kimitsu 機密 / Bouei Himitsu 防衛秘密（機密）
SECRET / HIGHLY PROTECTED	Gokuhi 極秘 / Bouei Himitsu 防衛秘密
CONFIDENTIAL / PROTECTED	Hi 秘
RESTRICTED / IN CONFIDENCE	No Japanese correspondent, but shall be protected as if it is Hi 秘, unless otherwise advised by the Government of Australia.

5. The Providing Party shall inform the Receiving Party of any change in the Security Classification of Transmitted Classified Information. Upon receipt of such information, the Receiving Party shall change the Security Classification of the Transmitted Classified Information accordingly. If the Receiving Party so requests, the Providing Party shall inform the change in writing.

6. The Receiving Party shall not downgrade the Security Classification of the Transmitted Classified Information without the prior written consent of the Providing Party.

ARTICLE 5
Principles for Protecting Transmitted Classified Information

Each Party shall apply the following rules to Transmitted Classified Information, subject to its National Laws and Regulations in force:

a. The Receiving Party shall take appropriate measures to provide all Transmitted Classified Information a degree of protection equivalent in effect to that afforded to it by the Providing Party;

b. The Receiving Party shall not release Transmitted Classified Information to a Third Party unless otherwise provided for in this Agreement or agreed in writing by the Parties;

c. The Receiving Party shall take appropriate measures to prevent unauthorised disclosure of Transmitted Classified Information;

d. The Receiving Party shall take appropriate measures to ensure that necessary inspections are carried out and relevant Security Policies are complied with in order to protect Transmitted Classified Information;

e. The Receiving Party shall establish procedures for the identification, location, inventory and control of Transmitted Classified Information, which are to be outlined in the Procedural Arrangement;

f. The Receiving Party shall not use or permit the use of Transmitted Classified Information for any purpose other than that for which it is provided without the prior written approval of the Providing Party;

g. The Receiving Party shall observe intellectual property rights such as patents, copyrights, or trade secrets applicable to Transmitted Classified Information;

h. The Providing Party may specify in writing additional limitations on the use, disclosure, and release of, and access to Transmitted Classified Information by the Receiving Party, and the Receiving Party shall comply with any such limitations; and

i. The Receiving Party may release Transmitted Classified Information to a Third Partner if the Providing Party specifies that the information is releasable to the Third Partner.

ARTICLE 6
Access to Transmitted Classified Information

Prior to the release to an individual, including a Contractor, of any Transmitted Classified Information, the Receiving Party shall, subject to its National Laws and Regulations in force, take appropriate measures to ensure that:

a. No individual shall be entitled to access Transmitted Classified Information solely by virtue of rank, appointment, or a Personnel Security Clearance;

b. Access to Transmitted Classified Information shall be limited to those individuals who:

(i) Require access to the Transmitted Classified Information for the performance of their official duties, and

(ii) Hold a current Personnel Security Clearance to the necessary level;

c. The granting of a Personnel Security Clearance shall be consistent with the interests of national security and based upon all available information indicating whether the individual is trustworthy and reliable in the handling of Transmitted Classified Information;

d. An appropriate investigation for the granting of a Personnel Security Clearance shall be conducted so that the criteria referred to in paragraph c of this Article have been met with respect to any individual to be granted access to Transmitted Classified Information;

e. All individuals who are granted access to Transmitted Classified Information shall be informed of their responsibilities to protect the information; and

f. An assurance in writing shall be provided to the Providing Party, upon its request, that the individual receiving the Transmitted Classified Information possesses the necessary level of Personnel Security Clearance and requires access for the performance of their official duties.

ARTICLE 7
Release of Transmitted Classified Information to Contractors

The Receiving Party may release Transmitted Classified Information to a Contractor, where the Parties mutually determine in writing, or if the Providing Party otherwise specifies that the information is releasable to a Contractor. Prior to the release to a Contractor of any Transmitted Classified Information, the Receiving Party shall, subject to its National Laws and Regulations in force, take appropriate measures to ensure that:

a. The Contractor and the Contractor's facilities have the capability to protect the Transmitted Classified Information; and

b. Initial and periodic security inspections are carried out at the Contractor's facilities to ensure that Transmitted Classified Information is protected in accordance with the terms set forth in this Agreement and any Implementing Arrangements.

ARTICLE 8
Security of Facilities

The Receiving Party shall, subject to its National Laws and Regulations in force, take appropriate measures to ensure that:

a. All facilities where Transmitted Classified Information is handled are secured in accordance with the terms set forth in this Agreement and any Implementing Arrangements;

b. For each such facility, individuals are appointed who shall have the responsibility and authority for the control and protection of Transmitted Classified Information and shall hold a current Personnel Security Clearance to the necessary level; and

c. Each facility that handles Transmitted Classified Information shall maintain a register of individuals holding a current Personnel Security Clearance who are authorised to have access to such information.

ARTICLE 9
Storage of Transmitted Classified Information

1. The Receiving Party shall, subject to its National Laws and Regulations in force, take appropriate measures to ensure that Transmitted Classified Information shall be stored in a manner that ensures access only by those individuals who have been authorised to access Transmitted Classified Information in accordance with Article 6 of this Agreement.

2. Subject to National Laws and Regulations in force, all information systems used to store Transmitted Classified Information in electronic form shall be protected in accordance with procedures that may be developed between the Parties or between Competent Authorities of the Parties.

ARTICLE 10
Transmission

Classified Information shall be transmitted between the Parties through Government-to-Government channels. While in transit, the Providing Party shall be responsible for custody, control, and security of all Classified Information until its receipt by the Receiving Party, subject to the National Laws and Regulations in force of the Providing Party.

ARTICLE 11
Security Requirements during Transmission

1. The minimum requirements for the security of the Classified Information during transmission between the Parties shall be as follows:

a. **Classified Information in the form of documents or other media**

(i) Classified Information in the form of documents or other media shall be transmitted in a sealed or tamper-indicating envelope enclosed within another sealed or tamper-indicating envelope or within a security pouch, the innermost envelope bearing only the Security Classification of the documents or other media and the organisational address of the intended recipient, the outer

envelope or the security pouch bearing the organisational address of the recipient, the organisational address of the sender, and the registry number, if applicable.

(ii) No indication of the Security Classification of the enclosed documents or other media shall be made on the outer envelope or the security pouch.

(iii) Receipts shall be prepared for packages containing Classified Information in the form of documents or other media that are transmitted between the Parties, and a receipt for the enclosed Classified Information shall be signed by the Receiving Party's final recipient and returned to the Providing Party's sender.

b. **Classified Information in the form of or contained in equipment**

(i) Classified Information in the form of or contained in equipment shall be transmitted in sealed, covered vehicles or be securely packaged or protected in order to prevent identification of its contents and kept under continuous control to prevent access by unauthorised individuals.

(ii) Classified Information in the form of or contained in equipment that is temporarily awaiting shipment shall be placed in protected storage areas that provide protection commensurate with the level of Security Classification of the Classified Information. Only authorised personnel with the appropriate Personnel Security Clearance shall have access to the storage areas.

(iii) Receipts shall be obtained on every occasion when Classified Information in the form of or contained in equipment changes hands en route and is delivered to the Receiving Party's final recipient. All receipts shall be returned to the Providing Party's sender.

c. **Electronic Transmissions**

(i) Classified Information transmitted by electronic means shall be protected during transmission using encryption appropriate for that level of Classified Information. Information systems' standards for processing or storing Transmitted Classified Information or conveying Classified Information shall receive security accreditation by the appropriate authority of the Party employing the system.

(ii) The Receiving Party shall maintain a log of Transmitted Classified Information received by electronic means from the Providing Party. This log shall be made available to the Providing Party upon request.

2. The requirements outlined in paragraph 1 above for the security of Classified Information during transmission between the Parties shall correspondingly apply to the transmission of Transmitted Classified Information between Competent Authorities of the Receiving Party.

ARTICLE 12
Changes in Security Policies

1. On request, the Receiving Party shall provide the Providing Party with a copy of its Security Policies.

2. The Receiving Party shall promptly notify the Providing Party in writing of any changes to relevant Security Policies that would adversely affect the protection of Transmitted Classified Information under this Agreement. In such cases, the Parties shall consult on possible amendments to this Agreement or possible modifications to the Procedural Arrangement. In the interim, Transmitted Classified Information shall continue to be protected according to the terms set forth in this Agreement and is also to be protected in accordance with the Procedural Arrangement, unless otherwise approved in writing by the Providing Party.

ARTICLE 13
Visit Procedures

1. Visits that involve access by individuals of one Party to Classified Information held by the other Party shall be undertaken only with the prior approval of the other Party. Approval for such visits shall only be granted to individuals who possess the necessary level of Personnel Security Clearance and who require such access for the performance of their official duties.

2. Requests for visits shall be submitted by the relevant Competent Authority of the visiting Party through Government-to-Government channels to the relevant Competent Authority of the other Party and shall include verification of the fact that the visiting individuals hold a Personnel Security Clearance to the necessary level.

ARTICLE 14
Visits by Security Personnel

Implementation of the requirements provided for in this Agreement can be advanced through visits by security personnel, designated as such by the National Security Authority or a Competent Authority of the visiting Party. Accordingly, the security personnel, after prior consultation, shall be permitted to visit the other Party, to discuss the other Party's security procedures and observe their implementation in the interest of achieving reasonable comparability of their respective security systems at mutually agreed venues and in a mutually satisfactory manner. The other Party shall assist the visiting security personnel in determining whether Transmitted Classified Information is being adequately protected.

ARTICLE 15
Destruction of Transmitted Classified Information

1. Transmitted Classified Information in the form of documents or other media shall be destroyed by burning, shredding, pulping, or other means preventing reconstruction in whole or in part of the Transmitted Classified Information contained therein.

2. Transmitted Classified Information in the form of or contained in equipment shall be destroyed beyond recognition so as to preclude reconstruction of the Transmitted Classified Information in whole or in part.

ARTICLE 16
Loss or Compromise of Transmitted Classified Information

1. The Providing Party shall be informed immediately of all losses or compromises, as well as suspected losses or compromises, of Transmitted Classified Information, and the Receiving Party shall investigate to determine the circumstances.

2. The results of the investigation and information regarding measures taken to prevent recurrence shall be provided in writing to the Providing Party.

ARTICLE 17
Procedural Arrangement and Implementing Arrangements

1. The Parties shall make a Procedural Arrangement, which is subordinate to this Agreement and shall specify supplementary provisions to implement this Agreement.

2. Competent Authorities, within their competence, may mutually determine Implementing Arrangements, which are subordinate to this Agreement and which shall specify supplementary provisions regarding the handling of Transmitted Classified Information.

ARTICLE 18
Disputes and Consultation

1. The Parties shall consult closely with each other regarding the implementation of this Agreement.

2. Any matter relating to the interpretation or application of this Agreement, the Procedural Arrangement, and any Implementing Arrangements shall be resolved solely through consultation between the Parties.

3. The Competent Authorities of the Parties shall settle disputes that may arise concerning the implementation of the Implementing Arrangements through consultation between the Competent Authorities.

4. Where a dispute cannot be settled under the provisions of paragraph 3 of this Article, the dispute shall be settled in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of this Article.

ARTICLE 19
Entry into Force, Amendment, Duration, and Termination

1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date on which written notifications have been received by both Parties, through diplomatic channels, that their respective internal legal procedures for entry into force of the Agreement have been completed.

2. This Agreement may be amended by written agreement between the Parties. Any amendment of this Agreement shall follow the same procedure as its entry into force.

3. This Agreement shall remain in force for a period of one year and shall be automatically extended annually thereafter unless:

a. The Parties otherwise agree; or

b. A Party gives to the other notice in writing of its desire to terminate this Agreement, in which event this Agreement shall be terminated one hundred and eighty days after the date on which the notice is given.

4. Notwithstanding the termination of this Agreement, all Transmitted Classified Information provided pursuant to this Agreement shall continue to be protected according to the terms set forth in this Agreement.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto by their respective governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE in duplicate at Tokyo this seventeenth day of May 2012 in the Japanese and English languages, both texts being equally authentic.

Subsection I-4

Joint Statement on the Australia-Japan "Special Strategic Partnership"

10 July 2014

Background: Although not a formal agreement, this joint statement is included in this section because it defines the Australia-Japan relationship as a "Special Strategic Partnership." Like other joint statements, it presents the policy priorities for the two governments and articulates the roadmap for cooperation going forward.

Prime Minister Abbott and Prime Minister Abe
Joint Statement
"Special Strategic Partnership for the 21st Century"

Prime Minister Tony Abbott is pleased to welcome to Australia Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Mrs Akie Abe from 7 to 10 July as guests of the Australian Government. The visit by Prime Minister Abe follows the very successful visit of Prime Minister Abbott to Japan in April 2014 as an official guest of the Japanese Government.

Prime Minister Abe's address to the Australian Parliament on 8 July highlighted the long- standing and deep friendship between Australia and Japan, our enduring economic relationship, shared strategic interests in peace, stability and prosperity and strong people-to-people links. Prime Minister Abe thanked Australians for their steadfast support in the aftermath of the tsunami in 2011 and highlighted the many areas of cooperation between our two nations.

At their meeting on 8 July, the two leaders affirmed the special relationship between Japan and Australia, based on common values and strategic interests including democracy, human rights, the rule of law, open markets and free trade. They confirmed that they would meet annually, alternately in Australia and Japan, to take forward the special relationship.

Economic relations
The two leaders signed the Japan-Australia Economic Partnership Agreement (JAEPA), the most significant economic accord between the two countries since the 1957 Agreement on Commerce. The JAEPA will underpin the expansion of bilateral trade and investment for decades to come, taking bilateral economic relations to a new level. They confirmed that the two countries will seek to bring the JAEPA into force as early as possible.

Discussions between the two leaders with Australian and Japanese business leaders confirmed Australia's place into the future as one of the most important suppliers of minerals and energy to

Japan, driven by continuing Japanese investment including in liquefied natural gas and coal. Business leaders noted the JAEPA will be a springboard for growth in the commercial relationship including in manufacturing, agriculture and financial services.

The two leaders highlighted the G20's crucial role in boosting the global economy, freeing up the private sector and creating jobs. With just over four months before the G20 Leaders Summit in Brisbane, the two leaders shared the view it was time to turn aspirations into actions that will boost trade and encourage investment, such as in infrastructure. Prime Minister Abbott praised the important contribution of Japan's national growth strategy to this G20 agenda. Prime Minister Abe welcomed the Australian Government's economic reform agenda, including the abolition of the carbon and mining taxes. They committed to working together to lift ambition and ensure the Summit delivers concrete results for our people: economic growth, jobs and a global economy that can weather future shocks.

The two leaders welcomed the deepening regional economic integration being driven through APEC and measures to enhance free trade in the region including the negotiation of high-quality liberalising trade and investment agreements. They confirmed their commitment to concluding a comprehensive, ambitious and balanced Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement as soon as possible, to promote free trade, investment and economic growth in the region, and to strengthen the trade system based on rules. They will also work together to achieve a modern, comprehensive, high-quality and mutually beneficial Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership.

The two leaders shared the view that promoting the introduction of higher efficiency coal-fired power plants is a realistic measure in addressing climate change considering the fact that many countries opt for coal-fired power generation due to coal's affordability and availability, and recognised the importance of sharing such a view in international fora.

The two leaders confirmed the continued importance of stable and secure trade and investment in liquefied natural gas (LNG) at competitive prices based on market principles, and the importance of the further promotion of flexible gas markets.

The two leaders will strengthen cooperation in the areas of space and Information and Communications Technology (ICT), establishing an officials' ICT policy dialogue. They will also strengthen cooperation for the promotion of Geospatial Information Project using the Japanese Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS).

Security and defence cooperation

The two leaders welcomed the recent growth and deepening of the bilateral defence and security relationship in support of international peace and stability. This builds on the 2007 Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation to ensure Australia and Japan can work effectively together in the region

and beyond. Prime Minister Abbott expressed support for Japan's recent efforts on its security policy of "Proactive Contribution to Peace" based upon the principle of international cooperation and the updating of its legal framework for security, including through the exercise of its UN Charter right to collective self-defence.

The two leaders were pleased to endorse the recommendations from Australian and Japanese Foreign and Defence Ministers to enhance practical defence cooperation. The recommendations will deepen the bilateral security and defence relationship through enhanced training and exercises, increased personnel exchanges, and deepened cooperation on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, maritime security, peacekeeping, capacity building and trilateral security cooperation with the U.S. The two leaders decided to commence negotiations with a view to making an agreement that would reciprocally improve administrative, policy and legal procedures to facilitate joint operations and exercises.

The two leaders signed the Agreement Concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology. The Agreement will facilitate deeper cooperation between Australia and Japan through joint research, development and production of defence equipment and technology in areas of mutual interest, including hydrodynamics.

Prime Minister Abbott looked forward to welcoming a Maritime Self-Defense Force vessel in November this year to participate in the centennial celebration of the first convoy of ships, escorted by HIJMS Ibuki that carried ANZAC troops to World War I.

Regional and international issues

The two leaders reaffirmed the contribution of their respective Alliances with the United States to peace and security in the region. They welcomed continued strong multifaceted US engagement in the region and reiterated their strong support for the US rebalance to Asia. The two leaders reaffirmed the value of the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue and undertook to further strengthen practical trilateral cooperation. They also underscored the importance of the East Asia Summit as the premier forum for addressing the strategic, political and economic challenges facing the region and undertook to work together on strengthening its role.

The two leaders reaffirmed the importance of promoting the rule of law, of peace and stability, unimpeded trade, as well as freedom of navigation and overflight of the high seas. They opposed any unilateral attempt to alter the status quo in the East and South China Seas by the use of force or coercion. Emphasising the need for disputes and issues to be settled by peaceful means, they called on all parties concerned to refrain from actions that could increase tensions, to clarify and pursue claims in accordance with international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and for ASEAN and China to reach early agreement on an effective Code of Conduct in the South China Sea.

They tasked officials to develop a coordinated strategy to strengthen cooperation in the Pacific region, commencing with consultations to identify priorities. The strategy would support economic prosperity, peace and stability in the Pacific region.

The two leaders welcomed the close collaboration between the two countries in promoting nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, including through the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI). They committed to follow up the outcomes of the 8th NPDI Ministerial Meeting in Hiroshima, including actively contributing to a successful 2015 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the early entry-into-force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

The two leaders reaffirmed they will continue to cooperate on United Nations Security Council reforms, peacekeeping operations and humanitarian assistance activities.

They called upon North Korea to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes as well as its ballistic missile programmes. North Korea should abide by its obligations under United Nations Security Council resolutions and its commitments under the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks. It should fully comply with the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement under the NPT. The two leaders reaffirmed their support for the work of the UN Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. They condemned North Korea's violation of human rights and called on it to address urgently its unresolved humanitarian concerns including the abductions issue.

The two leaders resolved to work together to manage and respond to regional and global challenges. They discussed developments in the Middle East, especially the conflicts in Iraq and Syria, and the renewed risk of regional instability and the export of terrorism. They exchanged views on the situation in the Ukraine.

Cultural and People-to-People Exchanges

The two leaders renewed their commitment to promote two-way student mobility between Japan and Australia, to increase mutual understanding. Under the New Colombo Plan the Australia government will increase the number of Australian undergraduate students who study in Japan. Under the Government Scholarship for Study Abroad and the 'TOBITATE! Young Ambassador Program' the Japanese government will increase the number of Japanese students who study in Australia. The two leaders warmly welcomed the commitment to establish the Rio Tinto Chair of Australia-Japan Studies at the University of Tokyo and the Australia-Japan Research Centre at the Australian National University (ANU), as well as the recent progress on cooperation between Ritsumeikan University and the ANU.

Prime Minister Abe welcomed the decision to simplify entry procedures for Japanese citizens arriving in Australia through the planned expansion of the SmartGate automated border processing system.

The two leaders affirmed their intent to cooperate for the success of the AFC Asian Cup 2015 in Australia, the Rugby World Cup 2019 in Japan and the Games of the XXXII Olympiad and Tokyo 2020 Paralympic Games.

Subsection I-5

Agreement on the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology

Signed on 8 July 2014
Entered into force on 8 December 2014

Background: Signed during the summit between Prime Ministers Tony Abbott and Shinzo Abe, this negotiated instrument is necessary for enabling the two countries to collaborate on research, development and production aimed at enhancing their security. The agreement establishes a Joint Committee to determine specific projects and oversee implementation of the agreement, while offering the basic provisions for this essential form of security cooperation.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN CONCERNING THE TRANSFER OF DEFENCE EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY

The Government of Australia and the Government of Japan (hereinafter referred to as "the Parties"),

Considering the shared common values and objectives, as well as the intention of the Parties to contribute jointly to peace and stability in the region and the international community, and particularly in view of the existing cooperative relationship between the Parties in the security area, as confirmed in the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation of 13 March 2007, the Memorandum on Defence Cooperation between Department of Defence, Australia and Ministry of Defense, Japan of 18 December 2008 as well as the Australia and Japan, Cooperating for peace and stability, Common Vision and Objectives of 14 September 2012;

Acknowledging the Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of Japan on the security of information, which entered into force on 22 March 2013 as well as the Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of Japan concerning reciprocal provision of supplies and services between the Australian defence force and the self-defense forces of Japan, which entered into force on 31 January 2013;

Recognising the fact that it has become common among developed countries to improve the performance of defence equipment and technology and to cope with their rising costs by participating in international joint research, development and production;

Desiring that the joint research, development and production of defence equipment and technology in which the Parties participate should contribute to the security of the respective countries and *encourage a closer relationship between Australian and Japanese defence industries*; and

Recognising that in order to promote the joint research, development and production projects in which the Parties participate or the projects for enhancing security and defence

cooperation between the Parties, the terms and conditions which should govern the transfer of defence equipment and technology need to be set forth;

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. Each Party shall, subject to the relevant laws and regulations of its country and in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement, make available to the other Party, defence equipment and technology necessary to implement joint research, development and production projects or projects for enhancing security and defence cooperation (hereinafter referred to as "defence equipment and technology") to be determined in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 below.

2. Specific projects of the joint research, development and production or for enhancing security and defence cooperation shall be mutually determined, taking into account various factors including commercial viability or the security of the respective countries, and confirmed by the Parties through the diplomatic channel.

Article II

1. A Joint Committee shall be established as the means for determining the defence equipment and technology to be transferred for the projects determined in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article I.

2. The Joint Committee shall be composed of two national sections.

The Australian Section shall be composed of:

- a representative each from the Department of Defence, the Defence Science and Technology Organisation and the Defence Materiel Organisation; and
- a representative of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

The Japanese Section shall be composed of:

- a representative of the Ministry of Defense;
- a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and
- a representative of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry.

3. The relevant information necessary for determining the defence equipment and technology to be transferred shall be communicated to the national sections through the diplomatic channel.

4. Based on the relevant information communicated in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3 above, the defence equipment and technology to be transferred shall be determined by the Joint Committee.

5. Detailed arrangements providing for, *inter alia*, the defence equipment and technology to be transferred, persons who shall be party to the transfer, and the detailed terms and conditions of the transfer, shall be made between the competent authorities of the Parties in order to implement this Agreement. The competent authority of the Government of Australia shall be the Department of Defence; the competent authorities of the Government of Japan shall be the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry.

Article III

1. Each Party shall make effective use of defence equipment and technology transferred from the other Party in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and such other purposes as may be determined in the detailed arrangements, and neither Party shall devote such defence equipment and technology to any other purpose.

2. Each Party shall not transfer to any person not an officer or agent including contractor and subcontractor of such Party, or to any other Government, title to or possession of any defence equipment and technology transferred pursuant to this Agreement, without the prior consent of the Party which transferred such defence equipment and technology.

Article IV

Each Party shall, subject to the relevant laws and regulations of its country and in accordance with other applicable international agreements between the Parties, take necessary measures to protect classified information transferred from the other Party pursuant to this Agreement.

Article V

This Agreement and all arrangements to be made hereunder shall be implemented subject to the relevant laws and regulations and budgetary appropriations of the respective countries.

Article VI

Any matter relating to the interpretation or application of this Agreement and all arrangements to be made hereunder shall be resolved solely through consultation between the Parties.

Article VII

1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date upon which the Parties exchange diplomatic notes informing each other that their respective internal procedures necessary to give effect to this Agreement have been completed.

2. This Agreement may be amended by written agreement between the Parties. Any amendment of this Agreement shall follow the same procedure as its entry into force.

3. This Agreement shall remain in force for a period of five years and shall be automatically extended annually thereafter unless either Party notifies the other in writing through the diplomatic channel ninety days in advance of its intention to terminate this Agreement.

In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorised by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE in duplicate at Canberra, this eighth day of July, 2014, in the English and Japanese languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of Australia:	**For the Government of Japan:**
Tony Abbott	Shinzo Abe
Prime Minister	Prime Minister

Subsection I-6

2017 Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement

Signed on 14 January 2017
Entered into force on 6 September 2017

Background: There were two major changes in Japanese security practice which prompted a renegotiation of the 2010 Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement. The first came in July 2014 when the Japanese government reinterpreted its constitution to allow for greater flexibility in the exercise of collective self defense and other operations with security partners. The second was in the summer of 2015 when the Japanese government passed the so-called "Peace and Security Legislation," which formalized the provisions of its constitutional reinterpretation into law. Once again, Australia blazed the trail for other governments as the Australia-Japan ACSA was the model for similar agreements with the United Kingdom and others.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN AND
THE GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA
CONCERNING RECIPROCAL PROVISION OF SUPPLIES AND SERVICES
BETWEEN
THE SELF-DEFENSE FORCES OF JAPAN AND
THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE

The Government of Japan and the Government of Australia (hereinafter referred to individually as a "Party" and collectively as the "Parties"),

Recognizing that the establishment of a framework between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Australian Defence Force concerning reciprocal provision of supplies and services in the field of logistic support (hereinafter referred to as the "supplies and services") will promote close cooperation between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Australian Defence Force,

Understanding that the establishment of the abovementioned framework will promote more efficient performance of the respective roles of the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Australian Defence Force in activities that they conduct pursuing the Parties' further active contribution to international peace and security in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. The purpose of this Agreement is to establish basic terms and conditions for the reciprocal provision of supplies and services, between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Australian Defence Force, necessary for the following activities:

a. exercises and training with participation by both of the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Australian Defence Force;

b. United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, internationally coordinated peace and security operations, humanitarian international relief operations, or operations to cope with large scale disasters in the territory of either Party or a third country;

c. protection measures or transportation of nationals of either Party or others, if appropriate, for their evacuation from overseas in case of exigencies of the situation;

d. communication and coordination or other routine activities (including visits of ships or aircraft of the forces of either Party to facilities in the territory of the other Party), with the exception of exercises and training conducted unilaterally by the forces of either Party;

e. any other activity in which the provision of supplies and services is permitted under the laws and regulations of the respective countries.

2. This Agreement sets forth a framework for the provision of supplies and services on the basis of the principle of reciprocity and mutual consent.

3. The request, provision, receipt, and settlement of supplies and services under this Agreement shall be carried out by the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and by the Australian Defence Force.

Article II

1. Under this Agreement, when requests by either Party to the other Party are made to provide supplies and services necessary for the activities which are set forth in subparagraphs a. to e. of paragraph 1 of Article I, and are conducted by the Self-Defense Forces of Japan or the Australian Defence Force, the other Party may provide such supplies and services within its competence.

2. The supplies and services related to the following categories may be provided under this Agreement: food; water; billeting; transportation (including airlift); petroleum, oils, and lubricants; clothing; communications services; medical services; base operations support (including construction incident to base operations support); storage services; use of facilities; training services; spare parts

and components; repair and maintenance services (including calibration services); airport and seaport services; and ammunition.

The supplies and services related to each category are specified in the Annex.

3. Paragraph 2 of this Article shall not be interpreted as to include the provision of weapons by the Self-Defense Forces of Japan or the Australian Defence Force.

4. The provision of supplies and services between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Australian Defence Force necessary for the activities which are set forth in sub-paragraphs a. to e. of paragraph 1 of Article I shall be conducted pursuant to the laws and regulations of the respective countries.

Article III

1. The use of supplies and services provided under this Agreement shall be consistent with the Charter of the United Nations.

2. The Party that receives supplies and services under this Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the "receiving Party") shall not transfer those supplies and services, either temporarily or permanently, by any means to those outside of the forces of the receiving Party, without prior written consent of the Party who provides them (hereinafter referred to as the "providing Party").

Article IV

1. The settlement procedures for provision of supplies and services under this Agreement shall be as follows:

a. For provision of supplies:

i. The receiving Party shall, subject to sub-paragraph ii., return the supplies in question in a condition and manner that are satisfactory to the providing Party.

ii. If the supplies provided are consumable or the receiving Party cannot return the supplies in question in a condition and manner that are satisfactory to the providing Party, the receiving Party shall, subject to sub-paragraph iii., return supplies of the same type and in the same quality and quantity in a condition and manner that are satisfactory to the providing Party.

iii. If the receiving Party cannot return the supplies of the same type and in the same quality and quantity as the supplies provided in a condition and manner that are

satisfactory to the providing Party, the receiving Party shall reimburse the providing Party in the currency specified by the providing Party.

b. For provision of services:

i. The services provided shall be reimbursed in the currency specified by the providing Party or settled by the provision of services of the same type and equivalent value.

ii. The manner of the settlement shall be agreed between the Parties prior to the provision of the services.

2. Internal duties or taxes shall not be charged by either Party for supplies and services provided under this Agreement to the extent permitted by the laws and regulations of the respective countries.

Article V

1. The reciprocal provision of supplies and services under this Agreement shall be carried out in accordance with the Procedural Arrangement, as may be modified, which is subordinate to this Agreement and which shall specify procedures and supplementary details of terms and conditions to implement this Agreement. The Procedural Arrangement shall be made between the competent authorities of the Parties.

2. The price of the supplies and the services reimbursed in accordance with sub-paragraph 1.a.iii. and sub-paragraph 1.b. of Article IV shall be determined pursuant to the relevant provisions set forth in the Procedural Arrangement.

Article VI

1. The provisions of this Agreement shall not apply to any activities conducted by the Australian Defence Force acting as a member of the United Nations Forces under the Agreement Regarding the Status of the United Nations Forces in Japan signed on February 19, 1954.

2. The Parties shall closely consult with each other regarding the implementation of this Agreement, and such consultation shall include the mutual determination on "any other activity" in sub-paragraph e. of paragraph 1 of Article I.

3. Any matter relating to the interpretation or application of this Agreement and the Procedural Arrangement shall be resolved solely through consultation between the Parties.

4. The competent authorities of the Parties shall settle disputes that may arise concerning the implementation of this Agreement in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Procedural Arrangement.

5. Where a dispute cannot be settled under the provisions of paragraph 4 of this Article, the dispute shall be settled in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3 of this Article.

Article VII

1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date upon which the Parties exchange diplomatic notes informing each other that their respective internal procedures necessary to give effect to this Agreement have been completed. This Agreement shall remain in force for a period of ten years, and shall thereafter be automatically extended for successive periods of ten years each, unless either Party notifies the other of its intention in writing to terminate this Agreement at least six months before the end of each period of ten years.

2. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article, each Party may terminate this Agreement at any time by giving one year's written notice to the other Party.

3. This Agreement may be amended by written agreement between the Parties.

4. Notwithstanding the termination of this Agreement, the provisions of Article III, IV, V and paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of Article VI shall remain in force in respect of the reciprocal provision of supplies and services conducted under this Agreement.

5. The Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of Australia concerning Reciprocal Provision of Supplies and Services between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Australian Defence Force signed at Tokyo on May 19, 2010, which entered into force on 31 January 2013 (hereinafter referred to as the "2013 Agreement"), shall terminate upon the entry into force of this Agreement. Any reference to the 2013 Agreement in other documents between the Parties which are in effect or force on the date this Agreement enters into force and related to the implementation of the 2013 Agreement shall be construed as referring to this successor Agreement. Any financial obligations, transactions or agreed transfers for the provision of supplies and services executed prior to the effective date of this Agreement under the authority of the 2013 Agreement shall remain binding until satisfied, unless otherwise agreed.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE in duplicate, in the Japanese and English languages, both equally authentic, at Sydney, this fourteenth day of January, two thousand and seventeen.

For the Government of Japan:
草賀純男
[Kusaka Sumio]

For the Government of Australia:
Bruce Miller

Subsection I-7

Reciprocal Access Agreement

Signed on 6 January 2022
Entered into force in August 2023

Background: The Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) was a groundbreaking deal between Australia and Japan that took a decade to negotiate and conclude. The RAA provides the legal framework for one party's defense forces to operate in the territory of the other, covering things such as taxation, rules for entry and exit of uniformed personnel and equipment, response to mishaps, and criminal jurisdiction, etc. It is akin to a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), but there is one key difference: SOFAs are for a single host nation and foreign forces stationed in or transiting the host country, whereas the RAA offers reciprocity—hence the naming convention. The Australia-Japan RAA has served as the template for Japan's negotiations on similar agreements with other governments including the United Kingdom and the Philippines.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN JAPAN AND AUSTRALIA CONCERNING THE FACILITATION OF RECIPROCAL ACCESS AND COOPERATION BETWEEN THE SELF-DEFENSE FORCES OF JAPAN AND THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE

Japan and Australia (hereinafter referred to individually as a "Party" and collectively as the "Parties"),

Recognising their shared interests in regional and global peace and stability;

Noting their mutual commitment to the peaceful settlement of international disputes and to the maintenance of international peace and security;

Desiring to deepen the security and defence relationship between the Parties by establishing a legal framework for facilitating mutually beneficial defence cooperation;

Desiring to define the status of the Visiting Force and the Civilian Component of a Party while in the territory of the other Party; and

Acknowledging their respective obligations under international law,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

For the purposes of this Agreement:

(a) "Civilian Component" means, unless otherwise mutually determined by the Parties, the civilian nationals of the Sending State accompanying the Visiting Force, who are employed by or in the service of the Visiting Force and who are neither ordinarily resident in the Receiving State nor contractors engaged by, or on behalf of, the Visiting Force;

(b) "Force(s)" means in the case of Japan, the Self-Defense Forces, and in the case of Australia, the Australian Defence Force;

(c) "Visiting Force" means the Force of a Party, which, with the consent of the other Party, is present in the territory of that other Party in connection with cooperative activities as referred to in paragraph 1 of Article IV;

(d) "member" in relation to the Visiting Force means any person who belongs to the Visiting Force;

(e) "Official Vehicle" means a motor vehicle (including a motorcycle or an armoured vehicle) owned by or, unless otherwise indicated, on exclusive hire or lease to, the Sending State that is operated by a member of the Visiting Force or the Civilian Component for the purpose of performing official duties;

(f) "Receiving State" means the Party in whose territory the Visiting Force or the Civilian Component is present, or as the context requires, the territory of that Party; and

(g) "Sending State" means the Party to which the Visiting Force or the Civilian Component belongs.

Article II

The purpose of this Agreement is to facilitate mutually beneficial defence cooperation between the Parties by establishing a framework for the conduct of such cooperation, and defining the status of the Visiting Force and the Civilian Component.

Article III

It is the duty of the Visiting Force and the Civilian Component and the members thereof to respect the laws and regulations of the Receiving State and to abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this Agreement, and, in particular, from any political activity in the Receiving State. It is also the duty of the Sending State to take necessary measures to that end.

Article IV

1. This Agreement shall apply to matters regarding mutually determined cooperative activities conducted by the Forces (hereinafter referred to as "cooperative activities") in the Receiving State. Paragraph 1 of Article XXIII and other provisions related to the settlement of claims under that paragraph shall also apply to cooperative activities conducted in waters and superjacent airspace beyond the territory of any State where the presence of the Forces therein is incidental to the conduct of cooperative activities in the Receiving State. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed as providing a basis for the Force of a Party to conduct activities in the territory of the other Party without its consent.

2. The Parties shall cooperate and, where required, take appropriate measures in accordance with their laws and regulations to ensure that cooperative activities:

(a) do not adversely impact upon the national interests of the Receiving State, or the readiness or capabilities of the Force of the Receiving State;

(b) are carried out with due regard for public safety; and

(c) do not interfere unnecessarily with navigation, aviation, telecommunication, or land travel to, from, or within the Receiving State.

3. This Agreement shall not apply to any activities conducted by the Australian Defence Force when acting as the United Nations forces pursuant to the Agreement Regarding the Status of the United Nations Forces in Japan, signed at Tokyo on 19 February, 1954.

4. The provisions of this Agreement shall not limit or prejudice the implementation of any existing bilateral agreements in force between the Parties.

Article V

1. Upon prior notification by the Sending State, the Receiving State shall, where appropriate, expeditiously grant through diplomatic channels clearances to the Sending State for access by the vessels or aircraft of the Visiting Force to ports or airports of the Receiving State.

2. For the purposes of cooperative activities, such vessels and aircraft of the Visiting Force and Official Vehicles as well as the members of the Visiting Force and the Civilian Component shall be accorded access to and movement between facilities and areas that are made available to the Visiting Force and the Civilian Component pursuant to Article VIII.

3. For the purposes of paragraph 2, the Parties shall consult in advance on the routes to be used by the Visiting Force. The Receiving State may prescribe such routes to be used, impose restrictions on movements within the Receiving State, and prohibit access to and passage through specified areas, airspace, and facilities.

4. Unless otherwise mutually determined by the Parties, the vessels and aircraft of the Visiting Force shall be under conditions comparable in respect of any tax, toll, or similar charges (except those that are charges for services rendered) to those applicable under the laws and regulations of the Receiving State to the vessels and aircraft of the Force of the Receiving State for access to and the use of ports and airports within the Receiving State, in so far as the central government of the Receiving State may set those conditions.

5. Unless otherwise mutually determined by the Parties, Official Vehicles shall be under conditions comparable in respect of any tax, toll, fee, or similar charges (except those that are charges for services rendered) to those applicable under the laws and regulations of the Receiving State to the vehicles of the Force of the Receiving State for the use of roads within the Receiving State, in so far as the central government of the Receiving State may set those conditions.

6. The vessels of the Visiting Force shall be subject to compulsory pilotage in accordance with the laws and regulations of the Receiving State, and if a pilot is taken, pilotage shall be paid for by the Sending State at appropriate rates.

7. For the purposes of this Article, the expression "of the Visiting Force" in relation to vessels or aircraft includes vessels and aircraft for the exclusive use or service of the Visiting Force and the Civilian Component.

Article VI

1. The Sending State shall notify the Receiving State in advance of the identity of the persons entering and present in the Receiving State pursuant to this Agreement.

2. Subject to paragraph 1 and compliance with any formalities set by the Receiving State relating to entry and departure, the members of the Visiting Force and the Civilian Component shall be exempt from any requirements to apply for a visa on entering and departing the Receiving State, and shall be exempt from the laws and regulations of the Receiving State on the registration of foreign nationals, but shall not be considered as acquiring any rights of permanent residence or domicile in the Receiving State.

3. Such members of the Visiting Force and the Civilian Component shall be permitted to perform their official duties in the Receiving State, but shall not be considered as acquiring any right to undertake additional work in the Receiving State beyond the requirements of their official duties.

4. Upon entry into or departure from the Receiving State, the members of the Visiting Force shall be in possession of the following documents:

(a) a valid passport or defence services identity card issued by the Sending State; and

(b) an individual or collective travel document issued by the Sending State certifying the status of the individual or group as a member or members of the Visiting Force and the travel ordered.

5. Upon entry into or departure from the Receiving State, the members of the Civilian Component shall be in possession of the following documents:

(a) a valid passport; and

(b) an individual or collective travel document issued by the Sending State certifying the status of the individual or group as a member or members of the Civilian Component and the travel ordered.

6. For the purposes of their identification while in the Receiving State, the members of the Visiting Force and the Civilian Component shall present to the appropriate authorities of the Receiving State, upon request, their passports or defence services identity cards as well as their individual or collective travel documents.

Article VII

1. For the purposes of this Article, "Duty" or "Duties" means any duty, tax, fee, charge or levy (including sales tax, customs duty, excise duty and goods and services tax) payable on importation or exportation except those that are no more than charges for services rendered.

2. Except as provided in this Agreement, the members of the Visiting Force and the Civilian Component shall be subject to the applicable laws and regulations administered by the competent import and export authorities of the Receiving State. In particular, such authorities of the Receiving State shall have the right in accordance with the laws and regulations of the Receiving State, to:

(a) undertake investigations and related functions;

(b) search members of the Visiting Force or the Civilian Component;

(c) examine luggage, cargo, and vehicles; and

(d) seize articles, which may be returned to the Sending State following consultation between the Parties.

3. For the purposes of paragraph 2, the Visiting Force and the customs authorities of the Receiving State shall assist each other, where necessary, in the conduct of investigations and seizure of articles.

4. Official documents under official seal of the Sending State shall be inviolable. The package of such official documents shall be accompanied by a certificate issued by the Sending State confirming that only official documents are enclosed.

5. The Visiting Force may import into the Receiving State free of Duty all materials, supplies, and equipment, including Official Vehicles, for the exclusive and official use of, but at the time of import not intended for sale by, the Visiting Force or the Civilian Component. Where required by the authorities of the Receiving State, the Sending State shall submit to the appropriate authorities of the Receiving State necessary documents confirming that such materials, supplies, and equipment are being imported for the exclusive and official use of the Visiting Force or the Civilian Component.

6. A member of the Visiting Force or the Civilian Component may import free of Duty reasonable quantities of personal effects, furniture, and household goods (other than motor vehicles, cigarettes, cigars, tobacco, and alcoholic beverages) (hereinafter referred to collectively as "personal items") into the Receiving State, provided that:

(a) the personal items are imported in compliance with any formalities set by the Receiving State, including where required by the authorities of the Receiving State the submission of necessary documents confirming that the personal items are for private use;

(b) the personal items are imported at the time of his or her first arrival to take up service in the Receiving State or within six months thereafter; and

(c) the personal items remain in his or her use, ownership, and possession.

7. A member of the Visiting Force or the Civilian Component may import into the Receiving State one motor vehicle free of Duty provided that the same conditions as set out in paragraph 6 are met. There is no obligation under this Article to grant exemption from other taxes payable in respect of such vehicle.

8. Subject to the requirements of paragraph 5, the Visiting Force shall be permitted importation into and exportation from the Receiving State of all fuel, oil, and lubricants exclusively

for official use in Official Vehicles as well as vessels and aircraft owned by or for the exclusive use or service of the Visiting Force and the Civilian Component, free of Duty.

9. Goods which have been imported free of Duty under paragraphs 5 to 8:

(a) may be exported free of Duty, provided that the appropriate authorities of the Receiving State may require verification that goods exported have been imported under the conditions of paragraphs 5 to 8 as the case may be; and

(b) shall not be disposed of in the Receiving State to persons not entitled to import such goods free of Duty unless otherwise authorised by the Receiving State and conducted in compliance with the laws and regulations of the Receiving State, including those concerning liability to pay any Duties payable on the goods so disposed of.

10. The exemptions granted in paragraphs 5 to 8 shall apply only to the importation and exportation of goods, as the case may be, and shall not be interpreted, in the case of purchases of goods in the Receiving State on which Duties have already been collected, as requiring the refund of such Duties.

11. Subject to the other provisions of this Article, the Sending State shall take appropriate measures to ensure that the Visiting Force and the Civilian Component and the members thereof shall pay any Duties and fines due to the Receiving State.

Article VIII

1. The Sending State may submit to the Receiving State requests for access to and use of facilities, areas, and related services necessary for the Visiting Force and the Civilian Component for the conduct of cooperative activities in the Receiving State. The Receiving State shall make reasonable efforts to address such requests. The conditions of such access and use shall be determined by the Receiving State through consultation with the Sending State.

2. The Receiving State shall be responsible for the overall control of the facilities and areas made available to the Visiting Force and the Civilian Component.

Article IX

1. With the prior consent of the Receiving State and subject to any arrangements that the Parties mutually determine as necessary, the Visiting Force and the Civilian Component may temporarily use for cooperative activities public utilities and services owned, controlled, or regulated by the Receiving State under conditions no less favourable than those applicable to the Force of the Receiving State.

2. The Visiting Force and the Civilian Component may operate, in accordance with arrangements with the appropriate authorities of the Receiving State, telecommunication and information systems for official communications purposes in connection with cooperative activities.

3. The Visiting Force and the Civilian Component may use publicly offered communication services in the Receiving State, subject to the laws and regulations of the Receiving State and the respective terms and conditions set by service providers.

Article X

1. Subject to any minimum age requirement for operating a vehicle in the Receiving State, the Receiving State shall accept as valid, without a driving test or fee, the driving permit or licence or defence services driving permit issued by the competent authorities of the Sending State to a member of the Visiting Force and the Civilian Component for the purpose of driving Official Vehicles.

2. For the purpose of driving vehicles other than Official Vehicles, an appropriate international driving permit, or a driving permit or licence issued by the appropriate authority of the Receiving State, shall be obtained if required by the laws and regulations of the Receiving State.

3. Official Vehicles, excluding vehicles hired or leased in the Receiving State, shall carry, in addition to the registration number issued by the Sending State, a distinctive nationality mark but shall not be required to be registered by the Receiving State.

4. Privately owned vehicles belonging to the members of the Visiting Force and the Civilian Component shall be registered and carry the number plates issued by the appropriate authorities of the Receiving State under the same conditions as those applicable to the nationals of the Receiving State.

Article XI

1. Subject to paragraph 2, the members of the Visiting Force and the Civilian Component with current and valid professional, technical, or trade licences and qualifications issued by the Sending State shall be allowed to perform their relevant official duties within the Receiving State and shall not be required by the Receiving State to obtain any permission (whether in the form of a licence or otherwise) to perform such official duties as a member of the Visiting Force or the Civilian Component.

2. Medical professionals, who are members of the Visiting Force or the Civilian Component, shall be allowed to provide medical treatment, prescribe and dispense medicinal drugs, and use medical products or devices in the Receiving State for the benefit of the members of the Visiting

Force and the Civilian Component. Such medical professionals shall not provide medical treatment, prescribe or dispense medicinal drugs, or use medical products or devices for the benefit of the general public in the Receiving State without the prior consent of the Receiving State.

Article XII

The members of the Visiting Force may possess and carry weapons and ammunition when they are authorised to do so by orders issued by the Sending State and in circumstances approved by the Receiving State for the conduct of cooperative activities.

Article XIII

The members of the Visiting Force shall be permitted to wear their uniform and defence services insignia while performing their official duties.

Article XIV

1. Subject to the provisions of this Article, the Visiting Force may transport, store, and handle weapons, ammunition, explosives, and dangerous goods for the conduct of cooperative activities in the Receiving State.

2. Such weapons, ammunition, explosives, and dangerous goods shall be transported, stored, and handled by the Visiting Force under the responsibility of the Sending State, in accordance with the procedures and requirements determined by the Receiving State.

3. The Sending State shall notify the Receiving State in advance of the types, quantities, and transportation schedule of any such weapons, ammunition, explosives, and dangerous goods to be imported for the purposes of cooperative activities in the Receiving State.

Article XV

1. The Receiving State shall take appropriate measures to protect the personal information of the members of the Visiting Force and the Civilian Component in accordance with the laws and regulations of the Receiving State.

2. All classified information transmitted between the Parties pursuant to this Agreement shall be subject to and protected in accordance with applicable security of information agreements and arrangements between the Parties.

Article XVI

1. The Sending State shall ensure that the members of the Visiting Force and the Civilian Component are medically and dentally fit to conduct cooperative activities upon entry into the Receiving State.

2. Unless otherwise mutually determined by the Parties, any medical or dental treatment or medical evacuation provided or arranged by the Receiving State for members of the Visiting Force or the Civilian Component shall be on a full cost-recovery basis.

Article XVII

1. The Visiting Force and the Civilian Component may acquire or use materials, supplies, equipment, and services in the Receiving State, for their own consumption or for the exclusive and official use of the Visiting Force or the Civilian Component, under conditions comparable in respect of any taxes, duties, or similar charges on acquisition or the use of such materials, supplies, equipment, and services to those applicable to the Force of the Receiving State.

2. Such materials, supplies, and equipment subject to exemption from taxes, duties, or similar charges under paragraph 1 shall not be disposed of in the Receiving State to persons not entitled to acquire or use such materials, supplies, and equipment exempt from taxes, duties, or similar charges, unless otherwise authorised by the Receiving State.

3. Neither members of the Visiting Force nor of the Civilian Component shall, by reason of this Article, enjoy any exemption from taxes, duties, or similar charges on personal acquisitions or use of materials, supplies, equipment, and services in the Receiving State.

4. When the Visiting Force or the Civilian Component engages local labour in the Receiving State, the conditions of employment and work, the conditions for the protection of workers, and the rights of workers concerning labour relations shall comply with the laws and regulations of the Receiving State.

Article XVIII

1. Unless otherwise mutually determined by the Parties, each Party shall, within the limits of its available resources, be responsible for its own costs of participation in the cooperative activities.

2. Where the Parties decide to share any costs of participation associated with the implementation of this Agreement or with the conduct of cooperative activities, such costs shall be shared on an equitable basis, taking into account the principle of proportionality, unless otherwise mutually determined by the Parties.

Article XIX

1. The members of the Visiting Force and the Civilian Component shall be subject to the laws and regulations of the Receiving State on foreign exchange, and, where applicable, to those of the Sending State.

2. The liability for taxes and duties, other than those for which other provisions are made under this Agreement, of a member of the Visiting Force or the Civilian Component shall be governed by the applicable laws and regulations of the Parties, as well as any agreement between the Parties in relation to such taxes or duties, including any agreement between the Parties for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income.

Article XX

1. The Parties shall implement this Agreement in a manner consistent with the protection of the environment, cultural heritage, and human health and safety.

2. Upon request from either Party, the Parties shall consult and exchange appropriate information regarding issues that could affect the environment, cultural heritage, or human health and safety in the Receiving State.

3. The Sending State shall, in cooperation with the Receiving State, promptly take appropriate measures to address any damage or potential damage to the environment, cultural heritage, or human health and safety, having regard to the laws and regulations of the Receiving State and following consultation between the Parties through the Joint Committee established under Article XXVII.

Article XXI

1. The members of the Visiting Force and the Civilian Component shall remain at all times under the national command and overall control of the Sending State in accordance with its laws and regulations.

2. Subject to the provisions of this Article:

(a) the authorities of the Sending State shall have the right to exercise within the Receiving State all criminal jurisdiction conferred on them by the law of the Sending State and shall have exclusive competence regarding disciplinary jurisdiction, over the members of the Visiting Force and the Civilian Component; and

(b) the authorities of the Receiving State shall have criminal jurisdiction over the members of

the Visiting Force and the Civilian Component with respect to offences committed within the Receiving State and punishable by the law of the Receiving State.

3. (a) The authorities of the Sending State shall have the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the members of the Visiting Force and the Civilian Component with respect to offences, including offences relating to the security of the Sending State, punishable by the law of the Sending State but not by the law of the Receiving State.

(b) The authorities of the Receiving State shall have the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the members of the Visiting Force and the Civilian Component with respect to offences, including offences relating to the security of the Receiving State, punishable by the law of the Receiving State but not by the law of the Sending State.

4. In cases where the right to exercise jurisdiction is concurrent, the following rules shall apply:

(a) The authorities of the Sending State shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over offences solely against the property or security of the Sending State, or offences solely against the person or property of another member of the Visiting Force or the Civilian Component, or offences arising out of any act or omission done in the performance of official duties.

(b) In the case of any other offence, the authorities of the Receiving State shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction.

5. (a) The authorities of the Parties shall assist each other in the arrest of members of the Visiting Force or the Civilian Component in the Receiving State and in handing them over to the authority which is to exercise jurisdiction.

(b) The authorities of the Receiving State shall promptly notify the authorities of the Sending State of the arrest of any member of the Visiting Force or the Civilian Component.

6. The authorities of the Parties shall assist each other, to the extent possible, in the carrying out of all necessary investigations into offences allegedly committed by a member of the Visiting Force or the Civilian Component, and in the collection and production of evidence, including the seizure and, in proper cases, the handing over of objects connected with an offence.

7. Where an accused has been tried by the authorities of a Party and has been acquitted, or has been convicted and is serving, or has served, his or her sentence or has been pardoned, he or she may not be tried again for the same offence by the authorities of the other Party.

8. Whenever a member of the Visiting Force or the Civilian Component is prosecuted under the jurisdiction of the Receiving State, the person shall be entitled to a prompt and speedy trial, to be informed of charges in advance, to present evidence, to have legal representation, and to communicate with a representative of the Sending State.

Article XXII

1. The Parties shall cooperate and take appropriate measures in accordance with the laws and regulations of the Receiving State to ensure the security of the facilities and areas made available to the Visiting Force and the Civilian Component and of their property, official records, and information.

2. Subject to paragraph 3, the Sending State shall have the right to maintain military police within the Visiting Force.

3. The military police of the Sending State shall be employed only subject to arrangements with the authorities of the Receiving State and in liaison with those authorities.

Article XXIII

1. Each Party shall waive all its claims against the other Party for damage, loss, or injury caused during the performance of official duties, except in cases of gross negligence or willful misconduct.

2. Claims by third parties arising out of acts or omissions of the Visiting Force or Civilian Component shall be dealt with by the Receiving State in consultation with the Sending State. Costs incurred in satisfying claims shall be distributed based on respective responsibility or shared equally if responsibility cannot be attributed.

3. The provisions of this Article shall not apply to any claims which arose before the entry into force of this Agreement.

Article XXIV

1. In the event that a Party receives notice of any accidents or incidents, that Party shall inform the other Party as soon as practicable. The accidents or incidents to be notified shall be mutually determined in advance by the Parties.

2. The Parties shall establish procedures, consistent with their respective domestic requirements, for the conduct of necessary administrative investigations in cooperation with each other, relating to any accident or incident in the Receiving State involving Official Vehicles, or vessels or aircraft owned by or for the exclusive use or service of the Sending State.

Article XXV

1. Each Party shall notify without delay the other Party of the death of any member of the Visiting Force or the Civilian Component in the Receiving State. The Receiving State shall endeavour to ensure that the identity of the deceased is not publicly disclosed without providing reasonable prior notification to the Sending State.

2. The Parties shall establish procedures for all other mortuary affairs matters including, but not limited to, the identification, processing, repatriation, and disposal of the remains of a deceased member of the Visiting Force or of the Civilian Component and of his or her associated personal effects.

Article XXVI

The Parties shall cooperate in preventing any abuse or misuse of the privileges granted in favour of, and in ensuring proper discharge of the obligations imposed in this Agreement on, the members of the Visiting Force and the Civilian Component.

Article XXVII

1. A Joint Committee shall be established as a means for consultation between the Parties on all matters requiring mutual consultation regarding the implementation of this Agreement.

2. The Joint Committee shall determine its own procedures. It may establish working groups to deal with specific issues.

3. The Joint Committee shall meet at any time at the request of either Party.

4. The Joint Committee shall be co-chaired by a representative of each Party.

5. If it is not possible for the Joint Committee to resolve a matter, it shall refer that matter to the Governments of the respective Parties for further consideration through appropriate channels.

6. The Parties may make arrangements following consultation between the Parties through the Joint Committee to implement this Agreement.

Article XXVIII

Unless otherwise mutually determined by the Parties, any dispute regarding the interpretation or the implementation of this Agreement shall be resolved solely by consultation and negotiation between the Parties.

Article XXIX

1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the fifth day after the date on which the Parties exchange diplomatic notes informing each other that their respective internal procedures necessary to give effect to this Agreement have been completed.

2. This Agreement may be amended by written agreement between the Parties. Any amendment shall be approved by the Parties in accordance with their respective internal procedures and shall enter into force on the date to be agreed on by the Parties.

3. (a) Each Party may terminate this Agreement at any time by giving six months' prior written notice to the other Party.

(b) Notwithstanding the termination of this Agreement, any outstanding obligations with respect to costs, jurisdiction, or claims shall remain binding until satisfied unless otherwise mutually determined by the Parties.

(c) Notwithstanding the termination of this Agreement, any obligations with respect to security of information shall remain binding.

4. The Annex to this Agreement shall form an integral part of this Agreement.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorised by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE, in duplicate at Tokyo and Canberra, on this sixth day of January, 2022 in the Japanese and English languages, both texts equally authentic.

For Japan:
岸田文雄 *[Prime Minister Kishida Fumio]*

For Australia:
S. Morrison *[Prime Minister Scott Morrison]*

* * * * * *

Annex Relating to Article XXI

1. In implementing paragraphs 5(a) and 6(a) of Article XXI, the Sending State shall not obstruct the lawful exercise of the territorial jurisdiction of the Receiving State in accordance with this Agreement.

2. With regard to paragraph 5(a) of Article XXI, the Parties mutually determine that the authorities of a Party shall not be obliged to provide such assistance in cases where that Party considers that such assistance would be inconsistent with its obligations under applicable international agreements existing at the time of entry into force of this Agreement.

3. In all cases other than those noted in paragraph 2 above, with regard to paragraph 5(a) of Article XXI, a Party shall give sympathetic consideration to a request from the other Party to allow the latter not to provide such assistance.

4. With regard to paragraph 2 above, if the authorities of a Party do not provide such assistance, that Party shall immediately consult with the other Party.

5. With regard to paragraph 5(a) of Article XXI, if the authorities of a Party do not provide assistance in handing over the person sought to the other Party, the Party that does not provide the assistance shall, to the extent permitted under its law, submit the case to its authorities for the purpose of prosecution, at the request of the other Party.

* * * * * *

AGREED MINUTES TO THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN JAPAN AND AUSTRALIA CONCERNING THE FACILITATION OF RECIPROCAL ACCESS AND COOPERATION BETWEEN THE SELF-DEFENSE FORCES OF JAPAN AND THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE

In connection with the Agreement between Japan and Australia concerning the Facilitation of Reciprocal Access and Cooperation between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Australian Defence Force signed today (hereinafter referred to as "the Agreement"), the undersigned hereby record the following understanding which they have reached during the negotiations for the Agreement:

1. Article I(c)
The Parties intend for the definition of Visiting Force to include individuals and groups, whether formed units or not. For Australia, the definition of Visiting Force includes a body, contingent, or detachment of the Force of the Sending State. Australia acknowledges that Japan does not precisely distinguish between these terms with respect to the Force of Japan.

2. Articles V and X
Except as specifically provided otherwise in these Articles, the relevant laws and regulations of the Receiving State relating to road use, air traffic, and vessel navigation will be applicable.

3. Article XVII(4)

For the avoidance of doubt, civilian workers employed in the Receiving State by the Visiting Force or the Civilian Component will not be regarded for any purpose as being a member of the Visiting Force or the Civilian Component.

4. Article XXIII

(a) It was not possible for Australia to accept in Article XXIII of the Agreement a text identical with Article VIII 5(g) of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement in accordance with Australian law. In any case, where judgment is entered against Japan, its Force, or a member of the Visiting Force or the Civilian Component of Japan in a matter arising out of the performance of official duties, Australia, as the Party responsible for dealing with the claim and liable for payment of any judgment, will meet the judgment so promptly that in practice proceedings for enforcement will not arise.
(b) The members of the Visiting Force or the Civilian Component of Australia will not be subject to any proceedings for the enforcement of any judgment given against them in Japan in a matter arising from the performance of their official duties in connection with cooperative activities pursuant to the Agreement.

At Tokyo and Canberra, this sixth day of January, 2022
For Japan:
岸田文雄 *[Prime Minister Kishida Fumio]*
For Australia:
S. Morrison *[Prime Minister Scott Morrison]*

* * * * * *

Record of Discussion on Article XXI

This Record of Discussion is intended to record matters discussed between the Parties to the Agreement between Japan and Australia concerning the Facilitation of Reciprocal Access and Cooperation between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Australian Defence Force (hereinafter referred to as "the Agreement") in the course of negotiations on Article XXI and the Annex of the Agreement. It is not legally binding and does not alter the scope of the Parties' domestic laws and regulations or international legal obligations arising under, or existing independently of, the Agreement:

1.

With reference to paragraph 2 of the Annex to the Agreement, the Parties confirm that the expression "such assistance would be inconsistent with its obligations under applicable international agreements existing at the time of entry into force of this Agreement" is intended to apply to situations where the Party seeking to refuse assistance considers there is a sufficient likelihood that as a result of such assistance, the person could be subject to the death penalty. While each situation

will be assessed on a case-by-case basis, the Parties currently do not consider that such assistance in any other cases under the Agreement would be inconsistent with their obligations under applicable international agreements existing at the time of entry into force of the Agreement and do not envisage any concrete situation where they would refuse such assistance because of the other Party's criminal justice system.

2.
The Parties also confirm that when a Party considers whether the assistance under paragraph 5(a) of Article XXI of the Agreement would be inconsistent with its obligations under applicable international agreements existing at the time of entry into force of the Agreement, that Party will have regard to relevant available information. Such information may include, among other things:
(a) representations made by or on behalf of the person in custody;
(b) representations made by the other Party, including supporting information relating to the offence of which a person has been accused, relevant statutory penalties and sentencing trends;
(c) relevant assurances provided by the other Party; and
(d) other relevant country information.

3.
In particular, the Parties acknowledge that an assurance from the appropriate authority not to seek the death penalty would be considered as a 'relevant assurance' for the purpose of paragraph 2(c) above. The Party receiving such an assurance will give it serious consideration when considering whether the assistance under paragraph 5(a) of Article XXI of the Agreement would be inconsistent with its obligations under applicable international agreements existing at the time of entry into force of the Agreement.

4.
(a) With regard to paragraph 6(a) of Article XXI of the Agreement, at this moment, Japan does not envisage any concrete situations where Japan would refuse the assistance in the carrying out of all necessary investigations into offences allegedly committed by a member of the Visiting Force or the Civilian Component, and in the collection and production of evidence, including the seizure and, in proper cases, the handing over of objects connected with an offence.
(b) With regard to paragraph 6(a) of Article XXI of the Agreement, at this moment, Australia does not envisage any concrete situations where Australia would refuse the assistance in the carrying out of all necessary investigations into offences allegedly committed by a member of the Visiting Force or the Civilian Component, and in the collection and production of evidence, including the seizure and, in proper cases, the handing over of objects connected with an offence, except where Australia considers there is a sufficient likelihood that the person under investigation could be subject to the death penalty.

5.

When Australia considers whether there is a sufficient likelihood that the person under investigation could be subject to the death penalty, Australia will have regard to relevant available information. Such information may include, among other things:

(a) representations made by or on behalf of the person in custody;

(b) representations made by Japan, including supporting information relating to the offence of which a person has been accused, relevant statutory penalties and sentencing trends;

(c) relevant assurances provided by Japan; and

(d) other relevant country information.

6.

The Parties acknowledge that nothing agreed or mutually determined in connection with the Agreement will prejudice any future negotiations between the Parties on treaties concerning extradition or mutual legal assistance.

Tokyo and Canberra, 6 January, 2022

Subsection I-8

Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation

22 October 2022

Background: Although the Australian and Japanese governments continued to advance and evolve their security relationship after 2007, the 2022 agreement was the first formal update to their Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation. The updated instrument incorporated all the developments of the past fifteen years while expanding the scope of bilateral security cooperation to include non-traditional issue areas such as economic security, space, cyber, pandemic response, and the Women, Peace and Security agenda. Importantly, this agreement demonstrated Australia's bipartisan support for and continuity in the Australia-Japan security relationship, as the original agreement came under a Liberal Party administration, and this update came via a Labor Party government.

Australia-Japan Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation

1. We, the Prime Ministers of Australia and Japan, hereby reaffirm the vital Special Strategic Partnership between our two countries, a pillar of a free and open Indo-Pacific that is inclusive and resilient.

2. We commit to a positive and ambitious agenda to deepen and expand our comprehensive engagement over the decade ahead.

3. Our significant trade, investment, defence and security ties, the deep affinity between our peoples and our shared values of democracy, human rights, free trade and a rules-based international order, make Australia and Japan natural partners.

4. We will build on the great strides our two countries have made through the Australia-Japan Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation of 2007 and the Special Strategic Partnership established in 2014.

5. We recognise that our partnership must continue to evolve to meet growing risks to our shared values and mutual strategic interests. We affirm our unwavering commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific, which is underpinned, in particular, by:

- a rules-based order where states resolve disputes peacefully and in accordance with international law, and where sovereignty and territorial integrity are respected
- a favourable strategic balance that deters aggression and behaviour that undermines international rules and norms

- an open, stable, and secure maritime domain underpinned by adherence to international law, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, in which States can exercise freedom of navigation and overflight and are not subject to coercive or destabilising actions
- inclusive and transparent institutions, norms and standards that guide cooperation on shared challenges in domains such as cyber, space, critical and emerging technologies and telecommunications
- countries that are resilient to aggression, coercion, disinformation, malicious cyber activity and other forms of interference, as well as to global challenges such as pandemics, natural disasters and climate change
- continuing regional economic integration underpinned by a rules-based and market-oriented trade and investment system, as well as diverse and resilient supply chains.

6. Over the next ten years, Australia and Japan will work together more closely for our shared objectives. We will strengthen exchanges of strategic assessments at all levels, including through annual reciprocal leaders' meetings, foreign and defence ministers' meetings, dialogues between senior officials, and intelligence cooperation. We will consult each other on contingencies that may affect our sovereignty and regional security interests, and consider measures in response.

7. Our bilateral partnership also reinforces our respective alliances with the United States that serve as critical pillars for our security, as well as for peace and stability of the Indo-Pacific. Deepening trilateral cooperation with the United States is critical to enhancing our strategic alignment, policy coordination, interoperability and joint capability.

8. We will expand and deepen practical cooperation and further enhance interoperability between the Australian Defence Force and the Japan Self-Defense Forces through more sophisticated joint exercises and operations, multilateral exercises with partners, mutual use of facilities including maintenance, asset protection, and personnel links and exchanges. We will reinforce security and defence cooperation including in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, capacity building for regional partners, advanced defence science and technology, defence industry and high-end capabilities. We will explore additional ways to improve the effectiveness of our bilateral security and defence cooperation, including through discussions on scope, objectives and forms of enhanced operational cooperation between our two defence forces.

9. We will strengthen cooperation with partners to ensure the benefits of economic openness do not engender vulnerabilities that can be exploited. We will promote economic security by building resilient supply chains, including for clean energy technologies, promoting high quality infrastructure and transparent and sustainable lending practices, strengthening protection of critical infrastructure, including telecommunications security and resilience, addressing forced technology transfers, including those with more sophisticated means, strengthening border and law enforcement

collaboration and resisting economic coercion and disinformation. We will work together to maintain an open, free, safe, and secure technology environment.

10. Australia and Japan will strengthen our cyber defences and improve our shared awareness of cyber threats. We will also enhance our cooperation in the space domain and other strategic capabilities vital to our partnership. We will continue to enhance our cooperation and information exchange on law enforcement and border security to combat transnational and serious organised crime, including on risks to critical supply chains.

11. In our shared pursuit of achieving a world without nuclear weapons, Australia and Japan will work closely with each other to uphold and strengthen the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

12. We will advance the women, peace and security agenda, as enshrined in UNSCR1325.

13. We will entrench and expand our cooperation with other partners in the Indo-Pacific and beyond, to align our efforts towards realisation of our vision for the Indo-Pacific.

14. We will cooperate with ASEAN and support ASEAN centrality and the fundamental principles of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific and its practical implementation. We will support a resilient and sovereign Pacific region, working with existing institutions, including the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), and to support the PIF with the implementation of its 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent. We will collaborate to build regional resilience in areas such as climate change, health security, energy transition, humanitarian assistance and disaster response, and maritime security.

15. We commit to leading action at all levels to implement this ambitious agenda for enhanced security cooperation, to maximise the potential of our Special Strategic Partnership and contribute to peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region.

Signed in duplicate at Perth, Australia, on 22 October 2022 in the English and Japanese languages, both texts having equal validity.

For the Government of Australia	For the Government of Japan
ANTHONY ALBANESE Prime Minister of Australia	FUMIO KISHIDA Prime Minister of Japan

SECTION II

Joint Statements



Delegates participate in the tenth Australia-Japan "2+2" Foreign and Defense Ministerial Consultations, 9 December 2022 (photo credit: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan)

Joint Statements

While negotiated instruments are necessary for institutionalizing security relationships, the roadmap for implementation is ever-changing. Turnovers in leadership and government personnel, the evolving security environment, and strategic shocks (e.g., the COVID pandemic) shift near-term priorities and shape the demands of the moment.

How do security partners define their shared policy roadmap? In the case of Australia and Japan, as with many others, it comes in the form of joint statements. Unsurprisingly, the joint statements relevant to Australia-Japan security ties come from the prime ministers, defense ministers, and foreign ministers. These joint statements identify the policy priorities and near-term objectives for the partners in addressing those priorities.

There are a few different types of joint statements included in this section. The "Leaders' Joint Statements" are those produced at the prime minister level. Then there are the individual Foreign Ministers' and Defense Ministers' joint statements. There are also the "2+2" consultations, a formalized mechanism between Australia and Japan which brings both sides' Foreign and Defense Ministers together for meetings annually to reset the agenda and the priorities for the forthcoming year. Finally, there are joint statements on disarmament and non-proliferation which specifically highlight a priority area of cooperation and shared interest between the two governments.

This section proceeds in reverse chronological order. Having the newest joint statements up front is intended to allow for easier reference. The closer to the present, the more relevant the joint statements are for practitioners working on or researching the Australia-Japan relationship. Naturally, reading through to the end of the section will shed light on the evolution of priorities and objectives for the partners over time.

Subsection II-1

11th Australia-Japan "2+2" Consultations

5 September 2024

Eleventh Australia-Japan 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations

The Hon Richard Marles MP, the Australian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence; Senator the Hon Penny Wong, the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs; H.E. Ms KAMIKAWA Yoko, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan; and H.E. Mr KIHARA Minoru, Minister of Defense of Japan, met in Victoria on 5 September 2024 for the 11th Australia-Japan Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations.

Our deep alignment in addressing strategic challenges

We reaffirmed our commitment to Australia and Japan's Special Strategic Partnership, underpinned by shared values, our alignment on strategic challenges and our significant energy, trade and investment ties. We recognised that our cooperation is essential to ensuring a peaceful, stable and prosperous region.

We remained steadfast in our commitment to working together, and with like-minded partners, to uphold the international order based on the rule of law and play a leading role in realising a free and open Indo-Pacific that is inclusive and resilient. We reaffirmed our strong opposition to any unilateral attempt to change the status quo by force or coercion anywhere in the world. We underscored our commitment to upholding respect for the rule of law and observing international law in good faith. We concurred on further strengthening exchanges of strategic assessments at all levels in line with the 2022 Australia-Japan Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (JDSC).

We expressed our strong opposition to any unilateral actions that seek to change the status quo by force or coercion in the East and South China Seas. We discussed with serious concern the recent activities by Chinese military assets in Japanese territory. We expressed serious concerns over recent developments in the South China Sea, including an intensification of China's dangerous and coercive activities towards the Philippines, which have occurred with high frequency. We opposed any coercive actions that could escalate tensions and undermine regional stability, including the militarisation of disputed features. We emphasised the importance of freedom of navigation and overflight and the peaceful resolution of disputes in accordance with international law, in particular the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and reaffirmed that the 2016 South China Sea Arbitral Tribunal Award is final and legally binding on the parties to the dispute.

We underscored the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. We called for the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues.

We strongly condemned North Korea's development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. We urged North Korea to cease provocative actions and to fully comply with all of its obligations under the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs). We reaffirmed our commitment to the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of all weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of all ranges of North Korea and called on all countries to fully implement relevant UNSCRs. We condemned North Korea's malicious cyber activities that fund its unlawful weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs. We also strongly condemned the increasing military cooperation between North Korea and Russia, including North Korea's export and Russia's procurement of North Korean ballistic missiles in violation of UNSCRs, as well as Russia's use of these missiles against Ukraine. We committed ourselves to continuing to cooperate closely towards the immediate resolution of the abductions issue.

We reaffirmed our unwavering determination to support Ukraine. We urge Russia to immediately, completely, and unconditionally withdraw all of its military forces from the internationally recognised territory of Ukraine. We concurred on the importance of continuing to remind third countries, including China, of their duty to uphold international law and in no way to validate, support, or condone Russia's attempts to acquire territory by force, in violation of the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. We reaffirmed our commitment to continuing to raise the costs for the architects of Russia's illegal and unjustified aggression by applying economic and financial sanctions.

We called for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza, for the protection of civilians, to allow increased humanitarian access and the release of hostages, and as critical to avoiding wider regional escalation. We urged parties to the conflict to agree to the ceasefire deal endorsed by the UN Security Council Resolution 2735 and reiterated our commitment to working towards a two-state solution. We remained unequivocal in our condemnation of Hamas for the atrocities of October 7. We expressed deep concern about increasing deaths and incidents affecting humanitarian personnel and stressed the need to regalvanise commitment to international humanitarian law and norms for the protection of humanitarian workers in crisis zones globally. Israel must listen to the concerns of the international community. We called on all parties in the region to cease their destabilising actions and attacks.

Strategic and security cooperation for peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific

As indispensable partners, guided by the JDSC, we are determined to further deepen and expand our strategic and security cooperation to include all tools of statecraft to help prevent conflict and maintain peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific. Our partnership is vital to delivering practical benefits to the region to enhance economic security and resilience, secure funding for quality

infrastructure in the region, including undersea cable infrastructure, counter information manipulation, and reduce the risk of misunderstanding and miscalculation.

We also committed to strengthening collective deterrence, further building interoperability, enhancing regional communication and reassurance, and coordinating our national security policies more closely than ever before, including in collaboration with the United States.
For these purposes, we will:

Strengthening the Special Strategic Partnership

- Further integrate our systems and strengthen the foundations of our Special Strategic Partnership to protect and advance our interests for a period of geostrategic competition, including through:

    - Leveraging an Australia-Japan Economic Security Dialogue—a framework for exchanging information on economic and strategic risks and exploring ways of concrete and practical bilateral cooperation in the area of economic security.
    - Strengthening discussion on strategic infrastructure cooperation to share experiences between Australia and Japan with the aim of increasing interoperability and delivering more effectively our assistance in the region.
    - Enhancing cybersecurity cooperation through the inter-agency Cyber Policy Dialogue.
    - Strengthening accountability for irresponsible and unacceptable behaviour by states in cyberspace by aligning frameworks on cyber attributions, building on recent cooperation on APT40 Technical Advisory, and sharing information on cyber sanctions frameworks.
    - Deepening dialogue between our foreign ministries' chief information officers to build resilience in government systems to cyber challenges and manage supply chain and vendor risks.
    - Deepening discussions on classified information sharing to enhance strategic coordination, interoperability and deterrence, under the Information Security Agreement.
    - Closely cooperating on the evacuation of respective nationals from third countries during crises and coordinating on contingency planning for potential evacuations, noting recent successful collaboration in New Caledonia.
    - Strengthening collaboration in support of full implementation of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda, including with partners and on climate, disaster risk reduction and response, cyber and space security, as well as nuclear non-proliferation, including through:

- Increasing bilateral WPS defence cooperation to strengthen gender perspectives in military activities, through reciprocal visits, dialogues and training.
- Increasing WPS cooperation with the United States and other countries.
- Joint support to countries in the Indo-Pacific in their implementation of the Gender Action Plan, underpinning implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030.

Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific to promote security, connectivity and prosperity

- Reinforce our respective enhanced approaches to Southeast Asia with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) at its centre, and work together towards mutually decided priorities and joint projects with ASEAN and Southeast Asian partners to improve regional economic, security, and climate resilience to security challenges, and implement the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, including by:
    - Enhancing civil maritime cooperation with the partners in the region, including support for the Philippine Coast Guard.
    - Australia's commitment to supporting the Asia Zero Emission Centre, focused on accelerating the uptake of clean energy to drive the region's energy transition.
    - Continuing to coordinate engagement with Southeast Asia to improve the resilience of undersea cable infrastructure, consistent with the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.
- Enhancing trilateral dialogue between Australia, Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) to advance shared interests in the region, building on the success of the inaugural Australia, Japan, ROK trilateral defence ministers' meeting and the inaugural officials level Indo-Pacific dialogue held in June 2024.
- Continue to work in genuine partnership with Pacific Island countries by supporting the Pacific Islands Forum's 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent, and including through:
    - Establishing an Australia-Japan Pacific Digital Development Initiative (PDDI) that will leverage dialogues and expertise between Japan and Australia to enhance connectivity and digital resilience across the Pacific in line with the priorities of Pacific Island countries, including collaborating on digital and telecommunications infrastructure, including undersea cables and regulatory capacity enhancement; data centres and security; and cybersecurity capacity building and cyber resilience.

- Working with other like-minded partners to ensure Pacific Island countries will have undersea telecommunications cable connectivity to support countries' economic growth and access to critical digital services.
- Jointly visiting and assessing needs and support for pilot projects in parallel in the Pacific to uplift cyber resilience through the purchasing of updated software and provision of technical assistance, while considering the support modalities of each country.
- Continuing to coordinate respective efforts for meeting regional security and stability needs in support of Pacific priorities, including through Japan's Official Security Assistance (OSA).

- Reaffirm our commitment to work with partners, including through the Quad, to support a free and open Indo-Pacific that is inclusive and resilient.

- Advance our trilateral cooperation with the United States, including through the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue and the Trilateral Defence Ministers' Meeting.

- Activate Australia-Japan-United States Trilateral Infrastructure Consultations (TIC) for information sharing and political coordination on infrastructure cooperation, including cooperation on systemic reforms and priority projects.

Operational Cooperation and Joint Training

We reaffirm the importance of, and commit to further refining Scope, Objectives, and Forms (SOF) as a critical mechanism to achieve deeper interoperability based on our shared strategic objectives in a range of situations, including contingencies.

Building on our substantial cooperation, we aim to enhance bilateral operational capabilities and interoperability from 2025 through operations and joint exercises, leveraging the Australia-Japan Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA).

Key initiatives include:

- Welcoming the Australian Defence Force's (ADF) inaugural participation in the United States-Japan Exercise ORIENT SHIELD in 2025.

- Increasing air cooperation from 2025, acknowledging the importance of air interoperability to deterrence, including through exchanges, people-to-people links, training, and exercises with air capabilities, as well as reciprocal asset deployments.

- Increasing the complexity of joint exercises, including through Exercise SOUTHERN JACKAROO.

- Examining how enhanced bilateral cooperation can deter unilateral changes of the status quo by force and maintain regional stability through deepening mutual understanding of Australia's Strategy of Denial and Japanese measures such as Flexible Deterrence Options.

- With the future establishment of Japan's Joint Operations Command (JJOC), welcoming reciprocal exchanges of liaison officers between joint headquarters, with the first Joint Staff Liaison Officer to commence in HQJOC in November 2024.

- Enhancing cooperation in the space domain by increasing information sharing and expanding opportunities for practical cooperation.

Defence Advanced Capability and Technology Cooperation

We commit to enhancing cooperation in defence and advanced technology development. Key areas include:

- Further cooperation between counter-strike capabilities that leverage Japan's stand-off defence capability and Australia's long-range strike capability.

- Enhancing information warfare capabilities by countering threats posed by negative information campaigns and countering mis- and disinformation.

- Continuing ongoing bilateral research projects, such as the Joint Research Project on Robotic and Autonomous Systems for Undersea Warfare (RASUW).

- Pursuing further operationally relevant collaboration under the bilateral and Japan-Australia-United States trilateral Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) Projects Arrangement.

- Consulting with AUKUS partners and Japan on opportunities for collaboration on AUKUS Pillar II Projects.

Trilateral Defence Cooperation with the United States

We commit to strengthening trilateral defence cooperation between Australia, Japan, and the United States. Initiatives include:

- Expanding trilateral intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.

- Welcoming Australian personnel's participation in the Japan-United States Bilateral Information Analysis Cell (BIAC).

- Reaffirming the importance of reciprocal deployments of United States, Japanese, and Australian F-35s and enhancing trilateral air cooperation facilitated by the signing of the Australia-Japan-United States Memorandum of Intent (MOI) at Exercise PITCH BLACK 2024.

- Cooperating on building a networked air and missile defence architecture among the United States, Japan, and Australia.

- Increasing Japan's participation in activities enabled by Australia-United States force posture cooperation, in alignment with AUSMIN 2024 commitments, including participation by Japan's Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade in training activities with Australia and the United States, such as Marine Rotational Force-Darwin.

Indo-Pacific Defence and Security Cooperation

We will deepen defence and security cooperation across the Indo-Pacific region, focusing on:

- Enhancing quadrilateral cooperation between Australia, Japan, India, and the United States, including through a maritime patrol aircraft collaboration activity on the sidelines of Exercise KAKADU in September.

- Strengthening cooperation with the Philippines through Maritime Cooperative Activities and capacity-building assistance.

- Continuing to build regional capacity through ASEAN-led mechanisms, including the ADMM-Plus Experts' Working Groups on Maritime Security co-chaired by Japan and on Cyber Security co-chaired by Australia (2024–2027).

- Supporting Pacific priorities aligned with the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent through humanitarian aid, disaster relief, capacity building, and regional collaboration such as Operation RENDER SAFE.

Subsection II-2

10th Australia-Japan "2+2" Consultations

9 December 2022

Tenth Japan-Australia 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations Joint Statement
H.E. Mr. HAYASHI Yoshimasa, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan; H.E. Mr. HAMADA Yasukazu, Minister of Defence of Japan; the Hon. Richard Marles MP, the Australian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence; and Senator the Hon. Penny Wong, the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, held the Tenth Japan-Australia 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations on 9 December 2022 in Tokyo. The consultations, in a timely manner, reaffirmed the ambitious vision set at the October 2022 Leaders' Meeting, including in the Joint Statement and Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (JDSC).

Strengthening the Special Strategic Partnership

We reaffirmed that our Special Strategic Partnership only grows stronger. Japan and Australia are united by our shared values, including an unwavering commitment to democracy, human rights, free trade, and a rules-based international order.

Recognising our shared views on the changing regional and global environment, expressed by our leaders' Joint Statement in October 2022, we today focused on expanding and deepening bilateral cooperation in line with the JDSC.

We underscored the importance of our respective alliances and our trilateral cooperation with the United States, including through the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, which underpins peace, stability, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. We reaffirmed our deep strategic alignment as we commit to our respective major reviews of security strategy and policies. We will continuously ensure our systems enhance our communication and consultations based on paragraph 6 of the JDSC.

We reaffirmed our commitment to realise a shared vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific, that is inclusive and resilient, where sovereignty and international law, including universal human rights, are upheld.

We underscored our commitment to work with partners to realise this vision, including with India and the United States under frameworks such as the Quad.

Key Actions Welcomed

- **Continuing effective and practical cooperation in the Pacific**, including working within established Pacific architecture such as the Pacific Islands Forum, to address the needs and priorities of Pacific island countries, through:

    - Collaboration on explosive ordnance disposal (EOD).
    - Deepened collaboration to support the Pacific's infrastructure, connectivity, and maritime security needs.
    - Enhanced coordination between our Pacific missions, including with Japan's new missions in Kiribati and New Caledonia.
    - Delivering tangible outcomes through Partners in the Blue Pacific (PBP).
    - Collaboration between the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), and Export Finance Australia (EFA) to provide credit guarantees for EFA's financing to Telstra to support its acquisition of Digicel Pacific.
    - Coordinating efforts to enhance water security in the Marshall Islands and other small island states.
    - Tackling oil spill risks from World War II wrecks in Chuuk Lagoon, Federated States of Micronesia.
    - Supporting increased maritime security capacity in Samoa.
    - Australia's support for the Pacific Climate Change Centre (PCCC) in Samoa, established in partnership with the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme, Japan, and New Zealand.

Deepening Security and Defence Cooperation

- Progressing commitments to deepen security and defence cooperation and build greater interoperability, building on the Reciprocal Access Agreement once it enters into force, including:

    - Deepening operational cooperation between the Japan Self-Defense Forces and the Australian Defence Force.
    - Expanding air-to-air refueling pairings between the Japan Air Self-Defense Force and the Royal Australian Air Force.
    - Committing to unit exchanges and more complex exercises, such as:

        - Manoeuvre deployment training of Japan's F-35s with an eye to future rotational deployment of Japan's fighters in Australia, and welcoming Royal Australian Air Force F-35s coming to Japan in 2023 for Exercise Bushido Guardian.
        - Enhancing the complexity of Japan Self-Defense Forces' participation in Exercise Talisman Sabre.
        - Options for conducting submarine search and rescue training between the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and the Royal Australian Navy.
        - Amphibious operations, exercises, and guided weapon live-fire drills.
    - Enhancing cooperation on strategic capabilities, including long-range guided weapons, Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD), and Undersea Warfare (USW).

Bolstering Trilateral Cooperation with the United States

- Increase training opportunities with U.S. Forces in northern Australia.
- Leverage the asset protection framework.
- Enhance intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) to develop a common foundation for optimised and agile operational cooperation.
- Promote the participation of the Australian Defence Force in Japan-U.S. bilateral exercises and the participation of the Japan Self-Defense Forces in U.S.-Australia bilateral exercises. Specifically:
    - Support the Australian Defence Force participation in Exercise Yama Sakura in 2023.

Elevating Defence Equipment, Science, Technology, and Industry Cooperation

- Finalise a research, development, test, and evaluation arrangement to conduct defence science and technology cooperation more smoothly.
- Enhance defence science and technology collaboration in autonomous systems across all domains.
- Explore opportunities for joint research, co-development, and production of advanced defence capabilities.

- Support policy dialogues on resilient supply chains, a shared challenge for Japan and Australia.

- Dispatch an Australian defence industry trade mission to Japan in 2023 to build industry resilience and cooperation.

Strengthening Economic Security and Cyber Cooperation

- Commit to continued communication and cooperation on cyber security and resilience, including:

    - Enhancing cooperation through the next Japan-Australia Cyber Policy Dialogue.
    - Supporting cyber capacity building in the Indo-Pacific through joint learning and coordination.
    - Working with partners in the Indo-Pacific on defence-related cyber security.
    - Enhanced defence cyber cooperation through joint participation in NATO Exercise Locked Shields in 2023.

Enhancing Space Cooperation

- Build on the Japan-Australia Letter of Intent concerning a defence space partnership signed in November 2022.

- Increase information sharing and practical collaboration on space security initiatives.

Advancing Development Assistance Coordination

- Increase information sharing and coordination on respective development assistance policies and between agencies and missions in the region.

- Enhance information sharing and views on information security.

Subsection II-3

9th Australia-Japan "2+2" Consultations

9 June 2021

Ninth Japan-Australia 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations Joint Statement

1. H.E. Mr. MOTEGI Toshimitsu, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, and H.E. Mr. KISHI Nobuo, Minister of Defense of Japan; Senator the Hon Marise Payne, the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs; and the Hon Peter Dutton MP, the Australian Minister for Defence, held the Ninth Japan-Australia 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations on 9 June 2021 via video conference.

Our Shared Strategic Vision on the Indo-Pacific and Beyond

2. We reaffirm that our Special Strategic Partnership continues to grow stronger. Japan and Australia are united by our shared values, including an unwavering commitment to democracy, human rights, free trade, and a rules-based international order. We are drawn ever closer by our shared strategic interests in the security, stability, and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific and beyond, and deep economic complementarity. Together, we renew our determination to deepen cooperation to promote a free, open, inclusive, and prosperous Indo-Pacific where disputes are resolved peacefully, without the threat or use of force or coercion, and where the sovereignty and rights of all states under international law are upheld.

3. We underscore the importance of a strong and enduring presence of the United States that underpins the peace, stability, and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific. We welcome the strong commitment of the United States to the region and its emphasis on reaffirming and revitalising alliances and partnerships. We reiterate the importance of close cooperation with our common ally. We will continue working with like-minded partners, including with India and the United States under frameworks such as the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue and the Quad, to realise our positive vision for the Indo-Pacific. We reaffirm the importance of ASEAN and express our enduring support to its unity and centrality, as well as commitment to the principles underlined in the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, and to its practical implementation. We also reaffirm the importance of ASEAN-led architecture, particularly the East Asia Summit as the premier forum for leaders' discussion on strategic issues in the region. We reconfirm our strong commitment to continuously strengthening cooperation with Pacific Island countries, and recognise the important role of the Pacific Islands Forum. We welcome the increasing commitment of European countries and the European Union toward the Indo-Pacific and acknowledge the importance of strengthening cooperation with European partners.

4. We express strong opposition to coercive and destabilising behaviour in the region, which undermines the rules-based international order. We reiterate our serious concerns about the situation in the East China Sea. We reinforce our strong opposition to any destabilising or coercive unilateral actions that could alter the status quo and increase tensions in the East China Sea. We will remain in close communication about the situation in the East China Sea. In this context, we express our concerns over China's Coast Guard Law and reaffirm that the actions of a state's coast guard must be consistent with international law. We underscore the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and encourage the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues.

5. We reiterate serious concerns about the situation in the South China Sea and reconfirm Japan and Australia's strong opposition to unilateral attempts to change the status quo. We express our objections to China's maritime claims and activities that are inconsistent with the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). We share serious concerns about the recent negative developments and serious incidents in the South China Sea, including continuing militarisation of disputed features, dangerous use of coast guard vessels and "maritime militia," and efforts to disrupt other countries' resource exploitation activities. In this context, we reiterate our concerns over China's Coast Guard Law in the context of the South China Sea. We reaffirm that the 2016 South China Sea Arbitral Tribunal decision is final and binding on the parties. We reaffirm the importance of respecting freedom of navigation and overflight and that all disputes should be resolved in a peaceful manner in accordance with UNCLOS. We call for any Code of Conduct in the South China Sea to be consistent with UNCLOS, not prejudice the sovereignty and legitimate rights and interests of non-parties to the Code of Conduct or the rights of all states under international law, reinforce existing inclusive regional architecture, and strengthen parties' commitments to ceasing actions that would complicate or escalate tensions.

Addressing Coercion and Human Rights Concerns

6. We commit to opposing coercion and destabilising behaviour by economic means, which undermines the rules-based international system.

7. We share serious concerns about reported human rights abuses against Uyghur and other Muslim minorities in Xinjiang. We call on China to grant urgent, meaningful, and unfettered access to Xinjiang for independent international observers, including the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.

8. We urge the Hong Kong and Chinese authorities to uphold their commitments to the Hong Kong people. We share grave concerns about recent moves that weaken Hong Kong's democratic institutions and undermine the rights and freedoms guaranteed under the Hong Kong Basic Law and the Sino-British Joint Declaration.

9. We express grave concerns about the ongoing crisis in Myanmar and its implications for regional stability. We firmly condemn the violence being perpetrated against the people of Myanmar and call on the military regime to immediately cease the violence and measures to curtail freedom of expression as well as to release all those arbitrarily detained. We underscore our strong support for ASEAN-led efforts to chart a course out of the current crisis and urge implementation of the "Five Point Consensus" on the situation in Myanmar, agreed at the ASEAN Leaders' Meeting on 24 April. As long-standing partners of Myanmar and its people, both countries underscore their commitment to supporting efforts to return the country to the path of democracy, and to this end, encourage all sides to engage in dialogue.

Commitment to Denuclearisation and Regional Security

10. We reiterate our commitment to achieving the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of all nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, and ballistic missiles of all ranges of North Korea. We urge North Korea to abide by its obligations under the UN Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs) and call on all United Nations Member States to continue to implement their obligations fully under relevant UNSCRs. We commit to deterring, disrupting, and ultimately eliminating the evasion of sanctions by North Korea, including illicit ship-to-ship transfers and direct shipments of sanctioned goods. We call on North Korea to end its human rights violations and immediately resolve the issue of Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea.

Enhancing Bilateral Security and Defence Cooperation

11. We embrace the growing depth and complexity of our bilateral security and defence cooperation and commit to building on our achievements to further deepen and broaden this cooperation while continuously sharing and updating our strategic vision and awareness. We highlight the growing interoperability and familiarity our forces share through increasingly sophisticated air, ground, and maritime exercises and operations. We underscore the importance of coordinating strategic approaches, enhancing capability, and deepening real-world defence cooperation in line with the increasingly challenging security environment. We commit to undertaking targeted, effective, and practical defence activities in support of a secure and stable region. We reinforce our ambition to increase the complexity and sophistication of bilateral exercises and operations between the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) and the Australian Defence Force (ADF), including through air-to-air refuelling. We reiterate our shared intention to deepen engagement in capacity building, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and personnel exchanges. We instruct officials to pursue relevant discussions in these respects.

12. We reaffirm the enduring importance of our respective alliances with the United States, and our strong commitment to further enhancing trilateral cooperation to support a free, open, inclusive, and prosperous Indo-Pacific region, including through deeper and broader defence cooperation, such as conducting complex and frequent joint training. We reiterate our determination to enhance

cooperative activities to defend the open, democratic, and human-rights-based foundations of the multilateral system and underscore our countries' commitment to working closely with regional partners and like-minded nations.

Strengthening Strategic Agreements and Economic Security

13. We reconfirm the strategic imperative of a reciprocal access agreement between Japan and Australia ("Japan-Australia RAA"), which will further strengthen the foundation of both countries' commitment to the peace and stability of the Indo-Pacific region and further enhance our strategic cooperation. We welcome the good progress made to date after reaching the agreement in principle in November 2020 and commit to accelerating all outstanding tasks to sign the RAA at the earliest possible opportunity. We underscore the importance of ensuring the safety of JSDF and ADF assets. We welcome the creation of a framework to protect ADF assets by the JSDF personnel under Article 95-2 of the JSDF Law, following the instruction by Defence Ministers in October 2020. The JSDF is ready to provide protection under this Article upon request from the ADF, whenever the appropriate opportunity arises.

14. We pledge to further strengthen cooperation in the area of economic security. We express concern over coercive economic practices and will work with partners to address economic challenges to support a free, open, inclusive, and prosperous Indo-Pacific. We will explore deeper collaboration, including to address illicit technology transfer, build resilience in relevant supply chains, increase defence industrial base collaboration, and promote the application of international law and agreed norms in state conduct in cyberspace. We will deepen cooperation on cyber and critical technology, including to develop our bilateral partnership, with a view to advancing collaboration on relevant themes such as research and development, regional capacity building, and industry resilience. To this end, we will enhance information sharing and coordination on standards setting in various multilateral fora.

15. We underscore our commitment to UNSCR 1325 Women, Peace and Security and agree to explore practical collaboration including through training and exercises.

Enhancing Information and Space Cooperation

16. We recognise the value of strengthening cooperation to facilitate the secure and timely exchange of information and analysis and improving information security between the foreign and defence agencies of our countries. We instruct officials to enhance cooperation, including working towards updating the Japan-Australia Information Security Agreement, and exchanging views on best practices in information sharing and security between our relevant agencies.

17. We recognise the increasing importance of space security in ensuring peace and prosperity and will promote cooperation on space domain awareness, including through information sharing and

collaboration on space science and technology. We commit to working closely together to promote responsible behaviours in outer space, including through the UN. We confirm that science and technology is vital to deepening our defence relationship and instruct officials to commence the necessary coordination to create an enduring framework to further this cooperation between Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA) and Defence Science and Technology Group (DSTG).

Commitment to Non-Proliferation and Pandemic Response

18. We reaffirm the crucial importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the success of the tenth NPT Review Conference. We welcome the five-year extension of the New START Treaty, which represents important progress in nuclear disarmament by the United States and Russia, and express our strong hope that this progress would lead to the development of a broader framework of arms control, which involves not only the United States and Russia but other countries and covers a wider range of weapon systems.

19. We acknowledge the COVID-19 pandemic has brought great suffering and insecurity, and the recovery of our region holds great promise and potential. We will cooperate with our Southeast Asian, South Asian, and Pacific Island partners to promote regional resilience in response to the pandemic, including by coordinating our vaccine-related assistance through the Quad and additional contributions to the COVAX Advance Market Commitment (AMC), including dose sharing. We welcome Japan's leadership in hosting the 2 June COVAX AMC Summit and Japan's ongoing work towards universal health coverage in the region. We commit to supporting sustainable development in the Mekong sub-region and reaffirm our intention to closely collaborate on strategic issues, critical infrastructure, development, clean energy, and health, including through an initial focus on ACMECS, the Mekong-Australia Partnership (MAP), and Partnerships for Infrastructure (P4I) and Japan-U.S.-Mekong Power Partnership (JUMPP). We will continue to deepen cooperation, including with the United States under the Trilateral Infrastructure Partnership, to facilitate financing for sustainable quality infrastructure development in the Indo-Pacific. We also remain determined to work together to enhance transparency of creditor lending practices in line with the international rules and standards, underlining the importance of information-sharing and the comparability of treatment principle among creditors as well as debtors' diplomatic autonomy.

Commitment to Regional Sustainability and Defence Cooperation

20. We commit to supporting sustainability and resilience in the region, including by sharing lessons learned from humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations during the COVID-19 pandemic; exploring new capacity building opportunities with Indo-Pacific partners, including in maritime security; and working together to counter disinformation. We welcome the progress to date through our defence cooperation.

21. United in our ambition, and with a sharp focus on contributing to peace and stability in the region, we will further elevate our security and defence cooperation, ensuring our Special Strategic Partnership is positioned to respond to the challenges and opportunities of the future.

Subsection II-4

Defense Ministers' Joint Statement

19 October 2020

2020 Japan-Australia Defense Ministers Kishi/Reynolds Joint Statement on Advancing Defence Cooperation

The Minister of Defense of Japan, Mr KISHI Nobuo, and the Australian Minister for Defence, Senator Linda Reynolds, met in Tokyo on 19 October 2020 to continue to build close bilateral defence and security ties in support of an Indo-Pacific region that is free and open, secure, inclusive and prosperous.

This was Minister Reynolds' second official visit to Tokyo and the Ministers' first face-to-face meeting as counterparts. Undertaking such a meeting at this challenging time is testament to the value and strength of the Japan-Australia Special Strategic Partnership.

The Ministers, in their commitment to build on the momentum of defence cooperation, acknowledged the strategic and practical depth of bilateral defence and security cooperation, including training and exercises, defence science and technology, and defence industry cooperation, and coordination on regional issues of shared interest. They acknowledged common objectives and drivers of cooperation, as evidenced in the two nations' respective strategic settings.

The Ministers shared their views on the strategic challenges facing the Indo-Pacific region, including trends accelerated during the COVID-19 pandemic. They noted the adverse health, economic and social impacts wrought by COVID-19 which they acknowledged would colour regional engagement in the coming period. They underscored their unwavering commitment to work closely with partners to support regional recovery and security.

The Ministers exchanged views on regional affairs, including the East China Sea, the South China Sea and North Korea.

The Ministers reinforced their strong opposition to any destabilising or coercive unilateral actions that could alter the status quo and increase tensions in the East China Sea. They expressed their intention to continue to coordinate closely on the security environment in this region.

The Ministers reinforced their strong opposition to any attempts to unilaterally change the status quo by coercion in the South China Sea, and reaffirmed the importance of upholding freedom of navigation and overflight. They reaffirmed their serious concern about recent incidents, including

the continued militarisation of disputed features, dangerous or coercive use of coast guard vessels and "maritime militia", and efforts to disrupt other countries' resource exploitation activities. They emphasised the importance of peaceful resolution of disputes in accordance with international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

The Ministers shared their strong concern over North Korea's repeated violation of multiple United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs), including repeated launches of short range ballistic missiles. They reaffirmed their commitment to efforts to achieve the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all of North Korea's nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of all ranges, in accordance with all relevant UNSCRs. They urged North Korea to fully comply with its international obligations. The Ministers welcomed and reaffirmed their commitment to deter, disrupt, and ultimately eliminate the evasion of sanctions by North Korea, including illicit ship-to-ship transfers and direct shipments of sanctioned goods. Reflecting on the resilience of the defence relationship, based on shared values and forged through times of shared challenge, the Ministers resolved to reinforce its momentum and to work closely together to respond to geostrategic challenges.

The Ministers resolved to pursue all means to forge deeper links across a range of defence and security interests, as COVID-19 measures allow. Ministers concurred:

- to enhance regular bilateral and multilateral cooperative activities in the Indo-Pacific, including maritime activities in the South China Sea, to maintain a free and open, secure, inclusive and prosperous region;

- to enhance interoperability between the Japan Self-Defense Forces and the Australian Defence Force through increasing the complexity and sophistication of bilateral exercises and operations, including testing of air-to-air refuelling;

- to continue enhancing the mutual understanding between the Japan Self-Defense Forces and the Australian Defence Force through people-to-people exchanges, including placement of the Australian Liaison Officer at the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force;

- to drive bilateral space and cyber cooperation in areas of mutual benefit;

- to deepen defence science and technology collaboration, including new possible joint research in the areas of hydroacoustics and ground vehicle autonomy; and

- to continue to grow industry-to-industry engagement to support capability for our respective defence forces.

The Ministers also concurred to continue to exchange views to support recovery and promote regional peace and security including by:

- sharing lessons learned from HA/DR operations during the COVID-19 pandemic;

- exploring new opportunities for capacity building with like-minded partners to build regional resilience;

- sharing information and exchanging views on reinforcing the rules-based international order, including working together to counter disinformation in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Ministers confirmed the importance of further close collaboration between the Japan Self-Defense Forces and the Australian Defence Force in the Indo-Pacific region. They instructed their officials to commence necessary coordination to create a framework to protect Australian Defence Force assets by the SDF personnel under Article 95-2 of the SDF Law (Provision for the protection of weapons and other equipment of the units of the U.S. Armed Forces and armed forces of other foreign countries).

The Ministers confirmed the strategic importance of Japan and Australia finalising a reciprocal access agreement and concurred that both sides continue to make efforts towards this goal. In light of the growing bilateral defence and security relationship, the agreement will improve administrative, policy, and legal procedures to facilitate joint operations and exercises.

The Ministers reiterated their commitment to active trilateral defence cooperation and exchanges with the United States that make tangible contribution and foster cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. They also underscored the importance of cooperation with regional partners in institutional and informal settings, building habits of collaboration.

The Ministers reaffirmed their shared commitment to continue working closely with Indo-Pacific partners. They reiterated their desire to work together in cooperation with Pacific Island countries in the fields of capacity building, maritime security and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, particularly where responding to priorities of the Boe Declaration on Regional Security. The Ministers recognised that Japan and Australia would continue to coordinate closely in defence-related fora, including through their respective involvement in the Japan Pacific Islands Defense Dialogue (JPIDD) and the South Pacific Defence Ministers' Meeting (SPDMM) and other relevant regional dialogues.

Subsection II-5

Defense Ministers' Joint Statement

20 November 2019

2019 JAPAN-AUSTRALIA DEFENCE MINISTERS KONO/REYNOLDS JOINT STATEMENT ON ADVANCING DEFENCE COOPERATION

The Minister of Defense of Japan, Mr. Kono Taro, and Australian Minister for Defence, Senator Linda Reynolds, committed to driving bilateral defence cooperation forward during Minister Reynolds' first official visit to Tokyo on 20 November 2019. They emphasized that as Indo-Pacific security dynamics became more challenging, the strategic logic underpinning Japan-Australia cooperation was only getting stronger.

The Ministers welcomed the significant progress in the defence relationship in 2019, including the first bilateral fighter jet exercise BUSHIDO GUARDIAN and Japan's largest ever participation in the Australia-United States joint exercise TALISMAN SABRE.

Ministers committed to building on this momentum in 2020, deepening the Special Strategic Partnership between the two countries and aimed at contributing to a free, open, inclusive and prosperous Indo-Pacific region.

United in their shared ambition, the Ministers affirmed that they will accelerate defence cooperation in the coming years including in the fields of military exercises, personnel exchanges, space and cyber policy, defence science and technology. To this end, the Ministers affirmed:

- regularising Japan Air Self-Defense Force's participation in Exercise PITCH BLACK commencing in 2020 in Australia, and fighter exercise BUSHIDO GUARDIAN in Japan.

- progressing the establishment of an Australian Army liaison officer in the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force to further enhance cooperation and deepen interoperability.

- the establishment of a program to exchange defence scientists and engineers to deepen bilateral collaborative defence research and development between Japan`s Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency and Australia`s Defence Science and Technology Group.

They confirmed that both sides continue to make efforts towards concluding a reciprocal access agreement which would improve administrative, policy, and legal procedures to facilitate joint operations and exercises.

The Ministers reiterated their determination to work bilaterally to enhance defence and security cooperation with partners in the Indo-Pacific region including in the fields of, capacity building, maritime security and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

The Ministers reaffirmed their intention to develop defence cooperation among Australia, Japan and the United States.

The Ministers exchanged their views on regional issues including the South China Sea, the East China Sea and North Korea. The Ministers discussed the recent series of ballistic missile launches by North Korea, which is a serious threat to the regional security and condemned the launches as violation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs). The Ministers remained committed to efforts to achieve North Korea's complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of all ranges of North Korea in accordance with all relevant UNSCRs and urged North Korea to fully comply with its international obligations. The Ministers welcomed and reaffirmed their commitment to implement the relevant UNSCRs and sustained international cooperation to deter, disrupt, and ultimately eliminate illicit activities, such as illegal ship-to-ship transfers.

Subsection II-6

8th Australia-Japan "2+2" Consultations

10 October 2018

Eighth Japan-Australia 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations

1. The Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senator Marise Payne, and the Australian Minister for Defence, Mr Christopher Pyne; Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, Mr Taro Kono; and the Minister of Defense of Japan, Mr Takeshi Iwaya, met in Sydney on 10 October 2018 for the Eighth Japan-Australia 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations.

2. The Ministers welcomed the closer engagement between Australia and Japan since the Seventh 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations, including visits to Japan by the Australian Prime Minister and by the Trade, Tourism and Investment Minister in January and July 2018 respectively. The Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to further deepening the Special Strategic Partnership between the two countries, founded on common strategic interests and shared values including a commitment to democracy, human rights, free trade, and the rules-based international order.

Indo-Pacific

3. The Ministers reaffirmed that Australia and Japan shared elements of their strategic visions for the Indo-Pacific region. They reiterated their determination to work proactively together, and together with the United States and other partners, to maintain and promote a free, open, stable, and prosperous Indo-Pacific region founded on the rules-based international order.

4. The Ministers recognised the importance of a stable and secure regional maritime order, including through enhanced maritime security cooperation. They reaffirmed their commitment to further enhancing bilateral and Japan-Australia-United States trilateral maritime security cooperation, in particular capacity building in the field of maritime law enforcement and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in Southeast Asia as well as Pacific Island Countries through close consultation with those countries.

5. The Ministers highlighted the importance of enhancing connectivity in this region for economic prosperity through the development of quality infrastructure in accordance with international standards that are open, transparent, non-exclusive, and sustainable, and which promotes fair and open competition and meets genuine needs. They affirmed commitment to advancing this agenda bilaterally and through the Japan-Australia-United States trilateral partnership for infrastructure investment in the Indo-Pacific region. The Ministers also shared the importance of debt

sustainability, including debt transparency, for sustainable development and sovereignty, and reiterated their concern about increases in foreign debt. In this regard, the Ministers called for wider adherence to and respect for international standards in this area.

Defence Cooperation

6. The Ministers reaffirmed their determination to pursue deeper and broader defence cooperation, including exercises, operations, capacity building, enhanced navy, army, and air force engagement activities and strategic visits, trilateral cooperation with the United States, and further cooperation on defence equipment, science, and technology. They identified a suite of new initiatives to further enhance bilateral defence engagement. These initiatives cover a commitment to increasing the complexity and sophistication of military exercises, focusing on deepening mutual understanding of operational planning and enhancing interoperability between defence forces. The Ministers determined to explore opportunities to conduct broader areas of bilateral/multilateral training and exercises involving the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF), including in areas such as disaster response, anti-submarine warfare, and mine countermeasures. The Ministers also affirmed the commitment to pursuing the rescheduling of the first-ever fighter jet exercise "BUSHIDO GUARDIAN" to an appropriate time in 2019, and to seeking an opportunity for bilateral or multilateral training or exercises in Australia involving the Royal Australian Air Force and Japan Air Self-Defense Force.

7. The Ministers welcomed the recent progress in the negotiations on the Reciprocal Access Agreement, which will reciprocally improve administrative, policy, and legal procedures to facilitate joint operations and exercises. The Ministers reaffirmed strong commitment to conclude the negotiations as early as feasible.

8. The Ministers reaffirmed the importance of their respective alliances with the United States, which are fundamental to each country's security and underpin broader regional stability and prosperity. In this regard, the Ministers welcomed the United States' commitment to the Indo-Pacific and the implementation of the Force Posture Initiatives. They reaffirmed their strong commitment to further enhancing trilateral cooperation, including through the Trilateral Summit Meeting, Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, and Trilateral Defence Ministers' Meeting to ensure the peaceful, stable, and prosperous future of the Indo-Pacific region.

Trilateral and Multilateral Cooperation

9. The Ministers reaffirmed their intention to further develop trilateral cooperation and coordination among Japan, Australia, and India. They also welcomed the progress in cooperation among Japan, Australia, India, and the United States.

Regional and International Issues

10. The Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to the goal of the international community for North Korea's complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of all its nuclear and other

weapons of mass destruction, as well as ballistic missiles in accordance with the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs). They welcomed the ongoing diplomatic engagements, including those between North Korea and each of the Republic of Korea and the United States, as steps toward the comprehensive resolution of the outstanding issues regarding North Korea. They also expressed support for efforts by the United States towards the denuclearisation of North Korea in compliance with the relevant UNSCRs.

11. The Ministers reconfirmed that it is critical for all United Nations Member States to continue to implement their obligations fully under relevant UNSCRs. They reaffirmed their commitment to cooperating to that end, including through surveillance of suspicious maritime activities, such as illicit ship-to-ship transfers involving North Korean-flagged vessels. The Ministers of Japan welcomed Australia's deployment of maritime patrol aircraft to that end. The Ministers agreed that the cap on the importation of refined petroleum products for 2018 imposed by UNSCR 2397 (2017) had been breached. They called on North Korea to end its human rights violations and immediately resolve the issue of Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea.

12. The Ministers remained seriously concerned about the situation in the South China Sea (SCS). They reaffirmed the importance of upholding the rules-based regional and international order, respect for international law, freedom of navigation and overflight, and unimpeded trade. The Ministers expressed their opposition to the use of disputed features for military purposes and urged all parties to pursue the demilitarisation of such features. They emphasised the importance of self-restraint and their opposition to any actions that could escalate tensions in the region. They urged relevant states to make and clarify territorial and maritime claims based on international law and resolve disputes peacefully in accordance with international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The Ministers acknowledged the recent movement towards a Code of Conduct (COC) for the South China Sea and supported the conclusion of negotiations for an effective COC. They called for the COC to be consistent with existing international law, as reflected in UNCLOS, and not to prejudice the interests of non-parties to the COC or the rights of all states under international law. The COC should reinforce existing regional architecture and strengthen parties' commitments to cease actions that would complicate or escalate disputes.

13. The Ministers shared the intention to remain in close communication about the situation in the East China Sea and expressed opposition to any coercive unilateral actions that seek to alter the status quo or increase tensions in the area.

Engagement with ASEAN and the Pacific

14. The Ministers resolved to further enhance their engagement with ASEAN and noted the achievements of ASEAN in fostering peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific. They reaffirmed their strong support for ASEAN centrality and unity and acknowledged the role of ASEAN as the convener of the regional security architecture. The Ministers underlined the value of the East Asia

Summit (EAS) as the region's premier leaders-led forum for addressing political-security challenges. The Ministers also welcomed the continued contributions of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus).

15. The Ministers expressed their commitment to enhancing cooperation between Australia and Japan to support economic and social resilience, stability, and prosperity in the Pacific, in close consultation with the Pacific Island Countries. They welcomed the success of the Eighth Pacific Island Leaders Meeting (PALM8) held in May 2018 and Japan's commitment to the region announced there. The Ministers of Japan welcomed Australia's enhanced engagement in the Pacific in line with its 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper.

Commitment to Broader Cooperation

16. The Ministers reasserted the importance of a constructive and mutually beneficial relationship with China through dialogue, cooperation, and engagement.

17. The Ministers stressed the importance of a free and open, rules-based trading system for global stability and prosperity. In this regard, they shared the determination to coordinate closely and exercise leadership towards an early entry into force of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership and the swift conclusion of a high-quality Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership that would promote closer regional economic integration. The Ministers recognised the importance of working together to improve the functioning of the World Trade Organization to address the challenges facing the multilateral trading system and benefit individuals and businesses throughout the region and the world. The Ministers reaffirmed support for global trade liberalisation and their commitment to resisting protectionism, including all unfair trade practices.

18. The Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to an open, free, fair, and secure cyberspace and to further strengthening cooperation in this area.

19. The Ministers underlined the crucial importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the success of the 2020 NPT Review Conference. The Ministers reaffirmed their determination to continue cooperation towards a world free of nuclear weapons through efforts on nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including through the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI). They urged all States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) without further delay towards its early entry into force and universalisation, prioritising the remaining eight Annex 2 states, including North Korea. They reiterated the importance of reinforcing the CTBT's verification regime.

20. The Ministers reaffirmed their determination to further cooperate in areas such as counter-terrorism.

Subsection II-7

7th Australia-Japan "2+2" Consultations

20 April 2017

Seventh Japan-Australia 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations
20 April 2017

Overview

1. Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, Mr. Fumio Kishida; Minister of Defense of Japan, Ms. Tomomi Inada; Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ms. Julie Bishop; and the Australian Minister for Defence, Senator Marise Payne, met in Tokyo on 20 April for the Seventh Japan-Australia 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations.

2. The Ministers welcomed the closer engagement between Japan and Australia since the Sixth 2+2 meeting, including Prime Minister Abe's visit to Australia in January 2017. They reaffirmed their determination to further enhance the Special Strategic Partnership between the two countries, founded on common values and strategic interests including democracy, human rights, the rule of law, open markets, and free trade.

3. The Ministers underlined the importance of ensuring a stable, free, and open rules-based order across the Indo-Pacific region and beyond. They recognised the importance of ensuring free and open sea lanes as well as enhancing regional connectivity, including through infrastructure. They reaffirmed that Japan and Australia will continue to work proactively in this regard, together with their common ally, the United States, and other like-minded partners. With this in mind, the Australian side welcomed Japan's greater engagement in the region under its "Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy."

Bilateral and Trilateral Security and Defence Cooperation

4. Marking the tenth anniversary of the 2007 Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, the Ministers renewed their determination to strengthen security cooperation. They welcomed increased cooperation in training and exercises, personnel exchanges, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, maritime security, peacekeeping, capacity building, and defence equipment and technology. The Ministers identified a suite of new initiatives to further enhance bilateral defence engagement, including looking to establish a joint activity in 2018 in Japan involving fighter jets of the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) and the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF).

5. The Ministers welcomed the progress in their respective internal procedures necessary for the entry into force of the new Japan-Australia Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement, signed on

14 January 2017, which will facilitate greater mutual logistical support between the Japan Self-Defense Forces and the Australian Defence Force. They acknowledged positive progress in negotiations toward an agreement to reciprocally improve administrative, policy, and legal procedures to facilitate joint operations and exercises, and reiterated the expectation expressed by Prime Ministers Abe and Turnbull in January 2017 that negotiations be concluded as early as feasible, preferably in 2017.

6. The Ministers welcomed the second meeting of the Japan-Australia Cyber Policy Dialogue in August 2016, as well as intensified engagement between the two countries in the area of space, including the Japan-Australia Space Security Dialogue in October 2016. They stressed the importance of further strengthening coordination and cooperation in these domains.

7. The Ministers highly valued the long-standing and indispensable contribution made by the United States to the peace, security, and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region. They welcomed the intention of the United States to strengthen its presence in the region. The Ministers reaffirmed the enduring importance of the U.S. alliances with Japan and Australia, which are the cornerstones of these countries' security as well as regional stability and prosperity. They expressed their willingness to continue working closely with the United States to ensure the peaceful and prosperous future of the region.

8. The Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to further enhance trilateral cooperation between Australia, Japan, and the United States, underlining the importance of the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue and the Trilateral Defence Ministers' Meeting. The Ministers welcomed the signing of the 2016 Trilateral Information Sharing Arrangement as one of the concrete outcomes of the Security and Defence Cooperation Forum.

9. Acknowledging India's strategic importance in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond, the Ministers reaffirmed their intention to further develop trilateral cooperation and coordination among Japan, Australia, and India, including by holding a third senior officials' trilateral dialogue in the coming weeks in Canberra.

Regional and International Issues

10. The Ministers discussed the importance of working through regional fora to support security, stability, economic growth, and regional integration. They reaffirmed the critical role of the East Asia Summit (EAS) as the region's premier leaders-led forum for strategic dialogue and welcomed efforts to strengthen it. The Ministers also welcomed the continued contributions of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus).

11. The Ministers remained seriously concerned about the situation in the South China Sea. They emphasised the importance of self-restraint and their opposition to any unilateral actions that increase tensions. The Ministers also expressed their opposition to the use of disputed features for

military purposes and urged all parties to pursue the demilitarisation of such features. They reaffirmed the importance of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and urged relevant states to make and clarify territorial and maritime claims based on international law. The Ministers called on parties to disputes in the South China Sea to refrain from using force or coercion to advance such claims and to seek to settle disputes peacefully in accordance with international law.

Continued Regional and International Issues

12. The Ministers re-emphasised the importance of upholding the rules-based regional and international order and called on all states to respect freedom of navigation and overflight, and unimpeded trade. They encouraged the early finalisation of an effective Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea (SCS) on the basis of international law, in light of the award rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal under UNCLOS on 12 July 2016. They reiterated the need for ASEAN member states and China to ensure the full and effective implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) in its entirety.

13. The Ministers reaffirmed their intention to further enhance bilateral and Japan-Australia-U.S. trilateral coordination and cooperation on maritime security capacity building in Southeast Asia.

14. The Ministers reiterated their opposition to any unilateral or coercive actions that could alter the status quo or increase tensions in the East China Sea. They also expressed their intention to remain in close contact on the situation in the area.

15. The Ministers reaffirmed the importance of a constructive and mutually beneficial relationship with China through dialogue, cooperation, and engagement.

North Korea and Humanitarian Issues

16. The Ministers reiterated condemnation in the strongest terms of North Korea's nuclear tests, multiple ballistic missile launches, and proliferation activities. They strongly urged North Korea to cease its destabilising and provocative actions immediately and to fully comply with its international obligations and commitments, including those under relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs). The Ministers welcomed the unanimous adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2321 and emphasised the importance of enhancing pressure on North Korea through full, thorough, and sustained implementation by Member States of all relevant UNSCRs, including Resolutions 2270 and 2321. The Ministers discussed Japan's and Australia's approaches to autonomous measures and noted their complementarity. They strongly urged North Korea to end its human rights violations, resolve the abductions issue immediately, and focus on the great unmet needs of the people of North Korea.

Cooperation in the Pacific Region

17. The Ministers welcomed the growing number of bilateral foreign policy consultations, including on North Asia, Southeast Asia, the Pacific, and development cooperation, and reaffirmed their intention to further enhance bilateral coordination and cooperation on regional issues.

18. The Ministers welcomed the outcomes of the first meeting of the Japan-Australia Pacific Policy Dialogue in October 2016. Recognising the complex challenges facing the Pacific region, they underscored the importance of further cooperation among Japan, Australia, and the Pacific Island countries to build economic resilience and regional peace and security. The Ministers reaffirmed their determination to strengthen cooperation and coordination in the Pacific region under the Japan-Australia Strategy for Cooperation in the Pacific issued by Foreign Ministers in February 2016. They resolved to cooperate closely towards the success of the Eighth Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM8), scheduled to be held in May 2018 in Iwaki, Fukushima.

Syria, Counterterrorism, and Nuclear Non-Proliferation

19. The Ministers expressed great concern at the continuing violence and lack of humanitarian access in Syria. They also expressed great concern at the use of chemical weapons in Syria and reiterated their strong support for the necessary work of the OPCW in respect of such use. The Ministers called on all countries with influence on the parties to the conflict to ensure they engage in negotiations under UN auspices to find a political solution as soon as possible.

20. The Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to continue their coordination on respective efforts to counter terrorism and violent extremism, including in the region, while expressing strong support for relevant efforts by the international community to address these threats.

21. The Ministers welcomed the Joint Statement on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), adopted at the Friends of the CTBT Ministerial Meeting in New York in September 2016, co-chaired by the Foreign Ministers of Japan and Australia. This meeting marked the 20th anniversary of the Treaty's opening for signature and demonstrated the strong global norm against nuclear testing. The Ministers also welcomed Resolution 2310, adopted by the UN Security Council in September 2016, and reiterated the importance of cooperation towards the early entry into force of the Treaty.

22. The Ministers reaffirmed Japan and Australia's determination to continue cooperation towards a world without nuclear weapons, through efforts on nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including practical progress towards the commencement of Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty negotiations and further cooperation on nuclear disarmament verification. As co-founders of the twelve-nation Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), the Ministers underlined the crucial importance of all three mutually reinforcing pillars of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the success of the 2020 NPT Review

Conference with the first Preparatory Committee meeting in May 2017. The Ministers welcomed the 2016 EAS Leaders' Statement on Non-Proliferation.

Trade and Future 2+2 Consultations

23. The Ministers stressed the strategic importance of a free and open, rules-based trading system for regional stability and prosperity. They reaffirmed the strategic and economic significance of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement and shared the intention to continue to work on a way forward. They also reaffirmed that a high-quality and commercially meaningful Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) offers opportunities for closer regional economic integration.

24. Australia offered to host the next meeting of Japan-Australia 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations.

Subsection II-8

Leaders' Joint Statement

18 December 2015

"Next steps of the Special Strategic Partnership: Asia, Pacific and Beyond"

1. Japanese Prime Minister, H.E. Mr Shinzo Abe, and Australian Prime Minister, the Hon Malcolm Turnbull MP, met in Tokyo today for the annual Japan-Australia summit. The meeting strengthened the deep and longstanding strategic, economic and people-to-people ties between the two countries. The Prime Ministers reaffirmed the special strategic partnership between Japan and Australia, based on common values and strategic interests including democracy, human rights, the rule of law, open markets and free trade.

2. The Prime Ministers underlined the importance of deepening the special relationship with a vision to shouldering responsibility for peace and prosperity in Asia and the Pacific and the international society. In this regard, the Prime Ministers expressed their determination to contribute to the establishment and maintenance of international order that respects universally recognised rules and high level of transparency in order to promote unimpeded mobility of people, goods, currency and information.

Economy, Innovation and Exchanges

3. The Prime Ministers were pleased at the substantial strengthening of the economic relationship, including a direct result of the Japan-Australia Economic Partnership Agreement (JAEPA) which entered into force this year. JAEPA has immediately prompted new growth in the trade and investment and opened up new opportunities including in the manufacturing, agriculture and services sectors. They welcomed the collaborative partnership between the two countries such as the identification of Australia as a partner in global food value chains by Japan, searching of potential investment opportunities by Japan in Northern Australia.

4. They also welcomed the conclusion of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations, encouraged its signature and entry into force at an early stage, and looked forward to benefits for the stability and prosperity in the region. They shared their intention to work together to support the interest of other economies in acceding to the TPP. They also encouraged the acceleration of the negotiations for the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) aiming at a comprehensive and high-quality economic partnership agreement.

5. The Prime Ministers highlighted the critical importance of science, technology and innovation for both Japan and Australia to deliver new sources of growth, maintain high-wage jobs and seize the

next wave of economic prosperity. The Prime Ministers welcomed ongoing cooperation projects such as utilising the Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS) and the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between Japan's Forum for Innovative Regenerative Medicine and Austrade, and the commitment by Japan's key research-intensive universities and Australia's Group of 8 Universities' to boost research links. Japan welcomed Australia's National Innovation and Science Agenda and the Prime Ministers shared their intention to develop specific innovation linkages for announcement at their next summit.

6. Prime Minister Abe introduced Japan's efforts in the Conference for Promotion of Exchanges between Japan and Australia which aims at innovation-led diversification of industrial structure and region-led promotion of relationship. Prime Minister Turnbull welcomed Japan's efforts and looked forward to strengthening cooperation in these areas. The Prime Ministers welcomed dispatch of missions to Australia, and further collaboration such as the establishment of periodic high level meetings including on urban transportation and high speed rail, and collaboration in energy including the formation of a diversified, flexible and integrated LNG market. They indicated support for projects such as the Hydrogen Energy Supply Chain Project to help realize the "hydrogen society". They also welcomed active exchanges by the Sister Cities and other forms of cooperation at the local government level.

Security and Defence Cooperation

7. The Prime Ministers welcomed the outcomes of and joint communique of the Sixth Japan Australia 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations held on 22 November in Sydney. They endorsed the new initiatives to further enhance bilateral defence engagement. They welcomed substantial progress in negotiations towards making an agreement to reciprocally improve administrative, policy and legal procedures to facilitate joint operations and exercises. They encouraged continued progress, with a view to concluding negotiations at the earliest possible opportunity.

8. Australia welcomed and supported Japan's recent passage of "Legislation for Peace and Security" which enables Japan to contribute even more actively in securing the peace, stability and prosperity of the region and the world in line with its policy of a "Proactive Contribution to Peace".

9. Prime Minister Abe explained Japan's commitment to fulfilling all the requirements in the Competitive Evaluation Process underway to select an international partner to assist in the delivery of "Australia's Future Submarine." Prime Minister Turnbull welcomed Japan's participation in the Process and noted Japan's commitment to it.

10. The Prime Ministers reaffirmed the contribution of their respective Alliances with the United States to peace and security in the region, and expressed strong support for the United States rebalance. They underlined the value of the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue and the trilateral

cooperation between Japan, Australia and the U.S. They also welcomed the inaugural Japan-Australia-India Trilateral dialogue.

Regional and International Issues

11. The Prime Ministers shared the views on a range of regional and international issues as well as contemporary serious challenges such as cybersecurity and welcomed the outcomes of the bilateral cyber policy dialogue. They had a wide-ranging discussion on the global economy, G20, nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, as well as the role of the U.S., and engagement with key regional countries including ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) member states, China, India, and Republic of Korea.

12. The Prime Ministers urged North Korea to refrain from any provocation, to abide by United Nations Security Council resolutions and the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks, and to fully comply with the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement under the NPT. They urged North Korea to address urgently its unresolved humanitarian concerns including the abductions issue.

13. The Prime Ministers noted that the economic development of all countries in the region, including their own, has been enabled by and will depend upon in the future, the continued peaceful maintenance of the international order. In that light, they expressed their strong opposition to any coercive or unilateral actions that could alter the status quo in the East China Sea. They likewise expressed their strong opposition to any coercive or unilateral actions that could alter the status quo in the South China Sea and called on all claimants to halt large scale land reclamation or construction, and to refrain from using any land features for military purposes. They urged all claimants to exercise restraint, take steps to ease tensions, refrain from any actions that could in the circumstances escalate tensions and act in accordance with international law, including the principles of freedom of navigation and overflight.

14. The Prime Ministers will work together to continue strengthening cooperation in regional fora to support security, stability, economic growth and regional integration. They welcomed outcomes of the 10th EAS (East Asia Summit) to strengthen the role of the EAS as the region's premier leaders-led forum for strategic dialogue and cooperation on political, security and economic issues, and the successful Philippines APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) meetings to further deepen cooperation toward open, predictable, rules-based, and transparent environment for trade and investment through such agenda as regional economic integration.

15. Japan and Australia are strong supporters of economic prosperity and stability in the Pacific. The Prime Ministers affirmed their commitment to helping the region achieve a peaceful and prosperous future and will continue close cooperation in the Pacific.

16. The Prime Ministers welcomed the adoption of the Paris Agreement at the 21st session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP 21). They expressed their intention to work together for the effective implementation of the Agreement.

17. Unreservedly condemning the recent terrorist attacks which have killed and injured so many innocent people, the Prime Ministers recognised the importance of international counter-terrorism efforts such as the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL. Japan and Australia are providing significant humanitarian support in response to the crises in Iraq and Syria.

18. The Prime Ministers emphasised the importance of an early realization of United Nations Security Council reform, and committed themselves to enhance cooperation to this end.

19. Prime Minister Turnbull conveyed to Prime Minister Abe Australia's deep disappointment with Japan's decision to conduct whaling in the Southern Ocean this summer. Prime Minister Abe explained Japan's position on the legal and scientific grounds for its NEWREP-A programme. The Prime Ministers reiterated that Japan and Australia do not condone any actions which are a risk to human life and property at sea.

Other issues

20. Prime Minister Turnbull welcomed Prime Minister Abe's announcement that Japan would open the way to Japanese graduate school admissions for foreign bachelor's degree recipients to further support increased two-way student mobility between the two countries. The Prime Ministers also welcomed the student exchanges that Australia's New Colombo Plan and Japan's 'TOBITATE! Young Ambassador Program' are promoting.

21. Prime Minister Turnbull announced Japan as Australia's public diplomacy Focus Country for 2018. The Prime Ministers were pleased to note enhanced opportunities for people to people linkages. They looked forward to Japan's hosting of the Rugby World Cup 2019, and Games of the XXXII Olympiad and 2020 Summer Paralympics.

22. Prime Minister Turnbull looks forward to receiving Prime Minister Abe in Australia next year.

Subsection II-9

6th Australia-Japan "2+2" Consultations

22 November 2015

Sixth Japan-Australia 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations
22 November 2015

Overview

1. Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ms Julie Bishop, and the Australian Minister for Defence, Senator Marise Payne; the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, Mr Fumio Kishida; and the Minister of Defense of Japan, Mr Gen Nakatani, met in Sydney on 22 November for the Sixth Japan-Australia 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations.

2. Ministers welcomed the closer engagement between Australia and Japan since Prime Minister Abe's visit to Australia in July 2014, enabled through the Special Strategic Partnership between Australia and Japan, a partnership based on common values and strategic interests including democracy, human rights, the rule of law, open markets, and free trade.

3. Ministers unreservedly condemned the terrorist attacks in Paris and many other recent attacks which have killed and injured so many innocent people. Ministers recognised the importance of international counter-terrorism efforts such as the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL. Japan and Australia are providing significant humanitarian support in response to the crises in Iraq and Syria.

4. Australia welcomed Japan's recent passage of Legislation for Peace and Security, which will enable Japan to contribute even more actively in securing peace, stability, and prosperity of the region and the world under the policy of "Proactive Contribution to Peace." Australia also supported Japan's review of exercising its right of collective self-defence in a limited manner, participating more actively in United Nations peace-keeping missions, and introducing new principles for the transfer of defence equipment and technology.

Bilateral Defence Cooperation

5. Enhanced bilateral defence cooperation is a priority for both Australia and Japan. Ministers welcomed the progress made towards implementing the recommendations developed for and endorsed by Leaders in 2014 that would elevate the bilateral security and defence relationship to a new level, building on the 2007 Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation. These recommendations included options for enhancing training and exercises, increased personnel exchanges, deepening cooperation on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, maritime security, peacekeeping, capacity building, and enhanced trilateral defence cooperation with the United States. Based on progress

already made, Ministers identified new initiatives to further enhance bilateral defence engagement and renewed their determination to strengthen cooperation in this area.

6. Ministers also welcomed substantial progress in negotiations towards making an agreement that would reciprocally improve administrative, policy, and legal procedures to facilitate joint operations and exercises. They encouraged continued progress with a view to concluding negotiations at the earliest possible opportunity.

7. Japanese Ministers explained Japan's commitment to fulfilling all the requirements in the Competitive Evaluation Process underway to select an international partner to assist in the delivery of "Australia's Future Submarine." Australian Ministers welcomed Japan's participation in the Process and noted Japan's commitment to it.

Regional Engagement and Cooperation

8. Ministers underlined the two countries' deep engagement in the economically and strategically significant Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean region. They recognised that building prosperity and maintaining stability in these regions were of vital importance to both countries.

9. Ministers expressed their determination to continue strengthening cooperation in the Pacific region to support economic prosperity and regional peace and stability and will finalise a joint strategy for cooperation in the Pacific as soon as possible.

10. Ministers discussed the importance of working through regional fora to support security, stability, economic growth, and regional integration. They welcomed efforts to strengthen the East Asia Summit (EAS) as the region's premier leaders-led forum for strategic dialogue.

Regional and Maritime Security

11. Both countries welcomed the continued contributions of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) to fostering cooperation and dialogue on security issues. They committed to working closely to advance the agenda of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).

12. Ministers reaffirmed the importance of promoting the rule of law at sea. They expressed their strong opposition to any coercive or unilateral actions that could alter the status quo in the East China Sea.

13. They expressed strong concern over the recent situation in the South China Sea and reiterated their strong opposition to any coercive or unilateral actions that could alter the status quo in the South China Sea. They called on all claimants to halt large-scale land reclamation, construction, and use for military purposes. They urged claimants to exercise restraint, take steps to ease tensions, and refrain from provocative actions that could escalate tensions. They called on claimants to clarify and

pursue territorial claims and accompanying maritime rights in accordance with international law, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). In this regard, they supported the right of claimants to seek to resolve disputes peacefully, including through arbitration. They took note of the ongoing arbitration case under UNCLOS brought by the Philippines, affirming that decisions of the arbitral tribunal are legally binding.

14. They also called for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China to ensure the full and effective implementation of commitments under the Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) and to reach agreement on a substantive Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC) as soon as possible. They emphasised the importance of the rights, freedoms, and lawful uses of the sea enjoyed by all states in accordance with international law. Ministers recognised that all states have a right under international law to freedom of navigation and freedom of overflight, including in the South China Sea. Both Australia and Japan strongly supported those rights.

15. Ministers reaffirmed the importance of a constructive and mutually beneficial relationship with China through dialogue, cooperation, and engagement.

North Korea and Global Security

16. Ministers reiterated their concern that North Korea remained a serious destabilising factor for the entire East Asia region and discussed humanitarian concerns. They urged North Korea to comply fully with its international obligations and commitments and to take concrete steps towards denuclearisation. They called on North Korea to terminate its inhumane and arbitrary human rights policies and address the unresolved abductions issue.

Women, Peace, and Security

17. Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to work together to achieve a world that respects the rights of women, including by continuing to condemn violence against women in all its forms. They also expressed their determination to cooperate to enable the United Nations and development organisations to contribute to increasing the participation of women to guarantee justice, security, and prosperity for all women. They reaffirmed their commitment to cooperation in implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1325, which urges member states to ensure meaningful participation of women in peacebuilding and peace negotiations and to protect the rights and interests of women and girls during armed conflict.

United Nations and International Cooperation

18. In commemorating the 70th anniversary of the United Nations, Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to a strong and effective United Nations in promoting peace and security, including by fostering human rights and sustainable development. In this context, Ministers reconfirmed their willingness to enhance cooperation towards the early realisation of United Nations Security Council reform, including Japan's permanent membership. They welcomed the election of Japan to the UN

Security Council for the term 2016-17, recognised the importance of Japan's constructive contribution to the Security Council's work in addressing the multiple and complex international threats confronting the world today, and committed to continuing close liaison on issues before the Security Council, building on Australia's experience during its 2013-14 term.

Alliances with the United States

19. Ministers exchanged views on the regional and international security situation and reaffirmed that their respective alliances with the United States made a significant contribution to peace and security in the region. Ministers underscored the importance of strong U.S. engagement in the region and strong support for the U.S. rebalance.

20. Ministers discussed the strength of their respective bilateral security relationships with the United States and their commitment to further enhancing trilateral cooperation, including through the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD).

Subsection II-10

Joint Statement on Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation

22 November 2015

Joint Statement on Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Between Japan and Australia

We, the Foreign Ministers of Japan and Australia, express our satisfaction with the close and long-standing partnership in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation that both countries have cultivated until now, and renew our determination to continue our cooperation for a peaceful and secure world free of nuclear weapons, including through our membership in the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI).

Consistent with the Hiroshima Statement issued by the NPDI ministers in April 2014, we reaffirm our commitment to promoting practical and concrete measures to advance both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation as mutually reinforcing processes. In this context, we underline the crucial importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and strengthening its three pillars (nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy) to achieve the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.

We express our regret over the lack of a consensus outcome at the 2015 NPT Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty, which has contributed to current difficulties in developing a concerted vision on how to proceed with nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. This situation, however, should not mean that we resign ourselves to minimal ambition and progress. We stress the importance of moving forward with practical progress in the next review cycle leading up to the 2020 Review Conference of the Treaty and reaffirm that the previous consensus outcomes of the NPT remain relevant and valid.

Japan and Australia have long promoted global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts while ensuring a secure environment, together on the world stage. This year the NPDI submitted to the NPT Review Conference a joint working paper which called for the implementation of practical and concrete measures across the three pillars. We welcome the United Nations General Assembly First Committee's adoption of two of our resolutions this year, by an overwhelming majority: the Resolution titled "United Action with Renewed Determination towards the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons" proposed by Japan and the Resolution titled "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)" proposed by Australia.

Call for Action and Areas of Focus
With that in mind, we hereby call once again on all states to take further practical and concrete measures, such as:

- The early entry into force of the CTBT, which Japan and Australia jointly promote as co-Chairs of the Friends of CTBT group.

- The early commencement of negotiations for the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT).

- The full implementation of their commitments towards a world free of nuclear weapons.

In the area of non-proliferation, we welcome the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action established between Iran and EU3+3, and stress the important role played by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under the leadership of Director General Yukiya Amano for strengthening the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and peaceful uses of nuclear energy and technology.

Concerns Regarding North Korea and Humanitarian Consequences
We strongly deplore North Korea's continued development of nuclear and missile programs and urge North Korea to refrain from any provocation, to fully comply with the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions and the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks, and to return to compliance with the NPT and IAEA safeguards.

On the occasion of the 70th year since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, we voice our deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and recall that this concern fundamentally underpins all our work for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. We encourage leaders, youth, and others to visit Hiroshima and Nagasaki and to hear the testimonies of the atomic bomb survivors.

Renewed Resolve and Cooperation
We call for greater cooperation between the nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, which in our view is indispensable for further reductions in the global nuclear stockpiles and subsequently for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Bearing in mind that Japan will assume the presidency of the G7 and will host the G7 Foreign Ministers' meeting in Hiroshima next year, we jointly renew our resolve to realize a world free of nuclear weapons through united action.

Subsection II-11

5th Australia-Japan "2+2" Consultations

11 June 2014

5th Japan-Australia 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations
Joint Press Release
11 June 2014

Overview

1. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, Mr. Fumio Kishida; the Minister of Defense of Japan, Mr. Itsunori Onodera; the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ms. Julie Bishop; and the Australian Minister for Defence, Senator David Johnston, met in Tokyo on 11 June for the 5th Japan-Australia 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations.

2. Ministers recalled the intent of leaders, announced at their 7 April summit meeting, to elevate the strategic partnership between Australia and Japan to a new special relationship based on common values and interests including democracy, human rights, the rule of law, open markets, and free trade. Australia welcomed Japan's recent efforts on its security policy from the perspective of "Proactive Contribution to Peace" based on the principle of international cooperation. Australia also supported Japan's consideration of the issues of exercising its right to collective self-defence, participating more actively in United Nations peacekeeping operations, and introducing new principles for the transfer of defence equipment and technology.

Defence Equipment and Technology Cooperation

3. Ministers confirmed the substantial conclusion of negotiations on an agreement for cooperation in the field of defence equipment and technology. Ministers also discussed preparations for joint research on marine hydrodynamics as an initial area of science and technology cooperation.

4. Ministers developed a suite of recommendations for consideration by the leaders of the two countries that would contribute to elevating the bilateral security and defence relationship to a new level, building on the 2007 Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation. These recommendations included options for enhancing training and exercises, increased personnel exchanges, deepening cooperation on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, maritime security, peacekeeping, capacity building, and enhanced trilateral security cooperation.

Cybersecurity and Space Cooperation

5. Japan's Ministers welcomed Australia's offer to host the inaugural bilateral cyber-policy dialogue in Canberra at a mutually convenient time in the second half of 2014 led by the Department of

Foreign Affairs and Trade and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The dialogue would seek to address common cyber threats and discuss ways to strengthen regional and international cooperation. They also discussed the importance of enhancing cooperation in other fields such as space security.

Commemorative Event and Pacific Region Strategy

6. Ministers reconfirmed arrangements for Japan's participation, through a Maritime Self-Defense Force vessel, in the Albany Convoy Commemorative Event in late 2014. The event will mark the centenary of the departure of the first convoy of ships, escorted by the HIJMS Ibuki, that carried ANZAC forces to World War I.

7. Ministers decided that Australia and Japan would develop a strategy for strengthened cooperation in the Pacific region to support its economic development as well as peace and stability. They reaffirmed that they would focus on support to Pacific Island countries in the fields of sustainable development, security and defence capacity-building, disaster relief, and diplomatic and multilateral cooperation, in a manner that is consistent with each country's policies. Ministers confirmed their intention to work closely together to support free and fair elections in Fiji and to support, in consultation with the government of the Independent State of Papua New Guinea, peace and development in the Autonomous Region of Bougainville.

Regional and International Security

8. Ministers exchanged views on the regional and international security situation and reaffirmed that their respective alliances with the United States made a significant contribution to peace and security in the region. Ministers underscored the importance of strong U.S. engagement in the region and strong support for the U.S. rebalance.

9. Ministers reaffirmed the importance of promoting the rule of law and confirmed the importance of regional peace and stability, unimpeded trade, and freedom of navigation and overflight of the high seas. The Ministers expressed their strong opposition to the use of force or coercion to unilaterally alter the status quo in the East China Sea and the South China Sea. Emphasising the need for disputes and issues to be settled by peaceful means, they called on parties concerned to refrain from actions that could increase tensions, to clarify and pursue claims in accordance with international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and for ASEAN and China to reach early agreement on an effective Code of Conduct in the South China Sea.

North Korea and Humanitarian Issues

10. The Ministers reiterated their concern that North Korea remained a serious destabilising factor for the entire East Asia region and discussed humanitarian concerns. They urged North Korea to comply fully with its international obligations and commitments and called on North Korea to terminate its inhumane and arbitrary human rights policies and address the unresolved abductions issue.

Multilateral Coordination

11. The Ministers affirmed the value of multilateral coordination in response to regional crises and noted the excellent cooperation surrounding the international response to Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines and the search and rescue operation for the missing Malaysia Airlines flight MH370 involving 26 countries, including Malaysia and China.

Commitment to Regional Fora

12. Ministers expressed their commitment to cooperating in strengthening the strategic, political, and economic roles of the East Asia Summit and to working together in the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus, and the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum.

Subsection II-12

4th Australia-Japan "2+2" Consultations

14 September 2012

4th Australia-Japan Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations
"Australia and Japan – Cooperating for Peace and Stability"
14 September 2012

Common Vision and Objectives

1. The Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senator Bob Carr; the Australian Minister for Defence, Stephen Smith; the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, H.E. Mr. Koichiro Gemba; and the Minister of Defense of Japan, H.E. Mr. Satoshi Morimoto, met in Sydney on 14 September to discuss regional and global security issues and ways to advance security and defence cooperation between Australia and Japan.

2. Australia and Japan are natural strategic partners sharing common values and interests, including a commitment to democracy, the rule of law, protection of human rights, and open markets.

3. Australia and Japan share a common strategic objective of ensuring long-term peace, stability, and prosperity in the changing strategic and security environment in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.

4. To help achieve that objective, Australia and Japan are committed to working even more closely on security and defence matters in the following ways:

Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific

5. Deepening exchanges and working together to strengthen regional cooperation on issues that have the potential to undermine the stability of the region.

6. Ensuring mutual support for our respective alliances with the United States, which continue to help underwrite peace, stability, and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific, and working together as active partners to maintain and strengthen comprehensive U.S. engagement in the region.

7. Enhancing trilateral policy coordination and practical cooperation among Australia, Japan, and the United States on a range of regional and global issues through the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue.

8. Continuing to build positive, comprehensive relationships with China, in support of China's responsible and constructive participation in the international rules-based order and role in

promoting regional prosperity and stability, while encouraging improved openness and transparency with respect to China's military modernization and activities.

9. Strengthening mutually beneficial relationships and cooperation on security issues with other countries in the region, including India, the Republic of Korea, and ASEAN countries.

10. Working with parties concerned to achieve long-term peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, including through strongly urging the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to fully comply with relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) and its commitments under the 2005 Six-Party Talks Joint Statement, and to resolve humanitarian concerns in the DPRK, such as the abductions issue.

Regional Architecture and Maritime Security

11. Strengthening regional architecture, particularly the East Asia Summit (EAS), to promote cooperation on political, security, economic, and other challenges facing the region.

12. Welcoming the EAS Foreign Ministers' Meeting and the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus and supporting cooperation and practical activities in the EAS, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus).

13. Promoting regional adherence to norms of maritime security and safety, including freedom of navigation, unimpeded lawful commerce, and the rules-based peaceful resolution of disputes in the South China Sea and beyond in accordance with international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

14. Advancing cooperation on development issues, including by assisting developing countries in the region to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015 and by supporting the establishment of the UN's post-2015 development agenda.

Cooperation on Pacific and Climate Issues

15. Strengthening joint efforts in support of sustainable development in the Pacific, including through the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) and the Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM), and in accordance with the PIF Cairns Compact on Strengthening Development Coordination in the Pacific and other internationally recognised principles on aid effectiveness, by:

(a) encouraging and supporting democracy, economic reform, and good governance;

(b) improving health, education, and infrastructure;

(c) promoting environmental and resource sustainability, including in fisheries;

(d) enhancing maritime surveillance; and

(e) adapting to and mitigating the impacts of climate change.

16. Deepening exchanges and cooperation on the impacts of climate change and food, water, and energy security.

Cooperation on International Security Issues

17. Deepening cooperation in global and regional fora, including the United Nations, to address international security concerns.

18. Pursuing regional and global action to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery, including through cooperation in the Proliferation Security Initiative and supporting Japan's role as chair of the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation in 2013-2014, and to uphold the international legal frameworks of non-proliferation and disarmament.

19. Working to achieve the resolution of legitimate international concerns about Iran's nuclear activities. Enhancing regional and global focus on the control of and trade in WMD-related goods based on relevant international norms and obligations.

20. Working with partners in the Australia-Japan-established Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative to give practical effect to consensus outcomes agreed within the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) framework.

21. Preparing regionally for the 2015 NPT Review Conference through the Australia, Japan, and Philippines 2012-2014 co-chairing term of the ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-Sessional Meeting on Non-proliferation and Disarmament.

22. Continuing cooperation bilaterally and among the Co-author's Group on international efforts to agree, as soon as possible, an Arms Trade Treaty to regulate international trade in conventional arms.

Disaster Management and Cybersecurity

23. Strengthening bilateral and regional cooperation on disaster management, including through improved coordination in civil and military areas, and disaster preparedness and response. Working proactively to realise tangible outcomes at the Third United Nations World Conference on Disaster Reduction, which Japan has expressed its intention to host.

24. Exploring opportunities for information exchange, sharing of expertise, and joint exercises between Australian and Japanese agencies responsible for disaster preparedness and response.

25. Working together to confront increasing threats in cyberspace by shaping international and regional dialogue on cyber issues, including on the development of international frameworks for cooperation.

26. Strengthening cooperation on space security issues bilaterally, trilaterally with the United States, and with other parties, particularly on the development of international norms and confidence-building measures for space. Working together to take forward the proposed International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities and engaging the region more on space issues, including in the ASEAN Regional Forum.

Counter-Terrorism and UN Security Council Reform

27. Enhancing cooperation on counter-terrorism through strengthened collaboration in the United Nations, the Global Counterterrorism Forum, and regional fora, and with other partners, including the United States, through the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue.

28. Enhancing cooperation towards the early realisation of United Nations Security Council reform, including Japan's permanent membership.

Afghanistan and Bilateral Defence Cooperation

29. Cooperating to support stability and sustainable development in Afghanistan.

30. Strengthening practical bilateral defence cooperation to enable the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF), and both defence ministries, to work closely, effectively, and at short notice to address regional and broader international security and defence requirements.

Enhancing Bilateral Defence Cooperation

31. Strengthening interoperability between the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) to enable operations in maritime security, peacekeeping operations, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and evacuation operations.

32. Maintaining an action plan that promotes an effective and flexible bilateral defence relationship with a forward five-year focus.

33. Conducting regular air, land, and maritime exercises and engagement to boost interoperability and enhance skills and capabilities of both defence organisations.

34. Deepening bilateral information exchanges at strategic, operational, and tactical levels to support interoperability.

35. Expanding people-to-people links and exchanges, including exchanges of strategy, policy, and science personnel.

36. Deepening Australia-Japan science and technology cooperation in the field of defence, noting Japan's 2011 Guidelines for Overseas Transfer of Defence Equipment.

37. Initiating information exchanges in defence science and technology fields of mutual interest.

38. Strengthening the relationship between Australia's Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) and Japan's Technical Research and Development Institute (TRDI).

39. Examining opportunities for defence capacity-building cooperation in Southeast Asia and the Pacific.

40. Deepening cooperation through early activation of the Australia-Japan Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement, including the conduct of exercises, operations, and other practical exchanges.

41. Building on cooperation between ADF and JSDF in the Republic of South Sudan and exploring further opportunities to work jointly on international peacebuilding efforts.

42. Reviewing existing bilateral cooperation frameworks to ensure they meet the needs of the expanding Australia-Japan relationship and developing additional arrangements if necessary.

Trilateral Defence Cooperation

43. Strengthening trilateral defence cooperation with the United States.

44. Enhancing interoperability among the defence organisations of Australia, Japan, and the United States.

45. Promoting robust, regular, and practical cooperation among Australia, Japan, and the United States through the Trilateral Defence Ministers' Meeting, the Trilateral Security and Defence Cooperation Forum (SDCF), and trilateral service-specific talks.

46. Developing and implementing an action plan that supports a strong, dynamic, and flexible trilateral defence relationship through the rest of the decade.

47. Conducting trilateral exercises focusing on maritime security, with cooperation across air, land, and maritime domains.

48. Encouraging observer exchanges for respective exercises with the United States.

Consultation and Information Exchange

49. Consolidating the Australia-Japan Foreign and Defence Ministers' 2+2 meeting as the key bilateral mechanism for oversight of the security and defence relationship.

50. Establishing a 2+2 senior officials' mechanism, supported by a working-level consultation process, to enhance bilateral consultation and coordination, and maintaining regular political-military, military-military, and service-to-service talks.

51. Building on the signing of the Information Security Agreement between Australia and Japan, including by considering practical ways to facilitate information sharing and strengthening cooperative efforts in this area.

Subsection II-13

Leaders' Joint Statement

21 April 2011

Joint Statement by the Prime Ministers of Japan and Australia

April 21, 2011

Earthquake and tsunami

1. Prime Minister Kan welcomed Prime Minister Gillard to Japan and expressed the sincere gratitude of the Japanese Government for the assistance provided by Australia in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami, including the dispatch of an Urban Search and Rescue Team to Miyagi Prefecture, the deployment of Royal Australian Air Force C-17 aircraft to assist with relief operations, and the donation of $10 million to the Australian Red Cross Japan and Pacific Disaster Appeal. He emphasized Japan's determination to overcome the recent tragedy and revitalize Japan, with a view to creating a new future.

2. Prime Minister Gillard expressed Australia's sorrow and grief over Japan's great losses. She affirmed Australia's friendship and solidarity with Japan and its people in the wake of the disaster and its readiness to support Japan's early recovery. She emphasized the Government's confidence in Japan's ability to recover quickly and to continue to play a strong and active role in the international community and global economy.

Nuclear safety

3. Prime Minister Kan expressed his determination to resolve the situation at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station and confirmed that Japan would continue to provide information to the international community with maximum transparency in relation to the response to the accident as well as on the safety of Japanese products, calling for measured responses based on sufficient scientific evidence. He also expressed his determination to thoroughly review the accident of the nuclear power plant in due course and to share the experiences gained from the accident with the international community. Prime Minister Gillard re-iterated the readiness of Australia to support Japan's efforts in resolving the situation.

4. The two Prime Ministers recognized the need to enhance their cooperation in the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to globally strengthen the safety standards of nuclear power generation.

Energy and resources

5. Prime Minister Kan emphasized the importance of Australia as a longstanding energy supplier and close economic partner of Japan and expressed his expectations for continued stable supply of LNG and other energy and mineral resources to Japan. Prime Minister Gillard assured Prime Minister Kan that Australia would continue stable supply through commercial market mechanisms. Prime Minister Gillard also welcomed further investment by Japanese companies in LNG development in Australia, which would contribute to the stability of supply to Japan.

6. The two Prime Ministers also emphasized the importance of further promoting the development and use of clean energy and confirmed that the two countries would continue bilateral and multilateral cooperation in this area.

Disaster preparedness and response

7. The two Prime Ministers confirmed it was timely to further develop bilateral cooperation and to strengthen coordination in the civil and military areas on disaster preparedness and response. They also confirmed that Japan and Australia would continue to cooperate on disaster relief in international fora such as the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD), Security and Defence Cooperation Forum (SDCF), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the East Asia Summit (EAS), based on any bilateral framework on disaster relief and humanitarian assistance.

Security and defence

8. The two Prime Ministers renewed their recognition that Japan and Australia were natural security partners by virtue of their shared strategic interests and values. They asked Foreign and Defence Ministers to take forward in the context of the next 2+2 meeting a vision for bilateral security and defence cooperation building on the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation 2007 and other arrangements. They also expressed willingness to bring the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement into force as soon as possible and to conclude negotiations on an Information Security Agreement by the time of the next 2+2 meeting.

Trade policy

9. The two Prime Ministers recognised that trade and investment liberalisation would be vital to the continuing health of the global and regional economy and to economic growth in the two countries. Taking into account the current circumstances in Japan and their implications, they confirmed that the two countries would conduct further negotiations leading to a conclusion of a comprehensive and mutually beneficial bilateral FTA/EPA. They also called for a successful conclusion of the WTO Doha Round negotiations as promptly as possible in light of the declarations at the APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting and the G20 Summit last November.

Global issues

10. The two Prime Ministers confirmed that Japan and Australia should work together to achieve reform of the UN Security Council and other UN bodies to be more representative and effective,

including enlargement in both the permanent and non-permanent categories of the Council. They would also continue to work together bilaterally and in global and regional fora. They confirmed the need to consolidate the G20 as the premier forum for international economic cooperation and to deliver strong outcomes at the G20 Summit to underpin the global recovery and job creation, including on the framework for strong, sustainable and balanced growth and on price volatility. They welcomed the forthcoming participation of the United States and Russia in the EAS and looked forward to the first meeting of the expanded EAS in Indonesia later this year. They confirmed they would work with ASEAN and other EAS members to support the development of a political, security and economic agenda for the EAS, while promoting existing priorities including CEPEA. They also looked forward to taking concrete actions to realize APEC's goals of free and open trade and investment and the Yokohama Vision for sustained growth and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region particularly in the areas of regulatory cooperation, green growth and regional economic integration this year.

11. The two Prime Ministers also confirmed that they would continue to work together to combat climate change, to alleviate poverty to enhance human security and to advance nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

Subsection II-14

Joint Statement on Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation

23 November 2010

Joint Statement on Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation

November 23, 2010

1. Meeting today in Canberra, we, the Foreign Ministers of Australia and Japan, Kevin Rudd and Seiji Maehara, recognise the grave threat that nuclear weapons pose to humanity and renew our commitment to work together determinedly to realise a peaceful and safe world without nuclear weapons. In this effort, we are encouraged by the positive developments which have emerged since our two governments issued the Joint Statement, "Toward a World without Nuclear Weapons", in February this year.

2. Our two nations have a strong record of promoting global engagement in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Beginning in 2008, with the establishment of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament - which produced specific and timely recommendations for addressing many challenges on the path to a world without nuclear weapons - our two nations have forged a partnership dedicated to achieving a world without nuclear weapons. The two governments worked closely to promote global efforts for a successful outcome to the May 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation on Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Our initiatives included the submission to the Review Conference of a joint package of practical disarmament and non-proliferation measures, and leading an urgent call for unity among the Parties to the treaty.

3. To build on the worldwide momentum generated by the successful conclusion to the Review Conference, our two governments convened in September a meeting of foreign ministers from states similarly dedicated to finding concrete ways to advance nuclear disarmament and strengthen non-proliferation agenda. The key priority which emerged from the meeting, co-chaired by Australia and Japan, and attended by Canada, Chile, Germany, Mexico, the Netherlands, Poland, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates, was the need to promote steady implementation of the sixty-four Actions adopted by consensus at the Review Conference to advance nuclear disarmament and strengthen non-proliferation.

4. We hope that this group - diverse in membership but united in its determination to support and advance the objectives of the NPT - will find common ground and develop creative and practical proposals to overcome the blockages to progress on the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation

agenda. We firmly believe that all countries have a responsibility to co-operate in this endeavour.

5. In view of the above, our two governments will propose that the group's initial work should focus on confidence building measures such as promoting increased transparency in nuclear disarmament through, inter alia, the development of a standardised method for nuclear-weapon states to report progress towards disarmament commitments. This mechanism could cover elements such as numbers of nuclear warheads, deployed and non-deployed as well as strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons. The reporting mechanism could also contain information in a standard form on the role of nuclear weapons in national security policies.

6. We also stress the particular importance of a swift commencement of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons (known as a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty or FMCT); early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT); strengthened IAEA safeguards against proliferation by universal adoption of the IAEA Additional Protocol; support for nuclear weapon-free zones and strengthened co-operation among them; and promotion of strict compliance with all non-proliferation obligations by all states. We reaffirm our readiness, in collaboration with other supportive countries, including members of the group, to seek recourse to alternative arrangements to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) for multilateral negotiations on an FMCT if the deadlock in the CD on this issue is not broken within the next year. Consistent with this approach, our two governments will propose that the group could undertake an analysis for the development of a framework to surmount the technical challenges for a verifiable FMCT. This could include consideration of options for verifying prohibitions under an FMCT, as well as the policy issues surrounding stockpiles of fissile material already accumulated by those states possessing nuclear weapons.

7. Our two governments also pledge to cooperate to propose concrete and practical steps towards a world without nuclear weapons. These proposed steps could extend to deepening discussion about such ideas as making negative security assurances more effective and establishing conditions under which a universal policy that deterring nuclear attack is the "sole purpose" of nuclear weapons could safely be adopted.

8. We take this opportunity to express our grave concern over the nuclear activities by North Korea. We are exceedingly alarmed by the report of North Korea's construction of a light water reactor and of the existence of a uranium enrichment facility. We strongly urge North Korea to fulfil its commitments including the September 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks and its obligations stipulated in the relevant Security Council resolutions. We will further continue our policy coordination on this issue.

9. Finally, we once again reiterate our firm resolution to co-operate and collaborate in all our undertakings in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, making the most of the

growing momentum to encourage members of the international community to move towards a world without nuclear weapons.

Subsection II-15

3rd Australia-Japan "2+2" Consultations

19 May 2010

The Summary of the Third Japan-Australia
Joint Foreign and Defense Ministerial Consultation
May 19, 2010

[Attendants] On the Japanese side, Mr. Katsuya Okada, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Mr. Toshimi Kitazawa, Minister of Defense. On the Australian side, the Hon. Stephen Smith, MP, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Senator the Hon. John Faulkner, Minister for Defence

1. Overview
The Ministers confirmed that the roles Japan and Australia play for the peace and stability in the dynamically changing Asia-Pacific region is increasing, and agreed to further strengthen their coordination.

2. Japan-Australia Bilateral Security Cooperation, including the signing of the Japan-Australia ACSA
(1) Japan and Australia welcomed the signing of the Japan-Australia Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA), and expressed their expectation that the conclusion of this agreement will further promote cooperation between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan (JSDF) and the Australian Defence Force (ADF), participating in such activities as the UN Peacekeeping Operations and disaster-relief operations.

(2) The Japanese side stated it was preparing to dispatch military liaison officers to the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), and were seeking to support peace-building in Timor-Leste together with Australia, which is playing a central role in assistance to Timor-Leste, when the dispatch is realized. In response, the Australian side welcomed the dispatch by Japan and expressed its willingness to assist Japan in this regard.

(3) Both sides agreed to accelerate the ongoing negotiations of the Japan-Australia information-security agreement.

3. Japan-Australia-US Trilateral Cooperation
Both sides shared recognition that the US presence continues to be indispensable in the Asia-Pacific region, and agreed to deepen consultations and cooperation on the security strategy in the region through the Japan-Australia-US trilateral framework.

4. Korean Peninsula: the sinking of a South Korean patrol ship

Both sides discussed the incident of sinking of a South Korean military patrol vessel. They expressed their appreciation that South Korea was taking a calm stance on the incident, by responding to the incident based on a scientific and objective investigation conducted with participation by experts from other countries including Australia. Both sides agreed to support South Korea, following findings of the investigation to be soon released.

5. Nuclear-Disarmament and Non-Proliferation

Both sides confirmed the achievement of the bilateral cooperation toward a world without nuclear weapons, and agreed to cooperate further to take leadership in this field, taking into account outcomes of the NPT Review Conference.

6. Regional Architecture

The Australian side stated that it is important to build a regional architecture that would include major regional powers such as the US in the dynamically changing Asia-Pacific region from medium- and long-term perspectives. In response, the Japanese side stated that it was proposing the East-Asian Community as a long-term vision, while upholding the Japan-US alliance as a cornerstone. The Japanese side also stated that open and transparent regional cooperation is important, taking advantage of existing frameworks including EAS, ASEAN +3, ARF, and APEC, in a multifaceted and flexible manner.

7. Regional Issues

(1) Afghanistan/Pakistan

Both sides discussed their efforts for the stabilization of Afghanistan and Pakistan. In particular, they agreed that the reconciliation and reintegration of former Taliban soldiers is an important undertaking. In this regard, both sides appreciated their financial contribution to the Reintegration Trust Fund, and shared the recognition that such assistance in non-military areas continues to be important.

(2) Iran

Both sides confirmed that they shared concerns for Iran's nuclear issues and agreed to closely coordinate with countries concerned and the UN Security Council, taking into account recent developments concerning Iran

(3) Myanmar

Both sides agreed that it is important to continue to encourage Myanmar to realize a fair and democratic election that meets the expectations of the international community.

Subsection II-16

2nd Australia-Japan "2+2" Consultations

18 December 2008

Japan-Australia Joint Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations Joint Statement 2008

1. Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs Hirofumi Nakasone, Japanese Minister of Defense Yasukazu Hamada, Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs the Hon Stephen Smith MP and Australian Minister for Defence the Hon Joel Fitzgibbon MP, met in Tokyo on 18 December 2008 to discuss regional and global security issues and ways to enhance cooperation between Japan and Australia. The meeting, the second Japan-Australia Joint Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations, reaffirmed the commitment made by the Japanese and Australian Prime Ministers in their June 2008 joint statement on Japan and Australia's comprehensive strategic, security and economic partnership, to promote bilateral security cooperation between Japan and Australia, and to work together to contribute to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.

2. Ministers underlined the strength of the comprehensive strategic partnership between Japan and Australia - a partnership which is based on enduring friendship, shared democratic values and strategic interests, and common alliance ties with the United States. Ministers welcomed the continuing growth of Japan-Australia security cooperation under the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (JDSC) and the 2007 Action Plan to implement the JDSC, noting their contribution to international peace and stability.

3. Ministers committed to further bilateral cooperation, and trilateral cooperation with the United States. They welcomed practical cooperation under the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) and the Security and Defence Cooperation Forum (SDCF), reiterated the importance of continued US strategic engagement in the Asia-Pacific region, and underlined their commitment to working closely with the new US Administration.

4. Ministers emphasised the importance of close multilateral cooperation between Japan and Australia on regional and global issues. Such cooperation benefited Japan and Australia and promoted regional security and prosperity. Ministers committed to cooperating in support of the reform of the United Nations, including of the UN Security Council.

Strategic Issues

5. Ministers shared the view that a close strategic relationship between Japan and Australia is of growing importance to both countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Ministers noted the importance of

strong alliance ties with the United States and comprehensive involvement in multilateral institutions for the international policies of both countries.

6. Ministers underlined their shared commitment to supporting regional and global security, including in relation to the threat of terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. They reiterated their support for the Six-Party Talks' process toward the verifiable denuclearisation of North Korea, and called on North Korea to take positive steps toward improving Japan-North Korea relations including by addressing the issue of the abductions of Japanese citizens.

7. Ministers welcomed cooperation between the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) and Australian Defence Force (ADF) in Iraq and endorsed the continued growth in Japan's international security role. They emphasised the importance of sustained international efforts in anti-terrorist efforts, including Japan's replenishment support activities in the Indian Ocean and Australia's activities in the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.

8. Ministers welcomed Australia's and Japan's cooperation in APEC, the East Asia Summit, and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and confirmed the importance of continuing regional discussions on the future of the Asia Pacific region, referring to Australia's proposal for an Asia-Pacific Community. Ministers committed to strengthen cooperation, and work constructively with other regional countries, to promote regional stability and prosperity.

Security Cooperation

9. Ministers noted that there had been significant progress of security cooperation in the 2007 Action Plan, noting that Australia proposed an updated Action Plan to be discussed by both Governments at an early stage.

Defence Cooperation

10. Ministers welcomed the updating of the Memorandum on Defence Cooperation in the Defence Ministerial meeting, as a platform for greater practical bilateral cooperation in areas such as peacekeeping, counter-terrorism, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and enhanced defence exchanges. Ministers welcomed efforts to promote enhanced strategic dialogue between defence authorities, noting the importance of such discussion to policy development.

11. Ministers decided to accelerate studies on logistics cooperation between Japan and Australia through the Working Group established in accordance with the decision of Japan-Australia Defence Ministerial meeting in May 2008.

12. Ministers affirmed Japan and Australia's continuing commitment to enhanced defence cooperation, including unit-to-unit exchanges, ship and aircraft visits and exercises, as confirmed by the Prime Ministers of Japan and Australia in their joint statement of June 2008. Ministers welcomed

the success of recent exchanges, including the first Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) participation in Exercise KAKADU in July 2008; the visit to Australia in September 2008 of JMSDF P-3C for exercising; the first Japan Air Self-Defense Force U-4's visit to Australia; and Royal Australian Navy ship's and Royal Australian Air Force AP-3C's visits to Japan in October 2007.

13. Ministers welcomed enhanced trilateral security and defence cooperation under the SDCF, including the Pacific Global Air Mobility Seminar (PGAMS) held in Japan in February 2008; the first trilateral P-3C exercise, held in October 2007; and trilateral cooperation in ARF disaster relief exercises held in May 2008.

Information Sharing

14. Ministers emphasized that closer information sharing, backed by improved information security policies, would be a vital support for closer bilateral and trilateral security cooperation across all areas. They decided to commence discussions in early 2009 on a possible legal framework between the Governments of Australia and Japan on their cooperation to promote information sharing within the scope of their respective laws and regulations in force, and confirmed basic principles on information security as guidance for the discussions.

Cooperation on Other Security Issues

15. Ministers committed to enhancing their practical cooperation to promote stability, governance and sustained economic growth and development in Pacific Island Countries. Ministers welcomed Japan's commitment to enhanced cooperation in Solomon Islands. They confirmed that Australia will work with Japan to ensure a successful 5th Japan-Pacific Islands Leaders' Meeting in 2009. They called on the regime in Fiji to hold democratic elections as soon as possible, noting the importance of engagement with Fiji through dialogue.

16. Ministers underlined the need to enhance regional cooperation in the area of disaster management. In this context, Ministers welcomed the first meeting of TSD Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief officials, which adopted Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief guidelines for practical cooperation. Ministers also committed to further bilateral exchanges and cooperation on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief including in the ARF. Ministers welcomed the proposed establishment of the Australia-Indonesia Facility for Disaster Reduction.

17. Ministers confirmed the importance of information sharing relating to Australia and Japan's respective peacebuilding structures, such as Australia's Asia-Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence and Japan's Hiroshima Peacebuilders Center.

18. Ministers welcomed the progress on trilateral counter-terrorism cooperation, as well as cooperation through the G8 Counter-Terrorism Action Group.

19. Ministers emphasised the importance of open and secure sea lines of communication and shared the recognition on the importance of strengthening national and international efforts for maritime security.

20. Ministers welcomed the close bilateral cooperation in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation. In particular, Ministers welcomed Japan's and Australia's co-chairing of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament as an important practical contribution to the urgent universal goal of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, recognising the necessity to contribute to the success of 2010 NPT Review Conference, to present a practical and realistic roadmap toward a world free of nuclear weapons and to respond to the major renewal of interest in peaceful uses of nuclear energy in an appropriate manner consistent with nuclear non-proliferation.

Next Meeting

21. Ministers confirmed that Australia will host the next Japan-Australia Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations in 2009.

Subsection II-17

Leaders' Joint Statement

12 June 2008

Joint Statement by Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda of Japan and Prime Minister Kevin Rudd of Australia on "Comprehensive Strategic, Security and Economic Partnership"

1. On 12 June 2008, Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda of Japan and Prime Minister Kevin Rudd of Australia met in Tokyo to reaffirm the particular importance of the relationship between Japan and Australia, and confirmed their commitment to strengthen further the comprehensive strategic, security and economic partnership between Japan and Australia.

2. The two Prime Ministers shared the view that the relationship was based on a long history of cooperation, trade and investment links of enduring significance to both countries, a growing strategic relationship reflecting shared strategic interests and democratic values, and close people-to-people links. They expressed their determination to strengthen these important pillars of the relationship and explore new areas of cooperation.

3. In this context, the two Prime Ministers called on the next Japan-Australia Conference to present forward-looking recommendations for future Japan-Australia relations.

Security Cooperation

4. The two Prime Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to promote bilateral security cooperation through the implementation of the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation and its Action Plan, including updating the Memorandum on Defence Exchange and holding the Customs Cooperation Meeting. This also covers continuing enhancement of defence exchanges including unit-to-unit exchanges through aircraft visits such as P-3Cs and ship visits. The two Prime Ministers also reaffirmed their commitment to work together to contribute to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.

5. In this context, the two Prime Ministers welcomed steady implementation of the Action Plan, and reaffirmed the importance of reviewing the status of bilateral security cooperation and examining further ways to enhance cooperation with a view to reviewing the Action Plan.

6. The Japanese side welcomed Australia's proposal to host the next Japan-Australia Joint Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations ("two-plus-two") in Canberra in early November. The two

Prime Ministers confirmed their commitment to hold the talks this year and to coordinate further to realise the proposal.

7. Noting that Japan and Australia both maintained alliance relationships with the United States, the two Prime Ministers emphasised the strategic value of promoting bilateral security and defence cooperation between Japan and Australia.

8. Underlining the importance of continuing presence and engagement of the United States in the region, the two Prime Ministers shared the view that strengthened bilateral cooperation would contribute to the enhancement of trilateral cooperation among Japan, Australia and the United States, such as through security and defence cooperation in the trilateral senior officials' meeting.

9. The two Prime Ministers confirmed their commitment to enhance dialogue and cooperation on a trilateral basis with the United States. The two Prime Ministers shared the view that the third ministerial meeting of the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) to be held in late June would give greater momentum to furthering trilateral engagement in a practical manner including through disaster relief cooperation. In this context, the Japanese side welcomed Australia's offer to host a first meeting of TSD disaster relief experts.

10. The two Prime Ministers renewed their commitment to tackle the proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The two Prime Ministers welcomed the fifth anniversary of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and expressed their determination to continue cooperation in the effective implementation of the PSI and its outreach activities.

11. The two Prime Ministers stressed the need to enhance regional capacities to provide disaster relief, including through the APEC Task Force for Emergency Preparedness (TFEP), and welcomed the World Food Program's plan to establish a regional disaster simulation facility. In this context, the Australian side noted Japan's intention to consider creating a network among disaster relief organisations already existing in Asia which would complement the work of other regional mechanisms. The Japanese side took note of Australia's intention to conduct a feasibility study on improving regional disaster relief mechanisms and to consult Japan closely on this.

Economic Relations

12. Reaffirming the importance and the high degree of complementarity of the economic relationship, the two Prime Ministers expressed their determination to further strengthen the economic relationship between the two leading economies. The Australian side noted the significant role Japanese investment had played in the development of the Australian economy.

13. The two Prime Ministers shared the view that the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) / Free Trade Agreement (FTA) would provide a good opportunity to strengthen and deepen the economic relationship. The two Prime Ministers affirmed their commitment to working towards a

comprehensive and mutually beneficial agreement. The two Prime Ministers stressed the importance of a flexible and constructive approach in negotiations to achieve such outcomes, bearing in mind the sensitivities of both sides.

14. The two Prime Ministers reaffirmed the importance of stable supply of food and energy and mineral resources from Australia to Japan, noting that both countries benefit from such reliable supply. They confirmed their commitment to examine this issue in the context of the EPA/FTA.

15. Recognising that services trade was a relatively underdeveloped part of the bilateral trade relationship which needed to be enhanced, the two Prime Ministers shared the view that efforts to link the two services sectors should be strengthened.

16. The Australian side welcomed Japan's "Invitation Programme for Future Business Counterparts from Australia," under the Japan-East Asia Network of Exchange for Students and Youth (JENESYS) programme that aims to build stronger business links between the two countries.

17. The two Prime Ministers decided to encourage the financial regulatory authorities in both countries to broaden the scope of their cooperation, including a regular dialogue between them to share experiences in financial services, with regulatory authorities involving business and other sectors as and when necessary.

Climate Change

18. The two Prime Ministers affirmed their commitment to cooperate on climate change and reduce greenhouse gas emissions, acknowledging the close bilateral engagement occurring between the two countries through the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), particularly in the 'Umbrella Group', the Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP), APEC and the East Asia Summit.

19. The Japanese Prime Minister welcomed the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by Australia. The Australian Prime Minister welcomed the close co-operation with Japan in advancing the climate change agenda, stressing the importance of Japan's leadership as the G8 Chair of this year.

20. The two Prime Ministers expressed their resolve to work to establish, by the end of 2009, an effective international climate change framework in which all major economies participate in a responsible manner through the negotiations under the UNFCCC process.

21. The two Prime Ministers emphasised that while developed countries should continue to take the lead, all major economies should make meaningful contributions in accordance with their responsibilities and capabilities.

22. The two Prime Ministers underlined the need to reach a positive outcome at the G8 Hokkaido Toyako Summit in July to accelerate negotiations in the framework of the United Nations. The two Prime Ministers confirmed their commitment to working with others in the Major Economies process on a shared vision for a long term global emissions reduction goal and other important elements.

23. The Australian side highly appreciated the contribution of Japan's "Cool Earth Promotion Programme" as an important input to address the challenge of global climate change. The two Prime Ministers saw that the sectoral approach is useful for encouraging global sector specific actions. They also saw the bottom-up sectoral approach, which can complement economy-wide targets, as a useful tool for identifying technically possible mitigation potentials. The two Prime Ministers looked forward to continuing to work cooperatively on this and many other issues.

24. The two Prime Ministers reiterated their support for cooperative private-public sector work to share best practices and improve energy efficiency in the APP. They shared the view that such cooperation between developed and developing countries needs to be further enhanced.

25. The two Prime Ministers welcomed the launch of the Callide A project, the world's first demonstration of oxy-fuel combustion with CO2 storage and shared the view that the project would make a significant contribution to the development of technology that captures greenhouse gas emissions from coal-fired power stations. As a flagship APP project it is a good example of how Japanese and Australian industry and researchers are working together to develop practical solutions to address climate change.

26. The two Prime Ministers stressed the need to develop innovative technologies and to shift to a low carbon society in order to achieve long-term emissions reduction. The two Prime Ministers concurred on the importance of sharing technology roadmaps in partnership with the International Energy Agency (IEA), and of establishing a framework for international cooperation. They also expressed their support for the outcome of the G8 Environment Ministers Meeting regarding an international research network of institutions involved in research on low-carbon societies.

27. The two Prime Ministers recognised that Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) is critical. Therefore, the two Prime Ministers welcomed that relevant agencies of both sides would continue to cooperate in developing integrated forest and carbon monitoring systems towards a Global Carbon Monitoring System (GCMS) to underpin REDD policies. Cooperation will include a collaborative research alliance of Australia's CSIRO, the Cooperative Research Centre for Spatial Information, Japan's National Institute of Environmental Studies and Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency.

28. Noting that forests play a key role in conserving biodiversity and mitigating climate change, the two Prime Ministers decided to continue to work together to achieve sustainable forest management and combating illegal logging in the Asia-Pacific region.

29. The two Prime Ministers expressed their commitment to cooperate in assisting developing countries including Pacific Island countries in their effort toward adaptation to climate change. In this context, the two Prime Ministers expressed support for the co-benefits approach which addresses both development and climate change issues at the same time.

30. The two Prime Ministers welcomed progress towards the establishment of the new Climate Investment Funds at the World Bank.

Science and Technology

31. Recognising the two countries' strengths as world-class centres of research, the two Prime Ministers directed relevant ministries and agencies to take a fresh look at existing science and technology cooperation with a view to identifying new areas of mutual interests. They also encouraged closer collaboration between Japanese and Australian researchers, especially among young researchers. They welcomed the twentieth anniversary of Questacon.

32. The two Prime Ministers underlined the importance of generating the interest of the younger generation in science and technology and expressed their intent to build cooperation in this area including through student exchanges.

33. The Japanese side welcomed Australia's interest in participating in the Integrated Ocean Drilling Program (IODP).

34. The two Prime Ministers recognised the important role of continued cooperation in scientific research in the Antarctic to support the understanding of the global impacts of climate change and confirmed their commitment to further enhanced cooperation in this area.

Pacific Islands

35. The two Prime Ministers reaffirmed their commitment towards the Pacific Island countries in supporting their efforts to promote peace and prosperity. The Australian side welcomed Japan's intention to strengthen its efforts as "Peace Fostering Nation" in the region. The Japanese side welcomed the 6 March Port Moresby Declaration outlining Australia's approach to cooperation with the Pacific Island countries.

36. The two Prime Ministers expressed their intention to enhance dialogue and cooperation not only bilaterally but also with other major players in the region such as the United States and New Zealand. The two Prime Ministers affirmed that they would closely cooperate toward the Fifth Japan-Pacific Islands Forum Summit Meeting (PALM 5).

Energy and Mineral Resources Security

37. Recognising the strategic importance and highly complementary nature of the trade and investment relationship in energy and minerals resources such as iron ore, coal, liquefied natural gas (LNG) and uranium, the two Prime Ministers underlined the importance of stable and secure supply of energy and minerals resources. They noted the efforts of Australian Federal and State Governments to enhance infrastructure in support of energy and minerals exports.

38. The two Prime Ministers noted with great concern the escalation in oil prices. They also noted the importance of increased investment in energy and resources projects for sustaining global economic growth and combating high oil prices. They confirmed the need to address these issues in a cooperative manner in relevant international forums such as the IEA.

World Food Security

39. The two Prime Ministers stressed the importance of world food security. They noted with strong concerns the trend of high prices of food, particularly in light of its acute impact on developing countries' efforts to overcome poverty and to reach the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). They confirmed the need to tackle this issue in a cooperative manner in line with the outcomes of relevant international fora including the FAO High-Level Conference on World Food Security in Rome.

East Asia Summit (EAS)

40. In order to realise long-term stability and prosperity in East Asia, the two Prime Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to the development of the East Asia Summit (EAS) by promoting specific cooperation in such areas as energy security, finance, the environment, disaster management, climate change, education and youth exchange, based upon the principle of openness and universally shared values.

Regional Economic Integration

41. The two Prime Ministers also welcomed initiatives for regional economic integration including the Track Two study on the Comprehensive Economic Partnership in East Asia (CEPEA), the establishment of the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA), initiatives on regional financial cooperation and the APEC initiatives for strengthening regional economic integration including the examination of the options and prospects for a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) as a long-term prospect.

APEC

42. Noting that Japan and Australia had been formative in the development of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the two Prime Ministers affirmed their shared commitment to strengthening APEC as one of the primary regional institutions and noted the contribution APEC could make to regional economic integration.

Future of Asia Pacific Region

43. The two Prime Ministers underlined the importance of continuing regional discussions on the future of the Asia Pacific region to explore ways to better respond to common challenges in the region, referring to Prime Minister Fukuda's Initiative for the future of the Asia Pacific as well as Prime Minister Rudd's proposal to exchange views on a future vision of the region including regional architecture.

WTO

44. Recognising the benefits of cooperating on economic issues in multilateral fora, the two Prime Ministers affirmed their strong intent to seek a conclusion to the WTO negotiations within this year and stressed the importance of achieving an ambitious, balanced and comprehensive outcome. They stressed that a successful outcome would be vital to the global economy, the international trading system, and the needs of developing countries.

Intellectual Property Rights

45. Emphasising the importance of intellectual property rights in this knowledge-based world economy, the two Prime Ministers affirmed their cooperation in intellectual property related issues, including on international efforts to harmonise substantive patent law. Recognising the need to combat counterfeiting and piracy, the two Prime Ministers also confirmed their commitment to work together towards early conclusion of negotiations for an Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), with a view to establishing a new standard of intellectual property protection.

Disarmament and Non-Proliferation

46. The two Prime Ministers renewed their determination to strengthen the international disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation regime. The two Prime Ministers reaffirmed that they would continue to closely cooperate with each other with a view to achieving a successful outcome of the 2010 NPT Review Conference including through launching a bilateral initiative for high-level expert dialogue on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. In this context, the Japanese side welcomed the idea of establishing an international commission on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament proposed by Prime Minister Rudd on 9 June in Kyoto.

47. The two Prime Ministers stressed the importance of cooperating in the field of denuclearization of the Russian Federation, including the dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines in the Russian Far East.

Subsection II-18

1st Australia-Japan "2+2" Consultations

6 June 2007

Japan-Australia Joint Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations
Joint Statement 2007
June 6, 2007

1. Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs Taro Aso, Japanese Minister of Defence Fumio Kyuma, Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs Alexander Downer and Australian Minister for Defence Brendan Nelson met in Tokyo on 6 June 2007 to discuss global and regional security and the state of relations between Japan and Australia. The meeting constituted the inaugural Japan-Australia Joint Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations based on the Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation signed by Prime Ministers Abe and Howard in March 2007.

2. Ministers shared the view that the strategic partnership had grown significantly in recent years and the bilateral relationship had never been stronger. Ministers especially welcomed the historic Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (JDSC) which reflected a desire by both countries for even closer security cooperation, and to enhance their joint contribution to regional peace and security. Ministers welcomed the progress to date in developing a forward-looking action plan of specific measures to implement the JDSC. Ministers recognised that strengthening bilateral cooperation on security combined with our dynamic economic relationship in this 50th anniversary year of the Commerce Agreement raised our comprehensive strategic partnership to new levels.

3. Both countries recognised each other as its indispensable partner in the region. Ministers noted that the bilateral relationship was underpinned by shared democratic values, common interests in peace and stability in the region, and respective alliance relationships with the United States. Ministers committed to deepening their trilateral engagement with the United States under the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD), as well as in the area of practical defence and security cooperation, and reaffirmed the importance of the continuing presence and engagement of the United States in the region. Japan and Australia will coordinate with the United States to hold the third round of the Ministerial Meeting of the TSD on the occasion of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Ministerial Meeting in August.

Work on Common Strategic Issues

4. Ministers discussed the security environment within the region and beyond and recognised that there are tasks ahead that require joint contribution by Japan and Australia. Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to continue working together on a wide range of global security issues to meet

common challenges including cooperation in Iraq, in Afghanistan, in response to the North Korean nuclear and missile threats, and in helping secure long-term sustainable development in East Timor and the Pacific Island countries.

5. In particular, Ministers deplored the destabilising actions of North Korea and expressed deep concerns over North Korea's nuclear and missile development programs. They reaffirmed their commitment to cooperate on measures to fully implement the Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks and the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1695 and 1718. Ministers also reaffirmed the importance of cooperation on humanitarian issues including the expeditious resolution of the abduction issue.

Advancing Practical Cooperation

6. Ministers committed, in jointly working on security issues within the region and beyond, to advancing practical cooperation between Japan and Australia. In this context, Ministers decided to promote measures to facilitate the exchange of information of strategic importance. Welcoming the progress of the work to date, Ministers decided to accelerate the process of developing a forward-looking action plan to implement the JDSC, including the aspects of joint training and exercises.

Defence Cooperation

7. Ministers welcomed the transition of the Japan Defense Agency to the Ministry of Defense and the stipulation of International Peace Cooperation as a primary mission of the Japan Self-Defense Forces.

8. Ministers noted that since both countries' participation in UN Peace Keeping Operations in Cambodia in 1992, Japan and Australia have deepened cooperation in various activities including UN Peace Keeping Operations in East Timor, Iraqi Reconstruction activities and International Disaster Relief activities for the earthquake and the subsequent tsunami disaster in the Indian Ocean.

9. Ministers also committed to the expansion of bilateral defence cooperation including through unit-to-unit exchanges through aircraft visits, including P-3C and U-4, and ships, as well as enhancement of defence personnel exchanges. Japan welcomed Australia's invitation to observe the forthcoming Australia -United States Talisman Sabre exercise in June.

10. Ministers emphasised the contribution that bilateral defence cooperation could make to the development of trilateral cooperation between Japan, Australia and the United States, as reaffirmed in the first trilateral defence ministerial meeting on 2 June, and to broader multilateral exchanges and activities. They noted with satisfaction the successful Trilateral Pacific Global Air Mobility Seminar at Yokota Air Base in May. They looked forward to close cooperation between Japanese and Australian defence and other authorities in the Desktop Exercise on Disaster Relief planned for 2008 under ARF auspices.

11. Ministers further welcomed the decision in the Defence Ministerial meeting on 5 June to commence updating the Memorandum on Defence Exchange, signed in 2003, as the JDSC action plan in the field of defence. The work on updating the memorandum will promote opportunities for expanding bilateral defence cooperation across a range of defence activities.

Cooperation on Disaster Relief

12. Japan and Australia decided to conduct joint training and exchanges in the field of humanitarian assistance between the two countries. In order to enhance the relief capability of both countries, an Australian Urban Search and Rescue team will participate in the Japan Disaster Relief Search and Rescue Joint Training in Japan this autumn. Ministers also decided to consider enhancing regional capacity in search and rescue.

Cooperation in Peacekeeping and Peace Building

13. Ministers decided to explore opportunities to develop and enhance regional capacity in peace keeping and peace building including through joint capacity building activities for third country nationals, and through promoting exchange of personnel in the region.

Cooperation in Countering Terrorism and Proliferation

14. Ministers renewed their commitment to wide-ranging cooperation to counter the threat posed by international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means. Welcoming the successful Trilateral Counter-Terrorism Consultations on 5 and 6 June in Sydney, and on-going cooperation in the context of global non-proliferation efforts such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), Ministers decided to enhance cooperation and information exchange, both in the bilateral and trilateral context.

15. Ministers noted the threat posed to international civil aviation by man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) in the hands of terrorists and other non-state groups. They stressed the importance of intensifying their efforts in the region to counter the illicit proliferation of MANPADS.

Cooperation on Stability of Pacific Island Countries

16. Consistent with their shared commitment to the security and prosperity of the Pacific region, Japan and Australia decided to commence an annual dialogue of their senior officials on the approach to that region, including in relation to development assistance.

Next Meeting

17. Australia will host the next Japan-Australia Joint Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations in 2008.

Subsection II-19

Foreign Ministers' Joint Statement

18 March 2006

JOINT STATEMENT: Building a Comprehensive Strategic Relationship

March 18, 2006

The Foreign Ministers of Australia and Japan, Mr Alexander Downer and Mr Taro Aso, today declared the partnership between Australia and Japan was stronger than ever. It was based on shared democratic values, mutual respect, deep friendship, and shared strategic views. The two Foreign Ministers in particular celebrated the profound contribution each country had made to the other's economic development. They commemorated the 30th Anniversary in 2006 of the Basic Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Australia and Japan by affirming their commitment to the highest level of ambition in the future development of the relationship.

The two Foreign Ministers noted that Australia and Japan had developed a comprehensive strategic relationship of great significance for both countries. They decided this partnership should be developed further. Australia and Japan have a proud record of achievement in working together to improve regional and international security in areas including in East Timor, Afghanistan, and Iraq and on such issues as non-proliferation, the fight against terrorism, natural disasters such as the 2004 tsunami and the threat of Avian Influenza. Australia and Japan have also been actively engaged in assisting their friends in the Pacific and both countries decided to continue their cooperation in promoting good governance and achieving a more prosperous and safer Pacific, including through consultation at PALM (Pacific Islands Leaders' Meeting). The Foreign Ministers noted in particular the historic joint contribution Australia and Japan were making to the development of a free and democratic Iraq, including through the highly professional manner in which their respective forces were cooperating in Al Muthanna.

The two Foreign Ministers resolved to work together to strengthen the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). They also welcomed the establishment of the East Asia Summit (EAS) and reaffirmed their commitment to cooperate with others with a view to building an East Asian community in the future based on open regionalism. They emphasised the pre-eminent role of these fora in building effective cooperation within the Asia-Pacific region.

The two Foreign Ministers welcomed the commencement of ministerial-level Trilateral Strategic Dialogue between Australia, Japan, and the United States and emphasised the vital contribution all three countries made to maintaining stability and security in East Asia. In that context, they decided

to increase further their collaboration in relation to counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation. They decided that Australia and Japan would strengthen their bilateral strategic dialogue and identify new areas to broaden the existing partnership on security matters. As an immediate step, they expressed their intention to hold, on an annual basis, a meeting of Foreign Ministers, a policy dialogue at Secretary/Vice-Minister level as well as a strategic dialogue at senior officials level, with a view to taking the strategic relationship forward.

The two Foreign Ministers confirmed the need to continue efforts to reform the United Nations including the membership and operation of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The Ministers also decided Australia and Japan would work together with a view to achieving UNSC reform during this session of the General Assembly. Mr Downer reiterated Australia's support for Japan's permanent membership of the UNSC, commensurate with its standing and contribution to world affairs.

Both Ministers confirmed that it was important to develop and deepen the bilateral economic partnership between Australia and Japan as part of the strategic relationship, in particular through the ongoing Joint Study for Enhancing Economic Relations between Japan and Australia, including the Feasibility or Pros and Cons of a Free Trade Agreement They welcomed that 2007 would mark the 50th anniversary of the signing of the landmark Australia-Japan Agreement on Commerce which had laid the foundation for the trading relationship. They shared the view that it would be important to ensure that this anniversary was marked in a way which set the scene for the next 50 years in the relationship. They also noted the importance of and benefit for both countries from the long-standing reliable supply of resources and agricultural produce from Australia to Japan.

Both countries recognise the value of achieving ambitious and balanced outcomes in the WTO Doha Development Agenda (DDA) Round of multilateral trade negotiations and the clear benefit this would have for global development.

The quality of the overarching partnership between Australia and Japan rests on the underlying network of people-to-people relationships. This will be honoured and further extended in the 2006 Year of Exchange. The two Foreign Ministers noted that the "Visit Japan Campaign" and the Australian "Vision One Million" project will also contribute to enhancing people-to-people exchange. The two Foreign Ministers also appreciated the contribution of the Australia-Japan Conference (AJC) process, attended by public and private sector representatives, which had contributed to the development of various policy initiatives.

Subsection II-20

Leaders' Joint Press Conference

29 April 1997

Joint Press Conference by Prime Minister Hashimoto and Prime Minister Howard on the Japan-Australia Summit Meeting

April 29, 1997
Canberra, Australia
(Provisional Translation)

1. Opening Statement by Prime Minister John Howard of the Commonwealth of Australia

Prime Minister John Howard: Prime Minister, ladies and gentlemen. The Prime Minister of Japan, Mr. Ryutaro Hashimoto, and myself have over the last few hours conducted very warm and friendly and useful discussions, and they will continue informally over lunch. Could I say, on a personal note, how delighted I am to have Mr. Hashimoto and his wife as guests here in Australia. The very deep association between Australia and Japan has been reinforced by the ease of the personal and professional relationship that I have developed with the Prime Minister of Japan, both during my visit to Japan last year, our meeting at the APEC Summit in Manila, and again over the last day or so. Personally, I welcome you very warmly to Australia, and I hope that you and your wife can come again, as very welcome and very honored guests, to our country.

I accept very readily the suggestion of the Prime Minister that the prime ministers of Australia and Japan should meet on an annual basis. It is the hope of my wife and I that we can visit Japan next year, and I thank the Prime Minister very warmly for that invitation.

I agree with the Prime Minister's suggestion that the next joint Ministerial Council meeting should be in Tokyo on 1 August. It should also be noticed that the Australian Defense Minister, Mr. Ian McLachlan, will visit Japan shortly. Increasingly, both the Japanese Prime Minister and I see the defense relationship as becoming part of the bilateral association.

We spent some time talking about domestic economic reforms. I also expressed my gratitude of the Australian Government for the Prime Minister's positive response that Japan took to my representations last year regarding the timing of rice tenders. An extra tendering process for 7,000 tons of rice allows Australia to offer new-season rice. It is a good step forward, and we hope it is the harbinger of further progress on that front. On the question of access, we look forward hopefully to a satisfactory conclusion of our desire for access for Australian Fuji apples. The Prime Minister

informs me that there is one further public hearing in Japan, to take place on 2 May, and if that is a satisfactory process, then access can be secured.

I thank the Prime Minister very warmly for the support that Japan has privately and publicly given to Australia's aspiration to be included in the ASEM group of countries. Japan's support on this front has been open and consistent, and it is deeply appreciated by the Australian Government. Both of us agree that the APEC association should remain the primary, dominant expression of our shared destiny as partners in the Asia Pacific region, and that although other associations and contacts could be valuable and are understandable, the over-arching importance of APEC remains. The particular value of that institution is provided in bringing together the leaders of such large and powerful nations as the United States, Japan and China, as was particularly noted.

And finally, I emphasized to the Prime Minister the deep concern Australia has about the impact, both on Australia and Japan, of the likely agreement between the United States and the European Union regarding emission targets. This is a situation where, atypically, Australia, as a developed exporter of energy, is particularly vulnerable. If a consensus emerges around targets, which would be quite unacceptable to Australia, we believe that those targets could also have damaging impacts on Japan. We seek, as we believe the Japanese Government seeks, a fair and feasible outcome, but what is likely to be the American and European position at present certainly does not represent that, and would be particularly damaging to Australia's national interests. Our position is very clear and strong on that. I welcomed the opportunity of raising those concerns with Mr. Hashimoto, and it is something over which the Australian and Japanese governments will retain a close dialogue between now and the Summit meeting to take place in Japan in December.

2. Opening Statement by Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto of Japan

Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto: Thank you very much. I must say that I am very gratified by the very warm welcome extended me since my arrival yesterday by Prime Minister Howard, the Government of Australia, and many people here.

I have come to Australia to strengthen the political relationship between Japan and Australia, taking into full consideration Japan's Asia Pacific policy. Today, I exchanged views with Prime Minister Howard on bilateral relations between the two countries, issues related to the Asia Pacific region, and other international issues, and I also described for him the results of my visit to the United States, and also outlined the reforms that my Cabinet is currently undertaking. I also expressed to Prime Minister Howard my wish to invite him, this time together with Mrs. Howard, to Japan as soon as an appropriate opportunity arises.

Furthermore, as Prime Minister Howard already stated in his opening remarks, I also had the consent of Prime Minister Howard on my proposal to have a once-a-year meeting of the prime ministers as a guiding principle, and also to hold the Japan-Australia Ministerial Committee meeting

on 1 August this year. I also have a matter to report to you -- that is, during today's meeting, I also received the full-fledged support by Prime Minister Howard for the Aichi Expo, which indeed is going to be a great souvenir for me, and so I would like to take this opportunity to express my heartfelt gratitude.

Concerning the security issues facing the Asia Pacific region, we shared the recognition that the presence of the United States in this region is the most important factor for stability in the region. We reaffirmed the importance of support from both Japan and Australia for the continued presence of the United States in this region, and we shared the view that Japan and Australia should further promote cooperation on regional security through senior-level politico-military consultations. I might also add that we are very pleased to hear that the Defense Minister of Australia will be visiting Japan soon.

Concerning Australia's participation in ASEM, certainly it goes without saying that I expressed Japan's continuous support for the new membership of Australia. When I say this, certainly it is with the assumption, of course, that Australia will participate as an Asian member.

I also explained that Japan highly appreciates Australia's contribution to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). In order to maintain the prosperity of the Asia Pacific region, Prime Minister Howard and I recognized the importance of maintaining and strengthening the free trading system and achieving the liberalization and facilitation of trade and investment. We agreed to further promote cooperation between Japan and Australia in APEC and the WTO. Furthermore, we reaffirmed our efforts to realize the accession of China to the WTO and to further incorporate China into the world community as a constructive member of it.

As a concrete result of such cooperation between Japan and Australia, we agreed to formulate a Japan-Australia Partnership Agenda for the occasion of the 14th Japan- Australia Ministerial Committee meeting, to be held on 1 August. Today we also confirmed our cooperation in 18 areas, including education, culture, the environment and many other fields, as well as in the political and economic spheres. These 18 areas cover seven areas in terms of bilateral cooperation and 11 areas in terms of cooperation on interregional and global issues. I am convinced that by promoting such cooperation in these areas, we will surely be able to achieve a far deeper friendship between our countries than today.

3. Questions and Answers

Q: This is a question to Prime Minister Hashimoto. What is your belief in terms of the meeting in Kyoto at the end of the year? Do you believe that Europe and America will push for trade sanctions if mandatory targets are not agreed to in a voluntary way?

Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto: I have no intention of making the Kyoto conference a forum for confrontation. The current issue with regard to the Framework Convention on Climate Change is what to do about the substances of the protocol to be adopted at the third conference, the so- called COP III (Third Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change) in Kyoto. We believe that at least with regard to the targets for control and reduction of greenhouse gases, that these targets must be effective in terms of preventing global warming, and that also, obligations to be imposed be fair and feasible. In this respect, I can understand the position of Australia, which seeks a negotiated differentiation of targets. In order to achieve these targets, we, our two countries included as well as many other countries, will have to work very hard and actively on various measures. Especially as the chair of the conference, I believe it our responsibility to make sure that the conference will not turn into the sort of situation that you mentioned just now by collaborating with the countries concerned.

Q: Because of the planned reduction of tariffs on automobile imports into Australia, Japanese manufacturers who produce in Australia say that they will be hard-hit. I wonder what views you have, Prime Minister Hashimoto, on this.

Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto: As I was reading press reports this morning, I noticed a press report that said that I would be raising this issue with Prime Minister Howard, so I complied with the expectations of the press and raised it. What I told Prime Minister Howard is the following: essentially, this matter is a domestic affair of Australia. Trade liberalization is a matter of common objective for all our countries under the WTO and APEC, and something that we all must pursue actively. Japan's auto investment into Australia has been creating a lot of jobs, and also has served as the linchpin of ties between Japan and Australia. So what I told Prime Minister Howard, in conclusion, on this matter was, "John, I trust you, and I am sure that you will take into consideration these aspects as well and arrive at a balanced conclusion." Because I do believe that Prime Minister Howard is a very trustworthy person.

Q: A question on security. There has been some suggestion by security analysts in Australia that we should try to upgrade the security relationship, perhaps along the lines of having the foreign ministers and defense ministers of both countries meet annually, as you do with the United States. Do both prime ministers see some merit in going down that route at some point in the future?

Prime Minister John Howard: For my part, I see merit in allowing the relationship in that area to evolve. I don't think we should dramatically accelerate it, nor, however, should we have any kind of blind spot about it either. What we are doing is Ian McLachlan is going to Japan. As I said in my opening remarks, increasingly I would see the defense dialogue becoming part of the bilateral association. I think it is something that should be allowed to move forward, but not dramatically accelerated, and I think that is something both countries would feel very right about and very comfortable about.

Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto: We mutually have expressed our appreciation for the Japan-U.S. Joint Security Declaration of April 1996 and the Australia-United States Joint Declaration of July 1996 as major steps towards ensuring regional security. Our two countries have been conducting politico-military consultations since February 1996, and soon the Defense Minister of Australia will be visiting Japan. As Prime Minister Howard said, I also believe that we should try and build on these steps we have been implementing, and rather than run ahead with a new enterprise or new exercise, I should rather like to make efforts to build up a firm relationship of trust by proceeding step by step.

Q: I would like to first ask a question of the two prime ministers with regard to defense cooperation between the two countries. What are the specific themes or subjects that you would be taking up? In connection with that, I would like to first ask a question of Prime Minister Hashimoto. There is an agreement in the Australia-U.S. Declaration that opportunities for training for the U.S. Marine Corps will be expanded. I wonder if this would lead to a reduced burden on Okinawa in terms of Marine training there.

Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto: Let me say that in the Australia-United States Joint Declaration, I am also aware that Australia may offer additional locations for the United States to conduct exercises. My understanding is that this offer will not lead to any reduced United States presence in other areas of the Asia Pacific. Japan and Australia certainly have been and should continue to promote confidence-building measures through, for one, the ASEAN Regional Forum and also through other regional dialogues in order to further improve the security environment in the Asia Pacific region. We, the two countries, do share the same approach vis- -vis regional security, and our two countries, sharing that common position, only naturally should build up further cooperation in such areas. As a matter of reality, there may be some aspects of training or themes of training for which Australia can provide a better environment, and other themes or aspects where Japan is the most suitable environment. So in accordance with such practicalities, training may shift from place to place, but that does not mean in any way that Japan's sharing of the burden will be reduced.

Prime Minister John Howard: For my part, I adopt the words that Mr. Hashimoto used in relation to the defense dialogue, that it would be wise at this stage to proceed step by step, and there is little point in beginning any kind of particular speculation about what form the association would take. Can I also say that my views regarding any potential link between Okinawa and the training arrangements provided for in the American-Australian Joint Declaration is precisely the same as that of Mr. Hashimoto? Thank you.

Subsection II-21

Leaders' Joint Statement

26 May 1995

Joint Declaration on the Australia-Japan Partnership

May 26, 1995

The Prime Ministers of Australia and Japan declare:

1. Fifty years on from the end of the War, Australia and Japan have a relationship of unprecedented quality. The Governments of Australia and Japan reaffirm the importance they place on the close relationship of goodwill and cooperation that they have built up over the post-war years. They pledge to build on that foundation an enduring and steadfast partnership.

2. The Governments of both Australia and Japan, and the private sectors of both countries, have worked closely in developing the relationship. The exchange of prime ministerial visits in 1957, the signing of the bilateral Commerce Agreement in the same year and the Basic Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1976 were milestones in establishing the foundations of the existing partnership. Active dialogue, including heads-of-government-level visits and meetings of the Australia-Japan Ministerial Committee have been important in giving vitality and direction to the relationship.

3. Australia and Japan recognise the great contribution that each country has made to the other's post-war economic development. Australia has made a crucial contribution to Japan's economy as a leading supplier of industrial raw materials and energy. It now also provides a growing range of advanced goods and services. For many years, Japan has been Australia's leading trading partner and a major source of investment and technology. It has made a vital contribution to Australia's national development and economic well-being. Cooperation between Australian and Japanese companies in third countries is also expanding.

4. The Governments of Australia and Japan will work to further strengthen their bilateral economic relationship as the structures of their economies change including in response to regional economic developments and globalisation. They value existing complementarities in their trade patterns and place importance on encouraging two-way investment between the two countries so as to promote continuing diversification of their economic relationship.

5. The two Governments will nurture the spirit of friendship that characterises their relationship. People-to-people links, fostered over decades through business, education, tourism and cultural contacts have made a profound contribution to the relationship. Both countries will strive to bring

their peoples even closer together, particularly through educational and cultural exchanges for young Australians and Japanese.

6. As partners in the Asia Pacific, the two Governments are determined to work with other countries in the region in promoting prosperity, reducing tension and enhancing political cooperation. Individually and in partnership, they will play an important part in achieving these objectives. The Government of Japan welcomes Australia's decision to create its future in the region and reaffirms that Australia is an indispensable partner in regional affairs.

7. Australia and Japan are proud of their roles in the development of a sense of community in the Asia Pacific region. The two Governments pledge their commitment to APEC as the primary vehicle of regional economic cooperation. Both Governments are committed to cooperating closely to ensure the success of the Osaka meeting and to realising the objectives of the Bogor Declaration as enunciated at the APEC Leaders' Meeting last year. Australia and Japan share a vital interest in the maintenance and strengthening of the open multilateral trading system and in the effective operation of the WTO.

8. The Governments of Australia and Japan reaffirm their strong support for the United States' presence and strategic engagement in the Asia Pacific as being of fundamental importance to the peace and prosperity of the region. The Governments of Australia and Japan will cooperate in developing the ASEAN Regional Forum and will further strengthen their own security dialogue.

9. The Governments of Australia and Japan will continue to contribute actively, both individually and in partnership, in such areas as the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the activities of the United Nations in international peace and security including its peacekeeping role, social and economic development and human rights. Australia supports Japan's adopting an international role commensurate with its weight in world affairs, including as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council.

10. The Prime Ministers of Australia and Japan pledge the full support of their Governments to the purpose of the declaration--to build an enduring and steadfast partnership which is a strong positive force for cooperation in the Asia Pacific region.

SECTION III

Trilateral Cooperation

USS John S. McCain, JS Kirisame (DD 104), and HMAS Arunta (FFH 151) exercise together in the East China Sea, October 2020 (photo credit: U.S. Navy 7th Fleet)

Trilateral Cooperation

It can be incredibly difficult to build a bilateral security relationship from scratch. Development of unilateral policies, finding opportunities for routine cooperation, negotiating policies and instruments—those things all take time and are often fraught with political contention, especially if the relationship involves a former adversary. What can help in these situations is the presence of a shared ally who has worked through some of the critical issues related to security partnership and can offer the stepping-stones towards deepening ties. Such was the role of the United States in supporting the Australia-Japan security relationship.

The original design for the U.S. alliance network in the Indo-Pacific was that of the "hub-and-spoke." That is, the United States would serve as the hub, and each of the bilateral alliances with countries like Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea would create the spokes. But the U.S. government realized it was necessary to "place the wheel" around the spokes by connecting those bilateral relationships into a tri- and multi-lateral networks. The most viable option was Australia and Japan.

There were several factors which contributed to the U.S. decision to catalyze trilateral cooperation with Australia and Japan. By the early 2000s, the countries had become two of America's staunchest allies, something made particularly evident following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York. Both ended up deploying troops in support of U.S.-led operations in Southwest Asia. Incidentally, it was in Samawah, Iraq that Australian troops provided security for Japan Self Defense Force engineers, an important development in the mutual trust and experience between the ADF and JSDF. Shared interests related to North Korea's illicit nuclear program and a desire to preserve the rules-based international order all fueled shared interests in trilateral cooperation.

The advantage of trilateral cooperation is that it has been able to fill the gaps in the bilateral relationship, when needed. For example, instead of scheduling discreet bilateral exercises, Australia can send a contingent to a U.S.-Japan exercise, or a Japanese contingent can join a U.S.-Australia training event. There are also options for leveraging existing information sharing mechanisms and building upon other bilateral frameworks for cooperation.

Through the years, trilateral joint statements have shaped and guided Australia-Japan-U.S. security ties. Like bilateral joint statements, these statements may be produced at different levels, but the Defense Ministers' joint statements are the most common given the emphasis on trilateral security cooperation.

This section proceeds in reverse chronological order. This allows for ease of reference by having the most timely and relevant statements up front. The evolution of the trilateral relationship is illustrated through the progression towards the end of the section.

Subsection III-1

Trilateral Defense Ministers' Joint Statement

16 November 2024

Australia-Japan-United States Trilateral Defense Ministers' Meeting November 2024 Joint Statement
Nov. 16, 2024

Australian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence Richard Marles, Japanese Minister of Defense Nakatani Gen, and United States Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin III convened the fourteenth Trilateral Defense Ministers' Meeting (TDMM) on 17 November 2024 in Darwin, Australia.

Through this fourteenth meeting, we affirm the longevity and enduring commitment of our partnership. Grounded in shared values, deep trust, and our unbreakable commitment to strengthening collective deterrence, our cooperation continues to evolve. We acknowledge significant progress made to implement activities and practical areas of cooperation set forth in our 2023 and May 2024 Joint Statements.

We are united in our steadfast commitment to a peaceful, stable, and prosperous Indo-Pacific region, where the rule of law is upheld, sovereignty is respected, and nations can make decisions free from coercion or threats of force.

We reaffirm our consistent and unwavering support for ASEAN centrality and unity, ASEAN-led regional architecture, and look forward to a successful ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) in Lao PDR this week. We reinforce our commitment to work with partners, including Canada, France, Germany, India, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, and the United Kingdom to increase engagement with Southeast Asian partners and support the region's security priorities.

We recognize the criticality of backing Pacific-led responses to Pacific-security challenges, consistent with the Pacific Island Forum's 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent. We commit to coordinate our defense engagement with Pacific counterparts, including capacity-building, Women, Peace and Security activities, and working through and with Pacific-led architecture such as the Joint Heads of Pacific Security and the South Pacific Defense Ministers' Meeting, of which Australia is a member and Japan and the United States are observers.

We reiterate our serious concern about destabilizing actions in the East and South China Seas, including dangerous conduct by the People's Republic of China (PRC) against Philippines and other coastal state vessels. We reiterate our strong opposition to any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion. It is important that all states are free to exercise rights and freedoms consistent with international law, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, including freedom of navigation and overflight and other lawful uses of the sea. We reaffirm the need for all states to pursue the peaceful resolution of disputes in accordance with international law and that the 2016 South China Sea Arbitral Award is final and legally binding upon the parties to those proceedings.

We emphasize the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and call for the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues.

We strongly condemn North Korea's destabilizing activities, including its series of reckless launches using ballistic missile technology, and its intercontinental ballistic missile test on 31 October 2024. These are serious violations of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions and pose a grave threat to international peace and stability. We reaffirm our continuing commitment to the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, consistent with UNSC resolutions. We express serious concern for Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic security following reports of the transfer of ballistic missiles and other materiel to Russia from third countries to sustain its aggression against Ukraine, and the deployment of North Korean troops to Russia. We urge Russia to immediately, completely, and unconditionally withdraw all of its military forces from the internationally recognized territory of Ukraine. We concur in the importance of continuing to remind third countries, including the PRC, of their duty to uphold international law and in no way to validate, support, or condone Russia's attempts to acquire territory by force, in violation of the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. These developments have destabilising consequences for the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic regions.

To support regional stability and collective deterrence, we commit to enhancing our defense cooperation under the following four pillars:

Expanding trilateral operational cooperation

- Recognizing the critical role the trilateral partnership plays to uphold regional stability, we commit to trilateral policy coordination and to consult each other on regional security issues and contingencies. We announce the establishment of the "Trilateral Defense Consultations" to support alignment of policy and operational objectives of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF), the Australian Defense Force (ADF), and the United States forces from peacetime to contingency.

- We welcome Japan's increased participation in Australia-United States force posture cooperation activities by increasing trilateral interoperability with the ADF and United States through:
    - Annual trilateral amphibious training among the ADF, the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force's Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade, and United States Marine Rotational Force – Darwin in northern Australia and the Indo-Pacific region from 2025, beginning with TALISMAN SABRE 2025.
    - Increasing Japan's contribution to Exercise SOUTHERN JACKAROO and Exercise TALISMAN SABRE in Australia, including more complex scenarios in order to increase trilateral interoperability from 2025.

- We reaffirm our commitment to trilateralize key Japan-United States exercises in Japan such as Australia's inaugural participation in Exercise ORIENT SHIELD from 2025, and enhance the ADF's participation in exercises such as Exercise YAMA SAKURA, KEEN EDGE, and KEEN SWORD.

- We continue to grow trilateral intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region as a priority, including Australian personnel's participation in the Japan-United States Bilateral Information Analysis Cell (BIAC). We work towards further commitment of Australian intelligence and capabilities for the BIAC.

- We intend to enhance trilateral air interoperability enabled by the Australia-Japan-United States Memorandum of Intent signed at Exercise PITCH BLACK 2024. We continue to explore future opportunities to increase trilateral cooperative activities, including reciprocal deployments of air assets such as fighter and transport aircraft, to all three countries from 2025, through Exercise COPE NORTH, Exercise BUSHIDO GUARDIAN, and Exercise PITCH BLACK.

Building advanced capabilities together

- We acknowledge progress and expanded cooperation under the trilateral Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) Projects Arrangement, particularly collaboration on composite aerospace materials and autonomous systems.

- We commend steady progress of discussion in the area of collaborative combat aircraft and autonomy and commit to find cooperative opportunities in this area.

- Our countries intend to continue to work together to strengthen regional deterrence, including through cooperating on a networked air and missile defense architecture to counter the growing range of threats throughout the Indo-Pacific. We continue to make progress on our regional architecture through deepened information sharing to improve

each country's ability to respond to threats. We continue to cooperate through various activities including trilateral training, exercises, and exchanges. The inaugural trilateral regional air and missile defense live-fire event at Exercise TALISMAN SABRE 2027 will be a key milestone.

- We welcome progress on Japan's consultation with AUKUS partners under AUKUS Pillar II, with the initial focus to improve interoperability with Japan's maritime autonomous systems.

- AUKUS partners welcome Japan's October 2024 participation as an observer in Exercise AUTONOMOUS WARRIOR under the AUKUS Pillar II Maritime Big Play series, an important step in our practical collaboration. AUKUS partners look forward to continued consultations with Japan to determine projects for future cooperation under AUKUS Pillar II.

- In order to promote trilateral defense industrial cooperation, we concur in further collaboration, including within the Partnership for Indo-Pacific Industrial Resilience (PIPIR), a multilateral forum of allies and partners aimed at strengthening defense industrial resilience in the Indo-Pacific region, and welcome increased opportunities for interaction between Australian, Japanese, and United States defense industries such as holding the Australia-Japan-U.S. Unmanned Aerial Systems Defense Symposium in Tokyo this October.

Planning together

- We welcome bilateral initiatives that will improve trilateral operational coordination, planning and information sharing between respective command centres, such as
    - Commencement of the first Japanese Joint Staff Liaison Officer in Australia's Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQJOC) in November this year, while acknowledging the commitment to send an ADF liaison officer to JSDF Joint Operations Command (JJOC) once established in 2025.
    - The United States-Japan Security Consultative Committee ('2+2') announcement to reconstitute U.S. Forces Japan as a Joint Force Headquarters, which will serve as an important JJOC counterpart.

Demonstrating our presence in the region

- We welcome greater defense cooperation between Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and the United States in the South China Sea, including through regular Maritime Cooperative Activities to support regional maritime security and uphold international law.

- We welcome the success of our maritime patrol aircraft collaboration activity with India on the sidelines of Exercise KAKADU in September 2024.

- We commit to enhancing Australia-Japan-India-United States maritime domain awareness in the Indo-Pacific from 2025, acknowledging India's leadership role in conceptualizing the idea of closer collaboration in maritime surveillance.

- We intend to deepen cooperation with Pacific island countries, including through Australia, Japan, and United States contribution to Exercise PUK PUK in Papua New Guinea in 2025 and future iterations of Operation RENDER SAFE.

Subsection III-2

Trilateral Defense Ministers' Joint Statement

2 May 2024

United States-Japan-Australia Trilateral Defense Ministers' Meeting (TDMM) 2024 Joint Statement

May 2, 2024

Australian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence Richard Marles, Japanese Minister of Defense Kihara Minoru, and U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin III convened a Trilateral Defense Ministerial Meeting in Hawaii on May 2, 2024. This was the thirteenth meeting among the defense leaders of the three nations and highlighted the landmark achievements made in implementing activities and practical areas of cooperation set forth in the 2023 Joint Statement.

The Ministers are united by our shared values and determination to deepen cooperation to promote the security, stability, and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific and beyond.

The Ministers welcomed and acknowledged the significance of each country's recently implemented strategic documents, underscoring their deep strategic alignment and shared values. They affirmed the important role that the trilateral partnership contributes to realizing a free and open Indo-Pacific and the significant progress over the past year demonstrating their growing trilateral coordination at all levels and across all domains.

The Ministers reiterated their strong opposition to any attempts by the People's Republic of China (PRC) to unilaterally change the status quo by force or coercion in the South and East China Seas. This includes concerning and destabilizing actions in the South China Sea, such as unsafe encounters at sea and in the air, the militarization of disputed features, and the dangerous use of coast guard vessels and maritime militia, including interference with routine maritime operations, and efforts to disrupt other countries' offshore resource exploration. They strongly objected to China's claims and actions that are inconsistent with international law including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and which undermine international rules, standards, and norms. They resolved to work together to support states being able to exercise their rights and freedoms in the maritime domain, including the freedoms of navigation and overflight, consistent with UNCLOS.

The Ministers emphasized the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. They called for the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues.

The Ministers reaffirmed their enduring commitment to a peaceful, secure, and prosperous Southeast Asia, where sovereignty is respected, international law is followed, and nations can make decisions free from coercion. They reaffirmed their commitment to ASEAN centrality and unity as well as ASEAN-led regional architecture. They recognized the importance of strengthening cooperation with Southeast Asian partners including the Philippines and welcomed the second meeting of Australia, Japan, Philippines, and United States Defense Ministers and Secretary also being held in Hawaii.

The Ministers committed to deepening cooperation with Pacific island countries, by supporting their needs and efforts in the implementation of the Pacific Islands Forum's 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent. The Ministers affirmed they will continue expanding regional engagement with Pacific counterparts, particularly through the Pacific Islands Forum of which Australia is a member, and other inclusive Pacific architectures.

The Ministers welcomed the U.S. Coast Guard's deployment of the Harriet Lane Cutter in its inaugural Operation Blue Pacific patrol in Oceania in early 2024. This deployment offered opportunities for the U.S. Coast Guard to work alongside Pacific island countries to share best practices on maritime domain awareness and support efforts led regionally by the Forum Fisheries Agency to combat illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing activities.

The Ministers are deeply concerned about North Korea's nuclear and missile development. They strongly condemn North Korea's repeated launches of missiles, including intercontinental ballistic missiles and other launches using ballistic missile technology, which are serious violations of United Nations Security Council resolutions. The Ministers strongly condemn the increasing military cooperation between North Korea and Russia, including North Korea's export and Russia's procurement of North Korean ballistic missiles in violation of UNSC resolutions, as well as Russia's use of these missiles against Ukraine. The Ministers remain committed to working with the international community to address North Korea's serious threat to the region. They reiterate their call on North Korea to immediately resolve the abductions issue and cease its human rights violations.

The Ministers noted the progress on the introduction of counterstrike capabilities by Japan and investment in long-range strike capabilities by Australia. They confirmed that Australia and Japan would work closely together, and with the United States as these capabilities are introduced.

The Ministers acknowledge the significant progress made by Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States over the past year to implement AUKUS, and noted the positive contribution the AUKUS partnership has on the security and stability in the region. Recognizing Japan's strengths and its close bilateral defense partnerships with all three AUKUS countries, the Ministers acknowledged that AUKUS partners are considering cooperation with Japan on AUKUS Pillar II advanced capability projects.

The Ministers welcomed the August 2023 entry into force of the Japan-Australia Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA), which will enable deeper trilateral cooperation and enhance interoperability by facilitating Australian Defence Force presence alongside the United States Forces in Japan and Japanese Self-Defense Forces alongside the United States Forces in Australia. They marked the inaugural reciprocal deployments of Japan's F-35A aircraft to Australia and Australia's F-35A aircraft to Japan in 2023 as the first cooperative activities under the RAA. Additionally, Ministers welcomed upcoming activities planned for trilateral F-35 joint training in 2025 and 2026. They noted progress on trilateral training using ranges in Australia and the successful conduct of Japan's first anti-air and anti-ship missile launch in Australia in 2023. The Ministers commit to leveraging the RAA to enable Japan's participation, alongside the United States Armed Forces, in force posture activities in Australia over the coming year.

The Ministers welcomed the historic inaugural achievements and activities in trilateral work over the past year and reaffirmed their intent to increase the complexity and scope of their work together. Since 2022, the three militaries have conducted multiple coordinated Asset Protection Missions, undertaken trilateral transits in the South China Sea, and increased the complexity of trilateral Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) cooperation including actual operations in the maritime and air domains. They committed to expanding trilateral ISR cooperation.

The Ministers welcomed Australia's valuable inaugural participation in the U.S.-Japan command post exercise, KEEN EDGE, in February, and the work underway to advance closer operational collaboration.

The Ministers reaffirmed their vision toward a networked air defense architecture among the United States, Japan, and Australia to counter growing air and missile threats in the Indo-Pacific region, including broadening missile defense information sharing and incorporating future capabilities. They announced their intent for the U.S. Armed Forces, Australian Defence Force, and Japan Self-Defense Forces to conduct an inaugural regional air and missile defense live fire exercise in 2027 at Exercise TALISMAN SABRE.

Today Ministers signed the trilateral Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) Projects Arrangement. Science and technology cooperation is vital to maintain their collective edge and deepen their defense cooperation. This landmark arrangement allows the respective defense organizations to pursue areas of interest for operationally-relevant advanced collaboration. Through this arrangement the ministries will further discuss cooperative opportunities in the areas of collaborative combat aircraft and autonomous systems and composite aerospace materials.

Reflecting the critical role the trilateral partnership plays in upholding regional stability, the Ministers committed to enhance our defense cooperation across the following areas:

Trilateral Activities and Exercises:

- Conduct trilateral F-35 Joint Strike Fighter trainings in all three countries in the next two years, including exercises such as:
    - Exercise COPE NORTH 2025 – United States
    - Exercise BUSHIDO GUARDIAN 2025 – Japan
    - Exercise PITCH BLACK 2026 – Australia

- Continue increasing the frequency and complexity of high-end trilateral exercises in northern Australia such as Exercise SOUTHERN JACKAROO.

- Increase opportunities and enhance the complexity of ISR cooperation.

- Regularize Asset Protection Missions for the U.S. Forces and the Australian Defence Force by Japan Self-Defense Forces and transits by Australia, Japan, the United States, and other partners.

- Accelerate and deepen trilateral information-sharing cooperation.

- Continue trilateral policy and strategy dialogues on regional issues.

Expanded Cooperation:

- Pursue trilateral Research Development Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) Arrangement cooperative opportunities in operationally-relevant advanced technologies.

- Boost strategic capabilities cooperation across multiple domains, including the conduct of an inaugural joint and combined live fire air and missile defense exercise in 2027 at Exercise TALISMAN SABRE.

- Increase Japan's participation in Australia-U.S. force posture cooperation activities.

Inclusive Partnerships:

- Deepen engagement with ASEAN Member States (including through the ADMM-Plus framework), Pacific island countries, India, the Republic of Korea, and like-minded partners and allies to uphold and reinforce free and open international order.

- Coordinate capacity building engagements with regional partners.

The Ministers affirmed that trilateral defense cooperation is essential to maintain regional stability, transparency, and respect for international rules and norms. They reiterated their firm determination to keep the Indo-Pacific free, open, secure, and prosperous while continuing to expand the scope of defense cooperation.

Subsection III-3

Trilateral Defense Ministers' Joint Statement

3 June 2023

Joint Statement - United States-Japan-Australia Trilateral Defense Ministers' Meeting 2023
3 June 2023

Australian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence the Hon. Richard Marles MP, Japanese Minister of Defense Hamada Yasukazu, and U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin III, convened a Trilateral Defense Ministerial Meeting in Singapore on June 3, 2023 during the 20th International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Asia Security Summit (2023 Shangri-La Dialogue) in Singapore. This was the twelfth meeting among the defence leaders of the three nations and highlighted the significant progress made in implementing activities and practical areas of cooperation set forth in the 2022 Joint Statement.

The Ministers welcomed and acknowledged the significance of each country's strategic documents issued this past year, confirming the alignment of their strategies and the important role that the trilateral partnership plays in realising a free and open Indo-Pacific. The Ministers highlighted that trilateral defence cooperation has never been stronger, and noted advances in the complexity of our trilateral cooperation and growing trilateral coordination at all levels.

The Ministers expressed serious concern about the increasingly severe security environment in the East China Sea. They strongly opposed any destabilising and coercive unilateral actions that may escalate tensions in the East China Sea.

The Ministers expressed concern about the situation in the South China Sea. They strongly opposed any unilateral attempt to change the status quo by force or coercion and actions that could increase tensions in the area, including the militarisation of disputed features, the dangerous use of coast guard vessels and maritime militia, and efforts to disrupt other States' offshore resource exploitation activities. They strongly object to China's claims and actions that are inconsistent with international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and which undermine international rules, standards, and norms. The Ministers emphasised the importance of the peaceful resolution of disputes in accordance with international law, particularly UNCLOS, and reaffirmed the 2016 South China Sea Arbitral Tribunal decision as final and legally binding on the parties. They resolved to work together to support states being able to exercise their rights and freedoms in the South China Sea, consistent with UNCLOS, including the freedoms of navigation and overflight.

The Ministers emphasised the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, and encouraged the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues.

The Ministers emphasised the importance of a secure and prosperous Southeast Asia, where sovereignty is respected and in furtherance of broader regional stability. They reiterated continued support for ASEAN centrality and ASEAN-led regional architecture, including ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus). They also emphasised their strong support for the practical implementation of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. The Ministers committed to work closely with regional countries, bilaterally and through ASEAN mechanisms, to support regional security and stability including to promote maritime, cyber, border, and health security cooperation. The Ministers recognised the importance of strengthening cooperation with the Philippines and welcomed the meeting of Australia, Japan, Philippines, and United States' defence ministers taking place while at the Shangri-La Dialogue.

The Ministers committed to deepening cooperation with Pacific island countries, including by working with Pacific partners to support maritime security, respond to increased pressure from natural disasters, and address the impacts of climate change. The three countries will continue expanding regional engagement and strengthening cooperation with Pacific counterparts, particularly through the Pacific Islands Forum and other inclusive Pacific architecture.

The Ministers are deeply concerned about North Korea's nuclear and missile development. They strongly condemn North Korea's repeated launches of missiles, including intercontinental ballistic missiles at an unprecedented frequency, and the most recent claimed space launch using ballistic missile technology, which is a serious violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions. The Ministers remain committed to working with the international community to address North Korea's serious threat to the region. They reiterate their call on North Korea to immediately resolve the abduction issue and cease its human rights violations.

Recognising the important role the trilateral partnership plays in boosting regional stability, the Ministers committed to continue to take concrete and practical measures to improve interoperability and deepen defence cooperation across the spectrum. They reinforced the importance of consulting with each other and developing coordinated responses to regional disasters and crises.

The Ministers noted the significance of the introduction of counterstrike capabilities by Japan and investment in long-range strike capabilities by Australia. They confirmed that Australia and Japan would work closely together, and with the United States, as these capabilities are introduced.

The Ministers welcomed the progress being made toward the entry into force of the Japan-Australia Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA). They acknowledged the important role of the RAA in enabling deeper trilateral cooperation and enhancing interoperability. The Ministers agreed to

leverage the RAA for this purpose as soon as it enters into force and committed to working on a roadmap for conducting trilateral cooperation activities in Australia over the coming year.

The Ministers welcomed the recent announcement of Australia's pathway to acquire conventionally armed nuclear-powered submarines. Japan reiterated its consistent support for AUKUS.

The Ministers welcomed the progress being made and highlighted achievements including the first coordinated Asset Protection Mission (APM) during a trilateral activity in November 2022, and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) cooperation at Iwakuni Air Base in March 2023.

The Ministers exchanged views on the regional security environment and concurred to resist unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion in all parts of the world and to work closely to deter and counter actions that undermine international peace and stability and the international system based on the rule of law. They strongly condemned Russia's unprovoked, unjust, and unlawful aggression against Ukraine. They shared the view that Russia should immediately, completely, and unconditionally withdraw all of its military forces from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders and cease hostilities in line with the Charter of the United Nations as called for in the resolution A/ES-11/L.7 adopted by the UN General Assembly on February 23.

The Ministers committed to continue enhancing defence cooperation among the three countries across the following areas:

Trilateral Activities and Exercises:

- Conduct trilateral F-35 Joint Strike Fighter training in Australia.
- Increase complex and high-end trilateral exercises in northern Australia such as Exercise SOUTHERN JACKAROO to enhance readiness.
- Regularise Asset Protection Missions for the U.S. Forces and the Australian Defence Force by Japan Self-Defense Forces.
- Accelerate and deepen trilateral information-sharing cooperation.
- Continue trilateral policy and strategy dialogues on regional issues.

Expanded Cooperation:

- Seek to conclude a trilateral Research Development Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) framework at the earliest possible opportunity.

- Boost strategic capabilities cooperation across multiple domains, including in integrated air and missile defence (IAMD), intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and undersea warfare.

Inclusive Partnerships:

- Further deepen engagement with ASEAN Member States (including through the ADMM-Plus framework), Pacific island countries, European countries and like-minded partners and allies to uphold and reinforce free and open international norms in every region in the world.
- Coordinate capacity building engagements with regional partners.

- Work in complement with Pacific partners in addressing the challenge of unexploded ordnance.

The Ministers affirm that trilateral cooperation is essential to maintain democratic values, transparency and respect for international norms, and expressed their firm determination to keep the Indo-Pacific region as a free, open, secure, and prosperous region while continuing to expand the scope of defence cooperation.

Subsection III-4

Trilateral Defense Ministers' Joint Statement

11 June 2022

United States-Japan-Australia Trilateral Defense Ministers Meeting - 2022 Joint Vision Statement
11 June 2022

Australian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence Richard Marles, Japanese Minister of Defense Kishi Nobuo, and U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin III, convened a Trilateral Defense Ministerial Meeting (TDMM) in Singapore on June 11 during the 19th International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Asia Security Summit (2022 Shangri-La Dialogue) in Singapore. This was the tenth meeting among the defense leaders of the three nations. The leaders exchanged views on the regional security environment and committed to work together to take concrete, practical steps to ensure the security, stability, and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region. With the TDMM having affirmed this strategic alignment among the three leaders, the respective ministries plan to continue to enhance trilateral defense cooperation in the interest of regional security, buttressing the important work of their nations' diplomats.

The Ministers oppose coercion and destabilizing behavior that undermine a rules-based international system. They continue to stand against unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force, as demonstrated by the united response against Russia's unprovoked, unjust, and illegal aggression against Ukraine. This aggression is a brazen violation of international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, and the Ministers have reason to believe that Russia has committed egregious war crimes across Ukraine. They call on Russia to immediately withdraw its forces and cease its attack on Ukrainian territory, and to comply with the legally binding order of the International Court of Justice of March 16.

The Ministers are concerned about the increasingly severe security environment in the East China Sea, which undermines regional peace and stability. The Ministers are strongly opposed to any destabilizing or coercive unilateral actions that seek to alter the status quo and increase tensions in the area.

The Ministers share serious concerns about the situation in the South China Sea and oppose any unilateral attempts to change or influence the status quo through militarization of disputed features and coercive or intimidating actions. They strongly object to China's unlawful maritime claims and activities in the South China Sea that are inconsistent with international law, particularly as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). They reaffirm the

2016 South China Sea Arbitral Tribunal decision as final and legally binding on the parties to the dispute. The Ministers emphasize the importance of the peaceful resolution of disputes in accordance with international law, particularly as reflected in UNCLOS, including freedom of navigation and overflight and other lawful uses of the sea. They also reaffirm their support for unimpeded lawful commerce.

The Ministers underscore the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, and encourage the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues.

The Ministers reaffirm their unwavering support for the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) unity and centrality and its importance in promoting positive norms and behavior, contributing to regional security, and building consensus and practical regional cooperation, including through the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting-Plus (ADMM Plus).

The Ministers remain committed to international efforts to address the serious threats posed to the region by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). They condemn the DPRK's destabilizing and unlawful nuclear weapons and ballistic missile development, including multiple intercontinental ballistic missile launches. They underscore the importance of achieving the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs). Their governments reaffirmed their commitment to enforce all relevant UNSCRs through cooperative efforts to deter and disrupt illicit ship-to-ship transfers and other illegal maritime activities. They call on the DPRK to immediately resolve the Japanese abductions issue, and cease its human rights violations.

The Ministers committed to deepening cooperation with Pacific Island countries to support a secure and prosperous Pacific region where sovereignty is respected, including by working with Pacific partners to support maritime security, respond to increased pressure from natural disasters, and address the impacts of climate change. The three countries will continue expanding regional engagement and strengthening cooperation with their Pacific counterparts, particularly through inclusive Pacific-centric architecture such as the Pacific Islands Forum, as well as acknowledging the importance of other forums such as the South Pacific Defence Ministers' Meeting (SPDMM) and Japan Pacific Islands Defense Dialogue (JPIDD).

In recognition of the vital role of their respective forces in anchoring stability in the region, the Ministers confirmed a number of concrete meeting outcomes for the following areas:

Trilateral Activities and Exercises:

- Increase and strengthen trilateral exercises to enhance interoperability and readiness.

- Build on the Asset Protection Mission (APM) for the Australian Defence Force by Japan Self-Defense Forces in 2021 by conducting the first APM during a trilateral activity.

- Enhance training opportunities which will be facilitated by the Japan-Australia Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) and other alliance frameworks.

- Promote coordinated responses to regional disasters and crises, and deepen cooperation on maritime capacity building.

Expanded Cooperation:

- Direct departments to conduct the necessary coordination to create a Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) framework to advance trilateral cooperation.

- Explore and pursue trilateral cooperation on advanced technologies and strategic capabilities.

Seamless Coordination:

- Effectively leverage trilateral mechanisms of information exchange.

Inclusive Partnerships:

- Deepen Indo-Pacific engagement with European and likeminded partners and allies in upholding the values of democracy, transparency, and respect for international norms which find home in all corners of the world.

They recognize that their respective bilateral relationships provide a strong bedrock for deepening the trilateral partnership and upholding regional peace and stability. Acknowledging the strength found in collective actions and sharing the view that no individual country can achieve this alone, the Ministers look to expand cooperation, build inclusive partnerships with other like-minded countries, increase the scope of defense cooperation in new and innovative fields, and work broadly to ensure a free, open, and prosperous future for the Indo-Pacific region.

Subsection III-5

Trilateral Defense Ministers' Joint Statement

8 July 2020

Australia-Japan-United States Defense Ministers' Meeting Joint Statement
8 July 2020

Australian Minister for Defence Linda Reynolds, Japanese Minister of Defense KONO Taro, and U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper convened a virtual trilateral defense ministerial meeting on July 7 (Washington). The ministers reaffirmed their joint commitment to enhance security, stability, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region in keeping with their shared values and longstanding alliances and close partnerships. This was the ninth meeting among the three nations' defense leaders.

The ministers concurred that the COVID-19 pandemic underscored the importance of a rules-based international order in setting the conditions for our nations to address this shared threat in a way that is transparent, accountable, and resilient. As a measure of the strength and adaptability of the trilateral partnership, the ministers discussed collaborative efforts to mitigate the impacts of COVID-19. They committed to:

(1) Continue to share information, best practices, and lessons learned about measures taken by defense authorities toward mitigating the impacts of COVID-19, including as part of whole-of-government efforts;

(2) Further develop a mutual understanding of the threat environment in the Indo-Pacific region, including the potential effects of the spread of COVID-19 on their respective defense policies and preparedness; and

(3) Promote vigorous trilateral defense cooperation and exchanges that make tangible contributions in support of a free, open, inclusive, and prosperous Indo-Pacific region.

The ministers reinforced their strong opposition to any destabilizing or coercive unilateral actions that could alter the status quo and increase tensions in the East China Sea. They expressed their intention to continue to coordinate closely on the security environment in this region, with a view to deterring such actions.

With regard to the South China Sea, the ministers reinforced strong opposition to the use of force or coercion to alter the status quo, and reaffirmed the importance of upholding freedom of

navigation and overflight. They expressed serious concern about recent incidents, including the continued militarization of disputed features, dangerous or coercive use of coast guard vessels and "maritime militia," and efforts to disrupt other countries' resource exploitation activities. They emphasized the importance of peaceful resolution of disputes in accordance with international law, in particular as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and called for all countries in the region to take meaningful steps to ease tension and build trust. The ministers also called for any Code of Conduct in the South China Sea to be consistent with existing international law, in particular as reflected in UNCLOS; not to prejudice the interests of third parties or the rights of any State under international law; and to reinforce existing inclusive regional architecture.

The ministers also expressed their deep concern over Beijing's imposition of a national security law upon Hong Kong.

The ministers shared their strong concern that North Korea's series of ballistic missile launches pose a serious threat to international security and condemned the repeated violations of multiple United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs). They expressed concern about North Korea's announcement that it no longer considered itself bound by its moratorium on nuclear tests and launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles. The ministers again called upon North Korea to cease actions that increase tensions and undermine regional stability, to comply with its international obligations, and to take clear steps to achieve the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles programs of all ranges in accordance with UNSCRs. To this end, they commended ongoing diplomatic efforts to engage North Korea, and called on North Korea to return to the negotiating table and make a sustained commitment to dialogue. In the meantime, they reaffirmed their commitment to implement and enforce sanctions against North Korea, including through ongoing cooperation to monitor and deter illegal ship-to-ship transfers of refined petroleum, coal, and other sanctioned goods.

The ministers underlined the instrumental role of ASEAN in facilitating regional dialogue and establishing norms of behavior that support stability, security, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region, and recognized the importance of supporting partners in South and South East Asia. The ministers emphasized their ongoing support for ASEAN centrality as a key contributor to regional security and prosperity. The ministers undertook to continue to coordinate closely on their support to the region, in order to maximize the benefits of their national and combined engagement activities in a transparent, efficient, and effective manner under their shared strategic vision.

The ministers underscored their unwavering commitment to work closely with their Pacific partners to support a Pacific region that is prosperous, secure, and respectful of sovereignty. They decided to continue their trilateral capacity-building efforts in the Pacific through joint defense initiatives with regional partners. The ministers welcomed and acknowledged the significance of each country's military-to-military activities, particularly when those activities contributed to whole-of-government

engagement with Pacific nations.

In reference to the 2019 Australia-Japan-United States Trilateral Strategic Action Agenda, the ministers directed their respective officials to continue to pursue avenues for practical engagement, cooperation, and interoperability in a time of geostrategic change.

Subsection III-6

Trilateral Foreign Ministers' Joint Statement

1 August 2019

Trilateral Strategic Dialogue Joint Ministerial Statement

August 1, 2019

1. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, HE Taro Kono, the Secretary of State for the United States of America, HE Michael R. Pompeo, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister for Women of Australia, Senator the Hon Marise Payne, met in Thailand on August 1, 2019, for the ninth ministerial meeting of the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD).

2. The Ministers reaffirmed the importance of the trilateral strategic partnership and of deepening coordination among Japan, the United States and Australia. They reiterated their commitment to working proactively together to maintain and promote a free, open, prosperous and inclusive Indo-Pacific region. They reaffirmed their commitment to working with other countries to uphold a rules-based order, including to ensure that: disputes are resolved peacefully in accordance with international law and without the threat or use of force; states are resilient to coercion; freedom of navigation and overflight and other internationally lawful uses of the sea are upheld; and markets remain open. In this context, the Ministers welcomed the adoption of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific at the ASEAN Summit in June 2019. The Ministers recognized the broad convergence of ASEAN's Outlook with our shared visions for the region. The Ministers endorsed the values ASEAN has articulated – "ASEAN Centrality, openness, transparency, inclusivity, a rules-based framework, good governance, respect for sovereignty and international law."

3. The Ministers noted the achievements of ASEAN in fostering regional peace and prosperity, including through its role as the convener of the regional security architecture. The Ministers reaffirmed their strong support for ASEAN centrality and unity, and underlined the value of the East Asia Summit (EAS) as the region's premier Leaders-led forum for addressing strategic, political, and security challenges. The Ministers recognised the important roles of other Indo-Pacific fora, including the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), in facilitating dialogue on regional issues of importance. The Ministers shared their intention to further strengthen trilateral cooperation to promote the security, stability, resilience, and economic and governance development of countries throughout the Indo-Pacific region.

4. The Ministers shared their intention to enhance their engagement with the Pacific Island countries, including through high-level exchanges and greater economic collaboration. In this context, they welcomed Australia's Pacific Step Up, President Trump's historic summit meeting with

the presidents of Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Palau in May, and Japan's PALM process and Foreign Minister Kono's upcoming visit to Pacific Island countries. They emphasized their determination to further strengthen their collaboration to support the region's economic and social resilience, stability, and prosperity. The Ministers noted that at the last PIF Leaders' meeting, Pacific Leaders adopted the Boe Regional Security Declaration for the Pacific. They shared their intention to work together to support and address the security challenges identified and prioritized by Pacific Island countries in close consultation with those countries.

5. The Ministers welcomed ongoing trilateral cooperation on capacity building for maritime security and safety throughout the Indo-Pacific region and were committed to enhancing cooperation in this area in close consultation with the countries in the region. In particular, the Ministers commended the recent progress in trilateral cooperation in capacity building for maritime security in a mutually complementary manner in Palau and Fiji. The Ministers also shared their intention to coordinate support for the Japan-led training program for maritime law enforcement at the University of the South Pacific. The Ministers reiterated the commitment of the three nations to continue coordinating their respective assistance programs, in consultation with partners, and to identifying ways they can collaborate more closely in the future.

6. The Ministers discussed their respective efforts to support the stability, prosperity and resilience of Southeast Asia, including through maritime and other security cooperation, and infrastructure development. They also discussed their respective initiatives to promote sustainable development in the Mekong sub-region and ways to complement each other's efforts in the sub-region. The Ministers affirmed their support for locally-led architecture, including the Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS) and the Mekong River Commission, as Mekong countries' own initiatives.

7. The Ministers emphasized the importance of enhancing connectivity through quality infrastructure investment that is consistent with internationally agreed principles, including social and environmental considerations, openness, transparency, economic efficiency and debt sustainability as affirmed in the G20 Principles for Quality Infrastructure Investment. The Ministers noted progress in enhancing each country's respective infrastructure financing capabilities, including the forthcoming U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, Export Finance Australia's expanded mandate and financing capacity and the new Australian Infrastructure Financing Facility for the Pacific, and Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC)'s establishment of its Trilateral Infrastructure Partnership taskforce. The Ministers welcomed growing cooperation among TSD partners to address the significant infrastructure investment needs in the Indo-Pacific, particularly through the Trilateral Infrastructure Partnership among JBIC, the United States Overseas Private Investment Corporation and the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Export Finance and Insurance Corporation. The Ministers recalled the successful trilateral joint mission to PNG in April which discussed prospective projects for trilateral cooperation and looked forward to

future plans for a trilateral joint mission to a country in Southeast Asia. The Ministers directed officials to discuss further opportunities to enhance economic cooperation under the TSD.

8. The Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to the international community's goal of complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of all ranges of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), in accordance with United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions. In this regard, the Ministers expressed support for U.S. diplomatic efforts aimed at achieving the final, fully verified denuclearization of the DPRK and called on the DPRK to take immediate, significant and concrete steps towards denuclearization and resume negotiations with the United States toward that goal. The Ministers noted the DPRK's potential to be a prosperous and successful member of the region. The Ministers called on all members of the international community to fully implement UNSC resolutions and combat sanctions evasion. They affirmed their commitment to international efforts particularly in addressing illicit ship-to-ship transfers, and to strengthening and enhancing cooperation with other partner countries in this context.

9. The Ministers encouraged the DPRK to take further action toward fulfilling all of its commitments in the U.S.-DPRK Joint Statement, including complete denuclearization. The Ministers also called on the DPRK to end human rights violations and abuses and to resolve the Japanese abductions issue immediately.

10. The Ministers reiterated their commitment to international law and its importance in maintaining peace and stability in the maritime domain. The Ministers expressed serious concerns about negative developments in the South China Sea (SCS), including the deployment of advanced weapons systems on disputed features. The Ministers voiced strong opposition to coercive unilateral actions that could alter the status quo and increase tensions such as land reclamation, construction of outposts, militarization of disputed features and other actions that cause permanent physical change to the marine environment in areas pending delimitation. The Ministers expressed concern about credible reports of disruptive activities in relation to long-standing oil and gas projects in the SCS.

11. The Ministers underscored the importance of the July 2016 Philippines-China Arbitral Tribunal's award, and noted that the Tribunal's award is final and legally binding for the two parties. The Ministers emphasized the importance of demilitarization of disputed features, resolving disputes peacefully, without the threat or use of force and in accordance with international law, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and full respect for freedom of navigation and overflight and other lawful uses of the seas in the SCS and around the world.

12. The Ministers acknowledged ASEAN and China's ongoing discussions on a Code of Conduct (COC) for the SCS. The Ministers called for the COC: to be consistent with existing international law, including international law of the sea as reflected in UNCLOS; not to prejudice the interests of

third parties or the rights of all states under international law; to reinforce existing inclusive regional architecture; and to strengthen parties' commitments to ceasing actions that would complicate or escalate disputes, including militarization of disputed features.

13. The Ministers shared their intention to remain in close communication about the situation in the East China Sea and expressed strong opposition to any coercive unilateral actions that seek to alter the status quo and increase tensions in the area.

14. The Ministers acknowledged the importance of security of ICT networks and services, which plays a critical role in the safety, security, and prosperity of their countries and are an attractive target for malicious cyber actors, including state-sponsored actors. The Ministers acknowledged the importance of national security as a key consideration in the evaluation of next generation telecommunications infrastructure and services. Recalling the G20 Antalya Summit Leaders' Communique, the Ministers also expressed concern that countries and their proxies are increasingly willing to pursue their objectives by undertaking malicious cyber activities including ICT-enabled theft of intellectual property. The Ministers decided to deepen practical cooperation to better deter, mitigate, attribute, and counter malicious cyber activity, and provide clear and consistent messages of the consequences of such activities.

15. The Ministers discussed ways to deepen cooperation to counter terrorism and violent extremism, including through Trilateral Strategic Dialogue Counterterrorism Consultations, information-sharing, and working together in regional fora such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and in international fora such as the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF). The Ministers resolved to coordinate and cooperate to support Southeast Asian countries' efforts to counter terrorism and violent extremism, including implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2396. Consistent with the G20 Osaka leaders' statement on the issue, the Ministers noted their commitment to preventing and countering exploitation of the internet for terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism in a way that is consistent with national and international law, including human rights and fundamental freedoms such as freedom of expression and access to information.

16. The Ministers directed officials to explore possible new areas of practical and complementary efforts in the Indo-Pacific region, including supporting good governance, transparency, rule of law, and human rights. The Ministers committed to meeting regularly, and to deepening cooperation with each other, and with partners, to promote a peaceful, stable, and prosperous Indo-Pacific.

Subsection III-7

Trilateral Defense Ministers' Joint Statement

2 June 2019

Australia - Japan - United States Defense Ministers meeting

2 June 2019

Australian Minister for Defence Linda Reynolds, Japanese Minister of Defense Takeshi Iwaya, and U.S. Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan, convened a trilateral defense ministerial meeting in Singapore on June 1 on the margins of the 18th International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Asia Security Summit (2019 Shangri-La Dialogue). The ministers were united in their shared commitment to do more together in support of security, stability, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region. This was the eighth meeting among the three nations' defense leaders.

Minister Iwaya and Acting Secretary Shanahan congratulated Minister Reynolds on her appointment to Minister for Defence following Australia's recent elections. The ministers affirmed their shared vision for an Indo-Pacific region that is open, inclusive, rules based and respectful of sovereignty, where disputes are resolved peacefully and free of coercion. The ministers recognized the importance of supporting Association of South East Asian Nations-led regional architecture and their support for ASEAN centrality, which has played an instrumental role in establishing norms of behavior and habits of cooperation in the region. The Australian and Japanese ministers welcomed the United States Indo-Pacific Strategy Report announced by Acting Secretary Shanahan. The ministers agreed to continue to closely coordinate support to the region to maximize the benefits of their national and combined engagement activities in the region in a transparent, efficient and effective manner under their shared strategic vision.

The ministers underscored the importance of the international community's ongoing commitment to achieving North Korea's abandonment of all of its weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, and related programs and facilities in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner in accordance with relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs). The ministers welcomed the United States' and Republic of Korea's diplomatic efforts to achieve the final, fully verified denuclearization of North Korea and called on North Korea to return to negotiations with the United States toward this goal. They confirmed that while a diplomatic path to peace on the Korean Peninsula exists, North Korea remains an extraordinary threat, exemplified by its recent missile launches, that requires continued vigilance. They agreed to continue to fully enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. The ministers welcomed and reaffirmed their commitment to sustained international cooperation to deter, disrupt, and ultimately eliminate illicit activities, such as illegal ship-to-ship transfers.

The ministers expressed strong opposition to the use of any coercive unilateral actions that seek to alter the status quo or increase tensions in the East China Sea. They also expressed their intention to remain in close contact on the security situation in that area with a view to deter such actions.

The ministers discussed the importance of adherence to international law and their shared commitment to upholding freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea. The ministers remained seriously concerned about any action including militarization of disputed features in the South China Sea that are destabilizing or dangerous. They emphasized the importance of the peaceful resolution of conflict in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and expressed strong opposition to the use of force or coercion to alter the status quo; calling instead for all countries in the region to take meaningful steps to ease tension and build trust. All sides called for the Code of Conduct for the South China Sea to be consistent with existing international law, as reflected in UNCLOS; to not prejudice the interests of third parties or the rights of all states under international law; to reinforce existing inclusive regional architecture; and to strengthen parties' commitments to cease actions that would complicate or escalate disputes.

The ministers underscored their commitment to work with their Pacific partners to support a Pacific region that is prosperous, secure and respects sovereignty. The ministers welcomed and acknowledged the significance of each state's military-to-military activities, particularly when those activities contributed to whole of government engagement with the Pacific.

The ministers agreed on a Strategic Action Agenda (SAA) that articulates their shared long-term vision for trilateral cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. They affirmed the SAA would enable their respective defense organizations to plan and implement enhanced trilateral defense cooperative activities.

The ministers underscored the close defense relationship between the three countries, and agreed to do more to coordinate their respective regional defense engagement activities, such as joint exercises and training and capacity building.

Subsection III-8

Trilateral Strategic Action Agenda

2 June 2019

Australia-Japan-United States Strategic Action Agenda

The defense ministers of Australia, Japan and the United States affirm their countries' alignment in strategic interests and universal principles, including a commitment to democracy, human rights, free trade, and the rules-based international order. Together, the three countries recognize the importance of enhancing engagement with our Indo-Pacific partners, in order to foster regional prosperity, resilience and transparency in a time of geostrategic change.

The trilateral relationship complements the strong and effective bilateral defense relationships between each of the three countries, and enables us to pool our resources in support of peace, security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region. The three defense ministers are committed to advancing trilateral cooperation, enhancing engagement with likeminded partners in the region, and reinforcing the rules-based global order through actively supporting key regional security and defense architectures.

This Strategic Action Agenda articulates our vision for trilateral activities, and our strong commitment to work both trilaterally and together with our regional partners. To that end, Australia, Japan and the United States intend to pursue the following lines of effort:

- Strengthen trilateral cooperation in the areas of maritime security, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, peacekeeping, counter-terrorism, amphibious activities, and non-conventional domains like space, cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum.

- In close collaboration with regional partners, identify and coordinate opportunities to build partner capacity through regular information sharing, complementary programs and cooperative activities.

- Increase the complexity and sophistication of trilateral exercises to enhance interoperability, build common understanding, and better enable our defence forces to work together to contribute to peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region.

- Promote transparency, regional cooperation and the rule of law through port visits and other defense-related activities that demonstrate every nation's right to freedom of navigation and overflight, in accordance with international law.

- Improve common understanding and shared regional situational awareness through enhanced trilateral information sharing.

The three defense ministers commit to identifying new opportunities to further trilateral cooperation, with the objectives of maintaining and promoting a free, open, stable and prosperous Indo-Pacific region.

Subsection III-9

Trilateral Foreign Ministers' Joint Statement

4 August 2018

Trilateral Strategic Dialogue Joint Ministerial Statement

4 August

1. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia, Julie Bishop, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, Taro Kono, and the Secretary of State for the United States, Michael R. Pompeo, met in Singapore on 4 August 2018 for the eighth ministerial meeting of the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD).

2. The Ministers reaffirmed the importance of the trilateral strategic partnership and of deepening coordination between Australia, Japan and the United States. They underscored their commitment to working together to maintain and promote a free, open, prosperous and inclusive Indo-Pacific region. They committed to work through partnership with countries in the region to uphold a rules-based order, including to ensure that: disputes are resolved peacefully in accordance with international law and without the threat or use of force; states are resilient to coercion; freedom of navigation and overflight and other internationally lawful uses of the sea are upheld; and markets remain open.

3. The Ministers noted the achievements of ASEAN in fostering regional peace and prosperity, including through its role as the convenor of the regional security architecture. The Ministers reaffirmed their strong support for ASEAN centrality and unity, and underlined the value of the East Asia Summit (EAS) as the region's premier Leaders-led forum for addressing political-security challenges. The Ministers recognised the important role of other Indo-Pacific forums, including the Indian Ocean Rim Association and Pacific Islands Forum, in facilitating dialogue on regional issues of importance. The Ministers shared their intention to further strengthen trilateral cooperation to promote the security, stability, resilience, and economic and governance development of countries throughout the region, including the Pacific Island countries.

4. The Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to the international community's goal for the final, fully verified denuclearisation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), as agreed by Chairman Kim Jong-Un of the State Affairs Commission of the DPRK. The Ministers reiterated that the international community needs to achieve the dismantlement of North Korea's weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs in accordance with United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions. The Ministers welcomed discussions between the United States and the DPRK, and called on the DPRK to take immediate, significant and concrete steps towards denuclearisation.

The Ministers noted the DPRK's potential to be a prosperous and successful member of the region. The Ministers called on all members of the international community to maintain pressure on the DPRK, including through the full implementation of UNSC resolutions.

5. The Ministers welcomed North Korea's return of the remains of fallen service members from the Korean War on 27 July 2018, as part of fulfilling the DPRK's commitments in the U.S.–DPRK Joint Statement dated 12 June 2018, and encouraged North Korea to take further action toward fulfilling all of its commitments in that statement, including to complete denuclearisation. The Ministers also called on the DPRK to end human rights violations and abuses, and to immediately release all foreign nationals being held in North Korea, including Japanese abductees.

6. The Ministers expressed serious concerns about developments in the South China Sea (SCS), including the deployment of advanced weapons systems on disputed features. The Ministers voiced strong opposition to coercive unilateral actions that could alter the status quo and increase tensions such as land reclamation, construction of outposts, militarisation of disputed features, and other actions that cause permanent physical change to the marine environment in areas pending delimitation.

7. The Ministers underscored the importance of the July 2016 Philippines-China Arbitral Tribunal's Award for the two parties. The Ministers emphasised the importance of non-militarisation of disputed features, resolving disputes through full respect for legal and diplomatic processes, without the threat or use of force and in accordance with international law, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and full respect for freedom of navigation and overflight and other lawful uses of the seas in the SCS and around the world.

8. The Ministers acknowledged recent movement towards a Code of Conduct (CoC) for the SCS. Ministers called for the CoC to be: consistent with existing international law, as reflected in UNCLOS; to not prejudice the interests of third parties or the rights of all states under international law; to reinforce existing regional architecture; and to strengthen parties' commitments to cease actions that would complicate or escalate disputes.

9. The Ministers shared their intention to remain in close communication about the situation in the East China Sea and expressed strong opposition to any coercive unilateral actions that seek to alter the status quo and increase tensions in the area.

10. The Ministers welcomed ongoing trilateral cooperation on capacity building for maritime security and safety in Southeast Asia and committed to enhancing cooperation in this area, as well as with Pacific Island countries in close consultation with those countries. The Ministers resolved to advance this cooperation through ongoing exchanges of information on regional needs. The Ministers reiterated the commitment of the three nations to continue coordinating their respective

assistance programs, in consultation with partners, and to identify ways they can more closely collaborate in the future.

11. The Ministers emphasised the importance of enhancing connectivity through the development of sustainable infrastructure in an open, transparent, non-exclusive, and financially responsible manner, in accordance with international standards, that unlocks the potential of the private sector to invest in the region and help close the infrastructure gap. In this regard, the Ministers welcomed growing cooperation among TSD partners to address the significant infrastructure investment needs in the Indo-Pacific, including the announcement of a trilateral partnership between the Australian Government through the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the United States Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and the Japanese Bank for International Cooperation for infrastructure investment in the Indo-Pacific.

12. The Ministers expressed their concern that states and their proxies are increasingly willing to pursue their objectives by undertaking malicious cyber activities. The Ministers affirmed that the rules-based international order must encompass online activities. The Ministers reaffirmed their joint commitment to promote an international stability framework for cyberspace based on the application of existing international law to state behaviour in cyberspace, adherence to voluntary, non-binding norms of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace in peacetime, and the implementation of confidence building measures, supported by coordinated capacity building programs. The Ministers decided to deepen practical cooperation to better deter, mitigate, publicly attribute, and counter malicious cyber activity, and provide clear and consistent messaging of the consequences of such activity. The Ministers resolved to continue to call out unacceptable behaviour in cyberspace.

13. The Ministers discussed ways to work together to counter terrorism and violent extremism, including through trilateral counter-terrorism consultations. The Ministers resolved to coordinate on protecting soft targets and countering terrorist financing. The Ministers also resolved to advocate for and strengthen existing information sharing mechanisms, and to combat the flow of foreign terrorist fighters both to and from conflict areas. The Ministers expressed their concerns regarding the potential for ongoing violent extremist activity in the southern Philippines. They urged increased cooperation in the Indo-Pacific to counter such terrorist activity and pledged their continued support for these efforts.

14. The Ministers are committed to meeting regularly, and to deepening cooperation with each other, and with partners, to promote strong and sustainable growth, including by supporting good governance, the rule of law and human rights. They directed officials to explore possible new areas of practical cooperation in support of a peaceful, stable and prosperous Indo-Pacific.

Subsection III-10

Trilateral Defence Ministers' Joint Statement

3 June 2018

Joint Statement – Australia-Japan-United States Defence Ministers Meeting

3 June 2018

Australian Minister for Defence Marise Payne, Japanese Minister of Defense Itsunori Onodera, and U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis convened a trilateral defense ministerial meeting in Singapore on June 2 on the margins of the International Institute for Strategic Studies 17th Asia Security Summit (2018 Shangri-La Dialogue), and held discussions on the Indo-Pacific region, North Korea, and trilateral defense cooperation. This was the seventh meeting among the three nations' top defense officials.

The ministers affirmed the importance of the Indo-Pacific region, and the key role Australia, Japan, and the United States play in upholding a free, prosperous, inclusive, and open international order. The ministers articulated the shared principles of respect for sovereignty, promotion of free and fair trade and investment, and adherence to international rules and norms. The ministers reaffirmed their strong support for ASEAN and its central role in the regional architecture.

The ministers remain concerned regarding the ongoing situation in the South China Sea. The ministers underscored their shared respect for international law as well as their shared commitment to upholding freedom of navigation and overflight and other lawful uses of the sea, including in the South China Sea. They emphasized the importance of the peaceful resolution of conflict in accordance with international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and expressed strong opposition to the use of force or coercion as well as unilateral action to alter the status quo, and to the use of disputed features for military purposes in the South China Sea. The ministers reiterated the importance of the conclusion of an effective and meaningful Code of Conduct between ASEAN and China.

The ministers agreed to remain united to support the ongoing diplomatic efforts to achieve complete and permanent dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and ballistic missile programs. They also agreed to continue enforcement of all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. The ministers welcomed sustained international cooperation to deter, disrupt, and ultimately eliminate illicit activities, such as illegal ship-to-ship transfers.

The ministers recognized the importance of further increasing the three countries' cooperation in the region, with a view to maximizing the opportunities for defense engagement. They affirmed

their determination to draft a strategic action agenda that would provide a long-term vision for trilateral cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region.

The ministers acknowledged the close defense relationship of the three countries, and agreed to increase synergies of both bilateral and trilateral cooperation and coordination on regional efforts such as maritime capacity building, counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance and disaster response, and peacekeeping support.

Subsection III-11

Trilateral Foreign Ministers' Joint Statement

7 August 2017

Australia-Japan-United States Trilateral Strategic Dialogue Joint Statement
August 7, 2017
Manila, Philippines

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia, Julie Bishop, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, Taro Kono, and the Secretary of State of the United States, Rex Tillerson, met in Manila, the Philippines, on August 7, 2017, for the seventh ministerial meeting of the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD).

The Ministers reaffirmed the importance of the trilateral strategic partnership among these three countries to ensure a free, open, peaceful, stable, democratic, and prosperous Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean region and world, based on the rule of law, and reiterated their enduring commitment to further deepening coordination and cooperation to achieve this goal. The Ministers noted that the partnership, which is founded upon the robust Australia-U.S. and Japan-U.S. Alliances, rests on the unshakable foundation of shared interests and values, including a commitment to a rules-based international order, respect for international law, open economies, and the peaceful resolution of disputes.

The Ministers condemned in the strongest terms North Korea's unlawful pursuit of a nuclear weapons program and unprecedented ballistic missile activity since last year, including the launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles on July 4 and July 28, 2017. These actions blatantly violate multiple United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions and clearly demonstrate that North Korea increasingly poses new levels of threat to regional stability and global security. In this regard, the Ministers welcomed the unanimous adoption of UNSC Resolution 2371 on August 5 which imposes a total ban on certain North Korean exports. The Ministers called on the international community to implement strictly UNSC resolutions and impose additional diplomatic and economic measures to address the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) threat posed by the North Korean regime and its destabilizing behavior, and to make further efforts to urge North Korea to abandon its current threatening and provocative path and immediately take steps to denuclearize. The Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to strong autonomous sanctions measures on North Korea and will coordinate these sanctions and capacity building measures, including in the area of export control to detect and disrupt North Korean WMD proliferation networks. The Ministers also urged ASEAN member states to maximize pressure on North Korea. The Ministers called on North Korea to immediately and fully comply with relevant UNSC resolutions and the Joint Statement of

the Six-Party Talks of September 2005. The Ministers also called on North Korea to end its systematic human rights violations and abuses and to immediately release all foreign nationals being held in North Korea, including Japanese abductees and American citizens.

The Ministers underscored the importance of upholding the rules-based order, called on all states to respect freedom of navigation and overflight and other internationally lawful uses of the seas, and reiterated that the three countries will continue to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows.

The Ministers expressed serious concerns over maritime disputes in the South China Sea (SCS). The Ministers voiced their strong opposition to coercive unilateral actions that could alter the status quo and increase tensions. In this regard, the Ministers urged SCS claimants to refrain from land reclamation, construction of outposts, militarization of disputed features, and undertaking unilateral actions that cause permanent physical change to the marine environment in areas pending delimitation. The Ministers called on all claimants to make and clarify their maritime claims in accordance with the international law of the sea as reflected in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and to resolve disputes peacefully in accordance with international law. The Ministers called on China and the Philippines to abide by the Arbitral Tribunal's 2016 Award in the Philippines-China arbitration, as it is final and legally binding on both parties. The Ministers noted the significance of the UNCLOS dispute settlement regime and the Tribunal's decision in discussions among parties in their efforts to peacefully resolve their maritime disputes in the SCS. The Ministers urged ASEAN member states and China to fully and effectively implement the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC). The Ministers acknowledged the announced consensus on a framework for the Code of Conduct for the South China Sea (COC). The Ministers further urged ASEAN member states and China to ensure that the COC be finalized in a timely manner, and that it be legally binding, meaningful, effective, and consistent with international law.

The Ministers welcomed the development of trilateral cooperation on capacity building for maritime security and safety in Southeast Asia. The Ministers resolved to advance and build on this cooperation through ongoing exchanges of information and dialogue on regional needs. The Ministers reiterated the commitment of the three nations to continue coordinating their respective assistance programs and to identify ways they can more closely collaborate in the future.

The Ministers expressed strong opposition to any coercive or unilateral actions that could alter the status quo and increase tensions in the East China Sea and will remain in close communication about developments in the area.

The Ministers discussed ways to work together to counter terrorism and violent extremism. The Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to the counter-terrorism-specific trilateral strategic dialogue to enhance coordination and programming. The Ministers noted the importance of increasing

engagement in regional and multilateral organizations such as the Global Counterterrorism Forum and the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. The Ministers expressed support for the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund and the UN Secretary General's Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism and called for its implementation. The Ministers resolved to continue to support internally displaced persons and to coordinate on protecting soft targets and countering terrorist financing. The Ministers also resolved to advocate for and strengthen existing information sharing mechanisms, such as those provided by the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), and to combat the flow of foreign terrorist fighters both to and from conflict areas. The Ministers reiterated their commitment to continue coordinating their respective assistance programs and to identify ways to collaborate in the future. The Ministers expressed their concerns regarding the recent attacks by the ISIS-affiliated groups in Marawi, the Philippines, the loss of life, and the displacement of local populations. The Ministers urged increased cooperation in the region to counter such terrorist activity and pledged their continued support for these efforts.

The Ministers underscored the importance of advancing cybersecurity, and committed to supporting the strategic framework for international cyber stability based on the application of existing international law; adherence to voluntary, non-binding norms of responsible state behavior in cyberspace in peacetime; and the implementation of confidence building measures, supported by coordinated capacity building programs. The Ministers affirmed their mutual commitment to promote operationalization of voluntary, non-binding norms of responsible state behavior recommended by the report of the 2015 *UN Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security*. The Ministers supported the establishment of a new ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-Sessional Meeting on Security of and in the Use of Information and Communications Technologies (ARF ISM on ICTs) as a dedicated international forum for advancing cyber cooperation among member states.

Congratulating ASEAN on its 50th Anniversary, the Ministers noted the central role ASEAN has played in the development of the Asia-Pacific regional architecture and its contribution to the region's stability and prosperity. The Ministers resolved to work together to strengthen regional ASEAN-centered organizations, especially the East Asia Summit (EAS). The Ministers stressed the value of the EAS as the premier Leaders-led forum in the region to address political and strategic issues and reiterated the importance of strengthening it in accordance with the 2015 Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the Tenth Anniversary of the East Asia Summit. The Ministers recognized the complex challenges facing the Pacific Island Countries, and underscored the importance of further trilateral cooperation to enhance economic resilience, sustainable development, and regional peace and security.

The Ministers recognized the importance of ensuring free and open sea-lanes as well as enhancing regional connectivity, including through quality infrastructure development.

The Ministers resolved to continue to work closely together and with their partners to promote strong, sustainable growth and prosperity, including by supporting good governance, the rule of law, and human rights.

Subsection III-12

Trilateral Defense Ministers' Joint Statement

3 June 2017

Joint Statement - Australia-US-Japan Defence Ministers' Meeting
3 June 2017

1. Australian Minister for Defence Marise Payne, Japanese Minister of Defense Tomomi Inada, and U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis held trilateral defence ministerial talks in Singapore on Saturday June 3, 2017, on the margins of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Shangri-La Dialogue. This was the sixth meeting of its kind among the three nations' top defence officials.

2. Minister Payne and Minister Inada congratulated Secretary Mattis on assuming the office of Secretary of Defense under the new Trump Administration. They reaffirmed that their respective Alliances with the United States are strong and essential to peace and security in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. They underscored their enduring support for United States engagement in the region, which continues to underpin peace, freedom, and prosperity. The three Ministers affirmed their shared intent to promote trilateral and multilateral security and defence cooperation with each other, regional allies, and partners.

3. Secretary Mattis and Minister Payne reiterated their support for Japan playing a greater role in regional and global security. In the Indo-Asia-Pacific, the U.S.-Japan Alliance and the U.S. Australia Alliance make essential contributions to continuing security and strategic stability. Moreover, Secretary Mattis welcomed the further deepening of bilateral defence cooperation between Australia and Japan.

4. The Ministers exchanged views on the increasing challenges to regional security. They reaffirmed the importance of further increasing cooperation among countries with shared interests in the peace and stability of the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, including India, the Republic of Korea, and other key regional partners.

5. The Ministers reiterated their condemnation in the strongest terms of North Korea's nuclear, ballistic missile, and other weapons of mass destruction programs and called on it to take concrete action toward denuclearization. They strongly urged North Korea to cease its destabilising and provocative actions immediately, and to comply fully with its international obligations and commitments, including those under relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. The Ministers reconfirmed their intention to continue to work with the Republic of Korea and other

partners, including China, to realise robust measures against North Korea to deter its reckless and provocative actions and so that North Korea instead engages responsibly with its neighbours and the international community.

7. The Ministers reaffirmed the importance of constructive and mutually beneficial relationships with China through dialogue, cooperation, and engagement. They also underscored their shared respect for international law as well as their shared commitment to upholding freedom of navigation and overflight and other lawful uses of the sea, including in the South China Sea. They expressed strong opposition to the use of coercion to unilaterally alter the status quo in the South China Sea, and their opposition to the use of disputed features for military purposes. The Ministers urged all South China Sea claimants to exercise self-restraint, take steps to ease tensions, halt land reclamation activities, demilitarise disputed features, and refrain from provocative actions that could escalate tensions. They highlighted the importance of the peaceful resolution of disputes through diplomacy and applicable dispute settlement mechanisms, noting in particular the Arbitral Tribunal's Award of July 2016. They called on the governments to clarify territorial claims and accompanying maritime claims in accordance with international law, particularly, for maritime claims, as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention. In this regard, they noted the Award of July 2016 could be a useful basis for further efforts to peacefully resolve disputes in the South China Sea. They also noted the announcement that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Chinese officials had finalised a draft framework for a Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea. The Ministers continued to encourage dialogues based on international law towards early finalization of an effective and legally binding COC, and call for the full and effective implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in its entirety.

8. The Ministers reiterated their strong opposition to the use of any unilateral or coercive actions that seek to alter the status quo or increase tensions in the East China Sea. They also expressed their intention to remain in close contact on the security situation in that area.

9. With regard to the continued enhancement of the strategic trilateral relationship among Australia, Japan and the United States, the Ministers welcomed the effective implementation of the Trilateral Information Sharing Arrangement signed on October 2016, which enhances information sharing on defence exercises and operations among the three nations in support of peace and stability.

10. On practical defence cooperation, the Ministers welcomed the trilateral ground Exercise SOUTHERN JACKAROO in May 2017, air Exercise COPE NORTH GUAM in February 2017, and the ongoing participation of Japan Self-Defense Forces elements in the United States-Australia joint exercise TALISMAN SABRE, the next iteration of which is scheduled for July 2017.

11. The Ministers reiterated their commitment to continue close coordination and cooperation in the fields of regional humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) and maritime security, including with other regional countries. They welcomed the successful trilateral engineering Exercise

HARI'I HAMUTUK, which was last held in Timor-Leste in November 2016, and the successful trilateral engagement in Exercise BALIKATAN, which was last held in the Philippines in May 2017.

12. Reaffirming the importance of ASEAN-led regional security architecture to security and stability in the Indo-Asia-Pacific, the Ministers welcomed continued progress in fostering practical defence cooperation within the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) framework and looked forward to the fourth ADMM-Plus in October 2017.

13. The Ministers reaffirmed their strategic goals and commitment to trilateral defence cooperation to further peace and security in the Indo-Asia-Pacific, and directed their respective officials to continue to identify and pursue new opportunities for practical engagement, cooperation and increased interoperability, including in training, deeper and more sophisticated exercises, operations and capacity building.

14. Noting the benefits that improved bilateral defence cooperation would have for the trilateral relationship, the Ministers welcomed the entry into force of the new Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) between the United States and Japan, and the progress in internal procedures necessary for the entry into force of the new ACSA between Australia and Japan, both of which reflect the enactment of Japan's peace and security legislation. Secretary Mattis also welcomed progress on negotiations toward an agreement between Australia and Japan to improve administrative, policy, and legal procedures reciprocally to facilitate joint operations and exercises.

Subsection III-13

Trilateral Foreign Ministers' Joint Statement

25 July 2016

Japan-United States-Australia Trilateral Strategic Dialogue Joint Statement

July 25, 2016

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, Fumio Kishida, the Secretary of State of the United States, John Kerry, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia, Julie Bishop, met in Vientiane, Laos on 25 July 2016, for the sixth ministerial meeting of the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD).

The ministers welcomed the growing positive impact of the strategic partnership between Japan, the United States and Australia, and reaffirmed the importance of TSD policy coordination and practical cooperation. They reiterated their commitment to further deepening their cooperation to ensure a peaceful, stable, and prosperous future for the Asia-Pacific region and the world.

The ministers reiterated the importance of upholding the rules-based maritime order including in the Asia Pacific region and the Indian Ocean. They called on all states to respect freedom of navigation and overflight. They reaffirmed the importance of states' making and clarifying their claims based on international law, including the 1982 United Nations Conventions on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), not using force or coercion in trying to advance their claims, and seeking to settle disputes by peaceful means including through legal processes such as arbitration.

The ministers expressed their serious concerns over maritime disputes in the South China Sea. The ministers voiced their strong opposition to any coercive unilateral actions that could alter the status quo and increase tensions, underlined the importance of refraining from unilateral actions that cause permanent physical change to the marine environment in areas pending delimitation, and urged all states to refrain from such actions as large-scale land reclamation, and the construction of outposts as well as the use of those outposts for military purposes. The ministers expressed their strong support for the rule of law and called on China and the Philippines to abide by the Arbitral Tribunal's Award of July 12 in the Philippines-China arbitration, which is final and legally binding on both parties. The ministers stressed that this is a crucial opportunity for the region to uphold the existing rules-based international order and to show respect for international law.

The ministers also opposed any coercive or unilateral actions that could alter the status quo and increase tensions in the East China Sea and will remain in close communication about the situation in the area.

The ministers welcomed the development of trilateral cooperation on maritime security capacity - building in Southeast Asia. The ministers resolved to advance this cooperation through ongoing exchanges of information and dialogue on regional needs. They reiterated the commitment of the three nations to continue coordinating their respective assistance programs and to identify ways we can more closely collaborate in the future.

The ministers condemned in the strongest terms North Korea's nuclear test in January and its subsequent ballistic missile launches which were conducted in violation of multiple UN Security Council Resolutions. They urged North Korea to immediately and fully comply with relevant UN Security Council resolutions, including Resolution 2270, and the Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks, and not to conduct any further provocation. They also urged North Korea to end its human rights violations and resolve the abductions issue immediately.

The ministers resolved to work together to strengthen cooperation in regional fora. They welcomed the central role of ASEAN in the development of regional architecture and its contribution to the region's stability and prosperity. They stressed the value of the East Asia Summit (EAS) as a Leaders-led forum for strategic dialogue and reiterated the importance of strengthening the EAS as the premier forum in the region.

The ministers strongly condemned terrorism in all forms and manifestations including recent attacks in Bangladesh, Iraq, Turkey, France, Afghanistan, and in many other places and expressed their deep sympathy and condolences to the families of the victims, and the governments of those affected. They expressed their strong support for the counterterrorism efforts by the international community.

Recognizing that ISIL/Da'esh, Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations pose serious threats to peace and international security, as well as to common values and principles for all humanity, the ministers reaffirmed the importance of international counter-terrorism efforts such as the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL. The ministers expressed support for the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund, which is pioneering development-based approaches to countering violent extremism in conflict affected countries. The ministers also expressed their support for the UN Secretary General's Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism and called for its implementation. Japan, the United States and Australia resolved to advocate for and strengthen existing information sharing mechanisms, such as those proposed by the International Criminal Police Organisation (INTERPOL), to combat the flow of foreign terrorist fighters.

The ministers stressed the strategic importance of a free, fair and open international trade and economic system for the region's stability and prosperity, and reconfirmed they would redouble their efforts to complete respective domestic processes for an early entry-into-force of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement.

The ministers resolved to further strengthen cooperation in the following fields:

- Joint cyber capacity-building in Southeast Asia and the Pacific and coordination in such fora as the UN Group of Governmental Experts and the ASEAN Regional Forum.
- Strengthening other countries' capacity for UN peacekeeping operations.
- Practical steps for achieving a peaceful and secure world free of nuclear weapons, stressing the importance of achieving a successful outcome in the 2020 NPT Review Conference.
- Implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, including the Sustainable Development Goals and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on Financing for Development.
- Effective implementation of the Paris Agreement, striving for entry into force in 2016.
- Promoting quality infrastructure investment and to encourage the relevant stakeholders to do so in cooperation with other partners.

The ministers resolved to continue to closely work together and with our partners to promote strong sustainable growth and prosperity in the Asia Pacific region and the world.

Subsection III-14

Trilateral Defense Ministers' Joint Statement

30 May 2015

Joint Statement - Japan-US-Australia Defense Ministers Meeting

30 May 2015

1. Japanese Defense Minister Gen Nakatani, U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, and Australian Minister for Defence Kevin Andrews held trilateral defense ministerial talks in Singapore on May 30, 2015, on the margins of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Shangri-La Dialogue. This was the fifth meeting of its kind among the three nations' top defense officials.

2. The Defense Ministers from Japan and Australia reaffirmed the strength of their respective Alliances with the United States as essential to peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region, and underscored their enduring support for the U.S. rebalance to the region. In this sense, the Japanese and U.S. Defense Ministers confirmed close collaboration based on the new Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation and affirmed their shared intent to promote trilateral and multilateral security and defense cooperation with Australia, regional allies, and partners. Recalling Japan's path as a peace-loving nation for the last 70 years, the U.S. Secretary of Defense and Australian Defense Ministers welcomed and supported Japan's recent efforts to play a greater role in regional and global security, including its efforts to develop legislation for peace and security under the banner of "Proactive Contribution to Peace" based on the principle of international cooperation. The US also welcomed the strengthening of bilateral relations between Australia and Japan.

3. The Secretary of Defense and Defense Ministers exchanged views on the regional security situation. On North Korea, they reiterated their call for North Korea to abide by United Nations Security Council Resolutions, to engage constructively with the international community, and to take concrete steps toward its denuclearization. They underscored their shared interest in the maintenance of peace and stability; respect for international law; commitment to upholding freedom of navigation and overflight; unimpeded commerce in the East China and South China Seas. They expressed strong opposition to the use of coercion or force to alter the status quo in the East China and South China Seas unilaterally and their serious concern over Chinese land reclamation activities in the South China Sea. They urged all South China Sea claimants to exercise self-restraint, halt reclamation activities, take steps to ease tensions and refrain from provocative actions that could escalate tensions. They called on governments to clarify and pursue territorial claims and accompanying maritime rights in accordance with international law. They also called for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China to reach early agreement on a meaningful Code of Conduct in the South China Sea.

4. Ensuring the value of multilateral cooperation in response to regional contingency, the Defense Ministers confirmed that the three countries are to continue to enhance practical trilateral defense cooperation and welcomed the trilateral anti-submarine warfare exercise held in August 2014, the trilateral exercises "Michinoku ALERT 2014" in November 2014, "Cope North Guam" in February 2015, and "Southern Jackaroo" in June 2015. They also welcomed the planned participation of Japan Self-Defense Forces elements' in the U.S. - Australia Joint Exercise "Talisman Sabre" scheduled for this July. The U.S. Secretary of Defense welcomed the involvement and leadership Japan and Australia have shown in recent "Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC)" exercises that have been important to enabling this exercise's continued success and maturation to ever higher degrees of combined operations and broader participation.

5. The Secretary of Defense and Defense Ministers confirmed their commitment to continued trilateral cooperation in defense capacity-building on maritime security and continued discussions on defense equipment and technology. They welcomed various opportunities for the three countries to discuss missile defense issues on a regular basis. The Secretary of Defense and Defense Ministers reaffirmed collaboration on maritime security assistance to Southeast Asia. They also shared the intention to coordinate and cooperate closely in the fields of regional humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) and maritime security together with other regional countries.

6. The Defense Ministers welcomed the contribution of ASEAN-led regional security architecture to security and stability in the Asia-Pacific. They welcomed continued progress in fostering practical defense cooperation within the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) framework and looked forward to the conduct of the third ADMM-Plus in November 2015.

7. The Defense Ministers reaffirmed their strategic goals for trilateral cooperation and pledged to further enhance trilateral defense cooperation.

Subsection III-15

Trilateral Foreign Ministers' Joint Statement

4 October 2013

Trilateral Strategic Dialogue
Joint Statement
4 October, 2013

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia, Julie Bishop, the Foreign Minister of Japan, Fumio Kishida, and the Secretary of State of the United States, John Kerry, met in Bali, Indonesia on October 4, 2013, for the fifth ministerial meeting of the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) to discuss current and emerging regional and global issues.

The TSD Ministerial meeting was held on the margins of the Asia-Pacific Economic Forum (APEC) Ministerial meeting.

The three ministers affirmed their commitment to the TSD process as it allows for a timely exchange of views on the regional strategic environment.

The ministers discussed ways in which all three countries could collaborate and contribute to regional stability and sustained economic prosperity.

Ministers welcomed UN Security Council resolution 2118 and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Executive Council Decision [EC-M-33/DEC.1] on the destruction of Syria's chemical weapons and called for the early convening of the Geneva II conference on political transition, as well as for improved humanitarian access and support as reflected in the 2 October UN Security Council Presidential Statement on Syria.

Ministers reiterated their concern regarding the Iranian nuclear program, welcomed the announcement of the next round of talks between the E3+3 and Iran in Geneva on October 15-16, and encouraged Iran to engage substantively with the E3+3 in the new round of talks, and adhere to the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council and the IAEA Board of Governors.
Ministers expressed deep concern at North Korea's continued development of its nuclear and missile programs and proliferation activities. They called on North Korea to comply with UN Security Resolutions 1718, 1874, 2087, and 2094.

The ministers also called on North Korea to adhere to the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement by taking concrete and irreversible steps to abandon its nuclear weapons and all existing nuclear

programs in a complete and verifiable manner. They also expressed deep concern at North Korea's deplorable human rights record, including the abductions issue.

Ministers opposed any coercive or unilateral actions that could change the status quo in the East China Sea. They underlined the importance of efforts to reduce tensions and to avoid miscalculations or accidents in the East China Sea, including by improving marine communications.

The ministers affirmed the importance of peace and stability, respect for international law, unimpeded trade and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. They called on claimants to refrain from actions that could increase tensions, to clarify and pursue claims in accordance with international law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and for ASEAN and China to agree on a meaningful Code of Conduct.

The ministers recognized that the East Asia Summit, ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus, ASEAN Regional Forum, and APEC are key fora to strengthen regional security and economic integration.

The ministers recognized the value of the TSD mechanism and reaffirmed their shared commitment to address security challenges of mutual interest in the Indian Ocean and Asia-Pacific region.

Subsection III-16

Trilateral Foreign Ministers' Joint Statement

27 June 2008

Trilateral Strategic Dialogue Joint Statement
June 27, 2008

The Foreign Minister of Australia, Mr. Stephen Smith, the Foreign Minister of Japan, Mr. Masahiko Koumura, and the Secretary of State of the United States, Dr. Condoleezza Rice met in Kyoto on June 27, 2008 for the third ministerial meeting of the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue to exchange views on both regional and global issues of mutual interest, and discussed ways to further trilateral cooperation. The three countries are committed to working together as close strategic partners to help promote stability and security globally, with a particular focus on the Asia-Pacific region.

The three Ministers shared the view that the Asia-Pacific region, while undergoing a dynamic change in political and economic terms, is faced with a wide range of security challenges, both traditional and non-traditional, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and responding to natural disasters. The three Ministers underlined the importance of meeting theses challenges by promoting cooperation between Australia, Japan and the United States thereby ensuring peace and prosperity in the region and beyond. This cooperation between the partners supports and complements the activities undertaken within the existing regional architecture and our efforts to strengthen the existing regional architecture.

Welcoming the candid discussions held at the senior officials' meetings and the progress made in trilateral cooperation, they confirmed their commitment to further strengthen trilateral initiatives in the following areas. They also indicated their desire that cooperation continue to be forward-looking and responsive to emerging security issues.

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
Recognizing the importance of advancing international cooperation in responding to natural disasters and humanitarian crises, the three Ministers welcomed the advancement of trilateral cooperation on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief as annexed to this Joint Statement. The three Ministers committed to finalize the guidelines for the implementation of the Joint Statement. Japan and the United States welcomed Australia's offer to host the first meeting of disaster relief officials possibly in November this year.

Counter-Terrorism
Recognizing the importance of advancing international cooperation in combating terrorism, the three Ministers welcomed that the Trilateral Counter-Terrorism Consultations have produced a number of positive collaborative activities, including information exchange and coordinated capacity building activities for Southeast Asian countries such as the Trilateral Philippine Pilot Port Project. Ministers also acknowledged recent efforts to address the threat of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorism, to combat terrorist financing, and to promote counter radicalization.

Southeast Asia Cooperation
Recognizing the importance of stability in Southeast Asia for the peace and security of the Asia-Pacific region, the three Ministers confirmed their commitment to explore trilateral regional cooperation.

Pacific Working Group
Welcoming the successful Working Group in April this year, the three Ministers decided to step up their efforts to assist Pacific island countries' efforts to promote peace and prosperity in the region. Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to ensure better development outcomes for Pacific Island countries through discussion and collaboration.

Security and Defense Cooperation
Welcoming that the Security and Defense Cooperation Forum has been actively working to increase inter-operability among the three countries, especially in the area of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, the three Ministers confirmed their commitment to further enhance their partnership through practical cooperation, which includes holding air mobility seminars, and participating in humanitarian activities by US medical ships and Proliferation Security Initiative exercises.

The three Ministers reaffirmed the value of regularly holding the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue at the ministerial level to enhance trilateral coordination and cooperation.

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Trilateral Strategic Dialogue Joint Statement Annex; Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief in the Asia Pacific Region: Trilateral Cooperation

At the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue ministerial meeting in Kyoto on June 27, 2008, the Foreign Minister of Australia, Mr. Stephen Smith, the Foreign Minister of Japan, Mr. Masahiko Koumura and the Secretary of State of the United States, Dr. Condoleezza Rice, discussed ways to enhance practical trilateral cooperation on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in the Asia-Pacific region.

The ministers recalled that Australia, Japan and the United States have a strong record in responding to natural disasters and other humanitarian emergencies, as demonstrated in the wake of the December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and other more recent events. They committed to build on this, trilaterally and in conjunction with relevant regional and international arrangements, to strengthen cooperation on disaster management and emergency response.

The ministers decided that the three countries would develop arrangements to exchange information to ensure best use of assets and other resources in preparing for and responding to natural disasters and other humanitarian emergencies in the region. While recognizing that each country would retain the prerogative to respond as it saw fit, they shared the view that there was value in aligning emergency response efforts and where appropriate in undertaking such efforts jointly.

Specifically, the ministers decided that the trilateral partners would identify contact points for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief officials, and that these officials would meet at a technical level to review and discuss practical trilateral cooperation and to share information on lessons learned. They also decided that the three countries should conduct exercises to build understanding of respective emergency response procedures and capabilities.

The ministers directed relevant officials to develop guidelines to facilitate this trilateral cooperation and information-sharing on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

In discussing these issues, the ministers recognized that national governments have primary responsibility for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief within their national jurisdictions, and that any help rendered by the trilateral partners would be in support and at the request of the governments and countries affected.

They also made clear that trilateral cooperation on disaster management and emergency response was intended to complement and reinforce the work of relevant regional and international arrangements, including bodies such as the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the International Search and Rescue Advisory Group and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.

Australia, Japan and the United States will continue to work closely with such bodies, and national partners in the Asia-Pacific region, to strengthen collaborative humanitarian assistance and disaster relief mechanisms.

Subsection III-17

Trilateral Foreign Ministers' Joint Statement

18 March 2006

Trilateral Strategic Dialogue Joint Statement Australia-Japan-United States

18 March 2006, Sydney

The Foreign Minister of Australia, Mr Alexander Downer, the Foreign Minister of Japan, Mr Taro Aso and the Secretary of State of the United States, Dr Condoleezza Rice met in Sydney, Australia, on 18 March 2006 for the inaugural ministerial meeting of the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue between the three nations.

As longstanding democracies and developed economies, our three countries have a common cause in working to maintain stability and security globally with a particular focus on the Asia Pacific region. This meeting was a significant step in intensifying the strategic dialogue between our countries and reflects the importance we attach to greater trilateral cooperation in addressing contemporary security issues. This cooperation will complement the strong security relationships that each of our three countries has established.

Discussions during the dialogue covered a wide range of current security challenges, both regional and global, of shared interest to our three Governments. Supporting the emergence and consolidation of democracies and strengthening cooperative frameworks in the Asia-Pacific region was a particular focus of our attention.

We welcomed China's constructive engagement in the region and concurred on the value of enhanced cooperation with other parties such as ASEAN and the Republic of Korea. We recognised the importance of reinforcing our global partnership with India and noted that India's decision to place its civilian nuclear facilities and programs under international safeguards would be a positive step towards expansion of the reach of the international non-proliferation regime.

We discussed the current situation in North Korea and called on it to return immediately and unconditionally to the Six-Party Talks with a view to implementing the Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks. We looked forward to the ASEAN visit to Burma/Myanmar and underscored the need for genuine progress in democratization there, including the release of all political prisoners. We have grave concerns about Iran's nuclear program, and discussed the need for concerted action at the UN Security Council to convince Iran to promptly suspend all enrichment-related activities, fully cooperate with the IAEA, return to negotiations and take all steps called for

by the IAEA board. We are also mindful of the challenges facing Pacific island countries and are determined to work together to support economic development and good governance.

To strengthen trilateral cooperation, we decided to enhance our exchange of information and strategic assessments on major international and regional security issues and developments, including to assist our efforts to counter terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We also reaffirmed the value of conducting regular trilateral consultations between our respective Ambassadors in charge of Counter-terrorism, with the intention of supplementing and reinforcing the network of partnerships each of our countries has created to fight the global terrorist threat.

Our agenda also encompassed pressing non-traditional security issues, such as the response to major pandemics, which is another area in which each of our three countries is committed to building on the already significant contribution we have made to regional security.

In recognition of the importance of strengthening international institutions that contribute to the maintenance of security, we reaffirmed the need to continue efforts to reform the United Nations, including the Security Council, and the support of our three Governments for Japan's bid for a permanent seat on the Security Council.

The trilateral dialogue between the United States, Japan and Australia began at the level of senior officials, in 2002. Its elevation to the level of Foreign Ministers reflects our determination to work together to protect our shared strategic interests in promoting peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. We expect that the dialogue will be held regularly at the Ministerial level, augmented by regular meetings of senior officials throughout the year.

SECTION IV

The Quad

Joint press conference from the Quadrilateral Foreign Ministers meeting in 2024
(photo credit: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan)

The Quad

While the trilateral relationship with the United States may have catalyzed bilateral Australia-Japan cooperation, the governments in Canberra and Tokyo have spurred on a quadrilateral relationship that brings India into the group. Commonly referred to as the "Quad," it is a diplomatic partnership focused on underpinning an open, stable, and prosperous Indo-Pacific. The partnership brings together leading democracies in the region who each play an important role in reinforcing a rules-based order in the region, while addressing pressing challenges including infrastructure, critical and emerging technology, maritime security, and counterterrorism, among other issues.

Although the partnership dates back to the four countries' collaboration in response to the December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, this section focuses on the developments in the relationship following group's re-emergence in 2017. Representatives from the four countries met numerous times since then, but it was not until 2021 that the group began regularly issuing negotiated joint statements from their engagements. This section includes the published readouts from the early meetings between senior diplomats as well as the joint statements that later became the norm. The section proceeds in reverse chronological order, with the recent statements included up front for ease of reference.

Subsection IV-1

Quad Foreign Ministers' Joint Statement

21 January 2025

Joint Statement by the Quad Foreign Ministers
January 21, 2025

We, the Secretary of State of the United States and the Foreign Ministers of Australia, India, and Japan, met today in Washington D.C. to reaffirm our shared commitment to strengthening a Free and Open Indo-Pacific where the rule of law, democratic values, sovereignty, and territorial integrity are upheld and defended. Our four nations maintain our conviction that international law, economic opportunity, peace, stability, and security in all domains including the maritime domain underpin the development and prosperity of the peoples of the Indo-Pacific. We also strongly oppose any unilateral actions that seek to change the status quo by force or coercion.

We are committed to strengthening regional maritime, economic, and technology security in the face of increasing threats, as well as promoting reliable and resilient supply chains. We look forward to advancing the work of the Quad in the coming months and will meet together on a regular basis as we prepare for the next Quad Leaders' Summit hosted by India.

Subsection IV-2

Quad Foreign Ministers' Joint Statement

31 December 2024

Joint Statement from the Quad Foreign Ministers Commemorating the 20th Anniversary of Quad Cooperation

December 31, 2024

1. Twenty years ago, in response to the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami, Australia, India, Japan, and the United States came together in service to the people of our region for the first time as the grouping now known as the Quad. The tsunami was one of the worst disasters in history, claiming the lives of nearly a quarter million people and displacing 1.7 million across 14 countries. Together our four countries contributed over 40,000 emergency responders, working with other partners across the Indo-Pacific region to support millions of people affected by the catastrophe. We honor the memories of those no longer with us and recognize the survivors and the families of those who were lost.

2. Our foundational commitment to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief remains strong. We continue to work side-by-side to prepare for and respond quickly and effectively to disasters across the region. In 2024, our four countries collectively supported disaster preparedness and life-saving relief efforts across the Indo-Pacific, and we continue to build on those efforts to identify new ways to respond rapidly to humanitarian crises and disasters.

3. What began as an emergency response to a catastrophe has grown into a full-fledged partnership delivering positive outcomes for the people of our region. Quad countries now work together and with partners across the Indo-Pacific to address complex challenges, from fighting climate change, cancer, and pandemics, to bolstering quality infrastructure, maritime domain awareness, STEM education, counter-terrorism efforts, critical and emerging technologies, and cyber security. Since 2021, the Leaders of our four nations have met annually to drive the Quad's positive contributions across South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific.

4. As four partners, we share a vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific that is peaceful, stable, and prosperous, underpinned by effective regional institutions. We reaffirm our unwavering support for ASEAN's centrality and unity as well as mainstreaming and implementation of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. We respect Pacific-led regional architecture, foremost the Pacific Islands Forum. We are also steadfast in our support for the Indian Ocean Rim Association, the region's premier organization.

5. The Quad is committed to working together in responding to the future needs of the region.

New Delhi
December 31, 2024

Subsection IV-3

Quad Leaders' Joint Statement

21 September 2024

The Wilmington Declaration Joint Statement from the Leaders of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States

Today, we—Prime Minister Anthony Albanese of Australia, Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India, Prime Minister Kishida Fumio of Japan, and President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. of the United States—met for the fourth in-person Quad Leaders Summit, hosted by President Biden in Wilmington, Delaware.

Four years since elevating the Quad to a leader-level format, the Quad is more strategically aligned than ever before and is a force for good that delivers real, positive, and enduring impact for the Indo-Pacific. We celebrate the fact that over just four years, Quad countries have built a vital and enduring regional grouping that will buttress the Indo-Pacific for decades to come.

Anchored by shared values, we seek to uphold the international order based on the rule of law. Together we represent nearly two billion people and over one-third of global gross domestic product. We reaffirm our steadfast commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific that is inclusive and resilient. Through our cooperation, the Quad is harnessing all of our collective strengths and resources, from governments to the private sector to people-to-people relationships, to support the region's sustainable development, stability, and prosperity by delivering tangible benefits to the people of the Indo-Pacific.

As four leading maritime democracies in the Indo-Pacific, we unequivocally stand for the maintenance of peace and stability across this dynamic region, as an indispensable element of global security and prosperity. We strongly oppose any destabilizing or unilateral actions that seek to change the status quo by force or coercion. We condemn recent illicit missile launches in the region that violate UN Security Council resolutions. We express serious concern over recent dangerous and aggressive actions in the maritime domain. We seek a region where no country dominates and no country is dominated—one where all countries are free from coercion, and can exercise their agency to determine their futures. We are united in our commitment to upholding a stable and open international system, with its strong support for human rights, the principle of freedom, rule of law, democratic values, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and peaceful settlement of disputes and prohibition on the threat or use of force in accordance with international law, including the UN Charter.

Reflecting the Vision Statement issued by Leaders at the 2023 Quad Summit, we are and will continue to be transparent in what we do. Respect for the leadership of regional institutions, including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), is and will remain at the center of the Quad's efforts.

A Global Force for Good

Health Security

The COVID-19 pandemic reminded the world how important health security is to our societies, our economies, and the stability of our region. In 2021 and 2022, the Quad came together to deliver more than 400 million safe and effective COVID-19 doses to Indo-Pacific countries and almost 800 million vaccines globally, and provided $5.6 billion to the COVAX Advance Market Commitment for vaccine supply to low and middle-income countries. In 2023, we announced the Quad Health Security Partnership, through which the Quad continues to deliver for partners across the region, including through the delivery of pandemic preparedness training.

In response to the current clade I mpox outbreak, as well as the ongoing clade II mpox outbreak, we plan to coordinate our efforts to promote equitable access to safe, effective, quality-assured mpox vaccines, including where appropriate expanding vaccine manufacturing in low and middle-income countries.

Today we are proud to announce the Quad Cancer Moonshot, a groundbreaking partnership to save lives in the Indo-Pacific region. Building on the Quad's successful partnership during the COVID-19 pandemic, our collective investments to address cancer in the region, our scientific and medical capabilities, and contributions from our private and non-profit sectors, we will collaborate with partner nations to reduce the burden of cancer in the region.

The Quad Cancer Moonshot will focus initially on combatting cervical cancer—a preventable cancer that continues to claim too many lives—in the Indo-Pacific region, while laying the groundwork to address other forms of cancer as well. The United States intends to support this initiative, including through U.S. Navy medical trainings and professional exchanges around cervical cancer prevention in the region starting in 2025, and through U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) openness to finance eligible private sector-driven projects to prevent, diagnose, and treat cancer, including cervical cancer. Australia is announcing the expansion of the Elimination Partnership in the Indo-Pacific for Cervical Cancer Program (EPICC) with support of the Australian Government and the Minderoo Foundation to AUD 29.6 million, to cover up to eleven countries in the Indo-Pacific in helping advance the elimination of cervical cancer and support complementary initiatives focused on cancer prevention, diagnosis, and treatment. India commits to providing HPV sampling kits, detection kits, and cervical cancer vaccines worth $7.5 million to the Indo-Pacific region. India, through its $10 million commitment to the WHO's Global Initiative on Digital

Health, will offer technical assistance to interested countries in the Indo-Pacific region for the adoption and deployment of its Digital Public Infrastructure that helps in cancer screening and care. Japan is providing medical equipment, including CT and MRI scanners, and other assistance worth approximately $27 million, including in Cambodia, Vietnam, and Timor-Leste, and is contributing to international organizations such as the Gavi Vaccine Alliance. Quad partners also intend to work, within respective national contexts, to collaborate in advancing research and development in the area of cancer and to increase private sector and non-governmental sector activities in support of reducing the burden of cervical cancer in the region. We welcome a number of new, ambitious commitments from non-governmental institutions, including the Serum Institute of India, in partnership with Gavi, which will support orders of up to 40 million HPV vaccine doses, subject to necessary approvals, for the Indo-Pacific region, and which may be increased consistent with demand. We also welcome a new $100 million commitment from Women's Health and Empowerment Network to address cervical cancer in Southeast Asia.

Altogether, our scientific experts assess that the Quad Cancer Moonshot will save hundreds of thousands of lives over the coming decades.

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR)

Twenty years since the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami, when the Quad first came together to surge humanitarian assistance, we continue to respond to the vulnerabilities caused by natural disasters in the Indo-Pacific. In 2022, the Quad established the "Quad Partnership on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief in the Indo-Pacific" and signed Guidelines for the Quad Partnership on HADR in the Indo-Pacific, which enable Quad countries to rapidly coordinate in the face of natural disasters. We welcome Quad governments working to ensure readiness to rapidly respond, including through pre-positioning of essential relief supplies, in the event of a natural disaster; this effort extends from the Indian Ocean region, to Southeast Asia, to the Pacific. In May 2024, following a tragic landslide in Papua New Guinea, Quad partners collectively contributed over $5 million in humanitarian assistance. Quad partners are working together to provide over $4 million in humanitarian assistance to support the people of Vietnam in light of the devastating consequences of Typhoon Yagi. The Quad continues to support partners in the region in their longer-term resiliency efforts.

Maritime Security

In 2022, we announced the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) to offer near-real-time, integrated, and cost-effective maritime domain awareness information to partners in the region. Since then, in consultation with partners, we have successfully scaled the program across the Indo-Pacific region—through the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency, with partners in Southeast Asia, to the Information Fusion Center—Indian Ocean Region, Gurugram. In doing so, the Quad has helped well over two dozen countries access dark vessel maritime domain awareness data, so they can better monitor the activities in their exclusive economic zones—including unlawful activity. Australia commits to boosting its cooperation with the Pacific Islands

Forum Fisheries Agency to enhance regional maritime domain awareness in the Pacific through satellite data, training, and capacity building.

Today we are announcing a new regional Maritime Initiative for Training in the Indo-Pacific (MAITRI), to enable our partners in the region to maximize tools provided through IPMDA and other Quad partner initiatives, to monitor and secure their waters, enforce their laws, and deter unlawful behavior. We look forward to India hosting the inaugural MAITRI workshop in 2025. Furthermore, we welcome the launch of a Quad maritime legal dialogue to support efforts to uphold the rules-based maritime order in the Indo-Pacific. In addition, Quad partners intend to layer new technology and data into IPMDA over the coming year, to continue to deliver cutting edge capability and information to the region.

We are also announcing today that the U.S. Coast Guard, Japan Coast Guard, Australian Border Force, and Indian Coast Guard, plan to launch a first-ever Quad-at-Sea Ship Observer Mission in 2025, to improve interoperability and advance maritime safety, and continuing with further missions in future years across the Indo-Pacific.

We also announce today the launch of a Quad Indo-Pacific Logistics Network pilot project, to pursue shared airlift capacity among our nations and leverage our collective logistics strengths, in order to support civilian response to natural disasters more rapidly and efficiently across the Indo-Pacific region.

Quality Infrastructure

The Quad remains committed to improving the region's connectivity through the development of quality, resilient infrastructure.

We are pleased to announce the Quad Ports of the Future Partnership, which will harness the Quad's expertise to support sustainable and resilient port infrastructure development across the Indo-Pacific, in collaboration with regional partners. In 2025, we intend to hold a Quad Regional Ports and Transportation Conference, hosted by India in Mumbai. Through this new partnership, Quad partners intend to coordinate, exchange information, share best practices with partners in the region, and leverage resources to mobilize government and private sector investments in quality port infrastructure across the Indo-Pacific region.

We applaud the expansion of the Quad Infrastructure Fellowships to more than 2,200 experts, and note that Quad partners have already provided well over 1,300 fellowships since the initiative was announced at last year's Summit. We also appreciate the workshop organized by the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure in India, working to empower partners across the Indo-Pacific to strengthen power sector resilience.

Through the Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience, we continue to support and strengthen quality undersea cable networks in the Indo-Pacific, the capacity, durability, and reliability of which are inextricably linked to the security and prosperity of the region and the world. In support of these efforts, Australia launched the Cable Connectivity and Resilience Centre in July, which is delivering workshops and policy and regulatory assistance in response to requests from across the region. Japan will extend technical cooperation to improve public ICT infrastructure management capacity for an undersea cable in Nauru and Kiribati. The United States has conducted over 1,300 capacity building trainings for telecommunication officials and executives from 25 countries in the Indo-Pacific; today the U.S. announces its intent, working with Congress, to invest an additional $3.4 million to extend and expand this training program.

Investments in cable projects by Quad partners will help support all Pacific island countries in achieving primary telecommunication cable connectivity by the end of 2025. Since the last Quad Leaders' Summit, Quad partners have committed over $140 million to undersea cable builds in the Pacific, alongside contributions from other likeminded partners. Complementing these investments in new undersea cables, India has commissioned a feasibility study to examine expansion of undersea cable maintenance and repair capabilities in the Indo-Pacific.

We reaffirm our support for the Pacific Quality Infrastructure Principles, which are an expression of Pacific voices on infrastructure.
We underscore our commitment to an inclusive, open, sustainable, fair, safe, reliable and secure digital future to advance our shared prosperity and sustainable development across the Indo-Pacific. In this context, we welcome the Quad Principles for Development and Deployment of Digital Public Infrastructure.

Critical and Emerging Technologies
Today, we are proud to announce an ambitious expansion of our partnership to deliver trusted technology solutions to the broader Indo-Pacific region.

Last year, Quad partners launched a landmark initiative to deploy the first Open Radio Access Network (RAN) in the Pacific, in Palau, to support a secure, resilient, and interconnected telecommunications ecosystem. Since then, the Quad has pledged approximately $20 million to this effort.

Quad partners also welcome the opportunity to explore additional Open RAN projects in Southeast Asia. We plan to expand support for ongoing Open RAN field trials and the Asia Open RAN Academy (AORA) in the Philippines, building on the initial $8 million in support that the United States and Japan pledged earlier this year. The United States also plans to invest over $7 million to support the global expansion of AORA, including through establishing a first-of-its-kind Open RAN workforce training initiative at scale in South Asia, in partnership with Indian institutions.

Quad partners will also explore collaborating with the Tuvalu Telecommunications Corporation to ensure the country's readiness for nationwide 5G deployment.

We remain committed to advancing our cooperation on semiconductors through better leveraging of our complementary strengths to realize a diversified and competitive market and enhance resilience of Quad's semiconductor supply chains. We welcome a Memorandum of Cooperation between Quad countries for the Semiconductor Supply Chains Contingency Network.

Through the Advancing Innovations for Empowering NextGen Agriculture (AI-ENGAGE) initiative announced at last year's Summit, our governments are deepening leading-edge collaborative research to harness artificial intelligence, robotics, and sensing to transform agricultural approaches and empower farmers across the Indo-Pacific. We are pleased to announce an inaugural $7.5+ million in funding opportunities for joint research, and welcome the recent signing of a Memorandum of Cooperation between our science agencies to connect our research communities and advance shared research principles.

The United States, Australia, India, and Japan look forward to launching the Quad BioExplore Initiative—a funded mechanism that will support joint AI-driven exploration of diverse non-human biological data across all four countries.

This project will also be underpinned by the forthcoming Quad Principles for Research and Development Collaborations in Critical and Emerging Technologies.

Climate and Clean Energy

As we underscore the severe economic, social, and environmental consequences posed by the climate crisis, we continue to work together with Indo-Pacific partners, including through Quad Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation Package (Q-CHAMP), to enhance climate and clean energy cooperation as well as promote adaptation and resilience. We emphasize the significant benefits of transitioning to a clean energy economy for our people, our planet, and our shared prosperity. Our countries intend to strengthen our cooperation to align policies, incentives, standards, and investments around creating high-quality, diversified clean energy supply chains that will enhance our collective energy security, create new economic opportunities across the region, and benefit local workers and communities around the world, particularly across the Indo-Pacific.

We will work together, through policy and public finance, to operationalize our commitment to catalyzing complementary and high-standard private sector investment in allied and partner clean energy supply chains. To this end, Australia will open applications for the Quad Clean Energy Supply Chains Diversification Program in November, providing AUD 50 million to support projects that develop and diversify solar panel, hydrogen electrolyzer and battery supply chains in the Indo-Pacific. India commits to invest $2 million in new solar projects in Fiji, Comoros, Madagascar, and Seychelles. Japan has committed to $122 million grants and loans in renewable energy projects in

Indo-Pacific countries. The United States, through DFC, will continue to seek opportunities to mobilize private capital to solar, as well as wind, cooling, batteries, and critical minerals to expand and diversify supply chains.

We are pleased to announce a focused Quad effort to boost energy efficiency, including the deployment and manufacturing of high-efficiency affordable, cooling systems to enable climate-vulnerable communities to adapt to rising temperatures while simultaneously reducing strain on the electricity grid.

We jointly affirm our commitment to addressing the challenges posed by climate change and ensure the resilience and sustainability of port infrastructure. Quad partners will leverage our learning and expertise to forge a path towards sustainable and resilient port infrastructure, including through the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI).

Cyber

In the face of a deteriorating security environment in the cyber domain, Quad countries intend to enhance our cybersecurity partnership to address common threats posed by state-sponsored actors, cybercriminals, and other non-state malicious actors. Our countries commit to taking concrete steps to increase our collective network defense and advance technical capabilities through greater threat information sharing and capacity building. We plan to coordinate joint efforts to identify vulnerabilities, protect national security networks and critical infrastructure networks, and coordinate more closely including on policy responses to significant cybersecurity incidents affecting the Quad's shared priorities.

Quad countries are also partnering with software manufacturers, industry trade groups, and research centers to expand our commitment to pursuing secure software development standards and certification, as endorsed in the Quad's 2023 Secure Software Joint Principles. We will work to harmonize these standards to not only ensure that the development, procurement, and end-use of software for government networks is more secure, but that the cyber resilience of our supply chains, digital economies, and societies are collectively improved. Throughout this fall, Quad countries each plan to host campaigns to mark the annual Quad Cyber Challenge promoting responsible cyber ecosystems, public resources, and cybersecurity awareness. We are constructively engaging on the Quad Action Plan to Protect Commercial Undersea Telecommunications Cables, developed by the Quad Senior Cyber Group, as a complementary effort to the Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience. Our coordinated actions to protect global telecommunications infrastructure as guided by the Action Plan will advance our shared vision for future digital connectivity, global commerce, and prosperity.

Space

We recognize the essential contribution of space-related applications and technologies in the Indo-Pacific. Our four countries intend to continue delivering Earth Observation data and other space-

related applications to assist nations across the Indo-Pacific to strengthen climate early warning systems and better manage the impacts of extreme weather events. In this context, we welcome India's establishment of a space-based web portal for Mauritius, to support the concept of open science for space-based monitoring of extreme weather events and climate impact.

Quad Investors Network (QUIN)

We welcome private sector initiatives—including the Quad Investors Network (QUIN), which facilitates investments in strategic technologies, including clean energy, semiconductors, critical minerals, and quantum. The QUIN is mobilizing a number of investments to promote supply chain resilience, advance joint research and development, commercialize new technologies, and invest in our future workforce.

People-to-People Initiatives

The Quad is committed to strengthening the deep and enduring ties between our people, and among our partners. Through the Quad Fellowship, we are building a network of the next generation of science, technology, and policy leaders. Together with the Institute of International Education, which leads implementation of the Quad Fellowship, Quad governments welcome the second cohort of Quad Fellows and the expansion of the program to include students from ASEAN countries for the first time. The Government of Japan is supporting the program to enable Quad Fellows to study in Japan. The Quad welcomes the generous support of private sector partners for the next cohort of fellows, including Google, the Pratt Foundation, and Western Digital.

India is pleased to announce a new initiative to award fifty Quad scholarships, worth $500,000, to students from the Indo-Pacific to pursue a 4-year undergraduate engineering program at a Government of India-funded technical institution.

Working Together to Address Regional and Global Issues

Today we reaffirm our consistent and unwavering support for ASEAN centrality and unity. We continue to support implementation of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) and are committed to ensuring the Quad's work is aligned with ASEAN's principles and priorities.

We underscore ASEAN's regional leadership role, including in the East Asia Summit, the region's premier leader-led forum for strategic dialogue, and the ASEAN Regional Forum. As comprehensive strategic partners of ASEAN, our four countries intend to continue to strengthen our respective relationships with ASEAN and seek opportunities for greater Quad collaboration in support of the AOIP.

We recommit to working in partnership with Pacific island countries to achieve shared aspirations and address shared challenges. We reaffirm our support for Pacific regional institutions that have served the region well over many years, with the PIF as the region's premier political and economic

policy organization, and warmly welcome Tonga's leadership as the current PIF Chair in 2024-2025. We continue to support the objectives of the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent. We and our governments will continue to listen to and be guided at every step by Pacific priorities, including climate action, ocean health, resilient infrastructure, maritime security and financial integrity. In particular, we acknowledge climate change remains the single greatest threat to the livelihoods, security and wellbeing of the peoples of the Pacific and applaud Pacific island countries' global leadership on climate action.

We remain committed to strengthening cooperation in the Indian Ocean region. We strongly support IORA as the Indian Ocean region's premier forum for addressing the region's challenges. We recognize India's leadership in finalizing the IORA Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (IOIP) and express our support for its implementation. We thank Sri Lanka for its continued leadership as IORA Chair through this year and look forward to India's assuming the IORA Chair in 2025.

As Leaders, we are steadfast in our conviction that international law, including respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the maintenance of peace, safety, security and stability in the maritime domain, underpin the sustainable development, and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific. We emphasize the importance of adherence to international law, particularly as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), to address challenges to the global maritime rules-based order, including with respect to maritime claims. We are seriously concerned about the situation in the East and South China Seas. We continue to express our serious concern about the militarization of disputed features, and coercive and intimidating maneuvers in the South China Sea. We condemn the dangerous use of coast guard and maritime militia vessels, including increasing use of dangerous maneuvers. We also oppose efforts to disrupt other countries' offshore resource exploitation activities. We reaffirm that maritime disputes must be resolved peacefully and in accordance with international law, as reflected in UNCLOS. We re-emphasize the importance of maintaining and upholding freedom of navigation and overflight, other lawful uses of the sea, and unimpeded commerce consistent with international law. We re-emphasize the universal and unified character of UNCLOS and reaffirm that UNCLOS sets out the legal framework within which all activities in the oceans and the seas must be carried out. We underscore that the 2016 Arbitral Award on the South China Sea is a significant milestone and the basis for peacefully resolving disputes between the parties.

Together, with our global and regional partners, we continue to support international institutions and initiatives that underpin global peace, prosperity and sustainable development. We reiterate our unwavering support for the UN Charter and the three pillars of the UN system. In consultation with our partners, we will work collectively to address attempts to unilaterally undermine the integrity of the UN, its Charter, and its agencies. We will reform the UN Security Council, recognizing the urgent need to make it more representative, inclusive, transparent, efficient, effective, democratic and accountable through expansion in permanent and non-permanent categories of membership of

the UN Security Council. This expansion of permanent seats should include representation for Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean in a reformed Security Council.

We stand for adherence to international law and respect for principles of the UN Charter, including territorial integrity, sovereignty of all states, and peaceful resolution of disputes. We express our deepest concern over the war raging in Ukraine including the terrible and tragic humanitarian consequences. Each of us has visited Ukraine since the war began, and seen this first-hand; we reiterate the need for a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace in line with international law, consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, including respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. We also note the negative impacts of the war in Ukraine with regard to global food and energy security, especially for developing and least developed countries. In the context of this war, we share the view that the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons is unacceptable. We underscore the importance of upholding international law, and in line with the UN Charter, reiterate that all states must refrain from the threat of or use of force against the territorial integrity and sovereignty or political independence of any state.

We condemn North Korea's destabilizing ballistic missile launches and its continued pursuit of nuclear weapons in violation of multiple UN Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs). These launches pose a grave threat to international peace and stability. We urge North Korea to abide by all its obligations under the UNSCRs, refrain from further provocations and engage in substantive dialogue. We reaffirm our commitment to the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula consistent with relevant UNSCRs and call on all countries to fully implement these UNSCRs. We stress the need to prevent any proliferation of nuclear and missile technologies related to North Korea in the region and beyond. We express our grave concern over North Korea's use of proliferation networks, malicious cyber activity and workers abroad to fund its unlawful weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs. In that context, we urge all UN Member States to abide by the relevant UNSCRs including the prohibition on the transfer to North Korea or procurement from North Korea of all arms and related materiel. We express deep concern about countries that are deepening military cooperation with North Korea, which directly undermines the global nonproliferation regime. As the mandate of the UN Panel of Experts tasked with monitoring violations of North Korea-related UNSCR sanctions was not renewed, we reiterate our commitment to continued implementation of the relevant UNSCRs which remain in full force. We reconfirm the necessity of immediate resolution of the abductions issue.

We remain deeply concerned by the worsening political, security and humanitarian situation in Myanmar, including in Rakhine State, and again call for an immediate cessation of violence, the release of all those unjustly and arbitrarily detained, safe and unhindered humanitarian access, resolution of the crisis through constructive and inclusive dialogue among all stakeholders, and a return to the path of inclusive democracy. We reaffirm our strong support for ASEAN-led efforts, including the work of the ASEAN Chair and the Special Envoy of the ASEAN Chair on Myanmar. We call for full implementation of all commitments under the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus. The

ongoing conflict and instability have serious implications for the region, including increases in transnational crime such as cybercrime, the illegal drug trade, and human trafficking. We restate our appeal to all States to prevent the flow of arms and dual-use material, including jet fuel. We remain resolute in our support for the people of Myanmar and commit to continuing to work with all stakeholders in a pragmatic and constructive way, to find a sustainable solution to the crisis in a process which is led by the people of Myanmar and returns Myanmar to the path of democracy.

We call upon all States to contribute to the safe, peaceful, responsible, and sustainable use of outer space. We remain committed to fostering international cooperation and transparency, as well as confidence-building measures with the goal of improving the security of outer space for all States. We reaffirm the importance of upholding the existing international legal framework for outer space activities, including the Outer Space Treaty, and the obligation of all States Parties to the Treaty not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.

The Quad reaffirms its commitment to fostering a resilient information environment including through its Countering Disinformation Working Group by supporting media freedom and addressing foreign information manipulation and interference, including disinformation, which undermines trust and sows discord in the international community. We recognize these tactics are intended to interfere with domestic and international interests, and we are committed, together with our regional partners, to leverage our collective expertise and capacity to respond. We reaffirm our commitment to respect international human rights law, strengthen civil society, support media freedom, address online harassment and abuse, including technology-facilitated gender-based violence, and counter unethical practices.

We unequivocally condemn terrorism and violent extremism in all its forms and manifestations, including cross-border terrorism. We are committed to international cooperation and will work with our regional partners in a comprehensive and sustained manner to strengthen their capability to prevent, detect and respond to threats posed by terrorism and violent extremism, including threats posed by the use of new and emerging technologies for terrorist purposes, consistent with international law. We are committed to working together to promote accountability for the perpetrators of such terrorist attacks. We reiterate our condemnation of terrorist attacks including the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai and in Pathankot, and our commitment to pursuing designations, as appropriate, by the UN Security Council 1267 Sanctions Committee. We welcome the constructive discussions held at the first Quad Working Group on Counter-Terrorism and the fourth tabletop exercise in Honolulu last year, and look forward to Japan hosting the next meeting and tabletop exercise in November 2024.

We share great interest in achieving peace and stability in the Middle East. We unequivocally condemn the terror attacks on October 7, 2023. The large-scale loss of civilian lives and the

humanitarian crisis in Gaza is unacceptable. We affirm the imperative of securing the release of all hostages held by Hamas, and emphasize that the deal to release hostages would bring an immediate and prolonged ceasefire in Gaza. We underscore the urgent need to significantly increase deliveries of life-saving humanitarian assistance throughout Gaza as well as the crucial need to prevent regional escalation. We urge all parties to comply with international law, including international humanitarian law, as applicable. We welcome UNSCR S/RES/2735 (2024), and strongly urge all parties concerned to work immediately and steadily toward the release of all hostages and an immediate ceasefire. We call on all parties to take every feasible step to protect the lives of civilians including aid workers, and facilitate the rapid, safe and unimpeded humanitarian relief to civilians. We also encourage other countries, including those in the Indo-Pacific, to increase their support in order to address the dire humanitarian need on the ground. We underscore that the future recovery and reconstruction of Gaza should be supported by the international community. We remain committed to a sovereign, viable and independent Palestinian state taking into account Israel's legitimate security concerns as part of a two-state solution that enables both Israelis and Palestinians to live in a just, lasting, and secure peace. Any unilateral actions that undermine the prospect of a two-state solution, including Israeli expansion of settlements and violent extremism on all sides, must end. We underscore the need to prevent the conflict from escalating and spilling over in the region.

We condemn the ongoing attacks perpetrated by the Houthis and their supporters against international and commercial vessels transiting through the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, which are destabilizing the region and impeding navigational rights and freedoms and trade flows, and jeopardize the safety of vessels and people on board including sailors.

We reaffirm our commitment to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda and the achievement of its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). We underscore the importance of achieving the SDGs in a comprehensive manner without selectively prioritizing a narrow set of such goals, and reaffirm that the UN has a central role in supporting countries in their implementation. With six years left, we remain steadfast in our commitment to the full implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and accelerating progress toward all the SDGs in a comprehensive manner that is balanced across three dimensions – economic, social and environmental. From global health to sustainable development and climate change, the global community benefits when all stakeholders have the opportunity to contribute to addressing these challenges. We affirm our commitment to contributing to and implementing the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda and to achieving gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls. We underscore our commitment to strongly engaging constructively in the discussion on advancing sustainable development, including at the Summit of the Future. The Quad continues to realize a safe and secure world where human rights and human dignity are protected, based on the central premise of the SDGs: "Leave no one behind."

We, the Quad Leaders, remain dedicated to working in partnership with Indo-Pacific countries in deciding our future and shaping the region we all want to live in.

Enduring Partners for the Indo-Pacific

Over the past four years, Quad Leaders have met together six times, including twice virtually, and Quad Foreign Ministers have met eight times in the last five years. Quad country representatives meet together on a regular basis, at all levels, including among ambassadors across the four countries' extensive diplomatic networks, to consult one another, exchange ideas to advance shared priorities, and deliver benefits with and for partners across the Indo-Pacific region. We welcome our Commerce and Industry ministers preparing to meet for the first time in the coming months. We also welcome the leaders of our Development Finance Institutions and Agencies deciding to meet to explore future investments by the four countries in the Indo-Pacific. Altogether, our four countries are cooperating at an unprecedented pace and scale.

Each of our governments has committed to working through our respective budgetary processes to secure robust funding for Quad priorities in the Indo-Pacific region to ensure an enduring impact. We intend to work with our legislatures to deepen interparliamentary exchanges, and encourage other stakeholders to deepen engagement with Quad counterparts.

We look forward to the next Quad Foreign Ministers' meeting hosted by the United States in 2025, and the next Quad Leaders' Summit hosted by India in 2025. The Quad is here to stay.

Subsection IV-4

Quad Foreign Ministers' Joint Statement

29 July 2024

Quad Foreign Ministers' Meeting Joint Statement, Tokyo
29 July 2024

(1) We, the Foreign Ministers of Australia, India and Japan and the Secretary of State of the United States of America gathered in Tokyo, Japan on July 29, 2024 and reaffirm our commitment, common principles, and capacities to preserve and strengthen the international order for the global good. We discussed and deliberated on these shared challenges, and present our respective visions for stability and prosperity together with other countries in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond, and our plans for the Quad to provide tangible benefits for the region.

(2) We reaffirm the Quad's steadfast commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific, which is inclusive and resilient, and are united in our commitment to upholding the free and open rules-based international order, with its strong support for the principle of freedom, human rights, rule of law, democratic values, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and peaceful settlement of disputes and prohibition on the threat or use of force in accordance with the UN Charter. All countries have a role in contributing to regional peace, stability, and prosperity, while seeking a region in which no country dominates and no country is dominated, competition is managed responsibly, and each country is free from coercion in all its forms and can exercise its agency to determine its own future. We emphasize the importance of all countries working to take practical measures to reduce the risks of misunderstanding and miscalculation.

(3) We are collectively advancing a positive and practical agenda to support the Indo-Pacific region's sustainable development, stability, and prosperity, responding to the region's needs. We contribute to a region in which all countries and peoples can exercise free choice on how they cooperate, and trade based on partnership, equality and mutual respect. Through the Quad, we are supporting the region through practical cooperation on challenges such as maritime security, critical and emerging technologies, cyber security, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, health security, climate change, counterterrorism, infrastructure and connectivity, and addressing the debt crisis through sustainable, transparent and fair lending and financing practices. We will continue to cooperate with regional partners to address shared challenges in our region.

(4) We support an open, stable and prosperous Indo-Pacific underpinned by effective regional institutions. We reaffirm our unwavering support for ASEAN's unity and centrality, and the ASEAN-led regional architecture - including the East Asia Summit and ASEAN Regional Forum. We support practical implementation of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) and will

enhance our respective cooperation with ASEAN in this regard. We respect Pacific-led regional architecture, foremost the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), and are strongly committed to supporting Pacific island countries in line with the objectives of the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent. We are also further strengthening our practical cooperation in the Indian Ocean, including through steadfast support for the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) as the region's premier organization for addressing the region's most pressing and important challenges and the implementation of IORA's Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.

(5) We reaffirm our conviction that international law, including respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the maintenance of peace, safety, security and stability in the maritime domain underpin the development and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific. We emphasize the importance of adherence to international law, particularly as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), to address challenges to the global maritime rules-based order, including with respect to maritime claims, and in the South and East China Seas. We are seriously concerned about the situation in the East and South China Seas and reiterate our strong opposition to any unilateral actions that seek to change the status quo by force or coercion. We continue to express our serious concern about the militarization of disputed features, and coercive and intimidating maneuvers in the South China Sea. We also express our serious concern about the dangerous use of coast guard and maritime militia vessels, the increasing use of various kinds of dangerous maneuvers, and efforts to disrupt other countries' offshore resource exploitation activities. We affirm that maritime disputes must be resolved peacefully and in accordance with international law, as reflected in UNCLOS. We emphasize the importance of maintaining and upholding freedom of navigation and overflight, other lawful uses of sea, and unimpeded commerce consistent with international law. We re-emphasize the universal and unified character of UNCLOS and reaffirm that UNCLOS sets out the legal framework within which all activities in the oceans and the seas must be carried out. We reiterate that the award rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal on July 12, 2016, is a significant milestone, and the basis for peacefully resolving disputes between the parties.

(6) We are determined to contribute to maintaining and developing the free and open maritime order consistent with UNCLOS in the Indian and the Pacific Oceans, and for this purpose, to enhance our collaboration and coordination with regional partners. We continue to work with the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency to enhance regional maritime domain awareness in the Pacific through satellite data, training and capacity building. In line with such efforts, we intend to geographically expand the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) to the Indian Ocean region. We are working for early operationalization of the South Asia program through the Information Fusion Centre-Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) in Gurugram, India. Furthermore, we are incorporating effective technical cooperation in close consultation with regional partners. We also contribute to the region through capacity building cooperation for enhancing maritime security. We intend to launch a Quad maritime legal dialogue under the Quad

Maritime Security Working Group to focus our expertise on international law of the sea issues in support of our efforts to uphold the rules-based maritime order in the Indo-Pacific.

(7) We recognize the transformative power of critical and emerging technologies to support sustainable development in the Indo-Pacific and deliver economic and social benefits. We continue to advance the development of a trusted, secure and robust telecommunications network, and promote supplier diversification, Open Radio Access Networks (Open RAN) and joint projects such as the Open RAN deployment in Palau, where Quad countries have collectively secured extensive investments in Open RAN trials, core network replacement, and capacity building. We are uplifting the next generation of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics experts through the Quad Fellowship, which expanded this year to include students from Southeast Asian countries. We welcome the concrete progress of AI-ENGAGE, including a Memorandum of Cooperation for the upcoming joint research collaboration which we intend to sign by the Quad Leaders' Meeting, to advance innovation in agriculture through emerging technologies to empower farmers everywhere to increase yield and resistance. We welcome progress made on enhancing resilience of semiconductor supply chains among Quad members. We recognize the importance of advancing international efforts to achieve safe, secure and trustworthy artificial intelligence systems, including through the outcomes of the Hiroshima AI Process, GPAI New Delhi Ministerial Declaration 2023, and the UN resolution on "Seizing the opportunities of safe, secure and trustworthy artificial intelligence systems for sustainable development". We commit to further deepening international cooperation on artificial intelligence systems and interoperability between artificial intelligence governance frameworks. We also welcome the Quad's track 1.5 dialogues on international technical standards for artificial intelligence and advanced communications. We recognize and reaffirm the important role of synthetic biology in promoting biomanufacturing as one of the key technologies driving a new industrial revolution, and will explore opportunities to expand cooperation.

(8) We reaffirm our commitment to a more open, secure, stable, accessible and peaceful cyberspace. We welcome the establishment of the Quad Cyber Ambassadors Meeting to discuss capacity building projects and responsible State behavior in cyberspace. We intend to accelerate our capacity building projects such as the international conference on cyber capacity building in the Philippines and the forthcoming Quad Cyber Bootcamp in India. We welcome the advancement of the discussion about our fields of cooperation necessary to enhance cybersecurity in the Indo-Pacific region, including in supply chain security and resilience of critical sectors and for the protection of critical infrastructure including secure commercial undersea cables from trusted vendors. We also welcome collaboration on mutual recognition of Quad partners' labeling schemes for cybersecurity of Internet of Things (IoT) products and affirm our commitment to promoting and strengthening a culture where software security is by design and default. We look forward to the second Quad Cyber Challenge which strengthens individual and community cyber security awareness across the Indo-Pacific.

(9) We reaffirm our commitment to protecting the information environment by supporting media freedom as well as addressing foreign information manipulation and interference, including disinformation, which undermines trust and sows discord in the international community. We recognize these tactics are intended to interfere with domestic and international interests, and we are committed, together with our regional partners, to leverage our collective expertise and capacity to respond. To protect the integrity of the information space, we reaffirm our commitment to upholding human rights, supporting media freedom, addressing online harassment and abuse, and countering unethical practices.

(10) We affirm the important role of women and girls in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peacebuilding, stressing the importance of their equal and meaningful participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of human rights and peace and security, and the need to increase their role in decision-making with regard to conflict prevention and resolution. We welcome ongoing efforts to promote women's and girls' wellbeing, safety and economic empowerment, aimed at building an inclusive, equitable and prosperous Indo-Pacific region. We are committed to contributing to and implementing the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda including its application to disaster risk reduction. We are also committed to achieving gender equality and promoting the human rights of women and girls in all their diversity, at home and abroad. The WPS agenda is crucial for effectively addressing conflicts and challenges.

(11) We are committed to responding to the vulnerabilities caused by natural hazards in the Indo-Pacific by coordinating disaster response operations and demonstrate this through our support for partner government and community-led responses to disasters in the region. We supported Papua New Guinea with relief assistance in the aftermath of the tragic landslide in May 2024, where Quad partners collectively contributed over $5M in humanitarian assistance, and look forward to continuing to support Papua New Guinea in its resilience efforts. We welcome the finalization of the Quad Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), which enable an effective, immediate and coordinated response mechanism between Quad partners. We look forward to further strengthening our coordination to provide practical support for regional partners in times of disasters. The next annual meeting and tabletop exercise will be held in Japan, which will continue to enhance Quad HADR cooperation and collaboration.

(12) We unequivocally condemn terrorism and violent extremism in all its forms and manifestations including cross-border terrorism. We deplore the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), drones, tunnels and information and communication technologies by terrorists and terrorist entities. We strongly reiterate our condemnation of terrorist attacks, including the 26/11 Mumbai and Pathankot attacks and call for bringing the perpetrators of these attacks to justice without delay. We urge all countries to take immediate, sustained and irreversible action to prevent territory under their control from being used for terrorist purposes. We are committed to working together to promote accountability for the perpetrators of terrorist attacks and support implementation including through domestic designations of UN Security Council resolutions as they pertain to sanctions. We reiterate

the call for concerted action against all UN-listed terrorist groups including Al-Qa'ida, ISIS/Daesh, Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), and their proxy groups. We are committed to international cooperation and working together with our international and regional partners in a comprehensive and sustained manner to strengthen their capacity to prevent, detect and respond to threats posed by terrorism and violent extremism including threats posed by the use of new and emerging technologies for terrorist purposes. We welcome the fruitful discussions held at the first Quad Working Group on Counter-Terrorism meeting and the fourth tabletop exercise in Honolulu in December 2023, and look forward to Japan hosting the next meeting and tabletop exercise in November 2024.

(13) We reaffirm our commitment to improving the region's connectivity through the development of resilient infrastructure and welcome progress under the Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience, including the establishment of the Cable Connectivity and Resilience Centre in Australia and training of over 1,000 telecom officials and executives in the region under the United States CABLES program. We also applaud the expansion of Quad Infrastructure Fellowships to more than 2,200 for project developers and managers in the Indo-Pacific including South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific islands, up from the initial 1,800 Infrastructure Fellowships announced at the 2023 Quad Leaders' Summit. Quad partners have provided 720 Fellowships since this initiative was launched at the Summit. We appreciate the workshop organized by the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI) in India towards strengthening the power sector resilience in the Indo-Pacific. We applaud the signing of a Memorandum of Cooperation among the Quad countries' export credit agencies, which will allow our countries to advance a prosperous Indo-Pacific. We welcome the Pacific Quality Infrastructure Principles, which were approved by PIF Leaders in 2023 and closely align with the G20 Principles for Quality Infrastructure Investment, and aspire to deliver infrastructure that maximizes positive development impacts. We encourage all infrastructure financiers, including multilateral donors, to promote infrastructure projects that are open, transparent, accountable, economically efficient in view of life cycle cost, considerate of debt sustainability, integrate social and environmental considerations and strengthen climate resilience. We aim to improve access to digital services in the Indo-Pacific, and examine the transformational opportunities of secure digital public infrastructure to boost sustainable development while respecting human rights. We intend to continue to work on complementary infrastructure projects in the region.

(14) We continue to recognize the importance of sustained efforts to strengthen and maintain health security in the region. We worked to strengthen the resilience of the Indo-Pacific by holding the second pandemic preparedness tabletop exercise under the Quad Health Security Partnership, building on the success of the Quad Vaccine Partnership to strengthen prevention, detection, and response to outbreaks of disease with epidemic or pandemic potential. As part of our commitment under the Quad Health Security Partnership, the Quad efforts in 2024 include training for public health specialists from Southeast Asia to build capability to respond to regional health emergencies.

(15) We recognize the urgent need to address the climate crisis, which poses tremendous social, environmental, and economic challenges for our region. Under the Quad Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation Package (Q-CHAMP), we continue to work together with Indo-Pacific partners to enhance climate and clean energy cooperation as well as promote adaptation and resilience to climate impact. We recall our commitment to the Quad Statement of Principles on Clean Energy Supply Chains in the Indo-Pacific, and the Clean Energy Supply Chains initiative designed to promote diverse, secure, transparent and resilient clean energy supply chains and support a sustainable, and inclusive clean energy transition. The Quad also continues to deliver on the Quad Climate Information Services Initiative, which is building capacity, cooperation, and information-sharing mechanisms for climate data in the Indo-Pacific to help Pacific island countries to increase their climate resilience. We also intend to provide support through global partnerships such as CDRI and its Infrastructure for Resilient Island States (IRIS) initiative.

(16) We recognize the essential contribution of space-related applications and technologies in the Indo-Pacific. We call upon all States to contribute to the safe, peaceful, responsible, and sustainable use of outer space. We remain committed to fostering international cooperation and transparency, as well as confidence-building measures with the goal of improving the security of outer space for all States. We reaffirm the importance of upholding the existing international legal framework for outer space activities, including the Outer Space Treaty, and the obligation of all State Parties to the Treaty not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.

(17) We express our deepest concern over the war raging in Ukraine including its terrible and tragic humanitarian consequences. We reiterate the need for a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace in line with international law, consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, including respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity. We also note the negative impacts of the war in Ukraine with regard to global food and energy security, especially for developing and least developed countries. In the context of this war, we share the view that the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons is unacceptable. We underscore the importance of upholding international law, and in line with the UN Charter, reiterate that all states must refrain from the threat of or use of force against the territorial integrity and sovereignty or political independence of any state.

(18) We condemn North Korea's destabilizing launches using ballistic missile technology and its continued pursuit of nuclear weapons in violation of multiple UN Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs). We express our grave concern over North Korea's use of proliferation linkages, malicious cyber activity and workers abroad to fund its unlawful weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs. We reaffirm our commitment to the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula consistent with relevant UNSCRs, and we urge North Korea to abide by all its obligations under the UNSCRs and engage in substantive dialogue. We stress the need to prevent any proliferation of nuclear and missile technologies related to North Korea in the region and

beyond. In that context, we urge all UN Member States to abide by the related UNSCRs including the prohibition on the transfer to North Korea or procurement from North Korea of all arms and related materiel. As the mandate of the UN Panel of Experts tasked with monitoring violations of North Korea-related UNSCR sanctions was not renewed, we reiterate our commitment to continued implementation of the relevant UNSCRs which remain in full force. We reconfirm the necessity of immediate resolution of the abductions issue.

(19) We remain deeply concerned by the worsening political, security and humanitarian situation in Myanmar, including in Rakhine. Ongoing conflict and instability have serious implications for regional peace and security. We again call for the immediate cessation of violence; the release of all those unjustly detained; safe and unhindered humanitarian assistance; resolution of the crisis through constructive and inclusive dialogue among all stakeholders; and a return to the path of inclusive democracy. We reaffirm our strong support for ASEAN leadership in seeking a resolution to the crisis, including through the implementation of the Five-Point Consensus, and the constructive efforts of the ASEAN Chair and ASEAN Special Envoy to Myanmar. We call on all parties to fully implement the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus. We are also concerned about the impact that the situation in Myanmar has on neighboring countries that are witnessing increases in transnational crime such as cybercrime, the illegal drug trade and human trafficking. We restate our appeal to all States to prevent the flow of arms and dual-use material, including jet fuel. We remain resolute in our support for the people of Myanmar and commit to continuing to work with all stakeholders in a pragmatic and constructive way, to find a durable and sustainable solution to the crisis in a process which is led by the people of Myanmar.

(20) We share great interest in achieving peace and stability in the Middle East. We unequivocally condemn the terror attacks on October 7, 2023. The large-scale loss of civilian lives and the humanitarian crisis in Gaza is unacceptable. We affirm the imperative of securing the release of all hostages held by Hamas, and emphasize that the deal to release hostages would bring an immediate and prolonged ceasefire in Gaza. We underscore the urgent need to significantly increase deliveries of life-saving humanitarian assistance throughout Gaza as well as the crucial need to prevent regional escalation. We urge all parties to comply with international law, including international humanitarian law, as applicable. We welcome UNSC Resolution S/RES/2735 (2024), and strongly urge all parties concerned to work immediately and steadily toward the release of all hostages and an immediate ceasefire. We call on all parties to take every feasible step to protect lives of civilians including aid workers, and facilitate the rapid transportation of humanitarian relief. We also encourage other countries, including those in the Indo-Pacific, to increase their efforts to address the dire humanitarian need on the ground. We underscore that the future recovery and reconstruction of the Gaza Strip should be supported by the international community. We remain committed to a sovereign, viable and independent Palestinian state taking into account Israel's legitimate security concerns as part of a two-state solution that enables both Israelis and Palestinians to live in a just, lasting, and secure peace. Any unilateral actions that undermine the prospect of a two-state solution, including Israeli expansion of settlements and violent extremism on all sides,

must end. We underscore the need to prevent the conflict from escalating and spilling over in the region.

(21) We condemn the ongoing attacks perpetrated by the Houthis against international and commercial vessels transiting through the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. These attacks destabilize the region, impede navigational rights and freedoms, and trade flows, and jeopardize the safety of vessels and people on board including sailors.

(22) We reiterate our commitment to the UN Charter and call for all countries to uphold its purposes and principles, including refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. We underscore our commitment to upholding respect for the rule of law and observing international law in good faith, as they constitute the foundation for peace, stability and prosperity of all Member States. In this context, we also reiterate our commitment to strengthening the multilateral system and its institutions. We emphasize the need to revitalize collective trust in the multilateral system, in particular the UN and we are committed to cooperating to address attempts to undermine the foundational principles of the UN and international system We are committed to advancing a comprehensive UN reform agenda, including through the expansion of permanent and non-permanent seats of the UN Security Council. In this regard, we commit to active and constructive engagement in the intergovernmental negotiations (IGN) process on Security Council reforms, and call for early reforms with an overall objective of making the Council more representative, transparent, effective, and credible. We also call for greater permanent representation for Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean in a reformed Security Council. We intend to work towards ambitious language on urgent and comprehensive UN reforms in the Pact for the Future. With six years left, we remain steadfast in our commitment to the full implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and achievement of all the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in a comprehensive manner that is balanced across three dimensions – economic, social and environmental. We recognize the 2030 Agenda and its 17 SDGs and 169 targets seek to realize the human rights of all and to achieve gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls. They are integrated and indivisible and balance the three dimensions of sustainable development: the economic, the social and environmental. In this regard, we underscore our commitment to strongly engaging constructively in the discussion on post-2030 framework for sustainable development, including at the Summit of the Future. The Quad continues to realize a safe and secure world where human rights and human dignity are protected, based on the central premise of the SDGs: "Leave no one behind." We are concerned at the attempts to reshape the UN SDG framework and affirm that the 2030 Agenda and SDGs are interrelated and indivisible.

(23) The Quad is a partnership that is evolving and delivering outcomes, and continues to present regional countries and the international community with solutions and options to meet the challenges of the day. The Quad is committed to steadily implementing its plans to provide tangible benefits to other countries, including those cooperation items presented here today.

(24) We look forward to India hosting the next Quad Leaders' Summit later this year, and to the United States hosting the next Quad Foreign Ministers' meeting in 2025.

Subsection IV-5

Quad Foreign Ministers' Joint Statement

22 September 2023

Joint Readout of the Quad Foreign Ministers' Meeting
22 September 2023

(1) We, the Secretary of State of the United States and the Foreign Ministers of Australia, India, and Japan, met in New York City during the 78th United Nations General Assembly to reaffirm our unwavering support for the United Nations, the enduring importance of upholding mutually determined rules, norms, and standards, and to deepen Quad cooperation in the international system.

(2) The Quad reiterates its steadfast commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific that is inclusive and resilient. We recommit to advancing the vision Quad leaders articulated in Hiroshima on 20 May 2023: a region that is peaceful and prosperous, stable and secure, free from intimidation and coercion, and where disputes are settled in accordance with international law. We strongly support the principles of freedom, the rule of law, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and peaceful settlement of disputes; and oppose unilateral attempts to change the status quo. We seek to maintain and strengthen stability in the Indo-Pacific, where competition is managed responsibly.

(3) We reiterate our commitment to the UN Charter and call for all countries to uphold its purposes and principles, including refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. We underscore our commitment to upholding international law as the foundation for stability and equitable treatment of all member states.

(4) We are steadfast in our support for full implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and achievement of all the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), so no one is left behind, and reiterate that the SDGs are integrated, indivisible, and balance the three dimensions of sustainable development: economic, social, and environmental. We underscore the importance of achieving the SDGs in their entirety without selectively prioritizing a narrow set of such goals and reaffirm that the UN has a central role in supporting countries in their implementation. We underline the primacy of the 2030 Agenda and its SDGs as a consensus document supported by all member states and call on member states and the UN to protect it. The Quad's practical action in the Indo-Pacific is advancing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its SDGs by delivering sustained economic and social value, that is responsive to regional partners.

(5) We affirm our support for a UN that solves the consequential challenges of our time and safeguards our shared and interconnected resources. We are committed to advancing a

comprehensive UN reform agenda, including through expansion in permanent and non-permanent seats of the UN Security Council. In this regard, we call for a UN Security Council that is more representative, transparent, effective, and credible. We underscore the need to address attempts to subvert the international system, including in the UN, and promote accountability.

(6) We support an open, stable, and prosperous Indo-Pacific underpinned by effective institutions and we reaffirm our unwavering support for ASEAN's unity and centrality, the ASEAN-led regional architecture – including the East Asia Summit and ASEAN Regional Forum – and practical implementation of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. We respect Pacific-led regional organizations, foremost the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), and are committed to supporting Pacific Island countries in line with the objectives of the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent endorsed by PIF leaders. We are also further strengthening our cooperation with partners in the Indian Ocean region, including through the Indian Ocean Rim Association, to address the region's most pressing and important challenges.

(7) We commit to advance the initiatives announced by our leaders in Hiroshima to support the Indo-Pacific region through practical cooperation, including on climate change and clean energy supply chains, and on infrastructure through the Quad Infrastructure Fellowships Program and the Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience. We continue to advance the development of a secure and trusted telecommunications network with a network modernization project and Open Radio Access Network deployment in Palau, progress on Quad cybersecurity initiatives — and explore avenues to share Earth Observation data to monitor extreme weather events and support climate adaptation. We support the private sector-led Quad Investors Network to facilitate investment in critical and emerging technologies. Such efforts help ensure the resilience of communities in the face of climate change and other global challenges. We are pleased to soon carry out the second tabletop Quad Pandemic Preparedness Exercise through the Quad Health Security Partnership to enhance the region's capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to outbreaks of infectious disease. We will also continue to leverage our collective expertise to respond to challenges such as disinformation.

(8) We are driving practical, positive outcomes for the region through the Quad Maritime Security Working Group. The Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness is supporting regional partners combat illicit maritime activities and respond to climate-related and humanitarian events. We look forward to the Quad Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Working Group convening our second tabletop exercise in Brisbane, Australia, to strengthen the Quad's readiness to support regional partners in times of humanitarian disaster.

(9) We also discussed the recent Quad Counterterrorism Working Group's Consequence Management Exercise, which explored the capabilities and support Quad countries could offer regional partners in response to a terrorist attack and look forward to the upcoming Quad Counterterrorism Working Group meeting and tabletop exercise in Honolulu, Hawaii in December

which will focus on countering the use of emerging technologies for terrorist purposes. We continue to cooperate on countering the use of the internet and other technologies for terrorist and violent extremist purposes. We are committed to countering terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, including preventing the international and cross border movement of terrorists, and countering terror finance networks and safe havens. We stressed the need for a comprehensive and balanced approach to effectively curb terrorist activities through whole of nation and whole of international community efforts.

(10) We reaffirm our conviction that international law, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the maintenance of peace and security in the maritime domain underpin the development and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific. We emphasize that disputes should be resolved peacefully and in accordance with international law, without threat or use of force. We emphasize the importance of adherence to international law, particularly as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), to address challenges to the global maritime rules-based order, including with respect to maritime claims, and in the South and East China Seas. We emphasize the importance of maintaining freedom of navigation and overflight consistent with UNCLOS and reiterate our strong opposition to any unilateral actions that seek to change the status quo by force or coercion. We continue to express serious concern about the militarization of disputed features, the dangerous use of coast guard and maritime militia vessels, and efforts to disrupt other countries' offshore exploitation activities.

(11) We express our deep concern over the war raging in Ukraine and mourn its terrible and tragic humanitarian consequences. We underscore the need for a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace in Ukraine in accordance with international law, consistent with the principles of the UN Charter. We are deeply concerned about the global food security situation and support the efforts of the UN in the resumption of the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI). In the context of this war, we concur that the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons would be unacceptable. We underscore that the rules-based international order must respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states.

(12) We condemn North Korea's destabilizing launches using ballistic missile technology and its continued pursuit of nuclear weapons in violation of multiple UN Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs). We reaffirm our commitment to the complete denuclearization of North Korea consistent with UNSCRs, and we urge North Korea to abide by all its obligations under the UNSCRs and engage in substantive dialogue. We stress the importance of addressing proliferation of nuclear and missile technologies related to North Korea in the region and beyond and urge all UN Member States to abide by the related UNSCRs including the prohibition on the transfer to North Korea or procurement from North Korea of all arms and related materiel. We reconfirm the necessity of immediate resolution of the abductions issue.

(13) We remain deeply concerned by the political, humanitarian, and economic crisis in Myanmar and again call for the immediate cessation of violence, the release of all those unjustly detained,

unhindered humanitarian assistance, resolution of the crisis through constructive dialogue, and a return to Myanmar's transition towards inclusive federal democracy. We are also concerned with the implications of the ongoing situation in Myanmar on neighboring countries including a rise in transnational crime such as drug and human trafficking. We reaffirm our strong support to ASEAN-led efforts and the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus. We also continue to encourage the international community to work together in a pragmatic and constructive way to support an end to the violence in Myanmar.

(14) We, the Quad Foreign Ministers, continue to advance the vision set by our Leaders – that the Quad's multilateral cooperation will deliver concrete outcomes for the benefit of all people throughout the Indo-Pacific. We intend to meet in person for the next Quad Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Japan in 2024.

Subsection IV-6

Quad Leaders' Joint Statement

20 May 2023

Quad Leaders' Joint Statement
20 May 2023, Hiroshima

Today, we — Prime Minister Anthony Albanese of Australia, Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India, Prime Minister Kishida Fumio of Japan, and President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. of the United States — met for the third in-person Quad Leaders' Summit, hosted by Prime Minister Albanese.

2. Together, we reaffirm our steadfast commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific that is inclusive and resilient. The global strategic and economic environment is changing rapidly – with direct impacts on countries in the region. We believe we should navigate this time of uncertainty and opportunity together, working closely with our Indo-Pacific partners. We believe all countries have a role in contributing to regional peace, stability, and prosperity, as well as upholding international law, including the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the rules-based international order. We seek a region where no country dominates and no country is dominated – one where all countries are free from coercion, and can exercise their agency to determine their futures. Our four countries are united by this shared vision.

3. As Indo-Pacific countries, Quad partners are deeply invested in our region's success. Harnessing our collective strengths and resources, we are supporting the region's development, stability, and prosperity through the Quad's positive, practical agenda. Our work is guided by regional countries' priorities and responds to the region's needs. We are and will continue to be transparent in what we do. Respect for the leadership of regional institutions, including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), is and will remain at the centre of the Quad's efforts.

4. The Quad Leaders' Vision Statement we have issued today sets out our shared vision for the Quad and the Indo-Pacific region based on these principles.

5. Today we reaffirm our consistent and unwavering support for ASEAN centrality and unity. We are committed to ensuring the Quad's work is aligned with ASEAN's principles and priorities and continues to support implementation of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP). We underscore ASEAN's regional leadership role, including in the East Asia Summit, the region's premier leader-led forum for strategic dialogue, and the ASEAN Regional Forum. We strongly support Indonesia's 2023 ASEAN Chairmanship and its Chair theme "ASEAN Matters:

Epicentrum of Growth". We will continue to strengthen our respective relationships with ASEAN and seek opportunities for greater Quad collaboration in support of the AOIP.

6. We recommit to working in partnership with Pacific island countries to achieve shared aspirations and address shared challenges. We reaffirm our support for Pacific regional institutions that have served the region well over many years, foremost the PIF, and warmly welcome Cook Islands assuming the PIF Chair in 2023. We continue to support the objectives of the 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent, and commit to working with partners, including through Partners in the Blue Pacific, to support engagement with these objectives. We welcome the 3rd Summit of the Forum for India-Pacific Islands Cooperation and the U.S. – Pacific Island Forum meeting, both to be held in Papua New Guinea in coming days. We also applaud Japan's longstanding engagement with Pacific island countries through the Pacific Islands' Leaders Meeting (PALM), and Australia's deep and enduring commitment to the Pacific as part of the Pacific family, including as a founding member of the PIF.

7. In these efforts, Quad Leaders will listen to and be guided at every step by Pacific priorities, including climate action, ocean health, resilient infrastructure, maritime security and financial integrity. In particular, we acknowledge climate change remains the single greatest threat to the livelihoods, security and wellbeing of the peoples of the Pacific and applaud Pacific island countries' global leadership on climate action.

8. We remain committed to strengthening cooperation in the Indian Ocean region. We welcome the work of IORA as the Indian Ocean region's premier forum for addressing the region's challenges. We recognise India's leadership in finalising the IORA Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (IOIP) and express our support for its implementation. We thank Bangladesh for its term as IORA Chair and commit to working with Sri Lanka and India as they assume the roles of IORA Chair and Vice Chair respectively this year.

9. We, the countries of the Quad, will work together to be a global force for good. We will bring our combined resolve to support each other's international leadership in 2023 including Australia's hosting of the Quad, Japan's G7 presidency, India's G20 presidency and the United States' APEC host year.

The Quad's positive, practical agenda

10. We recognise the urgent need to address the climate crisis, which poses tremendous environmental, social, and economic challenges for our region. Today we underline our dedication to taking significant action on climate change – individually and collectively. We will continue to support climate mitigation, adaptation, and resilience efforts in alignment with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement as well as regional architecture, including ASEAN, the PIF, and IORA. We will continue to collaborate on green shipping and ports,

disaster risk management, exchanging climate information, and capacity building support for Article 6 implementation of the Paris Agreement. Under the Climate Information Services Initiative, we plan to coordinate our collective resources to support early warning systems in the Indo-Pacific, including through the Pacific-led Weather Ready Pacific initiative and the longstanding leadership of the Pacific Meteorological Council. We also intend to provide support through global partnerships such as the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI) and its Infrastructure for Resilient Islands States (IRIS) initiative.

11. We recognise that achieving sustainable consumption and production is a key component of global efforts to achieve the 2030 Agenda and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), environment and climate ambitions. We will work together to seek meaningful outcomes on climate action and the clean economy transition in the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF).

12. The latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report makes clear that rapid and far-reaching transitions are needed across all sectors and systems. As we move to a net zero world, we underscore that it is critical to strengthen our cooperation to ensure better access to affordable, reliable and secure clean energy in the Indo-Pacific. We will work together to increase the region's access to climate finance and climate smart technology. Under the Quad Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation Package (Q-CHAMP), launched in 2022, we continue to work together and with Indo-Pacific partners to enhance climate and clean energy cooperation as well as promote adaptation and resilience. In this regard, we welcome the Sydney Energy Forum and the Quad Clean Hydrogen Partnership meeting hosted by Australia and India respectively in July 2022.

13. Building on those foundations, today, we are issuing a Statement of Principles on Clean Energy Supply Chains in the Indo-Pacific, which provide a basis for our engagement in the region on clean energy supply chain development. The principles are designed to promote diverse, secure, transparent and resilient clean energy supply chains and support a sustainable, and inclusive clean energy transition. We also announce a Clean Energy Supply Chains initiative designed to accelerate the Indo-Pacific's clean energy transition. Working with Indo-Pacific partners, the initiative will facilitate research and development and feasibility study projects to lower clean energy manufacturing and deployment costs, enhance regional energy security, and expand and diversify the regional production of necessary materials and technologies.

14. The COVID-19 pandemic has shown us how important health security is to our societies, our economies, and the stability of our region. In 2021 and 2022, Quad partners stepped up to help meet the region's most pressing need, delivering more than 400 million safe and effective COVID-19 vaccine doses to Indo-Pacific countries and almost 800 million doses globally, bilaterally and in partnership with COVAX.

15. Today, we announce the evolution of our Quad Vaccine Partnership into a broader Quad Health Security Partnership. Through this partnership, we will strengthen our coordination and collaboration in support of health security in the Indo-Pacific. We plan to implement a suite of activities to build the region's capacity to detect and respond rapidly to outbreaks of diseases with epidemic and pandemic potential. These activities include support for health workforce development, disease surveillance, and electronic health information systems and coordination of outbreak responses, such as the Quad Pandemic Preparedness Exercise.

16. We will continue cooperation with Indo-Pacific partners to meet the region's infrastructure priorities. Delivering on our commitment at the 2022 Quad Leaders' Summit, we will continue to support access to quality, sustainable and climate-resilient infrastructure investments in our region. We aim to ensure the investments we support are fit for purpose, demand driven and responsive to countries' needs, and do not impose unsustainable debt burdens. We will build on ongoing programs for Indo-Pacific countries including training and capacity-building focused on digital and economic connectivity, clean energy, and climate resilient power sector infrastructure. We continue to strengthen capacity to manage debt issues, including under the G20 Common Framework and promote debt sustainability and transparency.

17. Today, we announce a new initiative to boost infrastructure expertise across the Indo-Pacific: the 'Quad Infrastructure Fellowships Program'. The initiative aims to empower more than 1,800 of the region's infrastructure practitioners to design, build and manage quality infrastructure in their home countries.

18. The Quad is committed to improving the region's connectivity through the development of resilient infrastructure. We recognise the urgent need to support quality undersea cable networks in the Indo-Pacific, which are key to global growth and prosperity. Today we announce a new 'Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience'. The Partnership will strengthen cable systems in the Indo-Pacific, drawing on Quad countries' world-class expertise in manufacturing, delivering and maintaining cable infrastructure.

19. Quad partners' export credit agencies make an important contribution to the prosperity of the Indo-Pacific. We welcome ongoing efforts to enhance cooperation among Quad partners' export credit agencies: including through a Memorandum of Cooperation between ECGC Limited of India, Export Finance Australia (EFA), Nippon Export and Investment Insurance (NEXI) of Japan, and Export-Import Bank of the United States (USEXIM).

20. We recognise the transformative power of technology, including digital public infrastructure, to support sustainable development in the Indo-Pacific and deliver economic and social benefits. We are stepping up our efforts to strengthen supply chain resilience and improve the region's digital connectivity through access to critical and emerging technologies and advanced telecommunications technology, including 5G networks.

21. Today, we announce cooperation with Palau to establish a deployment of Open Radio Access Networks (Open RAN), the first in the Pacific. The Quad is committed to ensuring regional countries are not left behind as telecommunications markets and network architectures evolve. We support access to innovations, such as Open RAN, that enable greater vendor choice for countries to expand and modernise their telecommunications networks. We also welcome the release of the Open RAN Security Report which is expected to promote industry investment in approaches to telecommunications that are demonstrably open, interoperable, trusted and secure.

22. The Quad International Standards Cooperation Network and the Quad Principles on Critical and Emerging Technology Standards, released today, reflect our support for industry-led, consensus-based multi-stakeholder approaches to the development of technology standards.

23. We welcome the launch of the private sector-led Quad Investors Network (QUIN), which aims to facilitate investments in strategic technologies, including clean energy, semiconductors, critical minerals, and quantum.

24. We intend to support joint research to advance innovation in agriculture through emerging technologies designed to empower farmers everywhere to increase yield and resistance.

25. We reaffirm our commitment to a more secure cyberspace and to fostering an international digital economy that works for everyone. Quad partners will continue collaborating to enhance regional capacity and resilience to cyber incidents and threats. We welcome the first Quad Cyber Challenge, held earlier this year to promote cyber awareness and empower participants across the Indo-Pacific to protect themselves online. We also welcome the Quad Joint Principles for Secure Software and the Quad Joint Principles for Cyber Security of Critical Infrastructure, and efforts to develop a guiding framework for ensuring supply chain security and resilience. These principles are designed to strengthen our region's defences against cyber threats to the software supply chain and critical infrastructure and services.

26. We recognise the importance of space technologies and space-related applications in responding to climate change and disasters, and enhancing the sustainable use of oceans and marine resources. We reaffirm our commitment to supporting capacity building for countries in the region. The Quad Space Working Group will explore avenues to deliver Earth Observation data and other space-related applications to assist nations across the Indo-Pacific to strengthen climate early warning systems and better manage the impacts of extreme weather events. We commit to open sharing of civil Earth Observation data. We will continue to consult each other and the region on the peaceful, safe and sustainable use of outer space. We announce our intention to share expertise and experience in space situational awareness. We commit to strengthening our commercial space cooperation, including convening a commercial space business forum in 2023.

27. We are pleased the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA), announced at the 2022 Tokyo Quad Leaders' Summit, is underway in its pilot phase. Through IPMDA, we are providing near-real-time, integrated and cost-effective maritime domain data to maritime agencies in Southeast Asia and the Pacific, and will expand coverage to partners in the Indian Ocean region in the coming months. This supports our regional partners in combatting a wide range of illicit maritime activities, including illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, and responding to climate-related and humanitarian events. We are committed to deepening engagement with regional partners to support maritime safety and security and uphold international law.

28. At the 2021 Quad Leaders' Summit in Washington, we launched the Quad Fellowship. This year, we welcome the first cohort of Quad STEM Fellows, who will begin their studies in the United States in August 2023. Our one hundred Quad Fellows from all four Quad countries represent the best and brightest of our next generation. The diversity and dynamism of this inaugural class will help to ensure our nations remain at the forefront of innovation and we wish them well.

Global and regional issues

29. We remain fully resolved to uphold peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific maritime domain. We strongly oppose destabilising or unilateral actions that seek to change the status quo by force or coercion. We emphasise the importance of adherence to international law, particularly as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and the maintenance of freedom of navigation and overflight, in addressing challenges to the maritime rules-based order, including those in the East and South China Seas. We express serious concern at the militarisation of disputed features, the dangerous use of coastguard and maritime militia vessels, and efforts to disrupt other countries' offshore resource exploitation activities. We emphasise that disputes should be resolved peacefully and in accordance with international law, without threat or use of force.

30. Together, with our global and regional partners, we will buttress international institutions and initiatives that underpin global peace, prosperity and development. We reiterate our unwavering support for the United Nations (UN) Charter and the three pillars of the UN system. In consultation with our partners, we will work collectively to address attempts to unilaterally undermine the integrity of the UN, its Charter and its agencies. We seek to strengthen and reform the multilateral system so it may better reflect contemporary realities and meet aspirations of the Indo-Pacific region. We remain committed to a comprehensive UN reform agenda, including through expansion in permanent and non-permanent categories of membership of the UN Security Council. We reaffirm our commitment to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda and the achievement of its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). We underscore the importance of achieving the SDGs in a comprehensive manner without selectively prioritising a narrow set of such goals, and reaffirm that the UN has a central role in supporting countries in their implementation.

31. We stand for adherence to international law, peaceful resolution of disputes and respect for principles of the UN Charter, including territorial integrity and sovereignty of all states. In this context, today we express our deep concern over the war raging in Ukraine and mourn its terrible and tragic humanitarian consequences. We recognise its serious impacts on the global economic system including on food, fuel and energy security and critical supply chains. We will continue to render humanitarian assistance to Ukraine for its recovery. Conscious that ours must not be an era of war, we remain committed to dialogue and diplomacy. We support a comprehensive, just and lasting peace consistent with the UN Charter. In this context, we concur that the use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons is serious and inadmissible.

32. We condemn North Korea's destabilising ballistic missile launches and pursuit of nuclear weapons in violation of multiple UN Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs). These launches pose a grave threat to international peace and stability. We urge North Korea to abide by all its obligations under the UNSCRs, refrain from further provocations and engage in substantive dialogue. We urge North Korea to resolve the abductions issue immediately. We reaffirm our commitment to the complete denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula consistent with relevant UNSCRs and call on all countries to fully implement these UNSCRs. We stress the importance of addressing proliferation of nuclear and missile technologies related to North Korea in the region and beyond.

33. We remain deeply concerned by the deteriorating situation in Myanmar and again call for an immediate cessation of violence. We call for the release of all those arbitrarily detained, unhindered humanitarian access, resolution of the crisis through constructive dialogue, and the transition of Myanmar towards an inclusive democracy. We reaffirm our consistent support to ASEAN-led efforts, including the work of the ASEAN Chair and Office of the Special Envoy. We call for full implementation of all commitments under the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus.

34. We unequivocally condemn terrorism and violent extremism in all its forms and manifestations including cross-border terrorism. We are committed to international cooperation and will work with our regional partners in a comprehensive and sustained manner to strengthen capability to prevent, detect and respond to threats posed by terrorism and violent extremism, consistent with international law. We are committed to working together to promote accountability for the perpetrators of such terrorist attacks. We reiterate our condemnation of terrorist attacks, including the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai and in Pathankot, and our commitment to pursuing designations, as appropriate, by the UN Security Council 1267 Sanctions Committee. We will strengthen our cooperation through the new Working Group on Counterterrorism announced during the Quad Foreign Ministers' Meeting in March 2023.

34. We endorse the outcomes of the 3 March Quad Foreign Ministers' Meeting in New Delhi and the Ministers' Joint Statement committing to deepening practical and positive cooperation for the benefit of the Indo-Pacific region. India will host our next in-person Quad Leaders' Summit in 2024.

36. We, the Quad Leaders, remain firm in our resolve to meet the challenges facing our region and clear in our vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific that is stable, prosperous and inclusive. In doing so we are committed to working in partnership with Indo-Pacific countries – large and small – in deciding our future and shaping the region we all want to live in.

Subsection IV-7

Quad Leaders' Vision Statement

20 May 2023

Quad Leaders' Vision Statement - Enduring Partners for the Indo-Pacific
20 May 2023

We – the Leaders of Australia, India, Japan and the United States – convened to reaffirm our steadfast commitment to work through the Quad to support a free and open Indo-Pacific that is inclusive and resilient.

Our vision is for a region that is peaceful and prosperous, stable and secure, and respectful of sovereignty – free from intimidation and coercion, and where disputes are settled in accordance with international law. We seek a region in which all countries and peoples can exercise free choice on how they cooperate and trade based on partnership, equality and mutual respect. We share the belief that engaging openly, transparently and constructively creates more opportunity, greater economic vitality and better understanding of shared challenges, to the benefit of all.

At a time of fundamental change, challenge, and opportunity in our region, we are determined to make a positive and lasting contribution to the resilience and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific by leveraging our resources and sharing our expertise. Working with countries across the region and guided by their priorities, we strive to ensure that the principles that have underpinned peace and stability and stimulated decades of growth and prosperity continue to apply for decades to come, including the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity.

We will act together as a force for good to find common solutions for region-wide benefit. Recently, in our response to the devastation caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, we joined together to expand safe, affordable and effective vaccine production and equitable access. The Indo-Pacific's key challenges of health security, rapidly changing technology, the grave threat of climate change, and the strategic challenges facing the region, summon us to act with renewed purpose.

Today, we look to the future and commit to the following principles as we respond to the challenges ahead:

1. We are deeply invested in the future prosperity and stability of the Indo-Pacific, and are committed to bringing enduring benefit to the region by providing options that build resilience, open communication and economic growth.

2. We seek to maintain and strengthen stability in the Indo-Pacific where competition is managed responsibly, in accordance with international law, including the United Nations Charter, and we will work to strengthen and reform the multilateral system to ensure all nations, large and small, continue to have a voice. We seek to uphold the international order based on the rule of law.

3. We acknowledge and respect the centrality, agency, and leadership of regional institutions, including ASEAN, the Pacific Islands Forum, and the Indian Ocean Rim Association, and will work in and alongside them to complement their efforts and advance our shared interests.

4. We will work transparently and in open dialogue to implement a practical agenda that delivers sustained economic and social value, is responsive to regional partners, and contributes to global priorities by advancing the United Nations' 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its Sustainable Development Goals, noting the transformational power of technology to help meet these goals.

Subsection IV-8

Quad Foreign Ministers' Joint Statement

3 March 2023

Joint Statement: Quad Foreign Ministers' Meeting, New Delhi
03 March 2023

1. We, the Foreign Ministers of Australia, India and Japan and the Secretary of State of the United States of America met in New Delhi, India on March 3, 2023, for the Quad Foreign Ministers' Meeting. Our meeting today reaffirms the Quad's steadfast commitment to supporting a free and open Indo-Pacific, which is inclusive and resilient. We strongly support the principles of freedom, rule of law, sovereignty and territorial integrity, peaceful settlement of disputes without resorting to threat or use of force and freedom of navigation and overflight, and oppose any unilateral attempt to change the status quo, all of which are essential to the peace, stability and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region and beyond.

2. We reiterate our conviction that the Quad, acting as a force for regional and global good, will be guided by the priorities of the Indo-Pacific region through its positive and constructive agenda. Through the Quad, we seek to support the region through practical cooperation on contemporary challenges such as health security, climate change and the clean energy transition, critical and emerging technologies, infrastructure and connectivity, addressing the debt crisis through sustainable, transparent and fair lending and financing practices, space cooperation, cyber-security, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), maritime security and counter-terrorism.

3. Reaffirming our consistent and unwavering support for ASEAN centrality and unity, and the ASEAN-led architecture- including the East Asia Summit and ASEAN Regional Forum- we remain committed to supporting implementation of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) and will be guided in our work by ASEAN's principles and priorities. We welcome Indonesia's 2023 ASEAN Chairmanship and will support its Chair theme "*ASEAN Matters: Epicentrum of Growth"*, as we identify tangible areas for the Quad to support the work of ASEAN. In addition, we are committed to further strengthening our respective relationships with ASEAN, thus creating a platform for greater Quad collaboration in support of the AOIP.

4. We are committed to supporting Pacific Island countries in line with the objectives of the Pacific Islands Forum's 2050 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent, guided by Pacific priorities of climate change, resilient infrastructure and maritime security. We support regional institutions in the Pacific and are also further strengthening our cooperation with the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), to address the region's most pressing and important challenges. We welcome India's leadership in finalising the IORA Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.

5. We are pleased to note the progress made under the Quad Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Partnership (HADR) for the Indo-Pacific, since our last meeting in September 2022, when we signed the Guidelines for the Partnership. We welcome the outcomes of the first HADR tabletop exercise and biannual meeting held in India in December 2022. We look forward to the finalization of the Partnership's Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) which would enable an efficacious and coordinated response mechanism.

6. We concur that the rules-based international order is anchored in international law, including the UN Charter, and the principles of sovereignty, political independence, and territorial integrity of all states. We are committed to cooperate to address attempts to unilaterally subvert the UN and international system, in consultation with our partners and through multilateral and international platforms. We reiterate our unwavering support for the UN Charter, including its three pillars, and our steadfast commitment to strengthening the UN and international system through a comprehensive reform agenda, including through expansion in permanent and non-permanent seats of the UN Security Council. In this regard, we commit to active and constructive engagement in the Inter-Governmental Negotiations (IGN) process on Security Council Reforms with an overall objective of making the UN Security Council more effective, representative, and credible.

7. We will support meritorious and independent candidates for elections in the UN and in international forums to maintain the integrity and impartiality of the international system. We note with appreciation the UN Secretary General's call for full implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). In this regard, we underscore the importance of achieving SDGs in a comprehensive manner without prioritizing a narrow set of such goals, and reaffirm that the UN has a central role in supporting countries in its implementation.

8. We recognize that peace and security in the maritime domain underpins the development and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific, and reiterate the importance of respect for sovereignty, consistent with international law. We reiterate the importance of adherence to international law, as reflected in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), to meet challenges to the maritime rules-based order, including in the South and East China Seas. We strongly oppose any unilateral actions that seek to change the status quo or increase tensions in the area. We express serious concern at the militarization of disputed features, the dangerous use of coast guard vessels and maritime militia, and efforts to disrupt other countries' offshore resource exploitation activities.

9. We are determined to deepen engagement with regional partners, including through information-sharing, capacity-building and technical assistance, to strengthen maritime domain awareness; counter illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing; enhance their capability to protect and develop offshore resources, consistent with UNCLOS; ensure freedom of navigation and overflight; and promote the safety and security of sea lines of communication. We look forward to continuing these discussions at the Quad Maritime Security Working Group meeting hosted by the United States in

Washington DC in March 2023. In this context, we welcome the progress made under the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA).

10. We unequivocally condemn terrorism and violent extremism in all its forms and manifestations. We denounce the use of terrorist proxies and emphasize the importance of denying any logistical, financial or military support to terrorist organizations which could be used to launch or plan terrorist attacks, including transnational and cross-border attacks. We reiterate our condemnation of terrorist attacks, including 26/11 Mumbai, which claimed lives of citizens from all Quad countries, and Pathankot attacks. We are committed to working together with our regional and international partners to promote accountability for the perpetrators of such terrorist attacks, including through designations by the UN Security Council 1267 Sanctions Committee. In this regard, we express our concern at attempts to politicise the working of the UNSC Sanctions Regimes and call on all states to maintain the transparent, objective and evidence based working methods of UNSC Sanctions Committees.

11. We note with deep concern that terrorism has become increasingly diffuse, aided by terrorists' adaptation to, and the use of emerging and evolving technologies such as unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and the internet, including social media platforms for recruitment and incitement to commit terrorist acts, as well as for the financing, planning, and preparation of terrorist activities. We welcome the focused discussions on these themes at the Quad Counter-Terrorism Policy Meeting and tabletop exercise hosted by Australia in October 2022. We are pleased to announce the establishment of the Quad Working Group on Counter-Terrorism, which will explore cooperation amongst the Quad, and with Indo-Pacific partners, to counter new and emerging forms of terrorism, radicalization to violence and violent extremism. We look forward to its first meeting in the United States in 2023 to continue our discussions on this global issue.

12. We strongly emphasise the importance of maintaining peace, stability and prosperity and express our deep concern at the deteriorating situation in Myanmar. In this regard, we emphasise the need for complete cessation of violence, the release of all those arbitrarily detained, resolution of issues through dialogue, unhindered humanitarian access and transition to an inclusive, federal democratic system in Myanmar. Towards this, we reaffirm our consistent support to the ASEAN-led efforts, including the work of the ASEAN Chair and Office of the Special Envoy, and call for the full implementation of ASEAN's Five-Point Consensus. We also encourage the international community to work together in a pragmatic and constructive way towards resolving the crisis in Myanmar.

13. We condemn North Korea's destabilising ballistic missile launches, including the launch of yet another Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) on February 18, 2023 in violation of UN Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs). We reaffirm our commitment to the complete denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula and urge North Korea to comply with its obligations under UNSCRs. We reconfirm the necessity of immediate resolution of the abductions issue. We stress the importance of

addressing proliferation of nuclear and missile technologies related to North Korea in the region and beyond.

14. We continued to discuss our responses to the conflict in Ukraine and the immense human suffering it is causing, and concurred that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is inadmissible. We underscored the need for a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine in accordance with international law, including the UN Charter. We emphasised that the rules-based international order must respect sovereignty, territorial integrity, transparency and peaceful resolution of disputes

15. We welcome the announcement of the first class of Quad Fellows, who will begin their academic pursuits in the United States in August 2023.

16. We look forward to the next Quad Leaders' Summit being hosted by Australia this year.

17. We will work closely to align and complement Quad's agenda with Japan's Presidency of the G7, India's Presidency of the G20 and the United States' APEC host year in 2023.

18. We will continue to meet regularly to deliver concrete benefits and serve as a force for good, deepening practical and positive cooperation for the benefit of the Indo-Pacific region.

Subsection IV-9

Quad Ministerial Joint Readout

23 September 2022

Joint Readout of Quad Ministerial Meeting

The following is the joint readout released by the Secretary of State of the United States and the Foreign Ministers of the Governments of Australia, India, and Japan.

Begin Text:

We, the Secretary of State of the United States and the Foreign Ministers of Australia, India, and Japan, met in New York City on the sidelines of the 77th United Nations General Assembly to deepen Quad multilateral cooperation in support of advancing a free and open Indo-Pacific, which is inclusive and resilient. The Quad's vision is for a region where the rules-based international order is upheld, and where the principles of freedom, rule of law, democratic values, peaceful settlement of disputes, sovereignty, and territorial integrity are respected.

We reaffirmed our conviction that international law, peace, and security in the maritime domain underpins the development and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific. We strongly oppose any unilateral actions that seek to change the status quo or increase tensions in the region. We also reaffirmed our unwavering support for ASEAN unity and centrality, ASEAN-led regional architecture, and practical implementation of ASEAN's Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.

In meeting here, among the nations of the world, we underscored the Quad's unwavering support for the UN Charter, including its three pillars, and our steadfast commitment to strengthening and reforming the UN and international system. The Quad affirmed its support for a UN that solves the consequential challenges of our time and safeguards our shared and interconnected resources. This includes the full implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals. We are committed to advancing a comprehensive UN reform agenda, including through expansion in permanent and non-permanent seats of the UN Security Council, so that the Council reflects the current global realities and incorporates more geographically diverse perspectives. We underscored the need to address attempts to unilaterally subvert the international and multilateral system, including in the UN.

We welcomed progress in delivering on Quad commitments. In particular, we were pleased to sign guidelines to operationalize the Quad Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Partnership for the Indo-Pacific announced by Quad leaders in May 2022. We look forward to the counter-terrorism

tabletop exercise being hosted by Australia later in 2022, and we announced a statement on ransomware, calling on states to take reasonable steps to address ransomware operations emanating from their territory. We reiterated the Quad's commitment to supporting regional partners' efforts to improve their maritime security and domain awareness. We support the ongoing efforts, in close consultation with regional partners, to take forward the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness. We will continue to leverage our collective expertise to support the region to respond to other challenges, such as education and disinformation, as well as advance the initiatives set forth by Quad leaders on health security, climate change, infrastructure, peaceful use of outer space, critical and emerging technologies, and cybersecurity.

We, the Quad Foreign Ministers, resolved that our vision for the Quad's multilateral cooperation will be predicated on action-oriented engagement for the benefit of people throughout the Indo-Pacific. We intend to meet in person for the next Quad Foreign Ministers' Meeting in New Delhi in early 2023.

End text.

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Guidelines for Quad Partnership on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) in the Indo-Pacific

The Foreign Ministers of Australia, India and Japan and the Secretary of State of the United States met in New York on 23 September 2022 and signed into operation the Guidelines for the 'Quad Partnership on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) in the Indo-Pacific'. This partnership was announced by Quad Leaders in Tokyo on 24 May 2022, as part of a shared vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific that is inclusive and resilient.

The signing of these Guidelines marks a significant moment in Quad cooperation, which traces its origin from the 2004 ad hoc Tsunami Core Group which catalyzed international response efforts in the aftermath of the tsunami that devastated many countries in the region.

The Partnership has been designed to respond to the vulnerabilities of the Indo-Pacific region and will serve as a dedicated framework for Quad partners to coordinate their disaster response operations in the region. The mechanism will augment their capacity and capability, interoperability and operational synergy to undertake HADR operations.

Response operations will be guided by the core principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality as outlined in the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 46/182 on the provisions of humanitarian assistance.

A request for international assistance is needed before Quad partners may act in coordination under the Partnership. Quad partners may provide joint or coordinated individual assistance in crisis preparation or alert, crisis-response or post crisis review phases of disaster response. Any humanitarian action will be carried out with respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity of the affected state.

Under the partnership, Quad partners will promote inclusion by advancing gender equality and women's and girl's empowerment, ensuring persons with disabilities are agents and beneficiaries of humanitarian action, and by ensuring indigenous people, minority groups and persons in vulnerable situations are not left behind. The guidelines call for zero tolerance for inaction on tackling Sexual Exploitation, Abuse and Harassment (SEAH).

Quad partners will meet twice a year to share lessons and operational updates and will conduct at least one scenario-based table-top exercise to improve preparedness, coordination and interoperability.

The Partnership will coordinate HADR operations with the UN and other international agencies and donors, regional and local governments, public and private organisations, and nongovernment organizations where appropriate and in the best interest of humanity.

The guidelines have been signed by Quad Foreign Ministers and have come into effect this day, 23rd September 2022.

Subsection IV-10

Quad Leaders' Joint Statement

24 May 2022

Quad Joint Leaders' Statement

Today, we – Prime Minister Anthony Albanese of Australia, Prime Minister Narendra Modi of India, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida of Japan, and President Joe Biden of the United States – convene in Tokyo to renew our steadfast commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific that is inclusive and resilient.

Just over one year ago, Leaders met for the first time. Today in Tokyo, we convene for our fourth meeting, and our second in person, to demonstrate, at a time of profound global challenge, that the Quad is a force for good, committed to bringing tangible benefits to the region. In our first year of cooperation, we established the Quad's dedication to a positive and practical agenda; in our second year, we are committed to deliver on this promise, making the region more resilient for the 21st century.

With the COVID-19 pandemic still inflicting human and economic pain around the world, tendencies for unilateral actions among states and a tragic conflict raging in Ukraine, we are steadfast. We strongly support the principles of freedom, rule of law, democratic values, sovereignty and territorial integrity, peaceful settlement of disputes without resorting to threat or use of force, any unilateral attempt to change the status quo, and freedom of navigation and overflight, all of which are essential to the peace, stability and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific region and to the world. We will continue to act decisively together to advance these principles in the region and beyond. We reaffirm our resolve to uphold the international rules-based order where countries are free from all forms of military, economic and political coercion.

Peace and Stability

We discussed our respective responses to the conflict in Ukraine and the ongoing tragic humanitarian crisis, and assessed its implications for the Indo-Pacific. Quad Leaders reiterated our strong resolve to maintain the peace and stability in the region. We underscored unequivocally that the centerpiece of the international order is international law, including the UN Charter, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states. We also emphasized that all countries must seek peaceful resolution of disputes in accordance with international law.

The Quad is committed to cooperation with partners in the region who share the vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific. We reaffirm our unwavering support for ASEAN unity and centrality and for the practical implementation of ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. We welcome the EU's Joint Communication on the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific which was announced in September 2021 and increased European engagement in the Indo-Pacific region. We will champion adherence to international law, particularly as reflected in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and the maintenance of freedom of navigation and overflight, to meet challenges to the maritime rules-based order, including in the East and South China Seas. We strongly oppose any coercive, provocative or unilateral actions that seek to change the status quo and increase tensions in the area, such as the militarization of disputed features, the dangerous use of coast guard vessels and maritime militia, and efforts to disrupt other countries' offshore resource exploitation activities.

Individually and collectively, we will further strengthen our cooperation with Pacific island countries, to enhance their economic well being, strengthen health infrastructure and environmental resilience, to improve their maritime security and sustain their fisheries, to provide sustainable infrastructure, to bolster educational opportunities, and to mitigate and adapt to the impacts of climate change, which pose especially serious challenges for this region. We are committed to working together to address the needs of Pacific island partners. We reaffirmed our support for Pacific Islands Forum unity and for Pacific regional security frameworks.

Among ourselves and with our partners, we will deepen our cooperation in multilateral institutions, including at the United Nations, where reinforcing our shared priorities to reform and enhance the resilience of the multilateral system itself. Individually and together, we will respond to the challenges of our time, ensuring that the region remains inclusive, open, and governed by universal rules and norms.

We reaffirm our commitment to the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, consistent with United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) and also reconfirm the necessity of immediate resolution of the issue of Japanese abductees. We also condemn North Korea's destabilizing ballistic missile development and launches, including multiple intercontinental ballistic missile tests, in violation of UNSCRs, and call on the international community to fully implement these resolutions. We urge North Korea to abide by all of its obligations under the UNSCRs, refrain from provocations, and engage in substantive dialogue.

We remain deeply concerned by the crisis in Myanmar, which has caused grave humanitarian suffering and posed challenges to regional stability. We continue to call for the immediate end to violence in Myanmar, the release of all political detainees, including foreigners, engagement in constructive dialogue, humanitarian access, and the swift restoration of democracy. We reaffirm our support for ASEAN-led efforts to seek a solution in Myanmar and welcome the role of Special

Envoy of the ASEAN Chair. We further call for the urgent implementation of the ASEAN Five Point Consensus.

We condemn unequivocally terrorism and violent extremism in all its forms and manifestations and reiterate that there can be no justification for acts of terror on any grounds whatsoever. We denounce the use of terrorist proxies and emphasize the importance of denying any logistical, financial or military support to terrorist groups which could be used to launch or plan terror attacks, including cross-border attacks. We reiterate our condemnation of terrorist attacks, including 26/11 Mumbai and Pathankot attacks. We also reaffirm UNSC Resolution 2593 (2021), which demands that Afghan territory must never again be used to threaten or attack any country or to shelter or train terrorists, or to plan or finance terrorist attacks. We emphasize the importance of upholding international standards on anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism by all countries, consistent with FATF recommendations. We reaffirm that in our fight against global terrorism, we will take concerted action against all terrorist groups, including those individuals and entities designated pursuant to the UNSC Resolution 1267(1999).

COVID-19 and Global Health Security

For more than two years, the world has grappled with the devastating impacts of COVID-19 – on our communities, citizens, health workers and systems and economies. The Quad countries have led and will continue to lead global efforts for COVID-19 response, with a view to building better health security and strengthening health systems. We commit to adapt our collective approaches to get ahead of the virus with a focus on preparing for new variants, and getting vaccines, tests, treatments, and other medical products to those at highest risk.

To date, the Quad partners have collectively pledged approximately USD $ 5.2 billion to the COVAX AMC, approximately 40 percent of the total contributions from government donors. We are proud to have delivered over 670 million doses, including at least 265 million doses to Indo-Pacific. Noting significant expansion in the global supply of COVID-19 vaccines, we will continue to share safe, effective, affordable and quality-assured COVID-19 vaccines where and when they are needed.

We welcome the progress on the expansion of J&J vaccine production at the Biological E facility in India under the Quad Vaccine Partnership– sustainable manufacturing capacity will yield long-term benefit in the fight against COVID-19 and future pandemics. In this regard, we look forward to the grant of WHO's EUL approvals regarding the aforementioned vaccines in India. We celebrate the donation by the Quad to Cambodia and Thailand of WHO approved Made in India vaccines, together with Quad members' other vaccine related support, as an example of tangible achievement of our collaboration.

We will continue to address both the COVID-19 response and preparedness against future health threats. We will accelerate getting shots in arms through last mile support of which over 2 billion USD has been provided in more than 115 countries globally by our four countries, and will also address vaccine hesitancy through a Quad-convened event this week at the World Health Assembly. We will coordinate our efforts including through the "COVID-19 Prioritized Global Action Plan for Enhanced Engagement (GAP)," and COVAX Vaccine Delivery Partnership. We welcome the successful 2nd Global COVID-19 Summit co-hosted by the United States, and joined by the Quad members, which galvanized $3.2 billion in financial and policy commitments. We will strengthen support for economic and social revitalization in the Indo-Pacific region.

In the long term, we will strengthen the global health architecture and pandemic prevention, preparedness and response (PPR) to build better health security, including by enhancing finance and health coordination and bolstering on-going science and technology cooperation, such as through clinical trials and genomic surveillance. Building on existing Quad collaboration, we will enhance our capacity to improve early detection and monitor new and emerging pathogens with pandemic potential, and work to increase resilience to epidemics and pandemics. For the development of new vaccines to prevent and contain infectious diseases, Quad partners have collectively committed $524 million to the next phase of CEPI's work, accounting for about 50 percent of the total public investors.

We commit, as members of the Group of Friends of UHC, to take global leadership to further strengthen and reform the global health architecture for enhancing PPR and promoting UHC in the lead up to the UN High Level Meeting on UHC to be held in 2023.

Infrastructure

We reaffirmed our shared commitment to deepen cooperation on infrastructure, which is critical to driving productivity and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region. We also share a commitment to addressing debt issues, which have been exacerbated by the pandemic in many countries.

Quad partners bring decades of skills and experience together to catalyse infrastructure delivery to the region. We are committed to working closely with partners and the region to drive public and private investment to bridge gaps. To achieve this, Quad will seek to extend more than 50 billion USD of infrastructure assistance and investment in the Indo-Pacific, over the next five years.

We will work to strengthen capacities of the countries in need to cope with debt issues under the G20 Common Framework and by promoting debt sustainability and transparency in close collaboration with finance authorities of relevant countries, including through the "Quad Debt Management Resource Portal," which consists of multiple bilateral and multilateral capacity building assistance.

We also welcome the meeting of the development finance institutions and agencies of the four countries in the margins of the Quad Leaders' Meeting. We are working closely with experts, our region and each other to link our toolkits and expertise to better connect the Indo-Pacific.

We will further deepen collaboration and pursue complementary actions in identified areas, such as regional and digital connectivity, clean energy, and climate resilience including disaster resilience in energy related facilities that reflect the region's priorities including ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, to contribute to sustainable and inclusive growth in the region.

Climate

Recognizing the urgent need to address climate change as emphasized in the latest IPCC reports, we will steadfastly implement the Paris Agreement and deliver on the outcomes of COP26, accelerating our efforts to raise global ambition, including reaching out to key stakeholders in the Indo-Pacific region and supporting, strengthening, and enhancing climate actions by partners in the region including through mobilizing climate finance, both public and private, and facilitating the research, development, and deployment of innovative technology.

Today, we launch the "Quad Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation Package (Q-CHAMP)" with "mitigation" and "adaptation" as its two themes. Q-CHAMP includes ongoing activities under the Quad Climate Working Group on: green shipping and ports aiming for a shared green corridor framework building on each Quad country's input; clean energy cooperation in clean hydrogen and methane emissions from the natural gas sector; strengthening clean energy supply chains, welcoming the contribution of the Sydney Energy Forum; climate information services for developing an engagement strategy with Pacific island countries; and disaster risk reduction, including disaster and climate resilient infrastructure such as the efforts through the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI). Its coverage includes new cooperation in clean fuel ammonia, CCUS/Carbon Recycling, cooperation and capacity building support to advance high integrity carbon markets under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, climate-smart agriculture, knowledge sharing on subnational climate actions, and ecosystem-based adaptation. To make Q-CHAMP tangible, we are committed to expanding our programs, in support of climate actions between our four countries as well as in the Indo-Pacific region. We recognize the immense challenges posed by climate change to the island nations of the Pacific.

We welcome the new Australian Government's commitment to stronger action on climate change, including through passing legislation to achieve net zero by 2050 and lodging a new, ambitious Nationally Determined Contribution.

Cybersecurity

In an increasingly digital world with sophisticated cyber threats we recognize an urgent need to take a collective approach to enhancing cybersecurity. To deliver on the Quad Leaders' vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific, we commit to improving the defense of our nations' critical infrastructure by sharing threat information, identifying and evaluating potential risks in supply chains for digitally enabled products and services, and aligning baseline software security standards for government procurement, leveraging our collective purchasing power to improve the broader software development ecosystem so that all users can benefit. The Quad partners will coordinate capacity building programs in the Indo-Pacific region under the Quad Cybersecurity Partnership, and will initiate the first-ever Quad Cybersecurity Day to help individual internet users across our nations, the Indo-Pacific region, and beyond to better protect themselves from cyber threats.

Critical & Emerging Technologies

The Quad remains focused on harnessing critical and emerging technologies to enhance the prosperity and security of the region. In the area of 5G and beyond 5G, while welcoming the Prague Proposals on Telecommunications Supplier Diversity, we will advance interoperability and security through the signature of a new Memorandum of Cooperation on 5G Supplier Diversification and Open RAN. We are also deepening our engagement with industry, including through Open RAN Track 1.5 events, and exploring ways to collaborate on the deployment of open and secure telecommunications technologies in the region.

We have mapped the Quad's capacity and vulnerabilities in global semiconductor supply chains and have decided to better leverage our complementary strengths to realize a diverse and competitive market for semiconductors. The Common Statement of Principles on Critical Technology Supply Chains, launched on the occasion of this Summit, advances our cooperation on semiconductors and other critical technologies, providing a cooperative foundation for enhancing our resilience against various risks to the region. Our cooperation in the international standardization organizations, such as the Telecommunication Standardization Bureau of the International Telecommunication Union, has made great progress, and we expect to strengthen such cooperation through the new International Standards Cooperation Network (ISCN). This cooperation will help ensure technology development in the region is guided by our shared democratic values. We continue to strengthen our horizon scanning cooperation following our deepened discussions in biotechnology through our efforts on mapping and a corresponding Track 1.5 and a future focus on quantum technologies. We will convene a business and investment forum for networking with industry partners to expand capital for critical and emerging technologies.

Quad Fellowship

We recognize that people to people ties are the bedrock of the Quad and welcome the official launch of the Quad Fellowship, which is now open for application. The Quad Fellowship will bring 100 students from our countries to the United States each year to pursue graduate degrees in STEM fields, and is administered by Schmidt Futures. The first class of Quad Fellows will begin their studies in the third quarter of 2023, and we look forward to building together a talented cohort of next-generation STEM minds who will lead our countries in cutting-edge research and innovation.

Space

Space-related applications and technologies can also contribute to addressing common challenges such as climate change, disaster preparedness and response, and sustainable uses of oceans and marine resources. Each Quad partner will endeavor to improve public access to Earth observation satellite data and applications. We will work together to create an Earth observation-based monitoring and sustainable development framework. We will endeavor to share space-based civil Earth observation data, along with providing a "Quad Satellite Data Portal" that aggregates links to our respective national satellite data resources. We will work together to develop space applications, including in the area of Earth observations, and provide capacity building support to countries in the region, including with regards to partnering on using space capabilities to respond to extreme precipitation events. We will also consult on rules, norms, guidelines and principles for the sustainable use of space, and extend support to countries in the region through joint workshops including in relation to the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) Guidelines for the Long-Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities.

Maritime Domain Awareness and HADR

We welcome a new maritime domain awareness initiative, the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA), designed to work with regional partners to respond to humanitarian and natural disasters, and combat illegal fishing. IPMDA will support and work in consultation with Indo-Pacific nations and regional information fusion centers in the Indian Ocean, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific Islands by providing technology and training to support enhanced, shared maritime domain awareness to promote stability and prosperity in our seas and oceans. IPMDA embodies what the Quad stands for: catalyzing our joint efforts towards concrete results that help to make the region more stable and prosperous.

Delivering on our commitment following our virtual meeting on 3 March 2022, we announce today the establishment of the "Quad Partnership on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) in the Indo-Pacific". This Partnership will further strengthen our collaboration to effectively respond to disasters in the region.

Closing

Today, with a shared vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific, we once again emphasize the importance of fundamental values and principles, and commit to work tirelessly to deliver tangible results to the region. In doing so, we will regularize the Quad activities, including regular meetings by the Leaders and Foreign Ministers. We agree to hold our next in-person summit in 2023 hosted by Australia.

Subsection IV-11

Quad Foreign Ministers' Joint Statement

11 February 2022

Joint Statement of the Foreign Ministers of Australia, India and Japan and the Secretary of State of the United States

Quad Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific

Joint Statement of the Foreign Ministers of Australia, India and Japan and the Secretary of State of the United States Quad Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific We, the Foreign Ministers of Australia, India and Japan and the Secretary of State of the United States met in Melbourne, Australia on 11 February 2022, for the fourth Quad Foreign Ministers' Meeting. In meeting, we reaffirm the Quad's commitment to supporting Indo Pacific countries' efforts to advance a free and open Indo-Pacific – a region which is inclusive and resilient, and in which states strive to protect the interests of their people, free from coercion.

Our meeting advanced the Quad's positive and ambitious agenda. We are focused on working closely with Indo-Pacific partners to address the region's most important challenges. Working together as the Quad, we are more effective in delivering practical support to the region.

As unwavering supporters of ASEAN unity and centrality, and the ASEAN-led architecture, we continue to support ASEAN partners to advance the practical implementation of ASEAN's Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. The Outlook's principles are fundamental to regional stability and prosperity and will be key to guiding the region's economic and political future. We acknowledge the importance of sub-regional mechanisms and institutions, including in the Mekong sub-region. We will continue to support Cambodia in its important role as 2022 ASEAN Chair.

As we enter the third year of the COVID-19 pandemic, Quad partners have collectively provided more than 500 million vaccine doses. Together, we have pledged to donate more than 1.3 billion vaccine doses globally. We are pleased with the Quad Vaccine Partnership's rapid progress in expanding vaccine production at the Biological E Ltd facility in India, which aims to deliver at least 1 billion vaccines by the end of 2022. We look forward to the delivery of the first batch of Quad-supported vaccines in the first half of this year. We are assisting to train healthcare workers, combat vaccine hesitancy and augment infrastructure, especially cold chain systems, for 'last mile' vaccine delivery. We are working to identify and address vaccine gaps and barriers exacerbated by gender, disability and social inequities, and ensure safe, effective, affordable and quality-assured vaccination

coverage in hard-to-reach areas. We welcome the timely initiative for coordinating the response to combat the COVID pandemic under a Global Action Plan for Enhanced Engagement.

We welcome progress on the practical cooperation we lead as Quad Foreign Ministers to address regional challenges, including humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HADR), maritime security, counter-terrorism, countering disinformation and cyber security.

We are strengthening HADR cooperation in the region. Since 2004, when we collaborated in response to the Indian Ocean tsunami, Quad partners have continued to respond quickly and effectively to natural disasters in the Indo-Pacific. We recognise that recent natural disasters and the COVID-19 pandemic have highlighted the need to build and maintain resilience against such events, and are proud to be supporting our Tongan partners in their response and recovery efforts following the January 2022 volcano eruption and tsunami. We commit to further strengthening our collaboration and building links between our response agencies to provide timely and effective HADR support to the region.

The Quad recognises that international law, peace, and security in the maritime domain underpins the development and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific. We reiterate the importance of adherence to international law, particularly as reflected in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), to meet challenges to the maritime rules-based order, including in the South and East China Seas. We are determined to deepen engagement with regional partners, including through capacity-building and technical assistance, to strengthen maritime domain awareness; protect their ability to develop offshore resources, consistent with UNCLOS; ensure freedom of navigation and overflight; combat challenges, such as illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing; and promote the safety and security of sea lines of communication.

The Quad is exchanging information on ever-evolving threats and working with Indo-Pacific countries, and in multilateral fora, to counter all forms of terrorism and violent extremism. We denounce the use of terrorist proxies for cross-border terrorism and urge countries to work together to eliminate terrorist safe havens; disrupt terrorist networks and the infrastructure and financial channels which sustain them; and halt cross-border movement of terrorists. In this context, we call on all countries to ensure that territory under their control is not used to launch terror attacks and to expeditiously bring to justice the perpetrators of such attacks. We reiterate our condemnation of terrorist attacks in India, including 26/11 Mumbai and Pathankot attacks. We reaffirm UNSC Resolution 2593 (2021) that Afghan territory should not be used to threaten or attack any country, shelter or train terrorists, or plan or finance terrorist acts, with such ungoverned spaces being a direct threat to the safety and security of the Indo-Pacific.

The Quad is supporting regional neighbours to build resilience and counter disinformation. We will also coordinate efforts to assist partners across the Indo-Pacific to address the growing threat of ransomware, by strengthening capacity building to ensure resilient cyber security and to counter

cybercrime. We are committed to promoting international peace and stability in cyberspace, and to helping build the capacity of regional countries to implement the UN Voluntary Framework for Responsible State Behaviour in Cyberspace.

Quad partners champion the free, open, and inclusive rules-based order, rooted in international law, that protects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of regional countries. We reaffirm our commitment to upholding and strengthening the rules-based multilateral trading system, with the World Trade Organization at its core. We oppose coercive economic policies and practices that run counter to this system and will work collectively to foster global economic resilience against such actions.

We express our commitment to strengthen our diplomatic efforts so that the vision for technologies, guided by the Quad Principles on Technology Design, Development, Governance, and Use, will be further shared by all like-minded nations.

Reflecting Quad leaders' commitment to cooperate to establish responsible and resilient clean-energy supply chains, we welcome Australia's proposal to host an Indo-Pacific Clean Energy Supply Chain Forum in mid-2022.

We reaffirm our belief that our people-to-people ties are among the Quad's greatest strengths and welcomed the United States' new exchange programs in the fields of cyber security, maritime security, countering disinformation, and promoting transparency in governance. We are exploring a track 1.5 dialogue between our respective strategic thinkers.

Alongside our Quad Foreign Ministers' agenda, we welcome other ongoing work in delivering Quad Leaders' ambitious initiatives in key areas, such as the Quad Vaccine Partnership, climate change, cyber security, infrastructure, and the peaceful use of outer space, education, and critical and emerging technologies.

We remain gravely concerned about the crisis in Myanmar and call for an end to violence, the release of all those arbitrarily detained, including foreigners, and unhindered humanitarian access. We reaffirm our support for ASEAN efforts to seek a solution in Myanmar and call on the military regime to urgently implement ASEAN's Five-Point Consensus and swiftly return Myanmar to the path of democracy. We encourage the international community to work together to support an end to the violence.

We condemn North Korea's destabilising ballistic missile launches in violation of UN Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs), reaffirm our commitment to the complete denuclearisation of North Korea consistent with UNSCRs, and reconfirm the necessity of immediate resolution of the issue of Japanese abductees.

We look forward to Japan hosting the next Quad Leaders' Summit in the first half of 2022.

We will continue to meet annually to deliver as a force for good for the region.

Subsection IV-12

Quad Leaders' Joint Statement

24 September 2021

Joint Statement from Quad Leaders
September 24, 2021

We, the leaders of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States, convened today in person as "the Quad" for the first time. On this historic occasion we recommit to our partnership, and to a region that is a bedrock of our shared security and prosperity—a free and open Indo-Pacific, which is also inclusive and resilient. Just six months have passed since our last meeting. Since March, the COVID-19 pandemic has caused continued global suffering; the climate crisis has accelerated; and regional security has become ever-more complex, testing all of our countries individually and together. Our cooperation, however, remains unflinching.

The occasion of the Quad summit is an opportunity to refocus ourselves and the world on the Indo-Pacific and on our vision for what we hope to achieve. Together, we recommit to promoting the free, open, rules-based order, rooted in international law and undaunted by coercion, to bolster security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. We stand for the rule of law, freedom of navigation and overflight, peaceful resolution of disputes, democratic values, and territorial integrity of states. We commit to work together and with a range of partners. We reaffirm our strong support for ASEAN's unity and centrality and for ASEAN's Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, and we underscore our dedication towards working with ASEAN and its member states—the heart of the Indo-Pacific region—in practical and inclusive ways. We also welcome the September 2021 EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.

Since our first meeting, we have made considerable progress in tackling some of the world's most pressing challenges: the COVID-19 pandemic, the climate crisis, and critical and emerging technologies.

Our partnership on COVID-19 response and relief marks an historic new focus for the Quad. We launched the Quad Vaccine Experts Group, comprised of top experts from our respective governments, charged with building strong ties and better aligning our plans to support Indo-Pacific health security and COVID-19 response. In doing so, we have shared assessments of the state of the pandemic and aligned our efforts to combat it, reinforced shared diplomatic principles for mitigating COVID-19 in the region, and actively improved coordination of our efforts to support safe, effective, quality-assured vaccine production and equitable access, in close collaborations with multilateral efforts including the COVAX Facility. In addition to doses financed through COVAX,

Australia, India, Japan, and the United States have pledged to donate more than 1.2 billion doses globally of safe and effective COVID-19 vaccines. And to date, we have delivered nearly 79 million safe, effective, and quality-assured vaccine doses to countries in the Indo-Pacific as part of those commitments.

Thanks to the Quad Vaccine Partnership's financing of increased manufacturing capacity at Biological E LTD, additional production in India will come on line later this year. In line with our March announcement, and recognizing the continuing global supply gap, we will ensure this expanded manufacturing is exported for the Indo-Pacific and the world, and we will coordinate with key multilateral initiatives, such as the COVAX Facility, to procure proven safe, effective and quality-assured COVID-19 vaccines for low- and middle-income countries. We also recognize the importance of open and secure supply chains for vaccine production.

We have accomplished much to date despite months of pandemic hardship throughout the region and world. The Quad leaders welcome Biological E LTD's production, including through our Quad investments, of at least one billion safe and effective COVID-19 vaccines by the end of 2022. Today, we are proud to announce an initial step towards that supply that will immediately help the Indo-Pacific and the world to end the pandemic. The Quad also welcomes India's announcement to resume exports of safe and effective COVID-19 vaccines, including to COVAX, beginning in October 2021. Japan will continue to help regional partners purchase vaccines through $3.3 billion of COVID-19 Crisis Response Emergency Support Loan. Australia will deliver $212 million in grant aid to purchase vaccines for Southeast Asia and the Pacific. In addition, Australia will allocate $219 million to support last-mile vaccine rollouts and lead in coordinating the Quad's last-mile delivery efforts in those regions.

We will also strengthen our Science and Technology (S&T) cooperation in the areas of clinical trials and genomic surveillance so that we can accelerate our efforts to end this pandemic and build better health security. We are committed to align around shared global targets to help vaccinate the world, save lives now, and build back better, including by strengthening global health security financing and political leadership. Our countries will also conduct a joint pandemic-preparedness tabletop or exercise in 2022.

We have joined forces to tackle the climate crisis, which must be addressed with the urgency it demands. Quad countries will work together to keep the Paris-aligned temperature limits within reach and will pursue efforts to limit it to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. To this end, Quad countries intend to update or communicate ambitious NDCs by COP26 and welcome those who have already done so. Quad countries will also coordinate their diplomacy to raise global ambition, including reaching out to key stakeholders in the Indo-Pacific region. Our work is organized across three thematic areas: climate ambition, clean-energy innovation and deployment, and climate adaptation, resilience and preparedness, with the intent to pursue enhanced actions during the 2020s, contributing to the aim of achieving global net-zero emissions preferably by 2050, and taking into

account national circumstances. We are pursuing nationally appropriate sectoral decarbonization efforts, including those aimed at decarbonizing shipping and port operations and the deployment of clean-hydrogen technology. We will cooperate to establish responsible and resilient clean-energy supply chains, and will strengthen the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure and climate information systems. Quad countries will work together for successful outcomes at the COP26 and G20 that uphold the level of climate ambition and innovation that this moment requires.

We have established cooperation on critical and emerging technologies, to ensure the way in which technology is designed, developed, governed, and used is shaped by our shared values and respect for universal human rights. In partnership with industry, we are advancing the deployment of secure, open, and transparent 5G and beyond-5G networks, and working with a range of partners to foster innovation and promote trustworthy vendors and approaches such as Open-RAN. Acknowledging the role of governments in fostering an enabling environment for 5G diversification, we will work together to facilitate public-private cooperation and demonstrate in 2022 the scalability and cybersecurity of open, standards-based technology. With respect to the development of technical standards, we will establish sector-specific contact groups to promote an open, inclusive, private-sector-led, multi-stakeholder, and consensus-based approach. We will also coordinate and cooperate in multilateral standardization organizations such as the International Telecommunication Union. We are mapping the supply chain of critical technologies and materials, including semiconductors, and affirm our positive commitment to resilient, diverse, and secure supply chains of critical technologies, recognizing the importance of government support measures and policies that are transparent and market-oriented. We are monitoring trends in the critical and emerging technologies of the future, beginning with biotechnology, and identifying related opportunities for cooperation. We are also launching today Quad Principles on Technology Design, Development, Governance, and Use that we hope will guide not only the region but the world towards responsible, open, high-standards innovation.

Going forward, we will not only deepen our cooperation in these critical areas, but we will broaden it to new ones. Building upon each of our regional infrastructure efforts, separately and together, we are launching a new Quad infrastructure partnership. As a Quad, we will meet regularly to coordinate our efforts, map the region's infrastructure needs, and coordinate on regional needs and opportunities. We will cooperate to provide technical assistance, empowering regional partners with evaluative tools, and will promote sustainable infrastructure development. We support the G7's infrastructure efforts, and look forward to cooperating with like-minded partners, including with the EU. We reconfirm the G20 Quality Infrastructure Investment Principles and will reenergize our efforts to provide high-standards infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific. We reaffirm our interest in continuing our engagement with the Blue Dot Network. We emphasize the importance of supporting open, fair, and transparent lending practices in line with international rules and standards for major creditor countries, including on debt sustainability and accountability, and call on all creditors to adhere to these rules and standards.

Today, we begin new cooperation in cyber space and pledge to work together to combat cyber threats, promote resilience, and secure our critical infrastructure. In space we will identify new collaboration opportunities and share satellite data for peaceful purposes such as monitoring climate change, disaster response and preparedness, sustainable uses of oceans and marine resources, and on responding to challenges in shared domains. We will also consult on rules, norms, guidelines and principles for ensuring the sustainable use of outer space.

We are proud to begin a new chapter of educational and people-to-people cooperation as we inaugurate the Quad Fellowship. Stewarded by Schmidt Futures, a philanthropic initiative, and with generous support from Accenture, Blackstone, Boeing, Google, Mastercard, and Western Digital this pilot fellowship program will provide 100 graduate fellowships to leading science, technology, engineering, and mathematics graduate students across our four countries. Through the Quad Fellowship, our next generation of STEM talent will be prepared to lead the Quad and other like-minded partners towards the innovations that will shape our shared future.

In South Asia, we will closely coordinate our diplomatic, economic, and human-rights policies towards Afghanistan and will deepen our counter-terrorism and humanitarian cooperation in the months ahead in accordance with UNSCR 2593. We reaffirm that Afghan territory should not be used to threaten or attack any country or to shelter or train terrorists, or to plan or to finance terrorist acts, and reiterate the importance of combating terrorism in Afghanistan. We denounce the use of terrorist proxies and emphasized the importance of denying any logistical, financial or military support to terrorist groups which could be used to launch or plan terror attacks, including cross-border attacks. We stand together in support of Afghan nationals, and call on the Taliban to provide safe passage to any person wishing to leave Afghanistan, and to ensure that the human rights of all Afghans, including women, children, and minorities are respected.

We also recognize that our shared futures will be written in the Indo-Pacific, and we will redouble our efforts to ensure that the Quad is a force for regional peace, stability, security, and prosperity. Towards that end, we will continue to champion adherence to international law, particularly as reflected in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), to meet challenges to the maritime rules-based order, including in the East and South China Seas. We affirm our support to small island states, especially those in the Pacific, to enhance their economic and environmental resilience. We will continue our assistance with Pacific Island countries on responses to the health and economic impacts of COVID-19 and on quality, sustainable infrastructure, as well as partner to mitigate and adapt to the impacts of climate change, which poses especially serious challenges for the Pacific.

We reaffirm our commitment to the complete denuclearization of North Korea in accordance with United Nations Security Council resolutions, and also confirm the necessity of immediate resolution of the issue of Japanese abductees. We urge North Korea to abide by its UN obligations, refrain from provocations. We also call on North Korea to engage in substantive dialogue. We are

committed to building democratic resilience in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. We continue to call for the end to violence in Myanmar, the release of all political detainees, including foreigners, engagement in constructive dialogue, and for the early restoration of democracy. We further call for the urgent implementation of the ASEAN Five Point Consensus. We will deepen our cooperation in multilateral institutions, including at the United Nations, where reinforcing our shared priorities enhances the resilience of the multilateral system itself. Individually and together, we will respond to the challenges of our time, ensuring that the region remains inclusive, open, and governed by universal rules and norms.

We will continue to build habits of cooperation; our leaders and foreign ministers will meet annually and our senior officials will meet regularly. Our working groups will continue their steady tempo to produce the cooperation necessary to build a stronger region.

At a time that tests us all, our commitment to realize a free and open Indo-Pacific is firm, and our vision for this partnership remains ambitious and far-reaching. With steadfast cooperation, we rise to meet this moment, together.

Subsection IV-13

Quad Leaders' Joint Statement

13 March 2021

Quad Leaders' Joint Statement: 'The Spirit of the Quad'

1. We have convened to reaffirm our commitment to quadrilateral cooperation between Australia, India, Japan, and the United States. We bring diverse perspectives and are united in a shared vision for the free and open Indo-Pacific. We strive for a region that is free, open, inclusive, healthy, anchored by democratic values, and unconstrained by coercion. We recall that our joint efforts toward this positive vision arose out of an international tragedy, the tsunami of 2004. Today, the global devastation wrought by COVID-19, the threat of climate change, and security challenges facing the region summon us with renewed purpose. On this historic occasion of March 12, 2021, the first-ever leader-level summit of the Quad, we pledge to strengthen our cooperation on the defining challenges of our time.

2. Together, we commit to promoting a free, open rules-based order, rooted in international law to advance security and prosperity and counter threats to both in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. We support the rule of law, freedom of navigation and overflight, peaceful resolution of disputes, democratic values, and territorial integrity. We commit to work together and with a range of partners. We reaffirm our strong support for ASEAN's unity and centrality as well as the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. Full of potential, the Quad looks forward to the future; it seeks to uphold peace and prosperity and strengthen democratic resilience, based on universal values.

3. Our common goals require us to reckon with the most urgent of global challenges. Today, we pledge to respond to the economic and health impacts of COVID-19, combat climate change, and address shared challenges, including in cyber space, critical technologies, counterterrorism, quality infrastructure investment, and humanitarian-assistance and disaster-relief as well as maritime domains.

4. Building on the progress our countries have achieved on health security, we will join forces to expand safe, affordable, and effective vaccine production and equitable access, to speed economic recovery and benefit global health. With steadfast commitment to the health and safety of our own people, we also recognize that none of us can be safe as long as the pandemic continues to spread. We will, therefore, collaborate to strengthen equitable vaccine access for the Indo-Pacific, with close coordination with multilateral organizations including the World Health Organization and COVAX. We call for transparent and results-oriented reform at the World Health Organization. We are united in recognizing that climate change is a global priority and will work to strengthen the climate actions

of all nations, including to keep a Paris-aligned temperature limit within reach. We look forward to a successful COP 26 in Glasgow. We will begin cooperation on the critical technologies of the future to ensure that innovation is consistent with a free, open, inclusive, and resilient Indo-Pacific. We will continue to prioritize the role of international law in the maritime domain, particularly as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and facilitate collaboration, including in maritime security, to meet challenges to the rules-based maritime order in the East and South China Seas. We reaffirm our commitment to the complete denuclearization of North Korea in accordance with United Nations Security Council resolutions, and also confirm the necessity of immediate resolution of the issue of Japanese abductees. As long-standing supporters of Myanmar and its people, we emphasize the urgent need to restore democracy and the priority of strengthening democratic resilience.

5. To advance these goals and others, we will redouble our commitment to Quad engagement. We will combine our nations' medical, scientific, financing, manufacturing and delivery, and development capabilities and establish a vaccine expert working group to implement our path-breaking commitment to safe and effective vaccine distribution; we will launch a critical- and emerging-technology working group to facilitate cooperation on international standards and innovative technologies of the future; and we will establish a climate working group to strengthen climate actions globally on mitigation, adaptation, resilience, technology, capacity-building, and climate finance. Our experts and senior officials will continue to meet regularly; our Foreign Ministers will converse often and meet at least once a year. At the leader level, we will hold an in-person summit by the end of 2021. The ambition of these engagements is fit to the moment; we are committed to leveraging our partnership to help the world's most dynamic region respond to historic crisis, so that it may be the free, open, accessible, diverse, and thriving Indo-Pacific we all seek.

Subsection IV-14

Quad Ministerial Meeting Readout

18 February 2021

Japan-Australia-India-U.S. Foreign Ministers' Telephone Meeting
February 18, 2021

On February 18, from 9:00 p.m. to 10:30 p.m., Mr. MOTEGI Toshimitsu, Minister for Foreign Affairs, with Senator the Hon Marise Payne, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Commonwealth of Australia, H.E. Dr. Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, External Affairs Minister of India, and The Honorable Antony Blinken, Secretary of State of the United States, held a telephone meeting. The overview of the meeting is as follows:

1. The four Ministers welcomed the fact that this meeting was realized in the early days of the Biden administration of the U.S.

2. The four Ministers welcomed the continued progress in practical discussion and cooperation among the four countries since the second ministers' meeting. In addition, they shared the recognition that the existing international order has been under challenge in various fields including unilateral attempts to change the status quo and that the four countries, which share basic values and are deeply committed to reinforcing a free and open global order based on the rule of law, are playing increasingly important role under such situations.

3. The four Ministers confirmed the importance of promoting the vision of a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" together with more countries for the realization of the vision. They also shared the view in further deepening engagement and cooperation with ASEAN, the Pacific Island, and European countries. In this regard, the four Ministers reaffirmed their strong support for the "ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific", which is ASEAN's proactive efforts, and ASEAN's unity and centrality as well as the ASEAN-led regional architecture. They also welcomed proactive efforts by other countries including those in Europe toward a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific."

4. The four Ministers concurred on further advancing practical cooperation in various areas towards the realization of a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific", such as quality infrastructure, maritime security, counter-terrorism, cyber security, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, education and human resource development.

5. Foreign Minister Motegi expressed grave concern for deteriorating situation in Myanmar, and explained that Japan was strongly urging the Myanmar military to immediately stop

violence against citizens including shootings, release those who have been detained including State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and swiftly restore Myanmar's democratic political system. The four Ministers shared the view on the need to recover the democratic regime early.

6. Foreign Minister Motegi expressed serious concern with regard to the China's Coast Guard Law, and the four Ministers concurred to strongly oppose unilateral and forceful attempts to change the status quo in the context of the East and South China Sea.

7. In addition, the four Ministers also exchanged views on regional issues such as North Korea as well as cooperation on global challenges including response to the COVID-19 and climate change.

8. The four Ministers reaffirmed to make sure that they will meet every year and to coordinate closely at the working level.

Subsection IV-15

Quad Ministerial Meeting Readout

6 October 2020

The Second Japan-Australia-India-U.S. Foreign Ministers' Meeting
October 6, 2020

On October 6, commencing at 5:15 p.m. for approximately 3 hours, Mr. MOTEGI Toshimitsu, Minister for Foreign Affairs, chaired the Second Japan-Australia-India-U.S. Foreign Ministers' Meeting and dinner with Senator the Hon Marise Payne, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Commonwealth of Australia, H.E. Dr. Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, External Affairs Minister of India, and The Honorable Mike Pompeo, Secretary of State of the United States, who are visiting Japan. The overview of the meeting and the dinner is as follows:

1. The four Ministers welcomed the Second Japan-Australia-India-U.S. Foreign Ministers' Meeting, which became the first ministerial-level international conference in Japan since the outbreak and spread of COVID-19.

2. The four Ministers exchanged views on the response to various challenges which have come to the fore with the outbreak and spread of COVID-19, and affirmed their intention to continue their cooperation in the areas of health and hygiene and on issues including making new international rules in such areas as digital economy.

3. The four Ministers affirmed the importance of broadening cooperation with more countries for the realization of a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" as the vision serves for the peace and prosperity of the region and its importance in the post-COVID world is increasing. In this regard, the four Ministers reaffirmed their strong support for ASEAN's unity and centrality as well as the ASEAN-led regional architecture. They also reaffirmed their full support for the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. They also welcomed proactive efforts by other countries including those in Europe toward a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific."

4. The four Ministers concurred on further developing practical cooperation in various areas such as quality infrastructure, maritime security, counter-terrorism, cyber security, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, education and human resource development, in order to promote a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" in a concrete way.

5. The four Ministers also exchanged views on regional affairs such as North Korea and East and South China Seas.

6. The four Ministers shared the view to regularize this Foreign Ministers' meeting and hold the next one at an appropriate timing next year.

Subsection IV-16

Quad Senior Officials Meeting Readout

4 November 2019

Japan -Australia-India-U.S. Consultations
November 4, 2019

1. Senior officials from Japan, Australia, India, and the United States met in Bangkok, Thailand, on November 4, 2019, for consultations on collective efforts to advance a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific. From the Japanese side, Mr. Shigeo Yamada, Director-General of Foreign Policy Bureau attended. From Australian side, Mr. Richard Maude, Deputy Secretary, Indo-Pacific Group, in the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade attended. From Indian side, Mr. Gourangalal Das, Joint Secretary (Americas), Ministry of External Affairs attended. From the U.S. side, Mr. David Stilwell, Assistant Secretary of State (East Asian and Pacific Affairs) and Ms. Alice Wells, Acting Assistant Secretary of State (South and Central Asian Affairs) attended.

2. The four countries reaffirmed their support for a rules-based order in the region that promotes stability, growth, and economic prosperity.

3. The four countries continued productive discussions, based on the discussion at the Japan-Australia-India-U.S. Ministerial held on September 26, for advancing practical collaboration on counter-terrorism, cyber security, maritime security, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

4. The four countries agreed to enhance coordination on quality infrastructure investment based on international standards such as the "G20 Principles for Quality Infrastructure Investment", including through strengthening partnerships with and support for existing regional frameworks. The four countries exchanged views on regional issues, including the DPRK.

5. The four countries welcomed the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific and reaffirmed their countries' strong support for ASEAN's unity and centrality as well as the ASEAN-led regional architecture.

6. The four countries underscored their intent to continue regular consultations on Indo-Pacific engagement and agreed to hold the next senior officials' meeting in spring 2020.

Subsection IV-17

Quad Ministerial Meeting Readout

26 September 2019

Japan-Australia-India-U.S. Ministerial
September 26, 2019

On September 26, commencing at 8:30 a.m. (9:30 p.m. JST) for approximately 60 minutes, Mr. Toshimitsu Motegi, Minister for Foreign Affairs, who is visiting New York to attend the United Nations General Assembly session, held a Japan-Australia-India-U.S. Ministerial with Mr. Mike Pompeo, Secretary of State of the United States of America, Senator The Hon Marise Payne, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Commonwealth of Australia and H.E. Dr S. Jaishankar, External Affairs Minister of India. The overview of the meeting is as follows.

1. The four countries discussed collective efforts to advance a free, open, prosperous, and inclusive Indo-Pacific.

2. The four countries reaffirmed their shared commitment to close cooperation on maritime security, quality infrastructure, and connectivity in support of preserving and promoting a rules-based order in the region.

3. The four countries discussed cooperative initiatives including counter-terrorism, cyber security, and regional disaster response as significant areas for ongoing engagement.

4. The four countries reaffirmed their strong support for ASEAN centrality and the ASEAN-led regional architecture.

5. The four countries pledged to continue Indo-Pacific coordination and look forward to a senior officials meeting on the sidelines of the November 2019 East Asia Summit in Bangkok.

Subsection IV-18

Quad Senior Officials Meeting Readout

31 May 2019

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1. On May 31, senior officials from Japan, Australia, India, and the United States met in Bangkok for consultations on their collective efforts to advance a free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific.

2. The four countries recalled their shared commitment to preserving and promoting the rules-based order in the region. They affirmed their intent to continue close coordination and collaboration in support of sustainable development, maritime security, and good governance. They noted initiatives from each country to provide tools and opportunities to quality infrastructure investment in accordance with international standards and leverage the potential of the private sector.

3. The four countries highlighted their efforts to maintain universal respect for international law and freedom of navigation and overflight. They also emphasized the importance of cooperative efforts to support regional security needs.

4. The four countries agreed to continue to explore opportunities to enhance various cooperation, including regional disaster response, cybersecurity, maritime security, counterterrorism, and nonproliferation. They also noted their desire to work with like-minded partners and allies to promote a transparent, rules-based approach to trans-boundary challenges.

5. In reviewing recent developments in the region, the four countries welcomed the efforts made by ASEAN member countries towards an ASEAN Indo-Pacific Outlook. They further affirmed their strong support for ASEAN centrality and ASEAN-led regional architecture.

6. The four countries underscored their intent to continue regular consultations on Indo-Pacific engagement and initiatives together and with other interested countries and institutions, in order to support a diverse, peaceful, and prosperous region.

Subsection IV-19

Quad Senior Officials Meeting Readout

12 November 2017

Editorial note: While the four parties reported on common themes from the meeting in their respective readouts, there was not an agreement on the precise text. This subsection includes the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Indian Ministry of External Affairs readouts to illustrate the nuances in the statements.

Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs readout

1. Senior officials of diplomatic authorities in Japan, Australia, India and the United States, met in Manila, the Philippines on November 12, and discussed measures to ensure a free and open international order based on the rule of law in the Indo-Pacific.

2. From this perspective, the participants discussed the direction for cooperation, including with countries in the region, in upholding the rules-based order and respect for international law in the Indo-Pacific, tackling proliferation threats, including North Korea's nuclear and missile issues, against which maximized pressure needs to be applied, ensuring freedom of navigation and maritime security in the Indo-Pacific and countering terrorism and other issues.

3. The participants affirmed their commitment to continuing discussions and deepening cooperation based on shared values and principles.

Indian Ministry of External Affairs readout

Officials from India's Ministry of External Affairs, Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs, Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and United State's Department of State met in Manila on November 12, 2017 for consultations on issues of common interest in the Indo-Pacific region.

The discussions focused on cooperation based on their converging vision and values for promotion of peace, stability and prosperity in an increasingly inter-connected region that they share with each other and with other partners.

They agreed that a free, open, prosperous and inclusive Indo-Pacific region serves the long-term interests of all countries in the region and of the world at large. The officials also exchanged views on addressing common challenges of terrorism and proliferation linkages impacting the region as well as on enhancing connectivity.

The Indian side highlighted India's Act East Policy as the cornerstone of its engagement in the Indo-Pacific region.

SECTION V

Legacy Agreements

Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru signs the Treaty of Peace between the Allied Powers and Japan, 8 September 1951 (photo credit: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan)

Legacy Agreements

There are certain agreements which, although dated, are still relevant to the understanding and/or functioning of the Australia-Japan Special Strategic Partnership. This section is dedicated to those agreements which have helped form the foundation for the security cooperation that the two countries enjoy today.

This section proceeds in chronological order, serving to illustrate the evolution of bilateral ties over time.

Subsection V-1

Treaty of Peace between the Allied Powers and Japan

8 September 1951
Entered enter force on 28 April 1952

Background: Japan's surrender in the summer of 1945 ended World War II hostilities in the Pacific theater of conflict, but the diplomatic peace treaty that officially resolved the state of war between the Allied Powers and Japan did not come until 1951. In September 1951, the former parties to conflict gathered in San Francisco to sign their Treaty of Peace which would set the conditions for the end of the Allied occupation and normalized relations between Australia and Japan beginning in 1952.

Whereas the Allied Powers and Japan are resolved that henceforth their relations shall be those of nations which, as sovereign equals, cooperate in friendly association to promote their common welfare and to maintain international peace and security, and are therefore desirous of concluding a Treaty of Peace which will settle questions still outstanding as a result of the existence of a state of war between them;

Whereas Japan for its part declares its intention to apply for membership in the United Nations and in all circumstances to conform to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations; to strive to realize the objectives of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; to seek to create within Japan conditions of stability and well-being as defined in Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter of the United Nations and already initiated by post-surrender Japanese legislation; and in public and private trade and commerce to conform to internationally accepted fair practices;

Whereas the Allied Powers welcome the intentions of Japan set out in the foregoing paragraph;

The Allied Powers and Japan have therefore determined to conclude the present Treaty of Peace, and have accordingly appointed the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, who, after presentation of their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed on the following provisions:

CHAPTER I

PEACE

Article 1

(a) The state of war between Japan and each of the Allied Powers is terminated as from the date on which the present Treaty comes into force between Japan and the Allied Power concerned as provided for in Article 23.

(b) The Allied Powers recognize the full sovereignty of the Japanese people over Japan and its territorial waters.

CHAPTER II

TERRITORY

Article 2

(a) Japan, recognizing the independence of Korea, renounces all right, title, and claim to Korea, including the islands of Quelpart, Port Hamilton and Dagelet.

(b) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores.

(c) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Kurile Islands, and to that portion of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905.

(d) Japan renounces all right, title and claim in connection with the League of Nations Mandate System, and accepts the action of the United Nations Security Council of April 2, 1947, extending the trusteeship system to the Pacific Islands formerly under mandate to Japan.

(e) Japan renounces all claim to any right or title to or interest in connection with any part of the Antarctic area, whether deriving from the activities of Japanese nationals or otherwise.

(f) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Spratly Islands and to the Paracel Islands.

Article 3

Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to the United Nations to place under its trusteeship system, with the United States as the sole administering authority, Nansei Shoto south of

29° north latitude (including the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands), Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan (including the Bonin Islands, Rosario Island and the Volcano Islands) and Parece Vela and Marcus Island. Pending the making of such a proposal and affirmative action thereon, the United States will have the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters.

Article 4

(a) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (b) of this Article, the disposition of property of Japan and of its nationals in the areas referred to in Article 2, and their claims, including debts, against the authorities presently administering such areas and the residents (including juridical persons) thereof, and the disposition in Japan of property of such authorities and residents, and of claims, including debts, of such authorities and residents against Japan and its nationals, shall be the subject of special arrangements between Japan and such authorities. The property of any of the Allied Powers or its nationals in the areas referred to in Article 2 shall, insofar as this has not already been done, be returned by the administering authority in the condition in which it now exists. (The term nationals whenever used in the present Treaty includes juridical persons.)

(b) Japan recognizes the validity of dispositions of property of Japan and Japanese nationals made by or pursuant to directives of the United States Military Government in any of the areas referred to in Articles 2 and 3.

(c) Japanese owned submarine cables connecting Japan with territory removed from Japanese control pursuant to the present Treaty shall be equally divided, Japan retaining the Japanese terminal and adjoining half of the cable, and the detached territory the remainder of the cable and connecting terminal facilities.

CHAPTER III

SECURITY

Article 5

(a) Japan accepts the obligations set forth in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations, and in particular the obligations.

(i) to settle its international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered;

(ii) to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations;

(iii) to give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the Charter and to refrain from giving assistance to any State against which the United Nations may take preventive or enforcement action.

(b) The Allied Powers confirm that they will be guided by the principles of Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations in their relations with Japan.

(c) The Allied Powers for their part recognize that Japan as a sovereign nation possesses the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense referred to in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and that Japan may voluntarily enter into collective security arrangements.

Article 6

(a) All occupation forces of the Allied Powers shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as possible after the coming into force of the present Treaty, and in any case not later than 90 days thereafter. Nothing in this provision shall, however, prevent the stationing or retention of foreign armed forces in Japanese territory under or in consequence of any bilateral or multilateral agreements which have been or may be made between one or more of the Allied Powers, on the one hand, and Japan on the other.

(b) The provisions of Article 9 of the Potsdam Proclamation of July 26, 1945, dealing with the return of Japanese military forces to their homes, to the extent not already completed, will be carried out.

(c) All Japanese property for which compensation has not already been paid, which was supplied for the use of the occupation forces and which remains in the possession of those forces at the time of the coming into force of the present Treaty, shall be returned to the Japanese Government within the same 90 days unless other arrangements are made by mutual agreement.

CHAPTER IV

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CLAUSES

Article 7

(a) Each of the Allied Powers, within one year after the present Treaty has come into force between it and Japan, will notify Japan which of its prewar bilateral treaties or conventions with

Japan it wishes to continue in force or revive, and any treaties or conventions so notified shall continue in force or be revived subject only to such amendments as may be necessary to ensure conformity with the present Treaty. The treaties and conventions so notified shall be considered as having been continued in force or revived three months after the date of notification and shall be registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations. All such treaties and conventions as to which Japan is not so notified shall be regarded as abrogated.

(b) Any notification made under paragraph (a) of this Article may except from the operation or revival of a treaty or convention any territory for the international relations of which the notifying Power is responsible, until three months after the date on which notice is given to Japan that such exception shall cease to apply.

Article 8

(a) Japan will recognize the full force of all treaties now or hereafter concluded by the Allied Powers for terminating the state of war initiated on September 1, 1939, as well as other arrangements by the Allied Powers or in connection with the restoration of peace. Japan also accepts the arrangements made for terminating the former League of Nations and Permanent Court of International Justice.

(b) Japan renounces all such rights and interests as it may derive from being a signatory power of the Conventions of St. Germain-en-Laye of September l0, 1919, and the Straits Agreement of Montreux of July 20, 1936, and from Article 16 of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey signed at Lausanne on July 24, 1923.

(c) Japan renounces all rights, title and interests acquired under, and is discharged from all obligations resulting from, the Agreement between Germany and the Creditor Powers of January 20, 1930, and its Annexes, including the Trust Agreement, dated May 17, 1930; the Convention of January 20, 1930, respecting the Bank for International Settlements; and the Statutes of the Bank for International Settlements. Japan will notify to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris within six months of the first coming into force of the present Treaty its renunciation of the rights, title and interests referred to in this paragraph.

Article 9

Japan will enter promptly into negotiations with the Allied Powers so desiring for the conclusion of bilateral and multilateral agreements providing for the regulation or limitation of fishing and the conservation and development of fisheries on the high seas.

Article 10

Japan renounces all special rights and interests in China, including all benefits and privileges resulting from the provisions of the final Protocol signed at Peking on September 7, 1901, and all annexes, notes and documents supplementary thereto, and agrees to the abrogation in respect to Japan of the said protocol, annexes, notes and documents.

Article 11

Japan accepts the judgments of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East and of other Allied War Crimes Courts both within and outside Japan, and will carry out the sentences imposed thereby upon Japanese nationals imprisoned in Japan. The power to grant clemency, to reduce sentences and to parole with respect to such prisoners may not be exercised except on the decision of the Government or Governments which imposed the sentence in each instance, and on the recommendation of Japan. In the case of persons sentenced by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, such power may not be exercised except on the decision of a majority of the Governments represented on the Tribunal, and on the recommendation of Japan.

Article 12

(a) Japan declares its readiness promptly to enter into negotiations for the conclusion with each of the Allied Powers of treaties or agreements to place their trading, maritime and other commercial relations on a stable and friendly basis.

(b) Pending the conclusion of the relevant treaty or agreement, Japan will, during a period of four years from the first coming into force of the present Treaty.

(1) accord to each of the Allied Powers, its nationals, products and vessels

(i) most-favored-nation treatment with respect to customs duties, charges, restrictions and other regulations on or in connection with the importation and exportation of goods;

(ii) national treatment with respect to shipping, navigation and imported goods, and with respect to natural and juridical persons and their interests-such treatment to include all matters pertaining to the levying and collection of taxes, access to the courts, the making and performance of contracts, rights to property (tangible and intangible), participation in juridical entities constituted under Japanese law, and generally the conduct of all kinds of business and professional activities;

(2) ensure that external purchases and sales of Japanese state trading enterprises shall be based solely on commercial considerations.

(c) In respect to any matter, however, Japan shall be obliged to accord to an Allied Power national treatment, or most-favored-nation treatment, only to the extent that the Allied Power concerned accords Japan national treatment or most-favored-nation treatment, as the case may be, in respect of the same matter. The reciprocity envisaged in the foregoing sentence shall be determined, in the case of products, vessels and juridical entities of, and persons domiciled in, any non-metropolitan territory of an Allied Power, and in the case of juridical entities of, and persons domiciled in, any state or province of an Allied Power having a federal government, by reference to the treatment accorded to Japan in such territory, state or province.

(d) In the application of this Article, a discriminatory measure shall not be considered to derogate from the grant of national or most-favored-nation treatment, as the case may be, if such measure is based on an exception customarily provided for in the commercial treaties of the party applying it, or on the need to safeguard that party's external financial position or balance of payments (except in respect to shipping and navigation), or on the need to maintain its essential security interests, and provided such measure is proportionate to the circumstances and not applied in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner.

(e) Japan's obligations under this Article shall not be affected by the exercise of any Allied rights under Article 14 of the present Treaty; nor shall the provisions of this Article be understood as limiting the undertakings assumed by Japan by virtue of Article 15 of the Treaty.

Article 13

(a) Japan will enter into negotiations with any of the Allied Powers, promptly upon the request of such Power or Powers, for the conclusion of bilateral or multilateral agreements relating to international civil air transport.

(b) Pending the conclusion of such agreement or agreements, Japan will, during a period of four years from the first coming into force of the present Treaty, extend to such Power treatment not less favorable with respect to air-traffic rights and privileges than those exercised by any such Powers at the date of such coming into force, and will accord complete equality of opportunity in respect to the operation and development of air services.

(c) Pending its becoming a party to the Convention on International Civil Aviation in accordance with Article 93 thereof, Japan will give effect to the provisions of that Convention applicable to the international navigation of aircraft, and will give effect to the standards, practices and procedures adopted as annexes to the Convention in accordance with the terms of the Convention.

CHAPTER V

CLAIMS AND PROPERTY

Article 14

(a) It is recognized that Japan should pay reparations to the Allied Powers for the damage and suffering caused by it during the war. Nevertheless it is also recognized that the resources of Japan are not presently sufficient, if it is to maintain a viable economy, to make complete reparation for all such damage and suffering and at the same time meet its other obligations.

Therefore,

1. Japan will promptly enter into negotiations with Allied Powers so desiring, whose present territories were occupied by Japanese forces and damaged by Japan, with a view to assisting to compensate those countries for the cost of repairing the damage done, by making available the services of the Japanese people in production, salvaging and other work for the Allied Powers in question. Such arrangements shall avoid the imposition of additional liabilities on other Allied Powers, and, where the manufacturing of raw materials is called for, they shall be supplied by the Allied Powers in question, so as not to throw any foreign exchange burden upon Japan.

2. (I) Subject to the provisions of subparagraph (II) below, each of the Allied Powers shall have the right to seize, retain, liquidate or otherwise dispose of all property, rights and interests of

(a) Japan and Japanese nationals,

(b) persons acting for or on behalf of Japan or Japanese nationals, and

(c) entities owned or controlled by Japan or Japanese nationals,

which on the first coming into force of the present Treaty were subject to its jurisdiction. The property, rights and interests specified in this sub-paragraph shall include those now blocked, vested or in the possession or under the control of enemy property authorities of Allied Powers, which belonged to, or were held or managed on behalf of, any of the persons or entities mentioned in (a), (b) or (c) above at the time such assets came under the controls of such authorities.

(II) The following shall be excepted from the right specified in sub-paragraph (I) above:

(i) property of Japanese natural persons who during the war resided with the permission of the Government concerned in the territory of one of the Allied Powers, other than territory occupied by Japan, except property subjected to restrictions during the war and

not released from such restrictions as of the date of the first coming into force the present Treaty;

(ii) All real property, furniture and fixtures owned by the Government of Japan and used for diplomatic or consular purposes, and all personal furniture and furnishings and other private property not of an investment nature which was normally, necessary for the carrying out of diplomatic and consular functions, owned by Japanese diplomatic and consular personnel;

(iii) property belonging to religious bodies or private charitable institutions and used exclusively for religious or charitable purposes;

(iv) property, rights and interests which have come within its jurisdiction in consequence of the resumption of trade and financial relations subsequent to September 2, 1945, between the country concerned and Japan, except such as have resulted from transactions contrary to the laws of the Allied Power concerned;

(v) obligations of Japan or Japanese nationals, any right, title or interest in tangible property located in Japan, interests in enterprises organized under the laws of Japan, or any paper evidence thereof; provided that this exception shall only apply to obligations of Japan and its nationals expressed in Japanese currency.

(III) Property referred to in exceptions (i) through (v) above shall be returned subject to reasonable expenses for its preservation and administration. If any such property has been liquidated the proceeds shall be returned instead.

(IV) The right to seize, retain, liquidate or otherwise dispose of property as provided in sub-paragraph (I) above shall be exercised in accordance with the laws of the Allied Power concerned, and the owner shall have only such rights as may be given him by those laws.

(V) The Allied Powers agree to deal with Japanese trademarks and literary and artistic property rights on a basis as favorable to Japan as circumstances ruling in each country will permit.

(b) Except as otherwise provided in the present Treaty, the Allied Powers waive all reparations claims of the Allied Powers, other claims of the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out of any actions taken by Japan and its nationals in the course of the prosecution of the war, and claims of the Allied Powers for direct military costs of occupation.

Article 15

(a) Upon application made within nine months of the coming into force of the present Treaty between Japan and the Allied Power concerned, Japan will, within six months of the date of such application, return the property, tangible and intangible, and all rights or interests of any kind in Japan of each Allied Power and its nationals which was within Japan at any time between December 7, 1941, and September 2, 1945, unless the owner has freely disposed thereof without duress or fraud. Such property shall be returned free of all encumbrances and charges to which it may have become subject because of the war, and without any charges for its return. Property whose return is not applied for by or on behalf of the owner or by his Government within the prescribed period may be disposed of by the Japanese Government as it may determine. In cases where such property was within Japan on December 7, 1941, and cannot be returned or has suffered injury or damage as a result of the war, compensation will be made on terms not less favorable than the terms provided in the draft Allied Powers Property Compensation Law approved by the Japanese Cabinet on July 13, 1951.

(b) With respect to industrial property rights impaired during the war, Japan will continue to accord to the Allied Powers and their nationals benefits no less than those heretofore accorded by Cabinet Orders No. 309 effective September 1 , 1949, No.12 effective January 28, 1950, and No. 9 effective February 1, 1950, all as now amended, provided such nationals have applied for such benefits within the time limits prescribed therein.

(c) (i) Japan acknowledges that the literary and artistic property rights which existed in Japan on December 6, 1941, in respect to the published and unpublished works of the Allied Powers and their nationals have continued in force since that date, and recognizes those rights which have arisen, or but for the war would have arisen, in Japan since that date, by the operation of any conventions and agreements to which Japan was a party on that date, irrespective of whether or not such conventions or agreements were abrogated or suspended upon or since the outbreak of war by the domestic law of Japan or of the Allied Power concerned.

(ii) Without the need for application by the proprietor of the right and without the payment of any fee or compliance with any other formality, the period from December 7, 1941, until the coming into force of the present Treaty between Japan and the Allied Power concerned shall be excluded from the running of the normal term of such rights; and such period, with an additional period of six months, shall be excluded from the time within which a literary work must be translated into Japanese in order to obtain translating rights in Japan.

Article 16

As an expression of its desire to indemnify those members of the armed forces of the Allied Powers who suffered undue hard-ships while prisoners of war of Japan, Japan will transfer its assets

and those of its nationals in countries which were neutral during the war, or which were at war with any of the Allied Powers, or, at its option, the equivalent of such assets, to the International Committee of the Red Cross which shall liquidate such assets and distribute the resultant fund to appropriate national agencies, for the benefit of former prisoners of war and their families on such basis as it may determine to be equitable. The categories of assets described in Article 14 (a) 2 (II) (ii) through (v) of the present Treaty shall be excepted from transfer, as well as assets of Japanese natural persons not residents of Japan on the first coming into force of the Treaty. It is equally understood that the transfer provision of this Article has no application to the 19,770 shares in the Bank for International Settlements presently owned by Japanese financial institutions.

Article 17

(a) Upon the request of any of the Allied Powers, the Japanese Government shall review and revise in conformity with international law any decision or order of the Japanese Prize Courts in cases involving ownership rights of nationals of that Allied Power and shall supply copies of all documents comprising the records of these cases, including the decisions taken and orders issued. In any case in which such review or revision shows that restoration is due, the provisions of Article 15 shall apply to the property concerned.

(b) The Japanese Government shall take the necessary measures to enable nationals of any of the Allied Powers at any time within one year from the coming into force of the present Treaty between Japan and the Allied Power concerned to submit to the appropriate Japanese authorities for review any judgment given by a Japanese court between December 7, 1941, and such coming into force, in any proceedings in which any such national was unable to make adequate presentation of his case either as plaintiff or defendant. The Japanese Government shall provide that, where the national has suffered injury by reason of any such judgment, he shall be restored in the position in which he was before the judgment was given or shall be afforded such relief as may be just and equitable in the circumstances.

Article 18

(a) It is recognized that the intervention of the state of war has not affected the obligation to pay pecuniary debts arising out of obligations and contracts (including those in respect of bonds) which existed and rights which were acquired before the existence of a state of war, and which are due by the Government or nationals of Japan to the Government or nationals of one of the Allied Powers, or are due by the Government or nationals of one of the Allied Powers to the Government or nationals of Japan. The intervention of a state of war shall equally not be regarded as affecting the obligation to consider on their merits claims for loss or damage to property or for personal injury or death which arose before the existence of a state of war, and which may be presented or represented by the Government of one of the Allied Powers to the Government of Japan, or by the

Government of Japan to any of the Governments of the Allied Powers. The provisions of this paragraph are without prejudice to the rights conferred by Article 14.

(b) Japan affirms its liability for the prewar external debt of the Japanese State and for debts of corporate bodies subsequently declared to be liabilities of the Japanese State, and expresses its intention to enter into negotiations at an early date with its creditors with respect to the resumption of payments on those debts; to encourage negotiations in respect to other prewar claims and obligations; and to facilitate the transfer of sums accordingly.

Article 19

(a) Japan waives all claims of Japan and its nationals against the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out of the war or out of actions taken because of the existence of a state of war, and waives all claims arising from the presence, operations or actions of forces or authorities of any of the Allied Powers in Japanese territory prior to the coming into force of the present Treaty.

(b) The foregoing waiver includes any claims arising out of actions taken by any of the Allied Powers with respect to Japanese ships between September l, 1939, and the coming into force of the present Treaty, as well as any claims and debts arising in respect to Japanese prisoners of war and civilian internees in the hands of the Allied Powers, but does not include Japanese claims specifically recognized in the laws of any Allied Power enacted since September 2, 1945.

(c) Subject to reciprocal renunciation, the Japanese Government also renounces all claims (including debts) against Germany and German nationals on behalf of the Japanese Government and Japanese nationals, including inter-governmental claims and claims for loss or damage sustained during the war, but excepting (a) claims in respect of contracts entered into and rights acquired before September 1, 1939, and (b) claims arising out of trade and financial relations between Japan and Germany after September 2, 1945. Such renunciation shall not prejudice actions taken in accordance with Articles 16 and 20 of the present Treaty.

(d) Japan recognizes the validity of all acts and omissions done during the period of occupation under or in consequence of directives of the occupation authorities or authorized by Japanese law at that time, and will take no action subjecting Allied nationals to civil or criminal liability arising out of such acts or omissions.

Article 20

Japan will take all necessary measures to ensure such disposition of German assets in Japan as has been or may be determined by those powers entitled under the Protocol of the proceedings of the Berlin Conference of 1945 to dispose of those assets, and pending the final disposition of such assets will be responsible for the conservation and administration thereof.

Article 21

Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 25 of the present Treaty, China shall be entitled to the benefits of Articles 10 and 14 (a) 2; and Korea to the benefits of Articles 2, 4, 9 and 12 of the present Treaty.

CHAPTER VI

SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

Article 22

If in the opinion of any Party to the present Treaty there has arisen a dispute concerning the interpretation or execution of the Treaty, which is not settled by reference to a special claims tribunal or by other agreed means, the dispute shall, at the request of any party thereto, be referred for decision to the International Court of Justice. Japan and those Allied Powers which are not already parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice will deposit with the Registrar of the Court, at the time of their respective ratifications of the present Treaty, and in conformity with the resolution of the United Nations Security Council, dated October 15, 1946, a general declaration accepting the jurisdiction, without special agreement, of the Court generally in respect to all disputes of the character referred to in this Article.

CHAPTER VII

FINAL CLAUSES

Article 23

(a) The present Treaty shall be ratified by the States which sign it, including Japan, and will come into force for all the States which have then ratified it, when instruments of ratification have been deposited by Japan and by a majority, including the United States of America as the principal occupying Power, of the following States, namely Australia, Canada, Ceylon, France, Indonesia, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Republic of the Philippines, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America. The present Treaty shall come into force for each State which subsequently ratifies it, on the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification.

(b) If the Treaty has not come into force within nine months after the date of the deposit of Japan's ratification, any State which has ratified it may bring the Treaty into force between itself and Japan by a notification to that effect given to the Governments of Japan and the United States of America not later than three years after the date of deposit of Japan's ratification.

Article 24

All instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Government of the United States of America which will notify all the signatory States of each such deposit, of the date of the coming into force of the Treaty under paragraph (a) of Article 23, and of any notifications made under paragraph (b) of Article 23.

Article 25

For the purposes of the present Treaty the Allied Powers shall be the States at war with Japan, or any State which previously formed a part of the territory of a State named in Article 23, provided that in each case the State concerned has signed and ratified the Treaty. Subject to the provisions of Article 21, the present Treaty shall not confer any rights, titles or benefits on any State which is not an Allied Power as herein defined; nor shall any right, title or interest of Japan be deemed to be diminished or prejudiced by any provision of the Treaty in favor of a State which is not an Allied Power as so defined.

Article 26

Japan will be prepared to conclude with any State which signed or adhered to the United Nations Declaration of January 1, 1942, and which is at war with Japan, or with any State which previously formed a part of the territory of a State named in Article 23, which is not a signatory of the present Treaty, a bilateral Treaty of Peace on the same or substantially the same terms as are provided for in the present Treaty, but this obligation on the part of Japan will expire three years after the first coming into force of the present Treaty. Should Japan make a peace settlement or war claims settlement with any State granting that State greater advantages than those provided by the present Treaty, those same advantages shall be extended to the parties to the present Treaty.

Article 27

The present Treaty shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America which shall furnish each signatory State with a certified copy thereof.

IN FAITH WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty.

DONE at the city of San Francisco this eighth day of September, 1951, in the English, French and Spanish languages, all being equally authentic, and in the Japanese language.

Subsection V-2

UN Forces-Government of Japan Status of Forces Agreement

19 February 1954

Background: When North Korea forces spilled across the 38th parallel and invaded South Korea, the international community took immediate and decisive action. The UN Security Council passed a series of resolutions which would form the basis for a U.S.-led unified command known as United Nations Command (UNC). Australia was among the "Sending States" which deployed forces in fulfillment of the UN Security Council mandate, and Japan—which was still under the occupation at the time—provided rear area support. When the Allied occupation ended in 1952, Japan continued providing this support to the coalition war effort, which endured following the signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement in 1953.

Recognizing the continued need for UNC presence and activity until the achievement of a lasting diplomatic peace, several members of the command worked with the government of Japan to codify the rights, duties, and obligations for UN forces operating in or through Japan in support of operations related to Korean Peninsula security. The result of those efforts was the 1954 UN Forces-Government of Japan Status of Forces Agreement, which remains in effect today, with UNC-Rear Headquarters (based in Yokota Air Base and commanded by an Australian Group Captain) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs SOFA Division managing its implementation. Notably, the UN Forces-Government of Japan SOFA is specifically referenced in the Australia-Japan Reciprocal Access Agreement, demonstrating the longevity, viability, and continued importance of this agreement in underwriting Australian Defence Force operations in and through Japan.

Agreement Regarding the Status of United Nations Forces in Japan

WHEREAS it is stated in the notes exchanged by Mr. Shigeru Yoshida, Prime Minister of Japan, and Mr. Dean Acheson, Secretary of State of the United States of America, on September 8, 1951, that upon the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed at the city of San Francisco on the same day Japan will assume obligations expressed in Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations which requires the giving to the United Nations of every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the Charter;

WHEREAS in the above-mentioned notes the Government of Japan confirmed that if and when the forces of a member or members of the United Nations are engaged in any United Nations action in the Far East after the Treaty of Peace comes into force, Japan will permit and facilitate the support in and about Japan, by the member or members, of the forces engaged in such United Nations action;

WHEREAS the United Nations forces still continue to be engaged in action pursuant to the Security Council Resolutions of June 25, June 27 and July 7, 1950 and the General Assembly Resolution of February 1, 1951, which called upon all States and authorities to lend every assistance to the United Nations action; and

WHEREAS Japan has been and is rendering important assistance in the form of facilities and services to the forces which are participating in the United Nations action in Korea;

NOW, THEREFORE, in order to define the status of, and treatment to be accorded to, such forces in Japan pending their withdrawal from its territory, the Parties to this Agreement have agreed as follows:

Article I

Except as otherwise provided in this Agreement, the following definitions of terms shall be adopted for the purpose of this Agreement:

(a) "United Nations Resolutions" means the United Nations Security Council Resolutions of June 25, June 27 and July 7, 1950 and the United Nations General Assembly Resolution of February 1, 1951.

(b) "Parties to this Agreement" means the Government of Japan, the Government of the United States of America acting as the Unified Command, and each Government which signs, or signs "subject to acceptance" and accepts, or accedes to, this Agreement, as the Government of a State sending forces to Korea pursuant to the United Nations Resolutions.

(c) "Sending State" means any State which has sent or may hereafter send forces to Korea pursuant to the United Nations Resolutions and whose Government is a Party to this Agreement as the Government of a State sending forces to Korea pursuant to the United Nations Resolutions.

(d) "United Nations forces" means those forces of the land, sea or air armed services of the sending States which are sent to engage in action pursuant to the United Nations Resolutions.

(e) "Members of the United Nations forces" means personnel on active duty belonging to the United Nations forces when such persons are in Japan.

(f) "Civilian component" means the civilian persons of the nationality of any sending State who are in the employ of, serving with, or accompanying the United Nations forces when such persons are in Japan, but excludes persons who are ordinarily resident in Japan.

(g) "Dependents" means the following persons, when such persons are in Japan:

(i) Spouse, and children under 21, of members of the United Nations forces or of the civilian components;

(ii) Parents, and children over 21, of members of the United Nations forces or of the civilian components, if dependent for over half their support upon such members.

Article II

It is the duty of the United Nations forces as well as members of such forces and of the civilian components, and their dependents to respect the law of Japan and to abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this Agreement, and, in particular, from any political activity in Japan. The authorities of the Sending States and the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, shall take appropriate measures to this end.

Article III

1. Subject to the provisions of this Article, the Government of Japan grants permission to members of the United Nations forces and of the civilian components, and their dependents to enter into and depart from Japan for the purpose of this Agreement. The United Nations Command shall appropriately notify the Government of Japan of the number of persons entering and departing, the date of entry and departure, the object of entry, and the expected duration of stay.

2. Members of the United Nations forces shall be exempt from Japanese laws and regulations on passports and visas. Members or the United Nations forces and of the civilian components, and their dependents shall be exempt from Japanese laws and regulations on registration and control of aliens, but shall not be considered as acquiring any right to permanent residence or domicile in the territory of Japan.

3. Upon entry into and departure from Japan members or the United Nations forces shall be in possession of the following documents:

(a) personal identity card showing name, date of birth, rank and number, service, and photograph; and

(b) individual or collective travel order certifying to the status of the individual or group as a member or members or the United Nations forces and to the travel ordered.

4. For purposes of their identification while in Japan, members of the United Nations forces shall be in possession of the foregoing personal identity card, which must be presented on demand or the appropriate Japanese authorities.

5. Members of the civilian components shall have their status and the organization to which they belong described in their passports. Dependents shall have their status described in their passports.

6. For purposes or their identification while in Japan, members of the civilian components and dependents shall, on demand of the appropriate Japanese authorities, present their passports within a reasonable time.

7. If the status of any person brought into Japan under this Article is altered so that he would no longer be entitled to such admission, the authorities of the sending State shall notify the Japanese authorities, and shall cause such person to leave Japan without cost to the Government of Japan as promptly as possible, unless such person be permitted to remain in Japan in accordance with the Japanese laws and regulations concerned.

8. If Japan, for good cause, has requested the removal from its territory of a member or the United Nations forces or of the civilian components, or a dependent, the authorities of the sending State concerned shall be responsible for causing the said person to leave Japan without delay.

Article IV

1. Vessels and aircraft operated by, for or under the control of the United Nations forces for the purpose of this Agreement shall be accorded access to such ports or airports as may be agreed upon by the Joint Board provided for in Article XX, free from toll or landing charges. When cargo or passengers not accorded the exemptions of this Agreement are carried on such vessels and aircraft, notification shall be given to the appropriate Japanese authorities, and such cargo or passengers shall be entered according to the laws and regulations of Japan.

2. The vessels and aircraft mentioned in the preceding paragraph, official vehicles of the United Nations forces and of the civilian components, and members of such forces and of the civilian components, and their dependents, and vehicles of such persons shall be accorded access to and movement between facilities and areas in use by such forces in accordance with Article V and between such facilities and areas, and the ports or airports mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

3. When the vessels mentioned in paragraph 1 enter Japanese ports, appropriate notification shall be made to the proper Japanese authorities. Such vessels shall have freedom from compulsory pilotage, but if a pilot is taken pilotage shall be paid for at appropriate rates.

Article V

1. The United Nations forces may use such facilities in Japan, inclusive of existing furnishings, equipment and fixtures necessary for the operation of such facilities, as may be agreed upon through the Joint Board.

2. The United Nations forces may, with the agreement of the Government of Japan through the Joint Board, use those facilities and areas the use of which is provided to the United States of America under the Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America.

3. Within the facilities the United Nations forces shall have the rights which are necessary and appropriate for the purpose of this Agreement. All questions relating to frequencies, power and similar matters used by electric radiation apparatus employed by the United Nations forces shall be settled by mutual agreement through the Joint Board.

4. The facilities used by the United Nations forces under the terms of paragraph 1 shall be promptly returned to Japan whenever they are no longer needed, without any obligation to restore such facilities to their original condition and without compensation to or by either Party. The Parties to this Agreement may agree, through the Joint Board, on other arrangements with respect to construction or major alteration.

Article VI

The United Nations forces, members of such forces and of the civilian components, and their dependents may use public utilities and services belonging to, or controlled or regulated by the Government of Japan. In the use of such utilities and services the United Nations forces shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that given from time to time to the ministries and agencies of the Government of Japan.

Article VII

1. Japan shall accept as valid, without a driving test or fee, the driving permit or license or military driving permit issued by the sending State to a member of the United Nations forces or of the civilian components, or a dependent.

2. Official vehicles of the United Nations forces and of the civilian components shall carry a distinctive nationality mark and number.

3. Privately-owned vehicles of members of the United Nations forces and of the civilian components, and their dependents shall carry Japanese number plates to be acquired under the same conditions as those applicable to Japanese nationals.

Article VIII

The United Nations forces shall have the right to establish and operate, within the facilities in use by them, military post offices for the use of members of the United Nations forces and of the civilian components, and their dependents for the transmission of mail between such military post offices in Japan and between such military post offices and other post offices established and operated outside Japan by the sending States.

Article IX

1. Non-appropriated fund organizations authorized and regulated by the United Nations forces, may be established in the facilities in use by the United Nations forces for the use of members of such forces and of the civilian components, and their dependents. Except as otherwise provided in this Agreement, such organizations shall not be subject to Japanese regulations, license, fees, taxes or similar controls.

2. No Japanese tax shall be imposed on sales of merchandise and services by such organizations, but purchases within Japan of merchandise and supplies by such organizations shall be subject to Japanese taxes.

3. Except as such disposal may be authorized by the Japanese authorities and the United Nations forces in accordance with mutually agreed conditions, goods which are sold by such organizations shall not be disposed of in Japan to persons not authorized to make purchases from such organizations.

4. The obligations for the withholding and payment of income tax, local inhabitant tax and social security contributions, and, except as may otherwise be mutually agreed, the conditions of employment and work, such as those relating to wages and supplementary payments, the conditions for the protection of workers, and the rights of workers concerning labour relations shall be those laid down by the legislation of Japan.

5. The organizations provided for in paragraph 1 shall provide such information to the Japanese authorities as is required by Japanese tax legislation.

6. Such organizations may use military payment scrip in their transactions with persons who are authorized to use military payment scrip as provided for in Article XI. Such organizations may not hold deposit accounts in foreign currency with foreign exchange banks in Japan unless otherwise agreed through the Joint Board.

Article X

1. Members of the United Nations forces and of the civilian components, and their dependents shall be subject to the foreign exchange controls of the Government of Japan.

2. The preceding paragraph shall not be construed to preclude the transmission into or outside of Japan of foreign exchange instruments representing the official funds of the Governments of the sending States or realized as a result of service or employment in connection with this Agreement by members of the United Nations forces and of the civilian components, or realized by such persons and their dependents from sources outside Japan.

3. The authorities of the United Nations forces and the Governments of the sending States shall take suitable measures to preclude the abuse of the privileges stipulated in the preceding paragraph or circumvention of the Japanese foreign exchange controls.

Article XI

1. Military payment scrip may be used by persons authorized by the sending States for internal transactions within facilities in use by the sending States in accordance with the regulations of the States which issued the scrip and in whose currency it is denominated. The United Nations forces shall take appropriate action to ensure that authorized persons are prohibited from engaging in transactions involving military payment scrip except as authorized by appropriate regulations of the State which issued the military payment scrip. The Government of Japan shall take necessary action to prohibit unauthorized persons from engaging in transactions involving military payment scrip and, with the aid of the United Nations forces if necessary, shall apprehend and punish any person or persons under its jurisdiction involved in the counterfeiting or uttering of counterfeit military payment scrip.

2. The United Nations forces shall apprehend and punish by due process of law members of the United Nations forces or of the civilian components, or their dependents who tender military payment scrip to unauthorized persons and no obligation shall be due to such unauthorized persons or to the Government of Japan or its agencies from the United Nations forces as a result of any unauthorized use of military payment scrip within Japan.

Article XII

1. The United Nations forces shall not be subject to taxes or similar charges on property held, used or transferred by such forces in Japan.

2. Members of the United Nations forces and of the civilian components, and their dependents shall not be liable to pay any Japanese taxes to the Government of Japan or to any other

taxing agency in Japan on income received as a result of their service with or employment by such forces or by the organizations provided for in Article IX. The provisions of this Article do not exempt such persons from payment of Japanese taxes on income derived from Japanese sources, nor do they exempt citizens of the sending State who for purposes of income tax of that State claim Japanese residence from payment of Japanese taxes on income.

3. Periods during which the persons referred to in the preceding paragraph are in Japan solely by reason of being members of the United Nations forces or of the civilian components, or their dependents shall not be considered as periods of residence or domicile in Japan for the purpose of Japanese taxation.

4. Members of the United Nations forces and of the civilian components, and their dependents shall be exempt from taxation in Japan on the holding, use, transfer inter se, or transfer by death of movable property, tangible or intangible, the presence of which in Japan is due solely to the temporary presence of these persons in Japan, provided that such exemption shall not apply to property held for the purpose of investment or the conduct of business in Japan or to any intangible property registered in Japan. There is no obligation under this Article to grant exemption from taxes payable in respect of the use of roads by private vehicles.

Article XIII

1. Except as otherwise provided in this Agreement, the United Nations forces, members of such forces and of the civilian components, and their dependents, as well as the organizations provided for in Article IX, shall be subject to the laws and regulations administered by the customs authorities of Japan.

2. All materials, supplies and equipment imported by the United Nations forces or by the organizations provided for in Article IX exclusively for the official use of the United Nations forces or those organizations or for the use of members of the United Nations forces and of the civilian components, and their dependents shall be permitted entry into Japan free from customs duties and other such charges.

3. When the goods mentioned in the preceding paragraph are imported, a certificate signed by a person authorized for the purpose, in the form to be determined by the Joint Board, and certifying that they are being imported for the purposes stated in the preceding paragraph, shall be submitted by the United Nations forces to the customs authorities of Japan.

4. Property consigned to and for the personal use of members of the United Nations forces and of the civilian components, and their dependents shall be subject to customs duties and other such charges except that no such duties or charges shall be paid with respect to:

(a) Furniture and household goods for their private use imported by members of the United Nations forces or of the civilian components when they first arrive to serve in Japan or their dependents when they first arrive for reunion with members of such forces or of the civilian components, and personal effects for private use brought by the said person upon entrance.

(b) Motor vehicles and spare parts imported by a member of the United Nations forces or of the civilian components for the private use of himself or his dependents.

(c) Reasonable quantities of clothing and household goods which are mailed into Japan through military post offices for the private use of members of the United Nations forces and of the civilian components, and their dependents, provided that such clothing and household goods are those of a type which would ordinarily be purchased in the sending State to which such persons belong for everyday use. .

5. The exemptions granted in paragraphs 2 and 4 shall apply only to cases of importation of goods and shall not be interpreted as refunding customs duties and domestic excises collected by the customs authorities at the time of entry in cases of purchases of goods on which such duties and excises have already been collected.

6. Customs examination shall not be made in the following cases:

(a) Units and members of the United Nations forces under orders entering or leaving Japan;

(b) Official documents under official seal;

(c) Military cargo shipped on a government bill of lading, and mail in military postal channels.

7. Except as authorized by the authorities of Japan and of the United Nations forces in accordance with mutually agreed conditions, goods imported into Japan free from customs duties and other such charges under this Agreement shall not be disposed of in Japan to persons not entitled to import such goods free from customs duties and other such charges under this Agreement.

8. Goods imported into Japan free from customs duties and other such charges pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 4, may be re-exported free from customs duties and other such charges.

9. The United Nations forces, in cooperation with the Japanese authorities, shall take such steps as are necessary to prevent abuse of privileges granted to the United Nations forces, members of such forces and of the civilian components, and their dependents in accordance with this Article.

10. (a) In order to prevent offences against laws and regulations administered by the Japanese customs authorities, the Japanese authorities and the United Nations forces shall assist each other in the conduct of inquiries and the collection of evidence.

(b) The United Nations forces shall render all assistance within their power to ensure that articles liable to seizure by, or on behalf of, the Japanese customs authorities are handed to those authorities.

(c) The United Nations forces shall render all assistance within their power to ensure the payment of duties, taxes and penalties payable by members of such forces or of the civilian components, or their dependents.

(d) Any property belonging to the United Nations forces seized by the Japanese customs authorities in connection with an offence against its customs or fiscal laws or regulations shall be handed over to the appropriate authorities of the forces to which such property belongs.

Article XIV

1. Materials, supplies, equipment and services which are required from local sources for the support of the United Nations forces and the procurement of which may have an adverse effect on the economy of Japan shall be procured in coordination with, and, when desirable, through or with the assistance of, the competent authorities of Japan.

2. Disputes arising out of contracts concerning the procurement of materials, supplies, equipment, services and labour by or for the United Nations forces, which are not resolved by the parties to the contract concerned, may be submitted to the Joint Board for conciliation, provided that the provisions of this paragraph shall not prejudice any right which the parties to the contract may have to file a suit.

3. Materials, supplies, equipment and services procured for official purposes in Japan by the United Nations forces, or by authorized procurement agencies of the United Nations forces upon appropriate certification by the authorities of such forces shall be exempt from the following Japanese taxes:

(a) Commodity tax

(b) Traveling tax

(c) Gasoline tax

(d) Electricity and gas tax

Materials, supplies, equipment and services procured for ultimate use by the United Nations forces shall be exempt from commodity and gasoline taxes upon appropriate certification by the United Nations forces. With respect to any present or future Japanese taxes not specifically referred to in this Article which might be found to constitute a significant and readily identifiable part of the gross purchase price of materials, supplies, equipment and services procured by the United Nations forces, Japan and the United Nations forces will agree upon a procedure for granting such exemption or relief therefrom as is consistent with the purposes of this Article.

4. Except as such disposal may be authorized by the Japanese authorities and the United Nations forces in accordance with mutually agreed conditions, goods purchased in Japan exempt from taxes referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not be disposed of in Japan to persons not entitled to purchase such goods exempt from such taxes.

5. Neither members of the United Nations forces or of the civilian components nor their dependents shall by reason of this Article enjoy any exemption from taxes or similar charges relating to personal purchases of goods and services in Japan chargeable under Japanese legislation.

6. Local labour requirements of the United Nations forces shall be satisfied with the assistance of the Japanese authorities.

7. The obligations for the withholding and payment of income tax, local inhabitant tax and social security contributions, and, except as may otherwise be mutually agreed, the conditions of employment and work such as those relating to wages and supplementary payments, the conditions for the protection of workers, and the rights of workers concerning labour relations shall be those laid down by the legislation of Japan.

Article XV

The United Nations forces shall bear for the duration of this Agreement without cost to Japan all expenditures incident to the maintenance of such forces in Japan except that facilities, owned by the Government of Japan, the use of which is made available to such forces by the Government of Japan, shall be furnished by Japan free from rentals and other such charges.

Article XVI

1. Subject to the provisions of this Article,

(a) the military authorities of the sending State shall have the right to exercise within Japan all criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on them by the law of the sending State over all persons subject to the military law of that State;

(b) the authorities of Japan shall have jurisdiction over members of the United Nations forces or of the civilian components, and their dependents with respect to offences committed within the territory of Japan and punishable by the law of Japan.

2.(a) The military authorities of the sending State shall have the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over persons subject to the military law of that State with respect to offences, including offences relating to its security, punishable by the law of that sending State, but not by the law of Japan.

(b) The authorities of Japan shall have the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over members of the United Nations forces or of the civilian components, and their dependents with respect to offences, including offences relating to the security of Japan, punishable by its law but not by the law of the sending State concerned.

(c) For the purposes of this paragraph and of paragraph 3 of this Article a security offence against a State shall include

(i) treason against the State;

(ii) sabotage, espionage or violation of any law relating to official secrets of that State, or secrets relating to the national defence of that State.

3. In cases where the right to exercise jurisdiction is concurrent the following rules shall apply:

(a) The military authorities of the sending State shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over a member of the United Nations forces or of the civilian component in relation to

(i) offences solely against the property or security of that State, or offences solely against the person or property of another member of the force of that State or of the civilian component, or a dependent;

(ii) offences arising out of any act or omission done in the performance of official duty.

(b) In the case of any other offence the authorities of Japan shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction.

(c) If the State having the primary right decides not to exercise jurisdiction, it shall notify the authorities of the other State as soon as practicable. The authorities of the State having the primary right shall give sympathetic consideration to a request from the authorities of the other State for a

waiver of its right in cases where that other State considers such waiver to be of particular importance.

4. The foregoing provisions of this Article shall not imply any right for the military authorities of the sending State to exercise jurisdiction over persons who are nationals of or ordinarily resident in Japan, unless they are members of the force of that sending State.

5.(a) The authorities of Japan and the military authorities of the sending States shall assist each other in the arrest of members of the United Nations forces or of the civilian components, or their dependents in the territory of Japan and in handing them over to the authority which is to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with the above provisions.

(b) The authorities of Japan shall notify promptly the military authorities of the sending State of the arrest of any member of the force of that sending State or of the civilian component, or a dependent.

(c) The custody of an accused member of the force of a sending State or of the civilian component over whom Japan is to exercise jurisdiction shall, if he is in the hands of that sending State, remain with that State until he is charged by Japan.

6.(a) The authorities of Japan and the military authorities of the sending States shall assist each other in the carrying out of all necessary investigations into offences, and in the collection and production of evidence, including the seizure and, in proper cases, the handing over of objects connected with an offence. The handing over of such objects may, however, be made subject to their return within the time specified by the authority delivering them.

(b) The authorities of Japan and the military authorities of the sending State shall notify each other of the disposition of all cases in which there are concurrent rights to exercise jurisdiction.

7.(a) A death sentence shall not be carried out in Japan by the military authorities of the sending State if the legislation of Japan does not provide for such punishment in a similar case.

(b) The authorities of Japan shall give sympathetic consideration to a request from the military authorities of the sending State for assistance in carrying out a sentence of imprisonment pronounced by the military authorities of the sending State under the provisions of this Article within the territory of Japan.

8. Where an accused has been tried in accordance with the provisions of this Article either by the authorities of Japan or by the military authorities of a sending State and has been acquitted, or has been convicted and is serving, or has served, his sentence or has been pardoned, he may not be tried again for the same offence within the territory of Japan by the authorities of another State the

Government of which is a Party to this Agreement. However, nothing in this paragraph shall prevent the military authorities of the sending State from trying a member of its force for any violation of rules of discipline arising from an act or omission which constituted an offence for which he was tried by the authorities of Japan.

9. Whenever a member of the United Nations forces or of the civilian components, or a dependent is prosecuted under the jurisdiction of Japan he shall be entitled:

(a) to a prompt and speedy trial;

(b) to be informed, in advance of trial, of the specific charge or charges made against him;

(c) to be confronted with the witnesses against him;

(d) to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favour, if they are within the jurisdiction of Japan;

(e) to have legal representation of his own choice for his defence or to have free or assisted legal representation under the conditions prevailing for the time being in Japan;

(f) if he considers it necessary, to have the services of a competent interpreter; and

(g) to communicate with a representative of the Government of the sending State and to have such a representative present at his trial.

10.(a) Regularly constituted military units or formations of the United Nations forces shall have the right to police any United Nations forces facilities. The military police of such forces may take all appropriate measures to ensure the maintenance of order and security within such facilities.

(b) Outside these facilities, such military police shall be employed only subject to arrangements with the authorities of Japan and in liaison with those authorities, and in so far as such employment is necessary to maintain discipline and order among the members of the United Nations forces.

11. If the provisions of Article XVII of the Administrative Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America, signed at Tokyo on February 28, 1952, as amended by the Protocol signed at Tokyo on September 29, 1953 are further amended, Parties to this Agreement shall, after consultation, make similar amendments to the corresponding provisions of this Article, provided the forces of the sending State concerned are under circumstances similar to those giving rise to such further amendment.

12. The Protocol on the Exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction over United Nations Forces in Japan, signed at Tokyo on October 26, 1953, and the Annex thereto shall cease to be in force between the Government of Japan and any other Party to this Agreement which has signed the said Protocol as of the date of the entry into force of this Agreement with respect to such Party.

Article XVII

The Parties to this Agreement will cooperate in taking such steps as may from time to time be necessary to ensure the security of the United Nations forces, members of such forces and of the civilian components, their dependents, and their property. The Government of Japan shall seek such legislation and take such other action as it deems necessary to ensure the adequate security and protection within the territory of Japan of installations, equipment, property, records and official information of the United Nations forces, and for the punishment of offenders under the applicable laws of Japan.

Article XVIII

1. Each Party to this Agreement waives all its claims against any other Party to this Agreement for injury or death suffered in Japan by a member of the forces of, or a civilian governmental employee of the former Party, while such member or employee was engaged in the performance of his official duties, in cases where such injury or death was caused by a member of the forces of, or a civilian governmental employee of the other Party in the performance of his official duties.

2. Each Party to this Agreement waives all its claims against any other Party to this Agreement for damage to any property in Japan owned by it, if such damage was caused by a member of the forces of, or a civilian governmental employee of the other Party in the performance of his official duties.

3. Claims, other than contractual, arising out of acts or omissions of members or employees of the United Nations forces done in the performance of their official duties, or out of any other act, omission or occurrence for which the United Nations forces are legally responsible, arising incident to non-combat activities and causing injury, death or property damage in Japan to third parties shall be dealt with by Japan in accordance with the following provisions:

(a) Claims shall be filed within one year from the date on which they arise, and shall be considered and settled or adjudicated in accordance with the laws and regulations of Japan with respect to claims arising from the activities of its own employees.

(b) Japan may settle any such claims, and payment of the amount agreed upon or determined by adjudication shall be made by Japan in yen.

(c) Such payment, whether made pursuant to a settlement or to adjudication of the case by a competent tribunal of Japan, or the final adjudication by such a tribunal denying payment, shall be binding and conclusive.

(d) The cost incurred in satisfying claims pursuant to the preceding subparagraphs shall be shared by the Parties to this Agreement as follows:

(i) Where one sending State alone is responsible, the amount agreed upon or adjudged shall be shared in the proportion of 75% chargeable to the sending State and 25% chargeable to Japan.

(ii) Where more than one sending State is jointly responsible, the amount agreed upon or adjudged shall be shared in such proportion that the shares of the sending States concerned shall be equal among themselves and the share of Japan shall be one half of that of one of such sending States.

(iii) Where the injury, death or property damage was caused by the United Nations forces of more than one sending State and it is not possible to attribute it specifically to any of the United Nations forces, all of the sending States concerned shall be regarded as responsible for the cause of such injury, death or property damage and the provisions of item (ii) above shall apply thereto.

(e) In accordance with procedures to be established, a statement of all claims approved or disapproved by Japan pursuant to this paragraph, the findings in each case, and a statement of the sums paid by Japan shall be sent periodically to the sending State concerned, together with a request for reimbursement of the share to be paid by such sending State. Such reimbursement shall be made in yen within the shortest possible period of time.

4. Each Party to this Agreement shall have the primary right, in the execution of the foregoing paragraphs, to determine whether its personnel were engaged in the performance of official duty. Such determination shall be made as soon as possible after the arising of the claim concerned. When any other Party concerned disagrees with the results of such determination, that Party may bring the matter before the Joint Board for consultation.

5. Claims against members or employees of the United Nations forces arising out of tortious acts or omissions in Japan not done in the performance of their official duties shall be dealt with in the following manner:

(a) The Japanese authorities shall consider the claim and assess compensation to the claimant in a fair and just manner, taking into account all the circumstances of the case, including the conduct of the injured person, and shall prepare a report on the matter.

(b) The report shall be delivered to the authorities of the sending State concerned, who shall then decide without delay whether they will offer an ex gratia payment, and if so, of what amount.

(c) If an offer of ex gratia payment is made, and accepted by the claimant in full satisfaction of his claim, the authorities of the sending State shall make the payment themselves and inform the Japanese authorities of their decision and of the sum paid.

(d) Nothing in this paragraph shall affect the jurisdiction of the courts of Japan to entertain an action against a member or employee of the United Nations forces unless and until there has been payment in full satisfaction of the claim.

6.(a) Members and employees of the United Nations forces, excluding those employees who have only Japanese nationality, shall not be subject to suit in Japan with respect to claims specified in paragraph 3, but shall be subject to the civil jurisdiction of Japanese courts with respect to all other types of cases.

(b) In case any private movable property, excluding that in use by the United Nations forces, which is subject to compulsory execution under Japanese law, is within the facilities in use by the United Nations forces, the authorities of the sending State concerned shall, upon the request of Japanese courts, possess and turn over such property to the Japanese authorities. In the case of a sending State the forces of which have no legal authority to take such action, the authorities of that State shall allow the appropriate Japanese authorities to take possession of such property in accordance with Japanese law.

(c) The authorities of every sending State shall cooperate with the Japanese authorities in making available witnesses and evidence for a fair hearing and disposal of claims under the provisions of this Article.

Article XIX

The Parties to this Agreement shall as promptly as possible take legislative, budgetary and other measures necessary for the implementation of this Agreement.

Article XX

1. A Joint Board shall be established in Tokyo as the means for consultation and agreement between the Government of Japan and the other Parties to this Agreement on matters relating to the interpretation and implementation of this Agreement.

2. The Joint Board shall be composed of two representatives, one representing the Government of Japan and the other representing the other Parties to this Agreement, each of whom shall have one or more deputies and a staff. The Joint Board shall determine its own procedures, and arrange for such auxiliary organs and administrative services as may be required. The Joint Board shall be so organized that it may meet at any time at the request of either representative.

3. If the Joint Board is unable to reach agreement on any matter, it shall be settled through inter-governmental negotiations.

Article XXI

1. This Agreement shall be signed by the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America acting as the Unified Command, and may be signed by the Government of any State which has sent or may hereafter send forces to Korea pursuant to the United Nations Resolutions. After its first signature and until its first entry into force this Agreement shall be open, subject to the consent of the Government of Japan, for signature by the Government of any other such State.

2. Ten days after the date on which the Government of Japan accepts this Agreement, it shall enter into force for the Government of Japan and for each other Government which, on or before the date of acceptance by the Government of Japan, signs, or signs "subject to acceptance" and accepts, this Agreement. For each Government which signs, or accepts, or signs "subject to acceptance" and accepts, this Agreement after the date of acceptance by the Government of Japan, it shall enter into force ten days after the date on which that Government signs, or having signed "subject to acceptance" accepts, this Agreement.

3. The acceptance of this Agreement shall be made by depositing an instrument of acceptance with the Government of Japan. The Government of Japan shall notify each Government which is a Party to this Agreement, of the date of ea.ch signature and of deposit of each instrument of acceptance, if any.

4. The provisions of this Agreement, except those of Article XVI and those which are per se incapable of retroaction, shall be operative retroactively to April 28, 1952 for the Government of Japan and for each other Government, which, on or within six months after the date of first signature of this Agreement, signs, or signs "subject to acceptance" and accepts, this Agreement.

Article XXII

1. After the first entry into force of this Agreement in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article XXI, the Government of any State not signatory to this Agreement which has sent or may hereafter send forces to Korea pursuant to the United Nations Resolutions, may, subject to the consent of the

Government of Japan, accede to this Agreement by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of Japan.

2. The Government of Japan shall notify each Government which is a Party to this Agreement, of the date of deposit of each instrument of accession.

3. This Agreement shall enter into force for each acceding Government ten days after the date of deposit of its instrument of accession.

4. The provisions of this Agreement, except those of Article XVI and those which are per se incapable of retroaction, shall be operative retroactively to April 28, 1952 for each acceding Government which deposits its instrument of accession within six months after the date of first signature of this Agreement.

Article XXIII

1. Any Party to this Agreement may at any time request a revision of any Article. Upon such request the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America acting as the Unified Command, in consultation with and on behalf of the sending States concerned, shall enter into negotiations.

2. If any provisions of the Administrative Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America, signed at Tokyo on February 28, 1952, as amended by the Protocol signed at Tokyo on September 29, 1953 are revised, the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America acting as the United Command, in consultation with and on behalf of the sending States, shall, except as provided in paragraph 11 of Article XVI, enter into negotiations with a view to agreeing on similar revision of the corresponding provisions of this Agreement.

Article XXIV

All the United Nations forces shall be withdrawn from Japan within ninety days after the date by which all the United Nations forces shall have been withdrawn from Korea. The Parties to this Agreement may agree upon an earlier date by which all the United Nations forces shall be withdrawn from Japan.

Article XXV

This Agreement and agreed revisions thereof shall terminate on the date by which all the United Nations forces shall be withdrawn from Japan in accordance with the provisions of Article XXIV. In case all the United Nations forces have been withdrawn from Japan earlier than such

date, this Agreement and agreed revisions thereof shall terminate on the date when the withdrawal has been completed.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments for the purpose, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Tokyo this *nineteenth* day of February, 1954 in the Japanese and English languages, both texts being equally authoritative, in a single original which shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of Japan. The Government of Japan shall transmit certified copies thereof to all the signatory and acceding Governments.

Subsection V-3

Basic Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation between Australia and Japan

Signed: Tokyo 16 June 1976
Instruments of ratification exchanged: 21 July 1977
Entry into force: 21 August 1977

Background: While the 1952 Treaty of Peace served to reset diplomatic relations between Australia and Japan, it would take additional time and effort for the two governments to advance relations beyond a "negative peace"—that is, the absence of hostilities—to a "positive peace," or the presence of linkages and ties such that render the thought of the use of force to resolve disputes either untenable or unfathomable. The 1976 Basic Treaty of Friendship laid the foundation for a new era of bilateral Australia-Japan relations.

Basic Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation between Australia and Japan

Affirming the spirit of friendship and co-operation on which relations between the two countries are based, and wishing to place their relations on an even closer and more concrete basis,

Acknowledging the importance to each country of the wide-ranging relationship between them and the close and enduring connection between the well-being of their peoples,

Wishing to enhance the valuable contribution to their relations made by the existing agreements between the two countries in various fields,

Resolved to provide wider opportunities for their governments and their peoples to work together in a spirit of understanding on matters of mutual interest in the political, economic, trade, commercial, social, cultural and other fields,

Convinced of the importance of strengthening and diversifying their relations on an equitable and mutually advantageous basis in a long-term perspective,

Recognising that co-operation between the two countries should have in view not only their own mutual benefit but also their common interest in the prosperity and welfare of other countries, including those in the Asian and Pacific region, of which they are part,

Convinced that the conclusion of a Treaty which formally embodies and further advances the friendship and co-operation between the governments and peoples of the two countries will facilitate the further development of their relations,

Have resolved to conclude a Basic Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation and for that purpose have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

Australia: John Malcolm Fraser, Prime Minister,

Japan: Takeo Miki, Prime Minister,

Who, having communicated to each other their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

1. The basis of relations between Australia and Japan shall be enduring peace and friendship between the two countries and their peoples.

2. The objective of the present Treaty shall be to extend and strengthen relations between the Contracting Parties, in particular by promoting understanding between the two countries and their peoples and by developing co-operation on matters of mutual interest.

3. The Contracting Parties, noting that the agreements existing between them are consistent with the objective expressed in paragraph 2 of this Article, may enter into further agreements between them, wherever necessary, on matters dealt with in the present Treaty or on other matters, including those not covered by the existing agreements.

ARTICLE II

The Contracting Parties, recognising the importance of peaceful and friendly relations among countries in the international community, shall co-operate with each other in accordance with the Principles of the Charter of the United Nations in maintaining and strengthening those relations.

ARTICLE III

1. The Contracting Parties shall endeavour to facilitate, strengthen and diversify mutual understanding and co-operation ha such areas of mutual interest as the political, economic, labour relations, human rights, legal, scientific, technological, social, cultural, professional, sporting and environmental fields. To this end, the Contracting Parties shall encourage and promote in these fields, to the fullest extent practicable, appropriate study and research, exchange or information, knowledge and visits, and other suitable activities.

2. The Contracting Parties shall also develop mutual understanding and co-operation in those international organisations or which both Contracting Parties are members and which are concerned with any of the fields referred to in paragraph I of this Article.

3. The Contracting Parties shall collaborate closely with each other in developing the mutual understanding and co-operation referred to in paragraphs I and 2 of this Article. To this end, they shall hold consultations, whenever necessary, on matters in the fields referred to in paragraphs I and 2 of this Article, making use, where appropriate, of the means provided for in existing agreements or arrangements.

ARTICLE IV

The Contracting Parties recognise that the continuous expansion of international trade on an open, multilateral and non-discriminatory basis is of fundamental importance for the sound development of the world economy. They shall co-operate with each other to this end, in accordance with the objectives and principles of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, the Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and other relevant multilateral agreements to which both Contracting Parties are parties.

ARTICLE V

1. The Contracting Parties, recognising the importance of their relations in the economic, trade and commercial fields, shall co-operate in strengthening and developing those relations on the basis of mutual benefit and trust.

2. In respect of trade between the two countries, each Contracting Party, recognising a mutual interest in each being a stable and reliable supplier to and market for the other, shall promote the further strengthening and development of trade between the two countries on a fair and stable basis.

ARTICLE VI

The Contracting Parties recognising the importance to them of mineral resources, including energy resources, shall co-operate in the trade in and development of those resources in accordance with the provisions of Article V.

ARTICLE VII

The Contracting Parties, in accordance with the objectives and principles of international agreements to which both Contracting Parties are parties and also in accordance with the provisions of Article V, shall co-operate in the exchange of capital and technology in a mutually acceptable and beneficial manner.

ARTICLE VIII

1. Each Contracting Party shall accord to the nationals of the other Contracting Party fair and equitable treatment with respect to their entry into, sojourn or residence in, travel within and departure from its territory, provided that in no case shall such treatment be discriminatory between nationals of the other Contracting Party and nationals of any third country.

2. Each Contracting Party shall endeavour to simplify its procedures relating toæ

(a) the entry into its territory or nationals or the other Contracting Party;

(b) the departure from its territory of nationals of the other Contracting Party; and

(c) the registration as aliens of nationals of the other Contracting Party

ARTICLE IX

1. The nationals of one Contracting Party shall enjoy within the territory of the other Contracting Party constant and complete protection and security for their persons and property.

2. The nationals of one Contracting Party shall enjoy within the territory of the other Contracting Party access to courts of justice and tribunals in accordance with law.

3. Each Contracting Party shall accord within its territory to the nationals of the other Contracting Party fair and equitable treatment with respect to matters relating to their business and professional activities, provided that in no case shall such treatment be discriminatory between nationals of the other Contracting Party and nationals of any third country.

4. The property of nationals of one Contracting Party within the territory of the other Contracting Party shall not be compulsorily taken unless for a public purpose and unless prompt, adequate and effective compensation is paid. Without prejudice to the foregoing, with respect to all matters dealt with in this paragraph, the nationals of one Contracting Party shall be accorded within the territory of the other Contracting Party treatment which shall in no case be discriminatory between those nationals and nationals of any third country.

5. In paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 of this Article, the term `nationals' shall include companies except where the context otherwise requires.

6. The companies of one Contracting Party which are controlled, directly or indirectly, or in which more than one half of the interests are owned, directly or indirectly, by nationals or

companies of the other Contracting Party shall be accorded within the territory of the former Contracting Party, with respect to matters dealt with in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 of this Article, the treatment prescribed therein; provided that the requirement prescribed in paragraphs 3 and 4 shall be applied as between such companies and companies of the former Contracting Party which are controlled, directly or indirectly, or in which more than one half of the interests are owned, directly or indirectly, by nationals or companies of any third country.

ARTICLE X

The Contracting Parties, recognising that international shipping activities between the two countries play a significant role in the development of their economic, trade and commercial relations, and bearing in mind the objectives and principles of international agreements to which both Contracting Parties are parties, shall promote mutual co-operation for the development of shipping between the two countries on a fair and mutually advantageous basis.

ARTICLE XI

The Contracting Parties shall periodically review, at the ministerial level, the general operation of the present Treaty with a view to ensuring that the purposes of the present Treaty are being fully realised.

ARTICLE XII

Each Contracting Party may make representations to the other Contracting Party on matters arising out of or in connection with the implementation of the present Treaty. Any such representations shall receive sympathetic consideration. Where appropriate the Contracting Parties shall consult together on such matters.

ARTICLE XIII

Nothing in the present Treaty shall affect the validity of agreements which are in force between the Contracting Parties at the date of signature of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE XIV

1. The present Treaty shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at Canberra as soon as possible.

2. The present Treaty shall enter into force on the thirtieth day after the date of the exchange of the instruments of ratification. It shall remain in force until the expiry of twelve months from the

date on which either Contracting Party gives to the other Contracting Party written notice of its intention to terminate the present Treaty.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the abovenamed Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and have affixed thereto their seals.

DONE in duplicate, in the English and Japanese languages, each text being equally authentic, at Tokyo, this sixteenth day of June one thousand nine hundred and seventy six.

(Signed)
MALCOLM FRASER
for the Commonwealth of Australia

(Signed)
TAKEO MIKI
for the Government of Japan

* * * * * *

Protocol

At the time of signing the Basic Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation between Australia and Japan (hereinafter referred to as "the treaty"), the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, duly authorised by their respective Governments, have further agreed on the following provisions, which shall be considered integral parts of the Treaty:

1. Nothing in the Treaty shall

(a) entitle either Contracting Party to claim the benefit of any treatment, preference or privilege

(i) that the other Contracting Party has accorded or may hereafter accord to any developing country or to its nationals or companies by virtue of special agreements or arrangements with that developing country for the purpose of economic development or technical assistance;

(ii) in the nature of special tax advantages that the other Contracting Party has accorded or may hereafter accord on a basis of reciprocity or by virtue of agreements for the avoidance of double taxation or for the prevention of fiscal evasion; or

(iii) relating to passports or visas which the other Contracting Party has accorded or may hereafter accord to nationals of any third country by virtue of special agreements or arrangements;

(b) entitle Australia to claim the benefit of any treatment, preference or privilege which is or may hereafter be accorded by Japan exclusively to persons who originated in the territories to which all right, title and claim were renounced by Japan in accordance with the provisions of Article 2 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed at the city of San Francisco on 8 September 1951; or

(c) entitle Japan to claim the benefit of any treatment, preference or privilege which is or may hereafter be accorded by Australia;

(i) to any country or to its nationals or companies, where that treatment, preference or privilege originates from that country's membership of the Commonwealth of Nations;

(ii) to Ireland or to its nationals or companies;

(iii) to Papua New Guinea or to its nationals or companies;

(iv) to any non-metropolitan area for the international relations of which Australia is responsible at the date of signature of the Treaty, or to its residents or companies; or

(v) to any third country or to its nationals who are migrants to Australia, by virtue of a special agreement on migration between Australia and that country, with respect to matters relating to the entry into Australia for residence of such migrants or matters incidental to such entry.

2. Nothing in the Treaty shall affect the rights and obligations that either Contracting Party has or may hereafter have as a party to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund the Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development or any multilateral agreement amending or supplementing them, or other relevant multilateral agreements to which both Contracting Parties are parties.

3. For the purposes of the Treaty, the term "companies"

(a) in relation to a Contracting Party means legal persons incorporated pursuant to the laws in force in the territory of that Contracting Party; and

(b) in relation to any third country means legal persons incorporated pursuant to the laws in force in the territory of that country.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Protocol and have affixed thereto their seals.

DONE in duplicate, in the English and Japanese languages, each text being equally authentic, at Tokyo, this sixteenth day of June one thousand nine hundred and seventy-six.

(Signed)
MALCOLM FRASER
for the Commonwealth of Australia

(Signed)
TAKEO MIKI
for the Government of Japan

* * * * * *

(Note from the Prime Minister of Australia to the Prime Minister of Japan)

Exchange of notes relating to the non-metropolitan areas of Australia

(Note No. I)
Tokyo, 16 June 1976

Excellency,

I have the honour to refer to the Basic Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation between Australia and Japan signed today.

It is the understanding of the Government of Australia that, as regards Australia, the Treaty will apply only to the metropolitan area of Australia and not to any of the non-metropolitan areas for the international relations of which Australia is responsible. I should be grateful if Your Excellency would confirm on behalf of Your Excellency's Government that the foregoing is also the understanding of the Government of Japan.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

(Signed) MALCOLM FRASER
Plenipotentiary of Australia

His Excellency
(Signed) Mr. Takeo Miki
Plenipotentiary of Japan

* * * * * *

(Note from the Prime Minister of Japan to the Prime Minister of Australia)
(Note No. 2)
Tokyo, 16 June 1976

Excellency,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's Note of today's date which reads as follows:

(As in No. 1)

I have further the honour to confirm on behalf of my Government that the foregoing is also the understanding of the Government of Japan.

I have the honour to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

(Signed) TAKEO MIKI
Plenipotentiary of Japan
His Excellency

(Signed) Mr. John Malcolm Fraser
Plenipotentiary of Australia

* * * * * *

(Note from the Prime Minister of Australia to the Prime Minister of Japan)

Exchange of notes relating to Article VIII
(Note No. 3)

Tokyo, 16 June 1976

Excellency,

I have the honour to refer to Article VIII of the Basic Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation between Australia and Japan signed today and to confirm, on behalf of the Government of Australia, the following understanding reached between the representatives of the two Governments:

1. Each Government shall permit, in accordance with the relevant laws and regulations, nationals of the other country entering its territory temporarily for business purposes to stay therein initially for a period of one hundred and eighty days.

2. Each Government intends to treat nationals of the other country entering its territory for the following purposes and their spouses and their unmarried minor children as favourably as possible within the scope of the relevant laws and regulations, when determining their period of stayæ

(a) for the purpose of carrying on trade between the two countries or engaging in related commercial activities;

(b) for the purpose or developing or directing the operations of an enterprise; or

(c) for other purposes recognised by the laws and regulations relating to the entry and sojourn of aliens.

3. Each Government intends, in the application of the relevant laws and regulations not to take discriminatory measures when the nationals of the other country referred to in paragraphs I and 2 above file applications for the renewal of the period of stay under their current authorised status, and to give to such applications as favourable consideration as possible.

I should be grateful if Your Excellency would confirm the foregoing understanding on behalf of Your Excellency's Government.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

(Signed) MALCOLM FRASER
Plenipotentiary of Australia
His Excellency

Mr. Takeo Miki
Plenipotentiary of Japan

* * * * * *

(Note from the Prime Minister of Japan to the Prime Minister of Australia)

(Note No. 4)

Tokyo, 16 June 1976

Excellency,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's Note of today's date which reads as follows

(As in No. 3)

I have further the honour to confirm on behalf of my Government the understanding set forth in Your Excellency's Note.

I have the honour to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

(Signed) TAKEO MIKI
Plenipotentiary of Japan

(Signed) Mr John Malcolm Fraser
Plenipotentiary of Australia

* * * * * *

Agreed Minutes

In connection with the Basic Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation between Australia and Japan (hereinafter referred to as `the Treaty') signed today and the instruments related thereto, the Plenipotentiaries of Australia and of Japan hereby record the following understandings:

1. It is confirmed that the treatment prescribed in the provisions of paragraph I of Article VIII and paragraph 3 of Article IX of the Treaty will in effect be treatment which is no less favourable than that accorded to nationals of any third country, it being understood that these provisions in no way require either country to accord to nationals of the other country treatment which has been accorded to nationals of any third country under policies which are then no longer operative.

2. The term `property' used in Article IX of the Treaty includes rights and interests therein.

3. The term `matters relating to business and professional activities' used in paragraph 3 of Article IX of the Treaty comprises the levying of taxes, fees or charges of any kind, study and research, the making and performance of contracts, rights to property, participation in companies, investment activities and generally the conduct of all types of commercial, industrial, financial and other business activities as well as professional activities.

4. The provisions of Article IX of the Treaty will not be construed so as to affect in any way the right of either country to make provision in its legislation for the seizure or forfeiture of property for suspected breaches or breaches of its laws and to apply such legislation.

5. It is understood that the reference to Papua New Guinea in paragraph I of the Protocol to the Treaty is made in view of the now existing state of relations between Australia and Papua New Guinea and that in future the Governments of Australia and Japan will consult each other with a view to examining whether the treatment accorded by Australia to Papua New Guinea should fall within the scope of the provisions of the Treaty.

6. The terms `the relevant laws and regulations' and `the laws and regulations' used in the Exchange of Notes relating to Article VIII of the Treaty include administrative procedures.

7. It is noted that the Treaty recognises the importance or trade matters between the two countries and that arrangements between Australia and Japan regarding specific treatment to be accorded by the two countries are prescribed in other agreements, specifically related to trade, to which they are parties.

8. If either country claims, on the basis of provisions of the Treaty, the benefit of any treatment accorded or which may be accorded under any multilateral agreement to which it is not a party, the Governments of the two countries will consult together as to whether the benefit claimed falls within the scope of the provisions of the Treaty, taking into account the relevant circumstances, including the character of the multilateral agreement in question.

Tokyo, 16 June 1976

(Initiated) M.F. (Initiated) T.M.

* * * * * *

Record of discussion

In connection with the Basic Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation between Australia and Japan signed today, the Plenipotentiaries of Australia and of Japan wish to record the following:

The representative of the Government of Australia stated, with particular reference to Articles VI, VII and IX of the Treaty, that it was Australia's position that the aspirations of each country in relation to the ownership and control of its resources and industries and to the rational and efficient development of its mineral and energy resources were to be taken into account by the two Governments.

In response, the representative of the Government of Japan stated that he noted the statement of the representative of the Government of Australia.

Tokyo, 16 June 1976
(Initialled) M.F.
(Initialled) T.M.

Subsection V-4

Australia-Japan Partnership Agenda

26 May 1995

Background: A deliverable from the 1995 summit meeting between Prime Ministers Paul Keating and Tomiichi Murayama, the Australia-Japan Partnership agenda is significant because of its inclusion of objectives for near-term engagement on security issues. This included personnel exchanges and cooperation in areas of mutual interest such as peacekeeping and disarmament. While the scope of such engagement was still limited, through this agenda, the two governments were expanding the foundation upon which the security partnership would build.

Partnership Agenda Between Australia and Japan

Recognising the breadth of the links and exchanges at all walks of life between Australia and Japan and wishing to promote deeper mutual understanding and cooperation across the diverse range of shared interests in the bilateral, regional and multilateral fields, the Governments of Australia and Japan, pursuant to the 1995 Joint Declaration on the Australia-Japan Partnership, are resolved to take the following actions:

1. Political Dialogue

The Governments of Australia and Japan will continue their cooperative partnership through close dialogue at the highest levels, including through annual meetings of the two Prime Ministers and meetings of the Australia-Japan Ministerial Committee.

2. Security and Defence

Recognising the expanding bilateral security and defence dialogue and the range of defence activities between the two countries and wishing to contribute to the promotion of regional security, the Governments of Australia and Japan will:

- further develop their security dialogue through annual Politico-Military and Military-Military Talks and senior level visits; and
- examine ways to increase exchanges between the Australian Defence Forces and the Japan Self Defence Forces in areas of mutual professional interest, including defence education exchanges.

3. Bilateral Economic and Trade Relations

Recognising the strong commercial ties between Australia and Japan and building on the complementarity and growing diversification of their trade, the two Governments will further advance Australia-Japan commercial relations in the following areas:

(a) Promotion and Facilitation of Trade and Investment

The Governments of Australia and Japan will:

- actively examine the feasibility of developing mutual recognition arrangements on conformity assessment and certification, including by convening a meeting of technical experts in 1997;
- enhance the existing cooperation in the area of customs to increase the efficiency of customs procedures;
- continue cooperative arrangements between the Australian Trade Commission (Austrade) and the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) to promote exports to Japan, including improved collaboration on identifying market segments, promotional activities and events in Japan that best meet Australia's capability to supply;
- cooperate on the electronic transfer of health certification data for meat by establishing an initial pilot program in 1997; and
- exchange information on structural policy reforms necessary to underpin national productivity and economic growth, and on the contribution that research and institutional arrangements can make to the process of public policy development and community understanding of the benefits of greater productivity in all sectors of the economy.

(b) Deregulation and Competition Policy

In order to develop links between public policy planners, the Government of Australia will examine the feasibility of developing a program for a Japanese-sponsored delegation of administrative reform planners to visit Australia to study the Australian micro-economic reform experience. The Government of Australia will also share its experiences on deregulation of the economy and the role of competition policies by examining the feasibility of holding a Japanese-sponsored seminar in Tokyo, possibly in collaboration with a university in Tokyo.

(c) Tourism

In order to achieve the full potential of the growing tourism between Australia and Japan, the two Governments will facilitate tourism development through holding regular Australia-Japan Tourism Discussions and working together, including with industry, to address perceived barriers to tourism. The Government of Australia will also examine means of further facilitating entry for short-term Japanese visitors.

(d) Housing and Building

In order to contribute to the reduction of housing construction costs in Japan and promote two-way trade in this sector, the two Governments will cooperate to improve mutual access to their markets

- by promoting the mutual acceptance of test data concerning building materials and mutual recognition on building standards; in this connection, both countries will consider the way to utilise CSIRO as a facilitator; and
- by exchanges of information on technical, certification and related issues, including performance-based building regulations through meetings of the Japan-Australia Building and Housing Committee.

(e) Energy

Given the central importance of the minerals and energy trade to both Australia and Japan, the two Governments will cooperate to ensure its continued viability. Both Governments affirm the value of the Japan-Australia High-Level Group on Energy Forecasts and Energy Resource Development as an important forum for the exchange of information and high-level policy discussion.

(f) Agriculture

In recognition of the diverse and long-standing agricultural partnership that exists between Australia and Japan, the two Governments will continue informal dialogue on agricultural matters of mutual interest, in order to facilitate informal exchanges of views and build enhanced mutual understanding and cooperation.

(g) Employment and Training

Recognising the substantial similarities of the challenges they face, the Governments of Australia and Japan will enhance cooperation through exchanges of government officials and the sharing of information on labour market policies.

(h) Transport

Following the establishment of high-level dialogue at officials level, the two Governments will explore a range of issues, including infrastructure development, airport noise management, liberalisation of the international shipping market, substandard shipping and maritime safety.

4. Science and Technology

With science and technology links between Australia and Japan growing, and recognising the substantial potential for increasing joint activities in this area, the two Governments will explore further opportunities for cooperation in a number of areas, including:

(a) Science and Technology Agreement

Australia and Japan will explore new areas of cooperation under the Agreement between the Government of Japan and the Government of Australia on Cooperation on Research and

Development in Science and Technology. In this context, the two Governments will continue to cooperate through the Japan-Australia Joint Science and Technology Cooperation Committee.

(b) Information Technology

In order to facilitate collaborative research between Australian and Japanese scientists, the Governments of Australia and Japan have confirmed their intention to establish a high-performance computer and communications (HPCC) link between the two countries.

(c) Commercial Application of Scientific Research and Development

Recognising the growing diversification of commercially-based scientific research and development between Australia and Japan, the two Governments will explore increasing the commercial application of scientific research and development through close contact between commercial and scientific research personnel.

(d) Others

The Governments of Australia and Japan will pursue research into cancer and cardiovascular diseases through Australia-Japan collaborative research workshops and personnel exchanges.

5. Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy

Recognising the growing importance of nuclear energy in regional energy use and the importance of cooperating to ensure nuclear safety in the region, the Governments of Australia and Japan will:

- cooperate and promote mutual understanding in relation to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy including through high-level discussions under the annual Nuclear Policy Consultations;
- support each other's efforts to develop an effective dialogue on nuclear energy issues, including within such forums as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research Development and Training related to Nuclear Science and Technology (RCA), the International Conference on Nuclear Cooperation in Asia (ICNCA) and successor conferences to the Tokyo Conference on Nuclear Safety in Asia held in November 1996; and
- cooperate in the strengthened and efficient IAEA safeguards system and to ensure the effectiveness of nuclear export controls.

6. Education

Recognising the rapid development of ties in education -characterised by growing numbers of students from each country studying in the other, the increasing number of students and staff exchanges, expanding links between Japanese and Australian education institutions and increased exchanges of government officials - the Governments of Australia and Japan will collaborate further:

- through sharing information on policies and programs on education;

- through greater exchanges of personnel in the education sector, including staff of boards of education and school boards, university administrators, students, teachers, academics and government officials; and
- through increased university-based research and development and expanded exchange of researchers.

7. Industrial Relations

With a view to promoting mutual understanding of respective industrial relations environments, the Governments of Australia and Japan will continue to exchange high-level Tripartite Industrial Relations Delegations between the two countries approximately every three years. Following the last Japanese mission to Australia in November 1995, the Government of Australia will consider sending a Mission to Japan in 1998/99.

8. Cultural Exchanges

Recognising the importance of developing people-to-people contacts, the two Governments will continue their efforts to encourage cultural exchanges, including through the convening of the Australia-Japan Cultural Mixed Commission.

In order to commemorate a number of significant bilateral anniversaries between 1996 and 1998, the two Governments have developed a range of commemorative activities which are symbolically linked through a jointly-developed "Friendship Anniversaries" logo.

9. International Policy Coordination

Building on their close political relationship, the Governments of Australia and Japan will increase the coordination of their policies on key international issues, both in the Asia-Pacific region and globally. In this context, the two Governments will continue to work together in combating the global problem of illicit narcotic drugs through the Commission on Narcotic Drugs and criminal issues generally through the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, particularly on measures to regulate firearms.

(a) Narcotics

The Governments of Australia and Japan will continue to cooperate within such multilateral Frameworks as the United Nations International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) and the Dublin Group to combat the illicit production of, demand for, and traffic in, narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances and to coordinate approaches to find ways to address this problem.

(b) Terrorism

The Governments of Australia and Japan will continue to cooperate against terrorism within the framework of relevant international agreements to which both are parties.

(c) Money Laundering

Endorsing APEC Joint Ministerial Statements by Finance Ministers which recognise money laundering as a priority concern for the region, the Governments of Australia and Japan will work together to promote the adoption of anti-money laundering measures by countries in the region as well as globally, through the Financial Action Task Force and the Asia-Pacific Group on Money Laundering.

10. Environment

Given that Australia and Japan have similar interests and concerns in international environment issues, the two Governments will exchange perspectives and cooperate:

- on approaches to greenhouse gas emissions, including activities implemented jointly and other cooperative activities in the run-up to the third Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1997;
- on the outcomes of the UN General Assembly Special Session on Sustainable Development (UNGASS), and the discussions of the first meeting of the High-Level Committee of Ministers and Officials on the UN Environment Program (UNEP);
- on biological diversity matters, including biosafety protocol negotiations, and the development of clearing house mechanisms;
- on protection of coral reefs in South-East Asia and the Pacific under the International Coral Reef Initiative (ICRI), particularly through promoting implementation of the ICRI regional strategies developed for these regions;
- on approaches to the development of Pollutant Release and Transfer Registers (PRTRs);
- on regional implementation of the Global Program of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-Based Activities;
- on the implementation of the Asia-Pacific Migratory Waterbird Conservation Strategy 1996-2000, with particular respect to the East Asian-Australasian Shorebird Reserve Network;
- on the Geostationary Meteorological Satellite-5 System project and generally in the area of geostationary satellites carrying out meteorological observations;
- on the Global Research Network System (GRNS) project to develop indicators of global change and create a human information network to improve global environment management;
- on the development of the Asia-Pacific Network for Global Change Research;
- by working together, in cooperation with other countries and the United Nations under the Global Mapping program, to promote the development of world-wide geographic data sets in support of natural disaster mitigation and global environmental and resource management; and

- by promoting environmental education in the Asia-Pacific Region through the Asia-Pacific Symposium on Environmental Education and other actions on environmental education in this region.

11. Aid Cooperation

(a) Bilateral Cooperation

Recognising the commonality of their aid programs focused on the Asia-Pacific region, and taking account of complementary aspects of their respective aid programs, the Governments of Australia and Japan will strengthen their coordination efforts through regular High-Level Aid Policy Talks. The two Governments will consult on ongoing projects and explore opportunities to identify new joint projects.

(b) Development of the Mekong River Basin

The Governments of Australia and Japan will cooperate for the sustainable development of the Mekong River Basin. In this connection, both Governments will continue to work closely in the Forum for Comprehensive Development of Indo-China and note the useful dialogue initiated at the meeting of the Infrastructure Working Committee of the Indo-China Development Forum in September 1996 hosted by Australia and chaired by Japan.

12. Pacific Islands

As Australia and Japan share a common interest in the continuing development of the Pacific Island states, the two Governments will strengthen their dialogue on Pacific issues, including through the Post-South Pacific Forum Dialogue process, and will focus in particular on the management of natural resources; and economic and public management reforms. The two Governments will also cooperate in developing a strong private sector in the Pacific Island countries involving, inter alia, effective cooperation between, and coordination of, activities of the Pacific Islands Centre in Tokyo and the South Pacific Trade Commission in Sydney.

13. Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM)

The Government of Japan will continue to support firmly Australia's participation in Asia- Europe Meetings.

14. Regional Strategic and Security Cooperation

The Governments of Australia and Japan are committed to building with countries in the region a sense of trust, of shared interest, and of shared responsibility for the region's future.

(a) United States' Contribution to Regional Stability

The Governments of Australia and Japan, in light of the recent re-affirmation of their respective security relationships with the United States, and in joint recognition of the vital contribution the United States makes to underpinning the security of the Asia-Pacific region, will work together to

sustain the United States' important regional role. This will be achieved through each country's alliance with the United States and by supporting the constructive participation by the United States in multilateral security dialogues.

(b) ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)

Recognising the role regional multilateral security arrangements can play in promoting peace and stability, the Governments of Australia and Japan will:

- work together to further develop the ARF, including in the area of preventive diplomacy and approaches to conflicts, and to strengthen habits of dialogue, confidence-building and transparency which contribute to a sense of shared strategic and security interest among regional countries;
- strengthen the substantive agenda of the Inter-sessional Group on Confidence-Building Measures working to achieve practical cooperative defence-related measures, particularly those contributing to increasing defence transparency and the avoidance of a regional arms race;
- ensure that, consistent with the newly-agreed membership criteria, expansion of the ARF does not detract from its focus on security in the East Asia/Pacific and that all participants are fully consulted on new ARF members;
- encourage broad participation in ARF processes by defence civilians and military personnel; and
- encourage the ARF, through its consideration of non-proliferation and disarmament issues, to contribute to global efforts in non-proliferation and disarmament.

15. Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation

The Governments of Australia and Japan will continue to work closely in support of global arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation norms, particularly in the area of weapons of mass destruction, including through annual disarmament talks and cooperation in relevant international forums, in the interests of enhanced national and regional security, and will continue their cooperation in promoting adherence to those norms in the Asia-Pacific region.

16. United Nations

(a) UN Reform

Recognising the importance of strengthening the UN and the contribution that Japan can make as a member of the Security Council in 1997-98, the two Governments will cooperate to advance the reforms of the organisation in a balanced manner.

(b) Security Council Reform

The two Governments will work together in such forums as the General Assembly Working Group towards achieving reform of the Security Council, including expansion of permanent membership. In

this connection, Australia reconfirms its strong support for Japan's permanent membership of the Security Council.

(c) Financial Reform

Noting that a solid financial base and sound and effective financial management are essential for the UN to cope with the challenges of the 21st century, the Governments of Australia and Japan will promote reforms in financial areas, together with reforms in other areas, in order to achieve in a balanced manner the reform of the UN as a whole.

(d) Development

The Governments of Australia and Japan will cooperate to promote the idea of a new development strategy based on a global partnership of all countries and to advance reform of the UN system by increasing its effectiveness, improving coordination among UN organisations and agencies so that their activities bring about tangible benefits to developing countries.

(e) Economic and Social Council of Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP)

Given ESCAP's special role in the Asia-Pacific region, the Governments of Australia and Japan will work together to avoid a division amongst ESCAP members, while promoting the implementation of a graduated approach to reforming the organisation which is sensitive to the needs of the developing countries in the region.

(f) Human Rights

Recognising that democracy, development and human rights are inter dependent and mutually reinforcing, the Governments of Australia and Japan will promote consultation on human rights issues and explore effective and efficient ways of promoting human rights internationally through UN agencies and other forums, and through support of non-governmental institutions and arrangements.

(g) UN Peacekeeping

The Governments of Australia and Japan will pursue opportunities for cooperation in UN peacekeeping. In particular, the two Governments will explore ways to draw on their experience in UN peacekeeping operations.

17. APEC Issues

The Governments of Australia and Japan, reaffirming their commitment to a number of objectives and goals including achieving the long-term goal of free and open trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region by 2010/2020 as stated at Bogor and in accordance with the Osaka Action Agenda, will work together, inter alia, in the following areas:

(a) Facilitation and Liberalisation of Trade and Investment

The Governments of Australia and Japan will cooperate:

- to continuously and substantially improve their respective Individual Action Plans (IAPs) by including measures which go beyond respective multilateral and regional commitments, taking into account the private business sector's views and requests;
- to develop joint APEC initiatives to support and reinforce the multilateral trading system under the WTO;
- to promote early voluntary sectoral liberalisation in areas which would have a positive impact on trade, investment and economic growth;
- to intensify work on enhancing the environment for investment; and
- to advance APEC's trade facilitation agenda in areas of common interest, reflecting particularly the priorities identified by ABAC and the business sector.

(b) Economic and Technical Cooperation

The Governments of Australia and Japan will cooperate to further promote economic and technical cooperation in order to achieve sustainable growth and equitable development in the Asia-Pacific region.

(c) APEC Food Task Force

The Governments of Australia and Japan will also cooperate in further discussions on the APEC Leaders' Initiative on the impact of expanding population and economic growth on food, energy and the environment (FEEEP) as our long-term agenda, in particular as co-chairs of the Task Force on Food.

(d) Transport

The Governments of Australia and Japan will expand cooperation in transport areas such as maritime initiative, the Electronic Data Interchange Project and the Road Transport Harmonisation Project.

(e) Energy

Recognising that regional energy challenges will assume greater importance over the next decade as demand in many countries in the region is expected to rise significantly, Australia and Japan will cooperate closely on promoting better understanding of regional energy issues, mobilising capital for power infrastructure growth, mitigating environmental impacts concurrently with the enhancement of economic development, and reducing costs through cooperation on energy standards.

18. Cooperation on International Trade and Economic Issues

(a) WTO

The Governments of Australia and Japan share a common commitment to the primacy of the multilateral trading system under the WTO and recognise the need to strengthen it to promote further trade liberalisation and economic growth. The two Governments will work closely in pursuing an

effective WTO work program following the Singapore Ministerial Conference, in particular a successful conclusion of WTO negotiations on financial services.

The two Governments share common interests in new WTO work on issues arising from the globalised economy such as trade and investment, trade and competition policy and transparency in government procurement, and will work together in the WTO and relevant forums to ensure that regional trading arrangements are complementary to the WTO and consistent with its rules.

The two Governments confirm their support for universal membership of the WTO and the early accession of applicants based upon commercially meaningful market access commitments while preserving the integrity of WTO rules.

The two Governments will also work together to ensure a substantive and forward-looking outcome from the 1998 WTO Ministerial Conference that further strengthens the WTO as aforum for negotiation and liberalisation of world trade within a rules-based system, particularly through the built-in agenda of reviews and further negotiations and the work programme agreed at the 1996 WTO Ministerial Conference.

(b) OECD

Recognising the valuable work undertaken in the OECD on a wide range of economic issues of critical importance to Australia and Japan, the two Governments will strengthen their cooperation in, and coordination of, approaches to the OECD. Issues of immediate concern include administrative reform and better prioritisation of work in the Organisation. Both Governments will also strive to have the OECD give more attention to economic issues in the Asia Pacific region.

(c) The Governments of Australia and Japan will continue to exchange views on issues discussed at Summits of The Eight.

JS HAMANA conducts a bilateral exercise (Trident 24-1) with the Royal Australian Navy's HMAS HOBART in the East China Sea, May 2024 (photo credit: Ministry of Defense of Japan)

About the Editor

Michael MacArthur Bosack is the Special Adviser for Government Relations at the Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies and the founder of the Parley Policy Initiative. Previously, Michael served in the U.S. Air Force as a Foreign Area Officer. His last posting in the Air Force was as the Deputy Chief of Government Relations at Headquarters, U.S. Forces, Japan. There, he was part of the team that drafted and implemented the 2015 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation. Michael was one of the founding members of the Alliance Coordination Mechanism and acted as the lead negotiator for the United States government in implementation of mutual asset protection authorities. He also served as the Headquarters' multilateral coordinator, working with United Nations Command, Australian, and South Korean partners. During his U.S. Air Force career, he deployed twice to Afghanistan and traveled to Trinidad and Tobago to support development of the nation's Search and Rescue fleet. Michael completed his doctoral studies at the International University of Japan's Graduate School of International Relations. His Ph.D. research examined Alliance Theory and Intergovernmental Negotiations. His other research areas include Crisis Management, Peace Studies, North Korean Governance and Foreign Policy, Postwar Occupation Policy, and Leadership Studies.

The Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies (YCAPS) is a non-profit organization dedicated to promoting the study of strategic, diplomatic, and legal issues affecting the Asia-Pacific Region within the U.S. military and communities hosting U.S. military forces. We enable professional growth and foster grassroots connections with world-class expertise. YCAPS organizes seminars, provides educational experiences, enables social networking, and assists those with an interest in the Asia-Pacific region at all stages of their professional careers. To learn more about YCAPS and join its activities, visit www.YCAPS.org.

What is a "Special Strategic Partnership?"

In the case of Australia and Japan, it is a unique type of relationship founded upon core values and shared interests which underpin collaboration in multiple realms—not least of which being foreign policy and security.

This volume includes the agreements, joint statements, and related documents that underwrite this important security partnership. For practitioners involved in Australia-Japan relations, it is a handy reference book. For those from other countries seeking to foster ties with Australia, Japan, or both, this book presents the blueprint for how Australia and Japan built their relationship so their approach may be replicated elsewhere. For scholars and analysts, it is a one-stop resource for documents and statements related to this increasingly important bilateral relationship..

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