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**Introductory Theory of the “Taiwan Consensus”**

**~Statistical Analysis of Taiwan's Identity 2008–2015~**

**「臺灣共識」導論**

**~以統計分析（2008-2015）探討臺灣認同議題~**

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## 摘要 Abstract in Chinese

兩岸關係在馬政府執政時期發展轉為緊密。在此期間內，中國雖然強調已軟實力來統一臺灣，但是持續強調“一個中國”原則並且認為臺灣是中國的「核心利益」。對此，包括聯合報、日本國際問題研究所、內政部移民署等機構都進行了「臺灣認同」的民意調查，結果顯示了很明確的特徵。雖然「92共識」是馬政府採取的「一個中國」的戰術性解釋，但是從統計分析來看，它未能代表多數臺灣人的國家認同。換言之，未能代表臺灣認同的「現實」。在這些民調中即相當清楚地呈現了「臺灣認同」的概念，包括「我是臺灣人」、「我最不喜歡大陸」、「兩岸關係對臺灣仍然非常重要」、「大陸是臺灣旅遊、經濟與衝突的對象」、「維持現狀是最重要的」。這些觀點統合起來便構成了「臺灣認同」，其認同是直率的、不被控制的，而且與自由、民主、資本主義、民主主義的價值觀連接的。

## Abstract

Cross-strait relations have intensified dramatically. The Mainland Government adopted a “One-China” policy and regarded Taiwan as a “core-interests,” while emphasizing the use of soft power to unite with Taiwan. In response, institutions conducted public opinion polls. It found a strong tendency in the data regarding Taiwan’s identity. Although the “1992 Consensus” was a tactical interpretation of the “One-China” focus, it failed to represent the statistical aspects of Taiwan’s identity, or the reality of the “Taiwan-consensus.” Taiwan’s consensus is evident in comments such as “I am Taiwanese,” and “The maintenance of inclusive status quo is the most important.” These attitudes finally comprise a “Taiwanese consensus” that is straight and uncontrolled, and linked with the values of freedom, liberty, capitalism, and democracy.

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## 背景（中文版）

### 兩岸關係發展的堅強性和脆弱性

2016 年 5 月 20 日，在總統就職演說中，新任總統蔡英文宣誓捍衛自由和民主的價值。談及兩岸關係，表示「將持續推動兩岸關係和平穩定發展」並且新政府會依據《中華民國憲法》以及《兩岸人民關係條例》及其他相關法律來處理兩岸事務的方針。

在 2000 年 5 月臺灣第一次發生政黨輪替之際，蔡總統曾經在陳水扁政權下擔任了行政院大陸委員會的主任委員，她作為陸委會主任推動了小三通，大幅的修正了《兩岸人民關係條例》。《兩岸人民關係條例》，其意義是站在臺灣的立場來決定領土和公民的支配關係，提供了兩岸關係在國內法律上的依據。如此一來可望加強臺灣的政府治理，然而隨著兩岸關係的發展，問題也一一浮現。就是它的脆弱性顯現了出來。

隨著小三通簽訂和兩岸關係法的訂定，兩岸之間的交流合作達到前所未有的蓬勃發展。以雙方人民的往來為例，2008 年馬英九剛上任時，只有為數約 24 萬人的赴台陸客，到 2012 年快速增加了十倍左右，達到了約 245 萬人次，到了 2014 年則是高達了 332 萬人次。（至於日本赴台游客，2012 年為 143 萬人次）在這種情況下，除了遊客以外，陸生、陸配等人的往來也在社會各個層面擴大了許多。一般而言，人民交流的增加會促進社會的多民族化多元化，也會對於政權統治力的強化有所貢獻。（UNESCO, 2009）。另一方面，移民的增加會產生外籍勞工以及陸生、陸配的權利問題甚至導致治安惡化的憂慮。特別在兩岸關係上不容忽視的是，人民往來有可能性會成為雙方政府治理上的風險。

以大陸的立場來說，中共對臺政策始終保持拉攏臺灣的方向。實際上而言，在 2012 年赴台陸客達到 250 萬，與過去相比增多 10 倍的時候，中共胡錦濤政權呼籲「兩岸關係的和平發展」，基於大陸方面所認為的「一個中國」而主張臺灣是它的「核心利益」，其立場當然在習近平政權下也將持續保持。馬政府在外交政策上採用“MODUS-VIVENDI”（臨時解決辦法/權宜之計）的模式，承認「92 共識」去試圖處理“同床異夢”的兩岸關係，然而此舉提高了臺灣國安問題疑慮，使得民衆的對其支持度大大下降。經過了 2016 年的大選，蔡英文推出了與自由、民主價值有密切相關的「維持現狀」方針，並把它設為因應兩岸關係的核心理念，從而民衆將新的「臺灣認同」寄託于新政府。

在極大政局變化的背後，臺灣人民的「意識」是如何演變的？本報告以《聯合報》進行的民意調查為基礎，探討從 2008 年 5 月馬政權的上任到 2016 年 5 月蔡政權上任的期間，在這個兩岸關係前所未有深化的過程中，「臺灣認同」是如何演變的，並且筆者希望提出一些拙見對於兩岸關係的發展中所存在的加強臺灣治理的政策和使弱化臺灣治理的政策之間的差異。

## **1. Background: Development of Cross-Strait Relations and its Strengths and Weaknesses**

On May 20, 2016, the new president of the Republic of China, Tsai Ying-wen (蔡英文), gave a speech at her inauguration in which she promised the development of freedom and democracy, and said, “Cross-strait relations have become an integral part of building regional peace and collective security.... We will work to maintain peace and stability in cross-strait relations.” She also explained that the new government would conduct cross-strait affairs in accordance with the Republic of China’s Constitution, and the Act Governing Relations Between the People of Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area. In May 2000, the first regime change in Taiwan’s history occurred when Tsai was appointed chairperson of the Mainland Affairs Council. From this position, she implemented the “Mini-Three-Links” approach, thereby facilitating rudimentary postal, transportation, and trade links, and made a significant revision to the “Act Governing Relations Between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area” (the Cross-Strait Relations Act), which establishes the rule of territory and its people from Taiwan’s standpoint, and provides legal grounds for Taiwan’s relations with Mainland China. Therefore, these Acts contribute to strengthening the governance of Taiwan, as well as its cross-strait relations. However, as these cross-strait relations developed, the Acts’ weaknesses started to become apparent.

With the Mini-Three-Links approach and the Cross-Strait Relations Act, traffic between Taiwan and Mainland China expanded so greatly that relations between the two became very interactive. About 240 thousand tourists from Mainland China visited Taiwan in 2008, when the Ma Ying-jeou administration took office. This number increased 10 times to 2,450 thousand by 2012. It then increased to 3,330 thousand in 2014. These numbers included not only tourists, but also students and spouses (mostly wives), who travelled to Taiwan from the Mainland. The Acts led to an increase in the movement of people from many parts of society.

Generally, the increasing number of travelers to and from Taiwan has helped create a multiethnic and pluralistic society (UNESCO, 2009). On the other hand, increases in immigration may well arouse concerns over matters related to foreign workers, students, and spouses' rights, while maintaining security. In particular, when it comes to cross-strait affairs, the comings and goings of people can exacerbate high profile risk factors, because of the significant differences between the governing styles on either side of the strait. For the Mainland, the Communist Party of China (CPC) always tends to strengthen political measures that aim to lay the groundwork for absorbing Taiwan, which they refer to as a "core interest."

When the number of tourists from the Mainland to Taiwan increased tenfold to 2,450 thousand in 2012, the Hu Jintao administration held a forum titled “the peaceful development of the cross-strait relations,” and acknowledged that “One-China” was a “core interest.” This understanding was transmitted to the next Xi Jinping regime. On the other hand, Taiwan’s Ma Ying-jeou administration adopted the “1992 Consensus,” a kind of “modus-Vivendi,” that would allow both sides to co-exist and prosper without reaching any conclusion. However, this consensus raised concerns among the people of Taiwan with regard to the security of Taiwan’s governance. In the 2016 election, the people of Taiwan entrusted Taiwan’s oneness, or “Taiwan’s Identity,” to Tsai Ying-wen, who pledged to maintain the “status quo,” which may constitute a fresh “Taiwan Consensus” that would allow both sides to co-exist and prosper, based on the values of freedom and democracy.

In this paper, I will examine how Taiwan’s Identity evolved under this regime change, using statistics that summarize public opinions solicited by “The United Daily News (聯合報)” (UDN), one of the major newspapers in Taiwan. The UDN is regarded as moderate in terms of political thought (Ogasawara, 2011). In particular, statistics from 2008 (the year in which the Ma administration assumed office in May) to 2016 (the year


in which the Tsai administration assumed office in May) will be examined, to learn how Taiwan's Identity changed during the period of time when cross-strait relations influenced a historical development in the number of visitors. Finally, I would like to offer my opinions on policy differences that may raise concerns about Taiwan's governance, while strengthening the oneness of Taiwan and developing cross-strait relations.

## **2. Changes in Cross-Strait Relations after the Ma Administration Setout in 2008**

### **(a) Great Changes (in the Number of Visitors From Japan)**

In May 2008, six months before the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers, Ma Ying-jeou came into office. It is said that the Ma administration significantly changed cross-strait relations. It is easier to see how big these changes were if changes in the numbers of short-term visitors from the Mainland to Taiwan are compared to those of Japanese tourists to Taiwan. Generally, Japanese tourists to Taiwan increased greatly from 1996 to 2015, as shown below (see Figure 1).



**Figure 1: Changes in the Number of Tourists From Japan to Taiwan**


(Source: Data from the National Tourist Bureau of Japan, January, 2016)

Statistics show that at the time the Ma administration took office in 2008, about 240 thousand people traveled from the Mainland to Taiwan. In that same year, Japanese tourists to Taiwan exceeded one million. This figure was five times larger than the total number of visitors from the Mainland. The largest number of visitors from one country to Taiwan came from Japan. This number decreased slightly in 2009, a year after the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers, but it never dropped below one million. The number of visitors from Japan recovered to their 2008 level in 2010, and increased to 1.3 million (+19.8%) in 2011, 1.4 million (+10.6%) in 2012, and then 1.6 million (+15%) in 2014. Therefore, it can be pointed out that the number of Japanese tourists traveling to Taiwan was trending upward.

### (b) Even Greater Changes (in the Number of Visitors From the Mainland)

The change in the number of short-term visitors from the Mainland to Taiwan was even greater. Figure 2 below depicts changes in cross-strait affairs based on the number of short-term visitors from the Mainland to Taiwan, from the time the Ma administration took office in 2008, to the time Tsai assumed office in 2016. In 2008, this number was only 20% of the visitors from Japan. However, under the “Mini-Three-Links” policy and amendments made to the Act on Cross-Strait Relations, it rose to 2.45 million in 2012, which was 10 times larger than the number in 2008, and almost twice as large as the number of visitors from Japan in the same year, 2012. In 2015, this number rose to 3.33 million, the largest number in the history of cross-strait relations.

**Figure 2: Changes in the Number of Tourists from the Mainland District**



(Source: Data from Taiwan National Immigration Agency, December, 2014)

Ogasawara (2015) asserts that what symbolizes the significant changes in cross-strait relations after the commencement of the Ma Ying-jeou regime was a rapid increase in the number of tourists from the Mainland, and the offering of direct flights between Taiwan and Mainland China. As soon as direct flights entered service in 2008, the number of flights increased rapidly. In 2013, there were 680 passenger flights and 68 cargo flights across the strait every week. Following talks between the two Governments, these numbers increased to 840 weekly passenger flights and 84 weekly cargo flights (Ogasawara, 2015). Thus, it can be said that traffic between Taiwan and Mainland China had scaled-up to a large extent in various fields during the previous eight years, and crossing the Taiwan Strait is today a very common, everyday practice.

### **3. Political Change (in Cross-Strait Relations)**

#### **(a) Political Maneuvers on the Mainland Side**

In Mainland China, the Hu Jintao administration adopted a “Scientific Outlook on Development” perspective that emphasized the continuation of high economic growth as the party’s main policy. At the 6<sup>th</sup> Plenary Session of the 16<sup>th</sup> Central Committee in 2006, he also insisted that the succession and advance of reforms and open-door policies should realize the “harmonious society.” The hybrid of authoritarian control and a market economy not only strengthened the GDP, but also created dilemmas such as

widening disparities and increasing corruption. To overcome these dilemmas and stabilize the society, the Communist Party of China (CPC) resolved to strengthen one-party rule, and realize further economic growth based on the concept of a “harmonious society.”

Policies promoted by Fu Jingtao emphasized the development of soft power. Since “cultural structural reform” had been addressed at the 16<sup>th</sup> Party Congress in 2002, the pursuit of hegemony as part of the development of soft power was observed on many occasions such as the following: when the “harmonious society” was hoisted in 2006; when the “four-in-one reform” was introduced at the 17<sup>th</sup> Party Congress in 2007; when “inclusive growth” was appealed at the 5<sup>th</sup> Plenary Session of the 17<sup>th</sup> Central Committee in 2010; and when the expression of “China’s special social democracy” appeared at the 6<sup>th</sup> Plenary Session of the 17<sup>th</sup> Central Committee in 2011.

Since Deng Xiaoping’s reforms and opening-up policies, there is no evidence of democratization or the liberalization initialized by the CPC, however, by introducing a market economy, Mainland China autonomously adopted pluralism and detente into its society. Therefore, as far as the above CPC policies are concerned, the explanation is

that during the previous decades, Mainland China had, little by little, been creating “space” to accommodate the democratic systems and liberties that are appreciated and valued by Taiwan and Japan today (Endo, 2013). Under these circumstances, the Fujian administration promoted the “peaceful development of cross-strait relations,” regarded the political landscape as “One-China” with “core interests,” and used soft power to draw Taiwan into its politics, economics, and culture (Nakagawa, 2012).

Ogasawara (2015) wrote that, “For six years after the inauguration of Ma Ying-jeou, the PRC had a chance to pave the way to unite Taiwan.” Unlike the time of Jiang Zemin, they were no longer criticizing each other and banning tourism; numerous direct flights were available; and they had concluded a trade agreement. This agreement was called the “Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement,” or ECFA. It is called the “China-Taiwan FTA” in Japan. While negotiating the ECFA, the prime minister of PRC, Wen Jiabao, directed that a concession be made to Taiwan in a preferential manner, in order to realize the Agreement. The application of soft power by the Mainland was also evident when it was buying Taiwan’s agricultural products and cultured fish in the electoral turfs of Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party in order to take advantage of them (Ogasawara, 2015). Moreover, the PRC admitted Taiwan to the World Health

Organization (WHO) as an observer, to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) as a guest (and kicked out in 2016), and at the 2008 Summer Olympic Games used the Chinese translation of “Chinese Taipei” in a preferential manner, when referring to Taiwan. In this way, the PRC was striving to increase its soft influence over Taiwan, for the purpose of realizing the unification of China.

#### **(b) Countermeasures by Taiwan**

The growth of the PRC’s economic power, as well as population pressures that resulted from the liberalization of travel rights, were influencing neighboring regions that included Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan (not to mention the other three corners of the Mainland: Tibet, Uygur, and Inner Mongolia). To regain a competitive edge in the Taiwan District and the Mainland, Ma Ying-jeou’s administration proposed an interpretation of “One-China” known as the “92 Consensus.” However, this political strategy had three side effects:

1. It was rather regarded as a political tactic (Ogasawara, 2012): A “Modus-Vivendi (權宜之計)” that was in response to, or in accordance with political practices in Mainland China (such as “one-party rule,” “core-interests,” and “One-China”), where authoritarian control outranks public opinion.

2. Therefore, it was not based on the statistically-documented opinions of the people of Taiwan, which may be referred to as the “Taiwan Identity”; and
3. It instigated a concern with regard to constitutional government under the doctrine of vagueness (Shyi, 2014), and so, Ma Ying-jeou lost ground as the representative and trustee of the Taiwan Identity.

Consequently, despite the Mainland’s concessions and efforts to conclude the ECFA and the “Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement” based on the ECFA, the cross-strait affairs did not satisfy the Mainland’s needs. “The Sunflower Student Movement,” which protested the passing of those Agreements, broke out in Taiwan in 2014. Interactions with the Mainland had progressed too quickly, and the prevailing ignorance and vague understandings of the Taiwan Identity precipitated this movement, and the subsequent explosion of energy that expressed the Taiwanese people’s frustration (Shyi, 2014). In the aftermath of the Sunflower Movement, negotiations that began in March 2011, and the Agreements signed on June 21, 2013, have never been enacted.

As viewed above, taking into consideration the people of Taiwan’s perceptions of Mainland China, developing a unified economy that encompasses both sides of the strait

and uniting the identities of the two are two different things. On the one hand, the “social democracy” posted at the 6<sup>th</sup> Plenary Session of the 17<sup>th</sup> Central Committee in 2011 points to the pluralistic society under the CPC’s autocracy to achieve further economic growth (Endo, 2012). In this regard, uniting Taiwan is intended only to permit sole governance by the CPC, and satisfy the “core interests” of the “One-China policy.” On the other hand, Taiwan places great importance on the values of freedom and liberty, changing regimes through democratic elections, and the judicial principle of clarity. Amid the drastic changes occurring in cross-strait relations, the Ma administration faced the dilemma of “co-prosperity” and “self-reliance” (Ogasawara, 2015). This represented the gap between working together with Mainland China for “money,” and having Taiwan stand on its own feet for “values” that the people of Taiwan had to accept in order to live with their “identity.”

#### **4. Public Opinion Polls Relating to the “Taiwan Identity”**

The questions that then arise are, what represents a Taiwanese’ consensus, and what is Taiwan’s identity? In the following pages, changes in the Taiwanese’ recognition of Mainland China from 2010 to 2015 are analyzed to explore the “Taiwan Identity.” Then, a possible data source for a future “Taiwan Consensus” is examined.




**(a) Statistical Relations Between the “Taiwan Identity” and “One-China”**

The United Daily News investigated public opinions in September 2014, and reported that 12% of those surveyed supported a united China, and 34% placed a greater value on Taiwan’s self-direction (see Figure 3). The latter offered opinions such as the following:

“Taiwan should become independent immediately,” and “Taiwan should become independent sometime in the future.” Opinions regarding maintenance of the status quo are of three kinds: “to maintain the status quo for the present and then become independent,” “to maintain the status quo forever,” and “to maintain the status quo for the present but unite later.” Combined, the three types of status quo can be described as the “greater status-quo” or the “inclusive status quo,” shown as ( $\longleftrightarrow$ ) in Figure 3.


Those that accounted for the majority’s opinion were 75% of the total in 2010, 77% in 2011, 71% in 2012, 70% in 2013, and 70% in 2014 (see Figure 3).

**Figure 3: “Taiwan Identity” and “One-China”**

(Data from the Public Opinion Investigation Released by the UDN, 2014;  
Assembled by KFF.)

### (b) The Question of “Who am I?”

A United Daily News article dated March 14, 2016 pointed out that 70% of the people in Taiwan answered the question “Who am I?” by saying, “I am Taiwanese.” This represents the largest percentage of people to give this response in 20 years, since the poll was first conducted (See Figure 4).

**Figure 4. Answering the question of who I am**

Source Based on United Daily News (聯合報), March 14, 2016

The National Cheng-chi University's 2014 annual poll querying the identity of the people of Taiwan asked the question, "Who are you?" The response rate for "I am Taiwanese" was 60.6%, for "I am Chinese" it was 3.5%, and for "I am both Taiwanese and Chinese" it was 32.5% (with the effective response rate being 96.6%). Ogasawara (2015) in his research explained that, "the rate of people who think of themselves as 'Taiwanese' increased during the age of Lee Teng-hui (李登輝), but strangely or not, it increased even more in Ma Ying-jeou's time in office." Whether "I am Taiwanese" becomes the "Taiwanese consensus" or not remains undecided, but at least they have indicated a strong direction.

**(c) “Who am I not?”**

The first official statement by the CPC that it regards Taiwan as one of its “core-interests” was made at a meeting between the US state secretary Collin Powell and the PRC foreign minister Tang Jiaxuan (唐家璇), on January 19, 2003 (Takagi, 2013). Thereafter, the notion of “core-interests” has been expanded to include Tibet, Xinjiang-Uyghur, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands (尖閣/釣魚台), and the South-China Sea. The term “core-interests” is intended to emphasize the geopolitical importance of these areas, to counter the United States and its allies, and ensure that the CPC is able to secure the governance of Mainland China. Therefore, the people of Mainland China’s recognition of Taiwan satisfies the CPC, as long as its ruling power continues.

However, what about the people of Taiwan’s recognition of the Mainland? According to research reported in “Major Countries’ Recognition of China and Policy Analysis” by the Japan Institute of International Affairs, “people’s recognition of the Mainland Government in Taiwan,” and “people’s recognition of the Mainland Chinese in Taiwan,” were made clear. (The statistics cited were based on data gathered in a poll by the United Daily News on September 24, 2013, and the United Daily News Digital No. 5048 on September 15, 2014.) It has been reported that scores or ratings of the “people’s recognition of the CPC in Taiwan,” for “good”–“not good” were 33%–54% in 2010,

29%–56% in 2011, 28%–55% in 2012, 26%–58% in 2013, and 26%–57% in 2014.

Regarding “Taiwanese people’s recognition of Mainland Chinese,” the scores for “good”–“not bad” were 38%–47% in 2010, 40%–45% in 2011, 37%–48% in 2012, 36%–51% in 2013, and 36–51% in 2014 (Japan Institute of International Affairs, 2014).

Over 50% of the people of Taiwan continued to have the impression of “not good” for the Mainland Government during the past several years. However, given that this rate is not as high as that in response to the question “Who am I,” it may not be appropriate to constitute the “Taiwan Consensus” using the question of who I am not.

**(d) Then, “Who am I Against?”**

To examine the Taiwan identity from a realistic point of view, another question should be asked. The Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association, which is the Japanese Government’s contact organization, conducted an investigation into public opinion in Taiwan in January 2013. In response to the question, “Except for Taiwan, which country or region do you like the most?” 43% chose “Japan,” and 10% chose “China.” However, in response to the quest, “Which country or region should Taiwan take good care of?” 29% chose “Japan,” compared to 36% who chose Mainland China.

In 2015, in response to the former question, 59% chose “Japan,” and 7% “China,” and in response to the latter, 39% chose “Japan”, and 22% “China.” The gaps of underlined


percentages indicate the gap between “I love Mainland the most” and “Mainland is the Most Important.” Those gaps show that the people of Taiwan actually put significance on the cross-strait relations regardless of liking or disliking of Mainland as shown below (See Table 1).

**Table 1: The Impression of China**

	“Love the Most”	“the Most Important”	GAP
2012	10%	36%	26%
2015	7%	22%	15% (-11%)

Another opinion poll conducted by the Mainland Affairs Council shows that with reference to talks about cross-strait relations, the number who supported it exceeded those who did not support it (Ogasawara, 2015). These data show that the people of Taiwan actually want the development of cross-strait relations.

Interesting data explain Taiwan’s negative views on Mainland China. The United Daily News, on March 14, 2016, published a figure (See Figure 5), summarizing the results of its public opinion poll on the question, “What are the costs of declaring independence against the Mainland?”

**Figure 5. Possible Costs Associated With Broken Cross-Strait Relations****為宣布台獨願付出的代價 (Price for Independence\*)**

\*Multiple Choice Allowed (Source: Based on the Public Opinion Poll by The UDN, 2016)

More than 40% of the Taiwanese people are concerned about the declining number of tourists from the Mainland, and over 20% are worried about deteriorating foreign relations and going to war against Mainland China. Sixteen percent of the respondents pointed out the damage done by the “Economic Blockade,” and said similar damages would obviously be an outcome of a blockade of the cross-strait between Taiwan and Mainland China. Possible damages are mainly political or economic. The people of Taiwan are clearly aware of who would inflict these damages. It can be assumed that an awareness of who we are against in the event of failure, in turn, strengthens the consciousness of who we are.

### 5. Taiwan Consensus Directed by a Statistical Taiwan Identity

If a majority of those who respond (say over 50%) to the “Taiwan-identity” question examined in 4 should finally constitute the “Taiwan Consensus,” then features of this

consensus can be assumed as being the following:

1. As in 4(a), statistics indicate that the majority prefers to maintain the status quo.

To be correct, maintaining the “status quo forever” or “the inclusive status quo” can represent a consensus, but not “the status quo for the present before independence,” nor “the status quo before unity.” On the contrary, respondents supporting the concept of unity or “One-China” cannot form a majority. Thus, the “1992 Consensus,” a tactical interpretation of the “One-China” that came to be the focus since Ma Ying-jeou’s regime, falls short of Taiwan’s statistical consensus.

2. As in 4(b), “I am Taiwanese” was the main response to the question of who I am.

Not only did over 70% respond in this way, but also subsequent polls show this attitude is becoming more prevalent. “I am Taiwanese” can be regarded as representing a strong consensus of the people of Taiwan. In contrast, other choices, such as “I am Chinese” and “I am both Taiwanese and Chinese” were selected much less often, and this trend is continuing. Although the opinion that “Taiwanese is the proper Chinese” is an important support factor for interpreting the “1992 Consensus,” this choice was selected infrequently, and does not seem to withstand a reality check.



3. Over 50% of the people of Taiwan recognized the Mainland Government as “not good” throughout the data collection period beginning in 2010. This may constitute a regular consensus. It was only in 2013, however, when their recognition of “not good” for the Mainland people passed 50%. This slightly formed consensus may be called the majority’s response to “Who are we not?”, but requires further verification. Ten (2012) or seven (2015) percent of the people of Taiwan love the PRC the most, but 36% (2012) or 22% (2015) of them understand that the most important country for Taiwan is the PRC. The gap between these rates may reveal Taiwan’s realistic view of cross-strait relations, but neither rate is big enough to form a consensus.
4. The people of Taiwan clearly realize that if cross-strait relations were terminated, the resulting damages would be precipitated and implemented by Mainland China. As Samuel P. Huntington, an American political scientist, said in his article, “The Clash of Civilizations” (1993; 1996), “We know who we are only when we know who we are not and often only when we know whom we are against.” It can be assumed that the awareness of “Who would we be against?” strengthens the consciousness of who we are. The statistics showed, however, that the majority would accept any option that provided compensation for declaring independence.

Such is the consensus of Taiwan based on its statistical identity. It is assumed that this ultimately constitutes the “Taiwan Consensus” that may take a stand against the “1992 Consensus.”

## **6. Conclusions**

Cross-strait relations have intensified dramatically since the Ma administration. The Mainland Government also adopted a “One-China” policy that was so strong that Taiwan was regarded as one of the country’s “core-interests,” while emphasizing the use of soft power to unite with Taiwan. In response, institutions such as the United Daily News, the Japan Institute of International Affairs, and the National Immigration Agency of Taiwan conducted public opinion polls. It found a strong tendency in the data regarding Taiwan’s identity. Although the “1992 Consensus” was a tactical interpretation of the “One-China” focus that had been in place since Ma Ying-jeou’s time, it failed to represent the statistical aspects of Taiwan’s identity, or, in other words, the reality of the “Taiwan-consensus.” Taiwan’s consensus is evident in comments such as the following: “I am Taiwanese.” “I do not favor the Mainland most.” “Still, the cross-strait relations are the greatest interests for Taiwan.” “Mainland China is the counterpart of Taiwan’s tourism, economy and conflicts.” “The maintenance of

inclusive status quo is the most important.” Together, these attitudes finally comprise a “Taiwanese consensus” that is straight and uncontrolled, and linked with the values of freedom, liberty, capitalism, and democracy.

END

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